Do Foreign Ownership and Corporate Governance Mechanism reduce

Information Asymmetry?
Devyana Indah Fajriani, Siti Nurwahyuningsih Harahap
Faculty of Economics and Business, Universitas Indonesia
devyana_indah@yahoo.com
s.nurwahyu@ui.ac.id
Abstract
This research aimed to examine the influence of foreign ownership and Corporate Governance (CG)
mechanism on information asymmetry of Indonesian listed companies. GCG mechanism variable consists of
Corporate Governance Perception Index (CGPI), size of board commissioner and proportion of independent
commissioner. The result shows that the foreign ownership and CGPI affect information asymmetry negatively,
which means that these two variables effectively reduce information asymmetry. Higher foreign ownership
creates bigger pressure for management to disclose more and therefore reduce information asymmetry. Firms
with higher CGPI score are more willing to be more transparent and therefore disclose more, which later reduce
information asymmetry. Meanwhile, board of commissioner size and proportion of independent commissioner
do not any influence on information asymmetry. In can be interpreted that the board of commissioner size and
independence do not represent the effectiveness of monitoring mechanism. Result of this study is very important
for an emerging country like Indonesia that needs to identify factor to strengthen its capital market. A reduction
in information asymmetry may lead to higher stock liquidity and lower cost of equity capital. It can be obtained
by attracting foreign investors and encouraging listed firms to enhance their CG mechanism effectiveness
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Information Asymmetry; Foreign Ownership; Corporate Governance
Perception Index (CGPI); Board of Commissioners; Independent Commissioners.

Background
Technological progress, easy access, and supportive regulations in a country would
facilitate foreign investors in observing and obtaining information concerning investment
climate prevailing in that country. It is also true for Indonesia; the Indonesia capital market,
known as an emerging market, had been one of the targets of investors coming from
developed markets. As an emerging market in general, the Indonesia stock exchange or
market offers higher risk premium (Salomons and Grootveld, 2003), so that it also offers an
expected return which is higher than those in developed markets.
Based on information from the Indonesia Stock Exchange, in 2014, the share or stock
ownership by foreign investors was still high, that is 63 percents. The high percentage of
stocks owned by foreign investors will increase liquidity and facilitate market efficiency;
however, risks are also high upon rate of exchange (Frensidy, 2008). Increase of foreign
ownership on stocks does not refer to the economic growth of the country only. Every
investor compares the return he/she will receive and with the risks in deciding an investment.
Risks are expectedly as minimum as possible with the return as high as possible. Risks for a
firm may come from both external and internal factors of the firm. Internal risks include
agency costs or asymmetric information.
Compared to domestic investors, foreign investors are on a disadvantageous position
in relation with their access to local firms (Choe et al. 2005). Therefore, there is a probability
that foreign investors make a poor decision to invest their capital on a firm which has high
asymmetric information (Jiang and Kim, 2004). In dealing with informed traders, uninformed
traders will likely increase their bid-ask spread in order to cover the potential loss, irrespective
of whether they are market makers or dealers (Brockman and Chung, 2002). Information
asymmetry also occurs between corporate management and investors in markets when the
investors suspect that managers and major shareholders conceal information concerning
corporate prospect in the future. They likely broaden bid-ask spread to overcome the risk of
information asymmetry.
Several previous researches showed that ownership structure (platform) influence
information asymmetry between managers and investors (Bank and Lorenz, 2005; Gaul and
Stebunovs, 2009; Boujelbene and Besbes 2012). However, researches that focus on impact of
stock ownership by foreigners on information symmetry are very limited. Therefore, this

study is study is intended to fill this gap and contribute to the Corporate Governance
literature. Result of this study is particularly important for emerging market like Indonesia
that needs to identify factors to strengthen its capital market, particularly in terms of market
liquidity. Lower information asymmetry may lead to higher market liquidity, and later lead to
lower cost of equity capital. Therefore it is important to identify factors that potentially
reduce information asymmetry.

Previous studies
A study on the impact of ownership structure on information asymmetry was
conducted by Choi et al. (2013), which shows that foreign ownership can reduce information
asymmetry. This study was conducted on 51 companies in China registered in Shanghai Stock
Exchange or Shenzhen Stock Exchange. This research showed that foreign investors made
different impacts on information asymmetry because of certain specific reasons. One possible
explanation of these differences is an investment horizon. Long-term foreign ownership
supported by the use of better accounting standards and quality, will reduce levels of
information asymmetry, whereas short-term foreign ownership will on the contrary increase
levels of information asymmetry.
Choi et al. (2013) also included ownership by other parties as control variable,
including: (1) state ownership, (2) stock ownership by firm (institutional ownership), (3)
stock ownership above 3% (block ownership), and (4) stock ownership by managers and
board of directors (insider ownership). Motivated by Choi et al. (2013), this study investigates
the impact of foreign ownership on information asymmetry in Indonesian capital market.
This study contribute to the literature by adding several variables that may also potentially
reduce information assymmetry, i.e. corporate governance mechanism. In particular, this
study includes 3 measures of CG mechanism, i.e. (1) Corporate Governance Perception Index
(CGPI), a CG score published by the Indonesian Institute of Corporate Governance (IICG),
(2) size of board of commissioners, and (3) proportion of independent commissioners.
Inclusion of CG variable in this research is supported by results of several previous
researches related to information asymmetry which showed that CG mechanism has
significant influence on reduction of information asymmetry around the time of profit
publication (Kanagaretnam, et al., 2007; Nugroho, 2009; Nurlinda, 2011). Companies with

stronger CG provide more information to the market which then reduce information
asymmetry (Khomsiyah, 2003).

Hypothesis
Influence of Foreign Stock Ownership on Information Asymmetry
Foreign stock ownership in companies has an important role to enhance the quality of
corporate management. The foreign stock ownership will drive improvement of control
(supervision) and information exposure because most of investors in emerging market are
more experienced and have higher skills (Choi et al., 2013). Most of foreign investors are
also institutional investors that require management to be capable of providing adequate
information in accordance to their standard. Therefore, higher proportion of foreign
ownershipin firms will presumably increase disclosure and reduce information asymmetry.
H1: Foreign stock ownership has a negative influence on information asymmetry.

Influences of Corporate Governance Index on Information Asymmetry

Efforts for participation and contribution of IICG in promoting implementation of CG
principles in Indonesia in creating an ethic, healthy, fair and sustainable business practices
were done continuously by conducting research programs and releasing CG rating, known as
Corporate Governance Perception Index (CGPI). Better implementation of CG principles will
be reflected in higher CGPI score. Therefore, CGPI may serve as indicator of the strength of
firms CG. A firm with high CGPI score implies a good corporate governance that may
increase stakeholders trust on the firm. Investors, shareholders, and creditors will have
perception that a firm with high CG score has better disclosure that potentially reduce levels
of information asymmetry.
H2: Corporate Governance Perception Index has negative influence on information asymmetry

Influence of the Size of Board of Commissioners on Information Asymmetry

Board of commissioners is required to perform an effective supervision (control) in
order to reduce information asymmetry between management and public. In his research,
Klein (2001) showed that size of board of commissioner is an effective management control.

With larger size of board of commissioners, the chance that managers will take an
opportunistic action by concealing material information regarding the conditions of the
company will be reduced significantly. A company with larger board of commissioners has a
smaller information asymmetry around the time of profit publication or financial report
(Kanagaretnam, et al. (2007). Therefore, it is hypothesized that
H3: Size of board of commissioners has negative influence on information asymmetry.

Influences of Board of Independent Commissioners on Information Asymmetry

Studies by Kanagaretnam, et al. (2007), Nugroho (2009), and Nurlinda (2011) proved
that existence of independent commissioners has a significant influence on reduction of
information asymmetry around the time of profit publication. Hermalin and Weisbach (2003)
in Kanagaretnam et al. (2007) found that greater number of independent commissioners will
decrease managerial ineffectiveness.
Based on the agency theory, it was shown that independent commissioners are
required in board of commissioners to control and supervise behaviors and action of the
commissioners, especially their opportunistic behavior (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). With
greater number of independent commissioners, investors will put trust upon quality of
information obtained. Larger proportion of independent commissioners in the structure of
board of commissioners will results in a better control or supervision which will reduce the
chances for managerial fraudulence. Based on this, the next hypothesis is as follows
H4 : Proportion of board of independent commissioners has negative influence on information
asymmetry.
The research framework of this study is presented in Figure 1.

Figure 1

Framework
Independent Variables
Dependent Variables

Foreign stock ownership [H1]

Corporate Governance Perception
Index (CGPI) [H2]
Size of Board of commissioners[H3]
Board of independent
commissioners[H4]

Information Asymmetry
Return Saham

Control Variables
Family Stock ownership
State Stock ownership
Institutional Stock ownership
Managerial Stock ownership
Stock Return Volatility
Volume of Turnover
Corporate Size

METHODOLOGY
Objectives of this research were to test or measure influence of foreign stock
ownership, CGPI index, size of board of commissioners and proportion of independent
commissioners on information asymmetry in companies registered in the Indonesia Stock
Exchange (Bursa Efek Indonesia), particularly CGPI participants for period of 2008-2012.
Participation in CGPI survey is voluntarily, therefore not all listed companies has the index.
Participation in CGPI is one criteria to include a firm in the sample as the CGPI is needed to
measure the quality of firms CG mechanism.
The regression model to test the hypotheses is as follows
SPREADit = 0 + 1 FOREIGNit + 2 CGPIit+ 3 BOARDSIZEit + 4 INDCOMit + 5
SIZEit + 6 TURNOVERit + 7 VOLATILITYit + 8 STATEit + 9 FAMit
+ 10 INSIDERit + 11 INSTIit + 11+j 3j=1 YEARj + eit

SPREAD
FOREIGN
CGPI
BOARDSIZE
INDCOM

= Bid-ask spread
= Foreign stock ownership
= Corporate Governance Perception Index
= Sizeof board of commissioners
= Proportion of independent commissioners

SIZE
= Size of the firm
TURNOVER
= Stock turnover
VOLATILITY = Stock return volatility
STATE
= State ownership
FAM = Family firm ownership
INSIDER
= Insider ownership
INSTI
= Institutional ownership

Dependent Variable (Y)

Proxy for information asymmetry in this study is Bid-ask spread. Bid-ask spread is the
difference between lowest supply prices for selling stock and the highest prices for buying the
stock. To measure the bid-ask spread, this research adopts the model of Choi et al. (2013) as
follows:
SPREADi,t = (aski,t bidi,t)/ ((aski,t + bidi,t)/2) x 100
Note

aski,t

= highest ask price of stock of the i firm in the week t

bidi,t

= lowest bid price of stock of the i firm in the week t

Independent Variables (X)

1.

Foreign stock ownership

Foreign stock ownership variable is measured as proportion of stocks owned by

foreign investors. Foreign ownership (FOREIGN) is equivalent to percents of stocks owned

by foreign citizens or institutions compared to total stocks of the company, as follows:

2.

Corporate Governance Perception Index (CGPI)

Corporate Governance Perception Index (CGPI) is a publication by IICG as the

output of its independent research in collaboration with the SWA magazine. The CGPI is
regarded as a credible and reliable ratings to determine the rating (rank) of CG
implementation in Indonesian firms. The index is grouped into three categories of CG
reliability, as presented in Table 1.

Table 1
CGPI Rating
Score

Level of Reliability

85,00 100

very reliable

70,00 84,99

reliable

55,00 69,99

sufficiently reliable

Sounce: The Indonesian Institue for Corporate Governance (IICG)

3.

Size of Board of Commissioners

The size of board of commissioners variable is equivalent to the total number of

commissioners as disclosed in the annual report of each firm. In case the annual report is
unavailable, the data is obtained from Indonesian Capital Market Directory (ICMD).

4.

Proportion of Independent Commissioners

Independent commissioners are member of board of commissioners unaffiliated with

management, other member of the board and majority shareholders. Proportion of

independent commissioners is derived from the percentage of independent commissioners as
compared to total number of commissioners listed in the companys board of commissioners,
as follows:

The data was obtained from annual reports of every firm or from Indonesian Capital Market
Directory (ICMD).

Control Variable
1.

Stock Return Volatility

Stock return volatility was measured using standard deviations of average of weekly

stock price returns at closing price minus previous weekly closing price.
Standard deviations of daily stock price returns =

2.

Turnover Volume
Turnover volume or trade volume is usually used to measure market depth that is

volume of stocks traded divided by market value of equity during year t.

TURNOVERit =
3.

Size of Firm
Size of firm was determined by natural logarithm of total sales at the end if fiscal year

before profit publication dates and written with notation SIZEit.

4.

State ownership of stock

State ownership of stock was measured by the number of number of stock owned by

state divided by total number of stocks of the firm.

5.

Stock ownership by family (Family Firm)

Stock ownership by family means that the whole individuals and firms whose

ownership was listed or registered (ownership 5% or more must be registered), except public
company, state, financial institution (such as investment institution, fund management,
insurance company, bank, etc.) and public (individuals whose ownership is not obliged to
register or less than 5%).

6.

Insider Stock Ownership (Insider Ownership)

Insider ownership is measured based on percents of stocks owned by management

(consisting of directors and commissioners).

7.

Institutional Stock Ownership

Percents of institutional ownership equals to number of stock owned by institutions as

compared to total stocks of the company.

Population and Sample

Data used in this research are manufacturing companies registered in the Indonesia
Stock Exchange that participate in CGPI survey for period of 5 years from 2008 to 2012. The
observation can not be extended to the year after 2012 as the latest CGPI was for the period of
2012, which was published by IICG in December 2013.
Selection of sample in this research was conducted using purposive sampling
method, that meet several criterias as follows:
1. registered in the Indonesia Stock Exchange (not delisted) during the observation period
(2008-2012)
2. participated in CGPI survey during the period of January 2008 December 2012
3. issued Annual Report for the period of observation
4. had historical data concerning last bid and ask and closing price, stock trading volume, and
percents of stocks owned by public.
Analysis and Discussion
Results of Regression Test
Result of linear regression using regression model as previously discussed is presented
in Table 3.

Table 3
Regression Analysis
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

FOREIGN
CGPI
BOARDSIZE
INDCOM
SIZE

- 5.057075
- 2.051681
0.093934
1.401158
- 0.053427

1.304495
0.045760
0.149842
1.587623
0.204195

-3.876653
-1.129392
0.626889
0.882551
-0.261648

0.0002**
0.0026**
0.5319
0.3792
0.7940

TURNOVER
VOLATILITY
STATE
FAMILY
INSIDER
INSTI
C

3.893128
97.74684
- 3.001402
- 7.693512
- 33.77195
- 4.120060
1.189251

4.342127
5.476646
1.120756
4.192184
16.40030
1.185307
5.696388

0.896595
17.84794
-2.678015
-1.835204
-2.059227
-3.475944
0.208773

R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

0.3717
0.0000
0.0084
0.0689
0.0416
0.0007
0.8350
0.784463
0.765188
40.69713
0.000000

Hypothesis Testing and Interpretation of Results of Regression Analysis:

1.

Influence of Foreign Stock Ownership on Information Asymmetry

At significance levels of 95% ( = 5%), the FOREIGN variable (with coefficient

5.057075) has a p-value of 0.0002. This value is less than 0.05 so that the FOREIGN variable
is within the reject domain of H0, meaning that FOREIGN variable influences information
asymmetry of the firm. Coefficient of this variable is also negative, so that H1 is supported.
Negative value and significance of FOREIGN variable indicate that the larger the foreign
stock ownership in companies, the larger its influence is on reduction of the companies
information asymmetry. When the percentage of foreign stock ownership is high, the
company was required to expose more information. The demand for more information comes
from foreign investors who are experienced and highly-skilled, that dominates emerging
market such as Indonesia. This situation put pressure on management to release more
information, that will later on minimize information asymmetry, in order to avoid
dissatisfaction and suspicion from the foreign shareholders.
Results obtained in this research is consistent with the results of Choi et al. (2013) which
revealed that the larger the foreign stock ownership, the lower the information asymmetry of
companies.
2.

Influence of CGPI on Information Asymmetry

At significance level of 95% ( = 5%), CGPI variable has a p-value of 0.0026 (less than

0.05) so that CGPI variable conclusively influences companies information asymmetry.

Coefficient of this variable is negative, providing a support for H2. Negative value and
significance of CGPI variable indicates that the better the Corporate Governance
mechanismin in the companies, the greater its influence on reduction of the companies

information asymmetry. The average CGPI of sample companies in this research is 80.61,
which fall under the category of reliable company. It means that the company has made
attempts to minimize information asymmetry by adopting good corporate governance which
will increase shareholders trust so that it can reduce information asymmetry. Results of this
research is consistent to previous studies by Nurbuana (2011) and Fransiska (2011) who
concluded that implemention of corporate governance mechanism will influence negatively
information asymmetry.
3.

Influence of Size of Board of Commissioners on Information Asymmetry

At significance level of 95% ( = 5%), BOARDSIZE variable has a p-value of 0.539

(greater than 0.05) so that in can be inferred that BOARDSIZE variable does not influence
companys information asymmetry. This result is contrary to the result obtained by
Kanagretnam et.al (2007) who concluded that size of board of commissioners has a negative
influence on information asymmetry.
A possible reason for this contrary result for Indonesian firms is that Board of
commissioners in Indonesian firms are representative of major shareholders that are highly
concentrated in the founding family. This structure influences ability and independence of
board of commissioners to adequately control or supervise management in attempts to reduce
asymmetry level. The agency problem in a market like Indonesia is between the major
shareholder and minor shareholder, not between management and shareholder. Board of
commissioners is in the position to support policies which benefit the major shareholders,
including the level of disclosure that affects information asymmetry. Therefore, the board of
commissioners is not an effective mechanism to reduce information asymmetry.
Another possible explanation is that the size of board of commissioners was not the main
determinant of effectiveness of supervision of companys management. With large number of
member of board of commissioners, they will find trouble in performing their tasks, such as
difficulties in coordinating works of the boards members, difficulties in supervising and
controlling managements actions, and difficulties in making decision beneficial for the
companies (Yermack 1996, Jensen 1993) in Nurlinda (2011).
4. Influence of Proportion Independent Commissioners on Information Asymmetry
Coefficient of this variable is negative, which means that the higher the proportion of
independent commissioners in the board the lower the level of information asymmetry in the
company is. But, with significance level of 95% ( = 5%), the INDCOM variable has a p-

value of 0.3792 (greater than 0.05) so that the INDCOM variable does not affect companys
information asymmetry. This result is not consistent with the result of research conducted by
Kanagaretnam et. al. al. (2007), Nugroho (2009), and Fransiska (2011) which concluded that
proportion of independent commissioners will positively influence information asymmetry.
Possible reasons for this result are similar for the explanation for result of board of
commissioners size as previously discussed. The role of independent commissioners will
follow the role of board of commissioners as a whole. When the board of commissioners
contribute

insignificantly

in

controlling

management

practices,

the

independent

commissioners will do the same.

Another possible explanation for this result is that the presence of board of
commissioners in company was only to fulfill requirement by Indonesian capital market
authority that a go-public company should has at least 30% of independent commissioners to
the total size of the board. In practice, the companies tend to meet this minimum requirement,
showing that there is no willingness to add more independent commissioners in the board
structure to enhance the board independency. With a very minimum number of independent
commissioners, it is not surprising that the independent commissioners have limited role to
reduce companys information asymmetry.

Conclusions
Objective of this research is to determine influence of foreign stock ownership,
corporate governance mechanism, size of board of commissioners and proportion of
independent commissioners on information asymmetry of companies included in Corporate
Governance Perception Index (CGPI) registered in the Indonesia Stock Exchange during the
period of 2008-2012. Result of this study shows that foreign stock ownership and CG
mechanism reduce information asymmetry, while size of board of commissioners and
proportion of independent commissioners do not have influence on information asymmetry.
It can be concluded that when the percentage of foreign stock ownership is high, the
company was required to expose more information by the experienced and highly-skilled
foreign stockholders. This pressure to disclose more will later minimize information
asymmetry of the firm. Another conclusion is that the better the CG mechanismin in the
companies, the greater its influence on reduction of the companies information asymmetry.

Companies with good CG are more willing to be more transparent, therefore they disclose
more. Also, implementation of good CG may increase shareholders trust and decrease risk,
which then later reduce information asymmetry as a proxy of risk.
Result of this study is particularly important for emerging market like Indonesia that
needs to identify factors to strengthen its capital market, particularly in terms of market
liquidity. Lower information asymmetry may lead to higher market liquidity, and later lead to
lower cost of equity capital. Result of this study suggests that to decrease information
asymmetry, Indonesian capital market authority should attract foreign investors to invest more
in Indonesia, as the foreign investors potentially put pressure for more disclosure. Authority
should also encourage implementation of good CG by go public firms in order to increase
disclosure that will lead to lower information asymmetry.
Limitations
Limitations of this research, among others, are that this research did not take into
account investment horizons which cause different influences on information asymmetry, as
conducted in Choi et al. (2013). This is due to the difficulties to obtain data required to
observe the investment horizons. Future study may attempt to obtain the data so that the result
of the study can be compared to Choi et al. (2013). In this research, the sample companies
are not separated based on the industry and, consequently, the potential impact of industry
disclosure practice on information asymmetry is ignored. This research used only internal
factors, and did not take into account external factors such as the countrys macro factors and
other factors having broader coverage that might influence stock prices; particularly bid-askspread which has became a proxy upon the level of information asymmetry of the companies.

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Laws and Regulations

Stock record-keeping regulation No I-A Kep-00001/BEI/01-2014: about Common Definition
Stock Record which is Equity in Indonesian Stock Exchange.
Indonesian Reoublic Act No. 8 year 1995 about Market Capital Chapter XI Section 95-99.
vivi@iicg.org
www.finance.yahoo.com
www.idx.co.id
www.iicg.com
www.ksei.co.id

APPENDIX 1
STATISTICS DESKRIPTIVE
Mean
Median
Maximum
Minimum
Std. Dev.
Skewness
Kurtosis

SPREAD
9.077749
8.307356
25.55530
0.108500
4.591485
1.045900
4.851568

FOREIGN
0.178593
0.051200
0.850800
0.000000
0.262638
1.423450
3.610497

CGPI
80.61467
80.04000
91.91000
68.71000
5.881525
-0.042034
2.332318

BOARDSIZE
5.925926
6.000000
10.00000
3.000000
1.577025
0.546425
3.077503

INDCOM
0.395316
0.400000
0.800000
0.000000
0.164202
-0.377813
3.721953

SIZE
TURNOVER VOLATILITY
29.61609
0.052091
0.068765
29.74456
0.032558
0.060606
31.97668
0.241200
0.204900
25.33840
0.000000
-0.030085
1.415948
0.058158
0.039554
-0.856764
1.561519
0.825526
3.639961
4.836514
4.359997

STATE
0.252039
0.000000
0.749400
0.000000
0.307845
0.430194
1.253986

FAMILY
0.021304
0.000000
0.213500
0.000000
0.058038
2.595820
8.133632

INSIDER
0.004708
0.000000
0.068300
0.000000
0.014393
3.892221
17.23866

INSTI
0.181506
0.000000
0.956500
0.000000
0.290956
1.441416
3.692664

Jarque-Bera
Probability

43.89710
0.000000

47.68622
0.000000

2.547373
0.279798

6.751838
0.034187

6.143547
0.046339

18.81971
0.000082

73.83457
0.000000

25.73756
0.000003

21.31218
0.000024

299.8536
0.000000

1481.270
0.000000

49.44659
0.000000

Sum
Sum Sq. Dev.

1225.496
2824.952

24.11005
9.243127

10882.98
4635.373

800.0000
333.2593

53.36762
3.612932

3998.173
268.6577

7.032346
0.453232

9.283221
0.209649

34.02531
12.69894

2.876100
0.451372

0.635520
0.027759

24.50333
11.34386

Observations

135

135

135

135

135

135

135

135

135

135

135

135

APPENDIX 2

REGRESSION TEST OLS

Dependent Variable: SPREAD

Method: Least Squares
Date: 12/28/14 Time: 09:30
Sample: 1 135
Included observations: 135
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

FOREIGN
CGPI
BOARDSIZE
INDCOM
SIZE
TURNOVER
VOLATILITY
STATE
FAMILY
INSIDER
INSTI
C

-5.057075
-0.051681
0.093934
1.401158
-0.053427
3.893128
97.74684
-3.001402
-7.693512
-33.77195
-4.120060
1.189251

1.304495
0.045760
0.149842
1.587623
0.204195
4.342127
5.476646
1.120756
4.192184
16.40030
1.185307
5.696388

-3.876653
1.129392
0.626889
0.882551
-0.261648
0.896595
17.84794
-2.678015
-1.835204
-2.059227
-3.475944
0.208773

0.0002
0.0026
0.5319
0.3792
0.7940
0.3717
0.0000
0.0084
0.0689
0.0416
0.0007
0.8350

R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

0.784463
0.765188
2.224916
608.8810
-293.2352
40.69713
0.000000

Mean dependent var

S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
Hannan-Quinn criter.
Durbin-Watson stat

9.077749
4.591485
4.522003
4.780250
4.626947
1.796711