Cases

BLTB v. IAC

ABOITIZ
SHIPPING
CORPORATION
v. CA

DANGWA
TRANSPORTATI
ON CO., INC. v.
CA

Elcano v. Hill

Facts
Collision between BLTB
driven by Armando Pon
and Superlines driven
by Ruben Dasco took
place. The collision
resulted in the death
of some passengers.
Petitioners contended
that the CFI erred in
ruling that the actions
of private respondents
are based on culpa
contractual, since if it
were private
respondents' intention
to file an action based
on culpa contractual,
they could have done
so by merely
impleading BLTB and
Pon. Instead the
respondents filed an
action against all
defendants based on
culpa aquiliana or tort.
Anacleto Viana
boarded the vessel
M/V Antonia, owned by
defendant. While the
crane (owned and
operated by Figueroa)
was being operated,
Anacleto Viana who
had already
disembarked from said
vessel obviously
remembering that
some of his cargoes
were still loaded in the
vessel, went back to
the vessel, and it was
while he was pointing
to the crew of the said
vessel to the place
where his cargoes
were loaded that the
crane hit him, and
caused his death.
Private respondents
filed a complaint for
damages against
petitioners for the
death of Pedrito
Cudiamat. The
deceased was
attempting to board a
bus, but it suddenly
accelerated forward.
He fell off and the bus
ran over him, resulting
to his death.
Reginald Hill was a
minor, married, and
living with and
dependent on his
father Marvin. He killed

Issue
WON erred
in ruling
that the
actions of
private
respondent
s are based
on culpa
contractual

Held
Quasi-delict is different from criminal
negligence; it is an independent source of
obligation.

Whether or
not Aboitiz
is liable for
the death
of Viana.

A common carrier is bound to observe

extraordinary diligence. If a passenger dies
or is injured in the course of the voyage,
there is a presumption of fault or
negligence. This gives rise to an action for
breach of contract of carriage.

The common carrier's liability for the death

of or injuries to its passengers is based on
its contractual obligation to carry its
passengers safely to their destination. They
are presumed to have acted negligently
unless they prove that they have observed
extaordinary diligence. In the case at bar,
the appellants acted negligently.
BLTB is also solidarly liable with its driver
even though the liability of the driver
springs from quasi delict while that of the
bus company from contract.

The failure of Aboitiz to exercise

extraordinary diligence for the safety of its
passengers makes Aboitiz liable. It has been
recognized as a rule that the relation of the
carrier and passenger does not cease the
moment the passenger alights from the
carriers vehicle, but continues until the
passenger has had a reasonable time or a
reasonable opportunity to leave the carriers
premises.

Whether
the bus is
liable as a
common
carrier to
the
deceased
who was
still
attempting
to board

In an action based on contact of carriage,

the court need not make an express finding
or fault or negligence in order to hold the
carrier liable. By the contract of carriage,
the carrier assumes the express obligation
to transport the passenger to his destination
safely and to observe extraordinary
diligence. Any injury that might be suffered
by the passenger is right away attributable
to the fault or negligence of the carrier.

Whether or
not Marvin
Hill may be
held civilly
liable

Yes. The acquittal of Reginald in the criminal

case does not bar the filing of a separate
civil action. The extinction of civil liability
referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111,
refers exclusively to civil liability founded on

DMPI
Employees vs.
Velez MetalNAFLU

Padilla v. Court
of Appeals

Agapito Elcano, for

which he was
criminally prosecuted.
He was acquitted on
the ground of lack of
intent to kill, coupled
with mistake. The
parents of Elcano filed
an action for damages
against Reginald and
Marvin Hill. Defendants
moved
to dismiss on the
grounds of res judicata
and lack of cause of
action against Marvin
Hill. They claim that
Marvin
Hill was relieved as
guardian of Reginald
through emancipation
by marriage. Hence,
the Elcanos could not
claim damages against
Marvin Hill.
Estafa case was filed
against Carmen
Mandawe. Respondent
Villegas entrusted this
amount to Carmen
Mandawe, an
employee of petitioner
DMPI-ECCI, for deposit
with the teller of
petitioner. Eriberta
Villegas filed with the
Regional Trial Court, a
complaint against
Carmen Mandawe and
petitioner DMPI-ECCI
for a sum of money
and damages with
preliminary
attachment arising out
of the same
transaction. In time,
petitioner sought the
dismissal of the civil
case on the ground
that there is a pending
criminal case in RTC
Branch 37, arising
from the same facts
Padilla et al were
charged with grave
coercion in the CFI
after forcibly opening
and demolishing the
market stalls and
carting away the
merchandise of
complainants. The CFI
convicted them. The
judgment was
appealed to the CA on
the ground that it was
not supported by the

under
Article
2180.

Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code,

whereas the civil liability for the same act
considered as a quasi-delict only and not as
a crime is not extinguished even by a
declaration in the criminal case that the
criminal act charged has not happened or
has not been committed by the accused.
Briefly stated, culpa aquiliana includes
voluntary and negligent acts which may be
punishable by law.

Whether or
not the civil
case could
proceed
independe
ntly of the
criminal
case for
Estafa
without the
necessary
reservation
exercised
by the
party

Yes. As a general rule, an offense causes

two (2) classes of injuries. The first is the
social injury produced by the criminal act
which is sought to be repaired thru the
imposition of the corresponding penalty,
and the second is the personal injury
caused to the victim of the crime which
injury is sought to be compensated through
indemnity which is civil in nature. Thus,
"every person criminally liable for a felony is
also civilly liable."

Whether
the CA
erred in
requiring
Padilla et al
to pay civil
indemnity
after
acquitting
them
from the
criminal
charge.

The CA was correct.

Padilla et al were acquitted because of
reasonable doubt and not because they did
not commit the
acts stated in the charge against them.
There is no dispute over the forcible
opening of the market
stall, its demolition with axes and other
instruments, and the carting away of the
merchandise. The
petitioners were acquitted because these
acts were denominated coercion when they
properly
constituted some other offense such as

However, with respect to civil actions for

recovery of civil liability under Articles
32,33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code arising
from the same act or omission, the rule has
been changed. Under the present rule, only
the civil liability arising from the offense
charged is deemed instituted with the
criminal action unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves his right to
institute it separately, or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action.

PHILIPPINE
RABBIT BUS
LINES v. People

Manliclic v.
Calaunan

evidence. The CA
modified the CFIs
judgment and
acquitted Padilla et al
on the ground of
reasonable doubt.
They were,
however, ordered to
solidarily pay the
complainants P9,600
as actual damages. An
MR was filed,
contending that their
acquittal as to criminal
liability results in the
extinction of their civil
liability.
Napoleon Roman y
Macadangdang] was
found guilty and
convicted of the crime
of reckless imprudence
resulting to triple
homicide, multiple
physical injuries and
damage to property.
The CA ruled that the
institution of a criminal
case implied the
institution also of the
civil action arising from
the offense. Thus,
once determined in the
criminal case against
the accused-employee,
the employers
subsidiary civil liability
as set forth in Article
103 of the Revised
Penal Code becomes
conclusive and
enforceable.
Petitioner Manliclic is a
driver of Philippine
Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc.
(PRBLI) While driving
his bus going to
Manila, he bumped
rear left side of the
owner-type jeep of
Respondent Calaunan.
Because of the
collision, petitioner
was criminally charged
with reckless
imprudence resulting
to damage to property
with physical injuries.
Subsequently,
respondent filed a
damage suit against
petitioner and PRBLI.

threat or malicious mischief. They could not,

however, be
convicted under the latter offenses because
the information did not charge them with
the same.
Despite Article 29 of the Civil Code, which
provides for the institution of a civil action
in case of
acquittal, there is no more need to institute
a civil action in this case because all of the
facts necessary
to award damages were before the court.

WON Civil
Liability
Deemed
Instituted
in the
Criminal
Prosecution

Section 1 of Rule 111 of the current Rules of

Criminal Procedure provides:
When a criminal action is instituted, the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged shall be
deemed instituted with the criminal action
unless the offended party waives the civil
action, reserves the right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil action prior
to the criminal action.
What is deemed instituted in every criminal
prosecution is the civil liability arising from
the crime or delict per se (civil liability ex
delicto), but not those liabilities arising from
quasi-delicts, contracts or quasi-contracts.
In fact, even if a civil action is filed
separately, the ex delicto civil liability in the
criminal prosecution remains, and the
offended party may -- subject to the control
of the prosecutor -- still intervene in the
criminal action, in order to protect the
remaining civil interest therein

What is the
effect of
Manliclics
acquittal to
the civil
case?

Since the civil case is one for quasi delict,

Manliclics Acquittal Does not affect the
case. Manliclic and PRBLI are still liable for
damages.
It is now settled that acquittal of the
accused, even if based on a finding that he
is not guilty, does not carry with it the
extinction of the civil liability based on quasi
delict.
In other words, if an accused is acquitted
based on reasonable doubt on his guilt, his
civil liability arising from the crime may be
proved by preponderance of evidence only.
However, if an accused is acquitted on the
basis that he was not the author of the act
or omission complained of (or that there is
declaration in a final judgment that the fact
from which the civil might arise did not
exist), said acquittal closes the door to civil
liability based on the crime or ex delicto. In
this second instance, there being no crime
or delict to speak of, civil liability based
thereon or ex delicto is not possible. In this
case, a civil action, if any, may be instituted

Air France v.
Carascoso

LRTA v Navidad

Far East Bank

and Trust Co. v.
CA

Air France, through its

authorized agent,
Philippine Air Lines,
Inc., issued to plaintiff
a "first class" round
trip airplane ticket
from Manila to Rome.
From Manila to
Bangkok, plaintiff
travelled in "first
class", but at Bangkok,
the Manager of the
defendant airline
forced plaintiff to
vacate the "first class"
seat that he was
occupying because
there was a "white
man", who, the
Manager alleged, had
a "better right" to the
seat.
Nicanor Navidad, then
drunk, entered the
EDSA LRT station after
purchasing a token.
Escartin, the security
guard had
misunderstanding or
an altercation. They
had fist fight, Navidad
later fell on the LRT
tracks. At the exact
moment that Navidad
fell, an LRT train,
operated by Rodolfo
Roman, was coming in.
Navidad was struck by
the moving train, and
he was killed
instantaneously.

Luna applied for a

FAREASTCARD with
Fart East Bank. A
supplemental card was
also issued to his wife,
Clarita. Clarita lost her
card. FEB gave the
credit card account a
status of Hot Card
and/or Cancelled
Card. Luis Luna used
his card to purchase a
despidida lunch for his
friend in the Bahia
Rooftop Restaurant.

Was
Carrascoso
entitled to
the first
class seat
he claims
and
therefore
entitles to
damages?

Whether
LRTA liable
for tort
arising
from
contract.

Whether
Far East
Bank is
liable for
damages
to the
Spouses
Luna
amounting
the abovementioned
figures?

on grounds other than the delict complained

of.
Yes. It is conceded in all quarters that on
March 28, 1958 he paid to and received
from petitioner a first class ticket. But
petitioner asserts that said ticket did not
represent the true and complete intent and
agreement of the parties; that said
respondent knew that he did not have
confirmed reservations for first class on any
specific flight, although he had tourist class
protection; that, accordingly, the issuance
of a first class ticket was no guarantee that
he would have a first class ride, but that
such would depend upon the availability of
first class seats.

YES. The premise for employers liability for

tort (under the provisions of Article2176 and
related provisions, in conjunction with
Article 2180 of the Civil Code) is negligence
or fault on the part of the employee.
The foundation of LRTAs liability is the
contract of carriage and its obligation to
indemnify the victim arises from the breach
of that contract by reason of its failure to
exercise the high diligence required of the
common carrier. In the discharge of its
commitment to ensure the safety of
passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its
own employees or avail itself of the services
of an outsider or an independent firm to
undertake the task. In either case, the
common carrier is not relieved of its
responsibilities under the contract of
carriage.
When an act which constitutes a breach of
contract would have itself constituted the
source of a quasi-delictual liability had no
contract existed between the parties, the
contract can be said to have been breached
by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to
apply.
Spouses Luna are entitled only to nominal
damages but not moral and exemplary
damages. Moral damages are awarded if the
defendant is to be shown to have acted in
bad faith. Article 2219 states that, Moral
damages may be recovered in the following
and analogous cases: (1) A criminal offense
resulting in physical injuries; (2) Quasidelicts causing physical injuries.
Nothing however, can sufficiently indicate
any deliberate intent on the part of the
Bank to cause harm to private respondents.
Neither could the banks negligence in
failing to give personal notice to Luis be

Andamo v IAC

Castro v Pp

Fabre v. CA

His card was

dishonored. He felt
embarrassed by this
incident. He then
complained to Far East
Bank and he found out
that his account has
been cancelled without
informing him and and
thus filed this case for
damages
Within the land of
respondent
corporation, water
paths and
contrivances, including
an artificial lake, were
constructed, which
allegedly inundated
and eroded petitioners'
land, caused a young
man to drown,
damaged petitioners'
crops and plants,
washed away costly
fences, endangered
the lives of petitioner
sand their laborers
during rainy and
stormy seasons,
Petitioners filed a
criminal and a
separate civil action
for damages against
the respondent.
Justin Albert, son of Mr.
Tan. Justin was a Grade
12 student of Reedley
International School
(RIS). He was
dismissed for violating
the rules of his
probation. filed a
complaint in the
DepEd, claiming
malice and bad faith.
DepEd orders
readmission of Albert.
Castro said be careful
talking to Tan, thats
dangerous Ching then
relayed the
information to Tan, and
Tan filed a grave oral
defamation suit
against Castro.
Petitioners were
owners of 1982 model
Mazda minibus. They
are the bus principally
in connection with a
bus service for their
children which they
operated in Manila.
They hired Cabil as
their driver. (WWCF)
arranged with

considered so gross as to amount to malice

or bad faith.

Whether he
IAC erred in
affirming
the trial
courts
order
dismissing
the civil
case as the
criminal
case was
still
unresolved.

Yes. Civil actionis one under Articles 2176

and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts.
All the elements of a quasi-delict are
present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the
plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the
defendant, or some other person for whose
acts he must respond; and (c) the
connection of cause and effect between the
fault or negligence of the defendant and the
damages incurred by the plaintiff.

Whether
petitioner
can still be
held liable,
or has
double
jeopardy
set in?

No. Petitioner cannot be held liable as

double jeopardy has set in. Double jeopardy
occurs upon (1) a valid indictment (2)
before a competent court (3)after
arraignment (4) when a valid plea has been
entered and (5) when the accused was
acquitted or convicted or the case was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without
the express consent of the accused.

Whether
petitioners
were
negligent
and liable
for the
injuries
suffered by
respondent
s.

As common carriers, the Fabres were bound

to exercise extraordinary diligence for the
safe transportation of the passengers to
their destination. This duty is of care is NOT
excused by proof that they exercised the
diligence of a good father of the family in
the selection and supervision of their
employee.

Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or

negligence", covers not only acts "not
punishable by law" but also acts criminal in
character, whether intentional and
voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a
separate civil action lies against the
offender in a criminal act, whether or not he
is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended party
is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually
charged also criminally), to recover
damages on both scores.

Calalas v. CA

Padua v. Robles

petitioners for the

transportation of
members of young
adult ministry from
Manila to La Union and
back. They met an
accident, the bus hit a
fence and a coconut
tree that caused
passengers to be
injured including
respondent Antonio.
The latter filed a
criminal complaint
against the driver, the
trial court decided in
favor of respondents.
Eliza Jujeurche Salva
was a college
freshman majoring in
Physical Education at
the Siliman University
in
Dumaguete City. One
morning, Sunga rode a
jeep owned and
operated by Calalas,
but, since it was
already full,
she was given by the
conductor an
extension seat, a
wooden stool at the
back of the door at the
rear end of the
vehicle. Along the
route, the jeepney
stopped to let a
passenger off. As she
was seated at the rear
of the vehicle, Sunga
gave way to the
outgoing passenger.
Just as she was doing
so, an Isuzu truck
driven by Verena and
owned by
Salva bumped the left
rear portion of the
jeepney. As a result,
Sunga was injured.
a taxicab (bearing
1968 plate no. TX9395 and driven by
Romeo N. Punzalan but
operated by the Bay
Taxi Cab owned by
Gregorio N. Robles)
struck ten-year old
Normandy Padua.
Subsequently,
Normandy's parents
(Paulino and Lucena
Bebin Padua), by
complaint filed with
the Court of First
Instance of Zambales

Whether
Calalas is
guilty of
violating
the
contract of
carriage.

Yes. The RTC was wrong in deciding the

breach of contract [BOC] case on the basis
of the quasi-delict [QD] case. Firstly, Sunga
was not a party to the QD case and cannot
be bound by its ruling. Secondly, the issues
or causes of action in both cases are
different.
The QD case is premised on the negligence
of
the tortfeasor. The BOC case is premised
upon the negligence of the carrier in the
performance of the contractual obligation.
Sungas complaint was based on BOC. It
does not matter that a third persons act
was the proximate cause of the injury. The
doctrine of proximate cause is applicable
only to QD. In BOC, it is sufficient to show
that there is a contractual relation between
the parties and the common carrier failed to
transmit the passenger safely.

whether
the
judgment
dated in
criminal
case
includes a
determinati
on and
adjudicatio
n of
Punzalan's
civil
liability
arising
from his

In negligence cases, the offended party (or

his heirs) has the option between an action
for enforcement of civil liability based on
culpa criminal under article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code and an action for
recovery of damages based on culpa
aquiliana under article 2177 of the Civil
Code.
In the case at bar, the Court finds it
immaterial that the Paduas chose, in the
first instance, an action for recovery of
damages based on culpa aquiliana under
articles 2176, 2177, and 2180 of the Civil
Code, which action proved ineffectual. The
Court also takes note of the absence of any

Atlantic Gulf
and Pacific v.
CA

Vergara vs. CA

sought damages from

Punzalan and the Bay
Taxi Cab; likewise, the
city Fiscal of Olongapo,
by information filed
with the same court ,
charged Punzalan with
homicide through
reckless imprudence.

criminal act
upon which
Robles'
subsidiary
civil
responsibili
ty may be
based.

The Castillos filed an

action for damages
against AG&P alleging
that the latters
operations on the
formers property
caused the soil to
become infertile,
salty, unproductive
and unsuitable for
agriculture. The trial
court granted
damages for both the
damage to the land
and rentals for the
same property.
On, 5 August 1979 in
Gapan, Nueva Ecija,
Martin Belmonte, while
driving a cargo truck
belonging to Vergara,
rammed "head-on" the
store-residence of the
Amadeo Azarcon,
causing damages
thereto which were
inventoried and
assessed at
P53,024.22
Vergara filed a third
party complaint
against Travellers
Insurance and Surety
Corporation, alleging
that said cargo truck
involved in the
vehicular accident,
belonging to the
petitioner, was insured
by the third party
defendant insurance
company and asking
that he paid paid
whatever the court
would order him to pay
to Azarcon
The trial court and
the court of appeals
ordered Vergara jointly
and severally with
Travellers Insurance
and Surety Corporation
to pay to Azarcon (a)
P53,024.22 as
actual damages; (b)
P10,000.00 as moral

Whether
the grant
of the
damages
amounts to
double
recovery.

inconsistency between the aforementioned

action priorly availed of by the Paduas and
their subsequent application for
enforcement of civil liability arising from the
offense committed by Punzalan and,
consequently, for exaction of Robles'
subsidiary responsibility. Allowance of the
latter application involves no violation of the
proscription against double recovery of
damages for the same negligent act or
omission.
AG&P was guilty of two culpable
transgressions on the property rights of the
Castillos, that is, for the ruination of the
agricultural fertility or utility of the soil of
their property and, further, for the
unauthorized use of said property as a
dump site or depot for petitioner's heavy
equipment and trucks.
Article 2177 provides that the plaintiff
cannot recover damages twice for the same
act or omission of the defendant. In this
case, there were two separate acts or
omissions.

W/N
Vergara is
liable to
pay
damages.

Yes, he is liable.
The requisites (1) damages to the plaintiff;
(2) negligence, by act or omission, of which
defendant, or some person for whose acts
he must respond, was guilty; and (3) the
connection of cause and effect between
such negligence and the damages.
The acts which caused the damages to
Azarcon can be attributed to Vergara. The
fact that the vehicular accident occurred
was well established by the police report
describing the same. The contention of
Vergara that the accident occurred because
of mechanical failure of the brakes cannot
be considered fortuitous and could have
been prevented. Also, Vergara failed to
adduce evidence to dispute the
presumption
of negligence in the selection of his driver.

FGU Insurance
vs. CA

damages; (c)
P10,000.00 as
exemplary damages;
and (d) the sum of
P5,000.00 for
attorney's fees and the
costs. On the third
party complaint, the
insurance company
was sentenced to pay
to the petitioner
the following: (a)
P50,000.00 for third
party liability under its
comprehensive
accident insurance
policy; and (b)
P3,000.00 for and as
attorney's fees.
On 21 April 1987,
two Mitsubishi Colt
Lancers collided along
EDSA at around 3AM.
At that time, the car
owned by Soriano was
being driven by
Jacildone. The other
car was owned by
FILCAR Transport, Inc.
and was being driven
by Dahl- Jansen, as
lessee. Said DahlJensen, being a Danish
tourist, did not have
Philippine drivers
license. Dahl-Jensen
had swerved to his
right lane, thereby
hitting the left side of
the car of Soriano.
Petitioner FGU
Insurance paid Soriano
P25,382.20 pursuant
to the insurance
contract it had with
the latter. After which,
it sued Dahl-Jensen,
FILCAR, and
FORTUNE Insurance for
quasi-delict before the
RTC of Makati.
Summons was not
served on Dahl-Jensen;
and upon motion of
the petitioner, he
was later dropped from
the complaint. The RTC
dismissed the
complaint on the
ground that petitioner
had failed to
substantiate its claim
for subrogation.
The CA affirmed the
RTC decision, although
on a different ground,
i.e. that only the fault

W/N
FILCAR and
FORTUNE
are liable
for
damages
suffered by
a third
person
even
though the
vehicle was
leased to
another.

FILCAR AND FORTUNE ARE NOT LIABLE.

(please focus on the underlined doctrines
for: our concern for this case is PRIMARY
LIABILITY)
Art. 2176 of the Civil Code which states:
"Whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict .
..."
To sustain a claim based thereon, the
following requisites must concur: (a)
damage suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or
negligence of the defendant; and, (c)
connection of cause and effect between the
fault or negligence of the defendant and the
damage
incurred by the plaintiff.
The Supreme Court agreed with the
holding of the CA in saying that only the
fault and negligence of Dahl-Jensen had
been proved, since the only cause of the
damage was due to his swerving to the right
lane, in which FILCAR had no participation.
Art. 2184 of the NCC provides: "In motor
vehicle mishap, the owner is solidarily liable
with his driver, if the former, who was in the
vehicle, could have by the
use of due diligence, prevented the
misfortune . . . . If the owner was not in the
motor vehicle, the provisions of article 2180
are applicable." Obviously, this
provision of Art. 2184 is neither applicable
because of the absence of masterdriverrelationship between respondent
FILCAR and Dahl-Jensen. Clearly, petitioner
has
no cause of action against respondent
FILCAR on the basis of quasi-delict; logically,
its claim against respondent FORTUNE can
neither prosper.
Article 2180, par 5 Civil Code:
Employers shall be liable for the damages
caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their

and negligence of
Dahl-Jensen was
proved, and not that of
FILCAR. Hence this
appeal.

Equitable
Leasing Corp v
Lucita Suyom
et al

June 4, 1991:
Equitable Leasing Corp
had a lease agreement
with for a Fuso Road
Tractor with Ecatine
(as the lessee), who
according to the
agreement will
eventually own the
tractor, upon full
payment by Edwin Lim
of Ecatine.
December 9, 1992:
Lim completed the
payment, and thus a
Deed of Sale was
drawn between
Ecatine and Equitable,
however the deed was
not registered in the
LTO.
July 17, 1994: the
said Tractor, driven by
Raul Tutor, employee
of Ecatine, rammed
into the house cum
store of Myrna Tamayo
in Tondo Manila. A
portion of the house
was destroyed, 2 died
while 4 more were
injured.
Tutor was charged
and convicted of
reckless imprudence
resulting to homicide
and multiple physical
injuries in the MTC.
Upon verification
with the LTO, Equitable
was found to be the
registered owner of
the tractor. Equitable
then received a
complaint for
damages, but they
denied
liability claiming the
tractor was already
sold to Ecatine back in
1992.
RTC and CA held:

W/N
Equitable
remains
liable
based on
quasi-delict
for the
negligent
act of
a driver
who was
not the
employee
of the
petitioner

assigned tasks, even though the former are

not engaged in any business orindustry.
The liability imposed by Art. 2180 arises
by virtue of a presumption juris tantum of
negligence on the part of the persons made
responsible thereunder, derived from their
failure to exercise due care and vigilance
over the acts of subordinates to prevent
them from causing damage. 7 Yet, Art. 2180
is hardly applicable because FILCAR, being
engaged in a rent-a-car business was only
the owner of the car leased to Dahl-Jensen.
As such, there was no vinculum juris
between them as employer and employee.
Petition denied. CA affirmed.
EQUITABLE IS LIABLE
The negligent employees civil liability is
based on Art 2176 (NCC) and/or Art 100
(RPC), while employers liability is based on
Art 103 of the RPC: where employers are
held subsidiary liable for felonies committed
by their employees in the discharge
of latters duties. This liability attaches
when the convicted employee turns out to
be insolvent.
Art 2176 in relation to 2180, an action
predicated on quasi-delict maybe instituted
against the employer for an employees act
or omission. This liability for the
negligent conduct of a subordinate is direct
and primary (meaning SOLIDARY), with the
possible defense of due diligence in the
selection and supervision of employees. In
the case at bar, Tutors criminal liability has
been established, but
since Tutor cannot be found, the victims
recourse is to file damage claims against
Tutors employer. Unfortunately for
Equitable, they are the registered owners of
the tractor and jurisprudence provides, the
registered owners are deemed to be the
employer of the erring driver and thus civilly
liable. The sale between Ecatine and
Equitable, being unregistered, will not
bind/prejudice, a third person, in this case
the victim-respondents. Equitable cannot
use the defense that Tutor was not his
employee. As to a third person, the
registered owner is the employer, and
Ecatine, although the actual employer of
Tutor, is deemed to be merely an agent of
Equitable. Non-registration is the fault of the
petitioner, thus they cannot escape liability
to prejudice the rights (to damages) of the
respondents.
Side note: (on Moral Damages) The SC
also justified that there was causal
connection between the factual basis of the
respondents claim and Tutors wrongful
act. (3 element to sustain a claim on quasidelict: a)damage suffered by the plaintiff
b)fault or
negligence of the defendant c)causal
connection between the fault or negligence
of the defendant and
the damage incurred by the plaintiff) This
case falls squarely under 2219(2) which

Equitable is liable,
hence this appeal.

Cinco vs.
Canonoy

Petitioner Cinco
herein filed a
Complaint for the
recovery of damages
on account of a
vehicular accident
involving his
automobile and a
jeepney driven by
Romeo Hilot
and operated by
Valeriana Pepito and
Carlos Pepito, the last
three being the private
respondents in this
suit. Subsequent
thereto, a criminal
case was filed against
the driver, Romeo
Hilot, arising from the
same accident. At the
pre-trial in the civil
case, counsel for
private respondents
moved to suspend the
civil action pending the
final determination of
the criminal suit,
invoking Rule 111,
Section 3 (b) of the
Rules of Court, which
provides: (b) After a
criminal action has
been commenced. no
civil
action arising from the
same offense can be
prosecuted, and the
same shall be
suspended, in
whatever stage it may
be found, until final
judgment in the
criminal proceeding
has been rendered;
The City Court of
Mandaue City ordered
the suspension of the
civil case.
Petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration
thereof, having been
denied, petitioner

W/N
RESPONDE
NT JUDGE
MATEO
CANONOY,
ERRED IN
HOLDING
THAT THE
TRIAL OF
THE CIVIL
CASE NO.
189 FILED
IN THE CITY
COURT OF
MANDAUE
SHOULD BE
SUSPENDE
D UNTIL
AFTER A
FINAL
JUDGMENT
IS
RENDERED
IN THE
CRIMINAL
CASE.

provides for payment of moral damages in

cases of quasi-delict. Moral damages are
paid to alleviate the moral suffering/mental
anguish caused by the act or omission of
the defendant. Having established the
liability of Tutor and the Equitable as an
employer, respondents have successfully
shown the existence of the factual basis for
the award (injury to plaintiffs) and its causal
connection to the tortious acts of
Tutor. No proof of pecuniary loss is needed
to justify the moral damages. The amount of
indemnity will be left to the discretion of the
court.
The respondent judge erred in holding that
the civil case should be suspended until
after the final judgment is rendered in the
criminal case.
Liability being predicated on quasi-delict the
civil case may proceed as a separate and
independent civil action, as specifically
provided for in Article 2177 of the Civil
Code. Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or
negligence under the preceding article is
entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability
arising from negligence under the Penal
Code.
But the plaintiff cannot recover damages
twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant. (n)
Sec. 2. Independent civil action. In the
cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34
and 2177 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, Are independent civil action
entirely separate and distinct from the c
action, may be brought by the injured party
during the
pendency of the criminal case, provided the
right is reserved as required in the
preceding section. Such civil action shag
proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. In the light of
the foregoing disquisition, we are
constrained to hold that respondent
Judge gravely abused his discretion in
upholding the Decision of the City Court of
Mandaue City, Cebu, suspending the civil
action based on a quasi-delict until after the
criminal case is finally terminated. Having
arrived at this conclusion, a discussion of
the
other errors assigned becomes unnecessary.

Virata vs.
Ochoa

elevated the matter on

certiorari to the Court
of First Instance of
Cebu, alleging that
the City Judge had
acted with grave
abuse of discretion in
suspending the civil
action for being
contrary to law and
jurisprudence.
Respondent Judge
Cannony dismissed the
Petition for certiorari
on the ground that
there was no grave
abuse of discretion on
the part of the City
Court in suspending
the civil action
inasmuch as damage
to property is not one
of the instances when
an independent civil
action is proper; that
petitioner has another
plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy
under the law, which is
to submit his claim for
damages in the
criminal case; that the
resolution of the City
Court is interlocutory
and, therefore,
certiorari is improper;
and that the Petition is
defective inasmuch as
what petitioner
actually desires is a
Writ of mandamus.
Petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration was
denied by respondent
Judge.
Arsenio Virata died
as a result of having
been bumped while
walking along Taft
Avenue by a passenger
jeepney driven by
Maximo Borilla and
registered in the name
of Victoria Ochoa.
An action for
homicide through
reckless imprudence
was instituted against
Maximo Borilla in the
CFI of Rizal.
Atty. Francisco, the
private prosecutor,
made a reservation to
file separately the civil
action for damages
against the driver for
his criminal liability,

W/N the
Heirs of
Arsenio
Virata can
prosecute
an action
for
damages
based
on quasidelict
against
Maximo
Borilla and
Victoria
Ochoa,
driver and
owner,
respectivel
y on the
passenger
jeepney

YES. IT IS AN EQUITABLE MORTGAGE.

In negligence cases, the aggrieved parties
may choose between an action under the
Revised Penal Code or of quasi-delict under
Article 2176 of the Civil Code. What is
prohibited by Article 2177 of the Civil Code
is to recover twice for the same
negligent act.
In this case, the petitioners are not
seeking to recover twice for the same
negligent act. Before the Criminal Case was
decided, they manifested in the said case
that they were filing a separate civil action
for damages against the owner and driver of
the
passenger jeepney based on quasi-delict.
Acquittal from an accusation of criminal
negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or
not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil
action, not for civil liability arising
from criminal negligence, but for damages
due to a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.

which he later on
withdrew and
presented evidence on
the damages.
The Heirs of Arsenio
Virata again reserved
their right to institute a
separate civil
action.
They commenced an
action for damages
based on quasi-delict
against the driver
Maximo Borilla and the
registered owner of
the vehicle, Victoria
Ochoa.
Private respondents
filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground
that there is another
action pending for the
same cause.
The CFI acquitted
Borilla on the ground
that he caused the
injury by accident. The
motion to dismiss was
granted.

that
bumped
Arsenio
Virata?

The source of damages sought to be

enforced in the Civil Case is quasi-delict, not
an
act or omission punishable by law. Under
Art. 1157 of the Civil Code, quasi-delict and
an act or omission punishable by law are
two different sources of obligation.
Moreover, for petitioners to prevail in the
Civil Case, they have only to establish their
cause of action by preponderance of
evidence.