Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Arellano
Constitutional Law Review I
Atty. Victor Tulalian
Senate vs. Ermita , GR 169777, April 20, 2006
FACTS: In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the
North Rail Project as well as the Garci tapes surfaced. This prompted the
Senate to conduct a public hearing to investigate the said anomalies
particularly the alleged overpricing in the NRP. The investigating Senate
committee issued invitations to certain department heads and military
officials to speak before the committee as resource persons. Ermita
submitted that he and some of the department heads cannot attend the said
hearing due to pressing matters that need immediate attention. AFP Chief
of Staff Senga likewise sent a similar letter. Drilon, the senate president,
excepted the said requests for they were sent belatedly and arrangements
were already made and scheduled. Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464 which
took effect immediately.
EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of
executive departments who in the judgment of the department heads are
covered by the executive privilege; Generals and flag officers of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the
Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege; Philippine National
Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such
other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by
the executive privilege; Senior national security officials who in the
judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by the executive
privilege; and Such other officers as may be determined by the President,
from appearing in such hearings conducted by Congress without first
securing the presidents approval.
The department heads and the military officers who were invited by
the Senate committee then invoked EO 464 to except themselves. Despite
EO 464, the scheduled hearing proceeded with only 2 military personnel
attending. For defying President Arroyos order barring military personnel
from testifying before legislative inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen.
Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from their military posts and were
made to face court martial proceedings. EO 464s constitutionality was
assailed for it is alleged that it infringes on the rights and duties of
Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight
functions in the implementation of laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional.
HELD: The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To determine the
validity of the provisions of EO 464, the SC sought to distinguish Section 21
the question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22, Article VI of
the Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question hour
is discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to
appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation.
Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the
department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege
is subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive
Secretary.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department
heads are implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to such
information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief
Executive, such department heads must give a report of their performance
as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the
separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their
appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires
their appearance is in aid of legislation under Section 21, the appearance
is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.
RULING:
[The Court en banc ISSUED A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
enjoining the respondents from implementing the subpoena. It also
REQUIRED the respondents to COMMENT on the [merits of the] petition.]
YES, a TRO should be issued against the impeachment court to enjoin it
from further implementing the subpoena with respect to the alleged foreign
currency denominated accounts of CJ Corona.
There are two requisite conditions for the issuance of a preliminary
injunction:
(1) the right to be protected exists prima facie, and
(2) the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of that right.
It must be
proven that the violation sought to be prevented would cause an irreparable
injustice.
A clear right to maintain the confidentiality of the foreign currency deposits
of the Chief Justice is provided under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426,
otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act of the Philippines (RA
6426). This law establishes the absolute confidentiality of foreign currency
deposits:
xxx
xxx
xxx
Under R.A. No. 6426 there is only a single exception to the secrecy of
foreign currency deposits, that is, disclosure is allowed only upon the
written permission of the depositor. In Intengan v. Court of Appeals, the
Court ruled that where the accounts in question are U.S. dollar deposits, the
applicable law is not Republic Act No. 1405 but RA 6426. Similarly, in the
recent case of Government Service Insurance System v. 15th Division of the
Court of Appeals, the Court also held that RA 6426 is the applicable law for
foreign currency deposits and not Republic Act No. 1405. xxx.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012
FACTS: In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth member
was added to the JBC as two representatives from Congress began sitting in
the JBC one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate,
with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in
separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the
representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full
vote each. At present, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and
Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC
as representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has
questioned in this petition.
Respondents argued that the crux of the controversy is the phrase a
representative of Congress. It is their theory that the two houses, the
Senate and the House of Representatives, are permanent and mandatory
components of Congress, such that the absence of either divests the term
of its substantive meaning as expressed under the Constitution.
Bicameralism, as the system of choice by the Framers, requires that both
houses exercise their respective powers in the performance of its mandated
duty which is to legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1), Article VIII of the
Constitution speaks of a representative from Congress, it should mean
one representative each from both Houses which comprise the entire
Congress. Respondents further argue that petitioner has no real interest
in questioning the constitutionality of the JBCs current composition. The
respondents also question petitioners belated filing of the petition.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the conditions sine qua non for the exercise of the power
of judicial review have been met in this case; and
(2) Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to perform its functions
with eight (8) members, two (2) of whom are members of Congress, runs
counter to the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution.
HELD:
(1) Yes. The Courts power of judicial review is subject to several limitations,
namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the
exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have
standing to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in
the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result
of its enforcement; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest possible opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be
the very lis mota of the case. Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate
only when these conditions sine qua non are present, especially when the
constitutionality of an act by a co-equal branch of government is put in
issue.
The Court disagrees with the respondents contention that petitioner
lost his standing to sue because he is not an official nominee for the post of
Chief Justice. While it is true that a personal stake on the case is
imperative to have locus standi, this is not to say that only official nominees
for the post of Chief Justice can come to the Court and question the JBC
composition for being unconstitutional. The JBC likewise screens and
nominates other members of the Judiciary. Albeit heavily publicized in this
regard, the JBCs duty is not at all limited to the nominations for the highest
magistrate in the land. A vast number of aspirants to judicial posts all over
the country may be affected by the Courts ruling. More importantly, the
legality of the very process of nominations to the positions in the Judiciary is
the nucleus of the controversy. The claim that the composition of the JBC is
illegal and unconstitutional is an object of concern, not just for a nominee to
a judicial post, but for all citizens who have the right to seek judicial
intervention for rectification of legal blunders.
(2) Yes. The word Congress used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the
Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever
is made on whether the Senate or the House of Representatives is being
referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular representative may be
allowed to sit in the JBC. The seven-member composition of the JBC serves a
practical purpose, that is, to provide a solution should there be a stalemate
in voting.
It is evident that the definition of Congress as a bicameral body
refers to its primary function in government to legislate. In the passage of
laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role of each house
FACTS:
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution,
sponsored by Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed
the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation,
on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)." On June 2,
2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of
this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public
trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by
Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang
Dilangalen, and was referred to the House Committee. The House
Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment
complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on
October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. To date, the
Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in
plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the
Constitution. Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003
of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House
Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment
questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the
doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by
virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review
questions which are not truly political in nature.
Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez vs. The House Of Representatives
Committee On Justice, et.al.
G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011
HELD: The one-year bar rule. Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the
Constitution reads: No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against
the same official more than once within a period of one year.
Petitioner reckons the start of the one-year bar from the filing of the
first impeachment complaint against her on July 22, 2010 or four days
before the opening on July 26, 2010 of the 15th Congress. She posits that
within one year from July 22, 2010, no second impeachment complaint may
be accepted and referred to public respondent.
Following petitioners line of reasoning, the verification of the
complaint or the endorsement by a member of the House steps done prior
to the filing would already initiate the impeachment proceedings.
Contrary to petitioners emphasis on impeachment complaint, what
the Constitution mentions is impeachment proceedings. Her reliance on
the singular tense of the word complaint to denote the limit prescribed by
the Constitution goes against the basic rule of statutory construction that a
word covers its enlarged and plural sense.
The Court, of course, does not downplay the importance of an
impeachment complaint, for it is the matchstick that kindles the candle of
impeachment proceedings. The filing of an impeachment complaint is like
the lighting of a matchstick. Lighting the matchstick alone, however, cannot
light up the candle, unless the lighted matchstick reaches or torches the
candle wick. Referring the complaint to the proper committee ignites the
impeachment proceeding. With a simultaneous referral of multiple
complaints filed, more than one lighted matchsticks light the candle at the
same time. What is important is that there should only be ONE CANDLE
that is kindled in a year, such that once the candle starts burning,
subsequent matchsticks can no longer rekindle the candle.
Under the Rules of the House, a motion to refer is not among those
motions that shall be decided without debate, but any debate thereon is
only made subject to the five-minute rule. Moreover, it is common
parliamentary practice that a motion to refer a matter or question to a
committee may be debated upon, not as to the merits thereof, but only as to
the propriety of the referral. With respect to complaints for impeachment,
the House has the discretion not to refer a subsequent impeachment
complaint to the Committee on Justice where official records and further
debate show that an impeachment complaint filed against the same
impeachable officer has already been referred to the said committee and
the one year period has not yet expired, lest it becomes instrumental in
perpetrating a constitutionally prohibited second impeachment proceeding.
Far from being mechanical, before the referral stage, a period of
deliberation is afforded the House, as the Constitution, in fact, grants a
maximum of three session days within which to make the proper referral.
As mentioned, one limitation imposed on the House in initiating an
impeachment proceeding deals with deadlines. The Constitution states that
[a] verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the
House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution or
endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order
of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee
within three session days thereafter.