The Significance of the Aesthetic in Postmodern Architectural Theory

Author(s): Ritu Bhatt

Source: Journal of Architectural Education (1984-), Vol. 53, No. 4 (May, 2000), pp. 229-238
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. on behalf of the Association of Collegiate Schools of
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The Significanceof the Aestheticin PostmodernArchitecturalTheory

Ritu Bhatt,Massachusetts
Instituteof Technology

has radiRecentpostmodernsuspicionof truth,objectivity,andrationality

to
of architectureandits relationship
callytransformedourunderstanding
politics.Inthis paper,I drawuponHilaryPutnam(1981), NelsonGoodman
(1968), andSatyaMohanty(1997), whoproposea sophisticatedaccountof
themas
the "hard"
sciences, andby interpreting
objectivityby reexamining
complexsocialpractices.Buildinguponthese writers,I arguethatoursubjectiveexperiencesof architectureare rational.As an alternativeto both
modernessentialismandpostmodernskepticism,this paperdefendsa
of architectureto political
theoryof objectivitythatexplainsthe relationship
powerwithoutabandoningrationalthought.

AND FOUCAULT'SNOTIONSOF SURJEREMYBENTHAM'SPANOPTICON

veillance are familiar themes postmodern architectural theorists in-

voke when they deal with questions of space, power, and

relationship
subjectivity.'They do so to problematizearchitecture's
to politics. Postmodernistsarguethat modernismhas concerned
itself exclusivelywith the formaland visualaspectsof architecture
and has ignoredarchitecture'srole in furtheringpoliticalagendas.
Thus, insteadof following"visible"and explicitlypoliticalsymbols
of power,they seekthe invisiblemeansby which buildingsembody
powerrelationships.
This interestin invisiblepoliticshas coincidedwith the disseminationof postmodern"theory"throughjournalssuchasAssemblageandANYas well as throughnumerousbooksand anthologies.
Postmodernismin theory, however, has a different connotation
frompostmodernismin practice.In architectural
practice,the term
has come to denote the pseudo-historicalrevival
"postmodernism"
of the 1980s. RobertVenturi introducedthis populist rhetoricin
and Conarchitectural
practicethroughhis publications,Complexity
tradiction(1966) and Learningfrom Las Vegas(1972); later, the
terms"postmodern"
and "PoMo"enteredcommondiscoursewhen
were
they
popularizedby CharlesJencksin TheLanguageof PostModernArchitecture(1977). On the other hand, in architectural
theory,postmodernismrepresentsa critiqueof the pseudo-revival
of postmodern architecture.Postmoderntheory emerged in art,
aesthetics,and architecturewith the publicationof Hal Foster'sThe
Anti-Aesthetic(1983). This theoryquestionsthe categoriesof aesthetics,truth,and rationalityand alignsitselfwith structuralistand
poststructuralisttheories in philosophy and literarycriticism. In
architecturalhistory and theory, this shift in thinking coincided
with the translationof ManfredoTafuri'sinfluentialArchitecture
and Utopia:Designand CapitalistDevelopment(1980). Tafuricriti-

Journal ofArchitectural Education, pp. 229-238

@ 2000 ACSA, Inc.

229

cized modernismfor its complicitywith capitalismand for the operativerole "theory"playedin legitimizingthe modernagendasof
architects.His questioning of the easy translationof modernist
"theory"into practiceunderminedthe credenceof theoryproduced
by practicingarchitects.2Since the 1980s, architecturaltheoryhas
been producedmore often by architecturaltheoriststhan by practicing architects.3
More recently,a numberof books, most particularlythose
writtenby feministsand deconstructivisttheorists,haveintroduced
a rich and provocativedebateby givingspaceto issuesas diverseas
sexuality,power,representation,gender,politics,and domesticity.4
They arguethat architectureconstructsand is constructedby politics, pointingout how the metaphorof "fashion"is repressedin the
constructionof the modern movement,how the idea of a "pure"
modernspaceconcealsand fetishizessexuality,and how ideasfor a
feministarchitectureaffectarchitecturalpractice.Perhapsit is unfairto generalizeabout such a diversityof essayistsand theoristsas
the "postmodernists"
becausemost of them arguefrom particular
and
hold differing viewpoints. Yet they share
subject positions
claimsabout the relevanceof truth, rationality,and objectivityin
theirwritings,and these call for a closerexamination.
The adventof postmodernismhas broughtabout a shift in
emphasis from object to subject, revealingunintended political
motivationsin the constitutionof knowledge.In rejectingan understandingof architectureas object,postmoderncriticsarguethat
is not simplya platformthat accommodatesthe view"architecture
ing subject,but rathera viewingmechanismthat producesthe subject."5BeatriceColomina, in her essayentitled, "The Split Wall:
Domestic Voyeurism,"analyzesphotographsand drawingsof the
interiors of houses designed by Le Corbusier and Adolf Loos.
Colominashowshow the imagesof idealized,pure utopianspaces
concealand enablethe domesticationthat occursinside. She illustratesher claim that buildingsparticipatein producingdomesticated subjects by showing how they reinforceimages of female
subjects as vulnerable,mysterious,and desirablesexual objects.
Similarly,in anotheressayentitled"Untitled:The Housingof Gender"MarkWigleydiscussesthe complicityof spatialorderwith the
patriarchalauthoritydescribedin Alberti'swritings.Wigley argues
that "placeis not simply a mechanismfor controlling sexuality.
Rather,it is the control of sexualityby systemsof representation
that producesplace."'Accordingto Wigley,representation
hasspecific ideologicalfunctions.He statesthat, "theeffectof the maskis
that spaceappearsto precederepresentationand thereforeassumes
a specificideologicalfunction.'"7
He also questionsthe concept of
as
a
construct
of
"rationality"
knowing. In criticizing"rationality"
Bhatt

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and "order"he claimsthat "thebuildingmasqueradesas order.Order itselfbecomesa mask.This maskof orderuses figuresof rationalityto concealthe irrationalityof both individualsand society."
Accordingto Wigley, "rationalityis literallyaddedto the building
as the representationof an effacementof representation."8
Such theoreticalargumentshavenot only destabilizedarchitecture; they have completely unsettled the way we experience
buildingsand urbanspaces.While it is importantthat traditional
ideasof architectureand spacebe problematized,it is
"essentialist"
crucial
to examinethe methodologiesat playin the investiequally
I examinepostmodernmethodologiesand argue
Herein,
gation.
that both recognitionof the cognitiverole of our experienceof architectureand understandingof objectivityarecriticalto the modern-postmoderndebate.'My aim hereis to contestthe postmodern
critiquesleveledagainstobjectivityand show how broadernotions
of rationalityarefundamentalto architecturaltheory.

Experienceof Architectureand Cognition

Postmodernistscriticizethe moderntheorizationof the experience
of architecture.They arguethatpositivistepistemologyhasreduced
our experienceof architectureto factsand properties,by discounting its emotional,moral,and ethicalcontent. In the positivistobject-subjectsplit, the experienceof architecturehas been narrowly
determinedby functionalcoordinatesand acceptedas a sourceof
objectiveknowledge.'"This is becauseits objectivityand its truth
can be logicallydeducedor empiricallyverified.On the otherhand,
our emotionalresponsesto architectureand our preferencefor certain aestheticvalueshavecome to representa purelysubjectivedomainthatcannotbe groundedin reason.Subjectivepreferences,for
this reason,havenot beenacceptedas a legitimatesourceof knowledge." In the modernistobject-subjectsplit, the full cognitivepotentialof ourexperienceof architecturehasremainedunrecognized,
and it has been perceivednarrowlyas pure,visual,and abstract,devoid of anysubjectivedimension.RobertVenturi'sfamousobservation thatmodernismhasreducedtheVitruviantriadto "commodity
plusfitnessequalsdelight"clearlyexemplifiesthe instrumentaldefinitionsof knowledgeassociatedwith modernism.12
Furthermore,the separationof experiencefromits moraland
ethical content and the separationof architecturefrom its social,
political,andculturalcontexthavecreatedan autonomousspacefor
architecture.Postmodernistscontend that a visionaryand autonomous imageof modernarchitecturehasbeenachievedby a complex
maneuver.The objectis firstdecontextualizedfrom the specificity
May2000 JAE53/4

of its social, political, cultural, and physical context, and then

as a "visualrepresentation"
recontextualized
to be judgedon specifiaesthetic
terms.13
The
iconic image of Le.
and
formalist
cally
Corbusier'sVilla Savoyeas representingmodern ideasof space is
one such exampleof how an image of autonomousarchitectural
form has been createdand legitimizedby a varietyof mechanisms.
This reductionof architectureto an imagehas allowedsuch
aestheticpropertiesas formalunity, truth, and emphasison space
to be achievedthrough rationalmeans,which therebyhave been
perceivedto haveinternationalapplicationto effectsocial change.
Such an easyconflationof the rationalityof the autonomousarchitecturalformwith utopiansocialagendas,postmodernistscontend,
has helped mask the operationof ideologicalforces,such as those
of capitalismand colonialism.For example,the mannerin which
the CrystalPalaceconflatedthe valuesof technicalrationalitywith
the utopianidealsof a socialand democraticspaceshowshow autonomous architecturalforms have been projectedto embodysocial ideals. The fact that the Crystal Palace not only fostered
commodification,but was an artfulplayerin the Britishcolonial
enterpriseaswell, alsopoints to how such conflationhas been used
to maskideologicaloperations.14
Although,to a degree,the postmoderncriticismof modernism is justified,it could alsobe arguedthat postmodernepistemology also denies a legitimaterole to the experienceof architecture.
This is not becausetheoristsconsiderit to be subjectiveor emotional,but becausethey arguethatour aestheticexperienceand aesthetic judgments are "disguisedconstructions"that reproduce
asymmetriesof power.Moreimportantly,postmoderntheoristsask:
How arewe to decidewhose experienceof architectureshould be
taken seriously,given that one's experiencereflectsa construction
specificto one's subjectivity?For example,a public plazacould be
perceivedin many differentways. Is it a place for procession,celebration,or activism?Or is it an informalplacefor peopleto sit and
enjoy the outdoors?Or is it a meetingplacefor mothersto socialize and for childrento play?Or do these romanticideas of openness and playing children in reality mask a space that is under
constantsurveillance?
Postmodernistspoint to the diversityof such
In
viewpoints. emphasizingthis diversity,they questionthe criteria by which we judge a particularreadingto be more legitimate
thananother.They questionwhat is held asvaluablein a givencontext,by whom, and in whosepoliticalinterests.Throughsuchquestioning, they have critiqued "aesthetic"and "beauty"-qualities
perceivedto be inherent and thus universallyvalid. In his book
Distinction:A SocialCritiqueof the udgmentof Taste(1984), Pierre
Bourdieuhas shown how aestheticdiscourseuniversalizesthe ob-

230

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ject of value by assuming that the aesthetic-a distinct category of

human experience-is universally recognizable. This universality, in
turn, establishes the universality of aesthetic judgments and values,
thus guarding the value of that object. Bourdieu has characterized
this vicious cycle as "the circular circulation of inter-legitimation.""15
He argues that patterns of taste are class specific and reinforce the
political and economic domination of one class over another.
The problem, however, is not this uncovering of the complicity of class dominations with aesthetic tastes, but that postmodernists
take the political complicity of values as a given, and abandon discussion of aesthetic judgments and objective evaluations.16Such thinking is also central to architecturalcriticism. Postmodernists demand
that we wean ourselves from the fiction of "pure"space and revel instead in the possibilities opened up by impure, scopic, and controlled
regimes. But if we agree with the postmodern view and suspend our
judgment, can we still talk about more or less gender-responsive
space?Can we compare and legitimately discuss how the political and
ideological complicity of one space is better than another? To me,
these questions reveal the relativism inherent in postmodern claims.
Furthermore, it is ironic that, even though we are uncomfortable in
our awarenessof architecture'sparticipation in politics, we continue
to accept theoretical premises that do not allow a more responsive
architecture.
More recently, critics have begun to question this easy acceptance of surveillance as a construct for understanding architectural
space. Influenced by the notion of "everyday life" developed by
French philosopher Henri Lefebvre and by cultural theorist Michel
de Certeau, a number of theorists emphasize the role architecture
plays in "reallife," in the "hereand now," and not in abstracttruths.
Lefebvre in Everyday Life in the Modern World (1984), and de
Certeau in The PracticeofEverydayLife (1984), depict the disciplinary power of technology in society; in doing so, they also reveal how
society resists technology even in the most ordinary spaces. For example, they argue that consumption is not just a negative force, but
that it is also an arena of freedom, choice, creativity, and invention.
Influenced by the ideas of Lefebvre and de Certeau, Mary McLeod
has published an article entitled, "Everydayand 'Other' Spaces," in
which she explores the freedoms, joys, and diversity of "the network
of antidiscipline" in everyday spaces."7McLeod argues that the most
influential critic to stress issues of the "everyday"in architecturewas
a nonarchitect, Jane Jacobs, whose book The Death and Life of Great
American Cities (1961) had a powerful impact on a whole generation
of social and architectural critics. McLeod writes: "She [Jacobs]
comes closest to realizing de Certeau's plea for an account of cities,
not from the bird's-eye view, but from the experience of the pedes231

trian,the everydayuser.And the terrainshe describesis verydifferfromFoucault'sprisent fromthattraversed

by Baudelaire'sflaneurs,
ons andbrothels,or fromSituationistbarsand gypsyencampments.
Whatis invokedin herdescriptionof New YorkCity'sWestVillage
and Boston'sNorth End is an informalpubliclife: the worldof the
stoop,the neighborhoodbakery,the drycleaningestablishment,and
most importantly,the street;and with these come new subjectsmothersin the park,children,grocers,and newsstandattendants.""18
Sincethe 1970s,a numberof architectsaswellas architectural
theoristshave invokedthe idea of everydayexperiencein orderto
critiquemodernism'sfunctionaldeterminism.ChristianNorberg
Schultz'sphenomenologicalcritiqueof modernism,Denise Scott
Brownand RobertVenturi'spolemicfora historicistpopulistarchitecture,RogerScruton'sargumentfor recognizingthe cognitiverole
of the aesthetic,and the IndependentGroup'sappreciationof commerciallife as an alternativeto both modernistabstractionand deprivations-of postwar Britain have all addressedthe issue of the
everydayexperienceof architecture.Indeed,thesediverseattempts
to embracethe smallscale,the complex,the historical,the popular,
the vernacular,the decorative,andthe ordinaryhaveprovidedpowerfultheoreticalalternativesto modernism.But how does the invocation of the everydayhelp us in resolvingthe currentproblemof
architecture's
complicitywith politics?McLeodaddressesthis issue
and pointsout that "theordinarycan easilybecomea rationalization
of marketforcesand passiveconsumption."19
She cites postmodern
architectureas an exampleand shows how it reducedthe everyday
to populistrevival.But, to me, this readingalsobringsto surfacethe
epistemologicaldilemmainherentin our currentthinking. If the
ordinaryis so easily subsumedby marketforces, then should we
completelyabandondiscussingeverydayexperienceof architecture?
In otherwords,can we take experienceseriouslywhile being aware
of architecture's
tenuousrelationshipwith politics?
In orderto free ourselvesfrom the presentpredicamentwe
need to rethinkour theorizingof architecture.I believe that aesthetic perceptionis not just sociallyor politicallyconstructedexperience,but is a mode of evaluationthat is rational.I havedeveloped
my understandingby drawingupon the Realistaccountof knowledge developedby analyticphilosophersand literarytheoristssuch
as HilaryPutnam,Nelson Goodman,and SatyaP. Mohanty.20In
their writings,they proposea sophisticatedaccount of objectivity
by reexaminingthe actualnatureof the "hard"sciences,and by interpretingthem as complex,coordinatedsocialpractices.In so doing, they providean alternativeto postmodernskepticism.
HilaryPutnam,in Reason,TruthandHistory(1981), questions
the associationof rationalthinkingwith scientificthinking;in doing
Bhatt

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so, he challenges the idea that science alone provides the true descriptions of reality. Putnam shows how scientific inquiry, much like the
humanities, is holistic and relational relying on a number of preexisting assumptions. He develops a broader understandingof rationality
and objectivity and shows how these are not only central to studies in
ethics and value theory, but are also crucial to understandinginquiry
in the sciences.21 Satya Mohanty, in LiteraryTheoryand the Claimsof
History: Postmodernism, Objectivity, MultiCultural Politics (1997)
builds on Putnam's ideas; more directly, he addresses the skeptical
strandsof postmodern thought and shows how they are both theoretically and politically inhibiting. He points out that the older, positivists' view of objectivity is fundamentally flawed because it establishes
a false subject-object split in which subjectivity is diametrically opposed to objectivity. This reductive split does not recognize any cognitive value gained from subjectiveexperiences.In his book, Mohanty
develops a Realist account of knowledge as an alternative to
postmodern skepticism and demonstrates the continuity between
theory and subjectiveexperience, and the largerrelation between subjective experience and objective knowledge.2 On the other hand,
Nelson Goodman in LanguagesofArt:An Approachto a Theoryof Symbols (1968) deals more directly with art and argues that aesthetics is a
branch of epistemology. Goodman emphasizes that in this form of
knowing-understanding a work of art is not a matter of appreciating it, or having an "aestheticexperience"of it, but is a matter of interpreting it correctly. According to Goodman, emotions function
cognitively and play a central role in developing aesthetic awareness.23
Drawing upon these accounts of knowledge developed by
Goodman, Mohanty, and Putnam, I argue that our experience of
architecture involves a combination of aesthetic perception, evaluation, and cognition, and relies on the discernment of a dense particularity of human feeling not adequately theorized by the rational
thought of positivism. Rationality herein is understood broadly; it
is not opposed to passion. Both emotions and imagination are essential to rational choice as well as to many acts of aesthetic cognition. This broader understanding of rationality is closely related to
the Aristotelian idea of practical reasoning. In contrast to deductive
reasoning in which a conclusion follows necessarily from the stated
premises, practical reasoning leads to action. In practical reasoning,
one cannot proceed from stated premises to a conclusion, as there
is no general positive premise of the form "Alwaysdo X.'"24For example, a statement such as "Always park your car in space number
10," cannot be taken as a starting point for reasoning what to do,
unless this statement is hemmed in by particular clauses such as "if
it is available" or "if it is a weekend or a holiday." Aristotle points
out that such modifying clauses can be infinite. Practical reasoning
May2000 JAE53/4

requiresan imaginativeconstructionof the whole from an indefinite numberof particulars

and this processof constructionis active.
I use this understandingto arguethat practicalreasoningis
inherentin experiencingarchitecture.Aestheticexperience,like an
action,is the conclusionof an argument.25
In contrastto sensations
such as the beatingof one's heart,our attitudestowardand our beliefs about architectureare intentionalstatesof mind. Intentional
statesof mind havea direction;the inclinationto do somethingis
one subcategoryof these states.Our experienceof architectureis
intentionalbecauseit includesa conceptionof the objecton which
it focuses.In claimingthis intentionality,I want to stressthat we
have the capacityto justify and describewhat our experienceis
about,and this involvesan informalprocessof deliberation.We are
not passive.We do not merelyexperienceobjects,which inhabita
separaterealmas the familiarobject-subjectsplit suggests.We are
active.Our aestheticjudgmentsinvolve"takingresponsibility"for
a justificationof the acts,feelings,perceptionsexperiencedand are
by rationalcriticism.Moreimportantly,our
open to transformation
are
of our relationshipswith our world;
crucial
indices
judgments
and to stresstheircognitivenatureis to underscorethat theycan be
susceptibleto varyingdegreesof socialconstructionsandyet can be
the sourceof objectiveknowledge.
For example,it would be meaninglessto claim that "I agree
that a walkthroughLouisKahn'sSalkInstituteis like walkingin a
monasticcloister,but I don't experienceit that way."This shows
that,in orderfor one to agreewith an aestheticjudgment,one must
experiencethe (art)objectin accordancewith thatjudgment.Furthermore,a judgmentlike "LouisKahn'sSalk Institute is, metaphorically, a monastic cloister" distinguishes itself from mere
explanationin that it has an abilityto changeexperiencethrough
By the timewe come to perceive
argumentsgroundedin particulars.
the SalkInstitutein this way, we havealreadydeliberatedaboutit.
The serenityof the Salk Institute,the repetitivevocabularyof the
building,the courtyardwith a centralchannelof water,the concrete
frameand teakcubicles,and even, perhaps,the idea of a religious
experiencein a monasticcomplex-all contributeto our "reading"
of the Institute.Such an interpretationof the Salk Institutehighlights the fact that our judgmentsare not abstractstatementsdirectlycomplicitwith politics,as arguedby the postmodernists.Our
judgments,on the contrary,aregroundedin particulars.Our ability to change our judgments and to alter others' by arguments
groundedin particularsunderscoresthe rationalnatureof judgments and theirpotentialto resistpolitics.The relationshipof the
aesthetic to the political thus cannot be theorized by "antiaestheticizing,"as the postmodernistssuggest.Instead,an under-

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standingof the broaderrolethe aestheticplaysin our social,moral, aboutthe invisibletacticsof capitalism,waysin whichphysicalforms
can be used for manipulativeends, and how a readingof an archiand politicallives is crucial.
To explainthis idea let us sketcha scenarioin which we di- tecturalformin purelyaesthetic,formal,or technicaltermsdoes not
rectlyaddressthe questionof objectiveknowledgeand architecture's adequatelyrepresentthe full engagementof architecturein our sorelationshipto politics.Letus assumetwo agentswho claimverydif- cial and politicallives. Hence, one could arguethat the processby
ferentexperiencesof the CrystalPalace.In this scenario,the agents' which A has come to readthe CrystalPalaceas an artfulplayerof
knowledgeandexperienceof the buildingis derivedsolelyfromrep- capitalistidealsis rational.This does not implythatsuchexperience
resentations,drawings,and documents.For agentA, it representsa is dispassionate,but that it occursbecauseof and throughemotions
thatthe CrystalPalaceno longerextechnologicallyadvancedbuildingfor its time, with a rationaland and imagination.Furthermore,
innovativeuse of materialsand methodsof productionenablingthe istsreinforcesthe pointthatwhatcountsas "real"doesnot restsolely
constructionof a weightlessand flowingform. Let us also suppose on the physicaland experientialattributesof a realobject,but upon
thatA associatesthe physicalqualitiesof the buildingsuch as trans- how our experienceof realityis continuouslyinformedand transparencyand blurringof the boundariesbetweenthe exteriorandin- formedby our theoretical,cultural,and politicalknowledge.
teriorwith idealsof being sociallyopen and democratic.For agent
I usethisscenarioto illustratethe largerargumentof thispaper
on
the
other
the
innocent
and
of
that
such
B,
hand, seemingly
pureexpression
personalconflictsand argumentsbringto the surfacethe
the Crystal Palace is deceptive because the building fosters rationalcharacter
of ourexperienceof architecture.28
Ourexperiences
commodificationwith a remarkable
of
For
ideals.
of
architecture
do not simplydescribea fullyindependent"real"obmastery capitalist
B to showA thatthereis anotherwayto experienceandforma judg- jectwith a fixeddegreeof evidence,but attemptto articulatewhatis
ment aboutthe CrystalPalacewould requirethat B drawA's atten- initiallydisorderedor largelyunintelligible.To perceivearchitecture
tion to the particulars-the way in which transparencyboth in its fullcontext,in its repleteparticularity,
one requiresimagination
empowersthe viewerto see throughthe structure,and disempowers to constructthe whole.29Imagination,herein,playsa centralrole in
the viewer by not allowingescapefrom being viewed;the way in the actsof cognitionand rationalchoiceand contrastswith the conwhich the palace'salternatingreflectiveand transparentstatetrans- cept of imaginationas a flightof fancy.In fact, imaginationfocuses
formthe viewerinto a voyeurwhoseeye hasthe powerof appropria- moreon realitythanon fancy.Ourexperiences
of thisrealityareevalution withoutpurchase.And the veryideaof an experiencelimitedto ations;they reflectwhat we hold important,worthy, or fulfilling.
surfaceconcealsthe fact that one can Therefore,in all actsof imaginativereconstruction
thataremediated
lookingthrougha transparent
see but not touch,see but not hear,see but not speak,andso forth.26 by oursocial,theoretical,andpoliticalknowledge,we makearchitecIn this processof deliberation(whichis "practicalreasoning" tureaccessibleand/orinaccessiblein newways.As a result,our expein Aristotelianterms),the end is notan abstractconclusionderived riencescan be moreor less correct,and can be subjectto normative
from deductive reasoning,but is a transformatoryexperiencein claims.Furthermore,
sinceourperceptionsof architecture
representa
whichA comesto recognizeand readthe CrystalPalacedifferently; formof practicalreasoning,theseperceptionsarerationalandevaluathat is, it involvesa reconstructionof the CrystalPalacein A's mind tive in a mannerthatleavesroomfor re-evaluation.
The Realistconfrom an "infinite"numberof particulars.27
B's pointingout the par- ception of knowledge proposed here, while taking into account
ticulars,such as the illusoryoperationof a transparentsurface,does postmodernclaimsaboutthe constructednatureof ourexperienceof
not necessarilyimply that there is a logical connection between architecture-thatis, experiences
changewith increasedknowledgeas
the
and
it
it
Rather
is
form
a
of
well
as
or
social
doesnot
transparency
judgment supports.
political
context-arguesthatconstructedness
in
which
one
can
sift
withfacto
make
it
or
and
stresses
the
unstable,
practicalreasoning
throughparticulars
ipso
arbitrary
cognitiveand
out committingoneselfto abstractgeneralconcepts.Furthermore, evaluativenatureof our experienceof architecture.
the fact that A comes to agreewith B's judgmentdoes not in any
way assumethat B's judgmentrepresentsthe truth that is deductivelyinferred.RatherB'sjudgmentrepresentsa truththat can only Objectivityand PoliticalComplicity
be imaginativelyperceived,and thus the judgmentremainsopen to
modificationthroughrationaldeliberation.
The importantquestionthat follows from the above discussionis
A's comingto readthe CrystalPalacedifferentlyalsosuggests this: Can we criticizethe CrystalPalace (which has been seen as
an enhancementin A's sensibilityand imagination-a realization complicitwith capitalistand colonialpractices)without abandon233

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ing a claimto objectiveknowledge?Is the CrystalPalace'stechnique

of managementbad in itself, or because of the political ends it
served?In the Realistview of knowledgeproposedhere, the analyses and observationsthat revealthe complicityof the CrystalPalacewith the dominantpoliticalpower(suchas B's observations)in
factrepresentattemptsat providinga moreobjectiveexplanationof
architecture's
relationshipwith politics.Foralternativestrategiesto
resistpower,we must often dependupon observationssuch as B's
as well as the knowledgecreatedby conflicts,such as the one betweenA and B. Suchconflictsalsohelp to highlightthe dependence
of our judgments and our experiences on our respective
subjectivities.That is, how our subjectivitiesenableus to readthe
world by both facilitating and inhibiting knowledge in specific
ways.For instance,a critiqueof the CrystalPalacethat arguesthat
subjectsin the Palacewereunderconstantsurveillancebecausethey
could not escapethe condition of beingviewedwill sound less abstract,and less inimical, when we acknowledgethe historicalaccounts of the everydaylives of the subjects, and see how they
resistedthis surveillance.This knowledge-subjects'differentexperiencesof the building,the possibleresistancethroughthe creation
of shelteredenclavesto the all-embracingtransparency,and the
patternsof movementthat may have resistedthe building'slinear
organization-could providedesigningstrategiesto resistpower.
But can we deduceobjectiveknowledgeuncriticallyfromthe
of a subject?Is thisemphasison thelivedexperience
"livedexperience"
a sentimentalresponse?Mohanty,who has emphasizedthe continuity betweensubjectiveexperienceandobjectiveknowledge,arguesthat
the livedexperiencemaybe sincerelyfeltby a subject,butwhetherwe
considerit legitimateor illusorydependson the examinationof the
Let us, once again,considerA's readingof
specificsof the context.30
the CrystalPalacefromthepreviousexample.Givenourcurrenttheoaboutthecomplicityof theCrystalPalacewithcapireticalperspective
talismand colonialism,we may evaluateA's observationsthat the
formsof the CrystalPalacerepresentmorallycorflowingtransparent
rect idealsof open and democraticspaceas an illusion (despiteour
sympathywith A's socialand politicalviews).The illusoryas well as
the cognitivecomponentsareopen to analysisand evaluationon the
basisof empiricalresearchandtheoreticalaccountsof our currentsothatwe have
cial and politicalarrangements.31Thus, acknowledging
thecapacityto evaluateouraestheticexperiences
(includingemotions)
is not a romantic or a sentimental response to the problem of
relationto politics.Instead,it is a pragmaticrecognition
architecture's
of the politicalsignificanceof the experienceof architecture.
Anotherpoint is that changesin theoreticallanguagereflect
Let us once againconsiderthe rationalexknowledgeacquisition.32
May2000 JAE53/4

change that has occurredbetweenA and B. Assumingthat A did

come to agreewith B'sjudgment,if A is askedto justifyher experience of the CrystalPalace,A is likely to describethese particulars:
technicallyadvancedfor its time;an innovativeuse of materialsand
methods of production;a weightlessand flowing form;and a remarkablemasteryof capitalistideals.A's knowledgeof the Crystal
Palacehas been enhancedand enlargedby this rationalexchange,
of politicshasenableda moreobjectiveviewandthisunderstanding
thatB'sjustificationshave
point.Moreover,thisanalysisunderscores
not functionedmerelyas linguisticgeneralizations;
they have contributedto knowledgemuchthe samewayasnew empiricalhypotheses and evidence do. Here one may also see the parallelsin the
exchangebetweenA and B and the shift in our perceptionsfrom
to postmodernnotionsof "culturally
and "autonomous"
"abstract"
constructed"and "politicallycomplicit"buildings.When one sees
this shift as a processof theorychangethroughwhich particulars
havebeenadded,anda moreobjectiveviewpointhasbeenacquired,
the postmoderninterestin politics then does not appearto be as
radicala revolutionin thinkingas its polemicsmakeit out to be.

of the CrystalPlace:
Historiography
AnEpistemologicalEnterprise
In orderto illustratethis argument,I will brieflyreviewhow the
CrystalPalacewas initiallyacceptedand categorizedby criticsand
architecturalhistoriansand how changesin the theoreticalperception of the definition of architecturehave informed its history.
James Fergusson,in Historyof the ModernStylesof Architecture
(1873) cites the CrystalPalaceas one of the sourcesof the "Modern Styles."His entire discussion, however, revolvesaround the
controversyit inspired:Was the CrystalPalacea work of architecture or of engineering?Fergussonclaims that, "Asfirst proposed,
the Hyde ParkCrystalPalace,though an admirablepiece of Civil
Engineering,had no claimto be consideredas architecturaldesign.
Use, and use only, pervadedeveryarrangement,and it was not ornamentedto such an extent as to elevateit into the class of Fine
Arts.The subsequentintroductionof the archedtransept,with the
consequentarrangementsat each end and on each side, did much
In Fergusson'sopinion, the reto bringit within that category.""33
erectedbuildingat Sydenham,on the otherhand, "hasa fargreater
claim to rank among the important architecturalobjects of the
world."Its huge scale,its truthfulconstruction,and its ornamental
arrangementqualifyit to be architecturewith a capital, "A."He
arguesthatwhile the CrystalPalacepossessesthesethree"greatele-

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ments of architecturaldesign,it is deficientin two others."One is ment of the mid-nineteenth century, a monument often hailed with
an "insufficientamount of decoration"which does not allow the pardonable exaggerationas the first modern building."38Hitchcock's
Palaceto be altogethertaken "out of the categoryof first-classen- main concern is to mark the lineage of Modern design and he sees the
gineering,and to make it entirelyan object of Fine Art." But its Crystal Palace as a direct ancestor of modern architecture. In subsegreatestdefect, Fergussonmaintains,is "thatit wants solidity,and quent histories of modern architecture,the prefabricationof its interthat appearanceof permanenceand durabilityindispensableto changeable parts is recognized as the most important contribution of
makeit reallyarchitecturalin the strictmeaningof the word."34 the Crystal Palace. As Ralph Lieberman points out, the construction
It is only much laterin Nikolaus Pevsner'sPioneersofMod- process of the Crystal Palace symbolized a modernity in which we
ernMovement:FromWilliamMorristo WalterGropius(1937), that were "as far as we can [sic] be from the jealously guarded knowledge
the CrystalPalaceis acceptedas much as a feat of engineeringas it of medieval masons; the modern age was to replace secret techniques
is an "outstandingwork of architecture."35
Pevsnerrecognizesthat with building methods as publicly known as and as universallyreproof
the
nineteenth
"the progress engineeringduring
century has ducible as a scientific experiment."39
he
a
which
is
The significance of the Crystal Place as a metaphor exemplifyclaims, "asconsistent
passedunappreciated,"progress,
and grandioseas thatof Romanesqueand Gothicarchitecture."36
In ing modernity is later taken up as a central theme in Marshall
the revised edition of Pioneersof ModernDesign:From William Berman'sAll that Is Solid Melts into Air (1988). For Berman the role
Morristo WalterGropius(1964), Pevsnerincludesa moreextended of Crystal Palace as a metaphor for fancy, a metaphor for an "unreal"
descriptionof the CrystalPalace.This description,full of modifi- reality, and a metaphor for a dark and dismal modernity, is crucial.
ers, is carefullyreasonedand justified.For example,Paxtonis de- His analysisrevealsthe role the building has played-both literal and
scribedas an "outsider,"and the CrystalPalaceas a "temporary" metaphorical-in literature, fiction, and history. In Berman's book,
structure.Furthermore,Pevsnerconsidersit importantto explain the tendency of solid materialto decompose and melt is argued to be
that an "outsider"would not have daredsuch an "unprecedented the basic fact of modern life and the Crystal Palace emerges as its
design"had it not been for the temporarynatureof the building. quintessential representation.40Berman's discussion of Dostoevsky's
Nevertheless,Pevsneracknowledgesthat the Crystalpalaceis an Notesfrom Undergroundrevealshow the fantasy of the Crystal Palace
was more dismal than its reality. Citing Dostoevsky's fantasy of the
outstandingbuilding.In Pevsner'sown words:
Crystal Place, Berman points out that, wherever the process of modernization has not emerged from within, modernism takes on a fantastic character. According to Berman, Dostoevsky's fantasy of the
Crystal Palace as representingwestern mechanical view of the world
was more dismal than the creative ingenuity of its design and conception. Written at a time when modernism was being radically questioned, Berman'sdiscussion of Dosteovsky's Underground Man's fear
becomes very relevant. The Underground Man's suspicion of the
building's pure crystalline form is expressed most clearly in the following passage:"You believe in the crystal edifice indestructible for
all eternity, the kind that you could never stick your tongue out at on
the sly or thumb your nose at secretly. Well, perhaps the reason I am
afraid of that edifice is that it is crystal and indestructible for all eternity and one can't even stick one's tongue out at it on the sly."41
In her article entitled, "The Invisible Mask," Andrea Kahn
focuses on this fear and explores the "invisible"ways by which the
Crystal Palace controls and disciplines space. Kahn compares the
WhilePevsnerrecognizesthe CrystalPalaceasone of the many Crystal Palace to Jeremy Bentham's panopticon and argues that both
Englishcontributionsto the modernmovement,it is HenryRussell constitute "an apparatusof covert control based on the manipulation
Hitchcock,who, in his 1937 MoMAshow "ModernArchitecturein of lines of sight." Kahn points a number of ways by which the CrysEngland,"describesPaxton'sprojectas "themost propheticmonu- tal Palace manipulates and legitimizes control: how it allies the act

WhatmakesPaxton'sbuildingtheoutstandingexampleof midnineteenth-centuryiron and glassarchitecturewas ratherits

enormoussize--1851 feet long, that is, muchlongerthan the
palaceof Versailles-theabsenceof anyothermaterials,andthe
use of an ingenioussystemof prefabrication
for the iron and
based
a
on
twenty-four-foot
glassparts,
gridadoptedthroughout. Only by meansof prefabrication
coulda buildingof such
sizebe erectedin the miraculously
shorttimeof ten months.It
is quite likelythat even Paxton,the outsider,would not have
daredsuch an unprecedentedprocedureand such an unprecedenteddesign,if he hadnot workedfor a temporarybuilding.
However,the factthatthe CrystalPalacewasre-erectedin 1854
at Sydenhamnear London for a more permanentpurpose
provesthat the new beautyof metaland glasshad caughtthe
Victoriansandof the publicat large.37
fancyof progressive

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of shopping with the act of observing nature, how its power derives
from diffusion rather than constraint, how the opportunity to see
and be seen provides the masses with a false sense of power that obscures and legitimizes their economic powerlessness, and so forth.42
From the above discussion, it is clearthat changes in our knowledge of the CrystalPlacehave been informed by theoreticalshifts in the
definition of architecture.For Fergusson,architecturebelonged to the
realmof Fine Arts and his most important taskwas to justify the building as architecturewith a capital "A."For Pevsnerand Hitchcock, the
importanceof the building lay in tracingits lineagewithin Modernism;
their most important task was to show the contribution of English
nineteenth-centuryengineering. In subsequent histories, written during the second half of the twentieth-century,the building continued to
be mentioned for its unique process of prefabrication. In fact, its
method of construction became more important to architecturalhistory than its design or its relation to ideology and colonialism. In
MarshallBerman'swriting, the Palaceis transformedinto the quintessential metaphor for modernity, including its darkeraspects. But it is
Andrea Kahn's interpretationof the Crystal Palace determined by her
postmodern thesis that, "architectureis the disciplinization of space,
and that perceptionsin architectureexert a covertcontrol"that enables
us to readthe building as an insidious playerof capitalism.In the above
example, new theories of architecturehave contributed to our understanding of the CrystalPalacethe same way as new empiricalevidence.
This brings to the surfacethe fundamentaldisciplinarydivide that exists between architecturalhistory and architecturaltheory. Postmodern
theorists have rightly pointed to the constructednature of knowledge,
enabling us not to take historicalfacts at face value, but to understand
them with respect to their theoretical interpretation. However, while
pointing out that truth, rationality, aesthetics, and objectivity are social and cultural constructions, they also deny their role in knowledge
acquisition. Becauseof such skepticism, postmodern theory has ceased
to play a cognitive role. The problem today is not that history with a
capital"H"is consideredthe only source of knowledge, but that theory
with a capital "T"teaches us to be skepticalof all forms of knowing. It
is important to recognize that new theoreticaljustifications and judgments inform knowledge; however, these judgments need to be
grounded in particularsof its object-its experience,its emotional and

skepticalof any discussionof values,evaluations,and judgments.

Such an attitude overlooksthe basic evaluationsinherent in our
capacityto notice things, to make comparisons,to posit connections, and to see architecturalformsas intelligiblewholes. As suggestedby the analysisof the CrystalPalace,some evaluations,from
vaguelyfelt aestheticandethicaljudgmentsto developednormative
theoriesof right and wrong,will not only enableus to distinguish
between the varyingdegreesarchitecturehas been complicitwith
politics, they will also empowerus to imagineand conceiveof alternativestrategiesoutside the regimeof surveillanceand control.
Furthermore,the fact that objectiveexplanations,in the Realist
view of knowledge,areconcomitantwith strugglesagainstpolitical
complicityunderscoreshow and why objectiveknowledgeshould
not be allowedto sunderthe realmof "hardfacts"from the realm
of values.In a similarvein, aestheticexperiencealso shouldnot be
theorizedby separatingit from its role in moralcognition.
Moreover,we do not just evaluate.In reality,we arealso caof
pable reflectingupon our largervalues,say, about our moralor
politicalworld.43This capacity--fora self-consciousreflectionand
evaluationof our actionsand desires-underliesbasichumanrationality.Our aestheticvaluesareformsof practicalreasoningand our
responses,when we arecalledupon to justifythem, can be deeply
emotionaland rational.44But it is not enoughto recognizethatour
values are arguable.What is more importantto recognizeis that
what we perceiveas the realworld dependsupon our values.Our
valuesarecharacterizedby theirdepth and by the extent to which
they bringorderto our experience.In dealingwith waysourvalues
influenceour experiencesand aremediatedby socialand political
constructions,we aredealingwith subjectiveaspectsof objectivity.
The objectivitythat we seek is not the familiardisinterestedtheoreticalinquiry.It is a reasonablehope for objectiveknowledgethat
Once we ground
stems from particularkinds of social practices.45
our judgmentsin the "real"world of architecture(scale,proportions, and rhythmsof buildingsand urbanspaces)as well as in historical and theoretical accounts, the political significance of
architecturewill havemeaningnot only for architecturaltheorists,
but for architectsas well.

cognitive aspects.

Acknowledgments
Afterword
Ever since postmodernism made us aware of how our aesthetic
judgments can be politically complicit, we have become extremely
May2000 JAE53/4

I would like to thank StanfordAnderson,Sibel Bozdogan,Diane

Ghirardo,MarkJarzombek,and SatyaMohantyfor their insightful commentson this paper.

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Notes
1. A numberof contemporarytheoristshaveinvokedBentham'spanopticon
in theirwritings.Foran interestinganalysis,seeAndreaKahn,"TheInvisibleMask,"
AndreaKahn,ed., DrawingBuildingText(Princeton:PrincetonArchitecturalPress,
On Vision
1991), pp. 85-106. Also see JonathanCrary,Techniques
of the Observer:
and Modernityin theNineteenthCentury(Cambridge,MA: MIT Press,1990).
2. Theory'srelevanceto practicehasbeen questionedeversinceTafuricriticized the operativerole theory played in legitimizingthe "modern"agendaof architects. A numberof other books such as ArchitectureCriticismIdeology(1985),
(1988), DrawingBuildingText(1991), Out ofSite:A Social
Architectureproduction
CriticismofArchitecture(1991), Strategiesin ArchitecturalThinking(1992), and
RethinkingArchitecturalTheory(1988) have contributed to the debate about
theory'srelationshipto practice.
3. Tafuri'sfamousclaim that "architectsshould do architectureand historiansshould do history"exemplifieshow theory and practicein architecturehave
come to occupy separaterealms.In a similarvein, JeffreyKipnis arguesthat "all
architecturaltheoriesand historiesalwaysalso operate,beneaththeirveil of objectivity and asidefrom theirannouncedintent, in the serviceof a designagenda,despite their frequentprotestationsto the contrary."See JeffreyKipnis, "Formsof
Irrationality,"in John Whiteman,JeffreyKipnis, RichardBurdett,eds., Strategies
in Architectural
Thinking(Cambridge,MA:MIT Press,1992), p. 149. Forpositions
that criticize the current split between theory and practice in architecture,see
MichaelHays, "On TurningThirty,"in Assemblage
no. 30 (Cambridge,MA:MIT
Press,1996), pp. 6-11; and Diane Ghirardo'sreviewof "Space,Placeand Gender"
and "Architectureand Feminism"in HarvardDesignMagazine(Cambridge,MA:
GraduateSchool of Design, 1997), pp. 76-77.
4. See Nana Ellin, ed., Architecture
ofFear(Princeton,NJ: PrincetonArchitecturalPress, 1997); Debra Coleman, ElizabethDanze, and Carol Henderson,
eds., Architectureand Feminism(Princeton, NJ: Princeton ArchitecturalPress,
1996); ChristopherReed,ed., Not at Home:TheSuppression
ofDomesticityin Modern Art and Architecture,(London: Thames and Hudson, 1996); Diana Agrest,
PatriciaConway, and Leslie KanesWeisman, eds., TheSex ofArchitecture(New
York:HarryN. Abrams,1996); MarkWigley, WhiteWalls,DesignerDresses:The
Fashioningof ModernArchitecture(Cambridge,MA: MIT Press, 1995); Beatrice
as MassMedia (Cambridge,
Colomina, Privacyand Publicity:ModernArchitecture
MA: MIT Press,1994); DeborahFausch,PauletteShingley,Rudolpheel-Khoury,
Zvi Efrateds., Architecture:
In Fashion(Princeton:PrincetonArchitecturalPress,
1994); Doreen Massey,Space,Placeand Gender(Minneapolis:Universityof Minnesota Press, 1994); BeatriceColomina, ed., Sexualityand Space(Princeton,NJ:
PrincetonArchitecturalPress, 1992).
5. "TheSplitWall:DomesticVoyeurism,"in BeatriceColomina,ed., Sexuality and Space(Princeton,NJ: PrincetonArchitecturalPress, 1992), p. 83.
6. Wigley, "Untitled:The Housing of Gender,"in BeatriceColomina, ed.,
Sexualityand Space,p. 350.
7. Ibid., p. 387. In a similarvein, CatherineIngrahamcritiquesthe epistemological and representationaldependenceof architectureon orthogonality.She
arguesthat it is in the space of the line, the wall, that the architecturaldramabetween sexualityand spatialitybeginsto play out. The wall, which alwaysdreamsof
itself as the sexlessgeometricline, is where, Ingrahamclaims, "the differencesof
sexualitybegin to be homologizedas materialdifferences,albeitin complexways."
See CatherineIngraham,"Initial Proprieties:Architectureand the Space of the
Line,"in Sexualityand Space,p. 266.
8. Wigley, "Untitled: The Housing of Gender," p. 379.

9. Here my use of the term modern-postmodernmayappearto be simplistic. Clearlythese classificationsdo not adequatelyrepresentthe richnessand complexityof the debate.I haveused them only to makeclearhow discursiveformations
distinguishthemselvesthroughpolemics.Moreover,my critiqueof postmodernism
is directedat those theoristswho take a position of extremerelativism.
10. Stanford Anderson in "The Fiction of Function" criticizes the
postmodernistsfor equating modernismwith functionalism.He arguesthat few
modernist architectshave endorsedthe narrowfunctionalism-the "utility"-focused design methodologies-that postmodernistscriticize.Andersonfocuses on
the role of function in the modernmovementsince the 1932 exhibitionon the InternationalStyle by Henry-RussellHitchcock and PhilipJohnson.A reviewof architecturaltheory from roughly 1750 to 1932, however,revealsnot only a richer
notion of function but also a less instrumentalrelationshipbetween theory and
practice.See StanfordAnderson,"The Fiction of Function,"in Assemblageno. 2
(Cambridge,MA: MIT Press,1987), pp. 19-31.
11. The fact-valuedistinctionis boundup with the riseof sciencein the sevwithobjectiveknowlenteenthcenturyin Westernthought.Factscameto be associated
edgethatwasabsoluteandunchanging,whilevaluescameto occupya subjectiverealm.
The dissociationof factsandvaluesconjuredup problemssuchas: How can a person
functionboth as a knowerof factsand a chooserof values?How can one be at home
with a realitythat is supposedto be experiencedneutrally,withoutemotion?
12. RobertVenturi,Denise Scott Brown,and StevenIzenour.Learningfrom
Las Vegas(Cambridge,MA: MIT Press,1972), p. 90.
13. MiriamGusevich,"TheArchitectureof Criticism:A Question of Autonomy,"in AndreaKahn, ed., DrawingBuilding Text(Princeton,NJ: Princeton
ArchitecturalPress,1991), p. 9.
14. Built in 1851 in London to house the firstInternationalGreatExhibition, the CrystalPalacewas movedfromcity to countryin piecesand reconstructed
at Sydenhamwhereit remaineduntil it burneddown in 1937.
15. PierreBourdieu,Distinction:A SocialCritiqueoftheJudgementof Taste,
RichardNice, trans.(Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversityPress,1984), pp. 11-96.
16. For a skepticalreadingof value judgmentsand normativetheoriesof
evaluationsee BarbaraHerrnsteinSmith, "Truth/Value,"Contingencies
of Value:
AlternativePerspectives
for CriticalTheory(Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversity
Press, 1988), pp. 85-124.
17. Mary McLeod, "Everydayand 'Other' Spaces,"in Architectureand
Feminism,pp. 1-37.
18. McLeodpoints to the limitationsof relyingsolely on empiricalobservation. She acknowledgesthatJacob'sfocus on everydaylife-on how spaceis actually used-does not offer satisfactoryanswersto questions relatedto the tacit
operationsof power.Ibid., 23.
19. Ibid., 25.
20. See Nelson Goodman,Languages
ofArt:An Approachto a TheoryofSymbols (New York:The Bobbs-MerrillCompany, Inc, 1968); Hilary Putnam,Reason, Truthand History(Cambridge,UK: CambridgeUniversityPress,1981); Satya
P. Mohanty,LiteraryTheoryand the ClaimsofHistory:Postmodernism,
Objectivity,
MulticulturalPolitics (Ithaca,NY: Cornell UniversityPress,1997).
21. See Putnam,"Factand Value,"and "Two Conceptsof Rationality,"in
Reason,Truthand History (Cambridge,UK: CambridgeUniversityPress, 1981),
pp. 127-149.
22. See Mohanty, "Introduction:Criticism as Politics," "On Situating
Objective Knowledge," and "Identity, MultiCulturalism, Justice," in Literary
Theoryand the ClaimsofHistory:Postmodernism,
Objectivity,MulticulturalPolitics
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), pp. 1-24, 149-197, and 198-252.

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23. See Nelson Goodman'sLanguagesofArt: An Approachto a Theoryof

Symbols (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc, 1968). Also see Mark
Jarzombek, "Describing the Language of Looking: Wolfflin and the History of
Aesthetic Experientialism" in Assemblageno. 23 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, April
1994), pp. 28-69.
24. In order to understand the distinction between practical reasoning and
deductive reasoning, let us review, G.E.M. Anscombe's imitation of a classroom
example of Aristotle, published in Intention (1966). For instance, let us imagine that
a person is reasoning along these lines:
Vitamin Z is good for all men over 60.
Pigs' tripes are full of Vitamin Z.
I am a man over 60.
Here are some pigs' tripes.
Now we are likely to believe that this individual will conclude from the
above premises that "I should have some pigs' tripes." Anscombe points out that if
we look at this example carefully, we will see that the only logical conclusion that
this person can draw is "What's here is good for me." But "What's here is good for
me" is far from meaning "I should have some." Furthermore, the reason why we
cannot draw "I should have some" from the above premises is because we cannot
construct sane premises that yield this conclusion. Suppose we alter the universal
premise slightly. "It is necessary for all men over 60 to eat all the food containing
Vitamin Z that they ever come across." In this case, the individual can conclude, "I
should have some." The only problem is that the above universal premise is an insane one. In this Aristotelian counterexample, Anscombe shows that in reasoning
that leads to action one cannot proceed from stated premises to a conclusion as there
is no general positive premise of the form "Always do X." For more on Aristotle's
notions of practical reason, see Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, translated by Terence
Irwin (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1985), pp. 1147a, 27-28;
G.E.M. Anscombe, Intention (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1966) Sec 33,
pp. 57-63; and Martha C. Nussbaum "The Discernment of Perception: An Aristotelian Conception of Private and Public Rationality" in Love's Knowledge: Essayson
Philosophy and Literature (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 54-105.
25. See Roger Scruton, "Experiencing Architecture," and "Judging Architecture," The Aesthetics of Architecture (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1979), pp. 71-134. In his book, The Aesthetics ofArchitecture, Roger Scruton proposed that an Aristotelian conception of practical reasoning is central to the aesthetics and architecture of everyday life. American academic circles do not acknowledge
Scruton's critique of modern architecture as major; they dismiss it as reflecting
English "New Right" conservatism of the 1980s. Although his promotion of classical forms based on his own personal taste undermines his own claims for judgments open to evaluation, Scruton's argument for objectivity in philosophical
aesthetics deserves greater recognition.
26. For these observations, I am indebted to Andrea Kahn's critique of the
Crystal Palace in "The Invisible Mask," Drawing Building Text, pp. 85-106.
27. In an essay entitled "Aesthetic and Non-Aesthetic," Frank Sibley argues
that justification of aesthetic experience is not a matter of demonstration but of
perceptual proof, bringing someone to see something. See Frank Sibley, "Aesthetic
and Non-Aesthetic," The Philosophical Review, vol. 74 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Uni-

versity, 1965): 135-159.

May2000 JAE53/4

28. This example also illustrates that our experiences are not fully rational.
It is not easy to distinguish between an illusion and cognition. The sifting of information and reinterpretation of the whole from the particular can happen suddenly,
slowly, or in retrospect, and is mediated by the social and political theories. The
most important consideration is on what epistemic foundation we base our judgments and evaluations and how do we distinguish between an illusion and cognition. For more on this, see Mohanty, Literary Theoryand the Claims ofHistory, pp.
202-216.
29. Iris Murdoch defines imagination as "a spontaneous intuitive capacity
to put together what is presented to us so as to form a coherent spatio-temporal
experience which is intellectually ordered and sensuously based." On the role imagination plays in perceiving truth, see Iris Murdoch, "Imagination," Metaphysics as a
Guide to Morals (London: Penguin Books, 1992), pp. 308-348.
30. Mohanty argues that experience, properly interpreted, can be as much
a source of knowledge, as it can be of mystification. Experiences can be evaluated
as justified or unjustified in relation to the subject and her world. See Mohanty,

LiteraryTheoryand the Claimsof History,p. 205.

31. In fact, Mohanty argues that we should see our experiences as complex
theories about (and explanations of) the social world. The only way to evaluate such
theories is to look at how well they work as explanations. Ibid., p. 238.
32. See Michael Hays, "Theory-Constitutive Conventions and Theory
Change," in Assemblage no.1 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987), pp. 117-128.

33. JamesFergusson,Historyof theModernStylesofArchitecture(London:

John Murray, Albemarle Street, 1873), p. 556.
34. Ibid., 557.

35. Nikolaus Pevsner, Pioneersof the ModernMovement:From William

Morris to Walter Gropius (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1937), p. 42.
36. Ibid., p. 125.

37. Nikolaus Pevsner,Pioneersof ModernDesign:From WilliamMorristo

Walter Gropius (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd., 1964), p. 133.
38. Henry-Russell Hitchcock, Jr. "The British Nineteenth Century and
Modern Architecture," in Modern Architecturein England (New York: The Museum
of Modern Art, 1937), p. 10.
39. Ralph Lieberman, "The Crystal Palace," in AA Files 12 (London: Architectural Association, 1976), p. 55.
40. Marshall Berman, All That Is Solid Melts Into Air (New York: Penguin
Books, 1988), pp. 235-248.
41. Fyodor Dostoevsky, Notes fom Underground, Serge Shishkoff, trans.
(New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1969), p. 34.
42. Andrea Kahn, "The Invisible Mask," pp. 85-106.
43. See Charles Taylor, "Responsibility for Self," in Amelie Oksenberg
Rorty, ed., The Identities ofPersons (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press),
pp. 281-299; Harry Frankfurt, in The Importance of What We Care About: Philosophical Essays(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press), pp. 80-94; Satya P.

Mohantyin LiteraryTheoryand the ClaimsofHistory,pp. 139-142.

44. On the relationship between deeply emotional experience and rationality, and states of freedom, see Harry Frankfurt, in The Importance of What We Care

About:Philosophical
Essays,pp. 89-90.
45. Mohanty,LiteraryTheoryand the ClaimsofHistory,xii.

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