Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
December 2013
2014
ARGENTINA
BRAZIL
CHILE
COLOMBIA
MEXICO
PERU
URUGUAY
Alejandro Estevez-Breton
David Duong
Alejandro Rivera
(212) 350-3917
aestevez@santander.us
(212) 407-0979
dduong@santander.us
(212) 350-0734
arivera@santander.us
Marcela Bension*
(3491) 257-2172
jupcabrera@gruposantander.com
LATAM
Latin America Local Markets Summary ............. 3
ARGENTINA ...................................................... 4
ARS Bonar ......................................................... 9
ARS Boden....................................................... 11
Bocon ............................................................... 12
Bogar ................................................................ 14
Discounts and Pars (ARS-Denominated) ........ 16
Domestic USD Bonds ...................................... 17
Global USD Bonds ........................................... 18
GDP-linked Securities ...................................... 20
ARS vs. USD LIBOR Swaps ............................ 22
BRAZIL ............................................................ 23
LTN................................................................... 35
NTN-F............................................................... 37
LFT ................................................................... 39
NTN-B .............................................................. 41
NTN-C .............................................................. 45
Global Bonds Denominated in BRL ................. 46
DI Futures......................................................... 47
Pr-DI Swaps ................................................... 51
Pr-CDI Swaptions ........................................... 53
DI Options ........................................................ 54
IDI Options ....................................................... 55
IGP-M x CDI Swaps ......................................... 56
IPCA x CDI SWAPS ......................................... 57
FRC Futures ..................................................... 58
USD Futures .................................................... 60
SCC (Cross-Currency Swaps) ......................... 61
CHILE............................................................... 63
BCU .................................................................. 68
BTU .................................................................. 70
BCP .................................................................. 71
BTP .................................................................. 72
PDBC ............................................................... 73
CLP-Denominated International Bonds Due
2020 ............................................................ 74
Cmara swaps ................................................. 75
CLP vs. USD LIBOR Swaps ............................ 77
UF vs. USD LIBOR Swaps............................... 77
Inflation forwards (UF/CLP).............................. 78
COLOMBIA ..................................................... 79
TES .................................................................. 85
Fixed-Rate TES in COP ................................... 87
TES UVR ......................................................... 89
Floating-rate TES IPC ...................................... 89
Short-term TES in COP ................................... 91
Global TES ....................................................... 92
COP vs. USD LIBOR Swaps ........................... 96
IBR Swap ......................................................... 96
MEXICO ........................................................... 97
Bonos ............................................................. 106
Bondes ........................................................... 108
Cetes .............................................................. 109
Udibonos ........................................................ 110
Strips .............................................................. 112
BPA, BPAT, and BPA182 .............................. 113
TIIE Swaps ..................................................... 114
TIIE Swaptions ............................................... 115
UDI vs. USD LIBOR Swaps ........................... 116
UDI vs. TIIE Swaps ........................................ 116
MexDer .......................................................... 117
PERU ............................................................. 120
Fixed-Rate Bonos Soberanos ........................ 124
Inflation-Linked Bonos Soberanos ................. 125
URUGUAY ..................................................... 127
Foreign Exchange Market .............................. 132
Central Bank Bills (Letras de Regulacin
Monetaria) ................................................. 133
UYU Treasury Bills......................................... 136
UYU Treasury Notes ...................................... 137
UI Treasury Notes .......................................... 139
UI Treasury Bonds ......................................... 141
Dollar Treasury Bonds (Domestic Law) ......... 143
UYU vs. USD LIBOR Swaps ......................... 144
Argentina
ARS
Brazil
BRL
Chile
CLP
Colombia
COP
Mexico
MXN
Non-convertible
Managed float
Non-convertible
Dirty float
Partially convertible
Free float
Discretionary. Daily
Central Bank
purchases and USD
swaps used in the
past
Non-convertible
Free float
Fully convertible
Float
Discretionary USD
buying. Options
have been used in
the past.
Discretionary, spot,
Daily discretionary,
fwd, FX swaps and
spot & onshore
other regulatory
forward
mechanisms.
5mn & 10 cents
50 mm & 10pips
0.2 (onshore)
2.2
1.8-2
1-1.5
EMTA Industry
Survey
40mn at 1m-3m (on
& offshore)
PTAX (Central
Bank)
TRM
(Superfinanciera)
21 (swaps)+16
(fwds & fut)
Banxico official
MXN fixing
16.9 (BM&F)
1.0
1.0
0.0
Reverse repo
Selic
858.0
1,916.7
25,516.0
164,649.0
4,907.5
51.1
355.0
143.0
820.5
49.2
87.4
374.3
18.4
16.8
8.7%
59.1%
23.2%
9.0%
0.0%
39.9%
0.6%
35.6%
23.3%
0.6%
28.1%
0.0%
71.9%
0.0%
0.0%
77.4%
0.0%
22.6%
0.0%
0.0%
42.8%
0.0%
19.1%
21.2%
16.8%
80.1%
0.0%
19.9%
0.0%
0.0%
36.4%
3.6%
60.0%
0.0%
0.0%
7.2 & 13
2.9
0.6
18.9
8.1
220.0
0.4
2.4
1.2
24.0
1.8
0.1
0.0
0.6
0.0
1.7%
1.0%
0.9%
1.4%
0.5%
0.3%
0.2%
Inflation target
2mn
Indicative inflation
target
5% (200bps)
No reference rate
since July 1st 2013
Not applicable
Bid-ask spread
3.0% (1pp)
0.5
Policy rate
Cross currency
3.0% (1pp)
Inflation target
Inflation target
Swaps nominal
Inflation target
Uruguay
UYU
Bond market
Local govt. debt outstanding
LCY billion
Local govt. debt outstanding
US$ billion
Fixed
USD
Inflation linkers
Floaters
Other*
Average duration & maturity
(years) **
Daily turnover LCY billion
Daily turnover USD billion
Daily turnover as % of
outstanding
Daily turnover as % GDP
Local debt (securities) as %
GDP
AFP participation in local debt
(% )
Foreign participation in local
debt (%)**
Derivatives
FX options
1-month ATM implied vol
spread
Inflation forwards
Average ticket in local units
& bid/ask
Inflation target
Peru
PEN
2.0% (100bps)
BCRP reference
0.1%
0.4%
0.2%
0.3%
0.1%
0.0%
0.1%
23.0%
39.6%
17.0%
21.0%
26.8%
6.2%
30.0%
n.a.
17.3%
65.0%
28.3%
25.2%
26.1%
29.0%
10.0%
16.9%
1 to 3%
6.6%
40.0%
57.5%
25.0%
Not available
Available
Available
Available
Available
Not available
Available
0.70%-1.00%
1.00-1.50%
1.50-2.00%
0.5%-0.75%
UF/CLP
Not available
Not available
Not available
UI/USD OTC
IBR Swaps
TIIE
Not available
Exclusively
available OTC
5k DV01 (1015bps)
Not available
Not available
Not available
UYU x USD ,
exclusively OTC
5 mm (20 bps)
50-75 bps
Not available
Not available
Pre-DI
CLP x Camara
UF x Camara
CDI x Cupom
Cambial
600bps
10mn (10bps)
No longer liquid
COP & UVR x USD
TIIE x USD Libor
Libor
10k DV01 (15-20
20mn (15bps)
bps)
Sources: Corresponding Central Banks, government ministries, and other regulatory bodies, and Santander.
*Others include GDP warrants in Argentina (duration estimate excludes warrants).
**In Argentina excluding Par and discounts from the exchange which are subject to foreign law; in Peru duration is calculated with
most-liquid fixed bonds.
ARGENTINA
MACRO BACKGROUND
In 2013, the government of Argentina remained absent from international and local debt markets and continued
meeting its external obligations through the use of the Central Banks foreign reserves. As such, Central Bank
reserves declined to just US$33 billion at the end of October 2013 from US$43.3 billion at end 2012, covering
less than four months of imports. Meanwhile, the official exchange rate depreciated on average 2% monthly
during the same period.
Argentine asset prices continue to be driven by the legal battle with holdout creditors, a battle that now also
includes participants of the exchange and the trustee for the restructured bonds. On 23 August 2013, the U.S.
Court of Appeals of the Second District ruled against Argentina in favor of payment on the order of US$1.3
billion to the holdout creditors. However, the ruling was stayed until the U.S. Supreme Court decided to hear
the case and eventually make a judgment. The Supreme Court could make a decision on whether to hear the
case in 2014, but there is no firm timeline. In the interim, Argentina may continue to service its debt without
fear of attachment.
The fiscal deficit continued widening all during 2013. In the last 12 months to August, the primary deficit
reached 0.2% of GDP (including nontax revenue such as BCRA and ANSES transfers) and 2.2% of GDP after
interest payments. The government continues focusing all its financing strategy on domestic sources such as
Central Bank loans, ANSES transfers, and/or intragovernment debt issuances. According to our calculations,
the BCRA and ANSES transfers represented 3.8 times the size of the accumulated primary result of the first
eight months of the year. In 2012 and 2011, such numbers were lower at 2.1 and 0.8 times, respectively. We do
not see significant changes to the current expansionary fiscal stance, considering the traditional bias of the
present administration regarding public spending.
Since late 2011, mounting balance-of-payment tensions led authorities to launch a set of new measures and
controls aimed at fostering USD supply and curbing demand, especially from the corporate and household
sectors. These controls were significantly tightened during 2012 and have led to increasing pressures on the socalled blue-chip exchange rate, which reflects the implicit USD/ARS rate resulting from the onshore ARS
and the offshore USD price of the same financial asset (such as sovereign bonds or highly traded stocks).
These FX developments have added uncertainty in terms of convertibility risk and are leading to less
participation by foreign investors in the domestic market.
127.2
- Local currency
33.7
- Foreign currency
93.5
Loans
63.1
- Multilateral agencies
18.5
- Commercial banks
6.9
23.9
- Other
13.8
Paris Club
5.9
196.2
Holdouts
11.5
207.7
115.8
91.9
46%
20%
USD
bn*
USD
bn**
Uses
34.9
38.4
12%
Interest payments
6.9
10.4
10%
Amortizations
28.0
28.0
22.6
25.4
8%
Primary result
-4.8
-4.8
6%
IFI
1.7
1.7
4%
3.3
6.1
2%
22.3
22.3
0%
12.3
13.0
Sources
FX reserves
Public agencies roll over
(includes only BCRA loans)
Public agencies new debt
(includes only BCRA loans)
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Traded volumes
Monthly avg
Outstanding amount
(US$ millions)
In hands of ANSES/BCRA*
Bonar 14
279.7
3,602
55%
Bonar 15
98.2
1,407
32%
Bonar 16
n.a.
2,326
87%
Pro 12
4.9
269
n.a.
Pre 9
2.4
74
n.a.
Pro 13
56.1
983
11%
n.a.
Boden 2014
7.3
140
Par bonds
10.3
1,222
2%
0.2
13,631
68%
Discounts
61.0
5,681
53%
Bogar 18
83.6
603.7
6,398
36,205
15%
Total
Monthly traded volumes at MAE (Mercado Abierto Electrnico), cash basis, in millions of U.S. dollars (average of July, August and
September 2013). Outstanding stock as of June 30, 2013. n.a.: Not available.. Sources: MAE, IAMC, Superintendencia de AFJP,
Economy Ministry, and Santander.
Traded volumes
Monthly avg
Outstanding amount
(US$ million)
In hands of ANSES/BCRA*
Boden 15
1,009.2
5,818
6%
Global 17
20.7
966
0%
Bonar 18
n.a.
3,374
83%
Bonar X
493.8
6,398
37%
Bonar 19
n.a.
961
85%
Discount
39.3
10,746
53%
Par
71.6
6,695
2%
Total
1,635
34,957
Monthly traded volumes at MAE (Mercado Abierto Electrnico), cash basis, in millions of U.S. dollars (average of July, August
and September 2013). Outstanding stock as of June 30, 2013. n.a.: Not available. Sources: MAE, IAMC, Superintendencia de
AFJP, Economy Ministry, and Santander.
Traded volumes
Monthly avg
Outstanding amount
(notional, US$ mn)
In hands of ANSES/BCRA*
ARS
42.3
7,152
0%
USD
44.1
20,324
11%
EUR
n.a.
24,651
0%
JPY
n.a.
467
0%
ARS
42.3
7,152
0%
Total
86
52,594
Monthly traded volumes at MAE (Mercado Abierto Electrnico), cash basis, in millions of U.S. dollars (average of July, August and
September 2013). Outstanding stock as of June 30, 2013. *n.a.: Not available. Sources: MAE, Superintendencia de AFJP, Economy
Ministry, and Santander.
CERt 1 CPI i 2 k
CERt =
CPI i 3
Where t is the day, i is the month, and k is days in month i-1. The value of the CER index for May 1
equals the value of the index on April 30 times the daily geometric average of the inflation observed
during March.
Between the seventh day of the month and the last day of that same month:
1
CERt 1 CPI i 1 k
CERt =
CPI i 2
Where t is the day, i is the month, and k is days in month i. The value of the CER index for May 7
equals the value of the index on May 6 times the daily geometric average of the inflation observed
during April.
The objective of adjusting ARS-denominated bonds by CER was to maintain the real value of amortization
installments and coupon payments of the debt issued after the pesofication, i.e., Bodens, Bocones, and Bogars.
Consequently, the way to model all those bonds is to apply the CER index to the initial value of the principal
amount and to calculate amortization and interest payments on the gross-indexed principal (i.e., the nominal
amount). Therefore, each amortization or coupon payment is calculated on the total indexed principal (the
current nominal value of the principal).
Example:
Period
T0
T1
T2
T3
T4
Total
CER
1.00
1.20
1.40
1.60
1.80
Source: Santander.
Indexed
principal
(in ARS)
100.00
120.00
140.00
160.00
180.00
Percentage
amortized
Amount
amortized
(in ARS)
25%
25%
25%
25%
100%
30
35
40
45
150
Residual real
amortization
Coupon
100% real
75% real
50% real
25% real
0% real
2% + CER
2% + CER
2% + CER
2% + CER
2% + CER
Interest
amount
(in ARS)
2.40
2.10
1.60
0.90
ARS BONAR
This category comprises peso-denominated Bonars issued under local law. There is only one outstanding series
of fixed-rate ARS Bonars (issued in 2007) and two series of floating-rate, BADLAR-linked ARS Bonars, also
known by local players as Bocans (issued in 2009 as part of a debt exchange for Prstamos Garantizados).
BADLAR-linked Bonars trade on a dirty-price basis. Trading hours are generally 9:00 to 15:00 local time.
Bloomberg ticker
ARGBON <Govt>
Maturity
Coupon
Quarterly, fixed at 15.40% annually for the first four coupons. Since April
30, 2010, the annual coupon is equivalent to the private banks BADLAR
rate (provided by the Central Bank, BADLARPP Index at Bloomberg), plus
a 275-bp spread. The BADLAR rate will be the average observed between
the 10th business day prior to the beginning of the coupon period and the
10th business day prior to the end of the coupon period. It is paid on the
30th of January, April, July, and October, or the following business day.
Day count
Amortization
Bullet.
Convention
10
Issuer
Maturity
Coupon
Day count
Amortization
Convention
ARS BODEN
ARS-denominated Bodens (Bonos del Estado Nacional) are government securities issued by the National
Treasury after the declaration of default in December 2001, mainly as compensation for the effects of
asymmetric pesofication in the banking system. Bodens trade in the market on a dirty-price basis. Trading
hours are generally 9:00 to 15:00 local time.
Bloomberg ticker
ARGBON <Govt>
BODEN 2014
Issuer
Ministry of the Economy. Boden 2014s were initially issued as part of the
defaulted debt exchange program carried out by Argentina in 2005. The
purpose of the issuance was to exchange the Treasury Notes subscribed by
the Pension Fund Administrators (AFJPs) in December 2001. The 2014
series was authorized by Resolution 170/05 from the Ministry of Economy
and Production. Date of issuance September 30, 2004..
Face value
Maturity
Coupon
Day count
Amortization
11
BOCON
Bocones (Bonos de Consolidacin) are government securities issued by the National Treasury to cancel debts
with pension beneficiaries or public sector suppliers. Bocones trade in the market on a dirty-price basis.
Trading hours are generally 9:00 to 15:00 local time.
Bloomberg ticker
ARGBOC <Govt>
Face value
Maturity
January 3, 2016.
Coupon
Day count
Amortization
120 monthly installments; Each of the first 119 installments of 0.84%, and
the last of 0.04%, of principal adjusted by CER. First amortization paid on
February 3, 2006.
12
Issuer
Face value
Maturity
Coupon
Day count
Amortization
Face value
Maturity
Coupon
Day count
Amortization
120 monthly installments. Each of the first 119 installments of 0.83%, and
the last one of 1.23%, of principal adjusted by CER. First amortization
payment will be on April 15, 2014.
13
BOGAR
Bogars (Bonos Garantizados) were issued as part of a restructuring of provincial liabilities. Bogar 18s trade in
the market on a dirty-price basis. Unlike most other CER-indexed bonds, the bonds currently have a credit
rating from Fitch only. Trading hours are generally 9:00 to 15:00 local time.
Bloomberg ticker
ARGBON <Govt>
BOGAR 2018
14
Issuer
Face value
Maturity
February 4, 2018.
Coupon
Day count
Amortization
Additional features
BOGAR 2020
Issuer
Face value
Maturity
October 4, 2020.
Coupon
Day count
Amortization
15
ARGENT <Govt>
ARS DISCOUNT
Issuer
Maturity
Face value
Coupon
Day count
Amortization
ARS PAR
16
Issuer
Maturity
Face value
Coupon
Semiannual step-up coupon. First coupon paid on March 31, 2006. Coupon
schedule: December 31, 2003-March 31, 2009: 0.63%; March 31, 2009March 31, 2019: 1.18%; March 31, 2019-March 31, 2029: 1.77%; March
31, 2029-December 31, 2038: 2.48%. Short first coupon and short last
coupon.
Day count
Amortization
ARGBON <Govt>
BODEN 2015
Issuer
Face value
US$100.
Maturity
October 3, 2015.
Coupon
Semiannual 7% fixed coupon. Paid on the third of April and October, or the
following business day. First coupon paid on April 3, 2006.
Day count
Amortization
Bullet.
Face value
US$1.
Maturity
Coupon
Semiannual 7% fixed coupon. Paid on the 17th of April and October, or the
following business day. The first coupon was paid on October 17, 2007.
Day count
Amortization
Bullet.
17
ARGENT <Govt>
USD DISCOUNT
Issuer
Maturity
Face value
US$1.
Coupon
Day count
Amortization
USD PAR
Issuer
Maturity
Face value
US$1.
Coupon
Day count
Amortization
GLOBAL 2017
18
Issuer
Face value
US$1.
Maturity
June 2, 2017.
Coupon
Day count
Amortization
Bullet.
19
GDP-LINKED SECURITIES
GDP-linked securities (also known as GDP kickers or GDP warrants) were issued as part of the debt exchange
of 2005 and phase II in 2010. They initially were attached to Discounts, Pars, and Quasi-Discounts, but started
trading independently as of November 29, 2005. Trading hours are generally 9:00 to 15:00 local time.
Bloomberg ticker
ARGENT <Govt>
Expiration date
Payments
Calculation date
Payment conditions
Payment made if three conditions met: (1) Actual Real GDP for reference
year exceeds Base Case GDP for that year; (2) annual growth of Actual
Real GDP for reference year exceeds Base Case GDP growth rate for
that year; and (3) accumulated total payments do not exceed payment cap.
Payment calculation
20
Payment cap
Payments will cease if accumulated total amount paid exceeds 48% of the
notional amount expressed in each currency. Including the estimated
payment for the 2012 reference year, the accumulated total amount paid is
23.4% for ARS warrants and 18.0% for USD warrants.
Amortization
None.
Base Case
GDP Growth
4.26%
3.55%
3.42%
3.30%
3.29%
3.26%
3.26%
3.26%
3.22%
3.03%
3.00%
3.00%
3.00%
3.00%
3.00%
Reference
Year
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030
2031
2032
2033
2034
Base Case
GDP Growth
3.00%
3.00%
3.00%
3.00%
3.00%
3.00%
3.00%
3.00%
3.00%
3.00%
3.00%
3.00%
3.00%
3.00%
3.00%
Base case GDP subject to adjustment if INDEC elects to change the year for base prices from 1993 to another year.
Source: Economy Ministry.
21
22
Reference
Conventions
Maturity
Settlement
Generally T+2.
Liquidity
BRAZIL
MACRO BACKGROUND
Brazils debt markets have undergone a remarkable transformation over the past few years, coinciding with
dramatic changes in the countrys economic and financial situation, and ultimately leading to Brazils upgrade
to investment-grade status by the major rating agencies. Two agencies decided to upgrade even before the
collapse of Lehman Brothers, with S&P moving first in April 2008 and Fitch following in May 2008. Finally,
Moodys decided to match its peers in September 2009, once the Brazilian economy proved resilient after a
massive external shock. Over the course of 2011, Fitch, Moodys, and S&P each announced (the first in April,
the second in June, and the third in November) a one-notch upgrade that moved Brazils long-term foreign
currency sovereign rating to the second to last investment-grade rating (the first is now at BBB, the second at
Baa2, and the third at BBB).
Both Fitch and Moodys currently have stable outlooks (the former since April 2011 and the latter starting in
October 2013), while S&P recently downgraded its outlook to negative (since June 2013). The rating agencies
based their upgrades largely on the fact that Brazils potential growth rate had increased, which helped support
the medium-term fiscal outlook and external liquidity position. However, as the potential growth rate appears
to have decelerated, inflation has remained stubbornly high, and fiscal accounts have deteriorated over the last
two years, there has been increased concern among investors and analysts that there is a chance of a
downgrade, especially from S&P, as it currently has a negative outlook on Brazils foreign currency long-term
sovereign debt rating.
Brazils policy framework since 1999, the main driver of the countrys recent economic success, had been
based on three main principles, or the so-called triad: a floating FX regime, inflation targeting, and tight
fiscal policy. This stable and predictable macro framework reduced the economys vulnerability to external
shocks and paved the way for faster growth. Starting in the mid-2000s, policymakers have managed to
stabilize overall macroeconomic policy and effectively (1) transform Brazil into a net external creditor
beginning in 2008 (that is, international reserves exceed the gross external debt), (2) reduce inflation
significantly to more predictable single-digit figures since 2004, (3) cut the Selic rate by an impressive 1,975
bps since its recent peak in May 2003 to an all-time low of 7.25% starting in October 2012, and (4) change the
internal debt profile radically by virtually eliminating the exposure of local bonds to currency fluctuations and
substantially reducing sensitivity to interest rate fluctuations (the share of FX-linked bonds is converging to
zero, while the share of Selic floaters fell about 32 p.p. from 52.4% in December 2004 to around 20.4% in
September 2012, the lowest on record).
Brazil received considerable attention in the three years after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, as it was among
the least affected economies during the international financial crisis and ensuing global recession of 2008-09.
However, a bumpy recovery path in 2012, accompanied by an increasingly assertive and discretionary policy,
has made investors much less interested in Brazilian local assets. Over the course of 2012 and 2013, Brazilian
economic policy has become increasingly unpredictable and more discretionary. Oftentimes, substantial market
moves in the FX and rates markets have been based on expectations of either Central Bank (Bacen)
intervention or government policy action. Indeed, any articles, news, and blogs published on any of those
subjects (with opinions and quotes from unidentified government sources) have, for example, pushed the BRL
to move substantially, especially when it was mostly range bound. Many market players have gotten the
impression that Brazil policymakers interpretation of each of the principles of the so-called triad has
become increasingly fuzzy in the past two years.
Part of the reason behind for the flexibilization of the policy principles may be that the recent external
environment of low growth and low-interest-rate monetary policy for a prolonged period in developed market
(DM) economies is making the implementation of policy much more challenging, especially in a country with
such unique conditions as Brazil (high interest rates, a large public sector role in the economy, and structural
supply-side restrictions due to low productivity and abundant red tape). Although many other emerging market
(EM) economies have also become more assertive and innovative in terms of policies to face this new and
unusual external environment, Brazil seems to be leading the way due to its much more aggressive role in the
23
use of discretionary policy. Brazils Central Bank has become more tolerant of higher inflation for the sake of
faster growth and structurally lower rates and is much more active in preventing BRL appreciation (despite the
IPCA being mostly in the upper half of the 2.5-6.5% inflation target range since 2010), while the government
has become less focused on fiscal austerity (in part complicating the Central Banks job of fighting inflation).
One of the consequences of the more discretionary and flexible policy approach to the triad was a strong
negative price action in all Brazilian assets since Fed officials first hinted that there could be a tapering of
QE3, back in May 2013. Although the Central Bank has been tightening policy since April 2013 (with a
hawkish tone) and also unveiled an FX intervention program in August to contain the BRL, the fiscal accounts
have been deteriorating quite rapidly, which has triggered concern among investors. The Central Bank
announced in mid August 2013 one of the biggest FX intervention programs in EM history, with daily auctions
of US$500 million in FX swaps from Mondays through Thursdays, and US$1 billion in FX credit lines on
Fridays, lasting until at least December 31, 2013. Our calculations (which include local holidays) suggest that
the total program would reach around US$53 billion (US$35 billion in FX swaps and US$18 billion in credit
lines) if ended by the earliest date announced (December 31, 2013). The BRL managed to post a strong
reversal (of as much as 12% at the peak) right after the FX intervention program was announced , but has
started to weaken once again since mid-October on the back of a broad-based recovery in the USD (as
measured by the DXY index) and investors ongoing concern about Brazils fiscal dynamics. In fact, local rates
have performed much worse that the FX, in part because the FX intervention program has been largely offset
by increasing concern about fiscal numbers.
Fiscal data and any comments from government officials regarding fiscal targets (for this and next year) are
likely to remain the main drivers for rates and also to an extent for the BRL. Additionally, the sovereign debt
ratings agencies, especially S&P (which currently has the only negative outlook on Brazils long-term foreigncurrency sovereign debt rating) will also be waiting for the final 2013 fiscal results as well as any fiscal
commitments for 2014 before taking action on the rating.
Many investors have started to question Brazils growth outlook, not only from a structural growth standpoint,
but also based on the lack of stability in the policy framework. Investors may be increasingly concerned about
the potential exhaustion of the demand-side growth model, which was successful during most of the last
decade, because of increasingly evident restrictions in the supply side (including loss investment ratios and
poor productivity). The economic recovery has underperformed expectations even after massive monetary
policy easing of 525 bps in the 14 months after the August 2011 surprise Selic rate cut, along with a sizable
fiscal stimulus and amid record low unemployment and relatively high consumer confidence. In fact, a sharp
deceleration in economic activity since 1Q11 has become an important market driver, especially as the Central
Bank embarked on an aggressive easing cycle and more assertive FX policy, leading to a sizable rally in rates
and contributing to BRL weakness over the course of 2012. A tightening cycle in 2013 (since April) along with
widening 10Y UST rates (due to anticipation to tapering) and deteriorating fiscal numbers has triggered poor
price action in both rates and the BRL over the course of 2H13.
The combination of an increase in the IOF tax in Brazil and the inclusion of local government-issued MBonos
in Mexico in the WGBI index in October 2010 helped shift offshore flows from local instruments in Brazil to
equivalent assets in Mexico. In fact, one of the key developments since 2010 was the generalized use of the
IOF tax (either by increasing/decreasing it in markets that had already been taxed or by imposing it on new
markets) as a tool to regulate foreign inflows and/or manage the dynamics of some markets (effectively acting
as a macroprudential measure). The first effort was announced by the government in October 2010 when the
IOF tax on fixed income investments applied to nonresidents increased from 2% to 6% (increasing first to 4%
on October 5 and then to 6% on October 18, with the latter change also applying to foreign investors margin
deposits in the futures markets), which effectively reduced liquidity in several market segments (such as fixedrate NFN-Fs) in a significant manner (see Regulatory and Tax Issues section. The government decided to
lower the IOF tax on fixed income and FX derivatives in June to contain the losses seen in the local bond and
FX markets, which in part seems to have only reduced the losses driven by investors ongoing concerns about
the deterioration in Brazils fiscal accounts, which may end up in a sovereign rating downgrade.
24
Buybacks in
2009
139
65
72
3
916
238
35
7
30
28
129
36
-
Buybacks in
2010
406
152
157
60
38
2,803
621
192
147
192
81
71
30
247
-
Buybacks in
2011
412
353
59
1,865
602
69
144
380
10
10
6
Buybacks in
2012
12
6
7
675
189
57
76
135
-
Buybacks in
2013 (Jan-Aug)
449
140
12
32
10
21
10
7
88
15
272
-
5
74
1
85
1,057
-
11
20
5
18
591
-
219
706
291
415
249
-
1,056
3,209
2,278
555
449
5
-
Outstanding
(Aug 2013)
1,149
713
436
29,845
563
381
1,090
2,552
1,123
2,360
377
3,143
2,161
1,436
553
1,671
2,508
599
2,122
3,112
953
3,141
6,097
1,317
1,030
1,439
2,310
37,091
25
The market for international debt suffered in 2011 together with the rest of the capital market, but it bounced
back as sentiment improved in 2012. However, the anticipation of potential tapering in the Feds QE3 policy
also affected primary issuance starting in May 2013 and lasted a few weeks. The important thing to keep in
mind is that Brazil does not depend on the international market to cover its public sector borrowing
requirements. The Treasury pays attention to the market for USD-denominated debt, but the key policy
objective is to maintain a liquid benchmark curve to help the private sector obtain funding. After debt buyback
operations rebounded in 2010 compared to 2009 (increasing from US$1.1 billion to US$3.2 billion), the
government again reduced the pace in 2011 (with new supply falling to US$2.3 billion in 2011).
The 2008-09 international crisis had a more direct impact on private sector credit, both domestically and in
terms of the access of Brazilian firms to the international capital market. The governments response was to
implement a series of measures to ease the credit crunch and support economic activity, such as lowering
reserve requirements, implementing incentives for larger commercial banks to acquire the portfolios of smaller
lenders, and providing tax relief to some sectors. Probably the most innovative measures implemented were to
provide foreign currency liquidity to the local market after the international capital markets shut down in 2008
following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, in the form of sales in the spot and derivatives markets, foreign
currency loans to the private sector, and currency swap arrangements with foreign central banks. Some of these
measures, such as FX swaps and FX credit lines, have been reintroduced in response to the pressure seen on
the BRL given increased investor anticipation of the Feds tapering of its QE3 policy.
The impact of the international financial crisis was probably the most apparent in the FX market, causing the
BRL to plunge from a precrisis high of around USD/BRL1.54 to a low of USD/BRL2.62 at the beginning of
December 2008, a 69% move in about four months. The Central Bank injected US$10.2 billion in foreign
currency through its FX repo facility (between September and November 2008), provided another US$7
billion in funding for trade finance lines (October 2008-March 2009), and sold US$14.5 billion in the FX spot
market. In total, almost US$32 billion in foreign currency liquidity was provided to the market. In addition, the
Central Bank sold about US$37.4 billion in FX swaps in 4Q08.
About a year after Lehman collapsed, the Central Bank closed out its position in FX swaps, US$5.4 billion in
trade finance line funding was returned to the Central Bank, and in May 2009 the Central Bank resumed its
precrisis policy of buying foreign currency in the spot market, adding an astounding US$116.85 billion to
reserves between May 2009 and September 2011, for an average monthly purchase of US$4 billion during that
period. International reserves stood at around US$206 billion when Lehman Brothers collapsed in September
2008, touching a low of US$187 billion in February 2009 and recovering since then. By the end of 2011, they
had risen to about US$379 billion, making Brazil the worlds sixth largest foreign reserve holder. Although the
Central Bank stopped its USD purchases in the spot market between October 2011 and February 2012 due to
the escalation of the European crisis, it resumed its purchases from February to May 2012, buying a
cumulative US$11.2 billion during the period. Foreign reserves as a percentage of GDP have increased rapidly
over the last decade amid elevated terms of trade and strong foreign inflows (mainly due to consistently high
FDI and bouts of strong portfolio flows), accompanied by long-term currency appreciation over the last few
years (from a peak of around USD/BRL4 in 2002 to closer to USD/BRL2 more recently). Foreign reserves
virtually trebled from 6.6% in January 2002 to a high of 18% in November 2012, falling back only slightly to
16.2% in October 2013.
In 2011, the governments response to the escalating European debt crisis was much more modest, with
measures such as a payroll tax reduction in September 2011 in a few export-led sectors such as apparel and
cars and the announcement in November 2011 of a slower implementation of new accounting rules on the sale
of portfolio loans in order to help small and mid-sized banks increase their funding, as the European debt crisis
threatened liquidity. In December 2011, the Finance Ministry announced another set of measures in the form of
subsidies (with announced costs of around BRL7.6 billion or 0.15% of GDP between 2011 and 2012),
implemented via lowering the tax rates on different sectors, including the IOF tax on some types of consumer
loans (reversing the increase from 1.5% to 3.0% back in April 2011), income tax on some individuals, taxes on
home appliances, taxes on low-income housing, taxes on some food items, and lowering the IOF tax to zero on
foreign investment in stocks and infrastructure debentures.
The escalation of the European debt crisis over the course of 2011, along with incremental FX intervention
efforts, caused the BRL to weaken sharply from a 13-year high of USD/BRL1.53 in July 2011 to a 2-year low
26
of USD/BRL1.96 in September, a 28% move in about two months. This severe shift in the market triggered a
reversal in the Central Banks FX policy from a massive purchase of USD in the spot and currency swaps
markets in the first three quarters of the year to a complete halt in spot purchases and the initiation of USD
supply via currency swaps in September. Bacen managed to buy US$48 billion in the spot market through
September 15 (with almost continuous daily buying), but abstained from further purchases in the remainder of
2011. The spot purchases resumed in February 2012 briefly until May, for a cumulative US$11.2 billion, as the
BRL rallied in 1H12 (testing the 1.7 to the downside), but Bacens demand for the greenback has since ended.
In the FX swap market, the Central Banks net position started in neutral territory in December 2010 and
peaked at a long US$11.5 billion position by April 2011 due to an aggressive supply of reverse FX swaps
(equivalent to USD purchases) to counter a stronger BRL. Bacen then shifted gears once again by the summer
of that year (in the Southern Cone), moving its FX swaps exposure to negative territory (offering USD to the
market) given the rapid move from 1.7 in early 2Q12 to about 2.1 later in the quarter, reaching a record low of
more than US$10.8 billion in short positions in July 2012. In the three months to November, the Central Bank
maintained a moderately long position that hovered around US$3-5 billion as the BRL reversed closer to the 2
handle. However, by the beginning of December, the Central Bank switched its net FX swaps from a long to a
modest short position of about US$215 million, a more appropriate level given that the BRL flirted with 2.14,
its weakest level against the greenback since May 2009.
Over the course of 2012, the Central Bank continued to deliberately move interest rates closer to international
standards by aggressively easing monetary policy, while the government took a much more proactive role
compared to 2011. Some of the targeted measures taken by the government included: (1) reduction of either
import or IPI tax for infrastructure and cars in 2Q12 through August (later extended until the end of 2013) and
standardization of the tax structure on ports; (2) extension of tax cuts on appliances and construction materials
(first announced in December 2011); (3) reduced BNDES loan rates for trucks and capital goods (rates fell
from 5.5% to 2.5%); (4) reduction in utility rates by an average of 20% for industrial and retail sectors, to start
in 2013; (5) extension of the payroll tax cut to additional sectors; and (6) announcement by BNDES of a
reduction in its so-called TJLP rate for long-term infrastructure investment to 5% starting in January 2013 ,
from 5.5%, while it will extend for another year by BRL100 billion ($48 billion) an emergency credit line
established during the 2009 credit freeze to fund the purchase of capital goods.
Aggressive expansion in Bacens FX swaps position
Bacen USD FX swaps position (US$ bn)
USD/BRL (inverted scale, RHS)
10
1.50
1.60
1.70
-10
1.80
-20
1.90
-30
2.00
-40
2.10
2.20
-50
2.30
-60
2.40
-70
Nov-10
2.50
Mar-12
Aug-12
Feb-13
Aug-13
As international markets started in 2Q13 to anticipate a potential tapering of the Feds QE3 policy, many EM
assets suffered important losses. The Central Bank initially responded in June with a relatively discretionary
supply of FX credit lines and FX swaps. Technocrats from the Finance Ministry and Bacen had been aware
since early 2013 that the BRL had to depreciate further in order to redress some macroeconomic imbalances
and adjust to new external conditions (less sanguine terms of trade and slower Chinese demand). However, as
the BRL weakened as much as 26% from a recent low of 1.94 in March 2013 to 2.45 in August 2013 (weakest
level since December 2008), we believe Bacen officials probably started to worry about the speed and
27
magnitude of the move, fearing an increasing loss of confidence among investors (both local and offshore) that
could lead to an overshooting in the exchange rate.
With increased pressure on the BRL and DI curve came forceful action by the Central Bank, which announced
a comprehensive FX intervention program on August 22. The main aim of the program was to provide USD
liquidity via daily FX swaps auctions for US$500 million (between Mondays and Thursdays) and weekly FX
credit lines worth US$1 billion until at least December 31, 2013 (suggesting it could be extended if needed).
Our calculations (which exclude weekends and holidays) suggest the total program could reach at least US$35
billion in FX swaps and US$18 billion in FX credit lines, for a total of around US$53 billion, probably the
most aggressive such FX program in the EM world. However, the total will depend on whether the program is
extended for a longer period (beyond the tentative deadline of December 31, 2013) and the speed at which the
Central Bank rolls over the maturing FX swaps. In 2013, the government implemented a dual strategy: (1)
eliminating the IOF tax on fixed income securities and FX derivatives to help contain the pressure on the FX
market and investor confidence; and (2) supporting economic activity via fiscal incentives for car purchases
and to exporters of industrial products. The reduction in the IOF tax was aimed at increasing the attractiveness
of Brazilian assets among foreign investors, which in principle seems to have helped modestly on the margin
to increase foreign participation in the local sovereign bond market from 13.9% in December 2012, to 14.4%
in May 2013 (just before the elimination of the IOF tax), and more recently to around 17.5% in September
2013.
6
5
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
-
4
3
2
1
0
Jan-04
Jul-05
Jan-07
Jul-08
Jan-10
Jul-11
Jan-13
32.5 30.8
60%
40%
20%
28.1 29.6
22.2 20.4
35.5 36.8
Other
FX
Selic
Inflation
Fix ed
0%
-20%
Dec-06
Dec-08
Dec-10
Dec-12
In terms of auctions, after having stabilized to historical norms in the two years after the disruption seen in
2008 amid the global financial crisis, the percentage of bids rejected by the government through the traditional
auction mechanism (including first and second rounds) edged up slightly in 2011 and 2012 and increased more
strongly in 2013 (through November 14) to 18%, 28%, and 39%, respectively, from a low of 13% in 2010. The
rejection rate (the percentage of auctions in which the bids were not accepted out of the total of the amount
tendered during a given year) was about 14% in 2007, soared to 26% in 2008 amid the unraveling of the
financial crisis, but ended up stabilizing to 18% in 2009. The high rejection rate seen in 2013 probably reflects
28
the heightened market anxiety and the governments difficulty in placing bonds under acceptable conditions
due to anticipation of the Feds tapering of its QE3 policy and, in particular, concern among investors
regarding Brazils rapidly deteriorating fiscal accounts.
Meanwhile, foreign holdings of local debt instruments reached a fresh high of 17.5% in September 2013, from
about 11.5% in September 2010 (right before the IOF tax was increased from 2% to 6%) and 14.4% in May
2013 (right before the IOF tax was cut from 6% to zero). Foreign holdings had been growing steadily from
June 2007 (2.7%) to September 2010 (11.5%) and lost some momentum after the imposition of the IOF tax on
fixed income investments announced in October 2010, stabilizing at around 11.5% of the total through the end
of 2011. Although the return of the IOF tax was a significant disincentive for foreign flows, the aggressive
easing of monetary policy (between August 2011 and October 2012 it was reduced by 525 bps), pushing the
Selic monetary policy rate to a fresh low of 7.25%, helped spur interest in local bonds among the offshore
community. This helped drive foreign participation higher from an apparent lethargy in the immediate
aftermath of the October 2010 increase in the IOF (offshore participation hovered between 11.1% and 11.9%
for seventeen months until it breached the 12% mark in 1Q12).
Although foreign participation has soared from around 12% in 1Q12 to close to 18% in 3Q13, investors
ongoing concerns about Brazils fiscal dynamics and a BRL under pressure may set a speed limit going
forward. In any case, part of the increase in foreign participation in local bonds may have been driven by an
unwinding of offshore exposure via structured notes and other vehicles (local banks use their balance sheets
to buy bonds and then replicate their flows to provide exposure to international players) and a substitution to
actual exposure in local bonds. This substitution effect is hard to measure, as there in no hard data to confirm
it, but anecdotal evidence suggests it may have been considerable.
Composition of domestic public debt (BRL bn)
Dec-06 Dec-07 Dec-08 Dec-09 Dec-10 Dec-11 Dec-12 Sep-13
DOMESTIC DEBT
LFT (Selic Indexed)
LTN (zero-coupon)
NTN-B (IPCA indexed)
NTN-C (IGP-M indexed)
NTN-D (USD indexed)
NTN-F (Fixed coupon)
Securitized debt
Agricultural debt bonds
Other
FOREIGN DEBT
Bonds
USD Globals
BRL Globals
EUR
Pre-Brady
Other
Contractual debt
World Bank & IADB
Banks & Agencies
TOTAL (Domestic & Foreign)
1,094
412
347
167
66
1
48
19
4
29
144
113
88
7
16
1
2
1,225
409
325
242
66
1
132
21
5
24
109
85
62
11
12
0
-
1,265
453
239
299
59
168
15
5
27
133
101
76
11
13
0
-
1,398
500
247
330
58
224
12
5
22
99
79
59
11
9
0
-
1,603
521
355
374
65
254
9
4
22
90
69
50
7
12
0
-
1,783
549
402
454
62
280
10
4
22
83
72
55
4
12
0
-
1,917
425
552
602
66
237
8
3
23
91
78
62
2
14
0
-
1,898
388
583
617
67
207
8
3
25
91
82
66
3
14
-
31
25
6
1,237
24
20
4
1,334
32
27
5
1,397
20
17
3
1,497
21
17
4
1,693
12
7
5
1,866
13
7
6
2,008
9
3
6
1,989
LEGAL BACKGROUND
The body that oversees the local markets is the CVM (Brazilian Securities Commission), which is equivalent
to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. In 2005, in order to improve the infrastructure of the local
markets and make them more attractive to foreign investors, the governmental regulatory bodies (CVM, the
National Treasury, and the Central Bank) established a partnership with the main market agents (BM&F, the
Futures & Commodities Exchange; Bovespa, the stock exchange; CBLC, the main clearinghouse; and
ANBID, the association of investment banks). This partnership is called BEST (BrazilExcellence in
Securities Transactions). One important goal achieved by this partnership is that, since November 2006, a
29
nonresident investor can obtain registration with the CVM (and, consequently, be able to trade in the local
markets) in less than 24 hours. BEST has a useful website (http://www.bestbrazil.org.br), which includes
information about future road shows and comprehensive practical investor guides in English. The Brazilian
investment banking association ANBID and the national financial institutions association ANDIMA merged
in October 2009 to form a new entity called ANBIMA (Brazil Financial and Capital Market Association).
AMBIMA acts as a private regulatory organization and aims to regulate, jointly and constructively with the
Brazilian public institutions, those in the financial and capital markets. AMBIMA publishes fund industry
statistics and monthly rankings, taking the data sent by market participants on an ongoing basis.
Brazils Central Bank resolution #2689 of January 2000 regulated the flow of foreign investors money to all
the products traded in Brazilian financial markets. These products include all the derivatives traded in
BM&F, stocks, and government bonds.
There are three main legal requirements to be met by a foreign investor in Brazil:
1.
Nominate a legal and fiscal representative in Brazil responsible for updating the registration of all
assets within the CVM and the Central Bank. This representative can be a financial institution
authorized by the Central Bank.
2.
Obtain registrations with CVM, the Central Bank, and the Federal Revenue Service.
3.
Choose one or more custodians (authorized by CVM) and brokers. The investor can place
investments in more than one safekeeping account and with more than one custodian.
These procedures may look straightforward, but it is important to obtain advice from lawyers and fiscal
consultants who are knowledgeable about Brazilian legal requirements.
Income Tax (IR). Capital gains (earnings on equities and derivatives) are exempt from income tax.
Since February 2006, capital gains on fixed income instruments (bonds) and fixed income mutual funds
that have at least 98% of their assets allocated in Brazilian government bonds are also exempt. These
rules are not applicable to countries that do not have income taxes or where these taxes are less
than 20% (i.e., tax havens), in which case the rules are the same as for Brazilian residents: 20% on
earnings from shares, mutual funds, fixed income, swaps, and derivatives, and 15% on interest on
equity, with an exemption for dividends.
2.
Tax on Financial Activities (CPMF): The CPMF tax expired on December 31, 2007, and is no
longer collected by the Federal Revenue Service. Up until December 31, 2007, a 0.38% tax rate was
charged on some classes of assets (fixed income, swaps, futures, and options) when money was
transferred from one asset to another and on FX transactions. When the CPMF tax expired at the end of
2007, in order to replace at least part of the loss in fiscal revenues, the government increased the
IOF tax charged on loans, insurance, and FX transactions (exports, imports of goods and services,
and credit card payments). Although the CPMF no longer exists, there have been proposals to revive
it, and investors should remain aware of this.
3.
Tax on Financial Transactions (IOF). The IOF tax is a catch-all tax that may theoretically be levied
on any type of financial transaction and is often used for regulatory purposes. The IOF is a regulatory
tax and the rates can be increased or decreased by the Executive Branch from zero to 25% (ceiling)
whenever officials decide to either contain or foster the inflow of foreign currency funds into the
country, in accordance with the monetary and exchange policy goals adopted by the Brazilian
government. A brief chronology of the relevant changes faced by nonresident investors entering the local
market shows the discretionary nature of the governments usage of the IOF tax as a policy tool and could
be summarized as follows:
30
In March-October 2008, an IOF tax of 1.5% was levied on the FX transaction related to a purchase of
domestic fixed income securities by nonresidents (although transactions with derivatives remained IOFexempt). The tax was introduced as a reaction to the BRLs appreciation but was scrapped as part of
the governments response to the 2008 global financial crisis.
In October 2009, the IOF tax on portfolio investments was reintroduced at a flat rate of 2%. This time
around, however, equity investments were not exempted. Officially, the government said it reintroduced the
tax in order to avoid excesses in local asset prices, but the consensus is that the government again felt
uncomfortable with BRL appreciation and wanted to contain portfolio (and particularly IPO-related) inflows.
However, on December 1, 2011, the government decided to cut the IOF tax on equity investments to zero.
As was the case in 2008, this IOF tax is levied once, when foreign currency is converted into BRL
before it is invested in the local market. Once their assets are in BRL, cash investors are free to shift from one
asset to another. Swaps and other offshore instruments are not under Brazilian jurisdiction and thus are not
taxed. In order to avoid distortions in the ADRs market caused by the IOF tax, the government also imposed
a 1% tax on new ADR issuance by Brazilian companies.
On October 4, 2010, Finance Minister Guido Mantega announced a new increase in the IOF tax to 4% on
fixed income investments. Amid increased market talk about potential additional measures to contain the
BRL, the Finance Ministry announced a second increase in the IOF tax to 6% on October 18, 2010, levied on
any new inflows coming into fixed income securities. The Ministry clarified that although the impact was not
retroactive (existing investments would not be affected), the measure would also apply to margin deposits,
effectively raising the IOF tax levied on foreign investors positions in the futures markets from a modest
0.38% to the announced 6%. The low rate on margin deposits seemed to be a loophole that enabled investors
to avoid the IOF tax on some margin deposits used in the futures markets. The increase in the tax on margin
deposits to 6% only affected incremental inflows to be used as margin, specifically when the FX transaction
takes place. However, the measure did not affect the actual BMF margin calculation. In contrast, the IOF tax
applied to equity investors remained unchanged at 2%.
Some complementary measures were announced by Brazils Monetary Council (comprising the Finance
minister, the Planning minister, and the Central Bank president) to prevent investors from circumventing the
higher IOF tax on fixed income securities and funds. The Council decided that investors that were invested
in equities and wanted to migrate to fixed income had to pay the new 6% IOF tax, as some investors had
been sidestepping the higher 6% rate applied on incoming flows to the fixed income markets by investing
first in equities and then switching to rates. In late October 2010, the government clarified some remaining
issues: (1) nonresident accounts would not be able to lend securities (i.e., reverse repo) (this highlights the
governments resolution to limit leverage, since some offshore accounts had been using lending proceeds
as margin deposit to leverage their accounts); and (2) daily adjustments received from futures contracts are
not subject to symbolic FX transactions, which left the door open for investors to use the proceeds to buy
fixed income assets without being liable to pay the IOF tax.
In 2011 the government decided to impose an IOF tax on other financial transactions that implied
additional inflows of foreign currency. In March 2011, the government increased the IOF tax on
international bond sales and loans from 5.38% (applicable to liabilities of up to 90 days) to 6.00%
(liabilities of up to 360 days and extended to 720 days on April 6). In July the government was even
more aggressive, announcing a measure authorizing the CVM to define the trading rules for derivatives
markets (margin, collateral, leverage, tenors, etc.) and to collect an IOF tax that could reach as high as 25%,
but was initially set at 1%. The tax will apply to the notional value of FX-related derivatives equivalent
to an increase of at least US$10 million in short USD positions compared to the previous trading day. The
IOF was also used as a macroprudential measure when the government raised the tax levied on consumer
loans (excluding mortgages) from 1.5% to 3.0% on April 8, 2011, in order to contain frothiness in the credit
market. However, that move was partially reversed in December 2011 and December 2012, as a way to
support the local economy given the escalation of the European debt crisis and U.S. fiscal cliff disputes.
The government reduced the tax by 2% to zero for portfolio flows in equities.
In 2012, the government continued to extend new restrictions on foreign inflows by imposing the IOF on new
transactions. In February, as the BRL tested the 1.7 handle, a four-month high, the Ministry of Finance
31
announced that the 6% IOF tax on international bond sales, intercompany loans, loans abroad or BDRs (Brazilian
Depositary Receipts), applicable so far on any transactions with maturity of up to two years, would apply to those
with maturity of up to three years starting March 1, 2012. Bacen extended the 6% IOF to loans that Brazilian
exporters used to anticipate future proceeds from sales, or the so-called export prepayments. The IOF also
applied to any inflows classified under long-term export contracts, which were used as collateral. However, the
Central Bank exempted the payment of the IOF in cases of advanced payment agreements or exports
prepayments if they are shorter than one year (such as the ACC operations), and Bacen later reversed the IOF tax
on all exporters in December 2012 to help alleviate USD availability and support growth. A few days later, the
government increased the maturity on international bond sales and loans from three years to five years, and
imposed a retroactive payment for those who had executed such transactions in the last three years. This last
extension in the duration surprised FX market participants, as the external environment had been deteriorating
while the BRL had weakened sharply. In fact, on June 14, 2012, when the BRL flirted with 2.1, the government
decided to reverse course and once again reduce the duration of foreign loans from five years to two years, and
later reduced it again to 360 days on December 5, 2012.
However, over the course of 2012, the government also started to unwind some of the IOF taxes that it had
implemented as macroprudential measures to reignite economic growth, with measures such as: (1)
exempting exporters from paying the 1% IOF tax on FX derivatives as long as their currency exposure is 1.2x
their exports in the previous year (the amount in excess will be subject to IOF tax); (2) reducing the tax on
individual loans (from 2.5% to 1.5%) and cutting the reserve requirements for auto loans, benefiting
all banks; and (3) creating an IOF tax exemption on mortgage-backed securities, or Certificados de
Recebiveis Imobiliarios (CRIs) as long as at least 67% of a real estate funds assets are CRIs in the first two
years of the life of the fund, and they increase to 85% after that.
Finally, in June 2013 the government decided to reduce the IOF tax on fixed income assets from 6% to 0%
and cut the IOF tax on FX derivatives from 1% to 0%, effectively dismantling all the actual barriers
preventing foreigners from entering the local rates and FX markets. The radical changes were triggered by the
increasing pressure on the BRL to depreciate and on DI rates to widen amid anticipation, beginning in May
2013, of the tapering of the Feds QE3 policy.
In addition to these taxes, the CVM charges a quarterly registration fee of BRL7,872 and, at the end of
the calendar year, 0.1% on net equities of less than BRL4,100,000.
For a list of countries labeled as tax havens by the Brazilian tax authority, please see Brazils Federal
Revenue Service SRF IN 188.
32
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Dec-04
Other
FX
Selic
Inflation
Fixed
Nov-05
Nov-06
Nov-07
Nov-08
Nov-09
Nov-10
Nov-11
Nov-12
Data through October 2013. Sources: Brazil Central Bank (Bacen) and Santander.
33
34
LTN
LTNs (Letras do Tesouro Nacional) are fixed income instruments issued by the National Treasury that
account for about 22% of domestic public debt, or BRL583 billion (as of September 2013). Since 2007, the
Treasury consolidated its issuance of fixed-rate bonds, focusing on 6-, 12-, 24-, and 36-month LTNs with
maturities matching the quarterly DI futures (i.e., the first day of January, April, July, and October). LTNs are
auctioned on a weekly basis. The shorter tenor is initially offered with a term to maturity of roughly nine
months (with a fixed maturity date), which continues to be auctioned until six months before its maturity; once
it reaches six months, another LTN is issued with a nine-month term.
Bloomberg ticker
BLTN <Govt>
SUMMARY OF TERMS
Description
Face value
BRL1,000.
Tenor
Current on-the-run issues are April 14, July 15, and July 17. A new tenor
may have a maturity of up to four years.
Coupon
Zero coupon.
Day count
Amortization
Bullet.
PRIMARY AUCTION
Auction schedule
Bidding process
Each participating financial institution may submit no more than five bids.
Each bid must indicate the amount and the price offered.
Allocation process
The allocation starts at the highest price and goes to the lowest. The
Treasury has discretion to issue less (or more) than the announced amount.
If the full amount offered in the competitive auction is sold, primary dealers
will be entitled to buy additional LTNs in the second-round auction, at the
average price reached in the competitive auction. The amounts eventually
on offer in the second-round auction are announced together with the terms
of the auction.
35
120
103
100
87
72
73
60
60
52
40
40
49
28
26
20
Jan 17
Jul 16
Jan 16
Jul 15
Apr 15
Jan 15
Oct 14
Jul 14
Apr 14
Jan 14
Jul 17
80
SECONDARY MARKET
Trading
LTNs are among the most liquid Brazilian government debt instruments.
According to data provided by the Central Bank, the average daily turnover
in the secondary market in October 2013 for the Jan. 17 LTNs, the most
liquid, was BRL974 million. These highly liquid instruments were followed
by average daily turnover of BRL936 million for the Apr. 14, BRL793
million for the Jan. 14, and BRL788 million for the Jul. 14 LTNs.
Settlement
TRADING
LTNs are demanded by local mutual funds (mainly the strictly fixed income funds), because they are the
easiest and safest way of taking non-leveraged positions in Brazilian rates.
Historically, the perception of Brazilian sovereign risk has been worse than perception of BM&F systemic risk
(which is quite odd, in our opinion, given that the largest share of collateral deposited at BM&F is in
government bonds), so the LTN curve has usually traded above the DI curve. Although this gap is not stable
over time, it provides some room for arbitrage, with players buying or short-selling LTNs and taking opposite
positions in the DI future of the corresponding maturityand choosing either to maintain the trade until
maturity (thus earning the spread) or to trade the spread fluctuation in the market. In the local market, it is
common to quote this operation as a spread between the curves in basis points (local brokers usually offer a
complete bundle, long DI/short bond or vice versa). Another common way of expressing LTN prices is as a
percentage of CDI, by the following formula:
where LTN is the annualized discount rate of the LTN and DI is the market price of the DI future of the same
maturity. Under this approach, a LTN quoted at more than 100% of CDI is being traded with a premium over
the DI curve and at a discount for percentages under 100%.
36
NTN-F
NTN-Fs (Notas do Tesouro Nacional srie F), like LTNs, are fixed income instruments issued by the National
Treasury; they account for about 12% of domestic public debt or BRL207 billion (as of September 2013). The
differences reside in the cash flows (NTN-Fs pay semiannual coupons) and the tenors (NTN-Fs are longerterm securities). NTN-Fs were first issued in 2003 as part of a strategy to increase the share of fixed income
instruments in the public debt profile and create a term structure of benchmark rates for long maturities in
Brazil. The Treasury offers 3-, 5-, and 10-year NTN-Fs, with the 10-year being the longest currently available
after the introduction of a new bond in March 2012 that is due on January 1, 2023.
Bloomberg ticker
BNTNF <Govt>
SUMMARY OF TERMS
Description
Face value
BRL1,000.
Tenor
Current on-the-runs mature in Jan. 18, Jan. 21, and Jan. 23.
Coupon
Day count
Amortization
PRIMARY AUCTION
Auction schedule
The Treasury usually announces tenors and types of bonds it will offer in
its weekly auctions at the beginning of each month. Traditional auctions
normally occur every other week on Thursdays. The terms of each auction
are announced on the Wednesday immediately before the auction (and can
be found in Portuguese at https://www.tesouro.fazenda.gov.br/pt/dividapublica-federal/leiloes). On Thursday, bids are submitted electronically
through the OFPUB system to the Central Bank between 11:00 a.m. and
11:30 a.m. local time. Results are announced by 12:00 p.m. local time.
Bidding process
Each participating financial institution may submit no more than five bids.
Each bid must indicate the amount and the price offered.
Allocation process
The allocation starts at the highest price and goes to the lowest. The
Treasury has discretion to issue less (or more) than the announced amount.
If the full amount offered in the competitive auction is sold, primary dealers
will be entitled to buy additional NTN-Fs in the second round auction, at
the average price reached in the competitive auction. The amounts
eventually on offer in the second round auction are announced together
with the terms of the auction.
37
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
74
80
39
42
33
15
8
2014
2015
2017
2018
2019
2021
2023
SECONDARY MARKET
38
Trading
Settlement
LFT
LFTs (Letras Financeiras do Tesouro) are floating-rate instruments issued by the National Treasury. These
bonds are indexed to the Selic rate and represent less than one-fourth (from about one-third in 2011) of
domestic public debt, or BRL387 billion (as of October 2012). One of the Treasurys priorities has been to
reduce the participation of LFTs in the total stock of government debt over the last few years, but 2012
probably has been the most successful year in recent history when judged by that metric (outstanding volume
in public hands fell by over 23% between December 2011 and September 2012). LFTs are usually traded with
a premium over the Selic (the holder receives the Selic rate plus a fixed rate); however, given certain
supply/demand imbalances, this premium turns into a discount on some (rare) occasions.
Bloomberg ticker
BLFT <Govt>
SUMMARY OF TERMS
Description
Face value
BRL1,000.
Tenor
Coupon
Day count
Amortization
Bullet.
PRIMARY AUCTION
Auction schedule
The Treasury usually announces tenors and types of bonds it will offer in
its weekly auctions at the beginning of each month. Traditional auctions
normally occur once a month on Thursdays. The terms of each auction are
announced on the Wednesday immediately before the auction (and can be
found in Portuguese at https://www.tesouro.fazenda.gov.br/pt/dividapublica-federal/leiloes). On Thursday, bids are submitted electronically
through the OFPUB system to the Central Bank between 11:00 a.m. and
11:30 a.m. local time. Results are announced by 12:00 p.m. local time.
Bidding process
Each participating financial institution may submit no more than five bids.
Each bid must indicate the amount and the price offered.
Allocation process
The allocation starts at the highest price and goes to the lowest. The
Treasury has discretion to issue less (or more) than the announced amount.
If the full amount offered in the competitive auction is sold, primary dealers
will be entitled to buy additional LFTs in the second round auction, at the
average price reached in the competitive auction. The amounts eventually
on offer in the second round auction are announced together with the terms
of the auction.
39
50
48
38
40
26
30
20
10
11
Mar 17
Sep 16
Mar 16
Sep 15
Mar 15
Mar 14
Sep 14
32
Mar 19
51
50
Sep 18
60
Mar 18
60
63
Sep 17
70
Data as of October 31, 2013. Source: Treasury (LFT includes both LFT-A and LFT-B).
SECONDARY MARKET
Trading
LFTs are highly liquid instruments, with strong demand from all kinds of
institutional investors. In the secondary market, demand is greater during
episodes of turbulence, given the indexation characteristic of the bond.
Trading occurs mainly in the OTC market. The total monthly average of the
daily financial volumes among all LFT bonds fell to BRL2 billion in
October 2013 from BRL2.5 billion the same month of the previous year,
though this is partly due to the lower stock supplied by the government.
The daily turnover of the Mar. 19 in October 2013 was BRL507 million.
Liquidity for shorter-dated Mar. 14s and Mar. 15s was slightly lower at
BRL448 million and BRL269 million, respectively.
Settlement
TRADING
Since most mutual funds and hedge funds in Brazil use the CDI rate as a benchmark, LFTs play an important
role for local portfolio managers. An LFT holder has a very liquid instrument, which will pay the full Selic rate
(usually slightly higher than the CDI) plus a premium. Indeed, a whole category of mutual funds (the so-called
DI Funds) invest most of their assets in LFTs.
As with LTNs, the return of LFTs is measured as a percentage of CDI (assuming the Selic is a proxy for the
CDI):
where LFT is the annualized premium (or discount) of the LFT and DI is the market price of the DI future of
the same maturity.
40
NTN-B
These bonds started to be issued in significant amounts in late 2005, as part of the Treasurys strategy to reduce
the vulnerability of the Brazilian debt profile, as they are linked to the IPCA, which tends to be less volatile
than the IGP-M. In order to assure liquidity, the Treasury regularly holds buyback auctions. These bonds
represent about one-third of domestic public debt, or BRL617 billion (as of September 2013), and have a wide
variety of tenors, as the Treasury offers 3-, 5-, 10-, 20-, 30-, and 40-year NTN-Bs.
Bloomberg ticker
BNTNB <Govt>
SUMMARY OF TERMS
Description
Face value
BRL1,000.
Tenor
On-the-runs are August 2018, August 2022, August 2030, August 2040,
and August 2050. Other tenors are available in the secondary market.
Currently, bonds maturing in odd-numbered years mature in May, while
those maturing in even-numbered years mature in August. The one
exception here is shorter-term NTN-Bs, which can also have November
maturities if they mature in odd-numbered years.
Coupon
Day count
Amortization
PRIMARY AUCTION
Auction schedule
Bidding process
Each participating financial institution may submit no more than five bids.
Each bid must indicate the amount and the price offered.
Allocation process
The allocation starts at the highest price and goes to the lowest. The Central
Bank has discretion to issue less (or more) than the announced amount.
41
100
83
48
44
62
43
37
36
20
29
2050
2045
2024
2022
2020
2018
2017
2016
2015
16
2014
30
2040
40
70
2030
60
70
58
2035
80
SECONDARY MARKET
Trading
Liquidity has improved substantially, but at times still can be an issue for
investors. The average daily turnover for NTN-Bs in the secondary market
in October 2013 was BRL4.7 billion, down from BRL6.3 billion in October
2012. The most liquid tenor in October 2013 was the Aug. 16 (daily
turnover of BRL1 billion), followed by the Aug. 18 (BRL938 million), the
May 15 (BRL819 million), the Aug. 22 (BRL491 million), and the Aug.
14 (BRL340 million). Liquidity is uneven in the long end of the curve,
although the Treasury holds buyback and debt swap auctions at least once a
month.
Settlement
NTN-B CALCULATIONS:
The base date for all NTN-Bs is July 15, 2000. Also, all calculations should be made without rounding up
numbers (with all decimal places available).
The first step in calculating the price of an NTN-B is to establish the so-called UNV, or Updated Nominal
Value, which reflects inflation accumulated through the life of the bond.
IPCAindexk
PRORATA = (1 + IPCA%)
42
bdSINCE15
bdTOTAL
IPCAindexk
Also, remember that when considering the half-annual coupon payments based on the 6% annual coupon rate
of the bond, in line with Brazilian exponential interest-rate accrual conventions, the formula to be used is:
6
i
12
Coupon = 100
+ 1 1
100
PV =
i 1
12
i + 1 1
100
IRR
+1
100
bdi
252
IRR
+1
100
bdp
252
which discounts factors for the coupon and the principal payments by the bonds real internal rate of return
using Brazilian business-day and exponential interest conventions.
i = coupon rate of the bond.
n = number of coupon payments of the NTN-B.
IRR = internal rate of return, or the effective annual rate.
bdi = business days from (and including) the settlement date to (but NOT including) the coupon payment date.
bdp = business days from (and including) the settlement date to the (but NOT including) maturity date.
43
The unit-price (price of the bond) of the NTN-B is then simply given by:
UP = PV UNV
Because of Brazilian conventions, usually the bond calculations cannot be done using financial calculators. To
illustrate these calculations, we provide a numerical example below.
Remember that the NTN-B is traded on real-rate quotes.
The real interest rate of the NTN-B 2011 on November 28, 2008, was 9.794%.
To obtain the price, first calculate the UNV for November 28. Like all NTN-Bs, 2011s have a standard basedate (dated date) of July 15, 2000. The BRL1,000 face value is therefore adjusted by inflation starting on this
date.
Using the IPCA index numbers (available on Bloomberg):
IPCAindexk = IPCA index number for the month preceding the base date = IPCA June 2000 = 1614.62
IPCAindexk+1 = IPCA index number for the previous month = IPCA October 2008 = 2874.43
The UNV on November 15, 2008, is therefore:
2874.43
= 1780.2517.
UNV = 1000 IPCAindexk +1 = 1000
1614
.62
IPCAindexk
We must then accrue inflation from November 15 through November 28. During that period there were 10
business days. Also, between November 15 and December 15 there are 20 business days. Finally, since the
November IPCA was not officially published on November 28, to calculate the price, one must use the official
forecast published by ANBIMA, which was 0.5%. Therefore, the UNV for November 28 is:
10
2874.43
UNV = 1000
1.00520 = 1784.70
1614.62
Turning to coupon payments, because of the exponential interest rate accrual convention, an annual coupon
rate of 6% implies a half-annual coupon payment of ((1.06^0.5)-1)%, or about 2.956% every six months.
Individual coupon payments will be equal to 2.956% of the updated UNV on May 15 and November 15.
To calculate the value of the bond, use a spreadsheet:
Date
Bus Days
from Nov.
28
Nominal
Coupon/principal
factor (A)
Discount Factor
(based on real
rate) (B)
Discounted
Coupon
Factor (A/B)
UNV
Discounted cash
flow
Coupon
15-May-09
113
0.029563014
1.042787851
0.028349979
1784.70
50.60
Coupon
15-Nov-09
239
0.029563014
1.092660558
0.027055991
1784.70
48.29
Coupon
15-May-10
363
0.029563014
1.14406979
0.025840219
1784.70
46.12
Coupon
15-Nov-10
489
0.029563014
1.19878644
0.024660785
1784.70
44.01
Coupon+Principal
15-May-11
614
1.029563014
1.255654332
0.819941434
1784.70
1463.35
Price:
1652.36
Real Rate
9.794%
To calculate past returns, the investor should consider the change in price over a period, plus any coupon
payments received during the period (the coupon rate of 2.965% multiplied by the UNV of the payment date).
44
NTN-C
The NTN-Cs (Notas do Tesouro Nacional, Srie C) used to be the most liquid inflation-adjusted bonds in
Brazil, playing an important role in the composition of local portfolios as a hedge for FX movements, given
the sensitivity of the IGP-M to FX fluctuations (wholesale prices have a 70% weight in this inflation index).
The Treasury stopped issuing NTN-Cs in 2006 and replaced them with IPCA-indexed NTN-Bs. Local pension
funds still have large NTN-C holdings, but liquidity for this instrument is very limited. We do not anticipate
any issuance of NTN-Cs in 2014.
BNTNC <Govt>
Bloomberg ticker
SUMMARY OF TERMS
Description
Face value
BRL1,000.
Tenor
Coupon
Semiannual payment, 12% annually for the 2031 maturity and 6% annually
for the other maturities.
Day count
Amortization
PRIMARY AUCTION
No longer offered by the Treasury. The process was similar to NTN-Bs.
Auction schedule
50
39
40
30
20
20
10
0
Jul 17
Apr 21
Jan 31
SECONDARY MARKET
Trading
The secondary market is not very liquid, as the majority of NTN-C holders
tend to hold these securities to maturity.
Settlement
45
BRAZIL <Govt>
SUMMARY OF TERMS
Description
Face value
BRL100.
Tenor
January 5, 2016; January 5, 2022; January 5, 2024; and January 10, 2028..
Coupon
10.25% (Jan. 28s), 12.5% semiannual (Jan. 16s and Jan. 22s) or 8.5%
(Jan. 24s), with linear compounding. Coupons paid in January and July of
each year, with payments made in dollars according to the median spot
exchange rate (PTAX) at the end of each coupon payment date.
Amortization
PRIMARY AUCTION
Auction schedule
There is no official schedule for external debt issuance. The Treasury does
not use the international market for its borrowing needs, and debt issuance
policy aims at providing benchmarks for a yield curve denominated in
BRL.
Bidding process
Generally, Treasury asks for bids on the same day as the announcement of
the issuance.
SECONDARY MARKET
46
Trading
Settlement
DI FUTURES
DI futures are listed in the BM&F and are among the most liquid instruments in this exchangethe daily
turnover in January-November 2013 was BRL162.3 billion of notional value, an 18% increase over the
BRL137.1 billion seen in 2012 and more than double the BRL60.5 billion seen in all of 2009. Daily turnover
in the comparable January-November period in 2011 was BRL125.9 billion and in 2010 BRL109 billion. Daily
liquidity in this market should normally exceed BRL50 billion/day (notional), with a long-term daily average
since December 2005 of close to BRL100 billion. The record low trading volume was BRL10.7 billion on
September 6, 2010, two years after Lehmans collapse and a day before the celebration of Brazils
Independence Day. In contrast, the record high volume reached BRL659.8 billion on April 18, 2013, a day
after the April 2013 COPOM meeting, when The Central Bank met expectations of a 25 bps Selic rate hike.
The benchmark BRL yield curve is constructed using the different futures contracts as vertices (a pretty easy
task, as the DI contracts work like simple zero-coupon bonds), with the fixed-period points (1M, 1Y, etc.)
obtained by interpolation. (The cubic-spline method has proved most accurate for Brazilian rates. *)
Bloomberg ticker
PCDI <Go>
SUMMARY OF TERMS
Reference
The DI contracts are futures on the average of the CDI rate, between the
day of the trade and the maturity of the contract. One would make a profit
by holding a receiver position in a DI contract until maturity if the average
of the CDI rate in the period is below the original rate of the trade (the DI
future rate). This is the equivalent of holding a long position in a zerocoupon bond financed daily at the CDI rate.
Contract
Convention
Fixed rate
(Pr)
Floating rate
(CDI)
Equivalent position
in fixed-rate bond
Buy
Pay
Receive
Short
Sell
Receive
Pay
Long
Maturity
There are monthly maturities during the next four months, and then
quarterly tenors maturing in January, April, July, and October. Liquidity is
excellent in the first four contracts and more or less good up to the 24month contract (usually the contracts maturing in January are more liquid
than the intermediate ones), but maturities go up to 10 years.
Settlement
Expiration is on the first business day of the maturity month of the contract.
Trading ends the day before expiration (although trading declines
significantly after the corresponding COPOM meeting).
See Interpolao da curva de juros brasileira: mtodos e medidas de desempenho, from Andr dAlmeida Monteiro and Felipe Monteiro de
Salles, Resenha BM&F #147.
47
Jan 14
Feb 14
Mar 14
Apr 14
Jul 14
Oct 14
Jan 15
Apr 15
Jul 15
Oct 15
Jan 16
Apr 16
Jul 16
Oct 16
Jan 17
Apr 17
Jul 17
Oct 17
Jan 18
Apr 18
Jul 18
Oct 18
Jan 19
Apr 19
Jul 19
Oct 20
Jan 20
Apr 20
Jul 20
Oct 20
Jan 21
Apr 21
Jul 21
Oct 21
Jan 22
Jul 22
Jan 23
Jul 23
Jan 24
Jul 24
Jan 25
Jan 26
0.0
DI futures are marked to market on a daily basis, with the profits and losses being credited or debited daily in
the holders accounts at BM&F. The value in BRL of the daily adjustments is given by the formulas below:
- For day trades:
100,000
n
(1 + r ) 252
where ADt is the value of daily adjustment in BRL, APt is the closing price for the respective maturity, OP is
the current price, N is the number of contracts traded, r is the discount rate of the trade, and n is the number of
business days until the contract maturity.
- For previously opened positions:
where APt-1 is the closing price of the previous day, CDIt-1 is the Cetip CDI rate of the previous day, and the
other variables are the same as in the formula for day trades.
48
TRADING
- The short end
Trading in the short end of the curve usually consists of bets on the future path of monetary policy. Especially
in the first maturities, it is common to evaluate futures prices as a function of expected changes in the Selic rate
at the upcoming COPOM meetings. The calculation involved in this kind of trade is described graphically
below:
Future DI Rate
Copom
Meeting
Today
DI Maturity
Current CDI
New CDI
As soon as we know the market price for the future DI and the current level of the CDI, it is relatively easy to
calculate what the market is discounting for the new CDI (and, consequently, for the new Selic, as explained
above), with just one assumption: that the CDI will remain unchanged until the meeting not a big
assumption, given the strong auto-regressive characteristic of the historical series. Thus, the calculation to be
performed is the following (all rates in annualized terms, as traded in the market):
252
T2
252
(
)
DI
1
+
F
1
CDI 1 =
T1
(1 + CDI 0 ) 252
where CDI1 is the expected future CDI rate, DIF is the market price of the corresponding DI Future, T is the
number of business days between the reference date and the DI Future maturity, CDI0 is the current CDI rate,
T1 is the number of business days between the reference date and the next COPOM meeting, and T2 is equal to
T minus T1.
Example: On January 3, the DI Future maturing on February 1 is being traded at 11.12%. The current CDI rate
is 11.09%. The next COPOM meeting will occur on January 23 (so the first day of the new Selic rate will be
January 24, since the decision is made public after the market close). There are 15 business days until January
24 and 21 business days until February 1. Applying the formula above, we have:
1.1112 )
CDI1 =
15
(1.1109 ) 252
21
252
252
6
1 = 11.20%
So, in this situation, the market is discounting an 11 bp hike of the Selic rate. Note that after the COPOM
meeting, the plays on the next maturity of DI Futures tend to migrate to the following maturity, as the CDI will
remain the same until the next COPOM meeting (unless there is an extraordinary change between meetings). It
is also interesting to observe that since the COPOM changed the number of meetings per year from 12 (one
49
monthly meeting) to the current eight, some dead tenors appeared in the DI curve, in the sense that for a
whole month it is possible to have no changes in the overnight rate. For instance, with no monetary policy
meeting in February 2009, the future CDI tends to be the same at the maturity of the Feb. 09 and Mar. 09
contracts. The same calculation described above can be applied to subsequent maturities, just assuming that
Bacen will confirm the market expectations. Nevertheless, as the term premium increases and distorts the pure
expectations implied in the curve, this method can provide some misleading results. Thus, to find what longer
tenors are pricing in terms of monetary policy, we recommend the construction of the cash flow of the contract
until maturity and using a goal-seek function for the floating (CDI) rate for each meeting, which equalizes the
P&L at maturity to zero.
- Yield curve forwards
Another useful way to look at the yield curve is using the implied forward rates within the maturities of the
curve i.e., the equivalent rate of a cash-neutral barbell portfolio. Graphically, we can represent them as
below:
DI Jan 15
Today
Jul 14
Jan 15
Fwd Jan 15
Jul 14
DI Jul 14
In this example, the forward rate between the Jul. 09 and Jan. 10 contracts can be understood as the market
expectation (plus a risk premium) for the average Selic rate between the two maturities. In order to get
exposure to this forward rate, you must sell the Jul. 09 contract and buy the Jan. 10 contract (or vice versa)
on a cash-neutral basis equivalent to buying a bond financed by a loan with a shorter maturity.
Similar to the expected-Selic calculation, the forwards can be obtained by discounting the rate of the shorter
maturity from the rate of the longer one, as in the following formula:
252
T2
252
(
)
1
+
DI
L
1
Fwd =
T1
(1 + DI S ) 252
where Fwd is the forward rate, DIL is the market price of the longer DI future, T is the number of business days
between the reference date and the longer DI future maturity, DIS is the market price of the shorter DI future,
T1 is the number of business days between the reference date and the shorter DI maturity, and T2 is equal to T
minus T1.
50
PR-DI SWAPS
Pr-DI swaps are interest rate swaps in which one party agrees to pay a fixed income return (Pr) in order to
receive a floating rate flow (DI) from a counterparty (and vice versa). This instrument is traded in the OTC
market, with different maturities (usually matching the BM&F DI futures maturities). It is very hard to
estimate the depth of this market, but anecdotal evidence suggests that it is as big as the BM&F market for DI
futures.
There is a market for Pr-DI swaps both onshore (registered in the BM&F or Cetip) and offshore (by ISDA
contracts). The offshore Pr-DI swaps are good alternatives for investors interested in Brazilian rates but with
constraints on their actions in the local market.
The mechanics of the market are very similar to the DI futures marketactually, the instruments are
equivalent, diverging only in the cash flows. While the DI futures are marked to market on a daily basis, the
swaps settle on a net basis at maturity. This equivalency is reflected in the prices: traditionally has been a very
tight spread of a few basis points between the DI Futures at BM&F and the offshore OTC market for Pr-DI
swaps for the more liquid tenors.
However, the spread between BMF DI futures and offshore Pr-DI swaps has widened on the back of the
governments efforts to contain capital inflows. After the increase in the IOF tax from 2% to 6% on fixed
income investments and on margin requirements from 0.38% to 6% in October 2010, the spreads between
onshore and offshore markets have started to decouple. As officials continued implementing new measures and
regulations aimed at curbing foreign capital inflows into the local market, the offshore Pr-DI swaps moved
lower faster than their onshore BMF counterparts, reflecting the increasing pressures that local dealers are
facing to replicate the flows in their offshore and onshore books.
Dealers face three main issues that have been eroding the communication channels between their onshore and
offshore books, thus limiting their ability to absorb offshore flows: (1) dealers may have to cope with
restrictions on sending BMF payments made in BRL to their offshore clients (cross-border risk); (2) like many
subsidiaries or branches of foreign banks, dealers will have to pay the 6% IOF tax for any incremental
collateral the BMF may ask from their offshore clients and/or headquarters office; and (3) any incremental
offshore inflows through Pr-DI swaps cannot be replicated accurately, as the natural hedging mechanism for a
DI position is taking the opposite trade in the local bond market, which is now restricted due to the 6% IOF
tax.
Offshore Pr-DI swaps - BMF DI spread (bps)
15
10
5
0
-5
-10
-15
-20
-25
-30
-35
-40
Aug-10
500
400
300
200
Reduction in
IOF on bonds
Feb-11 Aug-11
Feb-12
Aug-12
Feb-13 Aug-13
100
0
-100
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.9
2.0
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5
2.6
2.7
The spreads between offshore Pr-DI swaps and onshore BMF DI futures have become more negative during
times when the government and Central Bank have imposed a plethora of measures to curb foreign inflows,
especially since late 2010. The Jan. 17 contract has been the one showing the strongest decoupling, probably
because offshore investors have been much more aggressively receiving in that sector, given expectations that
local interest rates will converge to international standards as well as given the risks of longer durations for
dealers. The widening spreads between Pr-DI swaps and onshore BMF DI futures reflect the increasing
51
operational costs for dealers in managing their onshore and offshore books. These higher costs are also
reflected in the higher spread between local Cupom USD rates and USD Libor rates. However, as dealers have
learned to better manage their risks between books and the government decided to reduce the IOF tax on fixed
income and FX derivatives in June 2013, the offshore-onshore spread has tightened substantially.
Bloomberg tickers
SUMMARY OF TERMS
Description
Face value
Tenor
OVER-THE-COUNTER MARKET
52
Trading
Local banks trade this swap daily from 9:00 a.m. until 5:00 p.m. local time.
Banks communicate with each other (or use an electronic system provided
by a broker) through their trading desks, giving the price (bid/ask) and
maturity.
Allocation process
Settlement
PR-CDI SWAPTIONS
Pr-CDI swaptions are options on Pr-DI swaps, where the investor buys or sells the right (but not the
obligation) to enter into a Pr-DI swap at a specific date in the future. For an up-front fee (premium), the
option buyer chooses the strike rate (the level at which it enters the Pr-DI swap), the length of the option
period, and the tenor of the underlying swap (usually corresponding to the BM&F DI futures maturities).
SUMMARY OF TERMS
Description
Exercise type
Exercise time
Notional value
Maturity date
Conventions
Premium
53
DI OPTIONS
DI options are traded in BM&F. There are four standardized types (all European), as follows:
Type 1: The underlying asset is the contract of DI future maturing three months after the options tenor.
Type 2: The underlying asset is the contract of DI future maturing six months after the options tenor.
Type 3: The underlying asset is the contract of DI future maturing one year after the options tenor.
Type 4: The underlying asset is the contract of DI future maturing on a date specified by BM&F (usually
they structure an option on the most liquid contract with the same maturity as the first DI futures
contract).
This kind of option works as an option on a forward rate agreement (or a swaption), since its holder has a
right to be exposed to a fixed rate at a future date. Therefore, the delta can be neutralized by buying (or selling)
a DI future contract maturing on the date of the option expiration and selling (or buying), on a cash-neutral
basis, another DI future contract maturing together with the underlying contract.
SUMMARY OF TERMS
54
Reference
Contract
Maturity
Exercise
The option can be exercised by its holder at the maturity date. On exercise,
the option is automatically transformed into a position in DI futures a call
exercise implies buying a futures contract in rate terms, as we explained in
reference to the convention of the DI future contract, equivalent to paying a
fixed rate. A similar reasoning is applied to puts.
Settlement
Expiry is on the first business day of the maturity month of the contract.
Trading ends the day before expiry.
IDI OPTIONS
The IDI is an index of the average rate on one-day deposits, calculated by BM&F. The index was set at
100,000 points on the date fixed by BM&F as beginning of the valuation (January 3, 2000), when it began to
be corrected by the daily CDI rate, as follows:
IDI t = IDI t 1 t 1 + 1
100
where IDIt is the IDI index on the date t, IDIt-1 is the IDI of the previous date and it-1 is the CDI of the date
t-1.
BM&F offers European options on the future value of the IDI. The tenors and strikes are defined by BM&F
tenors usually coincide with the quarterly maturities of the DI futures. As they are defined, IDI options work
like Asian options on the CDI rate, constituting an alternative to play either the implied future CDI or CDI
volatility (in this case the delta should be neutralized by buying or selling DI futures contracts). The liquidity
of this market is relatively thin, with the positions concentrated among a few players.
Bloomberg ticker
SUMMARY OF TERMS
Reference
Options on the average of the CDI rate between the trade date and the
expiration date of the option.
Contract
Maturity
Exercise
Settlement
Expiry is on the first business day of the maturity month of the contract.
Trading ends the day before expiry.
55
56
Description
Face value
Tenor
Convention
Settlement
Face value
Tenor
Convention
Settlement
57
FRC FUTURES
FRC futures are forward rate agreements of a USD fixed rate, launched by BM&F. Once traded, a contract of
FRC is automatically converted into two contracts of DDI (another BM&F instrument). A DDI contract is
equivalent to a cross-currency Cupom x CDI swap, paying (or receiving) a fixed rate in USD and receiving (or
paying) the compounded CDI rate. The FRC contract simply combines two DDI contracts (one maturing on
the first business day of the following month and another on the desired future tenor) to create a synthetic
contract free of CDI and FX risk its holder is exposed only to the forward Cupom rate. Before the settlement
of the shorter contract, the holder of an FRC position has to roll it forward; otherwise, when the short leg
matures, there will be exposure to both CDI and FX. The diagram below illustrates the mechanics of this
market:
Long DDI
1st day of
the next
month
Today
Short DDI
Bloomberg ticker
Long future
tenor
FRC
GDA <Crncy> CT
SUMMARY OF TERMS
58
Reference
FRC contracts are forward rate agreements in USD fixed-rate terms, but
settled in BRL.
Contract
Convention
The market trades the forward rate in USD, with BM&F responsible for
converting the position in DDI contracts. The trade convention is the same
as for the DI future market: if you buy an FRC contract, you pay the fixed
discount rate; in case of selling a FRC contract, you receive the fixed rate.
Maturity
There are monthly maturities for the nearest four sequential months and
then quarterly tenors maturing in January, April, July, and October.
Maturities go up to 10 years, but the scarce liquidity is concentrated within
the first two years.
Settlement
Expiry is on the first business day of the maturity month of the contract.
Trading ends two business days before the expiration.
FRC contracts are marked to market on a daily basis, with profits or losses being credited or debited daily in
the holders accounts at BM&F. The value in BRL of the daily adjustments is given by the formulas below (to
be applied for each DDI contract):
- For day-trades:
100,000
n
i +1
360
where ADt is the value of daily adjustment in BRL, APt is the closing price for the respective maturity, OP is
the price of the trade, N is the number of contracts traded, i is the discount rate of the trade, ER-1 is the
exchange rate BRL/USD of the previous day (Ptax), and n is the number of days until the contract maturity
date.
- For previously opened positions:
(1 + CDI t 1 ) 252
1
ERt 1
ERt 2
where APt-1 is the closing price of the previous day, CDIt-1 is the CDI rate of the previous day, and the other
variables are as in the formula for day trades.
59
USD FUTURES
The BM&F has a very liquid market for futures of USD/BRL exchange rates, with daily turnover normally
exceeding BRL25 billion of notional. The monthly turnover in January-November 2013 was BRL36.4 billion
of notional value (equivalent to US$17 billion), a 9.9% increase over the BRL33.1 billion seen last year.
Liquidity is concentrated in the first maturity, but it is possible to set up positions in longer tenors through a
synthetic operation. The pricing of the forward exchange rate contract, by interest rate parity, is:
FWD =
(1 + DI )
(1 + Cupom)
Spot
where FWD is the future exchange rate, DI is the rate in BRL for the period, Cupom is the rate in USD for the
period, and Spot is the FX spot price. Thus, if you go long (receive) Pr rates (by selling a DI Future contract)
and short Cupom rates (by buying a FRC contract and selling a USD Future maturing on the same date as the
short leg of the FRA), the two transactions combined result in a cash flow identical to a short position in a
future on the foreign currency.
Bloomberg tickers
SUMMARY OF TERMS
Reference
Contract
Convention
The market trades the future exchange rate multiplied by 1,000, using a tick
of 0.5 to get the equivalent notional. There are also transactions of forward
points (FRP), where the counterparts trade the number of pips over the
closing PTAX of the day.
Maturity
First business day of each month. Usually there are open series maturing in
the three nearest months and in January of the following year.
Settlement
Expires at the maturity of the contract. Trading ends one business day
before expiration.
USD futures at BM&F are marked to market on a daily basis, with the difference between the closing price of
the current day and the closing price of the previous day (multiplied by the number of contracts involved)
being credited/debited in the holders account at BM&F.
The BM&F has options on the USD futures contracts, maturing on the same day as the underlying contract.
The exchange also offers structured operations of exchange rate volatility, a bundle trade consisting of an
option and the equivalent future contract to have a delta-neutral structure.
There is a well-developed offshore over-the-counter market for BRL NDFs, although liquidity has declined
here as more foreign participants have increased their participation in the onshore market. The players who
have access to both markets can trade the spread between the local USD future and the offshore NDF (by
buying a contract onshore and selling the equivalent offshore, or vice versa). This spread tends to reflect the
cross-border risk, or convertibility risk. However, since the increase in the IOF tax in October 2010, the
onshore/offshore spread has widened, reflecting the increased convertibility risks that such a measure entails.
60
Cross-currency Cupom x CDI swaps, issued by BM&F and with the Central
Bank as a counterpart.
Contract
Convention
SCCs are traded on a discount basis, using the linear actual/360 convention.
Maturity
Settlement
Expires at the maturity of the contract. Trading ends two business days
before the expiration.
PRIMARY AUCTION
Auction schedule
The Central Bank can auction SCCs on any business day; however, the
auction must be announced on the previous day after the market close.
Bidding process
Each participating financial institution may submit no more than five bids.
Each bid must indicate the amount and the price offered.
Allocation process
The allocation starts at the highest price and goes to the lowest. The Central
Bank has discretion to issue less (or more) than the announced amount.
61
SECONDARY MARKET
Trading
Settlement
Like the FRC contracts, SCCs are marked to market on a daily basis.
62
CHILE
MACRO BACKGROUND
After a transitional period for Chiles economy in 2013, the Central Bank (Banco Central de Chile, or BCCh)
expects economic activity to moderate in 2014. The December 2013 Quarterly Inflation Report (Informes de
Political Monetaria, or IPOM), published by BCCh, revised growth forecasts lower to a range of 3.75-4.75%
y/y (from 4-5%). This is below an average annual GDP growth rate of 5.5% from 2010-13. Contributing
factors include a cooling mining investment cycle and a slowdown in consumption, as labor conditions
normalize. BCCh cut the monetary policy rate by a total of 50 bps in 4Q13, based on this outlook, after
keeping rates unchanged at 5% for 20 months. The Central Bank also indicated a big downside revision in its
investment forecast for 2013, to 3.9% growth from its original forecasts of 5.7%, while 2014 expectations were
adjusted downward from 4.5% to 4.1%. Headline inflation was fairly low in 2013, and core inflation levels
remain below the target range on a 12-month basis. BCCh reduced its inflation expectations for 2014 from
2.8% to 2.5%, adjusting for lower figures published at the end of 2013. The outlook for the current account
deficit looks more benign, with a revision to 3.2% of GDP in 2013 (from 4.5%) and only 3.7% in 2014 (down
from 4.8%).
In the political space, Michelle Bachelet of the center-left Nueva Mayoria coalition won the presidential
election at the end of 2013 and will take office on March 11, 2014. Her platform includes educational,
constitutional, and fiscal reforms, estimated to cost at least US$15 billion. However, many of these reforms are
expected to take place over the next four to six years, and while Bachelet would have a majority in both houses
of Congress, most lower level reforms (like education) will still require a 4/7ths majority, which predicates
some wrangling within her own fractious coalition and/or finding support from independents and possibly
members of the center-right. Moreover, constitutional reforms require a 2/3rds majority and electoral reforms
require a 3/5ths majority. Bachelets proposals include making higher education 100% state-funded within six
years, having free training for teachers, increasing the minimum wage by 2016, creating a state-owned pension
fund, increasing corporate tax rates, eliminating the Taxable Income Fund (FUT), and amending the
constitution to make legal changes more flexible.
nominal. The average duration of Treasury inflation-linked paper was 19 years, while the average duration of
nominal paper was 11 years.
Meanwhile, the proportion of external bonds in Chile remains very small, with the government having
refrained from selling bonds in international markets from 2004 through 2009, though it then issued foreigncurrency-denominated debt in the three consecutive years ended 2012. The last time Chile tapped the
international debt market in 2012, it issued the October 2022 and October 2042 U.S. dollar bonds in the
amounts of US$750 million each.
BTU
BCU
BTP
BCP
Jan-12
Feb-12
Mar-12
Apr-12
May-12
Jun-12
Jul-12
Aug-12
Sep-12
Oct-12
Nov-12
Dec-12
Jan-13
Feb-13
Mar-13
Apr-13
May-13
Jun-13
Jul-13
Aug-13
Sep-13
Oct-13
Nov-13
Dec-13
10
25
20
15
10
0
BTP
BTU
BCP
BCU
Global Depositary Notes (GDNs). Note that foreign investors can currently trade global depositary notes
(or GDNs), which were introduced in April 2013 and can be settled in USD via Euroclear, Clearstream or
DTC. These are available for a variety of local BCCh and Treasury issued sovereign bonds, including BCPs,
BCUs, BTPs and BTUs, though not across all maturities. Currently, GDNs represent more than half of all
nominal and UF-linked bonds (about 69% of the total local sovereign bonds stock outstanding). These can be
accessed on Bloomberg at GDNC <GO>. GDNs are fully fungible with the underlying bonds, and liquidity in
the GDNs should reflect liquidity in the underlying bonds. Note that for Chile bonds, there are two GDN
facilities for each underlying bond, namely a Reg S and a 144A series, each with its own dedicated ISIN. We
believe the GDNs should eventually increase foreign participation in the local sovereign debt market in Chile.
64
Inner: 2012-Dec-31
Outer: 2013-Oct-31
Other 25%
25%
(CLP trn)
20%
15
Pension funds
64.9%
Insurance co.
4.7%
15%
10
10%
5%
Mutual funds
5.1%
0
Jan 09
0%
Jan 10
Jan 11
Jan 12
Jan 13
The AUM of local insurance companies amounted to CLP25 trillion (US$50 billion) as of September 2013.
AUM have been growing rapidly, at an average of 9% a year over the last four quarters. However, as a share of
GDP, AUM of insurance companies fell to 17% versus 20% of GDP in 2009. Insurance companies hold close
to 5% of their AUM in local government bonds, and a large portion of their AUM are in bonds and debentures.
Their importance in the local bond market has been reduced in recent years, from a participation rate of 11% in
2010 to less than 5% as of October 2013. Mutual funds have also been an important player in local government
bonds. These assets currently make up 8% of mutual funds AUM, although this is down significantly from
40% in 2000. The AUM of mutual funds was CLP19.3 trillion (US$37.4 billion) at the end of October 2013
and have been growing around 9% y/y on average over 2013. Their holdings of the outstanding stock of
government bonds have been stable around 5% for a while now, but this is down from 7% in 2010.
Foreign participation in the Chilean fixed income market remains low, as the registration process is still
cumbersome, and, although provisions exist to exempt foreign institutional investors from the capital gains tax,
some uncertainties persist about the application of these provisions. Note however that the government
approved the Ley Unica de Fondos (LUF) bill in November 2013, which amends article 104 (see the
Regulatory and Tax Issues section for more information on article 104, also known as la Ley de Impuesto a
la Renta) and addresses some of these operational problems. However, the implementation of these changes
65
still depends on the approval of rules defining the operations procedures between the Superintendencia de
Valores y Seguros (SVS) and the Tax Agency (SII). This is expected to happen in March 2014. Official
government numbers on foreign holdings do not exist, but estimates of foreign participation in the local
government bond market are in the 1-3% range of outstanding stock. However, this does not include offshore
involvement in the recently created Global Depositary Note (GDN) program, which has helped facilitate
greater foreign participation. Nevertheless, foreigners still prefer to focus their participation on the swaps
market for the time being.
66
ii. the taxpayer must have purchased and sold through a stock market broker or agent
(with the exception of banks);
iii. the security has to be registered in the Register of Securities;
iv. the security has to be placed at a value equal to or higher than par;
v. the instrument has to specify that it avails itself of this exemption.
b) The investor complies with the requirements of article 18bis of the Income Tax Law, which
are as follows:
i. the investment must have no establishment or residence in the country (incorporated
outside and having no domicile in Chile);
ii. proof of being a foreign institutional investor; *
iii. no claim to ownership, directly or indirectly, of 10% or more of the capital or the net
profit of the issuer;
iv. a written contract with a Chilean bank or stockbroker under which that party is
responsible for verifying that all of the remittances comply with SII requirements
and, if they do not, for carrying out all the tax withholding required by law;
v. registration with the SII, which can be done by the local intermediary, and
establishing that all the conditions set by the SII to be exempted from capital gains
tax are fulfilled.
Pursuant to the above, investors have to provide the issuer with two pieces of information to
qualify for the exemption: (1) a sworn statement; and (2) a report describing the type of
institutional investor it is as well as the type of security and period of time during which it has
held the instrument.
2. Income tax on interest. Foreign investors face a 4% total tax (instead of the 35% rate that applies to
foreign entities on all other income) on interest income from debt instruments issued by the Central
Bank of Chile, the government, or local corporations including banks, whether these instruments are
denominated in Chilean pesos or in a foreign currency. The custodian is responsible for paying this tax
and for informing the SII (the tax authority). For any gain obtained through derivatives (forwards,
futures, options, or swaps), Chilean tax law considers these as income, so foreign investors could face
a 35% income tax.
a) Note that the Pro Crdito Plan simplified the tax structure by standardizing the 4% tax
charged on interest income for both local and offshore investors, effectively leveling the
playing field for all market players.
So far, no new corporate bond issues have been covered by the Pro Crdito tax advantages. Also, this law
enables foreign investors to participate in bond auctions from the BCCh and Ministry of Finance through a
local intermediary (a bank or a broker).
In any case, investors are encouraged to consult their legal advisors and custodians regarding tax regulations
under Chilean law, which are subject to change.
THE UF
The UF, or Unidad de Fomento, is Chiles inflation-linked currency. It was established in the late 1960s and
gained further prominence in the 1980s during Chiles hyperinflation period. Chile was a pioneer in inflation
indexation, and the use of the UF has transcended all layers of the financial system. As is the case for the CER
in Argentina and the UDI in Mexico, the UFs value is derived from the consumer price index. It is adjusted
daily, and the factor of adjustment is the geometric average of the change in CPI between the 10th day of the
*
By fulfilling at least one of the following conditions: (1) being an open fund established in an investment-grade country; (2) being a fund
registered in an investment-grade country; (3) having less than 30% of total assets in Chilean instruments; (4) being a pension fund; and (5) being
an investment fund where all of the shareholders are foreign investors or, if Chilean, institutional investors.
67
previous month and the 9th day of the current month. UF values can be found on Bloomberg under CHUF
<Index>.
Central Bank amount outstanding (US$ millions)
Tenor
CLP
UF
Total
2y
4,818
20%
5,283
22%
10,101
5y
2,068
9%
5,661
24%
7,729
10y
1,179
5%
2,463
10%
3,642
20y
1,281
5%
1,281
30y
1,281
5%
1,281
15,970
66%
24,035
Total
8,065
34%
Does not include short-term bills (PDBC paper). Data from Sept 2013. Sources: BCCh and Santander.
CLP
UF
Total
2y
600
2%
2,797
11%
3,397
5y
2,745
11%
5,328
21%
8,073
10y
838
3%
4,352
17%
5,191
20y
820
3%
3,754
15%
4,574
30y
813
3%
3,103
12%
3,916
Total
5,816
23%
19,335
77%
25,150
68
BCU
BCUs (Bonos del Banco Central de Chile denominados in Unidades de Fomento) are inflation-indexed
securities issued by the Central Bank. They are denominated in Unidades de Fomento (UFs).
Bloomberg ticker
BCUCL <Govt>
SUMMARY OF TERMS
Issuer
Nominal value
BCUs are placed in denominations of 500, 1,000, 5,000, and 10,000 UFs.
Tenors
2-, 5-, 10-, 20-, and 30-year tenors have been issued, with the largest
outstanding amounts currently in the 2- and 5-year sectors. In 2013, the
Central Bank issued only 5- and 10-year paper.
Coupon
Semiannual and transformed into CLP at the prevailing CLP/UF rate. The
older series included coupons of 3% and 5% in real terms, while all of the
current on-the-run bonds of all tenors have a 3% coupon.
Day count
Amortization
Bullet.
Primary auctions
The Central Bank publishes issuance calendars one month ahead on the 9th
of the preceding month. In 2013, total BCU issuance is slated to be 42
million UF (CLP963 billion, US$1.97 billion), slightly below the 49
million UF that was planned. This issuance will be broken down between
the 5-year sector (31 million UF) and the 10-year sector (11 million UF).
Note that there is only one BCU bond maturing in 2014, which should limit
the size of the rollover amount. The full calendar of auctions will not be
released, however, until early 2014.
Outstanding amount
Moodys rating
Aa3.
S&P rating
AA+.
69
BTU
BTUs (Bonos de la Tesorera General de la Repblica en Unidades de Fomento) are inflation-indexed
securities issued by the Treasury. They are denominated in Unidades de Fomento (UFs).
Bloomberg ticker
CHILBT <Govt>
SUMMARY OF TERMS
70
Issuer
Nominal value
500 UFs.
Tenor
5-, 7-, 10-, 20-, and 30-year maturities have been issued, with the 7-year
issue appearing in 2010. In 2013, the Treasury was active in auctioning
paper in all the above-mentioned tenors except the 5 year. In 2013, 22% of
issuance was in the 7-year sector, 31% was in the 10-year sector, 25% in
the 20-year sector, and 22% in the 30-year sector.
Coupon
Semiannual and transformed into CLP at the prevailing CLP/UF rate. All
the on-the-run series have a 3% coupon in real terms.
Day count
Amortization
Bullet.
Primary auctions
In 2013, the Treasury issued BTU paper across all tenors except the 5Y, to
complete almost 66 million UF (CLP1.5 trillion, US$3 billion), below the
81 million UF of the previous year. Note that there is only one small BTU
maturity in 2014 worth UF13 million, which does not demand significant
rollover issuance. However, the full calendar of auctions will not be
released until early 2014, and could depend on the governments cash
needs.
Outstanding amount
Moodys rating
Aa3.
S&P rating
AA+.
BCP
BCPs (Bonos del Banco Central de Chile en pesos) are fixed-rate bonds issued by the Central Bank.
Bloomberg ticker
BCPCL <Govt>
SUMMARY OF TERMS
Issuer
Nominal value
Tenor
In the past, the Central Bank has issued 2-, 5-, and 10-year tenors. The
Central Bank began issuing these bonds in September 2002. From August
2008 until February 2011, the Central Bank auctioned only new 2- and 5year paper. However, in 2011 it completed a new 10-year auction, creating
a new 2021. In 2013, only 5-, and 10-year paper was issued.
Coupon
Day count
Amortization
Bullet.
Primary auctions
The Central Bank publishes issuance calendars one month ahead on the 9th
of the preceding month. Total issuance of nominal Central Bank paper in
2013 will be CLP735 billion (US$1.5 billion), below the planned issuance
of CLP827 billion. Maturity breakdown is two-thirds in the 5-year and the
rest in 10-year. In 2012 nominal Central Bank issuance was CLP950
billion, with 26% 2-year, 37% 5-year, and 37% 10-year. With only CLP485
billion of BCP maturities in 2014 compared to CLP570 billion in 2013, we
expect that BCP issuance will be relatively moderate compared to the
previous year.
Outstanding amount
Moodys rating
Aa3.
S&P rating
AA+.
71
BTP
BTPs (Bonos de la Tesorera General de la Repblica en Pesos) are fixed-rate bonds issued by the Treasury.
Bloomberg ticker
BTPCL <Govt>
SUMMARY OF TERMS
72
Issuer
Nominal value
CLP5 million.
Tenor
In 2013, 10-, 20- and 30-year BTP paper was issued, compared to only 10and 20-year paper in 2012. In 2009 5-year paper was issued and in 2011 7year paper was issued. A new benchmark for the tenors being issued in a
particular year is created each year.
Coupon
Day count
Amortization
Bullet.
Primary auctions
In 2013, the Treasury issued BTP paper in 10-, 20- and 30-year tenors;
placing a total of CLP850 billion (US$1.7 billion) compared to plans of
CLP870 billion. This is above the CLP450 billion that was placed in 2012.
In the beginning of 2014, the Treasury will publish its auction calendar for
the year.
Outstanding amount
Moodys rating
Aa3.
S&P rating
AA+.
PDBC
PDBCs (Pagars Descontables del Banco Central de Chile) are zero-coupon securities issued by the Central
Bank.
Bloomberg ticker
SUMMARY OF TERMS
Issuer
Nominal value
Tenor
There are 30-, 60-, 90-, 180-, and 360-day securities available. The most
liquid on-the-run issues mature in 91 days and 31 days or less. The Central
Bank began issuing these instruments in 1995..
Interest
Zero coupon.
Primary auctions
Placed through competitive auctions or via direct sales several times per
month. The Central Bank regularly places these instruments on the basis of
a monthly calendar published by the Central Bank. In 2013, a total of
CLP22.9 trillion were auctioned (US$50.6 billion).
Outstanding amount
73
74
Maturity
August 5, 2020.
Face value
Coupon
Amortization
Bullet.
Governing law
New York.
Settlement
T+3.
Payment currency
Additional features
Moodys rating
Aa3
S&P rating
AA-
CMARA SWAPS
The Cmara swap is a fixed-for-floating par swap that trades over the counter, where the investor receives or
pays a floating leg indexed to the Indice de Cmara Promedio and in exchange pays or receives a fixed rate.
The fixed rate may be expressed in nominal terms (nominal versus Cmara swaps) or in UF terms (UF versus
Cmara swaps).
Bloomberg ticker
SUMMARY OF TERMS
Reference
The ndice de Cmara Promedio (ICP) is an index that captures the cost of
financing a position in the local fixed income market at the overnight rate
represented by the Tasa Cmara Interbancaria Promedio (TCIP), which is
the interbank rate reported by the Central Bank. The ICP is determined
every business day by the Asociacin de Bancos e Instituciones
Financieras (ABIF) and communicated to all financial intermediaries
before 10:00 a.m. local time by the Sistema Nacional de Comunicaciones
Financieras (Sinacofi).
The Cmara index was set at 10,000.00 on September 2, 2002. It grows
every day according to the following formula (which was updated in 2006):
360
where ICPi is value of the ICP on day i, TCIPi-1 is the TCIP on the working
day prior to day i, and n is the number of days to apply the TCIPi-1 (usually
one, except for Mondays and any working day following a holiday when it
corresponds to the number of nonworking days plus one). The index is
rounded to two decimal places.
A series of the ICP published by Sinacofi (which, as of December 11, 2013,
stood at 15,638) can be found on Bloomberg under the ticker CLICP
<Index>.
Convention
For tenors under 12 months, cash flow exchanges usually occur at maturity
on an actual/360-day basis. For tenors over a year, cash flows usually take
place every six months on an actual/360-day count. In order to calculate the
annualized rate for a nominal vs. Camara swap over a specific period, the
following formula is applied:
ICP1
360
TNA =
1
ICP0
T1 T0
where TNA is the average nominal annual rate, ICP1 is the value of the ICP
at maturity of the period, ICP0 is the value of the ICP at the beginning of
the period, T1 is the maturity date of each period, T0 is the initial date of
each period, and T1-T0 is the interest payment period. The rate is rounded to
two decimal places.
For UF fixed for floating swaps, the following calculation needs to be done
to obtain the rate in UF:
75
1
360
UF0
360
TRA =
T T0
UF
1
1
UF0
where TRA is the average real annual rate, TNA is the average nominal
annual rate calculated as indicated above, UF1 is the value of the UF at
maturity of the period, UF0 is the value of the UF at the beginning of the
period, T1 is the maturity date of each period, T0 is the initial date of each
period, and T1-T0 is the interest payment period.
For UF vs. Cmara swaps, a historical series of the UF can be found on
Bloomberg under the ticker CHUF <Index>.
76
Maturity
For both the nominal and inflation-adjusted curves there are the following
maturities: 3, 6, and 9 months, 1 through 10 years (with one-year
increments, but also including 1.5 years), 15 years, and 20 years.
Liquidity
Liquidity is relatively high between the 1- and 5-year sectors, but 10-year
maturities are also quoted, while longer-dated tenors like 15- and 20-year
are generally quoted on an ad hoc basis only. Liquidity has improved over
the last year, and the typical quote for tenors between 1 and 5 years for the
CLP and UF fixed is now equivalent to US$7,500-10,000 DV01 with a 5bp spread.
Conventions
Settlement
Conventions
Settlement
77
78
Reference
Maturity
Future values are calculated using each players inflation forecasts for
every single month over the next 18 months. There are thus contracts for 1
through 18 months, but the most liquid are 1, 2, and 11 months.
Conventions
Settlement
COLOMBIA
MACRO BACKGROUND
One of the key themes concerning Colombias economy for the majority of 2013 was the outlook for a
potential recovery after growth bottomed in 1Q13. Growth in 1Q13 (2.7% y/y) disappointed forecasts, given
(1) weak mining growth, affected by the Cerrejon coal miners strikes and problems with Drummond
Companys seaport license, and (2) manufacturing activity, which decelerated by 4.4% y/y compared with a
decline of only 0.5% in 2012. The economy is expected to recover into 2014 following stronger construction
activity and consumption, as well as the lagged effect of expansionary monetary policy. (The Central Bank cut
rates by 200 bps at the end of 2012 and 1Q13.) The positive 2Q13 GDP surprise of 4.2% y/y, which surpassed
BanRep expectations of 3.7%, has led the Central Bank (Banco de la Repblica, or BanRep) to upwardly
adjust its outlook on the economy, as GDP results confirmed for BanRep that the factors affecting economic
activity at the beginning of 2013 were transitory shocks rather than something more structural. BanRep sees
potential growth at around 4.3% y/y.
In the FX market, the government and BanRep were active participants on both the regulatory and intervention
fronts. BanRep accumulated US$6,523 million in reserves via daily open market purchases from January to
November 2013, raising total international reserves at the Central Bank to US$43.6 billion. Note that reserves
as a percentage of GDP are still low relative to Colombias LatAm peers at 10% of GDP. In response to rising
costs and a stronger USD outlook going into 4Q13, the Central Bank board, at its September meeting, reduced
the size of its intervention program to buying up to US$1 billion from October-December from buying at
least US$3 billion from February-May and US$2.5 billion from June-September. Meanwhile, the government
introduced the Plan to Enhance Productivity and Employment (PIPE, otherwise informally known as the shock
plan) in April 2013. The plan includes a series of fiscal stimulus measures designed to create positive impulse
effects for the industrial sectors. As part of this plan, the government had originally proposed reforms that
would provide incentives to private pension funds to diversify their portfolios into foreign assets, which, by
extension, would weaken the peso. The government subsequently postponed these pension fund reforms in the
middle of the year, which many analysts attributed to USD/COP trading above 1900.
Domestic
180
50
150
40
120
Inner: Dec-2012
Outer: Oct-2013
JPY 0.4%
30
90
20
60
30
10
0
01 02
03 04 05 06
07 08 09 10 11
USD 23.0%
EUR 0.1%
COP 60.4%
UVR (COP)
16.1%
12 13
The breakdown between external and internal debt remained stable in 2013 at 28% and 72% of total
government debt, respectively. This is a marked improvement over the 49% of debt denominated in foreign
currency in 2002. Moreover, Finance Minister Mauricio Cardenas announced on November 30, 2012, that the
government intends to reduce external debt further to 22% of total debt over the next four years, in order to
limit the foreign currency risk of buying dollars to make payments on maturing bonds. In regard to external
debt issuance, Colombia did not return to the Global TES market in 2013, after issuing a 2023 maturity bond in
79
September 2012, which was approximately US$560 million in size. Instead, it placed USD-denominated bonds
in the 2023 maturity (US$992 million in size) as well as the 2024 maturity (US$1,578 million in size). Global
TES allows holders to get exposure to COP via an asset that is clearable on both Euroclear and Clearstream.
Currently, the composition of Colombias sovereign debt (both external and local) shows about 60%
denominated in COP; 16% in inflation-linked, or real value units (UVR for its acronym in Spanish); and the
remainder in other currencies. This is in-line with the Ministry of Finances objective to have 75% of
government debt in pesos and 25% in other currencies, with a view toward a split of 80%/20% in the future,
according to an interview in local newspaper La Republica with Public Credit Director Michel Janna in June
2013.
42,318
Uses
42,318
Disbursements
External
Bonds
Multilaterals
Internal
TES
Auctions
Public entities
Other
39,879
9,369
5,621
3,748
30,510
30,500
22,500
8,000
10
Deficit
External interest
Domestic Interest
18,155
4,525
13,752
Amortizations
External
Internal
22,716
4,485
18,230
BanRep losses
848
Final availability
In pesos
In US$
599
192
407
465
Initial availability
In US$
In pesos
975
694
280
Other
1,000
In terms of domestic TES issuance, the government issued COP15.5 trillion via auction (both COPdenominated and UVR but excluding monetary control TES) in 2013, well below its original intention to
auction COP23 trillion in TES and better even than its twice-revised issuance plans of COP20 trillion. While
TES issuance via auctions in 2013 was higher than in 2012, it is well below that in 2011, when including short80
term bill issuance as well (COP21.9 trillion in 2011). In terms of local debt rollover, 2014 looks to be another
year in which there will be net negative local government issuance in Colombia, with a rollover ratio of 95% to
cover upcoming amortizations and coupon payments. However, this ratio is above the 93% in 2013 and 83% in
2012, although we saw three consecutive years of net positive issuance before that. The Treasury is planning to
sell a total of COP30.5 trillion in local government debt next year, of which COP22.5 trillion is scheduled to be
sold in auctions and another COP8 trillion to be placed with public entities.
Monetary Control TES. Since November 2012, the Ministry of Finance has been issuing short-term local TES
paper called Monetary Control TES, which is designed to withdraw liquidity from the economy and to
increase the capacity of the Central Bank to sterilize dollars purchased as part of the FX intervention program.
All proceeds from this issuance are deposited in a lockbox with the Central Bank, and is not used to finance
spending. Therefore, we have not included these securities in our calculation for government debt, although
they clearly do add to the supply of government paper. The maturities of the new TES range from 90 days, 120
days, 1Y, 2Y, and 3Y. No issue will exceed COP1.5 trillion, and will not be included in the market-making
points system; therefore, we expect this paper to remain illiquid and likely trade at a higher yield than the
short-end TES issues despite its essentially prefunded nature. With the issuance of this paper, amortizations
could be COP5.1 trillion higher in 2014 and COP2.4 trillion higher in 2015. We would not be surprised to see
some sort of debt swap operation, similar to that executed in 2011, designed to extend and smooth the maturity
of local sovereign debt.
Inner: 2012-Dec-31
22.3%
Outer: 2013-Oct-31
Foreigners 6.6%
Pension funds
28.3%
Insurance Co.
5.5%
Public Entities
Other 13.2%
6.8%
Public Trust
Funds 17.4%
40%
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Note that official government numbers on TES holdings do not include TES NDF trades in which a foreign
investor enters into a total-return swap with a local counterparty to replicate a TES holding without actually
owning the paper. Firm numbers regarding the size of foreign participation in this product are not yet available
81
but are likely to also be relatively small. Aside from local TES bonds and the TES NDF product previously
discussed, foreign investors continue to have several options for accessing Colombias local rates market,
including Global TES. As mentioned, Global TES allows holders to get exposure to COP via an asset that is
clearable in both Euroclear and Clearstream. Also, as of publication, a market for global depositary notes
(GDNs) for Colombian local bonds is in the process of being established and may be operational in 2014.
prior to Decree 4800 passed on December 29, 2010. Such limited direct access to the market is no longer the
case, as Decree 4800 modified the existing regulatory framework pertaining to international investors
originally established in Decree 2080 of 2000. The decree removed the FIF requirement and granted
international investors the right to make investments themselves with the use of a local administrator.
Moreover, the decree extended an investors choices from just fixed income securities, such that investors can
engage in both repo and other securities lending, and they can trade derivatives onshore. This has helped to
level the playing field for international investors engaged in portfolio investment in Colombia. Foreign
investors are subject to the same compliance rules as local investors. Foreign investors can trade only on
markets regulated by the Colombian Superintendency of Finance.
Foreign investment funds, or FIFs, nevertheless do continue to operate in accordance with Decree 4800. With
FIFs, local institutions (such as a trust company or authorized brokerage firm) serve as the custodians,
administrators, and legal representatives of these funds. Funds can be set up as individual or institutional
portfolios. Historically, foreign investors often opted for institutional omnibus funds. This type of fund is
formed by a recognized dealer/international intermediary that brings together several foreign investors through
subaccounts. Otherwise, access to the local Colombian market can be facilitated via a broker or credit-linked
notes.
FIFs are required to register all foreign investment activities in the country on a trade-by-trade basis through a
local administrator, indicating the following details: type of fund, NIT (fiscal ID), amount and type of
operation (entrance/repatriation of capital, profits, income, etc.), as well as the unique objective of the
investment (portfolio investment); FX operations must also be registered on an individual basis and done only
through authorized local intermediaries. Reinvestment of proceeds from sales and income is permitted without
prior repatriation. In any case, specific information must be provided and reinvestment must be registered with
the Central Bank. Foreigners can open accounts in COP only and may not take speculative trades in the FX
market. Offshore investors are allowed to hedge their transactions up to the amount invested in securities and
through authorized foreign exchange intermediaries. The mechanisms available to hedge trades are limited to
forwards, swaps, and options (calls and puts) and must be done for a minimum period of four days in order to
be considered hedging transactions.
Taxation
Regarding taxation, some important changes were made in 2012 and 2013 with regard to offshore investors
and local bond ownership. First among these is a reduction of the general tax rate applied to foreign investors
bond profits. At the end of 2012, the administration of President Juan Manuel Santos passed a comprehensive
tax reform law (Law 1607) that included new rules lowering the income tax on bond profits for foreign
portfolio investors from a tax rate of 33% to a rate of 14% for non-tax-haven residents. The rate is 25% for
foreign investors located in tax havens. Note that a list of 44 tax havens was published on October 7, 2013,
under Decree 2193, including Hong Kong, Macao, Grenada, the Bahamas, and the Cayman Islands. Taxes are
applied to realized cash flows and do not include profits from currency appreciation.
The government also passed Decree 2318 on October 22, 2013, which amends articles 25, 26, and 27 (and
repeals articles 30, 31, and 32) of Decree 700. The decree addresses some key concerns of foreign investors
regarding greater transparency and clarity over how income taxes are calculated for gains earned on local TES
bonds. The decree recognizes foreign portfolio investors as non-self-withholding agents and local custodians
as withholding agents on behalf of foreign investors. Some of the key changes to the tax calculation
methodology follow.
1. Taxes are no longer payable monthly. Prior to the reform, investors were required to pay monthly
taxes on accrued interest on a bond from additional funds set aside for these payments, adding a layer
of complexity to the transaction. The modified rule means that withholding is performed only at
times at which revenue on the bond is actually received, specifically under two scenarios: (a) when a
coupon is paid; and/or (b) when the bond is sold.
2. Calculation of the cost basis seems clearer. One of the main complications that arose prior to Decree
2318 was that depending on whether a bond trading at a premium was sold before or after a coupon
payment was made, a foreign investor could be responsible for higher taxes than what that person
might rightfully be liable for. Now we seem to have two straightforward scenarios:
83
a.
If a bond is sold prior to the collection of a coupon payment, the withholding will be the
difference between the dirty sale price and the dirty purchase price such that the 14% tax will
be applied only if there is a net gain. A net loss could be used against other assets in a
particular portfolio.
b. If a bond is sold after the collection of a coupon payment, the withholding will be the
difference between the dirty sale price and the clean purchase price (that is, the purchase price
of the bond minus the accrued interest) such that the 14% tax will be applied only if there is a
net gain. A net loss could be used against other assets in a particular portfolio.
Note that we use the 14% general tax rate in the two cost-basis scenarios above, but the tax rate could in fact
be 25% or lower for foreign investors domiciled in tax havens depending on the double-taxation treaty of a
particular country. Investors are encouraged to consult their legal advisors regarding tax regulations under
Colombian law, which are subject to change.
84
TES
TES B (Ttulos de Tesorera Clase B) are public debt instruments issued by the Colombian government. They
can be denominated in COP, USD, or UVR (real value units); however, USD-denominated TES have not been
sold in several years. TES securities are currently issued at a fixed rate for original maturities between 1 and 15
years, and inflation-linked for original maturities from 2 to 20 years. Instruments of original maturity of one
year or longer pay an annual coupon and amortize in full on the designated maturity date.
As of October 31, 2013, the total amount of TES outstanding was COP165 trillion (US$87.4 billion).
Composition of TES B outstanding
Total outstanding
(COP billion)
Total outstanding
(USD million)
% of total
COP fixed-rate
127,388
67,614
77%
UVR
37,247
19,770
23%
12
0%
164,649
87,391
100%
Type
Data as of October 31, 2013. Includes bonds maturing in 2013. Sources: Ministry of Finance and
Santander.
In addition to regular TES auctions, the Colombian government usually places about half of total annual TES
issuance through obligatory and voluntary underwritings by public sector companies.
Obligatory underwriting (Inversiones forzosas). All public entities that are financially dependent on the
central government are obliged to subscribe to TES during the first five days of each month. The minimum
amount to be subscribed will be equal to the daily average of all cash and deposits held by these entities during
the previous month in financial instruments other than TES. The yield is the same as that of the cut-off rate in
the latest auction held, and although this can be done with any type of TES, the government has usually used
one-year fixed-rate COP-denominated TES.
Voluntary underwriting (Inversiones convenidas). Based on its domestic financing needs, the central
government makes preliminary agreements with decentralized public entities for those entities to subscribe to
TES. These TES are placed at the cut-off rate of the last auction held of each instrument, while the amount and
timing is based on the conditions specified in the agreements. In order to avoid distortions in the secondary
market, companies are obliged to keep the paper underwritten at least until the next auction of each instrument
before negotiating these in the secondary market.
85
PRIMARY AUCTION
Auction schedule
Bidding process
Bid format
Bids are submitted in terms of annualized interest rate (to three decimal
places). Each bid must also indicate the nominal amount desired and the
city in which the transaction will be carried out. Market makers/aspiring
market makers can make as many bids as desired as long as the sum of all
the bids does not exceed the total amount being auctioned. Participants will
not be allowed to submit bids when the difference between the maximum
and minimum rates exceeds a specified level.
Allocation process
The Ministry of Finance has discretion to issue less than the announced
amount of the auction of each tenor; settlement is T+0.
Placement agent
SECONDARY MARKET
Trading
86
Settlement is usually on the same day (T+0) or next day (T+1), but can go
to a maximum of (T+5) and is always done in book-entry form for
dematerialized or immobilized securities at depositories. In order to execute
T+0 transactions, clients should provide the local trust company with the
corresponding instructions to settle the trades no later than 10:00 a.m.
Colombia time. Foreign investors are required to appoint a local custodian.
All transactions in government securities are settled and cleared exclusively
through the Centralized Securities Deposit (DCV), which is administered
by BanRep. FX instructions should be included either in the instructions or
in a separate message that must be sent immediately after the instructions.
Settlement
Total outstanding
USD (mn)
14-May-14
9.25
140
6,422
5,877
12-Sep-14
13.5
215
3,148
28-Oct-15
199
37,328
6,896
15-Jun-16
7.25
230
55,510
10,852
24-Oct-18
11.25
1,792
6,895
21-Nov-18
90
36,646
4,277
24-Jul-20
11
3,540
4,484
4-May-22
91
56,396
6,129
24-Jul-24
10
333
284,123
8,940
26-Aug-26
7.5
4,584
3,876
28-Apr-28
79
62,978
3,924
1,181
549,536
65,298
Maturity
Total
Average daily volume for six months prior to December 3, 2013. Includes trades executed on exchanges and does not include
auctions or OTC transactions. Sources: SEN, MEC, Ministry of Finance, Bloomberg, and Santander.
TOTAL
PERCENTAGE
Pension Funds
27,315,074
21,982,560
49,297,634
28.32%
Commercial Banks
35,535,303
3,244,809
38,780,113
22.28%
Public Fiduciaries
27,444,001
2,755,634
30,199,635
17.35%
Public Entities
11,787,936
50,480
11,838,416
6.80%
Foreigners
10,562,027
865,066
11,427,093
6.57%
Insurance Companies
5,179,138
4,329,251
9,508,389
5.46%
5,958,776
2,477,206
8,435,982
4.85%
3,398,542
306,595
3,705,137
2.13%
Mutual Funds
2,371,333
358,919
2,730,252
1.57%
Ministry of Finance
2,522,378
140,905
2,663,283
1.53%
Financial Corporations
835,704
470,963
1,306,667
0.75%
Banco de la Republica
1,042,146
21,538
1,063,684
0.61%
Other
2,846,854
244,060
3,090,913
1.78%
Total
136,799,212
37,247,986
174,047,198
100%
Based on data as of October 31, 2013; includes short-term TES. Sources: Ministry of Finance and Santander.
87
COLTES <Govt>
SUMMARY OF TERMS
88
Description
Face value
Maturity
Coupon
Annual.
Day count
Amortization
Bullet.
Auctions
S&P rating
BBB+.
Moodys rating
Baa3.
TES UVR
TES UVR (TES Clase B Unidades de Valor Real Constante) are fixed-rate bonds denominated in UVR (real
value units). Principal and interest payments are calculated in UVR and paid in COP based on the value of the
UVR unit on the payment date. Currently, the UVR curve extends out about 20 years after the 2013 issuance of
a March 2033 maturity bond.
Bloomberg ticker
COLTES <Govt>
UVRt = UVR value in COP after t calendar days have passed since the 16th
of the month m.
UVR15,m = UVR value in COP on the 15th of the month m.
m = month in which the change in the CPI index of the previous month is
applied to calculate the UVR value.
Im-1 = monthly percentage change in the CPI index in month m-1.
t = number of days since 15th of the month m.
Dm = number of days in month m.
UVR <Index>
Bloomberg ticker
SUMMARY OF TERMS
Description
Face value
Maturity
Coupon
Annual.
Day count
Amortization
Bullet.
Auctions
Usually carried out on Wednesdays, during the first and/or third monetary
weeks of the month (that is, the first and/or third week of each month
containing at least three business days).
S&P rating
BBB+.
Moodys rating
Baa3.
Coupon (%)
Original Term
Duration (yrs)
25-Feb-15
10,529,532
12
1.15
17-May-17
4,25
7,799,219
3.13
03-Mar-21
3.5
4,550,962
8.6
6.14
23-Feb-23
4.75
12,304,332
17
7.19
25-Mar-33
2,063,940
15
13.60
Total
37,247,986
*Coupon adjusted by UVR index, based on data as of October 31, 2013. Sources: Ministry of Finance, SEN, Bloomberg, and
Santander.
89
COLTES <Govt>
Coupon calculation
SUMMARY OF TERMS
90
Description
Face value
Maturity
2014.
Coupon
Annual.
Day count
Amortization
Bullet.
S&P rating
BBB+
COLTC <Govt>
SUMMARY OF TERMS
Description
Face value
Maturity
Coupon
Zero coupon.
Auctions
S&P rating
A-2
91
GLOBAL TES
To date, Colombia has issued five global bonds that are denominated in pesos but pay interest and principal in
U.S. dollars. The Global TES 2010 (which was initially issued in November 2004 and reopened on January 21,
2005) was the first nominal rate bond denominated in local currency to be issued by a sovereign in a global
format. Colombias second offering in this sector, the Global TES 2015, was initially issued in February 2005
and reopened on three occasions (December 2005, March 2006, and August 2006). The third offering was the
Global TES 2027, issued in June 2007 as a 20-year bond as part of an exchange transaction, where the
government used the proceeds of the offering to purchase USD-denominated securities. Finally, in September
2012, the government issued a fifth bond, the Global TES 2023. Global TES provide international investors
offshore exposure to peso FX risk via an asset that is clearable through Euroclear and Clearstream. Global TES
are included in the market makers program, but are not yet tradable in the local electronic trading system
(SEN).
Bloomberg ticker
COLOM <Govt>
92
Maturity
Face value
Coupon
12.00% annual.
Day count
Amortization
Bullet.
Governing law
New York.
Settlement
T+3.
Payment currency
Additional features
Moodys rating
Baa3.
S&P rating
BBB.
Face value
Coupon
7.75% annual.
Day count
Amortization
Bullet.
Governing law
New York.
Settlement
T+3.
Payment currency
Additional features
Moodys rating
Baa3.
S&P rating
BBB.
93
94
Maturity
Face value
Coupon
4.375% annual.
Day count
Amortization
Bullet.
Governing law
New York.
Settlement
T+3.
Payment currency
Additional features
Moodys rating
Baa3.
S&P rating
BBB.
Face value
Coupon
9.85% annual.
Day count
Amortization
Bullet.
Governing law
New York.
Settlement
T+3.
Payment currency
Additional features
Moodys rating
Baa3.
S&P rating
BBB.
95
Conventions
Semiannual; actual/360-day.
Maturity
Liquidity
A typical quote for tenors between 2 and 10 years is US$10 million, with
bid-ask spreads in the inter-dealer market of about 10-20 bps.
Settlement
T+2.
IBR SWAP
The IBR swap is a fixed versus floating swap based upon the overnight Indicador Bancario de Referencia
(IBR). In the swap, one side receives a fixed rate and the other pays the geometric average of overnight rate
fixings for the life of each coupon period. The swap trades as a 0 coupon overnight index swap in tenors up to
18 months; OIS tenors are 3, 6, 9, 12, and 18 months. From 2 years and longer it trades with quarterly coupon
payments. Both OIS and coupon swap formats use an actual/360-day count. In coupon swap format the tenors
are 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 15, and 20 years. However, it appears that the 2-, 5-, and 10-year points are absorbing
most of the liquidity. Because this swap trades offshore in a non-deliverable format, it is not subject to the
same taxation as a long TES position. Therefore, IBR swaps have traditionally traded below comparable
maturity TES bonds.
SUMMARY OF TERMS
96
Reference
Conventions
Quarterly; actual/360-day.
Maturity
The curve extends out to 20 years, but liquidity is focused on the short end.
Liquidity
Settlement
T+2.
MEXICO
MACRO BACKGROUND
Concern about the fiscal outlook was a major investment theme in Mexico in 2009, with both Fitch and S&P
downgrading the countrys sovereign credit rating by one notch in November and December, to BBB.
However, Mexico actually compares favorably with other BBB+ countries such as Thailand on most metrics,
as Mexicos gross external debt hovered around 18.2% of GDP in December 2012 while Thailands reached
38.8%; public sector debt in Mexico is 36% compared to 44.7% in Thailand. Furthermore, Mexicos gross
external federal debt to GDP is around 5.4%, a relatively low level compared with similarly rated EM peers.
The country also has a solid track record in terms of public sector debt management. By October 2013, net
federal government debt stood at 29% of GDP, most of it funded locally. The overall public sector fiscal
balance remained close to zero over the five years to 2009 (with the primary fiscal balance averaging 2.2% of
GDP), in line with the average for BBB+ countries. However, it averaged 2.5% in the last four years before
2013 (primary surplus of 1.5%) and is expected to reach a deficit of about to 2.4% of GDP in 2013 and 3.5% in
2014, according to our local economics team.
What concerns investors is not so much the headline fiscal indicatorswhich, as described above, look
relatively solidbut certain structural characteristics that indicate a more challenging fiscal road ahead. At
16.5% of GDP (in September 2013), total federal government revenue in Mexico is among the lowest in the
BBB rating universe as well as OECD countries. Moreover, over the last five years (through September 2013)
5-6 p.p. of total government revenue was obtained through the governments participation in the oil sector,
meaning that non-oil government revenue in Mexico is closer to the 10% of GDP mark. One could interpret
these numbers as evidence that there is substantial room for fiscal adjustment in Mexico, further reinforcing
perceptions that the country enjoys a solid fiscal footing.
Oil sector not following market signals but strong majority in Congress is pushing change
Pemex crude oil production (mbd, RHS)
Pemex mezcla (US$/barrel)
120
100
3.6
3.4
3.2
80
3.0
60
2.8
40
2.6
Dec 12
*Aug 13
Dec 11
Dec 10
Dec 09
Dec 08
Dec 07
Dec 06
Dec 05
Dec 04
Dec 03
2.2
Dec 02
Dec 01
2.4
Dec 00
20
Sources: Bloomberg, Finance Ministry, Lower and Upper Houses of Mexico Congress and Santander.
However, the core problem is that: (1) the reform track record of the last several years indicates intense
political opposition to increases in non-oil revenue despite the relatively low tax base; and (2) there has been a
sharp fall in oil production in the past few years (after peaking at 3.4 million barrels/day in 2004) along with a
decline in proven reserves, although production has actually tended to stabilize since late-2009 (at around 2.6
million barrels/day). Nevertheless, the newly installed PRI executive (led by President Pea Nieto) and
legislative branches have shown a strong positive change from their historical patterns, producing a solid track
record in approving structural reforms that subsequently has opened up room for substantial improvements in
productivity and competiveness in the upcoming years, in our view. If the most important reforms are executed
successfully (energy, financial, fiscal and telecommunications) potential GDP may increase (by as much as
2%, as per government estimates), and the main rating agencies may upgrade Mexico in the first half of 2014.
97
As a response to heightened market concerns in the aftermath of Lehmans collapse, the Mexican government
introduced a fiscal package aimed at increasing non-oil tax revenue by creating a new consumption tax in late
2009. Although the version of the fiscal package that was finally passed by Congress was watered down
relative to the governments original proposal, it was the first step toward reducing Mexicos fiscal dependence
on oil. Indeed, Congress passed politically difficult proposals in December 2009, such as a one-percentagepoint increase in the VAT tax (instead of the proposed consumption tax), and increases in specific excise taxes.
More recently, the newly elected president, Enrique Pea Nieto, of the PRI party, has proposed two important
reforms as part of his key economic proposals: (1) a tax reform that would reduce the governments
dependence on oil revenue, increase the tax base, and eliminate exceptions and loopholes; and (2) reform that
would develop Mexico as an energy power by opening PEMEX to private investment, but maintain the states
controlling stake, which should increase productive investment and employment levels, in our view.
The tax reform was finally approved by Congress in November, but the potential impact and scope was more
limited than most observers previously expected. Broadly speaking, the government aims to collect the
equivalent of around 1.4% of GDP in additional tax revenue in 2014. However, the reform sets the stage to
increase tax revenue even more over the medium term given the added items that create incentives for the
formalization of the informal economy. The government aims to collect 3.0% of GDP of extra revenue by
2018. The clear weakness of the economy during most of 2013 and the challenging political environment while
the Congress was considering a busy structural reform agenda made it difficult for the government to go for a
deeper and more aggressive tax reform that would sizably reduce the fiscal reliance on energy-related revenue.
This would have been possible only by increasing taxes such as VAT on food and medicines. The approved tax
reform increased the tax burden by relying on two main pillars: (1) the income tax structure of high-income
individuals and corporations; and (2) adjustments to certain exemptions on the VAT (food and medicines
remain at a 0% rate), and special taxes on soft drinks and gasoline.
98
100%
100%
M30
80%
M10
60%
30Y
20Y
60%
10Y
M7
M3
*2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
0%
2004
20%
*2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
20%
3Y
40%
M5
2003
40%
0%
80%
M20
Elsewhere, participation of 30-year MBono sector supply in total auctions (including Cetes, Bondes,
UDIBonos, and MBonos) decreased from close to 2.4% of the total in 2008 to 1.1% in 2009, but rebounded to
2.4% in 2011 and 2.5% in 2012 (including the syndicated transaction). However, the participation of the 30year MBono in the overall supply of sovereign bonds fell in 2013 to 1.90%, possibly due to renewed market
turmoil as a consequence of expectations of potential changes in the Feds bond purchases. The 30-year sector
MBono auction as a percentage of total MBono supply has behaved very similarly, as it decreased from around
12.9% in 2008 to 9.4% in 2009, but recovered to 12.3% in 2011 and 2012. Surprisingly, the participation of the
30-year MBono as a percentage of the total MBono supply fell to the lowest annual level in 2013 (through
November), at 9.22%. We would expect to see the government gradually reduce its issuance at the short end of
the curve, replacing it with long-term debt only once market conditions stabilize after the Fed starts the
tapering of its QE3 policy.
20%
18%
20%
19%
21%
20%
19%
80%
82%
80%
81%
79%
80%
81%
Dec-07
Dec-08
Dec-09
Dec-10
Dec-11
Dec-12
Oct-13
0.6
0.8
0.9 0.9
40%
20%
Oct-13
Dec-12
Dec-11
Dec-10
Dec-09
Dec-08
Dec-07
Dec-06
Dec-05
Dec-04
22%
0.5
0.6
0.0
Dec-03
78%
60%
1.8
0.4
Ex ternal debt
Dec-06
0.4
33%
1.0 1.2
0.6 0.7 0.6
67%
0.9
80%
Dec-05
1.0
0.5
1.5
2.8
Domestic debt
100%
39%
2.0
1.5
2.5
2.3
3.7
61%
2.5
3.5
Dec-04
3.5
3.0
3.1
40%
Domestic debt
Ex ternal debt
60%
4.0
Dec-03
0%
The participation of domestic debt and foreign debt did not change in any meaningful way during the course of
2013. After somewhat contained activity in the external bond market in 2009 given the aftermath of the global
recession, Mexico was able to be more assertive in 2010 as market conditions improved, issuing international
bonds for US$6.5 billion, compared with close to US$5 billion in 2009. However, in 2011 the government
tapped the external market by raising a more modest total of US$3 billion (with only three re openings). In
contrast, over the course of 2012 the government managed to issue around US$7.2 billion worth of bonds in
international markets: (1) the 10-year USD Global bonds maturing in March 2022 for US$2 billion, issued in
January 2012 (with demand of 2.5x the amount offered and pushing the USD 10-year yield to 3.71%, the
lowest in history); (2) the 30-year USD Global bonds maturing in March 2044 for US$2 billion (with demand
of 3.4x; the amount offered and again priced at 4.84%, the lowest USD 30-year yield in Mexicos history); (3)
two tranches of a 3- and 5-year JPY Samurai bond, with maturities in June 2015 and June 2017, and yields of
99
1.29% and 1.56%, respectively (the first Mexican sovereign issue in Japan without guarantees since 2000); and
(4) an exchange worth US$2.2 billion that accepted more than a dozen existing (and in many cases illiquid)
issues maturing between 2013 and 2040 for the new 10-, 30- and 100-year issues, as a means to perfect the
USD curve as a benchmark (there was no net financing from this transaction, as the proceeds from the issues
of the new benchmarks were used to pay for existing bonds).
The government has signaled that it would seek to tap the European and Japanese markets on an ongoing basis
in order to diversify its funding sources in international markets, tapping only the latter in 2012 and tapping
both in 2013. In fact, external debt issuance in 2013 was not only the largest in recent history, reaching the
equivalent of US$8.3 billion, but also among the most diverse in terms of funding sources: (1) the reopening of
the Global March 2044 for US$1.5 billion in January was at a record low spread of 110 bps against 30Y UST;
(2) the issue of the new Global 2023 for EUR1.6 billion in April (including an option to switch or exchange the
new issue for existing bonds on the EUR curve, in order to provide more liquidity to the new 10Y benchmark)
also set a new record of 120 bps against the EUR interbank swap curve; (3) and three new issues of Samurai
bonds denominated in JPY maturing in 2016, 2018 and 2019.
On the inflation-linkers front, there has been no issuance of the 20-year since the end of 2008, while the 30year UDIBono supply lost some momentum in 2011, with its participation in total supply of bonds via auctions
falling from a recent high of 0.8% in 1Q10 to an average 0.53% in all quarters of 2011 (assuming the
government delivers what it promised in the 4Q11 auction schedule). Elsewhere, although the issuance of the
30-year UDIBono lost some momentum in 2H11 as its participation fell from an average of 0.65% of total
supply (including syndicated transactions) in the previous four quarters, it then bounced back in 2012 to an
average of 0.65% and even reached a record high in 4Q12 of 1.29% due to the syndicated transaction in
November. However, participation of the 30-year UDIBono went back down to 0.44% of total local sovereign
bond supply in 2013, reaching 0.36% in 4Q13, a sixteen-quarter low, suggesting that demand for linkers may
be ebbing due to more challenging global market conditions ahead of the Feds tapering of QE3 and generally
contained inflation (as well as expectations) across the globe, including Mexico.
Elsewhere, the supply of the 10-year sector remained around 0.45-0.50% of total bond supply five quarters
before and immediately after the syndicated transaction in 1Q11, but increased to 0.61% in 2012 and 0.57% in
2013. The participation of both MBonos and UDIBonos (these bonds have the longest available maturities) in
overall government debt increased from 59.7% in December 2012 to 62.0% in November 2013, pushing the
average maturity of domestic debt higher to a record high of 8.01 years in June 2013 (it then returned to a
slightly lower 7.78 years in October 2013, the latest available month) as part of a relatively consistent increase
since October 2009.
Outstanding government securities (% of total)*
13
19
21
21
19
19
19
17
23
12
25
14
16
24
18
21
18
25
22
18
16
19
6.55
7
6
Nov-13
Dec-12
19
50
Dec-10
24
18
46
Dec-09
22
Dec-03
0%
29
18
48
3
2
1.47
1
Jan-00
100
8.01
Lehman collapse
43
46
Dec-08
20%
36
42
45
Dec-07
40%
Mbonos
44
44
Dec-06
60%
40
Dec-05
34
Dec-04
80%
UDIBonos
Bondes
Dec-11
Cetes
100%
Jan-02
Jan-04
Jan-06
Jan-08
Jan-10
Jan-12
65%
16
55%
12
45%
35%
25%
0
Jan-08
15%
Jan-09
Jan-10
Jan-11
Jan-12
Jan-13
65%
60%
55%
50%
45%
40%
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
Dec-07
WGBI incusion
Dec-08
Dec-09
Dec-10
Dec-11
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
-2
Dec-12
*Data through November 21, 2013. Sources: Ministry of Finance and Santander.
Foreign participation in the MBonos market increased rapidly well ahead of the actual date of the WGBI
inclusion on October 1, 2010, moving from 28% right before the inclusion of MBonos to the WGBI,
converging toward 31%, equivalent to MXN463 billion (or around US$37.5 billion) as of December 31, 2010.
Over the course of 2012-2013, foreign participation in the MBono market continued its robust rise, reaching an
all-time high of 59.3% in the week ending October 23, 2013, and clustering mainly between the 5- and 10-year
sectors (hovering between 60% and 72% of the total outstanding in those tenors).
Foreign flows have been lured not only by the WGBI announcement in 2010 but also by other factors such as:
(1) despite the recent supply shocks affecting food prices (3Q12 and 2Q13), medium-term inflation
expectations (1Y-4Y expectations published by Banxico) and core CPI readings have continued to tighten,
moving closer to the lowest levels seen since the 2008-09 global financial crisis, reflecting Banxicos increased
credibility; (2) the relative improvement in country risk driven by the aggressive structural reform agenda
promised by President Pea Nieto since before his election back in July 2012 and mostly delivered as of
December 7, 2013; and (3) what we think is a global structural rebalancing out of developed markets bonds
and into emerging market bonds.
101
European bonds
Europe (Geographic definition)
European Union (EU)
European Monetary Union (Euro zone)
Peripherals
Solid balance sheets (EM & DM)*
Solid balance sheets ex-Mexico*
Total EM bonds in WGBI
Mexico
Poland
South Africa
Malaysia
Total WGBI
Market weight
Weighted av.
Weighted av.
in WGBI (%)
Life (Yrs)
40.12
39.59
32.78
11.98
5.29
4.50
2.16
0.79
0.62
0.37
0.38
100.00
1.98
1.99
1.94
2.93
3.34
2.95
5.10
5.57
3.59
8.10
3.68
1.27
9.01
9.06
8.11
8.00
7.59
7.30
8.09
9.23
4.89
13.23
5.91
8.17
*Solid balance sheets are calculated with general government gross debt (% GDP) lower than 60% and
general government net lending/borrowing (% GDP) smaller than 5% from IMFs October 2013 WEO.
Sources: IMF, data provided by Citi as of December 2013 (via Bloombergs SSIB function), and Santander.
As international investors that participate in the WGBI have been affected by the woes in European debt
markets, most of them have looked for alternatives in bonds issued by countries with stronger balance sheets
and sounder fundamentals (including higher growth potential and strong banks). As European bonds made up
about 41% of the WBGI market weight (with peripherals reaching 14%) by March 2010 (when Citi published
the formal statement of Mexican bonds eligibility to the WGBI), countries with more attractive balance sheets
such as Mexico have become much more attractive. The ongoing rebalancing is likely to continue exerting
structural compression potential on bond rates of countries that possess better fundamentals due to the relative
scarcity of bonds issued by those countries within the WGBI, at least compared with European bonds. This
seems especially true, in our view, now that the medium-term growth and structural reform outlook in Mexico
has improved substantially.
It is difficult to estimate the total funds benchmarked to the WGBI, which makes it a daunting task to gauge
the potential market-weight investment in the Mexican market (based on the 0.64% Mexico weight established
by Citi in March 2010 or the more recent 0.79% as of December 2013). The WGBI has undergone some
changes since March 2010, when Citi first announced that MBonos were eligible for the index (they were
formally added on October 1, 2010); these changes include the exclusion of two peripheral European bond
markets, Greece and Portugal, and the inclusion of a fourth EM bond market, South Africa.
The latest MBono foreign holdings data suggest that if we assume that all offshore MBono holders are WGBIfocused investors who are currently market-weight in Mexico, the total funds benchmarked to WGBI would be
around US$20.3 trillion, the higher end of estimates. However, we are inclined to believe that not all investors
are WGBI-focused, as there is a quite diverse set of investors (including real money and hedge fund firms),
and those who are focused on the index, have been leaning toward being overweight in Mexico, at least from
the anecdotal evidence we have seen in our institutional client base.
The size of the MBono market grew to MXN2,089 billion in November 2013 from roughly MXN1,870 billion
at the end of 2012. The total number of outstanding issues remained at 22 in 2012 and 2013, as one new issue
in 2013 replaced one bond that matured (Jun. 13s matured). The new bond was a benchmark for the 5-year
sector and was first issued in August 2013 (Jun. 18s) via the syndication process. The average quarterly
MBono issue size increased to MXN79.3 billion in 2013 (average of all four quarters including the last three
weeks of December based on the announced government schedule) from MXN76.1 billion in 2012 and
MXN55.0 billion in 2011, although the new syndicated placement system will occasionally affect the
announced traditional volumes at primary auctions. (A new bond issue distributed through the syndicated
mechanism will generally be absent from the auction calendar in any given quarter.)
If syndicated transactions are included, effective MBono supply ends up decreasing 8.7% from 2012 to 2013
(assuming the government follows the 4Q11 auction schedule in the last weeks of December), from
102
MXN374.5 billion to MXN342 billion, in part due to fewer syndicated transactions. The governments new
syndications are intended to: (1) provide a decent amount in circulation for new issues; (2) be eligible for
inclusion in global bond indices, such as the WGBI; (3) enable wide distribution among local and foreign
investors; and (4) support better general liquidity conditions in the secondary market. In 2012, we expect that
the number of outstanding MBono tenors will remain around 22 or may rise to 23, given new benchmarks. One
MBono will expire, while there could be a new 3-, 10-, 20- or 30-year benchmark (only a new 5-year was
announced in 2013).
STRUCTURAL REFORMS
At the start of his campaign back in July 2012, candidate Pea Nieto had promised to push through Congress a
whole array of structural reforms if elected president. Once he started his presidency he decided to negotiate
with all the main political parties a grand vision for the country, which was called Pact for Mexico, which
included five broad themes: (1) agreements on a society based on liberty and rights: (2) agreements to foster
economic growth, employment, and competitiveness; (3) agreements to improve security and justice; (4)
agreements for promoting transparency, accountability, and the fight against corruption; and (5) agreements to
improve democratic governance. Although there are many aspects to the Pact for Mexico, the most significant
structural reforms proposed by the new PRI administration were broadly spelled out so that there was wide
political and social commitment to and legitimacy for those reforms.
President Enrique Pea Nietos (2012-17) structural reform timeline
Reform
Labor
Education
Telecom
Fiscal
Financial
Energy
TOTAL
Date of approval
4Q12
1Q13
1Q13
4Q13
4Q13
4Q13
Secondary laws
1Q13
3Q13
1Q14
N/A
1Q14
2Q - 3Q 14
Overall, the reform agenda suggests that Mexico is moving quickly on the right path to stronger and potentially
more balanced growth, as a change in incentives and the new institutions should lead to a better use of
resources and a reduction in the existing distortions of local factors, markets and sectors. For instance, the
telecommunications reform, which so far lacks a secondary legislation, has the potential to transform an
inefficient sector by reducing the costs of linking markets, people and resources with better flow of
information. This reform illustrates the importance of the secondary legislation, which should materialize the
spirit of the law and reduce uncertainty, potentially affecting activity.
The interaction between growth and reforms in the short-term has been mixed: in some cases regulatory
uncertainty has exerted a negative drag on output, and in others, weak activity actually has forced the watering
down of a reform (i.e., tax). After our meetings, five factors emerged as the main explanations behind the sharp
deceleration of the Mexican economy: (1) the new Enrique Pena Nieto administration wanted to control
spending and focus on efficiency, which at a Federal level proved much more difficult than at the State level
(he was governor of the State of Mexico); (2) the housing sector lost momentum quite dramatically due to the
homebuilders failed model and slow execution of the governments budget; (3) a slowdown in U.S.
manufacturing at the beginning of the year; (4) less energy production and availability of natural gas; and (5)
uncertainty due to reforms affected some sectors. Also, businessmen were initially excited with the PRI
administration, but felt unhappy about the tax reform, which, in their view, targeted them directly, resulting in a
weaker investment sentiment.
The interaction between reforms and growth is likely to be an important factor for the rating agencies before
they make their assessment of Mexicos rating. The big three rating agencies generally believe that growth
tends to be a good antidote to compensate for any weak fiscal or external indicators. The fact that growth has
103
decelerated so sharply in 2013 makes 2014 a challenging year for Mexico, as rating agencies will probably be
looking for evidence regarding two factors: (1) progress on secondary legislation; and (2) macro data pointing
to a cyclical recovery toward stronger growth (an upgrade would require a comparison with BBB+ countries,
which have generally grown faster in 2013).
A double notch upgrade seems unlikely by rating agencies, even by S&P, which holds the weakest rating for
Mexico, as there is much to be seen in terms of execution of the reforms, while countries rated at the A scale
are usually much richer in terms of GDP per capita. However, the effort to add some wording regarding further
details (giving some color related to the secondary legislation) to the constitutional changes included in the
energy reform may give rating agencies more information to make their case for a sovereign upgrade sooner.
Rating agencies may not have to wait for the actual approval of the secondary legislation, particularly for the
energy reform, to make a case for an upgrade, which seems likely in the next 3-6 months.
One of the most transformational efforts is the energy reform approved on Thursday, December 12 by the full
Senate, as Mexico currently has the sixth largest reserves of non-conventional shale gas and oil in the world,
but currently produces nothing from such sources. Such a reform could have a diverse set of implications on
several variables: fiscal, growth, inflation and competitiveness. Another surprising fact is that the U.S. Gulf of
Mexico currently produces 1.6 million barrels of oil per day, while the Mexican side of the Gulf produces
virtually nothing. This situation suggests there is massive potential for Mexico given the similar geology on
both sides of the Gulf and as existing technology should be effective for exploration and production in both
national territorial waters.
The Senate approved a much more market-friendly reform than the initial proposal made by the government.
The bill changes the constitution with specific wording that private companies will be allowed to invest in
upstream and downstream activities in hydrocarbons, including a menu of options on offer to the private sector
such as service contracts, profit-sharing, production sharing, licenses and others. This is quite positive as it
makes it more attractive for international firms, especially in the riskiest projects such as in deepwater. The
energy bill goes beyond hydrocarbons and also opens the electricity sector, which could reduce costs per
gigawatt, making manufacturing more competitive.
Mexico is among the top ten producers of oil in the world and is the third largest exporter of oil to the U.S.
Current production is around 2.5 million barrels per day, and Pemex expects it to reach around 3.0 million
barrels per day by 2018 without reforms. A scenario including the energy reform could change these estimates
substantially. Pemex calculates prospective resources at around 55 billion barrels in conventional and 60
billion in non-conventional, a total of about 115 billion barrels, and equivalent to 46 years of current
production. Some private sector estimates suggest that to replace the giant Cantarell oil field (one of the largest
in the world, with peak production at 2.1 million barrels per day in 2003) as much as US$100 billion in
investment would be needed in offshore fields. As offshore rigs take an average of 10 years to reach maturity,
shale gas and oil would probably be a more compelling short-term investment story that would result in faster
production increases.
Despite the ongoing boom in U.S. hydrocarbons, Mexicos northern neighbor is likely to continue importing
heavy crude (which is currently produced and is present in most prospective wells in Mexico) from Mexico
and Canada to refine it (US refineries are good at processing heavy oil) and then export refined products to
many countries, including Mexico. This geographical distribution of energy resources suggests not only that
the energy reform will be a boon for Mexico, but that it has the potential to integrate the NAFTA region even
more via a more efficient energy market and giving it an increasingly competitive edge on a global scale.
Mexico seems to be following Norways steps by keeping sovereignty over hydrocarbons but opening up
exploration and production to market forces, directed by a strong regulator. Most people we talked to had a
good impression of the energy bill, especially as private firms will be allowed to book expected profits (not
reserves, as ownership of the oil will continue to be of the State) by the SEC, which should ensure interest
among major oil firms. Public opinion is mixed regarding the energy reform, as favorability varies depending
on the wording of the question (when efficiency is involved, favorability tends to be above 50%, while when
foreigner ownership is mentioned, favorability falls). These different results in polls suggest that
implementation and public relations will be an important task for the government in the months ahead to make
the energy reform widely accepted by society and effective in terms of its impact on the economy. Another
104
challenge may be the approved law on referendums at the Lower House, which may enable the left-leaning
PRD party to hold a national vote on the energy reform in 2015. Although there are many hurdles before the
reform can be declared void, such as validation of 1.6 million signatures by the electoral authority, vetting by
the Constitutional Court and voting against the initiative by 40% of registered voters, only uncertainty has the
potential to deter investment.
As nice as the reform sounds, producing more oil does not guarantee a sustained source of growth. Success in
terms of improving prosperity should depend more on the secondary legislation, future macro management of
the potential oil boom and how the benefits trickle down to other sectors. The governments expected next
steps regarding the energy reform are: (1) approval of secondary reforms and approval by at least 17 out of 31
state legislatures (the PRI party rules in 22 of them) in 1H14; (2) first contracts signed by end of 2014; and (3)
FDI flows and job creation should start in 2015. The impact of the reform will be on how the law is rolled out,
including new institutions, regulations, and enforceability. In other words, the devil is in the details.
However, there are execution risks for the energy reform, just as the lack of a secondary legislation for the
telecom reform highlights how regulatory uncertainty can affect investment and growth. Factors such as the
complexity of the reform, resistance from vested interests and diminishing political capital may all act as
deterrents in the approval of secondary legislation and may end up diluting the content. Another risk is that the
left-leaning PRD party calls a referendum in 2015 against the energy reform.
The silver lining of the energy reform may be the fact that some details about regulatory framework and
governance were added to law, providing some direction as to where the secondary legislation may be heading
and potentially providing rating agencies with enough information to come up with an assessment regarding
the sovereign credit even before the secondary legislation is ready. For instance, the bill includes specific
wording about: (1) how the private sector will be allowed to invest across activities including many types of
contracts (from profit-sharing to licenses); (2) Pemex and CFE will be provided a 2-year period to revamp their
governance before becoming state-owned enterprises and be excluded from the budget; (3) the board of Pemex
will be cut from 15 members down to 10, excluding the current 5 members from the union (the new board will
have 5 members from the government and 5 independent members); and (4) there will be a period of 120 days
after the law is signed to approve the secondary law with the details regarding the allowed contracts.
MARKET MAKERS
In order to increase market liquidity, the Ministry of Finance designates as market makers a number of
financial intermediaries that meet certain quantitative criteria. Market makers are selected based on their
trading volume with clients and in the interbank market, in addition to their participation in the primary
auctions. The list of market makers is announced every three months with the latest one published in
November 2013 and effective December, including eight market makers for MBonos (all banks) and four for
UDIBonos (also banks). New market makers are allowed to begin operations on the first business day of the
next month. Market makers are required to provide a constant two-way market in all fixed-rate securities
across the curve, and must participate in every Cetes and fixed-rate Bonos auction with a minimum established
amount.
Financial institutions that qualify as market makers of government securities have the benefit of borrowing
securities from Banco de Mxico. The repo and securities lending regulatory framework has been in place for a
few years now, but activity is still incipient. Each market maker is allowed to borrow from the Central Bank
any series of Cetes or Bonos for a total of up to 2% of the total amount of securities outstanding or 4% of the
outstanding of each particular series. Banks can provide as collateral almost any government bond, including
IPAB bonds and BREMs, and the repo is rolled over on a daily basis. The program, which was created in
September 2000, currently has eight market makers, which means that the system as a whole can be short up to
32% of the outstanding of each series of Bonos.
105
BONOS
The so-called MBonos (Bonos de Desarrollo Tasa Fija) are fixed-rate MXN-denominated instruments issued
by the Mexican government. The Ministry of Finance, with the Central Bank acting as its placement agent,
announces its auction schedule on a quarterly basis. The main auction guidelines have consisted of both
reopening outstanding series to enhance liquidity and issuing new references to build a more complete curve.
The only new reference announced in 2013 was the introduction of a five-year tenor, maturing June 14, 2018
and paying a six-month coupon of 4.75%, first issued via syndication. At the time of writing of this report, the
Ministry of Finances 2014 Annual Borrowing Program had not been released. However, we expect the
number of outstanding MBono tenors to remain around 22 this year, with the reopening policy continuing for
all tenors. The longest tenor on the curve should continue to be the MBono 30Y benchmark (maturing on
November 13, 2042, issued in April 2012).
Bloomberg tickers
SUMMARY OF TERMS
Description
Medium- and
instrument
long-term
coupon-bearing
MXN-denominated
debt
Face value
MXN100
Maturity
3, 5, 10, 20, and 30 years. Shorter tenors are available in the secondary
market. The 7-year tenor was discontinued in 2007.
Coupon
Semiannual.
Day count
Moody's rating
Baa1
S&P rating
A-
PRIMARY AUCTION
106
Auction schedule
Bidding process
Bid format
Bids are submitted in terms of price. Each bid must indicate the amount and
the price up to five decimal places.
Allocation process
Banco de Mxico has discretion to issue less than the announced amount at
the auction of each tenor. Settlement is T+2.
Placement agent
Banco de Mxico
SECONDARY MARKET
Trading
Settlement
Coupon
(%)
8.00
7.00
9.50
6.00
8.00
6.25
7.25
5.00
7.75
4.75
8.50
8.00
6.50
6.50
8.00
10.00
7.50
8.50
7.75
10.00
8.50
7.75
Max
255
734
419
533
609
1,352
1,731
1,297
1,148
568
736
575
913
2,137
1,657
4,306
674
704
2,183
949
1,192
1,921
Outstanding
0
28
95
94
47
104
416
65
290
128
170
208
439
686
50
280
336
169
470
198
503
564
Total outstanding
% of Total
(MXN million)
110,681
69,040
115,850
89,990
104,200
149,687
120,799
129,531
76,100
47,076
54,279
86,342
107,687
107,494
80,340
98,963
85,703
92,840
123,542
60,990
104,288
74,417
2,089,838
trading
0.4%
1.6%
1.6%
1.6%
1.2%
2.5%
6.5%
3.2%
4.1%
2.4%
2.4%
2.8%
4.0%
8.0%
5.1%
22.5%
3.1%
2.1%
8.6%
2.2%
5.1%
9.2%
Total
outstanding
(USD billion)
8.50
5.30
8.89
6.91
8.00
11.49
9.27
9.94
5.84
3.61
4.17
6.63
8.27
8.25
6.17
7.60
6.58
7.13
9.48
4.68
8.00
5.71
160.41
% of Total
outstanding
5.3%
3.3%
5.5%
4.3%
5.0%
7.2%
5.8%
6.2%
3.6%
2.3%
2.6%
4.1%
5.2%
5.1%
3.8%
4.7%
4.1%
4.4%
5.9%
2.9%
5.0%
3.6%
Data as of November 21, 2013. Sources: Bloomberg, Central Bank of Mexico, and Santander.
107
BONDES
Bondes (Bonos de Desarrollo) are medium-term floating-rate debt instruments issued by the Mexican
government and denominated in Mexican pesos. There are five different types of Bondes: LP, LT, LS, L, and
the newer D series. These series vary depending on the benchmark to which they are indexed, chiefly 1-, 28-,
91-, and 182-day Cetes. The Ministry of Finance has prioritized the issuance of fixed-rate bonds since 2004. It
has been reducing gradually the issuance of floating-rate securities in order to leave that market segment for
the IPAB to refinance its liabilities. In 1H06 it stopped issuing the LS series (the so-called Bondes 182) and
introduced the D series as a result of the US$9 billion prepayment to multilateral entities. In addition to
shortening the duration of fixed-rate debt offered in weekly auctions, Mexico increased issuance of Bondes D
as part of its response to the effects of the 2008 financial crisis. However, these two changes were reversed in
2010, given the normalization of local markets and the economy.
Bloomberg ticker
MBOND <Govt> for D series and MBON <Govt> for the rest
SUMMARY OF TERMS
Face value
MXN100
Maturity
For the D series 1-, 2-, 3-, 4-, and 5-year tenors have been issued.
Currently, Banxico is only issuing 5-year bonds.
Coupon
In the LP series the coupon is paid every 91 days at the maximum of either
the inflation rate or the prevailing coupon rate (the latter is determined by
adding a spread to the 91-day Cetes rate). In the LT series the coupon is
paid every 91 days based on the 91-day Cetes plus a spread. In the LS
series the coupon is paid every 182 days at the maximum of the inflation
rate or the prevailing coupon rate (the latter is determined by adding a
spread to the 182-Cetes rate). The L series pays its coupon every 28 days at
the higher of 28-day Cetes and the short-term promissory note rate. Finally,
Bondes D offer the same structure as Banxicos BREMs (used for open
market operations), which will be phased out gradually. They are linked to
the official overnight rate (MXBRBA <Govt>); the coupon rate, paid every
28 days, is the compounded average of the daily overnight rate during the
relevant 28-day period.
Day count
Auction schedule
Every second Tuesday, bids are due to Banco de Mxico before 1:00 p.m.
local time. Results are announced within an hour after bids are submitted
(usually 1:30 p.m.). Auctions of Bondes D are completely independent of
Banxicos open market operations.
Auction process
SECONDARY MARKET
Trading
108
Trading occurs over the counter. Given the large share of over-the-counter
transactions, total trading volume is difficult to determine. As a reference,
the outstanding balance for all Bondes as of November 28, 2013, was
MXN1,046.7 (US$80 billion), of which 100% corresponded to the D series.
Settlement can be same-day, T+1, T+2, T+3, or T+4.
CETES
Cetes (Certificados de la Tesorera) are short-term discounted Treasury bills issued by the Mexican
government. Every quarter, the Ministry of Finance announces revisions to the auction structure. Currently, 28, 91-, 182-, and 364-day Cetes are being auctioned. Other tenors have been issued in the past. For many years
28-day Cetes have been the benchmark rate for the domestic market. However, the Ministry of Finance has
increased the amount auctioned in the 182-day Cetes in order to enhance its liquidity and migrated the
benchmark interest rate to the six-month reference, more in-line with international markets. In the last three
quarters of 2013, Hacienda issued Cetes bonds with alternating ranges of MXN5-9 billion of 28-day every
week and MXN6-10 billion (MXN7-11 billion in 4Q13) of 91-day every week, compared to set amounts of
MXN5.0 billion and MXN7.0 billion, respectively, in 1Q13. Issuance of 182-day Cetes varied from MXN9.5
billion weekly in 1Q13 to MXN9.0 billion in 2Q13 before increasing to MXN10.0 billion in 3Q13 and
MXN10.5 billion in 4Q13. Finally, issuance of one-year Cetes increased from MXN9.5 billion every four
weeks in 1Q13 and 2Q13 to MXN10.0 billion in 3Q13 and MXN10.5 billion in 4Q13.
Bloomberg ticker
SUMMARY OF TERMS
Description
Face value
MXN10
Tenor
Currently 28-, 91-, 182-, and 364-day paper. However, longer and shorter
maturities can be issued.
Coupon
Zero coupon
Day count
S&P rating
A-
PRIMARY AUCTION
Auction schedule
Bidding process
Allocation process
The allocation starts from the highest price and moves to the lowest. Banco
de Mxico has discretion to issue less than the announced amount of the
auction.
SECONDARY MARKET
Trading
Cetes have traditionally been the most liquid government debt instruments
in Mexico. Trading occurs over the counter. Given the large number of
OTC transactions, total daily trading volume is difficult to determine. The
outstanding balance as of November 28, 2013, was MXN822.6 billion
(US$62.7 billion).
Settlement
109
UDIBONOS
UDIBonos (Bonos denominados en UDIs) are medium- and long-term coupon-bearing debt instruments issued
by the Mexican government. They are denominated in Investment Units (UDIs) and converted into MXN at
the UDI rate as of the settlement date (each coupon payment is likewise transformed into MXN at the
prevailing UDI/MXN exchange rate). Created in April 1995 to protect investor savings during the aftermath of
the Tequila crisis, UDIs are a daily inflation projection based on the current consumer price index and
published one business day after the biweekly CPI is released. Consequently, they have a 15-day lag to the
CPI. As in the case of other inflation-adjusted indices, daily UDI observations are obtained by calculating the
geometric average of the reference period inflation. The Central Bank publishes CPI numbers twice a month,
usually on the 9th day of the month (corresponding to the second two weeks of the preceding month) and also
on the 24th (corresponding to the first two weeks of the current month). The value of the UDI on December 9,
2013, was 5.05110more than five times its initial value of 1.00 on April 4, 1995. Thus, since that date, there
has been more than 505% inflation. UDI values can be found in Bloomberg under MXUDI<Index>.
Since 2007, the government has increased its efforts to develop the inflation-linked UDIBono market as a way
to diversify the domestic debt profile and provide a more relevant benchmark for private sector issuance in
housing and infrastructure. The government introduced a new 3-year issue in 4Q07, and increased the amount
of issuance at the long end of the curve in 2010, but had to partially reverse it in 2H11 due to the European
debt crisis. The 20-year UDIBono was suspended in 2009, while auctions have continued at the 3-, 10-, and
30-year tenors. In January 2011 there was a new 3-year UDIBono issuance with December 19, 2013 maturity,
and in March 2011 the government unveiled a new 10-year benchmark maturing on December 10, 2020. In
September 2012 the government introduced a new 10-year benchmark via syndicated transactions with
maturity on June 9, 2022. There were no new issues in 2013. In order to encourage higher trading volumes in
the secondary market, UDIBonos were incorporated in the market makers program in 2009; there are four
market makers as of December 2013. In addition, Hacienda has indicated that it will look at measures to help
make the price discovery process more efficient in this market.
Bloomberg ticker
SUMMARY OF TERMS
110
Description
MXN conversion
Face value
100 UDI
Maturity
The government currently issues 3-, 10-, and 30-year tenors, although other
maturities (5- and 10-year) have been issued in the past.
Coupon
Day count
Moody's rating
Baa1
S&P rating
A-
PRIMARY AUCTION
Auction schedule
Bidding process
Bid format
Allocation process
Usually the allocation starts from the highest price and moves to the lowest.
However, since September 2005 allocation has been done at a single price.
Banco de Mxico has discretion to issue less than the announced amount of
the auction.
Placement agent
Banco de Mxico
SECONDARY MARKET
Trading
Settlement
111
STRIPS
In 2005, the Ministry of Finance announced the creation of a strips market. Investors have the right to strip the
coupons and trade them separately from the principal on all outstanding fixed-rate MBonos and inflationadjusted UDIBonos. The nominal value of the coupons from both principal and interest will be MXN10 for
fixed-rate Bonos and UDI10 for UDIBonos. Each stripped coupon formed from the principal and interest will
have an identification code formed with the letters MP and MC, respectively, in the case of MBonos and
SP and SC in the case of UDIBonos. All codes will be followed by the maturity date in yy/mm/dd format.
The amount of segregated Bonos stood at MXN8.95 billion (US$683 million) for MP and MXN5.9 billion
(US$453 million) for MC as of November 28, 2013. For UDIBonos, the corresponding figures were UDI 5.3
billion (MXN27 billion or US$2 billion) for SP and UDI 3.65 billion (MXN18.4 billion or US$1.4 billion) for
SC.
Bloomberg ticker
Bloomberg ticker
For UDIBonos, MUDIR <Govt> for principal strips and MUDIS <Govt>
for interest strips
The minimum amount of titles to strip (or reconstitute, for that matter) will depend on the coupon of the
instrument, according to the following table. The purpose is to obtain a coupon payment related to each lot that
represents a multiple of 10, either MXN or UDIs.
Determining the minimum amount of titles to strip
Coupon (%)
Coupon (%)
5.0
720
8.0
5.5
7,200
8.5
7,200
6.0
600
9.0
400
6.5
7,200
9.5
7,200
7.0
3,600
10.0
360
7.5
480
10.5
2,400
As an example, if a market participant wanted to strip a 5-year Bono with an 8% coupon as of 2004, it would
have to create a lot of 450 titles. The transaction would result in the following characteristics and structure:
Strip of a five-year Bono with an 8% coupon
Identification code
Coupon days
Coupon
MC041230
182
8.0%
1,820
182
MC050630
182
8.0%
1,820
182
MC051229
182
8.0%
1,820
182
MC060629
182
8.0%
1,820
182
MC061228
182
8.0%
1,820
182
MC070628
182
8.0%
1,820
182
MC071227
182
8.0%
1,820
182
MC080626
182
8.0%
1,820
182
MC081224
181
8.0%
1,810
181
Principal
MP081224
45,000
4,500
Date
112
MBPA <Govt>
SUMMARY OF TERMS
Face value
MXN100
Maturity
One- and three-year tenors (BPAs), five years (BPATs), and seven years
(BPA182), but could be technically issued in any tenor in multiples of 28day periods. During 4Q12 the IPAB announced plans to carry out weekly
auctions of MXN1,100 million BPA182s, MXN1,500 million BPATs, and
MXN1,400 million BPAs.
Coupon
BPAs are very similar to 28-day Bondes. They pay interest every 28 days at
the greater of the 28-day Cetes auction yield or the most representative
gross annual rate that the Central Bank announces for one-month notes for
corporations. BPATs pay interest every 91 days at the greater of the 91-day
Cetes auction yield or the most representative gross annual rate that the
Central Bank announces for three-month notes for corporations. BPA182s
have the same structure as Bondes LS. The coupon is paid every 182 days
at the maximum of the inflation rate or the prevailing coupon rate, which is
obtained by adding a spread over the 182-day Cetes auction yield.
Auction schedule
Auction process
SECONDARY MARKET
Trading is over the counter and settlement is same-day, T+1, T+2, T+3, and T+4. Repurchase agreement
transactions can be carried out in-line with the applicable regulatory framework set by the Central Bank. As of
November 28, 2013, the outstanding amounts of BPAs, BPATs, and BPA182s were MXN12.5 billion (US$954
million), MXN9.97 billion (US$761 million), and MXN415.4 billion (US$31.7 billion), respectively. The
amount outstanding of BPATs has declined from MXN53.4 billion at the end of 2012.
To value the bond in the primary auction, it is assumed that the Cetes reference rate will be constant
throughout the life of the instrument.
113
TIIE SWAPS
The TIIE swap is a fixed-for-floating par swap that trades over the counter, where the investor receives or pays
a floating leg indexed to the 28-day TIIE rate and in exchange pays or receives a fixed rate. The MexDer (the
Mexican Derivatives Exchange, see market description below) started offering exchange-traded TIIE swaps as
of the beginning of 2007. According to press reports, the initiative is a response to a perceived growth in
demand for exchange-traded instruments instead of OTC derivatives, driven by greater scrutiny of OTC
instruments by regulators.
Bloomberg tickers
SUMMARY OF TERMS
114
Reference
The swap market has evolved on the back of the 28-day reference and is
indexed to the 28-day TIIE (Tasa de Inters Interbancaria de Equilibrio).
The TIIE is Mexicos interbank rate. The Central Bank conducts a daily
survey of the equilibrium rate from 15 banks corresponding to a MXN350
million firm quote, out of which at least six quotes will be selected randomly
by the Central Bank. A 5-bp differential is used for TIIE fixing, and the
intersection of the seven quotes in ascending order (by adding 5 bps) and in
descending order (by subtracting 5 bps) is the TIIE rate. If there is no
intersecting point, then the average of the best bid and best offer is the TIIE
rate. It is published by the Central Bank every day in the Official Gazette and
at www.banxico.org at 12:30 p.m. local time. This rate is valid for the next
business day and the 28-day count begins on the next business day after the
trade. Banks whose bid is at least 5 bps higher/lower than the average have to
borrow/lend money from/to Banxico for the amount submitted within 28
days. It is this approach that differentiates TIIE fixing from Libor fixing
eliminating any incentives to misreport the equilibrium rate. TIIE rates can
be found on Reuters page MEX06 and on Bloomberg at MXIBTIIE <Index>
and MXIB91DT <Index>.
Convention
Cash flow exchanges occur every 28 days (thus there are 13 payments in a
year).
Day count
Maturity
3-month (3 x 28 days), 6-month (6 x 28 days), 9-month (9 x 28 days), 1year, 2-, 3-, 4-, 5-, 7-, 10-, 15-, and 20-year tenors are generally listed on
the broker screens. Liquidity up to the 10-year tenor is generally good, and
15- and 20-year maturities are starting to be quoted more regularly.
Regulation
Settlement
Liquidity
The typical quote for tenors between one and 10 years is for US$10,000
DV01 with a 1-2 bp spread. Much larger tickets can be quoted on demand.
Cross-currency
Either the fixed or the floating leg of the swap can be denominated in USD,
effectively converting the contract to a cross-currency swap. The USD
reference rate is LIBOR, which is considered as if it traded on an
actual/360-day basis. The cross-currency swap is quoted as a spread over
LIBOR. Thus, the swap is structured as a 28-day TIIE versus one-month
LIBOR +/- a spread, where LIBOR is truncated to accrue also on a 28-day
basis without any further rate adjustment.
TIIE SWAPTIONS
TIIE swaptions are options on TIIE interest rate swaps where the investor buys or sells the right (but not the
obligation) to enter into a TIIE swap at a specific date in the future at a particular fixed rate. For an up-front
premium, the option buyer can select the strike rate (that is, the level at which it would enter the TIIE swap),
the length of the option period, and the tenor of the underlying swap.
Bloomberg ticker
SINV3 <Go>
SUMMARY OF TERMS
Description
Option Style
Notional value
Maturity
Underlying
1 month to 20 years, with 1-, 2-, 5-, and 10-year TIIE among the more
common tenors.
Premium
Received/paid up-front
115
SINV6 <Go>
SUMMARY OF TERMS
Reference
Conventions
Semiannual/semiannual, actual/360
Settlement
T+2
SINV6 <Go>
SUMMARY OF TERMS
116
Reference
This is a swap in which the fixed leg is denominated in UDI and the
floating leg is denominated in MXN.
Conventions
Settlement
T+2
MEXDER
The MexDer (Mercado Mexicano de Derivados, S.A. de C.V.) is the options and futures market in Mexico. It
began operation on December 15, 1998. Underlying securities in all MexDer contracts refer to financial
variables, which include currencies (namely the USD and EUR), equity indices (Bolsas IPC), stocks, debt
instruments, and interest rates (TIIE, Cetes, MBonos). Although activity is still mainly concentrated in the TIIE
futures market, its participation fell fairly rapidly from about 98% in 2004 to an all-time low of 32% in 2013.
The participation of the TIIE market has fallen for sixth consecutive year, while overall trading volume of
futures has consistently declined since the peak year of 2006. Other futures contracts, such as those based on
USD, have become increasingly important over the past few years, with all the contracts based on the
greenback garnering about 51% of the total volume (compared with just 1.4% back in 2007). In contrast, the
sum of all the contracts on MBonos (including M3, M5, M10, M20, and M30) represented only about 12% of
the total contracts traded YTD in October 2013.
Bloomberg ticker:
MMDD <Go>
117
M10 Bono
DWA <Cmdty> CT
M20 Bono
VYBA <Cmdty> CT
USD
DSA <Crncy> CT
1,000 Bonos
Quarterly maturities during 12
quarters (three years)
1,000 Bonos
Quarterly maturities during 12
quarters (three years)
10,000 USD
Monthly maturities
during 12 months and
then quarterly
maturities during 16
quarters (nine years)
10,000 Cetes
Monthly maturities
during 12 months
and then quarterly
maturities during 24
quarters (seven
years)
CE91 plus month
and year of maturity
(e.g., CE91 FB05)
In annual yield with
two decimals
Minimum
price change
Trading
hours
Last trading
day
1 basis point
1 basis point
MXN0.025
MXN0.025
Settlement
Code
Quote
28-day TIIE
DOA <Cmdty> CT
MXN100,000
Monthly maturities
up to 10 years
91-day Cetes
GMA <Cmdty> CT
Eligible
bonds for
delivery
MexDer also has a 2- and 10-year TIIE interest rate swap futures contract (Bloomberg ticker SWTA <Cmdty>
CT) that provides another trading/hedging vehicle for investors. The contract size is MXN1 million notional,
with monthly or quarterly maturities for up to one year, but liquidity is still very low. MexDer also started
offering 2-year and 10-year TIIE cross-currency swaps that have so far seen only very modest trading volumes.
In addition, MexDer started providing futures contracts on 5- and 30-year MBonos, which work exactly the
same as the existing contracts on 3-, 10-, and 20-year MBonos. The most liquid MBono futures contracts are
the M10 and M20 (for contract details, see table above).
As published in the Official Gazette (Miscelnea Fiscal) on October 12, 2005, income received by foreign
investors from derivative operations is tax exempt if the underlying securities are debts related to TIIE or
government securities. Beneficiaries of the exemption have to reside in a country that has signed a tax treaty
with Mexico.
118
Liquidity in the MexDer is quite relatively poor and has only improved in contracts other than the 28-day TIIE,
particularly currencies. A few years ago, various pension funds were not allowed to trade TIIE swaps OTC but
were allowed to trade TIIE futures, which boosted liquidity in this contract. Current regulation lets pension
funds trade OTC TIIE swaps, but many do not have the operational and systems requirements in place to be
able to execute such transactions. Trading volumes in 28-day TIIE futures have fallen since the 2006 peak,
while other contracts, especially those related to currencies (USD and EUR) have seen an increase in both
trading volumes and number of transactions over the last few years, now taking a more substantial share of
total volume (about 51% in 2013, compared with less than 2% back in 2007). The challenge is to extend this
trend to the other financial futures contracts. The following graphs summarize the evolution of the activity in
the MexDer in recent years.
50
400
40
300
30
200
20
100
10
600
400
300
200
100
*Oct-13
Dec-12
Dec-11
Dec-10
*Oct-13
Dec-12
Dec-11
Dec-10
Dec-09
Dec-08
Dec-07
Dec-06
Dec-05
Dec-04
Dec-03
Dec-02
700
500
Dec-09
500
Dec-08
200
60
Dec-07
400
600
Dec-06
600
70
Dec-05
800
700
Dec-04
1,000
80
Dec-03
1,200
800
Dec-02
1,400
119
PERU
MACRO BACKGROUND
Resilient domestic demand continued to drive economic activity in Peru in 2013, but weaker external
conditions triggered notable deceleration of economic growth to below the potential growth rate of around
6.0%. Economic activity in 2014 should be in-line with (or stronger than) that of the previous year as the
global economic environment improves and the impact of BCRPs monetary easing takes form. Inflation
remained in the upper half of the target band, and at times exceeded it, throughout the course of 2013 as food
prices and supply-side shocks kept consumer prices elevated. Core inflation excluding all food and energy
prices were more contained though, remaining below 3% throughout the course of the year. The Central Bank
believes headline inflation will converge to the center of the 21% target range in 2014.
In November 2013, the Central Bank (Banco Central de Reserva del Peru, BCRP) cut the reference rate 25 bps
to 4%, after keeping the reference rate at 4.25% since May 2011. The reference rate had remained fixed at
4.25% from May 2011 through October 2013, with the BCRP less concerned about inflation and more
preoccupied with speculative capital inflows and credit growth, which the government has informally been
trying to keep below 15%. The government pursued several measures to address these concerns in 2013,
including:
Systematically tightening monetary policy using macroprudential measures such as raising the
average reserve requirements in domestic and foreign currencies;
Raising the administrative limit for what pension funds (AFPs) are allowed to invest offshore to 36%
from 30% at year-end 2012 (note that the legal ceiling was raised to 50% in July 2011 by Congress,
but the operational ceiling is set by the Central Bank); and
Reducing domestic currency reserve requirements to help stimulate credit growth in nuevo soles and
away from foreign currency.
At the onset of 2013, the Central Bank focused its attention on reversing the appreciation trend of the local
currency (i.e., nuevo soles, or PEN) experienced in 2012. Primarily, through direct intervention via U.S. dollar
purchases, increases in foreign currency reserve requirements, and the changes in APF foreign investment
limits, the BCRP was able to steadily depreciate the currency. Given the sharp sell-off in risk assets, including
LatAm currencies, beginning in May the BCRP revised its intervention strategy and began to sell USD and
dollar-linked securities known as CDRs, at times defending the 2.80 USD/PEN level. Through October-end,
net BCRP dollar purchases were US$1.8 billion after US$5.2 billion in dollar purchases from January to May
and US$3.3 billion in dollar sales from July through October. The net purchases resulted in an increase of the
BCRPs reserve position to US$66 billion as of end-October, more than 30% of GDP and significantly above
public debt stock of around US$36 billion.
120
25
Inner: 2012-Dec-31
Outer: 2013-Jul-31
Pension funds
26.7%
20
Banks 5.1%
15
10
Foreigners
58.1%
5
0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
First Tuesday of the month: maximum of PEN15 million 3-month and 9-month Treasury bills.
Second Tuesday of the month: minimum of PEN15 million Soberano 17 and 29s and VAC (inflationlinked) 18s.
121
Third Tuesday of the month: maximum of PEN15 million 6-month and12-month Treasury bills.
Fourth Tuesday of the month: minimum of PEN15 million Soberano 23 and 42s and VAC (inflationlinked) 46s.
Other
Pension Funds
Foreigners (GDNs)
Foreigners (Soberanos)
AFPs (9bn)
Banks (2bn)
Other (4bn)
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
'13
'15
'17
'20
'23
'26
'29
'31
'37
'42 VAC
'13
'15
'17
'20
'23
'26
'29
'31
'37
'42 VAC
21,811
25.7
5.1
2.9
3.3
1.5
0.0
UVR
2,153
32.3
16.8
44.6
1.8
-
'15
17
'20
'23
'26
1,687
1,311
9,047
2,839
4,389
0.3
6.3
0.7
1.5
0.1
1.7
21.9
0.1
1.6
1.4
0.0
4.1
4.6
0.2
0.8
1.5
-
22.2
15.8
1.2
2.7
3.9
-
47.5
1.0
0.0
1.3
1.1
0.0
'29
41
0.1
90.3
4.9
-
'31
'37
'42
Total
4,290
4,750
4,024
34,741
19.3
49.4
51.4
26.1
1.3
1.6
1.2
5.9
0.5
2.8
18.1
5.6
2.7
9.6
6.0
3.2
2.3
1.3
0.1
1.4
0.2
0.0
0.4
Other
0.4
3.1
0.5
0.3
0.4
0.3
0.1
0.3
Foreign Investors
61.1
4.6
88.0
72.8
88.6
53.9
48.9
4.8
73.7
35.1
23.0
57.5
agencies continue to emphasize Perus fiscal strength and the countrys increasing ability to handle external
shocks.
123
BONOS SOBERANOS
FIXED-RATE BONOS SOBERANOS
Fixed-rate Bonos Soberanos are PEN-denominated instruments issued by Perus Ministry of Finance (MEF).
Currently, the fixed-rate curve extends out 30 years to February 2042.
Bloomberg ticker
PERUGB <Govt>
SUMMARY OF TERMS
Description
Face value
PEN1,000
Maturity
Coupon
Semiannual
Day count
Amortization
Bullet
S&P rating
BBB+
Moodys rating
Baa2
Maturity Date
Coupon
Issue Date
(Opening)
Original Term
(Years)
GDNs (% of
Total Stock)
Outstanding
Stock (PEN mn)
May-15
5-May-15
9.91%
05-May-05
10
59.53%
1686.6
Aug-17
12-Aug-17
8.60%
08-Jul-05
12.1
47.30%
1212.5
Aug-20
12-Aug-20
7.84%
18-Jul-05
15.1
56.14%
9047.5
Sep-23
12-Sep-23
5.20%
22-Jun-12
11.2
27.41%
690.3
Aug-26
12-Aug-26
8.20%
03-May-06
20.3
29.06%
4388.7
Feb-29
12-Feb-29
6.00%
10-Jul-13
15.5
0.00%
41.3
Aug-31
12-Aug-31
6.95%
24-Apr-08
23.3
54.05%
4290.2
Aug-37
Feb-42
12-Aug-37
6.90%
26-Jul-07
30
23.20%
4750.0
12-Feb-42
6.85%
27-Jan-10
32
14.37%
Total
*Trades in August 37s can settle off-shore. Data as of September 30, 2013. Sources: MEF and Santander.
124
2718.8
29,401.2
PERUGB <Govt>
Coupon calculation
Coupon = V r
i
n
Face value
PEN1,000.
Maturity
Coupon
Semiannual.
Day count
Amortization
Bullet.
Maturity Date
Coupon
Issue Date
(opening)
Original Term
(yrs)
Outstanding
Stock (PEN mn)
Jan-14
30-Jan-14
5.80% + VAC
30-Jan-04
10
94.1
Apr-16
14-Apr-16
5.90% + VAC
14-Apr-04
12
43.7
Jun-16
8-Jun-16
6.84% + VAC
8-Jun-04
12
18.6
Jul-19
13-Jul-19
7.40% + VAC
13-Jul-04
15
14.0
Feb-18
Oct-24
12-Feb-18
13-Oct-24
4% + VAC
6.8399% + VAC
10-Jul-13
13-Oct-04
5
20
55.0
795.2
Jan-35
31-Jan-35
7.39% + VAC
31-Jan-05
30
911.0
Aug-46
12-Aug-46
3.83% +VAC
28-Nov-06
40
Total
261.8
2,138.4
Data as of September 30, 2013. Sources: Economy and Finance Ministry and Santander.
125
PRIMARY AUCTION
Auction schedule
Bidding process
Bids are usually received from 11:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. local time. Primary
auctions of a new series are made at par. In a new series, the variable is the
interest rate or coupon, while price is the variable in a reopening. Specific
details are set by the MEF prior to the auction.
Allocation process
A Dutch-style auction is currently used, with the MEF determining the cutoff rate. When there is investor demand for more than the original amount
offered, second and third rounds can take place. If excess demand is 25100% of the initial offering, the government can place an additional 25% of
the initial offering. If the excess demand is above 100% of the initial
offering, the MEF can place up to an additional 50%. Only market makers
who bid successfully in the original auction will be allowed to participate in
the second- and third-round placements. All bonds placed in subsequent
rounds will have the same yield as those approved in the first auction.
Placement agent
MEF
SECONDARY MARKET
126
Trading
Most trading occurs via trade order management systems designated by the
MEF: DATATEC (which is the most widely used system), CIMD and
ELEX. The fixed rate August 2037 Soberanos can also be settled offshore.
Settlement
T+1
Registration
URUGUAY
PUBLIC DEBT COMPOSITION
As of October 2013, the outstanding stock of public bonds amounted to US$27.1 billion, of which US$16.9
billion were domestic bonds (i.e., bonds issued under local law, including both Treasury and Central Bank
paper) and US$10.2 billion were international sovereign bonds.
Public sector securities
18,0
Domestic
International
USD Treasury
UI Treasury Bonds
Bonds
4%
2%
16,0
14,0
12,0
10,0
UI Treasury
Notes
23%
8,0
6,0
4,0
2,0
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
UYU Central
Bank Bills
(LRM-UYU)
27%
UYU Treasury
Notes
9%
UI Central Bank
Notes
10%
UI Central Bank
Bills (LRM-UI)
25%
Nov. 2013
Change
3.0
4.6
1.6
On the run
3.2
4.2
0.9
1.7
1.7
0.4
1.4
UI Treasury Notes
3.3
UI Treasury Bonds
0.3
0.0
On the run
-0.4
1.5
0.1
On the run
3.9
0.5
On the run
0.3
0.0
0.8
0.6
-0.2
Total
14.1
16.8
2.7
In USD million. As of November 2013. Excludes state-owned companies and banks. Sources: BCU and Santander.
127
Every five years, each new government official assuming office must present a five-year plan to the legislature
specifying the fiscal needs for the overall period. This plan is presented by the Executive committee six
months after the start of the presidential term in March. Since 2004, annual debt issuance has been capped by
law, subject to fiscal needs that are reviewed on an annual basis, in midyear.
The authorities do not have to meet specific time frames to present their annual financing policy. In recent
years, the Debt Management Unit, under the authority of the Ministry of Finance, publishes quarterly reports
announcing indicative guidelines for the financial program. In January 2013, authorities announced a US$1.2
billion issuance program for the current year that will likely end quite higher, at US$2.7 billion, as they prepaid
loans and bonds for an additional US$1.2 billion and used a lower portion of international reserves than
initially announced. Treasury financing needs for 2014 amount to US$2 billion, of which US$0.9 billion are
announced to be covered through bond issuance, both domestically and abroad: US$0.4 billion through the use
of international reserves, US$0.4 billion through fiscal primary surplus, and US$0.3 billion through alternative
sources.
Securities accounted for 81% of total public sector debt as of June 2013. During the past decade domestic
financing has become increasingly significant for authorities, as demand from pension funds, financial
institutions, individuals, and even nonresidents increased. Currently, 62% of total securities are issued under
domestic law (versus 54% a year ago), although this figure declines to a lower 29% in the case of Treasury
liabilities (25% a year ago).
Domestic debt issued by the Central Bank, both UYU and inflation-linked denominated (UI), represented 62%
of total domestic instruments as of November 2013. (The remaining 38% had been issued by the Treasury.)
Domestic debt was 96% peso denominated as of that date, with inflation-linked securities amounting to 60% of
total domestic debt.
Domestic debt by currency of denomination
Inner: 2012
Outer: 2013
USD
4%
UYU
36%
UI
60%
The authorities currently announce auction schedules for both Treasury and Central Bank instruments through
a weekly calendar. This schedule is available at http://www.bcu.gub.uy/Politica-Economica-yMercados/Documents/Calendario%20Deuda/calendario_deuda.pdf under the title Calendario Tentativo de
Colocacin de Ttulos Emitidos por el BCU. Tendered amounts announced in the weekly calendar can be
increased at the Central Banks discretion on the day of the auction.
at US$10.4 billion, equivalent to 19% of GDP, of which 73% was invested in global and domestic sovereign
bonds (US$7.6 billion). Considering domestic debt only, AFAP holdings reached US$4.8 billion, or 47% of
total AUM. In general, AFAPs follow a buy-and-hold investment strategy due to the limited depth of secondary
markets and also due to the fact that the current pension system based on individual saving accounts is still in
its early stages. (The new system was implemented in 1996 from a pay-as-you-go regime.)
Major international banks have a presence in the Uruguayan banking system. Local bank penetration is
confined to the state-owned BROU (Banco de la Repblica Oriental del Uruguay), with 42% of total market
share.
MARKET INSTRUMENTS
Money market. Money market instruments are mostly overnight transactions (repos, call money, certificates
of deposit) and short-term local currency BCU bills and certificates. Bidders are mostly pension funds and
banks. Banks make use of monetary instruments generally to regulate their excess liquidity in pesos in a
context of relatively low demand for local currency loans from private sector. (The credit market is highly
oriented to firms and U.S. dollar currency denominated.) Currently, primary bill auctions from both the BCU
and the Treasury amount to roughly UYU4.7 billion weekly (equivalent to approximately US$220 million).
Trading activity in formal secondary markets hovered around US$27 million daily in the past year. Larger
trades can be closed over the counter (OTC) with counterparties such as brokers, banks, or pension funds. In
addition, the Central Bank occasionally provides liquidity through repo transactions, as tested during the
September 2008 turmoil.
Fixed income market. Sovereign global bonds are denominated in different currencies (USD, EUR, JPY, CLP,
and local currency [mostly inflation-linked]), while sovereign domestic bonds are both dollar and localcurrency-denominated, although the former are off the run. (In 2009, the Treasury temporarily resumed
domestic issuance in U.S. dollars at 10-year tenors but halted it a few months later.) Corporate bonds
accounted for barely 0.4% of total trading within secondary markets in the past year.
Local peso-denominated securities comprise two main categories: fixed rate bonds and inflation linkers. Tenors
currently go up to 10 years. In recent years, inflation-linked instruments (also called UI bonds) have gained
importance in the local market. The Central Bank currently issues LRM-UI at one and two-year tenors, for UI
100 to 240 million weekly (equivalent to US$13-31 million weekly). The Treasury alternates 5-year and 10year UI notes every month, issuing UI 500 million in the first case (US$65 million) and UI 350 million at 10year tenors (equivalent to US$45 million).
As per fixed-rate peso instruments, the Central Bank currently issues between UYU2.5 billion and UYU4
billion weekly amounts up to two-year tenors (equivalent to US$120-190 million) while the Treasury auctions
UYU650 million on a monthly basis, equivalent to US$31 million per month.
Both UYU and UI yield curves have risen sharply in recent months, standing flat near 15% and 4%,
respectively. (UYU rates stood at 9% as of past May and UI yields hovered at 1.5% then.) Such an increase
owed to a combination of factors that included (1) higher peso weakening and FX volatility amid increasing
chances of monetary tapering in the U.S., (2) higher domestic inflation readings that went from 8% y/y this
past May to currently 9% y/y amid robust domestic demand and high wage increases, (3) the implementation
of a new monetary policy framework that eliminated the Monetary Policy Rate (TPM) in favor of monetary
aggregates target, and (4) a more restrictive monetary policy amid rising consumer price inflation. As a result
of higher UYU and UI rates, the Treasury suspended most fixed-rate and inflation-linked auctions since June.
On the derivatives front, FX forwards, cross-currency swaps (UYU fixed versus USD Libor), and USD interest
rate swaps (fixed versus Libor) are locally available on an OTC basis.
In order to invest in domestic instruments, foreign investors must open an account with a local custodian
agency, bank, or broker. To do this, it is necessary to fill out a form and a custody agreement with the bank or
broker in order to have a legal representative in Uruguay for tax purposes. The local custodian is responsible
for withholding and paying taxes on behalf of the investor and must have the necessary documentation that
proves that the investor is a nonresident.
Nonresident investors receive equal treatment relative to residents in terms of foreign currency and security
holdings. However, since August 2012, nonresidents investing in Central Bank instruments are subject to a
new tax that was extended to Treasury securities on June 2013. The imposition of the tax forces nonresidents to
place 50% of the amount invested in domestic securities within the monetary authority with no interest rate
compensation. Tax requirements are marginal because they only apply to new investments since the day
measures were launched: August 16, 2012, for Central Bank securities and June 7, 2013, for Treasury holdings.
As a result, nonresidents investing in domestic securities are subject to the new tax if total balances exceed
those held in such dates. However, if a nonresident investor reduces its holdings below the initial balance as of
the day of the new measures (because of amortization, for example), local financial agents can reallocate such
unused marginal reserve requirements among other investors that want to increase their bond holdings. In
such a case, investments are not subject to the new tax. Considering that peso market yields currently stand at
15%, the new measure roughly represents a 5% tax on UYU investments.
The new tax on nonresidents was introduced by the authorities in the second half of last year in an attempt to
contain rising capital inflows and peso strengthening occurring at that time, particularly after the country
regained investment-grade status by mid 2012. Capital inflows persisted during the first half of 2013,
motivating an increase on Central Bank holdings tax and its extension to Treasury investments.
The oversight of financial institutions, pension funds, insurance companies, and stock exchanges (the
Electronic Stock Exchange, BEVSA, and the Montevideo Stock Exchange, BVM) is carried out by the
Superintendencia de Servicios Financieros (Superintendency of Financial Services) at the Central Bank of
Uruguay (BCU).
Financial transactions made by nonresidents in Uruguay are subject to the following taxes:
1. Income tax on capital gains and interest earnings. Set at a 12% rate for both resident and nonresident
investors, this is levied on the capital gains obtained when the instrument is sold and on the interest
coupon of the instrument. Non-Resident Income Tax is calculated with grossing up, which implies that
the 12% rate applies to the capital gain and interest earnings plus the tax amount. The tax rate on interest
received declines to 3% for instruments issued beyond three-year tenors, tendered through public offer
and quoted within stock markets. Sovereign bonds are exempt from income tax.
2. VAT. Set at 22% for fees related to custody services.
3. Reserve requirement imposition on nonresidents investing in Treasury and Central Bank securities.
Since June 2013, nonresidents must place 50% of total Central Bank and Treasury holdings within the
monetary authority.
Before undertaking any transaction, investors are encouraged to seek counsel from their legal advisors
regarding tax regulations under Uruguayan law, which may be subject to change.
130
UI d , M
CPI M 2
= UI 5, M 1
CPI M 3
d + DM 1 5
DM 1
Between the sixth and the last day of that same month:
d 5
UI d , M
CPI M 1 DM
= UI 5, M
CPI M 2
Where UId,M means the value of the UI in the day d of the month M. DM means the number of calendar days of
the month M; CPIM corresponds to the CPI value (consumer price index value) of the month M; therefore, the
ratio between CPIM-1 and CPIM-2 corresponds to the inflation rate in the previous month.
131
SPOT
Bloomberg ticker
UYU <Curncy>
BEVSA
Quotation convention
2 decimal points
UYU/USD
Minimum size
US$100,000
Available quotes
T+0
FX FORWARDS
132
Currency pairs
Tenors
Up to one year
Settlement
Fixing convention
Market convention
Minimum size
US$100,000
Available quotes
Legal documentation
LRM-UYU
Letras de Regulacin Monetaria del Banco Central in pesos (or LRMs, the Central Banks monetary
regulation bills) are UYU-denominated zero-coupon bills, with tenors up to 24 months.
Outstanding stock of LRM-UYU instruments was US$4.6 billion as of November 2013, thus representing the
main domestic security, accounting for 27% of total local debt. Average maturity of LRM-UYU stood at 0.9
years.
Availability of LRM-UYU tenors is at the discretion of the Central Bank and subject to monetary policy
considerations. However, the Central Bank is currently issuing most tenors along the peso curve.
Since June 2013, nonresidents investing in LRM-UYU must place 50% of total holdings at the Central Bank as
part of capital controls implemented by the authorities to contain robust peso strengthening (unless such
investments do not add to overall nonresident balances as of August 16, 2012, in which case tax imposition is
not mandatory).
Bloomberg ticker
UTB <Govt>
SUMMARY OF TERMS
Description
Tenor
Usually 30, 90, 180, 360 and 720 days. Maturities vary upon Central Bank
discretion.
Coupon
Zero coupon.
Day count
Actual/365 basis.
Rating
133
PRIMARY AUCTION
Auction schedule
Minimum value
Bidding process
Allocation process
The allocation system is the Dutch (single price) method. The BCU has
discretion to issue less or more than the announced amount (up to 50%
more of the original tender).
Settlement
T+0 for instruments up to 180 days tenor. T+1 for auctions beyond 180-day
tenor.
SECONDARY MARKET
Trading
Most of the volume traded on formal markets takes place at the Bolsa
Electrnica de Valores (BEVSA), although OTC trading is also available,
especially for larger trades.
Settlement
Usually T+0 for securities up to 180-day tenor and T+1 for securities
beyond that tenor.
LRM-UI
Letras de Regulacin Monetaria en Unidades Indexadas (UI) del Banco Central (or LRM-UI) are inflationlinked zero-coupon bills at 12- and 24-month tenors.
LRM-UI are denominated in UI and converted into UYU at the settlement date, at the corresponding UYU/UI
exchange rate. The UYU/UI exchange rate is available in Bloomberg at UYI <Curncy>.
Total outstanding of LRM-UI amounted to an equivalent of US$4.2 billion as of November 2013, also one of
the main domestic securities, accounting for 25% of total domestic debt. Average maturity is 0.7 years.
Since June 2013, nonresidents investing in LRM-UYU must place 50% of total holdings at the Central Bank as
part of capital controls implemented by the authorities to contain peso strengthening (unless such investments
do not add to overall nonresident balances as of August 16, 2012, in which case tax imposition is not
mandatory).
Bloomberg ticker
134
UTB UI <Govt>
SUMMARY OF TERMS
Description
Tenor
Coupon
Zero coupon.
Day count
Actual/365 basis.
Rating
PRIMARY AUCTION
Auction schedule
Minimum value
Bidding process
Allocation process
The allocation system is the Dutch (single price) method. The BCU has
discretion to issue less or more than the announced amount (up to 50%
more of the original tender).
Settlement
T+1.
SECONDARY MARKET
Trading
Most of the volume traded takes place at the Bolsa Electrnica de Valores
(BEVSA) or OTC.
Settlement
Usually T+1.
Prior to 2010, the Central Bank also issued inflation-linked notes Notas del Banco Central en Unidades
Indexadas at longer tenors and with semiannual coupons. As a result, there are 11 series of BCU UI Notes,
currently off the run, with a total outstanding of UI13.3 billion as of November 2013, equivalent to US$1.7
billion and representing 10% of total domestic debt (average maturity: 3.1 years).
Bloomberg ticker for UI BCU Notes:
UNBCU <Govt>
135
136
UNT <Govt>
Description
Tenors
3-year tenor, current series on the run maturing on August 22, 2015.
Coupon
Day count
Amortization
Bullet.
Rating
137
PRIMARY AUCTION
Auction schedule
The BCU leads auctions on behalf of the Treasury. The BCU usually
announces the auction schedule at the beginning of each week. Auctions of
UYU Treasury Bills take place once a month, usually on Tuesdays or
Wednesdays of the third or fourth week. Bids are submitted electronically
to the BCU through the Valnet system. Results are announced
approximately one hour after the auction closing time. Monthly auctions
currently amount to UYU650 million (equivalent to US$31 million).
Minimum value
Bidding process
Allocation process
The allocation system is the Dutch (single price) method. The BCU has
discretion to issue less or more than the announced amount (up to 200% of
the original amount tendered).
Settlement
T+1.
SECONDARY MARKET
Trading
Most of the volume traded on domestic markets takes place OTC. Formal
trading occurs mostly within the Bolsa Electrnica de Valores (BEVSA)
although usually at lower trading volumes.
Settlement
T+0 or T+1.
Coupon
Issue date
(opening)
Original term
(years)
Outstanding
(UYU bn)
Outstanding
(USD bn)
27-jan-14
9.0
27-jan-11
6.0
0.3
27-jan-16
9.5
27-jan-11
6.4
0.3
14-jun-14
9.8
14-jun-11
3.0
0.1
21-mar-15
10.5
21-mar-12
4.0
0.2
21-mar-17
11.0
21-mar-12
4.0
0.2
22-aug-15
10.3
22-aug-12
8.4
0.4
31.8
1.5
Total
Data as of November 21, 2013. Sources: BCU and Santander.
138
UI TREASURY NOTES
SUMMARY OF TERMS
Issuer
Description
UYU conversion
Tenors
5 and 10 years.
Coupon
Amortization
Bullet.
Rating
PRIMARY AUCTION
Auction schedule
The BCU leads auctions on behalf of the Treasury. The BCU usually
announces the auction schedule at the beginning of each week. Auctions of
UI Treasury Notes take place once a month, alternating between 5- and 10year tenors. Bids are submitted electronically to the BCU through the
Valnet system, in terms of the price in UI (dirty price) and until the closing
time announced in the auction schedule. Results are announced
approximately one hour after the auction closing time. Auctions currently
amount to UI500 million (equivalent to US$65 million) for 5-year tenor
notes and UI350 million (equivalent to US$45 million) for 10-year tenors,
each of them issued every two months..
Minimum value
Bidding process
Allocation process
The allocation system is the Dutch (single price) method. The authorities
have discretion to issue less or more than the announced amount (up to
200% of the original tender).
Settlement
T+1.
SECONDARY MARKET
Trading
Settlement
Usually T+1.
139
UI Treasury notes
Maturity
Coupon
Issue Date
(Opening)
Original Term
(Years)
Outstanding
(UI bn)
Outstanding
(USD bn)
23-dec-14
7.00
23-dec-04
10
0.6
0.1
05-jan-17
4.25
05-jan-07
10
2.0
0.3
07-mar-20
4.25
07-mar-08
12
1.3
0.2
25-may-25
4.00
25-may-10
15
4.6
0.6
10-jun-20
4.00
10-jun-10
10
5.2
0.7
14-jun-15
4.00
14-jun-10
2.7
0.3
27-jan-19
3.25
27-jan-11
6.0
0.8
16-jun-16
2.75
16-jun-11
2.0
0.3
16-jun-16
2.75
16-jun-11
3.5
0.5
27-sep-22
2.50
27-sep-12
10
2.2
30.0
0.3
3.9
Bond
UI Treasury Notes, Series 2
Total
Data as of November 21, 2013. Sources: BCU and Santander.
140
UI TREASURY BONDS
Bonos del Tesoro en Unidades Indexadas (or UI Treasury bonds) are medium- and long-term coupon-bearing
instruments issued by the Uruguayan Treasury. They are denominated in UI (Unidades Indexadas) and
converted into UYU at the UI quote as of the settlement date. (Each coupon payment is also transformed into
UYU at the prevailing UI/UYU quote.) UI Treasury bonds offer fixed-rate coupons (plus the inflation
adjustment), except the 2018 series (step-up structure).
The Treasury began issuing domestic UI bonds in 2002 in order to develop a local currency yield curve
(especially longer tenors) and reduce high dollarization levels in the Uruguayan economy. However, since
2005 such issuance is off the run. Currently there are three domestic outstanding series (maturing in 2012,
2018, and 2020), rarely traded in secondary markets. Total outstanding currently amounts to US$0.3 billion,
roughly 2% of total domestic securities (average maturity of 4.8 years). Bloomberg ticker: UNT<Corp>.
As per global UI bonds, the government started issuing such instruments in August 2004. Currently there are
five series, maturing in 2018, 2027, 2028, 2030, and 2037, totaling US$4.3 billion outstanding as of November
2013. (Average maturity of 15.8 years.) Secondary markets for global UI bonds tend to be deeper than those
for domestic securities. The last UI global bond was issued in 2011; the previous one had been issued in 2008.
GLOBAL BONDS
Bloomberg ticker
URUGUAY <Corp>
SUMMARY OF TERMS
Issuer
Republic of Uruguay.
Description
Tenor
Coupon
Semiannual.
Day count
Amortization
Bullet or sinkable.
Law
Rating
PRIMARY AUCTION
Auction schedule
Minimum value
SECONDARY MARKET
Trading
Settlement
Usually T+3.
141
Original
Issue Date
Maturity
Date
Outstanding
(UI bn)
Outstanding
(US$ bn)
Treasury, Ser. 2
14-Sep-06
14-Sep-18
2.9
0.4
Treasury, Ser. 3
03-Apr-07
05-Apr-27
4.4
0.6
Capital
Repayment
Interest
Payments
5.0
Bullet
Semiannual
4.25
5-apr-25 - 1/3
Semiannual
Coupon
5-apr-26 - 1/3
5-apr-27 - 1/3
Treasury, Ser. 4
26-Jun-07
26-Jun-37
4.4
0.8
3,7
26-jun-35 - 1/3
Semiannual
26-jun-36 - 1/3
26-jun-37 - 1/3
Treasury, Ser. 5
10-Jul-08
10-Jul-30
5.4
0.7
3.7
26-jun-28- 1/3
Semiannual
26-jun-29 - 1/3
26-jun-30 - 1/3
Treasury, Ser. 6
15-Dec-11
15-Dec-28
14.6
1.9
4.0
10-jul-26 - 1/3
10-jul-27 - 1/3
10-jul-28 - 1/3
Total
31.6
142
4.3
Semiannual
UTF <Govt>
143
144
Reference
The USD reference rate is 6-month LIBOR. FX rate at inception is the spot
quote, and local currency rates are those set by counterparties, based on
prevailing market rates.
Conventions
Semiannual, actual/360.
Maturity
Liquidity
DO NOT DELETE
145
Contacts
Economics Research
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