Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Table of Contents..................................................................1
CAUSE IN FACT........................................................................ 2
Matsuyama v. Birnhaum......................................................................4
Summers v. Tice...............................................................................5
Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co....................................................................5
NEGLIGENCE.......................................................................... 6
Brown v. Kendall..............................................................................6
Codling v. Paglia...............................................................................7
Baltimore Ohio R.R. v. Goodman case
(Holmes, J.).....................................8
Pakara v. Wabash Railway Co. case
(Cardozo, J.).....................................8
Martin v. Herzog case.........................................................................8
Tedla v. Ellman................................................................................8
Yabarra v. Spangard..........................................................................9
PROXIMATE CAUSE................................................................10
Gibson v. Garcia.............................................................................10
Polemis Case.................................................................................11
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co.............................................................11
Intentional Tort........................................................................21
Strict Liability/ Product liability......................................................25
Modern Product Liability.............................................................29
Products liability:......................................................................32
s 402A. SPECIAL LIABILITY OF SELLER OF PRODUCT FOR PHYSICAL HARM
TO USER OR CONSUMER................................................................34
Defects:................................................................................. 35
Soule v. General Motors.....................................................................41
Camacho v. Honda Motors..................................................................42
2.
3.
4.
5.
Federal Courts
U.S. Supreme Court
U.S. Court of Appeals (13 circuits)
U.S. District Court (94 courts)
All or Nothing Rule: (Is a traditional rule) If you cannot establish causation by a
preponderance you will lose.
Ruminations on Cause-in-fact: (Wex Malone)
Simple cause (cause-in-fact) is a question of fact. It is for the consideration of the jury
whenever the evidence affords ground for reasonable difference of opinion. Simple cause
determined by but for test. However, we use past experience to determine. (judge can
take away from jury if he feels like jury will be left to conjecture; however, this is the
judge using conjecture to decide on conjecture. When he does this will use words like
mere possibility instead of using probability.) Cause is not a fact and must
necessarily be an inference drawn from data furnished by the evidence.
For Lost Chance Theory: Special relationship between patient and doctor higher
standard for duty of care and obligation to take necessary precautions serves deterrence.
Against Loss Chance Theory: Probability standard of causation treats the better-thaneven chance as a certainty. Why should a P whose decedent had a 49% chance of
survival recover 49% of the value of their life, when someone whose decedent had a 51%
chance of survival can recover 100%. If Ds negligence did not actually cause Ps
injuryno justification for requiring D to bear cost of Ps damages. Loss of chance
could affect loss of damages in and could affect all forms of negligence. It is much more
difficult to define a % of lost chance in non-medical cases (such as Grimstad)
Does loss of chance undermine the causation element? What deterrent function is SO
important that we can bypass the causation factor? Doctors to a higher standard?
Would it require doctors to behave in a non-negligent way? If we didnt have loss
chance, could doctors be reckless and do whatever they want if the chances are below
50%? (I can do anything I want b/c I wont be sued under but for test.
Loss of Chance Doctrine:
Some courts will permit recovery for tortious conduct that did not cause Ps harm but
merely reduced Ps chances of a favorable outcome. Some deny all recovery unless the
victims chances were initially over 50%; some allow damages based on the jurys
determination that the defendants negligence was a substantial factor in hastening or
precipitating the adverse result; and some allow damages based on the percentage
difference attributable to the defendants negligence times the plaintiffs total damages.
Under this theory the P would recover % of loss in damages. What if P lives? Still loss
the chance of life (our new defined injury). No court has allowed P to collect unless they
suffer ultimate result. Is loss of chance really an injury or is this a major challenge that
you need the but for test by preponderance? Loss of chance is only present when P has
a preexisting condition that presents a risk. However, when doctor creates or initiates
the harm, loss of chance is not present. Deterrence concern is if P had a <50% chance of
living then the doctor could never be held accountable by preponderance and thus would
never be held liablebad public policy.
For Lost Chance Theory: Special relationship between patient and doctor higher
standard for duty of care and obligation to take necessary precautions serves deterrence.
Against Loss Chance Theory: Probability standard of causation treats the better-thaneven chance as a certainty. Why should a P whose decedent had a 49% chance of
survival recover 49% of the value of their life, when someone whose decedent had a 51%
chance of survival can recover 100%. If Ds negligence did not actually cause Ps
injuryno justification for requiring D to bear cost of Ps damages. Loss of chance
could affect loss of damages in and could affect all forms of negligence. It is much more
difficult to define a % of lost chance in non-medical cases (such as Grimstad)
Does loss of chance undermine the causation element? What deterrent function is SO
important that we can bypass the causation factor? Doctors to a higher standard?
Would it require doctors to behave in a non-negligent way? If we didnt have loss
chance, could doctors be reckless and do whatever they want if the chances are below
50%? (I can do anything I want b/c I wont be sued under but for test.
New York R.R. v. Grimstad (US Court of Appeals 1920)
Wife sued RR because husband fell off of barge after it was bumped and it didnt have
any safety equipment. (but for Ds not having safety equipment P would have been
saved?). Court said that jury was left to pure conjecture and speculation. No award for P
cause that was not the cause-in-fact of death.
Reynolds v. Texas & Pacific Ry. (Sup Ct. of Louisiana 1885)
Mrs. Reynolds was rushing down stairs to get to train. The stairs were dark and had no
handrail. (But where the negligence of the D greatly multiples the chances of accident to
the P, and is of a character naturally leading to its occurrence, the mere possibility that it
might have happened without the negligence is not sufficient to break the chain of cause
and effect between the negligence and injury.)
Kirincich v. Standard Dredging Co. ( US Ct. of Appeals 1940)
P fell off ship and drowned. (very similar to Grimstad) (We prefer to balance the budget
on the side of the cheap precaution rather than to so characterize the life it is designed to
save). Nobody could be sure if safety equipment would have saved P. But argued that
reasonable men (jury) could disagree whether if it had been there it would have saved
life.
Matsuyama v. Birnbaum (Supre Judiacl Ct. of MA 2008)
Where a physicians negligence reduces or eliminates the patients prospects for
achieving a more favorable medical outcome, the physician has harmed the patient and is
liable for damages. (gets rid of all or nothing rule if survival was over 50% than had an
action but if under Dr. could act negligently and wouldnt be liable) Injury is diminished
likelihood of achieving a more favorable medical outcome. (there is now tons of reliable
evidence (med stats) to prove). Only applicable to medical malpractice.
If Plaintiff recovers from one driver (A), that liable driver (A) can file suit to the
other negligent driver (B) for financial liability (to balance the financial burden)
Multiple Cause Case # 3 (Joint and several liability: Sue either or both Defendant)
Riding Negligently: Motorcycle A + Motorcycle B make noisehorse is scared runs
and hits Plaintiff (C)
Substantial Factor Test: Liability made by one party (motorcycle As noise) is sufficient
w/o the involvement of another party (motorcycle Bs noise) to cause damage or
percentage of damages to the plaintiff (horse scared, running, and hitting the plaintiff)
In combined forces cases there must be evidence that the force set in motion by D was a
substantial factor in bringing about the damage before the cause issue will be submitted
to the jury. However, for this to be applicable it must be clear that the force by the D
would have been enough on its own regardless of the other force it combined w/.
Ex: Concurrent - Substantial Factor - A & B negligently drive noisy motorcycles
starling a horse that runs off and injuries C. Either Motorcycle alone would have
produced the same result. But for test does not work b/c whether you remove A or B
the injury would have occurred anyway (neither would be liable).
Ex: Combination of Culpable and Innocent Causes Substantial Factor Test
Motorcyclist As noise would have startled the horse but at the same time there was an
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innocent cause (thunder). Regardless of innocent cause as long as the As act was a
substantive factor A is still liable. The but for test is usually applied but cannot be if
there are multiple causes, such as this.
Ex: Successive Substantial Factor - As fire burned the house down and then Bs fire
passed over the rubble, there was no injury left to be done, even though B was negligent.
Only A is liable
Indeterminate Defendants:
Summers v. Tice: (Multiple Ds) (Sup. Ct. of CA 1948)
P was hunting with 2 Ds. Both Ds shot negligently and one of them hit P in the eye.
Could not tell which D caused the injury. Court held both liable. Shifted burden to Ds to
prove that they were not the one that caused the injury to P. (Firearm injuries normally
held to higher standard)
Holding: Joint tortfeasors & both liable b/c were both negligent and negligence was legal
cause of Ps injury.
Reasoning: To hold otherwise would be to exonerate both from liability, although each
was negligent and the injury resulted from such negligence. Ds should not escape liability
and to do so would be unfair to the P.
Rule: Burden of proof shifts to the Ds b/c they are usually in a better position to determine which
one caused the injury. B/c they were unable to determine it in this case, they were both liable.
Notes:
Rule only applies if both Ds were negligent
B/c of shift to comparative fault, neither D would be held liable for full damages
today. Each D would be assigned a fault % (50% in this case) and would have to pay
that % of the total damages
One of Ds was 100% cause of the injury other0%. How can P prove causation by a
preponderance of the evidence? 50% likelihood Tice, 50% Simonson was causenot a
preponderance, according to classic but for test, P loses. Two bad Ds, and a P w/out a remedy
from traditional tort law. Court shifted burden of proof to Ds b/c theyre in a better position to
show who caused harm (what does that mean though? Were gunmen really in a better position to
know, or have better access to know? No. No one can tell. At the beginning of the course, we
declared we couldnt collapse negligence into causationbut isnt that what were doing here?
Policy considerations that kind of give us wiggle room to adjust stringent causation
requirementthis case wants to take broad view of causation (fudges it a bit) b/c this case deals
w/ negligent use of firearms.
Analysis:
1. Doctrine of alternative liability (Summers v. Tice) doesnt applytoo many possible
wrongdoers and the Ds are not in a better position than P to determine culpability b/c
of long latency period
2. Most appropriate that loss be put on those that produced drug, rather than those
injured by use, even where precise manufacturer of the drug cannot be identified in a
particular action. Chance that a particular manufacturer caused the injury is very
remote.
3. Court adopted market share rule- all the manufacturer of DES are liable to each P
and liability is dependent on each Ds percentage of national marketprobably not
accurateoffset b/c Ps wont be able to fully recover
4. P needs to prove mother took drug, manufacturer produced drug, injuries came from
DES. P can sue any of manufacturers if can prove all 3. No exculpation rule doesnt matter if D can prove did not produce drugdeterrence.
5. No notion of proof by a preponderance of evidence or the but for test; case is handled
this way for policy
Challenge to the individual Causation Requirement in Mass Products Torts:
Traditionally, tort law requires P must prove that a particular Ds acts caused the Ps
injuries. Corrective Justice: P must prove D caused Ps harm. Also distribute losses
broadly.
Market Share Liability: The manufacturer is in the best position to discover and guard
against defects in its products and to warn of harmful effects so it has incentives to
product safety.
Alternate Liability: Unless Ds could prove that they did not cause harm both held
liable. (doesnt work for mass torts cause not always have all actors in court)
Horowitz Article
All injuries were judged by a strict liability standard
(1800s)
If you can prove liability you dont have to prove anything liability = fault
Mid 1800s (1850)
Strict liability concept changed. Developed negligence theory
o Only a portion (portion they were liable for) was held by defendant
Trespass on the case- indirect harm cases (Negligence)
Trespass-direct harm cases (Strict Liability)
Justice Shaw: It doesnt matter. if it is not an intentional injury you need
to prove negligence
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Negligence
Restatement 3 Negligence:
A person acts negligently if the person does not exercise reasonable care under all the
circumstances. Primary factors to consider in ascertaining whether the persons conduct
lacks reasonable care are the foreseeable likelihood that the persons conduct will result
in harm, the foreseeable severity of any harm that may ensue, and the burden of
precautions to eliminate or reduce the risk of harm.
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disagreeing mean jury question? No. I dont think judges are arguing w/ decision. Instead
are arguing that it is not the right of judges to make those determinations and that a jury
must decide otherwise there will not be an opportunity for social and/or regulation
change. 3. Court may approve a summary judgment if there is not a dispute over the
evidence.
HOLMES: fixed uniform standard of conduct so everyone will know how they are
suppose to act; also juries are less rational than judges
CARDOZO: different standards depending on where, when, circumstances, community
norms; case by case basis because times change and the question of negligence is one for
the jury
Customs:
In determining whether conduct is negligent, the customary conduct of the community,
industry, profession, or other relevant group in similar circumstances is relevant but not
conclusive.
Exception: In professional negligence cases involving physicians and certain other
professionals, customary conduct usually is conclusive as to the standard of care.
Trimarco v. Klein (Ct. of App NY 1982)
D apartment owner didnt follow custom of having shatterproof glass. Found negligent.
Custom is common practice need proof ignored it. Must also be reasonable. Custom
may show if D acted reasonably.
Custom 2 circumstances: P can try to show D deviated from custom and therefore
was negligent. D can try to show that conformity to custom can prove that they were not
negligent. Is custom w/in a given community always reasonable? Clearly custom is not
necessarily reasonable. Even if you can show that a certain custom of conduct is common
it does not mean that it is reasonable. Reasonable is defined by ought and not by is.
Holmes quote about what ought to be done. If custom is not the same as reasonableness
than why does it have any value at all? On page 71-72 in Morris. 3 reasons: If an entire
industry follows a custom than the court may become aware that there may be a safer
way to do things than what P is claiming. If no one follows this non customary item than
D can claim a lack of notice. If customary behavior involves large fixed costs than the
court is wary of imposing those costs.
1. In many instances reasonable prudence is same as what is commonly done.
Butdifficult to determine when something is done by many people and when it
actually becomes a custom. Relating to Trimarco, installation of new shower doors
may be done by some apt. complexes but may not be sufficient to say it was required
by all
2. If industry adheres to a certain way of doing something the court might be skeptical
of anything a P claims to be an alternatives and require adequate reasoning/proof of
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its ability. Even if alternative is proved to work by the P, if it is not well known it is
reasonable to believe the D may not have heard about it.
3. Even if there are things that could have been done. (Lavallee v. Vermont Motor Inns
did not have emergency lighting for power outages) if it is not used by others in the
industry it is very hard to prove D violated duty of ordinary care. Just b/c other
competitors in the industry have safer methods does not mean its custom, does not
guarantee negligence on the D. Difference between smaller and larger companies in
an industry and their ability to incur costs for safety updates.
Statues in negligence:
Legislation is relevant on the standard of care in a negligence case only if the statute was
intended, at least in part, to protect a class of persons which includes P against the
particular hazard and kind of harm which resulted.
Martin v. Herzog (Ct. of App NY 1920)
Statutes should not be undermined. They are written for a specific purpose with a specific
intent by the legislature. In some cases statute can be left to jury to interpret for a case but
that is up to the judge to refer case to the jury.
Cardozo buggy didnt have any lights on it in violation of statute. unexcused
omission of the statutory lights is more than evidence of negligence it is negligence
itself.
Telda v. Ellman (Ct. of App NY 1939)
People were walking on wrong side of road and hit. They were in violation of statute.
Statute was in place to protect ppl however, they would have been in more danger if
walking on other side. Would a reasonable person is situation violate statute for safety,
overrules Martin.
Notes:
If NOT negligence per se via the statute, we go w/ the reasonable person standard.
If Tedlas brother was deaf? He would have been putting himself in more danger b/c
he cannot see the cars behind him. Therefore he would have been safer on the left
hand side of the road even w/ heavy traffic.
No basis to excuse violation of the law where violations are common practice.
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Sometimes violations are ruled to be irrelevant if damage occurred was out of the
scope of the purpose of the statute (e.g. parent gives kid a gun, kid drops gun on
friends toe but gun does not go off).
Performing a practice that you are not authorized or licensed to do is negligence.
Negligence per se (posner) Courts are reluctant to make any violation of a license
negligence would basically be strict liability. Even if the person is not licensed they
may have acted reasonable while performing the action. Is there such a thing as non
negligence per se (I conformed to the statute so you cannot say I am negligent). No.
Reasonable person standard is higher than statutory minimum. Can the reasonable
person standard make you directly violate a statute? Yes. 1. If compliance would cause
more danger than violation. 2. If compliance would be beyond defendants control. Why
bother w/ statutes at all? Negligence per se has more teeth than custom but it is not an
absolute guarantee. Statutes represent a kind of authoritative ruling than a custom. Give
Ds advanced noticewidespread normative expectations. Existence of a statute hold
Ds liablewont catch them by surprise and impose many costs.
Statutes (Continued & review)
Violate a statute is negligence per se (Posner): Represent yourself w/o
an attorney
Other court say violation of some statutes are reasonable
Three (3) Important Point Regarding Statute
1. Statutory Purpose: Must be of the type for the statute is suppose
to protect
a. CB p. 82 (Di Pozio v. Riordan)
2. Statutory Requirement: Even when defendant violates a statute,
Plaintiff still have to prove the persons conduct is below
reasonable standard (Must prove violation of reasonableness
standard)
a. CB p. 83 (Brown v. Shyne)
3. Compliance w/ Statute: Compliance w/ statute does not mean
that you are free from negligence. You may not meet
reasonableness standard. This standard may supersede a
legislative statute.
Proof of Negligence: Res Ipsa Loquitur thing speaks for itself(rule of
circumstantial evidence when direct evidence is not met)
1. In absence of evidence of negligence, P can use res ipsa as inferred evidence. Each
prong must be proven beyond a preponderance of evidence.
a. Used as circumstantial evidentiary device to shield against Ds motion for summary
judgment/directed verdict.
b. Three Prong Test: Criteria for Ps burden of proof:
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INFERENCE (Majority rule): burden does not shift from where jury can conclude
that negligent actions happened, even without evidence.
W/PRESUMPTION (Minority rule- CA) to shift burden to D who must rebut it or be
convicted; if D cannot provide evidence to show no negligence, P is granted summary
judgment. However, if D shows some proof, burden moves back to P and then the
jury must find more likely than not that negligence occurred.
Res ipsa usually doesnt apply when there are multiple Ds.
instrumentality: the tire comes out which was the drivers responsibility exclusively
occurred w/o negligence: plaintiff does not have to limit with certainty all other
causes
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could not be contrib.. neg. Reluctant to hold other than Dr. /patient relationship since they
work together and code of silence.
Barrett v. Emanuel Hos. modern discovery practice cast doubt on need for res ispa.
and P must be able to establish that probability that a particular Ds conduct was the
cause of the
plaintiffs harm.
Example: Hit and run: P can identify the make of the car. Sues everyone w/ that kind
of car. This seems different from Ybarra b/c none of the car owners know each other and
there is no preexisting relationship between Ds and P, and higher duty of care and b/c all
Ds had control of instrumentality at some point. Also P was not unconsciousdifferent
from Ybarra. Plus Ds cant put pressure on the Ds to finger the person responsible b/c
they do not know.
Difference between res ipsa (Ybarra) and strict liability (negligence would not matter)
Possibility of exculpating oneself by proving non-negligence in res ipsa. If one of the
doctors spoke up then the others would have been off the hook.
Strict liability requires more (causation)
Proof of Negligence: Res ipsa loquitur- Rule of circumstantial evidence that permits an
inference of negligence under certain circumstances. A shield for P so the case isnt
thrown out. Permits, but does not compel, a jury to make an inference (to negligence or
not). It creates an inference of negligence. An inference does not shift the burden of
proof. A presumption shifts the burden of proof to the D. D must introduce evidence that
there was no negligence. In this case Res Ipsa is not a shield for the P but a sword for
them against the D. But if D does present evidence then the presumption disappears. It
may be strong, it may be weak just gets it to the jurythen they can decide on its
strength. (inapplicable where the instrumentality producing the injury or damage is
unknown or is not in the exclusive control of D)
Can only be used in RARE instances. P is required to prove:
1) Instrumentality that caused the injury was in the exclusive control of D
2) The accident would not have occurred in the absence of negligence
3) P was not contributory negligent
Proximate Cause: (or Scope of Liability): an additional factor courts look into
pursing negligence claim to regulate the scope of liability.
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Proximate cause deals with 3 main areas (Explain each or one when doing
proximate cause from Def. View):
a. unexpected manner (manner of injury occurs in way that defendant would not
have expected)
i. intervening -> superseding caused (Gibson v. Garcia) (Do u Expect Zebra in Road)
b. unexpected harm (nature or extent of injury itself goes beyond what could
have been expected) Did you expect a cop to crash into a telephone pole because
someone pushed an alarm button? Maybe not. (Wagonmound)
c. unexpected plaintiff (when does the face that the plaintiff themselves was an
unexpected victim come into play (palsgraf)
Unexpected Manner: (Superseding Causes)
3.Unexpected Manner: Superseding Cause - the injury is foreseeable but not the way it
happened
*Unexpected Manner Rule: The harm must be foreseeable but the manner in which it
happens doesnt have to be. Ex. If an elephant crashes into a rotten pole, even though
that specific event was unforeseeable, it was foreseeable that something would crash into
it.
Gibson v. Garcia (D. Ct. of App of CA 1950)
One D hits other Ds pole with car and causes it to fall on P causing injury. But for test
fails for D(LA transit) who owns the pole, because injury was caused by intervening act.
RULE: The original actor is liable when the intervening cause is not a superseding cause.
Even though Garcia was unforeseeable, the event that something would crash into the
pole was indeed foreseeable.
1) If the intervening cause is foreseeable, then the D is held liable
OR
2) If it is a normal consequence of the negligent actor, then D is still negligent, as
long as what occurred was foreseeable
Proximate cause is not stopped by intervention of outside force if original negligence
continues and contributes substantially to an injury along with the intervening act. Each
may be P/C and full liability may be imposed. Decision was to let the jury decide if the
collision with the pole was an intervening or superseding cause. Inconsistent with 435
if extraordinary.
1. Actor should have realized 3rd party would act
2. Reasonable man wouldnt have regarded it extraordinary for 3rd parties act.
3. Intervening act is a consequence of a situation caused by actors conduct.
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-Board fell in ship hole and made spark, lit Benzene vapors and fire burned the ship. If
spark caused fire, D is liable regardless of whether dropping the plank would foreseeably
cause spark or the ship to burn.
SIGNIFICANCE: Negligence is an unreasonable act; negligence is the foreseeable risk of
harm and the occurrence of a foreseeable injury.
-Two Definitions of Negligence established:
1. Fairness to the plaintiff: foreseeability is relevant only in deciding whether the
actor was negligent, not in deciding what consequences actor should be held liable forit
is used to determine negligence;
a. once found negligent, actor is responsible for all consequences foreseeable or not
2. Fairness to the defendant: use foreseeability to show actor is negligent, then
continue to use it to determine if damage was foreseeable as to hold actor responsible
a. once found negligent, if a consequence is not foreseeable, proximate cause cuts off
liability.
-2 Views of Proximate Cause:
All Consequences rule- Foreseeability may be relevant to whether or not you
are negligent but that is all. Once that door is opened by negligent the D is responsible
for all damages. Ex: Reasonable for boat being destroyed.
a. Direct Consequences Rule does not matter whether the consequences were
foreseeable or not but they have to be the direct consequence of Ds action.
(From Polemis court which modified the all consequences rule)
Foreseeable Consequences Rule - Foreseeability is also used to determine negligence
but also to determine what consequences you are responsible for. Ex: D is not reasonable
for destruction of the boat for the damages that the extent to their harm would have
incurred. Apply foreseeability to consequences, as soon as you get to a result is
unforeseeable the D is no longer liable. (Wagon Mound)
Wagonmound (Foreseeable Consequences Rule)
D spilled bunkering oil in water (not flammable when mixed with waterthey thought).
Court held P liable for foreseeable damages, such as the congealing of oil in the slipways
of other ships, but not for unforeseeable damage such as the fire. Ct. held that it is not
just or moral that Ds negligence should make D responsible for all consequences, no
matter how unforeseeable as long as they are direct. Foresight of reasonable person
determines responsibility, not hindsight. Only responsible for foreseeable consequencesD not liable. It was foreseeable that the oil would mess up peoples property, but not that
it would catch on fire.
Critique of Polemis- direct consequences rule in Polemis is unjust to
indirect parties. Adoption of the foreseeable consequences rule in this
case.
Modifies Polemis reasoning of All consequences rule to the direct consequences rule,
then rejects that and adopts the foreseeable consequence rule.
Key: For negligence to occur (Polemis or Wagonmound) there must be a negligent act.
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RULE: test each consequence for its foreseeability and if it is, then the P can recover, but
if not, no recovery.
Theories of Negligence:
1.) Negligence in the Air: something a reasonable person would not do, whether
it results in harm or not, is negligence. When someone acts unreasonable and
it creates a risk of harm then a negligent act has occurred.
2.) Negligence must have Injury: negligence only results when unreasonable acts
result in harm. W/O harm there is not negligence.
Example: Restatement Section 281 Illustration #3 D hands a loaded pistol to a little
boy and tells him to walk across the room and give the pistol to another boy. On the way
across the room the kid drops the gun on someones foot. Negligence to D? No. It is not
b/c foreseeable harm is for the gun to go off and shoot someone.
But if the gun did discharge and hit someone else after being dropped and break anothers
foot the person w/ the broken foot cannot sue but the person shot can. If you held the
foreseeable consequence rule for this situation neither would be able to recover.
Unexpected Harm:
Benn v. Thomas (Sup. Ct. of IA 1994)
P had an risk of coronary disease. D rear-ended and P died as result from heart attack 6
days later. (Dr. said accident was straw that broke camels back)
Eggshell Plaintiff: - take the P as you find him, even if that means that the D must
compensate the P for harm an ordinary person would not have suffered. Defendant is
liable for plaintiffs injury even if the injury is not foreseeable.
- this negates the foreseeability element of establishing proximate cause; it is
only necessary to be negligent and cause an injuryforeseeability of extent of
the injury does not apply.
Smith v. Leech Brian (P burns lip)
Use Egg Shell worker in gas industry burnt lip by D negligent act. P was predisposed
with cancer (unforeseeable) burnt lip (foreseeable), Co. negligent for act of burnt lip
Unexpected Victim:
Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co. (P gets hit w/ fireworks) CARDOZO
P injured by falling scales while standing on the platform when package of another
passenger running to catch train falls and explodes as the guard helps him onto train. The
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passenger was never found and the bag in which the fireworks were in was unmarked,
giving no indication of its contents. ISSUE: Was there a breach of duty to P (Palsgraf)?
NO. Guard owed a duty to the man who he helped on the train to prevent injury to him.
However, Guard owed no duty relationship to P who was not a passenger, therefore cant
have a breach of duty, no negligence-causation is irrelevant. There was no foreseeable
risk to and since risk defines duty, there is no duty to P and therefore no negligence.
The only foreseeable damage was to the property- the explosion and damage were
outside the foreseeablity
Helen Palsgraf is, if anything, piggybacking on the wrong done to another-i.e.
property owner who experienced a loss
Cardozo: (relational negligence)
Risk reasonably perceived defines the duty to be obeyed.
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an injury, even if it happened in a different way he is still liable. The causes of anything
can be traced backward to a certain point. It cannot be denied that the explosion was the
direct cause of the Ps injury and it was foreseeable that someone would get injured given
the action, just didnt know how. B/c of policy considerations you cut off liability at some
point in time.
Cardozo (Torts -A Private Law for enforcing duty relationship): Judge to determine if
duty exists and jury to decide if D breached duty. The judge is the eye of reasonable
vigilance. But if it is not obvious, judge should give the question to the jury along w/ the
question of breach of duty. In Palsgraf, he took the case away from the jury, so
apparently he thought the judge alone should decide if there was duty. Court should
determine if there is a duty to P. If it is possible to draw varying inferences then the jury
should decided.
Andrews(Torts -More of public some private): Not clear whether jury should be given
proximate cause question. Strong inference- court should be making policy
considerations (regarding proximate cause). Cause in fact is for jury.
Rescuers:
While intervention of rescuer may not be truly foreseeable, D is accountable for injuries
to rescuer caused by Ds negligence. Doesnt matter if risk assessed. (Wagner v.
International Railway)
Notes cases:
Moore v. Shah (1982) P donated kidney to his father who was hurt through Ds
malpractice. Donors actions were not foreseeable and not made under pressure so he was
not entitled to recovery as a rescue
Firman v. Sarcia (1959s) D drove negligently, hit P, who struck a 3 yr old that suffered
severe brain trauma. P shoots and kills D 7 yrs later. P claimed he did not realize the
nature of his consequences.
Ryan v. New York Central RR (1866) Sparks from Ds negligently maintained engine
ignited one of its sheds and the fire spread across many buildings. Judge Andrews ruled
that it was not expected that it would spread from building to building so RR was only
cause of the initial building fire. Almost all other states reject view.
The Kinsman cases: Kisman transit owned the Shiras who responded inadequately to
impending danger of stream made of ice and water. As a result, crashed into the properly
docked Tewksburywent downstream and both crashed into a city bridge which was
negligently not raised. This caused a backup of the ice, no flow of water down stream,
and flooding damage.
Wagon Mound excludes liability where the injury sprang from a hazard different from
that which was improperly risked. This is stupid. If the consequences other and greater
than foreseen does not make the conduct any less culpable or provide a reasoned basis for
insulation
Pragmatic Realism and Proximate Cause in America, Herbert Hovenkamp, (1984)
25
Facts: 1980s, Boston and Albany RR Company operated a terminal branch from the
Village of Spencer, Mass to the main line in South Spencer. Howard Stone owned a
lumberyard across the tracks from the RRs freight stock. On Sept, 13, 1893 B & A
loading terminal was crowded w/ barrels of fuel and it was spilled all over the place by
employees. No one cleaned it up, or planned to until the dock was cleared. In the
afternoon, a salesman, Casserly, loaded his pipe, relit it and threw down a match which
caused a great explosion. Oil barrels blew up and the fire spread to Stones lumberyard
burning it down. Stone brought a case versus B & A for negligence but lost b/c it was
determined that proximate cause was Casserlys thrown match and that the last sufficient
cause is as far back as the law will look back.
26
27
2 friends, 1 beaten and left in car by friend who had tried to help when they got in a fight
over girls outside a restaurant with another group of guys. P(beaten) dies and D is held
liable.
HOLDING: there was a relationship, a drinking buddy relationship. Court has the ability
to carve out new relationships.
Two arguments for Ds liability: 1) P and D were companions in a social venture and this
creates a duty. 2) D could be liable for failing to exercise reasonable care after coming to
someones aidcalled rescuer liability.
-If you start giving aide to someone who is helpless, then you have assumed a duty-can
be held liable if you do it in (1) an reasonable manner (2) discontinued aide and leave
them worse off then before
-Question of duty is for the judge but to determine whether a duty exists or not based on
factual circumstances is for the jury.
Considerations from the Restatement:
322: when an actor knows his conduct created the harm, actor has a duty to try to
prevent greater harm
324: rescuer rule- once voluntarily begin to help another, you are held to a duty to
exercise reasonable care to the injured party, and will be liable if you breach that duty and
stop giving aid, and leave that person in a worse condition than you find them
326: if you prevent another from helping an injured party, you are liable
Note cases:
Bjerke v. Johnson Ds invited P (a minor) to live w/ them. Minor had sexual relations
w/ Ds live in boyfriend. When P filed suit against D court ruled the D assumed duty (a
special relationship)
Simonsen v. Thorin Non negligent harm Motorist who ran into a pole (w/out fault),
pole fell, motorist drove on, another motorist hit pole = injury. Motorist is responsible.
Menu v. Minor Driver hit a median, became disabled. Taxi comes by, rescues driver,
leaves car in the middle of the road. Another person crashes into empty car and sues cab
company for not staying at scene or warning someone. Court ruled for cab company in
that they owed no duty to P and did not increase the risk of an already dangerous
situation.
OBLIGATIONS TO CONTROL THE CONDUCT OF OTHERS:
1.)
The Relationship Where D stands in a special relationship to someone who may
cause injury to P, that D has a duty to use reasonable care to control the 3rd person in that
relationship who injures P, even if D and P have no relationship. (Physician/patient,
w/guardians, school/pupil, parent/child).
2.)
Duty to Warn 3rd party:
3.)
Two types of relationships
a. type I: (not our case) D has a duty to P (to protect from X)
b. type II: D has a duty/control to X and therefore P (Like employee is X)
28
29
-Consider Restatement 319: If Doctor knows or should know that patient is likely to
cause harm to others if not controlled, the Doctor has a duty to warn.
Note Cases on Duty:
Reisner v. Regents: 12 yr old received transfusion which infected her w/ AIDS. A few yr
later she became intimate w/ P, who contracted AIDS. Doctor of patient never told her,
thus if patient knew she would have told P doctor was cause of P contracting AIDS
from his patient.
Pate v. Threlkel: Doctor knew of genetic situation of a patient and the high likelihood of
her adult children contracting a carcinoma. Never told patient, children got the disease.
Disease would have been discovered soon had the mother known of the genetics.
Hawkins v. Pizarro Physician incorrectly tested patient negative for hepatitis C.
Months later patient met manmarriedhe tested positive for hepatitis C. Court said no
to claimshe did not already know the man so there was no duty.
Hardee v. Bio-Medical Application of South Carolina: Doctor provided health care to
patient but failed to warn them of inability to drivepatient drivesaccidentinjury
party sues doctorcourt sides w/ P.
Tenuto v. Lederle Laboratories: Father (contracted polio) sued infants physician for
failure to warn about the danger of contracting polio by having an open wound come in
contract w/ the excrement of an infant recently immunized against polio. Court identified
a special relationship based expanded duty of care. 1st thing you look forexisting
relationship?No. Not really like Tarasoff b/c infant & physician have a closer
relationship then relationship in Tarasoff. Again, court creates special relationshipnot
previously identified.
Bellah v. Greenson: Psychiatrist patient commits suicideparents suecourt says no
b/c the Tarasoff ruling does not apply to self-inflicted harm or mere property damage.
Thompson v. County of Alameda: County released James, a violent juvenile, into his
mother custody even though he had threatened to kill an unidentified child in the area.
W/in 24 hrs he did. County was not liable b/c they had no way of knowing who it would
have been.
Rule: Therapists are immune from liability except when the patient has communicated to
the psychotherapist a serious threat of physical violence against a reasonably
identifiable victim or victims.
-When mental suffering is accompanied with physical impact and consequential physical
injuries.
-Court used test:
a. w/in zone of danger of physical impact?
b. Reasonably feared for her safety?
c. Suffered severe emotional distress and physical manifestation?
-POLICY: the reason behind this is the courts fear fraudulent claims of emotional harm.
B.) INDIRECT HARM:
-There is a trend for emotional harm to be an independent recoverable torts (w/out
physical manifestation). No thin skull P (Gammon)
a. Here the trial process will weed out fraud, but the basic rule is the foreseeability: must
reasonable foresee potential damage to ORDINARY SENSITIVE PERSON. Jury
determines this
one.
-Genuineness of Emotional Harm: Negligence Physical Impact (overruled in Falzone)
Emotional Distress Consequential Physical Manifestation.
Falzone v. Busch: (Physical Impact is not needed anymore) S.C. of NJ, (1965)
1.
S.C.s Response:
Emotional harm question of medical evidence not of law. Relationship between
emotional disturbance and physical harm has expanded over time.
31
Just b/c no precedent and no cases about this doesnt mean court rejects itLaw
changes as things change.
3.
Not an excessive # of cases in other states that do not require impact as a basis for
recovery. Fear of expansion of litigation not legitimate reason for the court to deter from
a ruling.
Holding: S. C. P suffered substantial bodily injury or sickness such conditions was the
proximate result of the Ds negligence physical impact may not be required but does need
to be physical manifestations as a consequence and also a sort of zone of danger. Must
be reasonable fright of substantial injury caution against the eggshell psyche. Do not want
to reject this issue b/c of fictitious claims b/c in many respects harm to the brain is more
severe than physical harm.
Notes: Word physical is used differently something that can be objectively determined in
a person (Ex: nervous disorder).
1. Reasonable fear of immediate personal injury
2. Injury may be bodiliy injury or sickness (must be serious)
2.
32
Courts state that physical impact is meaningless b/c there are cases when genuine
emotional distress instances that occur w/ slight or no physical impact
o To think that emotional cases w/o physical impact will flood litigation has
not proven to be true (based on statistics)
33
Zone of Danger:
1. Plaintiffs who sustain a physical impact as a result of a defendants negligent
conduct; or
2. Plaintiffs are placed in immediate risk of physical harm by that conduct
-----
34
Indirect Victim
(Plaintiff viewing for emotional distress due another parties injury)
Tobin/ Bovsun: Restrictive View (New York approach)
No recovery
Unless within Zone of Danger:
o Death/serious injury
o Immediate family member
o Severe and verifiable
Portee/Dillon: Expansive View (California approach)
Dillon criteria
o Plaintiff has to be located near the scene of the accident
The proximity to the accident scene increases the likelihood
o Traumatic distress occasioned by immediate perception (observation) of
the accident resulting in death or serious injury to injured party
o Plaintiff need to be closely related to the injured person
36
November 3, 2014
Levandoski v. Cone
Police officer chases Defendant
Police officer was injured
Police officer is capable to sue Defendant
Fire Fighters rule
o A premises rule
Fire fighter rule covers Premises liability and liability of the landowner
Defendant does have to be concerned about double taxation for the fire fighter
rule b/c is not a landowner
----
Li v. Yellow cab
Plaintiff, Li, made a left turn at intersection
Defendant driving a yellow cab at a fast speed and clips back of Plaintiffs car
38
Li was contributory negligent b/c Plaintiff made a left turn at a intersection when
it wasnt her turn to turn
Case resulted in a bench trial
Judge found Plaintiff contributory negligent because she was not permitted to turn
at the time proceeding the automobile accident
Judge verdict was in favor of defendant b/c Plaintiff was contributory negligent
barring her from recovery (all-or-nothing rule)
50% rule: Plaintiff should not allowed to cover if they are 50%+ contributory negligent
After Li v. Yellow Cab:
Two kinds of defenses
1. Plaintiff act unreasonably to
2. Plaintiff is held to agree to relieve defendant of an obligation of reasonable
conduct toward him
Assumption of risk that is a variant is abolished (California)
Comparative Negligence New York
Culpable conduct attributable to the claimant or the decedent, including contributory
negligence or assumption of risk, shall not bar recovery, but the amount of damages
otherwise recoverable shall be
39
40
Intent: (Restatement Third) requires that (a) the person acts w/ the purpose of producing
the consequence or (b) the person acts knowing that the consequence is substantially
certain to result.
Battery: Conduct that is construed as being harmful or offensive contact. (Intentional)
Assault: An actor is subject to liability to another for assault if he acts intending to cause
a harmful or offensive contact w/ the person of the other or an imminent apprehension of
such a contact.
November 10, 2014
McGuire v. Almy
Nurse in-charge of mentally unstable patient
Patient when on a rampage in room.
Plaintiff tried to calm patient down
Patient strike plaintiff with a lowboy (furniture) leg - (Intent)
Rule: Tort law does not indemnify the mentally insane of liabilities. The intent that would
be necessary in order to render a normal person liable, the insane person in order to
liable, must have been capable of entertaining the same intent and must have entertained
it in fact. But the law will not inquire further into his peculiar mental condition w/ a view
to excusing him.
Beach v. Hancock
Defendant pulled out a unloaded gun and aimed it at Plaintiff
Defendant pulled the trigger of the gun
Plaintiff assaulted Defendant because the Plaintiff reasonably feared being shot, despite
the defendant knowing the gun was unloaded.
Rule: Assault
Defendant:
o Intent to cause battery; or
o Intent to cause apprehension of battery
41
Plaintiff moored his sloop at a dock on defendants Private Island in order to avoid
the hazards of a storm. Defendants servant cut loose the sloop which, as a result,
was battered by the storm. Plaintiff and his family were injured
Defendant argued that he was simply protecting his private property from use by
plaintiff. The court awarded damages to plaintiff, recognizing a privilege, born of
necessity, to use defendants property
42
Defendant is guilty because servant unmoored the dock and prevented the plaintiff
from exercising his privilege
Rule:
Private necessity- the plaintiff has the privilege to use the dock. Plaintiff has the
privilege and the right to use that privilege. The privilege is I had a necessity. I
had a need to use your property (i.e. there was a storm so I had a need to use
your dock)
Mouse case: protect human life. The defendant was sued for taking and carrying away
the plaintiffs casket out of the barge. It was resolved that in case of necessity, to save the
lives of the passengers, it was lawful for the defendant, being a passenger, to cast the
plaintiffs casket out of the barge
The steamship Reynolds, owned by the defendant, was for the purpose of
discharging her cargo moored to plaintiffs dock in Duluth
Unloading the boat was taking place a storm from the northeast developed so
grown in violence that the wind was then moving 50 mph.
Its conduct during the storm was rendered necessary by prudence and good
seamanship under conditions over which it had no control, it cannot be held liable
for any injury resulting to the property of others, and claims that the jury should
have been so instructed
Intentional destruction of the plaintiffs dock because the defendant kept the ship
connected to the dock out of necessity.
It could hardly be said that the obligation would not be upon such person to pay
the value of the property so taken when he became able to do so
Court says there is a privilege, but you need to pay for what you destroyed.
Compensation must be made. where the defendant prudently and advisedly
availed itself of the plaintiffs property for the purpose of preserving its own more
valuable property, and the plaintiffs are entitled to compensation for the injury
done
Rule: the reasonableness of an incomplete privilege makes a person make a
reasonable cost benefit decision to determine his conduct
Encourages dock owner to consent to allow the use of the privilege only because
he knows that he will become whole after. (compensated)
43
Public necessity has absolute privilege not incomplete. For the good of everybody so you
do not want people to think that they would be held liable afterwards (have an incentive
not to do good for the community). When it is beneficial to the community at large,
intentional torts are permitted because you do not want people to feel like they will be
sued afterwards.
Natural v non -natural use- if you use the land in a natural way (negligence applies) if
you use it in non-natural use then it is strict liability
Non-natural- unusual or nonconforming use given on the community around you.
there had been any accumulation of water, either on the surface or underground, and if,
by the operation of the laws of nature, that accumulation of water had passed off into the
close occupied by the plaintiff, the plaintiff could not have complained that that result had
taken place.
on the other hand if the defendants, not stopping at the natural use of their close, had
desired to use it for any purpose of introducing into the close that which in its natural
condition was not in or upon it If in consequence of their doing so, the water came to
escape and to pass off into the close of the plaintiff, then it appears to me that that which
the defendants were doing they were doing at their own peril, and if in the course of their
doing it, the evil arose of the escape of the water and its passing away to close of the
plaintiff and injuring the plaintiff, then for the consequence of that then the defendants
would be liable.
Negligence applies when youre just sitting at home and if your neighbor is engaged in
natural use of his land.
Hay Case:
Blasting case. D was blasting rocks at his own house but the rocks were thrown
on plaintiffs home so he was found strictly liable.
Strict liable because D use of the land is not an absolute land because the higher
right of plaintiffs use of his land.
You cannot use your land in a way that it hurts my use of my land. If you use your
land in a way that hurts my land, you are strictly liable
Brown v Kendall:
Negligence is universal
Losee v Buchanan:
D was using a steam boiler; the stream boiler exploded and went into neighbors
land. Court could either follow strict liability or negligence principle from Brown
v Kendall.
Negligence is the universal principle of liability with no exceptions
45
Distinguish Hay case by saying in Hay the damage was the necessary
consequence (a case was like an intentional torts thats why they were strictly
liable)
Held that one who, without negligence and with due care and skill, operates a
stream boiler upon his own premises, is not liable to his neighbor for the damages
caused by the explosion thereof. A tremendous force escaped, so to speak, from
the owner, but was not voluntarily set free
Prosser:
These 2 cases can be reconciled through natural v non-natural so in Hay dynamite use is
non-natural but Losee was a natural use because paper manufacturing was the norm.
Losee:
We must have factories, machinery, dams, canals and railroads. They are demanded by
the manifold wants of mankind. If I have any of these upon my lands, and they are not a
nuisance, and are not so managed as to become such, I am not responsible for any
damage they accidently and unavoidably do my neighbor
Negligence law is necessary if society wants to advance.
Sullivan v Dunham:
When does strict liability apply or when does negligence apply?
D employed men to dynamite a tree on the land
Non-natural use but negligence is a universal rule with no exceptions
Blast hurled a fragment onto a highway where it struck plaintiff and killed her
Nature of the damage is personal injury and natural of activity of the D
Based ruling on public policy (Hay case)
**Upon grounds of public policy, it is better that one man should surrender a
particular use of his land, than that another should be deprived of the beneficial
use of his property altogether.
The use of land by the proprietor is not therefore an absolute right, but qualified
and limited by the higher right of others to the lawful possession of their property
He must abandon that mode of using his property, or be held responsible for all
damages resulting thereform.
Conflicting Principle of strict liability (Hay case) v. Negligence law (Losee)
Rests upon the principle, founded in public policy, that the safety of property generally
is superior in right to a particular use of a single piece of property by its owner
Some judges want to apply strict liability but they feel they cannot because the
negligence principle emerged.
Indiana Harbor v American Cyanamid:
46
Issue: who should be liable- the manufacturer or the shipper of the material? If this
qualifies as an Ultra hazardous material then strict liability applies and if not, then
negligence applies.
One who stores or transports ultra-hazardous material is held strictly liable. In this case,
D did not transport material.
Posner: strict liability does not apply based on Restatement 520 of the 6 factors.
The harm occurred not because of the substance, but because someone was negligent.
Restatement 520:
One who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability for
harm...resulting from the activity, although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent
the harm
In determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous section 520 listed six
factors for consideration:
(1) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or chattels of
others
(2) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great
(3) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care
(4) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage
(5) inappropriateness if the activity to the place where it is carried on
(6) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes
Posner:
47
The be and end all of tort law is create system of incentive to encourage the most
beneficial behavior. Concludes from this case that since the accident was caused by
negligence, we do not need strict liability
If negligence is good enough then we do not need strict liability, negligence is an
adequate deterrence
526: note 4 and note 6
Examples of why courts might apply strict liability to folks involved in dangerous
activities
Goals of Strict Liability: J. King
Deterrence
o Problematic as rationale for Strict Liability (contra Posner)
o For non-negligent Defendant, Strict Liability = ineffective inducement
o Over-deterrence can lead to riskier alternatives
Loss Spreading
Administrative Efficiency
Fairness (aka Corrective Justice)
Modern Product Liability
Emeregence of Modern Product Liability Law Topics for Discussion:
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.
Plaintiff bought a Buick for a dealer. The Dealer received the car from the
manufacturer
The vehicle suddenly collapsed and ejected Plaintiff out of the vehicle
Manufacture only has a duty of care to the immediate purchaser
o The immediate purchaser was the dealer not the Plaintiff
Privity of contract: confine the duty that was own to someone who you had a
contractual relationship with.
Manufacture and Plaintiff did not have privity (a contractual relationship w/ each
other) =No Liability (No duty to the purchaser)
o Exception: Products that are imminently dangerous (Cardozo: anything
that causes danger if it is negligently made)- Cardozos interpretation
vastly broaden the scope of imminently dangerous products.
Poisons
Explosives
Rule: No liability w/o privity unless it is imminently dangerous product
Warranty Law: Is a hybrid theory (Contract & Tort)
Seller breached a promise of a product that was expected by a consumer
(contract)
Allows compensation for injuries from product (Tort)
48
terms
50
1) defendant is innocent and acted reasonably (contradiction) you cannot make someone
act more reasonable if they are already acting reasonably. (strict liability is contradictory)
2) trying to make people behave more reasonably but they may not have that ability
(unrealistic goal)
3) Idea of over deterrence. You may drive people to do something that is even more
dangerous
Strict liability is okay when negligence is hard to prove
Goal of strict liability: J. King
Loss distribution (spreading)- a lot of people take on the injury is a lot more effective.
Strict liability is more efficient- no trial
Fairness- (corrective justice) negligence you would have to prove that someone is wrong,
whereas, here in strict liability you do not have to prove who is wrong and in strict
liability between 2 innocent parties it is fair to impose strict liability on the party that gets
benefits from it.
(put notes from phil and medical malpractice)
Products liability:
1916- most famous Cardozo opinion
MacPherson v Buick Motor co:
Buick was resold. Bought car from dealer who bought it from Buick. Plaintiff was
injured when the wheel was shattered. He tried to sue Buick in negligence
Whether the defendant owed a duty of care to anyone besides the immediate purchaser
(who is the dealer-even though the dealer was not going to drive the car)
Whether manufacturer should have reasonably foreseen the injury? Buick should be able
to foresee danger if the car was poorly made.
Problem of privity of contract. This is understood to confine the duty to someone you had
a contract with. You would have to have a contract. (no liability from the manufacturer to
the purchaser because no contract between them- you could not sue the manufacturer
because there was no duty). (winterbottom case)
Exemption: if a product was imminently dangerous
No liability without privity unless a product was imminently dangerous like poisons,
explosives etc
51
Thomas v Winchester:
Negligently labeling of poison
Manufacturer sold it to druggist, druggist sold to purchaser. Manufacturer was held liable
because the product was imminently dangerous
Devlin v Smith:
Negligent building of scaffold. Sold it to painter. Painters workers were injured.
Manufacturer was liable. he knew that the scaffold if improperly constructed was a most
dangerous trap
Statler case:
Exploding coffee urn. Sold it to the jobber, who sold it to a hotel. Plaintiff injured. Sued
manufacturer and won because if it is improperly made, it could be a danger to the
consumer
Cardozo:
Anything that puts purchaser at risk becomes an imminently dangerous product.
Anything that can injury the consumer can be dangerous. The consumer can bring a
negligence suit against the manufacturer.
Negligence theory is still used and yet the law kept evolving. This is seen in warranty
law: warranty is a form of strict liability (food and drink then extended) part contract and
part tort theory- seller breached a promise to provide a product that was promised. The
defendant provides compensation for injury.
Warranty law:
Part of the law of sales. Deals with the expectation of consumers and promises that are
implicit when products are sold. Problem w warranty law is that it is hard to extend
protection to people beyond the contract (privity problem)
Warranty law overcame this problem that said the warranty ran from manufacturer to
consumer. Disclaimer problem allows to get away from liability so courts started to get
rid of the disclaimers
Consumers can proceed under negligence in Macpherson and warranty law.
Strict tort liability for dangerous products:
Escola v Coca Cola bottling:
Waitress was handling bottle of coke that exploded in her hand
Expert witness says that bottles are infallible
J, Traynor:
(negligence) Res ipsa case: the bottle would not have exploded unless someone was not
negligent
The plaintiff was not contributory negligence
52
53
54
Negligence-defect means the manufacturer should have reasonably made the product
safer but did not
Strict liability- defect in the product holds strict product liability
Product liability should focus on the nature of the product not the behavior of the
manufacturer- this is important bc if you focus on the conduct then you are asking a
negligence question
Strict liability for products is stricter than negligence
Manufacturing defect:
A manufacturing defect is when something goes wrong during the manufacturing process.
When one of the products is different than other products on assembly line
Proof of this is fact specific.
Design defect:
The concept of the product is flawed. The way it was conceived and designed is a
problem. Go back to the engineers of the product. It is more complicated
Take the product and give it to the jury to decide whether it is defective. The point is that
this is not the approach instead courts have devised tests and have juries use the tests to
see if there is a design defect.
The consensus view is that there must be a test and should be on the product NOT on the
conduct of the defendant. Problem is which test should be used. This is supposed to be
strict liability in order for that you should look only at the product and in order to answer
that question you need a test
Design defect:
2 tests:
1. Consumer Expectation test
2. Risk benefit analysis (hand formula)
a. imputed knowledge test
b. reasonable alternative design
Soule v General Motors:
A womans ankle was injured. She said the car was defective.
Consumer expectation test:
The product is defective if it was more dangerous than the consumer expected.
Polices the bargain. Asks whether the plaintiff got the product that the plaintiff reasonably
expected to get. (Dangers that the consumer expects i.e. a knife is intrinsically
dangerous) What the reasonable consumer would expect. It polices the bargain.
55
The plaintiff wanted the consumer expectation test. Send issue of defect to jury on that
test basis.
Consumer expectation tests should be abolished according to defendants or limited. If
you are going to keep it, do not use it in a case where technical questions of causation are
at issue.
California has narrowed the range of choice for plaintiff. In many cases, the plaintiff
cannot choose the consumer expectation test. It was ruled that it was okay to use it in
certain situations. Ex. If a car explodes at a stop light, if when you are leaving the
dealership the tire gets messed up. So not much room for consumer expectation in at least
automobile case. Consumer test does not require expert evidence like in risk benefit
where plaintiff is at a disadvantage by engaging in a debate w an expert. Consumer
expectation is plaintiff friendly.
Barker case:
Risk- benefit analysis. Risk benefit has to do with the design decisions that were made.
But the court said this puts a heavy burden on the plaintiff. It shifts the burden of proof to
the defendant. If they chose risk benefit, all the plaintiff has to prove is that the design of
the product caused the injury. Then the defendant has to do the risk benefit analysis and
to prove that the benefits outweigh the risk. If they fail to do it, then it triggers strict
liability.
Plaintiff choses which tests he or she wants to use. When they brought in the risk benefit
analysis, they said that it is plaintiff friendly.
Purpose of CET vs RBA: (get these from presentation and the quote) (also put it
notes from phil)
CET:
- Police the bargain
- Make sure expectations of the parties are vindicated
Camacho case:
Motorcycle had no crash bars to protect his legs when he got into a car accident. It was
available on other products not his. Vehicle has to be crashworthiness. The plaintiff
unlike the plaintiff in Soule did not argue for CET. He wanted RBA (risk benefit) and
defendant wanted CET (consumer expectation test). If you use CET in this case, the
plaintiff will lose because he selected the motorcycle and knew the risks. The court
agreed that risk benefit should be used. Referred to the 7 factors in the Ortho case. Use
the risk benefit analysis as to whether it was defective or not on a product like a
motorcycle.
If your focus is on just to police the bargains then you are only focusing on the parties not
others. The concern of the court is that if the concept of defect imports assumption of the
56
risk into it, then these cases will never get to the jury. Court is saying is lets separate
those concepts- defects and assumption of the risk. Dont conflate those two questions. If
you conflate then you will never get the risk reduction that we want. The defendant will
never be liable because the danger is so obvious.
Review
Strict Liability in Tort.
- Theory first announced in Traynors concurring opinion in Escola case
o Became important after Greenman decision
- Section 402A- Second restatement addresses strict loiability
o Additional condition unreasonably dangerous
o P has to prove two things. Looks a lot like negligence law (Reasonable
test)
New
Issues of Coverage in Product Liability Cases
Is a bystander or pedestrian covered?
- At first it seemed bystanders werent covered under product liability because they
didnt partake in the transaction itself
- Then courts realized they should be covered
- Ex: Elmor case (1969) in notesBystander cannot inspect the product and protect
themselves
What about used products? (2nd hand purchaser)
- The expectations of a 2nd hand purchaser are different, dont expect a car to be
free from defects
- Retailer doesnt guarantee product safety for used products as it does for new
products
o This is just in terms of tort lawwarranties and state laws may give the
2nd hand purchaser other options
Notes Continued on Defects
Three types of Defect in Product Liability Cases (Slide on PowerPoint)
1. Manufacturing Defect
2. Design Defect
3. Defective Warnings or Instructions
Absolute liability is really not recognized. Example: Cannot sue a knife manufacturer
because you are cut with a knife
A defect in a product gives rise to Strict Liability.
Defect is Crucial in this area of law
What is a defect?
- Somewhere between absolute liability and Negligence
Negligence- defect means the manufacturer should have reasonably made the product
safer but did not
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5. How does Chamallas view the connectionsand differencesbetween civil rights and
tort law? What does she view as the unique and essential contribution tort law can make
in the miscarriage, stillbirth, and sterilization cases and in cases based on the parentinfant relationship?
Jason- 1 perceived dif between civ rights and tort law- civil rights layout what govt cant
do to ppl. Tort law- positive rights. Contracts/duty. Civ rights can be used to help courts
with NIED cases though. Can be used to promote equality in private relationships.
Constitutional law can be used to enforce rights that dont come from contract
relationships. Sterilization procedure cases is a good example. Court gave attention to
civil rights in this case. Medical professions, when dealing with reproductive health, have
a heightened duty to their patients.
Soule v. General Motors
Womans ankles injured, she claimed the design was to blame.
History in Cal:
In Cal, in the Greenman decision, was the consumers expectations test. Product was
defective if it was more dangerous than they would have expected when buying a
product. Police the bargain. Cronin used that test as well in 1972
1978- Barker case- There are some kinds of products where the consumer has no
reasonable expectation of product. New option for P- risk benefit analysis. Puts a heavy
burden on P. Has to prove the risks of the design outweigh the benefits. Thats a lot to ask
of a layperson. Burden shifted to P. P can choose consumer expectations test or risk
benefit. If they choose risk benefit all P has to prove is if design of the product caused the
injury. Then burden shifts to D to prove benefits of design outweighed the risks. If D cant
prove this, it is unreasonably dangerous.
Soule:
P elected Consumer Expectations test. Court said this was fine.
Case gets to Cal Sup Ct. Strong argument by D-- Consumer expectations test should be
abolished. That is how they design products, there will always be benefits, they will
always weigh them. 2nd arg by D- if you keep consumer expectations- dont use it in a
crashworthiness case/ complex product/ or issues of causation are an issue.
Soule decided- we arent abolishing CET. There are some cases where it is okay to use it.
It is okay to use it when the everyday experience of the proiducts users permits a
conclusion that a products design violated safety standards. If it promotes an inference
that it works below standards. Not okay to use this test when youre dealing with a
complex product which may cause injury in a way that does not engage its users
reasonable minimum assumptions about safe performance. p. 575
A car is a complex product. The rule for CET is narrow. Footnote 3- p575.
Why is this bad from a Ps point of view?
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Critical question: RBA has nothing to do with the bargain. Does it focus on the product
rather than the conduct?
CET gives us the benefit of the bargain
Camacho v. Honda Motors
P had severe leg injuries, sued Honda because they didnt have crash bars to protect his
leg.
By this time, crashworthiness was well-settled. Veh has to have safety features to protect
the occupant.
P did not argue for a CET. P wanted RBA. D wanted CET.
Why did this switch?
Lauren- Ds argument looked like assumption of the risk
Engel- what were ps expectations for buying a bike with not crash bars. P doesnt have
a leg to stand on Ha. You picked this one, thats the bargain you made, no defect.
How does the court resolve this?
Court agreed RBA should be used. Referred to a 7 factor test in Ortho test. The specific
test is not as interesting as the fact that for a motorcycle you should use RBA whether it
was a defect or not.
Engel- if you are policing the bargain, its not just the purchaser protected. What about
people that ride with you? A car endangers people riding with you and pedestrians. If you
focus on policing the bargain, you are only worried about the parties in the contract that
made the exchange.
Engel- important words about assumption of risk.
If defect imports assumption of risk into it the case will never get to the jury. If the
danger is so obvious that the idea of defect will be shaped by the notion that the
consumer knew the risk and agreed to it. Court is saying lets separate defect from
assumption of risk. These are two dif questions. First you ask if it is defective, for this
you use RBA. Next, did P assume Risk? Should his recovery be reduced? Maybe. If you
conflate them, you will never get the reduction we want in society, will always have
dangerous products. Will have products where everyone can see how dangerous they are.
P may have been blameworthy, but not the same was whether the product was defective.
Review:
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Product liability comes down to the question of defect. The plaintiff has to prove that
product harmed consumer because it was defective3 kinds of defects:
1. Manufacturing defect: the particular product in question does not match up
w the other products of its kind. Doesnt conform to its own specifications.
2. Design defect- the engineers who conceived of it made the product dangerous
to the consumer. How do we tell to determine whether product is defective?
What is the test?
2 tests:
a. consumer expectation test- 402 (a) restatement.. was the product more
dangerous than a consumer would have expected when purchasing the
product? It polices the bargain.
b. risk benefit analysis- does not police bargain. More of a deterrence
policy that tries to induce the most cost effective behavior on the part of
the manufacturer. Come up w a product that is safe in comparison to the
benefit it.
Product liability is different than negligence because it looks at the product not the
conduct of the manufacturer. In theory, product liability should look at product itself not
the conduct. Risk benefit test is used to assess whether that product has a defect or not.
CET (consumer expectation test) vs Risk benefit analysis:
By 1978 Barker case- consumer expectation alone is not sufficient bc a consumer
sometimes has no reasonable expectations about the products dangerousness. Risk benefit
is another test for the plaintiff.
Shift the burden of proof on defendant so not too burdensome on the plaintiff.
Plaintiff just have to show that design caused injury. 2 factors of barker:
1-Plaintiff choses between CET and risk benefit
2-And burden shifts to defendant
Soule case:
Court said plaintiff should not be able to choose between CET or risk benefit. No
CET for complex products where consumers have no expectations such automobiles.
- This was a victory for defendant. They prefer risk benefit test.
Camocho case: case in which the plaintiff chose the motorcycle without the crash bars
and sued Honda by saying the product is defective. The plaintiff wanted risk benefit
analysis because the plaintiff did not want to choose CET because that is what he
expected to get. Court agreed that risk benefit analysis should be used. Risk reduction in
society. Policing the bargain is not enough because other people can be exposed to that
risk. When someone gets injured, others suffer as well. Labeling this motorcycle
defective there is still the question of assumption of the risk. If you find that plaintiff
assumed the risk, his recovery will be reduced.
Product w an open and obvious dangerous can still be defective
a. imputed knowledge test- Philips case: previously endorsed CET test. But now they
wanted to try something different. This is the case involving the fiber board that
was being sanded by the P w the sanding machine made by D. the question is
whether the machine was defective or not?
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New test applied: if D sold the product knowing the risk involved. Strict liability is
imposed. Imputing knowledge of the risk to the seller. Constructive knowledge:
Imagine that the seller knows of the dangers of the product then ask whether
seller is reasonable to go ahead and sell the product.
How is it difference than negligence: the key difference is that the imputed knowledge
does not ask what the manufacturer should have known. Negligence looks at
conduct. Imputed knowledge says lets imagine that he D knows we do not care
that he knows or should have known. The question is once this knowledge is
assigned to you, then the test goes would that manufacturer be reasonable to
make the product available.
Negligence only looks at reasonableness of the actual D. imputed knowledge looks at
imaginary D that went ahead and marketed even though product was dangerous.
Imputed knowledge only looks at product and says this product seems to have danger so
lets ask an imaginary D to see if D was reasonable. Doesnt look at what the
actual D knows or should have known.
When might it be reasonable to market a product that you know is dangerous?
- The manner of injury may be so fortuitous and the chances of injury occurring so
remote that it is reasonable to sell the product despite the danger.
- The cost of the change necessary to alleviate the danger may be so great that the
article would be priced out of the market and no one would buy it even though it
was of high utility.
The manufacturer can control the safety of the product. Imputed knowledge not
widely used anymore. Courts still tend to draw on it for certain products.
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More warnings are not always better for cost benefit analysis. Concern is warning
pollution- cost benefit analysis is not the best way. The cost of adding warning is always
minimal. Also the problem of products whose dangers are common knowledge. Ex: bottle
of tequila. Courts say this is common knowledge. You do not have to warn against that.
Emery case:
Whether you have to warn that marshmallows will expand in children- this is a jury
question. Many people do not know dangers of marshmallows expanding.
When is warning required?
Negligence standard- when danger is foreseeable- anything that is foreseeable needs
warning.
Reasonable foreseeability of misuse if required, but you do not have to warn about
everything. Too much detail is not a good thing.
Causation problems:
Suppose that Hood never read the owners manual or read the decals on the machine and
the court found that warnings were defective (inadequate)
What is the argument that the D can make even though P did not read the manual?
This is a But for problem- D loses on the defect issue but D can still win on the causation
issue. Argument for D is that even if the warnings were terrific, but for the defectiveness
of the warnings, P would have been injured anyways because he did not read the
warnings anyways. D can still argue that a better warning would not have made a
difference.
Some courts have a heeding presumption meaning that if the warning would be good
then the P would have read the warning. D would have to show that p would not have
heeded it even if we had better warnings because P is stubborn, etc.... it shifts the burden
of proof to the D.
When would have a warning made a difference? Would the consumer have paid attention
if the warning was good?
What if the defect is not in the product but the consumer? Ex: allergies. So drugs are safe
but too some consumers the drug is harmful to them because of the way the drug reacts w
a few consumers?
The answer is reasonable foreseeable. If the atypical allergic reaction is foreseeable, then
the manufacturer has to warn against it but do not have to change the design. Design is
not defective but you do have to warn about it.
To what extent is it okay to take a poorly designed product and cure that with words that
point out the risk to the consumer?
i.e. what if you produce a car called the death trap so it has every risk known and it is
really cheap. They warn against dangers. Did the words cure the defective design?
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No. bad policy to allow this type of injury to occur. Risk preferring people are not only
harming themselves but harming others as well. tension of reducing injuries and goal of
policing bargain
Martinez caseif there is a safer way to make the product, then the manufacturer might be liable despite
a warning. Risk reduction- third restatement comment L agrees with this. If you can
reasonably make the product safer, then you have to do that. Chose this over a warning.
State v Karl:
A drug manufacturer asks this court to adopt the learned intermediary doctrine as an
exception to the general duty of manufacturers to warn consumers of the dangerous
propensities of their product.
We decline to adopt this doctrine
Facts:
Gellner was prescribed the drug Propulsid by her primary care physician, Dr. Wilson.
Propulsid manufactured and distributed by Jansen. Mrs. Gellner died suddenly on the 3rd
day after she began taking Propulsid.
Mrs. Gellners estate filed a products liability/ medical malpractice action against Janssen
and Dr. Wilson. Janssen filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that under the
learned intermediary doctrine, it had fulfilled its duty to warn by providing warnings
regarding Propulsid to Dr. Wilson. The circuit court denied Jannsens motion by order
entered on June 2006
the learned intermediary doctrine provides an exception to the general rule imposing a
duty on manufacturers to warn consumers about the risks of their products.
a drug manufacturer is excused from warning each patient who receives the product
when the manufacturer properly warns the prescribing physician of the products
dangers. Prescribing physician or healthcare providers, who acts as a learned
intermediary between the manufacturer and the ultimate consumer and assumes
responsibility for advising individual patients of the risks associated with the drug
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I has also been suggested that the rule is made necessary by the fact that it is ordinarily
difficult for the manufacturer to communicate directly w the consumer.
Drug manufacturers now directly advertise products to consumers on the radio, tv,
internet, billboards on public transportations, and in magazines
The supreme court of NJ opined and we agree that such advertising obviates (avoids)
each of the premises upon which the doctrine rests:
1) norman Rockwell image of the family doctor no longer exists. Informed consent
requires a patient based decision rather than the paternalistic approach
2) physicians have considerably less time to inform patients of the risks and benefits of a
drug
3) having spent 1.3 billion on advertising, drug manufacturers can hardly be said to lack
effective means to communicate directly with patients
Exception: where the manufacturer knows or should know that a physician will not be in
a position to provide an adequate warning:
d) a prescription drug or medical device is not reasonably safe due to inadequate
instructions or warnings if reasonable instructions or warnings regarding foreseeable risks
of harm are not provided to:
1) prescribing and other health care providers who are in a position to reduce the
risks of harm in accordance with the instructions or warnings or
2) the patient when the manufacturer knows or has reason to know that health care
providers will not be in a position to reduce the risks of harm in accordance with
the instructions or warnings
Finally, because it is the prescription drug manufactures who benefit financially from
the sales of prescription drugs and possess the knowledge regarding potential
harms
Public policy dictates that the manufacturer should warn the ultimate user of the
harmful effects of its pharmaceuticals since it involves a persons health
Courts are increasingly motivated to protect the consumer, and require manufacturers
to warn more than just the physician
The burden should be on the one producing health care, not the one consuming it
We now hold tht under West Virginina products liability law, manufacturers of
prescription drugs are subject to the same duty to warn consumers about the risks
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What is the standard to know if a warning is adequate- warning under the defendants
proposed standard a warning is adequate if it mentions all the risk that are known to the
D.
Do we impute what was known at the time of manufacture or about the warnings that we
now know about. Both parties want to impute knowledge. One wants it at the time of
manufacture (d) or what the manufacturer knows now of the product. (dangers were not
known until after). Ex. Manufacturers did not know about the risk of asbestos after a long
time.
If a consumer is injured before defect is known, who should bear injuries (the
manufacture is liable). If no warning against danger, the product defective so product
liability should apply.
Holding: t1 (time of manufacture or distribution) knowledge gets imputed by the
manufacturer (what they should reasonably have known at the time of manufacturer.
Unfair to hold manufacturers liable for unforeseeable risk. Deterrence goal (induce
conduct that is capable of being performed. What a reasonable knew or should have
known).
Old rule was time of trial (what they know now about the product- something that was
once unknown). Loss distribution mentality and induces greater testing and research
(corrective justice they caused the harm so they should be held liable) (deterrence)
Issue: who should bear the cost of injuries between the time the product is distributed and
the time the risk becomes known or reasonably knowable?
S Ct held that that 3rd restatement rejects hindsight approach. Manufacturer has to
perform reasonable testing. Seller is charged with what he reasonably should know by
testing
Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp.: the function of state of the art evidence
in strict products liability.
In Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that
a state of the art defense is unavailable in cases brought under a theory of strict liability
for failure to warn. The court indicated that asbestos producers may be held liable for
their products' harms even if the health hazards of asbestos were unknown and not
discoverable when the products were marketed. In a subsequent case, the New Jersey
court held that state of the art evidence is relevant to whether a product is defective. This
Case Comment examines these different uses of knowledge evidence in the disposition of
products liability cases. It contends that manufacturers should not be held liable for
unknowable risks. The Comment concludes that the state of the art defense establishes a
logical limit on strict liability and promotes efficient resolution of products liability
claims.
Feldman v Lederle:
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The appellate division affirmed, but the New Jersey Supreme Court remanded for
reconsideration in light of its decision in Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 13
ELR 20533, which imposed strict liability for failure to warn of the health risks of
asbestos, regardless of whether the risk was discovered, given the state-of-the art at the
time of the transaction. The appellate division reaffirmed, holding that prescription drugs
are a special category of products for which there is no strict liability for failure to warn
of a side effect not known when the drug was sold.
Defenses:
General Motors Corp. v Sanchez:
Facts: no witnesses. Sanchez 1990 Chevy pickup truck rolled backward w the drivers
side door open pinning Sanchez to the open corral gate in the angle between the open
door and the cab of the truck suffered a broken right arm and damages right knee when
the gate crushed him. He bled to death.
Family sued GM corp. and the dealership that sold the pickup for negligence, products
liability and gross negligence based on a defect in the trucks transmission and
transmission control linkage.
The jury rejected GM theories and found that GM was negligent, the transmission was
defectively designed, and GMs warning was inadequate. The jury also found that
Sanchez was 50 percent responsible for the accident, but the trial court disregarded this
finding. The trial court rendered a judgment for the estate for $8.5 million.
The jury found that Sanchez was 50 percent responsible for his accident. GM argues that
this finding should be applied to reduce its liability for damages whether in negligence or
strict liability.
Comparative fault applies to products liability law.
A later court refused to recognize such a failure as a defense relying on party n to section
402 A of the Restatement Second: contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a
defense when such negligence consists merely in a failure to discover the defect in the
product, or to guard against the possibility of its existence. Assumption of the risk barred
recovery but now you can recover but it is reduced.
Consumer has no obligation to discover or guard against a defect.
What does this mean? Ex: of a consumer who is contributory negligent includes misuse
of a product.
Holding: we hold that a consumer has no duty to discover or guard against a product
defect, but a consumers conduct other than the mere failure to discover or guard against
a product defect is subject to comparative responsibility.
Final exams:
Dec 10-torts 915
Dec 15 contracrs 9
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Beyond products?
Royer v Catholic Medical Center:
New Hampshire high court upheld dismissal of a strict liability suit filed by a patient
against a hospital for the damage he suffered from a defective prosthetic knee that was
implanted in him during surgery at the hospital. Provision of the knee was incidental to
the main purpose of the hospital, which is provision of health service.
Hospital argues that this is a service not a products liability. Negligence law applies
to service but there was no negligence in this case.
Royer underwent total knee replacement surgery at CMC hospital. The prosthetic knee,
provided by CMC, turned out to be defective and had to be replaced by another surgery
two years later. Royer sued the maker of the knee, Dow Corning, but it was in bankruptcy
proceedings, so Royer sued CMC in strict liability. CMC was granted dismissal by the
trial court that found, as a matter of law, that CMC was not engaged in the business of
selling prosthetic devices. Royer appealed.
Affirmed. Under the Restatement of Torts, 402(A), if the defendant merely provides a
service there is no liability absent proof of a violation of a legal duty. New Hampshire
joins with most other courts that have addressed similar cases and finds that a health care
provider that supplies a defective prosthesis is not subject to strict liability. The health
care provider is a service provider. The sale of the device is incidental to the health care
service. CMC is not a seller of goods subject to strict liability for defective products; it is
a service provider.
LIABILITY FOR DEFECTIVE PRODUCTS AND SERVICES:
Service-negligence law
Hybrid transaction- sale of product plus rendering a service: arguable
professional D negligence standard is more likely)
(for
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