To what extent was the quality & morale of ordinary

soldiers the decisive factor in land warfare 1792 1918 ?

INTRODUCTION
The outcome of land warfare is dependent upon the quality & morale of the
soldiers involved in military operations. The efficiency of fighting units
1792-1918 allows battles to be engaged and campaigns to continue in
victory or defeat. As quality and morale decline then ultimate defeat
becomes more likely for a fighting force , however quality and morale is not
the only determinate of military outcomes. One could argue that a crucial
technological edge in weaponry or overwhelming attritional advantage
determine likely success.

THE MIDDLE BIT

QUALITY & MORALE
Quality of fighting for is crucial to military success and the question is
how to improve your fighting units
One method is to be highly trained professionals (British model 17921916 of small volunteer force)
Another method is to be a huge army where sheer numbers become
more crucial than training (Conscription 1793 -1918 )
Another method is the Reservist system originated by the Prussians
1864-71) to have a large army but well trained
Soldiers often perform better for certain commanders that inspire
them (Napoleon & Lee ) or who lead them to success (Haig)
Soldiers perform better if they have a motivation to fight that they can
relate to (French Nationalism 1793-1815 & The Cause- CSA , The
Union- USA 1861-1865)
Men can also undergo War Fever 1914 (Nationalism + Militarism +
Social Darwinism)
All the above combines to create Morale a fighting units
determination to continue the struggle whether victorious or defeated.
Victory can multiply good morale (Years of Legend 1804-1809 &
CSA 1861-3)

 Defeat or set backs can produce a determination to continue (First day

Somme 1916)

TECHNOLOGY

However good morale is , a clear advantage in technology could

become crucial as a decisive factor
During the period 1793-1815 no army had a significant technological
edge in weaponry ( cutting & projectile)
Morale was crucial with equality of weaponry (Wellington comment
about Napoleon being worth 40,000 men)
1815-1914 saw a period of weapon development (rifling)
An imbalance of weaponry could now be used to compensate for
differences in quality/morale of soldiers (Civil War 1861-5 where
CSA troops /Generals were better than USA but USA had better
weaponry ( death of CSA Jackson 1862 or Gettysburg 1863)
Industrial death 1914 -18 cared little for the enthusiasm of the British
volunteers (Somme 1916) and the Sub-Machine gun gave a major
advantage to the elite German Stormtroopers (Operation St Michael
1918)
Ultimately it could be argued that weapons are only as good as the
soldiers using them (Superb British musketry Waterloo 1815 / CSA
victory at Fredericksburg 1862 / Misuse of Tank Somme 1916)

ATTRITION (LOGISTICS)
Soldiers could have very high morale (Napoleonic French) be inspired
(CSA under Lee) or gripped by war fever (British volunteers 191415).
Soldiers could compensate for any technological deficits in weaponry
(fastest with the mostest Sherman USA) but one could argue that
attrition is the decisive factor (progressive degradation)
Attrition increasingly became the dominant strategy in determining
the outcome of military conflict
The effect of 1812 Russia on Napoleon led to the 1813-14 defeat by
attrition
Brilliant CSA victories 1861-2 were eventually nullified by the
Anaconda Plan of the USA after the turning point 1863

 1915-17 the Germans caused more casualties , were not invaded &
spent less on killing rate per soldier than the Allies yet still lost
(Chantilly agreement 1915)

CONCLUSION
Quality and morale of ordinary soldiers is of course of vital
importance to any military effort. However , on there own the
qualities that contribute to the willingness to continue the struggle
may not be enough. A decisive edge in weapon technology may
hold the key once an imbalance occurs 1850s-1914.The real
crucial element could be attrition , the progressive degradation of
even a well motivated fighting force.