The Case for

Human Intelligence (HUMINT)

By Edward J Barr, Esq.

The State of Human Intelligence (HUMINT) in the Department of Defense and

continued CIA Preeminence
Gaps in prewar and post-deployment intelligence resulted from Iraqs fear of and countermeasures to
communications, electronic and photo intelligence collection methodswhich in turn facilitated
deception. The most striking aspect of the Iraq experience may have been the proof that even a Third
World country could implement highly successful denial and deception programs to foil technical
intelligence collection.1
The above quote contained in the Congressional Record (House of Representatives) highlights the
limitations the United States has placed on itself by championing technical means of intelligence
collection at the expense of human intelligence (HUMINT). As a new administration comes in next year
and considers policy and staff changes there will inevitably be some discussion in the media about the
fate of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
Some pundits have suggested that they will face increased scrutiny by any new administration, and
others have gone a step further to suggest eliminating some of their roles. The CIA is an easy whipping
boy, unable to defend itself in the media and without many natural constituents. Yet before changes
are made to CIA policymakers should consider the recent past, and look at the Department of Defenses
(DoD) record in HUMINT, as DoD would be the only US organization capable of taking on some of CIAs
current responsibilities.
The continued overreliance on technology exhibited by US policy makers and defense officials is based
on several factors:
1. The US owns the technological edge over it adversaries and seeks to use this dominance to its
advantage,
2. Technology is viewed as sexy and reliable, as opposed the HUMINT being viewed as slightly
dirty and unreliable. If a satellite takes a picture of a terrorist camp that is proof; if a source
tells a HUMINT collector where a terrorist camp is located, we seek more proof, despite the
experiences of US intelligence highlighted by a four star general in the quote above.
3. Technology translates into jobs for Congressional districts and defense contractors, hence
creating a potent partnership to champion technical intelligence programs.

4. Conversely, investing in human intelligence collection development is time consuming, and

there are limited organic or external constituents demanding that improvements be made.
The last point illustrates the challenge to US intelligence forces that have been heavily engaged in
operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere over the past decade. Consider the woeful state of
linguistic capabilities in the intelligence community. Despite the vital need for Arabic, Dari, and Pushtun
speakers since at least 2001, the US still has a dearth of these critical assets. Yet how can, for example,
Army intelligence allocate the time and money to send an experienced mid-level HUMINT professional
to language training that may take 2 years, when they are critically short of an immediate need for such
professionals in the US CENTRAL COMMAND area of responsibility (AOR)?
While there as been a positive increase in the number of entry level HUMINT professionals being hired
and trained by the HUMINT intelligence community, we have not adequately addressed the language
issue. This caused, and will continue to cause, serious challenges to our operations in theaters of war, as
well as major counterintelligence problems pertaining to homeland security.
Congress has been aware of the shortcomings in the US HUMINT community for years. Janes Security
International noted the lack of focus on HUMINT both before and in the immediate aftermath of the
September 11, 2001 attacks. In an article published that specific day, it noted that key US
leadershiphas been calling for a re-assessment of Washingtons intelligence investment priorities, and
that the chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence said that the US needs to focus
greater attention on increasing its HUMINT capabilities.2 Three years later that committee concluded
that since the intelligence community did not have direct access to manysources, it was exceedingly
difficult to determine source credibility. The Committee also noted (Conclusions 78-82) how the lack of
unilateral HUMINT reporting contributed to intelligence collection gaps leading up to Operation Iraqi
Freedom (OIF).
In the spring of 2005 the U.S. Army published an article by Senator Saxby Chambliss, a member of the
Senate Armed Services and Senate Intelligence Committees. In the piece, Chambliss opined that last
years debate on intelligence reform should have centered on espionage, which we call human
intelligence, or HUMINT, or spying. As we reframe the intelligence debate this year, we need to make
sure HUMINT gets the right emphasis. His direction was clear, as he noted that it is important to
stress that HUMINT is where we need to put our priority of effortit is clear that human intelligence
offers us the best chance to protect ourselves and successfully win the war on terrorism.3
The last point by Senator Chambliss needs amplification. Intelligence fusion (incorporating many
intelligence disciplines into one product) is a stated goal of the intelligence community, as each
intelligence discipline (INT) possesses unique characteristics. Yet in a counterinsurgency (COIN) and
counterterrorism fight, it is the intentions of the enemy that we need to know. The only way to learn
the intentions of the enemy is through HUMINT, or HUMINT enabled technical means. This is because
our enemies in this fight are not as reliant on technology as we are, and are aware that we maintain the

edge in the technological arena. In short, they exploit our lack of HUMINT and overreliance on
technological means.
Despite Congressional awareness of the neglect of the discipline, HUMINT was not mentioned even
once in the 26-page summary of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 prepared
by the Congressional Research Service.4 However, some efforts were undertaken as part of intelligence
reform to improve HUMINT capabilities. Increasing the training pipeline for the organizations that have
authority to conduct HUMINT has helped at the entry level, and the U.S. Defense Department (the
largest member of the intelligence community) creation of the Defense Counterintelligence and
HUMINT Center (DCHC) to organize the DoD CI/HUMINT effort was a positive step. Yet despite these
changes the US is still critically short of qualified HUMINT collectors.
In the military, key positions that should be filled by experienced HUMINT or Counterintelligence officers
(such as the J2X, the military intelligence section that coordinates Counterintelligence and HUMINT) are
often filled by individuals outside the CI/HUMINT field, or those with limited experience for the position.
The military would never place a HUMINT officer in charge of a Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) unnit, yet
habitually place SIGINT and other non-HUMINT/CI professionals in key HUMINT/CI and J2X positions. At
US CENTRAL COMMAND a top intelligence priority for years has been improving CI/HUMINT capabilities;
however, ten years after the terrorist attacks on the US homeland CENTCOM still doesnt receive the
optimal mix of CI/HUMINT personnel in terms of numbers and experience
The above are partial reasons why DoD is not capable of assuming CIAs traditional HUMINT functions.
Another more important reason is organizational focus. In CIA the case officer is the organizations
basic fighting unit, the organizational element that all others support. In the military the intelligence
field (S2/G2/J2) is a supporting element to operations. It is institutionally subordinate to operations
(S2/G2/J2) and other non-intelligence functions. This translates into the senior intelligence officer at
every echelon being outranked by most other disciplines senior officer.
For example, at most Combatant Commands the J2 is a one-star general while the operations officer is a
two-star. Within a S2/G2/J2 office there is a similar hierarchy of intelligence disciplines. Just as the J2
ranks below the senior operations officer the HUMINT personnel in the J2 are a smaller and less
integral part of the J2 than other intelligence personnel (such as analysts). This fact of life is recognized
in promotions. It is nearly impossible for any HUMINT officer to achieve general officer rank, and quite
difficult to reach the grade of Colonel.
In contrast, HUMINT case officers are well represented in CIAs senior leadership. Even if CIA officers
perform other jobs during their career the focus is on supporting the collectors. For CIA HUMINT is THE
priority; therefore it is the only USG organization suited for the lead role. Conversely, HUMINT is not a
priority for DoD, and it wont be, even if it should be.

Combat operations are intelligence driven, frequently by HUMINT. The nature of the enemy, both in
combat and non-combat zones, makes HUMINT the preferred intelligence discipline of choice. Yet
despite periodic rhetoric espousing the criticality of enhancing our HUMINT capabilities, DoD suffers
from a benign neglect that cannot be ignored. HUMINT has been, is, and if trends continue, will be THE
most ignored intelligence discipline in DoD, and the one that will be exploited most by our enemies.
While internal (intelligence community) and external (Congress/Executive) studies have listed lessons
identified, to use the British term, on HUMINT shortfalls, we certainly cant claim any lessons learned.
Case in point: the quote that opened this article was made by General Norman Schwarzkopf in 1992,
commenting on the dearth of HUMINT in Operation Desert Storm.
Copyright by Edward J. Barr
SOURCES:
1. Hi-Tech Versus Human Spying, Congressman Bud Shuster, in Congressional Record, US House
of Representatives, March 2, 1992.
2. Chronic underfunding of US HUMINT plays role in intelligence failures, Clifford Beal, in Janes
Security International, September 11, 2001
3. We have not Correctly Framed the Debate on Intelligence Reform, Senator Saxby Chambliss,
in Parameters, Spring 2005.
4. Ibid.