1. Loucks v.

Stadard Oil
Facts:
-Everett Loucks was a resident of NY
-he had a wife and kids, who were also residents of NY
-while travelling on a highway in Massachusetts, he was run down and killed
through the negligence of defendant Standard Oil Co.'s employee then engaged in
its business.
-Massachusetts law allow recovery, so does NY law though not in the same terms
Massachusetts

NY

If a person or corporationby negligence of its agents or

servants while engaged in its businesscauses the death of
a person who is in the exercise of due careit shall be liable
in damages in the sum of not less than $400, nor more than
$10,000...

Gives a civil
remedy where
death is caused in
NY

+ Constitution, Art 1, 18: there shall be some atonement for the wrong - civil
remedy where death is caused
-Administrators of Loucks' estate filed action before NY courts
ISSUE: WON Loucks' estate may recover in NY courts on the basis of Mass. Law?
HELD: YES
The heirs have a vested right: though the source of the obligation invoked is a
foreign statute which is not the law in NY, the said statute gives rise to an obligation
which follows the person and may be enforced wherever the person may be found.
On lack of similar legislation in NY: even if NY has no legislation on the subject, or
not similar law, it is not enough to show that public policy forbids NY court to
enforce the foreign right
-right of action is property: the mere fact that NY does not give a like right is NO
REASON FOR REFUSING TO HELP THE PLAINTIFF IN GETTING WHAT BELONGS TO
HIM.
-presence/similarity of legislation (in/w/ forum) shows that the foreign statute does
not offend public policy of the forum; BUT ABSENCE does not prove that it is against
public policy

On discretion of the sovereign to aid to the foreign right: wrong!

-not free to refuse to enforce a foreign right at the pleasure of judges
-TEST: not close doors, unless help would violate some fundamental principle of
justice, some prevalent conception fo good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of
common weal.
Test applied: no violation of public policy
Thus, court would help them!
-even if NY cannot give the plaintiffs the same judgment (if it was brought before
Mass. Courts - probably NY law gives something lower) but it is not reason for
refusing to give the plaintiffs what NY courts can give.
-no need to compel plaintiffs to bring action to another state where defendant may
not be found, where suit may be impossible
Sui generis about death statutes (there's civil remedy for another's death): before it
was not that acceptable but is not becoming more acceptable in almost all states,
tendency toward a larger comity
Fundamental public policy of vested rights: rights lawfully vested shall be
everywhere maintained and only exceptional circumstances should lead to the
refusal of enforcement
-it would be unreasonable to apply lex loci delicti comissi uniformly independent of
fairness to the parties, thus frustrating the ends of justice

2. Saudi Arabian Airlines v CA

FACTS:
- Milagros Morada is a flight atttendant for Saudi Arabian Airlines (SAUDIA)
-While in Jakarta, she went to disco w/ fellow attendants Thamer and Allah (both
Saudi nationals)
-She agreed to have breakfast at Thamer's room where Thamer attempted to rape
her after Allah excused himself. Rape was not consumated when hotel staff heard
Morada's cries. Thamer and Allah were both arrested
-Saudi government made the Indonesian authorities deport the 2 Saudi nationals
only after 2 weeks of detention

She was transferred to Manila

-during one of her trips to Jeddah (1992), she was brought to the police who took
her passport and questioned her about the Jakarta incident. Her passport was
returned only after she agreed to drop the case against the 2 Saudi nationals
-In 1993, before she was to return to Manila, a SAUDIA officer brought her to Saudi
Court to sign an Arabic document, then later interrogated through an interpreter
all these with the assurance ofSAUDIA that it was merely routine procedure
necessary to drop the charges against 2 nationals. INSTEAD, SHE WAS SENTENCED
TO 5 MONTHS IMPRISONMENT AND 286 LASHES FOR ADULTERY, GOING TO DISCO
AND LISTENING TO MUSIC AND SOCIALIZING W/ MALE CREW, ALL IN VIOLAITONOF
ISLAMIC LAW (wtf?)
-RP embassy assisted Morada, eventually Saudi authorities admitted that she had
been wrongly convicted
-SAUDIA terminated her contract before she was allowed to return to Manila
-Morada filed COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES vs. SAUDIA
Issue: WON Morada has a COA?
Held: Yes. Though Art 19 merely declares a principle of law, Art 21 gives flesh to its
provisions
WON RP Courts could exercise jurisdiction? YES
Allowed under Section 1 of RA 7691 (expanded jurisdiction of MTC)
Pragmatic considerations: Unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant,
the plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed
-if dismiss, plaintiff would be compelled to bring her action in Saudi Arabia where
she no longer have any substantial connections, thus causing her fundamental
unfairness
-no inconvenience and difficulty shown by SAUDIA
-SAUDIA has filed several MTDs on other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction of
the court, thus, asked affirmative relief from the court
WON RP Law is the choice of law applicable? YES
2 important questions sought to be answered by choice-of-law problems:
What legal system should control a given situation where some of the significant
facts occurred in two or more states

To what extent should the chosen legal system regulate the situation
Characterization/doctrine of qualification: process of deciding WON the facts relate
to the kind question specified in a conflicts rule
-purpose: enable the forum to select the proper law
HERE: CHARACTERIZED AS A TORT
In tort, the "connecting factor" or "point of contact" could be the place or places
where the tortiuos conduct or lex loci actus occurred
HERE: RP is the place of tort
-Morada was already working in Manila but SAUDIA brought her to Jeddah on the
pretense that she would merely testify in an investigation of the charges she made
against the 2 SAUDIA crew members for the attack on her person while they were in
Jakarta BUT INSTEAD, she was the one made to face trial for very serious charges,
including adultery and violation of Islamic laws and tradition
-SO IT IS IN MANILA where SAUDIA deceived Morada
-Morada honestly believed that petitioner would, in the exercise of its rights and in
the performance of its duties, "act with justice, give her her due and obeserve
honesty and good faith", but SAUDIA failed to protect her
-That certain acts or parts of the injury allegedly occurred in another country is of no
moment. For in our view, what is important here is the place where the over-all
harm or the totality of the alleged injury to the person, reputation, social standing
and human rights of complainant, had lodgedaccording to the private respondent.
All told, it is not without basis to identify the Phil. as the situs of the alleged tort.
applied MOST SIGNIFICANT RELATIONSHIP rule
-what are the contacts to be taken into account and evaluated according to their
relative importance w/ respect to the particular issue
Place where the injury occurred
Place where the conduct causing injury occurred
The domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation, and place of business of
parties
Place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered
-as applied in the case:
Place of injury is RP

Plaintiff is resident, national of RP

Respondent is a resident foreign corporation engaged in the business of
international air carriage engaged in RP
Relationship between the parties were entered in RP
RP TORTS LAW have paramount application
-Plaintiff has no obligation to prove the applicable SAUDI ARABIAN LAW because her
COA was Art 19 and 21 of NCC - it was SAUDIA who was invoking the applicability of
Saudi Arabian law so it has the burden to plead and establish it

3. Hilao v Estate of Ferdinand Marcos

FACTS:
Ferdinand Marcos and his family fled to Hawaii in 1986. Almost immediately,
several lawsuits were filed on behalf of individuals who had been arrested, tortured,
executed, or dis-appeared during Marcos' 15-year tenure as President of the
Philippines. Hilao v. Estate of Marcos (In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human
Rights Litig.) (Estate II), 25 F.3d 1467, 1469 (9th Cir.1994). The Judicial Panel on
Multi-District Litigation consolidated all those cases in the District of Hawaii; the
consolidated case was later certified as a class action. Id. Ferdinand Marcos died
three years after the litigation commenced. In February 1995, the district court
entered a final judgment in the class action, approving jury awards of $1.2 billion in
exemplary damages and $766 million in compensatory damages against the Marcos
Estate. Hilao v. Estate of Ferdinand Marcos (Hilao II), 103 F.3d 767, 772 (9th
Cir.1996). We affirmed that judgment. Id. at 787.
Collecting that judgment proved exceedingly difficult for the Hilao plaintiff class
(who are Plaintiffs in this case) because of two developments. First, to settle a
separate suit by the Republic against the Marcos Estate, the Estate agreed to
transfer to the Republic the bulk of the portion of the Estate's assets that had been
impounded by United States customs officials in Hawaii. Hilao v. Estate of Marcos
(In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litig.) (Estate III), 94 F.3d 539, 542
(9th Cir.1996). Although the district court tried to enjoin the Republic from
participating in that transfer, we vacated the injunction to the extent that it
purported to enjoin the Republic directly, on the ground of foreign sovereign
immunity. Id. at 548.
Second, in August 1995 the Republic asked Switzerland's federal government to
transfer frozen Estate assets, which were held in Swiss banks, to a Philippine
National Bank (PNB) escrow account. The request was somewhat unusual in that

the Republic sought an early transfer of assets before a final Philippine-court

adjudication of the ownership of those assets. But the Swiss Federal Supreme
Court confirmed orders approving the Republic's request in December 1997.
Those two developments brought the bulk of the Estate's assets under the
Republic's control. Yet Plaintiffs were owed almost $2 billion. As a result of this
dilemma, Plaintiffs and the Estate entered into an Agreement and Compromise in
December 1998 under which the Estate would pay Plaintiffs $150 million to satisfy
all claims. To fund the settlement, it was agreed that [a]ll parties shall make
efforts to obtain all necessary consents to trigger release and transfer of the
US$150 million from the [PNB] Escrow of the Settlement Fund and shall execute all
documents necessary to accomplish the release and transfer.
The Republic did not sign, and was not a party to, the settlement agreement.
Nonetheless, the chairman of the Philippine Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG),1 Magdangal Elma, signed a February 1999 Undertaking
under which the PCGG would seek to transfer $150 million from the PNB escrow
account to the settlement fund. The Undertaking conditioned that transfer on the
approval of the Sandiganbayan2 and other competent court, and the President of
the Republic of the Philippines. On April 29, 1999, the district court granted final
approval of the settlement agreement between the Estate and Plaintiffs.
In a July 27, 1999, decision, the Sandiganbayan rejected the PCGG's request to
transfer $150 million to the settlement fund because, among other reasons, the
Sandiganbayan concluded that the settlement was not in Plaintiffs' best interests.
That decision left no viable source of funding for the settlement agreement. In
light of the parties' failure to acquire settlement funds, the district court terminated
the settlement agreement in January 2001.
B.The District Court's Past Efforts to Preserve Estate Assets in Connection with the
Hilao Litigation
Both before and after the parties' attempt to settle the Hilao litigation, the district
court took a number of measures to secure funding for the sizable judgment against
the Estate. Plaintiffs first moved for a preliminary injunction in November 1991 to
prevent the Estate from transferring or secreting any of its assets. We upheld that
injunction against a challenge from the Estate. Estate II, 25 F.3d at 1480. When
the Estate later settled its dispute with the Republic by agreeing to transfer certain
assets to the Republic, the district court modified the injunction to bring the
Republic within its scope. We agreed with the Republic that, under the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976,3 it was immune from the district court's
jurisdiction. So, as noted above, we vacated the injunction insofar as it purported
to enjoin the Republic. Estate III, 94 F.3d at 548.
The district court next ordered several Swiss banks to deposit into the court registry
as an interpleader proceeding all [Estate] assets in the possession of the BANKS

that are the subject matter of this proceeding. Hilao v. Estate of Marcos (Hilao I),
95 F.3d 848, 851 (9th Cir.1996). We vacated that order, holding that neither
California law nor[Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 69(a) gave the district court the
authority to order the Banks to deposit the contested funds into the court registry.
Id. at 856.
Undeterred, the district court next entered an identical order, sua sponte, against
the Swiss banks in connection with an action that Plaintiffs' lawyer had filed against
those banks in Rosales v. Credit Suisse & Swiss Bank Corp., No. CV 96-6419
(C.D.Cal.). The Swiss banks petitioned for a writ of mandamus. We granted the
writ in Credit Suisse v. United States District Court, 130 F.3d 1342 (9th Cir.1997).
There, we concluded that the act-of-state doctrine prohibited the district court's
order in view of the paradigmatically sovereign executive orders issued by the
Swiss Federal Council, freezing all Estate assets held in Switzerland. Id. at 1347.
Consequently, we directed the district court to refrain from taking any further
action in the Rosales action or any other case involving any or all of the Real Parties
in Interest4 and any assets of the Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos held or claimed to
be held by the Banks. Id. at 1348. But we retained jurisdiction and later clarified
that the district court could continue to perform its Rule 23 and/or settlement
duties in [the Hilao action] so long as such duties do not involve an attempt to reach
Marcos assets held or claimed to be held by the banks,5 and as long as such duties
do not involve taking any further action in the Rosales action. Credit Suisse v.
United States Dist. Court, 130 F.3d 1342 (9th Cir.1997) (unpublished order).
C.The Memorandum and Order and Order Directing Compliance
While Plaintiffs were attempting to secure Estate assets to fund the judgment that
they had obtained, or at least the settlement, in the Hilao litigation, the Republic
was pursuing forfeiture proceedings in Philippine courts against the Estate's assets.
In July 2003, those proceedings ended in a lengthy Philippine Supreme Court
judgment, which concluded that the Estate's assets were ill-gotten wealth stolen
from the Republic. The Philippine Supreme Court thus granted summary judgment
in favor of the Republic and ordered the assets in the PNB escrow account forfeited
to the Republic.
On September 2, 2003, upon learning of the Philippine Supreme Court's decision
and the impending transfer of the Estate's assets, the district court entered sua
sponte the Memorandum and Order and Order Directing Compliance that are at
the center of this case. The first order discusses perceived deficiencies in the
Philippine Supreme Court decision, as well as the Republic's involvement in the
Hilao litigation and settlement proceedings. Its operative text, however, merely
reinstates the 1999 settlement agreement between Plaintiffs and the Estate and
directs Plaintiffs' lawyer to serve notice of the order, and the accompanying Order
Directing Compliance, on all depository institutions in Singapore6 and Switzerland,

past and present, and counsel for the Republic in the related proceeding pending in
this Court, as well as the Swiss government.
The Order Directing Compliance notes the worldwide scope of the injunction
against the dissipation of the Estate's assets7 and concludes that the injunction
would be violated by any transfer of the Estate's assets now held in the PNB escrow
account. The operative text states:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any such transfer, without first appearing and showing
cause in this Court as to how such transfer might occur without violating the Court's
injunction shall be considered contempt of the Court's earlier order. Any and all
persons and banking institutions participating in such transfers, including but not
limited to the Swiss banks, which were the original depository institutions and the
depository institutions where the money is currently invested, are hereby notified
that such transfer would be considered in contempt of this Court's injunction
The Order Directing Compliance was not entirely successful in preventing the
transfer of assets from the PNB escrow account. The Singapore branch of the
German bank West Landesbank, which holds $22 million under the PNB escrow
agreement, filed an interpleader in Singapore, rather than transferring that sum to
the Republic. PNB, however, transferred the escrowed funds it controlled to the
Republic. Upon learning of this transfer in February 2004, the district court entered
an order requiring PNB to show cause why that transfer did not put PNB in contempt
of the injunction. PNB appealed the order to show cause, contesting the validity of
the Order Directing Compliance; that separate appeal (No. 04-71843) was
submitted to another panel of this court on June 16, 2004.
The Republic filed an appeal, challenging the Order Directing Compliance, as well as
the Memorandum and Order. It claims that the orders violate our past holdings
related to this litigation, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, and the act-of-state
doctrine. Although the Republic did not raise those issues-or even appear-before
the district court, it now asks us to vacate both orders.
STANDARD OF APPEAL
We review de novo questions of standing.
DISCUSSION
We have consistently held that[a] nonparty has standing to appeal a district court's
decision only in exceptional circumstances. We have allowed such an appeal only
when (1) the appellant, though not a party, participated in the district court
proceedings, and (2) the equities of the case weigh in favor of hearing the appeal.
S. Cal. Edison Co. v. Lynch, 307 F.3d 794, 804 (9th Cir.2002) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted). Generally, we have found that equities support
nonparty standing when a party has haled the non-party into the proceeding

against his will, and then has attempted to thwart the nonparty's right to appeal by
arguing that he lacks standing, SEC v. Wencke, 783 F.2d 829, 834 (9th Cir.1986), or
when judgment has been entered against the nonparty, Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v.
Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir.1989).
Looking to each order with that standard in mind, we conclude that the Republic
does not have standing to bring this appeal.
A.The Memorandum and Order
The Memorandum and Order is the vehicle by which the district court determined
to reinstate the settlement agreement between Plaintiffs and the Estate. The
Republic's request that we vacate that order is perplexing in view of the Republic's
insistence, in both its briefing and at oral argument, that it is in no way bound by
the agreement. In its opening brief, for example, the Republic observes that the
funding of the settlement agreement depended on the acquiescence of the
Republic. The Republic, however, never signed or was a party to the settlement
agreement. Similarly, during oral argument, the Republic's lawyer stressed that
the PCGG, although it signed the conditional Undertaking, did not in fact enter into
a settlement agreement [with Plaintiffs or the Estate].
A party (or, in this case, a nonparty) is bound by concessions made in its brief or
at oral argument. United States v. Crawford, 372 F.3d 1048, 1055 (9th Cir.2004) (en
banc), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1057, 125 S.Ct. 863, 160 L.Ed.2d 783 (U.S. Sept. 15,
2004) (No. 04-6368). In view of the Republic's concession that it is not bound by
the settlement agreement, its argument for nonparty appellate standing to
challenge that same agreement collapses.
We independently agree with that concession because the Republic is required to do
nothing under the settlement agreement. At most, the separate Undertaking
bound the PCGG to ask the Sandiganbayan to approve a transfer of $150 million
from the PNB escrow account to fund the settlement. The PCGG made that
request, but the Sandiganbayan refused it. The Republic agreed to nothing more.
The district court has taken no steps signaling an intent to bind the Republic to the
settlement agreement. In the circumstances, the Republic cannot show that it is
prejudiced by the Memorandum and Order, let alone demonstrate that exceptional
circumstances or equitable considerations justify nonparty appellate standing.
B.Order Directing Compliance
The Republic contends that the Order Directing Compliance threatens it with
contempt in the event that any funds are transferred from Swiss or Singaporean
banks to the Republic. The crucial phrase in the order states:
Any and all persons and banking institutions participating in such transfers,
including but not limited to the Swiss banks, which were the original depository

institutions and the depository institutions where the money is currently invested,
are hereby notified that such transfer would be considered in contempt of this
Court's injunction
The Republic contends that [a]ny and all persons and banking institutions
participating in such transfers, includes the Republic because the Republic
participates in the transfers by receiving the money. We read the order
differently. The qualifying phrase-including but not limited to the Swiss banks,
which were the original depository institutions and the depository institutions where
the money is currently invested-casts considerable light on the order's intended
effect. The district court clearly sought to bring within the scope of its injunction
all financial institutions and escrow agents who handled the funds once they left the
Swiss bank accounts. Our reading is consistent with the threatened sanctions
against all persons and banking institutions. (Emphasis added.) Notably absent
from that list is the term countries or nations, or any reference to the Republic.
Also, the district court's enforcement of its Order Directing Compliance is
inconsistent with the Republic's interpretation. After PNB transferred the bulk of
the escrowed funds to the Republic, the district court issued an order to show cause
against PNB. It did not, however, issue such an order against the Republic or
threaten the Republic with contempt sanctions despite its receipt of the funds. In
view of the history of this case and the strong wording of the Memorandum and
Order, we think it unlikely that the district court voluntarily would have stayed its
hand had it intended to bring the Republic within the scope of the order.
Reading the Order Directing Compliance in its proper context, the Republic's
challenge suffers from the same defect as its challenge to the Memorandum and
Order. The present case stands in marked contrast to Estate III, where we held that
the Republic had nonparty standing to appeal because
[t]he permanent injunction finds as a matter of fact that the Republic is an agent,
representative, aider or abettor of the Estate and expressly enjoins not only the
Estate but also its agents, representatives, aiders and abettors. Thus, the court
clearly expressed its view that the injunction binds the Republic.
Estate III, 94 F.3d at 544 (emphasis added). By contrast, neither the text of the
Order Directing Compliance nor the court's efforts to enforce it suggest that the
order binds, or was meant to bind, the Republic.
The Republic asserts that the Order Directing Compliance has interfered with its
efforts, pursuant to the Philippine Supreme Court judgment, to collect all funds held
in the PNB escrow account. As we have noted, one bank has elected to withhold
$22 million pending the resolution of an interpleader action in the High Court of
Singapore. That inconvenience to the Republic, however, does not rise to the level
of an exceptional circumstance justifying nonparty standing to appeal. Lynch,
307 F.3d at 804. Were we to hold otherwise, any judgment creditor whose interests

may be adversely affected by a district court's decision in wholly separate litigation,

to which the creditor is not a party, would have nonparty standing to appeal. We
decline to stretch nonparty standing to appeal that far.
CONCLUSION
The Republic is not a party to the settlement agreement that is reinstated by the
Memorandum and Order. Nor is the Republic a person or banking institution that
is threatened with contempt under the Order Directing Compliance. Accordingly,
the Republic, as a nonparty, lacks standing to challenge either order in this court.
APPEAL DISMISSED.

4. Trajano v Marcos
5. Guinto v Marcos
6. Time v Reyes
Facts: Petition for certiorari and prohibition, with preliminary injunction, to annul
certain orders of the respondent Court of First Instance of Rizal, issued in its Civil
Case No. 10403, entitled "Antonio J. Villegas and Juan Ponce Enrile vs. Time, Inc.,
and Time-Life International, Publisher of 'Time' Magazine (Asia Edition)", and to
prohibit the said court from further proceeding with the said civil case.
The petition alleges that petitioner Time, Inc., 1 is an American corporation with
principal offices at Rocketfeller Center, New York City, N. Y., and is the publisher of
"Time", a weekly news magazine; the petition, however, does not allege the
petitioner's legal capacity to sue in the courts of the Philippine. 2
In the aforesaid Civil Case No. 10403, therein plaintiffs (herein respondents) Antonio
J. Villegas and Juan Ponce Enrile seek to recover from the herein petitioner damages
upon an alleged libel arising from a publication of Time (Asia Edition) magazine, in
its issue of 18 August 1967, of an essay, entitled "Corruption in Asia",
On motion of the respondents-plaintiffs, the respondent judge, on 25 November
1967, granted them leave to take the depositions "of Mr. Anthony Gonzales, TimeLife international", and "Mr. Cesar B. Enriquez, Muller & Phipps (Manila) Ltd.", in
connection with the activities and operations in the Philippines of the
petitioner,issued a writ of attachment on the real and personal estate of Time, Inc.

Petitioner received the summons and a copy of the complaint at its offices in New
York on 13 December 1967 and, on 27 December 1967, it filed a motion to dismiss
the complaint for lack of jurisdiction and improper venue, relying upon the
provisions of Republic Act 4363. Private respondents opposed the motion.
Respondent court deferred the determination of the motion to dismiss until after
trial of the case on the merits, the court having considered that the grounds relied
upon in the motion do not appear to be indubitable.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the deferment private respondents again
opposed.
Respondent judge issued an order re-affirming the previous order of deferment for
the reason that "the rule laid down under Republic Act. No. 4363, amending Article
360 of the Revised Penal Code, is not applicable to actions against non-resident
defendants, and because questions involving harassment and inconvenience, as
well as disruption of public service do not appear indubitable. ..."
Failing in its efforts to discontinue the taking of the depositions, previously adverted
to, and to have action taken, before trial, on its motion to dismiss, petitioner filed
the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition.

Issue:
Whether or not, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 4363 the respondent Court
of First Instance of Rizal has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the civil suit for
damages arising from an allegedly libelous publication, considering that the action
was instituted by public officers whose offices were in the City of Manila at the time
of the publication; if it has no jurisdiction, whether or not its erroneous assumption
of jurisdiction may be challenged by a foreign corporation by writ of certiorari or
prohibition; and
Held:
(1) The under Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
No. 4363, actions for damages by public officials for libelous publications against
them can only be filed in the courts of first instance ofthe city or province where the
offended functionary held office at the time ofthe commission of the offense, in case
the libelous article was first printed or published outside the Philippines.
(2) That the action of a court in refusing to rule, or deferring its ruling, on a motion
to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or for improper venue, is
in excess of jurisdiction and correctable by writ of prohibition or certiorari sued out
in the appellate Court, even before trial on the merits is had.

WHEREFORE, the writs applied for are granted: the respondent Court of First
Instance of Rizal is declared without jurisdiction to take cognizance of its Civil Case
No. 10403; and its orders issued in connection therewith are hereby annulled and
set aside,. Respondent court is further commanded to desist from further
proceedings in Civil case No. 10403 aforesaid. Costs against private respondents,
Antonio J. Villegas and Juan Ponce Enrile.

7. US v Guinto
Facts:
In the 4 consolidated suits, the USA moves to dismiss the cases on the ground that
they are in effect suits against it which it has not consented
On the first suit:
On February 24, 1986, the Western Pacific Contracting Office, Okinawa Area
Exchange, US Air Force, solicited bids for barber services contracts through its
contracting officer James F. Shaw
Among those who submitted their bids were private respondents Roberto T.
Valencia, Emerenciana C. Tanglao, and Pablo C. del Pilar
Bidding was won by Ramon Dizon over the objection of the private respondents who
claimed that he had made a bid for 4 facilities, including the Civil Engineering Area
which was not included in the invitation to bid
The Philippine Area Exchange (PHAX), through its representatives petitioners
Yvonne Reeves and Frederic M. Smouse, upon the private respondents' complaint,
explained that the Civil Engineering concession had not been awarded to Dizon
But Dizon was alreayd operating this concession, then known as the NCO club
concession
On June 30, 1986, the private respondents filed a complaint in the court below to
compel PHAX and the individual petitioners to cancel the award to Dizon, to conduct
a rebidding for the barbershop concessions and to allow the private respondents by
a writ of preliminary injunction to continue operating the concessions pending
litigation
Respondent court directed the individual petitioners to maintain the status quo

On July 22, 1986, the petitioners filed a motion to dismiss and opposition to the
petition for preliminary injunction on the ground that the action was in effect a suit
against USA which had not waived its non-suability
On July 22, 1986, trial court denied the application for a writ of preliminary
injunction
On Oct. 10, 1988, trial court denied the petitioners' motion to dismiss
On the second suit:
Fabian Genove filed a complaint for damages against petitioners Anthony
Lamachia, Wilfredo Belsa, Rose Cartalla and Peter Orascion for his dismissal as cook
in the US Air Force Recreation Center at the John Hay Air Station in Baguio City
It had been ascertained that Genove had poured urine into the soup stock used in
cooking the vegetables served to the club customers
His dismissal was effected on March 5, 1986 by Col. David C. Kimball, Commander
of the 3rd Combat Support Group, PACAF Clark Air Force Base
Genove filed a complaint in the RTC of Baguio
The defendants, joined by the United States of America, moved to dismiss the
complaint, alleging that Lamachia (the manager) as an officer of the US Air Force
was immune from suit for the acts done by him in his official capacity; they argued
that the suit was in effect against USA, which had not given its consent to be sued
Motion was denied by respondent judge: although acting intially in their official
capacities, the defendants went beyond what their functions called for; this brought
them out of the protective mantle of whatever immunities they may have had in the
beginning
On the third suit:
Luis Bautisa, who was employed as a barracks boy in Camp O'Donnell, an extension
of Clark Air Base, was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by the
individual petitioners Tomi J. King, Darrel D. Dye and Stephen F. Bostick, officers of
the US Air Force and special agents of the Air Force of Special Investigators (AFOSI)
Bautista was dismissed from his employment as a result of the filing of the charge
He then filed a complaint for damages against the individual petitioners, claiming
that it was because of their acts that he was removed

Defendants alleged that they had only done their duty in the enforcement of laws of
the Philippines inside the American bases, pursuant to the RP-US Military Bases
Agreement
The counsel for the defense invoked that the defendants were acting in their official
capacity; that the complaint was in effect a suit against the US without its consent
Motion was denied by respondent judge: immunity under the Military Bases
Agreement covered only criminal and not civil cases; moreover, the defendants had
come under the jurisdiction of the court when they submitted their answer
On the fourth suit:
Complaint for damages was filed by private respondents against the petitioners
(except USA)
According to the plaintiffs, the defendants beat them up, handcuffed the, and
unleashed dogs on them
Defendants deny this and claim that the plaintiffs were arrested for theft and were
bitten by dogs because they were struggling and resisting arrest
USA and the defendants argued that the suit was in effect a suit against the United
States which had not given its consent to be sued; that they were also immune from
suit under the RP-US Bases Treaty for acts done by them in the performance of their
official functions
Motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court: the acts cannot be considered Acts
of State, if they were ever admitted by the defendants
Issue:
-Whether or not the suits above are in effect suits against United States of America
without its consent.
-In relation, whether or not the defendants are also immune from suit for acting
within their official functions.
Held:
1st suit: No. The barbershops concessions are commercial enterprises operated by
private persons. They are not agencies of the US Armed forces. Petitioners cannot
plead immunity. Case should be remanded to the lower court.
2nd suit: No. The petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of state immunity. The
restaurants are commercial enterprises. By entering into the employment contract

with Genove, it impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit.
(However, the petitioners are only suable, not liable.)
3rd suit: Yes. It is clear that the petitioners were acting in the exercise of their
official functions. For discharging their duties as agents of the US, they cannot be
directly impleaded for acts attributable to their principal, which has not given its
consent to be sued.
4th suit: The contradictory factual allegations deserve a closer study. Inquiry must
first be made by the lower court. Only after can it be known in what capacity the
petitioners were acting at the time of the incident.

8. Garcia v Chief of staff

Facts: The plaintiff filed with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, an
action to collect a sum of money against the above defendants. He
suffered injuries while undergoing a 10-month military training at Camp
Floridablanca, Pampanga. He filed a claim under Commonwealth Act 400
and in April 1957 with the Adjutant Generals Office which later disallow
his claim for disability benefit. After further demands of the plaintiff, the
same Adjutant Generals Office denied the claim, alleging that the
Commonwealth Act 400 had already been repealed by RA 610 which took
effect January 1, 1950. That by the reason of the injuries suffered by
plaintiff, he was deprived of his sight or vision rendering him permanently
disabled; and by the reason of unjustified refusal of defendants on the
claim, plaintiff was deprived of his disability pension from July 1948
totalling no less than P4,000 at the rate of P20/mo and suffered moral
damages and attorneys fees the amount of P2,000. The Philippine
Veterans Administration and the Chief of Staff of AFP file separate motions
to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the court has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the complaint; that the plaintiff failed to
exhaust all administrative remedies before coming to court; that the
complaint states no cause of action; and that the cause of action is barred
by the statute of limitations. Acting on the said Motion, the Court of First
Instance, on March 2, 1962, rendered an order dismissing the complaint
on the ground that action has prescribed. Motion for reconsideration of

the said order having been denied, the plaintiff has interposed this
appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the lower court is right in dismissing the
complaint.
Held: The SC uphold the order of dismissal for the simple reason that the
Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, it being
a money claim against the government. It was already held in the case of
New Manila Lumber vs. Republic in L-14248, 4/28/60, that a claim for the
recovery of money against the government should be filed with the
Auditor General, in line with the principle that the State can not be sued
without its consent.
Commonwealth Act 327 provides:
Section 1. In all cases involving the settlement of accounts or claims,
other than those of accountable officers, the Auditor General shall act and
decide the same within 60 days, exclusive of Sundays and holidays after
their presentation.
Section 2.

The party aggrieved by the final decision of the Auditor

General in the settlement of an account or claim, may within 30 days

from receipt of decision, take an appeal in writing to (c) the Supreme
Court, if the appellant is a private person or entity.

The well established rule that no recourse to court can be had until all
administrative remedies had been exhausted and that actions against
administrative officers should not be entertained if superior administrative
officer could grant relief is applicable to this case. The order dismissing
the complaint is hereby affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.

9. M.H. Wylie v. Rarang

Facts:
Petitioner M.H. Wylie was the assistant administrativeofficer while petitioner Capt. Ja
mes Williams was thecommanding officer of the US Naval Base in Subic Bay,
Olongapo City. Private Respondent (PR) Aurora Rarang wasassigned as merchandise
control guard in the Office of the Provost Marshal M.H. Wylie, inhis capacity as asst.
admin. Officer, supervised the publication of the socalled Plan of the Day (POD) published
daily by the US Naval Base Station. The POD featured important announcements,
necessary precautions andgeneral matters of interest to military personnel. One of
the regular features of the POD was the
action lineinquiry (NAVSTA ACTION LINEINQUIRY), a te
lephone answering device in the Office of the Admin Asst intended toprovide
personnel access to the Commanding Officer on matters they feel should be
brought to his attention forcorrection or investigation. On February 3, 1978, the POD
under the (NAVSTA) action line inquiry, published and
mentioned a certain AURING as a disgrace to her division and to the Office of
the
Provost Marshal. The samearticle explicitly implied that Auring was consuming
and appropriating for herself confiscated items likelike cigarettes and
foodstuffs. The PR was the only one who was named Auring in the
Office of the ProvostMarshal. As a result thereof, she was investigated by her
superior. The PR commenced an ACTION FOR DAMAGESin the CFI of
Zambales against M.H. Wylie, Capt. James Williams and the US Naval Base
alleging that the
articleconstituted false, injurious, and malicious defamation and libel tending to imp
each her honesty, virtue andreputation exposing her to public hatred, contempt and
ridicule. The TC ruled in favour of the PR and dismissedthe suit against the US Naval
Base. The IAC (now,CA) affirmed the judgment of the TC with modifications as to
theamount of damages awarded.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the American naval officers (such as Wylie and Capt. Williams) who
commit a crime ortortious act while discharging official functions still covered by the
principle of state immunity from suit. Does
thegrant of rights, power, and authority to the US under the RP-US Bases Treaty cov
er immunity of itsofficers from crimes and torts?
HELD:

The general rule is that public officials can be held personally accountable for acts
claimed to have been performedin connection with official duties where they have
acted ultra vires or where there is showing of bad faith (Chavezv. Sandiganbayan).It
may be argued, as a general rule, that Capt. Williams as commandingofficer of the
naval base was far removed in the chain of command from the offensive publication
and it wouldbe asking too much to hold him responsible for everything which goes
wrong on the base. However, in thisparticular case, the records show that the
offensive publication was sent to the commanding officer for approvaland that he
approved it. ART. 2176, CC prescribes a civil liability
for damages caused by a persons act or omissionconstituting fault or negligence,
stating that, Whoever
by act or omission, causes damage to another, there beingfault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault
or negligence,.. Moreover, ART. 2219(7),
Civil Code provides that moral damages may be recovered in case of libel, slander
or any other form of
defamation.Indeed, the imputation of
theft contained in the POD was a defamation against the character
andreputation of the PR. Petitioner Wylie himself admitted that the Office of the Prov
ost Marshal explicitly
recommended the deletion of the name Auring if the article will be published. The
petitioners, however, wereNEGLIGENTbecause under their direction, they issued
thepublication without deleting the said name. Such act
oromission was ULTRA VIRES and CANNOT be deemed part of official duty. It was a T
ORTIOUS ACT whichridiculed the PR. As a
result of petitioners act, PR suffered besmirched reputation,
serious anxiety, woundedfeelings and social humiliation, especially so, since the
article was baseless and false. The petitioners, alone, intheir personal capacities,
are liable for the damages they caused the Private Respondent.

10. Liang v. People

FACTS:
Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB).
Sometime in 1994, for allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB
worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged before the MeTC of Mandaluyong City with two
counts of oral defamation. Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by
the MeTC. After fixing petitioners bail, the MeTC released him to the custody of the
Security Officer of ADB. The next day, the MeTC judge received an office of
protocol from the DFA stating that petitioner is covered by immunity from legal
process under section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine
Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB in the country. Based on the
said protocol communication that petitioner is immune from suit, the MeTC judge
without notice to the prosecution dismissed the criminal cases. The latter filed a
motion for reconsideration which was opposed by the DFA. When its motion was
denied, the prosecution filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the RTC of
Pasig City which set aside the MeTC rulings and ordered the latter court to enforce
the warrant of arrest it earlier issued. After the motion for reconsideration was
denied, the petitioner elevated the case to the SC via a petition for review arguing
that he is covered by immunity under the Agreement and that no preliminary
investigation was held before the criminal case.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the petitioners case is covered with immunity from legal
process with regard to Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the
Philippine Govt.
(2) Whether or not the conduct of preliminary investigation was imperative.

HELD:
(1) NO. The petitioners case is not covered by the immunity. Courts cannot blindly
adhere to the communication from the DFA that the petitioner is covered by any
immunity. It has no binding effect in courts. The court needs to protect the right to
due process not only of the accused but also of the prosecution. Secondly, the
immunity under Section 45 of the Agreement is not absolute, but subject to the
exception that the acts must be done in official capacity. Hence, slandering a

person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because our laws
do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official
duty.
(2) NO. Preliminary Investigation is not a matter of right in cases cognizable by the
MeTC such as this case. Being purely a statutory right, preliminary investigation
may be invoked only when specifically granted by law. The rule on criminal
procedure is clear that no preliminary investigation is required in cases falling within
the jurisdiction of the MeTC.