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Clientelism
Allen Hicken
Department of Political Science, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109;
email: ahicken@umich.edu
Keywords
Abstract
Clientelism is characterized by the combination of particularistic targeting and contingency-based exchange. This method of contingent
exchange thrives in both autocracies and democracies. It exists in a
large variety of cultural contexts. Confronted with economic development, clientelism fades away in some political contexts but adapts and
survives in others. This article explores our understanding of the origins and dynamics of clientelism, focusing on the relationships between
clientelism and democracy and between clientelism and development.
It then evaluates the connection between clientelism and a variety of
political and economic outcomes, including democratic accountability,
corruption, and public goods provision. It concludes by outlining some
remaining empirical and theoretical challenges and highlighting recent
innovations in data collection and empirical methods.
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INTRODUCTION
Hicken
WHAT IS CLIENTELISM?
If there is one theme that appears again and
again in Annual Review articles, it is the lack of
conceptual clarity and consensus that plagues
the study of whatever topic is under review.
Clientelism is no different. In fact, the term
is often used in the literature colloquially with
little attempt to dene it. The term serves as
shorthand for systems, institutions, or individuals that are somehow less than ideal (e.g., clientelist party system, clientelist political party, or
clientelist politician). And yet these colloquial
uses are grounded in a literature replete with
attempts to dene and delimit the concept of
clientelism. There is no generally accepted definition, but many denitions highlight the following as key elements of clientelist relationships: dyadic relationships, contingency, hierarchy, and iteration. Below, I discuss each of these
elements in turn, highlighting shifts in the literature over the relative weight of each element.
Dyadic Relationships
For early scholars of clientelism, the social
relationship between patron and client was
paramount. The emphasis was on direct, faceto-face interactions and transactions between
the patron and client. For example, Scott (1972,
p. 92) speaks of clientelism as an instrumental
friendship, while Lande (1977, p. xx) refers to
dyadic alliances. Clients, it was assumed, had
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1
Specically, club goods are clientelist if the exchange satises the following conditions: predictability, elasticity, and
competition (Kitschelt & Wilkinson 2007a, pp. 1415). Club
goods are discussed further below.
2
Schedler (2002) includes an extensive list of material goods
offered to Mexican voters. See Brusco et al. (2004) for a similar list of goods offered to Argentinean voters.
Contingency
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party to monitor and sanction the other is crucial (Kitschelt & Wilkinson 2007a).
Hierarchy
3
Kitschelt & Wilkinson (2007a, p. 2) dene clientelism as
the direct exchange of a citizens vote in return for direct
payments or continuing access to employment, goods, and
services, while Stokes (2007a, p. 605) offers the following
denition: the proffering of material goods in return for
electoral support, where the criterion of distribution that the
patron uses is simply: did you (will you) support me?
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Iteration
One of the key factors that differentiates clientelist exchange, from, say, a bribe demanded
by a policeman, or pencils handed out by
political candidates to potential voters at the
county fair, is the ongoing nature of the relationship. The former are (hopefully) one-off
interactions, with neither party having a strong
expectation of interacting in the future. By
contrast, clientelism is at its core an iterated
interaction, with each side anticipating future
interactions as they make decisions about their
behavior today. This has a couple of important
implications. Iteration provides a mechanism
for overcoming one of the key challenges of
When Kitschelt & Wilkinson turn to the dynamics of clientelism, they reverse the patron-client relationship. Politicians
become the effective principal, concerned with shirking on
the part of voters, and thus need to nd ways to monitor voters and ensure compliance (Kitschelt & Wilkinson 2007a,
pp. 1417).
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Volition?
The concept of volition as a possible element of
clientelism is strongly debated in the literature
(for the positive case, see Eisenstadt & Roniger
1984). At its core, this is a question about the
nature of the glue that holds clientelist relationships together: power/force, needs/demands,
or voluntary obligations (Muno 2010). Like
any relationship, clientelism contains certain
costs of ending the relationship. The question
is whether these costs are so prohibitively high
as to deprive voluntary of any recognizable
meaning. If we approach patron-client relationships as a mutually benecial contingent
exchange, as rational choice approaches typically do, then speaking of volition makes sense.
Successful clientelist exchange is a mutually
reinforcing equilibrium, with each side free to
exit if they become dissatised with the nature
of the relationship.
Other approaches focus on power asymmetries and argue that in many cases these are so
severe that it is not useful to think of clientelism
as voluntaryfor example, where the threat of
violence or legal ramications are attached to
noncompliance on the part of the client (e.g.,
5
As a corollary, where voters and politicians trust each other
to deliver on their promises, this trust raises the costs (decreases the vote choice elasticity) for potential rivals looking
to sway voters to their side (Kitschelt & Wilkinson 2007a,
p. 13).
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6
Some scholars reject such relationships as examples of clientelism (e.g., Muno 2010, Piattoni 2001b), but others choose
to include them (Stokes 2007a).
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characteristics or voting history. The discretion given to politicians over the distribution
of these benets is minimal. (Unemployment
benets in the United States are a classic example of a programmatic club good.) By contrast,
clientelist club goods come with substantial discretion by politicians over disbursement, and
delivery of benets is contingent on the groups
past or promised political support (Kitschelt &
Wilkinson 2007a).
A couple of examples from Southeast
Asia help to illustrate the distinction between
clientelism and other types of targeted benets.
In Thailand, part of Thaksin Shinawatras
electoral strategy was promising a basket of
club goods targeted to poor, rural votersan
innovative strategy in the Thai context (Hicken
2009). Policies such as the 30-baht healthcare
scheme and a debt moratorium for farmers
targeted certain groups, with the costs of
the programs borne by other groups, but
the benets of the policies were not directly
contingent on a vote for Thaksins Thai Rak
Thai party. Qualied voters in constituencies
that supported the opposition still had access
to the promised health cards and debt relief. By
contrast, in the 1980s, the Singapore government announced a change to its vote-counting
systemvotes would now be counted and
reported at the ward level, which in Singapore
roughly equates to an apartment block. As the
vast majority of Singapore citizens live in public
housing estates, this meant that the government would possess fairly detailed data about
the distribution of its support. The ruling PAP
party wasted no time in explicitly tying housing
services to support for the PAP. Apartment
complexes that supported the opposition could
expect to be last on the list for upgrades and
improvements (Tremewan 1994).
How is clientelism distinct from the related
concepts of patronage and vote buying? For
many authors, patronage and clientelism are
largely synonymous and are used interchangeably (see Kitschelt & Wilkinson 2007c; Piattoni
2001b, p. 6). However, in a subset of the literature there is an important distinction between
patronage and clientelism. Some dene patron-
7
Robinson & Verdier (2003, p. 2), by contrast, label the
exchange of a public sector job for political support as
clientelism.
8
Medina & Stokes (2007) draw a similar distinction between
resources that the patron controls independent of electoral
outcomes (what they term economic monopolies) and resources that depend on the patron holding public ofce (political monopolies). The latter would be patronage, and both
would fall under the rubric of clientelism.
9
On vote buying see Schaffer (2007), Schaffer & Schedler
(2007), and Hicken (2007).
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Targeted Benefits?
Y
Contingent?
Y
Clientelism
Incl: patronage, clientelist vote
buying, clientelist club goods
National Public
Goods &
Programmatic
Policies
Figure 1
Clientelism versus other benets.
Hicken
CLIENTELISM AND
DEMOCRACY
The literature on clientelism can be broken
down into roughly three approaches (Roniger
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10
Nyblade & Reed (2008) and Golden & Tiwari (2009) similarly nd that robust electoral competition and the accompanying uncertainty make politicians more likely to engage
in criminal or corrupt behavior.
11
298
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CLIENTELISM AND
DEVELOPMENT
Economic Development
Perhaps the most common association drawn
in the clientelism literature is between the level
of economic development and the prevalence
of clientelism.The literature reports this association both cross-nationally, noting that clientelism appears to be more prevalent in developing countries, and within nations, noting that
poorer voters appear to be more susceptible to
clientelist offers than richer voters (e.g., Brusco
et al. 2004). We can trace the scholarly roots of
this association to the modernization and developmentalist schools from the mid-twentieth
century, but current theorizing views the
relationship between economic development
and clientelism as probabilistic rather than deterministic. Although the empirical association
between poverty/development and clientelism
is fairly robust (see Wantchekon 2003, Keefer
2006, Kitschelt & Wilkinson 2007a, Remmer
2007, Bustikova & Corduneanu-Huci 2009;
for opposing views see Schaffer 2004, Speck &
Abramo 2001), there are a variety of views about
the causal mechanisms at work. We can divide
these into two groups: rst, those that emphasize the effect of development on potential
clients assessment of the value of a clientelist
offer versus other alternatives, and second,
those that emphasize the effect of development
on the capacity of patrons to provide clientelist
benets.12
Development might affect voters assessment of the relative value of clientelist benets
13
12
Kitschelt & Wilkinson (2007a, pp. 2428) term these, respectively, demand-side and supply-side factors.
Lyne (2007) argues that even wealthy voters should generally prefer the immediate benets available via clientelism to
offers of larger-scale collective goods.
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300
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14
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For a similar logic as it relates to party strategies in established democracies, see Golden & Chang (2001), Samuels
(1999), and Cox & Theis (1998).
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bureaucratic capacity. Given the strong evidence of a link between clientelism and an
underprovision of public goods (discussed
below), one wonders whether the causal arrows
ought to be reversed.
In short, the evidence for Shefters argument
is mixed. But what is clear from these and other
studies is the importance of institutional legacies.16 Not surprisingly, the best predictor of
whether a given country currently has programmatic parties is whether it has a historical legacy
of such parties.17
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Consequences
The starting point (stated or unstated) for most
of the literature is that clientelism is inefcient
at best and downright dangerous at worst. It
may be a necessary or at least an unavoidable evil in many cases, but it is nonetheless
regrettable. There is however, an alternative
school of thought that emphasizes theoretically
salutary aspects of clientelism. First, it points to
the redistributive and social welfare aspects of
clientelist exchange and argues that our standard for comparison should be not only programmatic political systems but also predatory
or exploitative systems. Yes, clientelism may be
less than ideal, but if the alternative is a state
that provides even fewer benets to citizens, especially the poor, then clientelism is not such a
bad bargain. Clientelism can be one important
mechanism for securing transactional benets
from the state. Second, there is also a line of
argument that stresses the benets of localism
16
See Grzymala-Busse (2007) for how historical institutional legacies interacted with the robustness of democratic
competition to shape party strategies in postcommunist
democracies.
17
302
Hicken
18
See Hicken & Simmons 2008 for a summary of these arguments as they relate to particularism generally.
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19
20
303
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CONCLUSION
Hicken
21
See Kitschelt & Wilkinson (2007a, pp. 32329) for a summary of these challenges.
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Operationalization/proxy
Sample works
Desposato 2007
Desposato 2007
Level of corruption
Keefer 2007
22
Other alternatives include noncontingent pork-barrel politics, noncontingent constituency service, or appeals that rely
on charisma or shared ethnicity.
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interesting work could be done on how clientelism shapes party organization and how, conversely, party organization may shape the type
of clientelist strategies a party pursues. In addition, we are still lacking in our understanding
of why some states are able to transition from
clientelism to other forms of exchange, while in
others clientelism adapts and endures. Finally,
it is worth exploring more carefully the role of
political institutions such as electoral systems
and regime type. At present, there is relatively
little evidence that such institutions have an
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DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
The author is not aware of any afliations, memberships, funding, or nancial holdings that might
be perceived as affecting the objectivity of this review.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Thanks to Anna Grzymala-Busse for her helpful and challenging comments.
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