Citizenship

G.R. No. 175430

June 18, 2012
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
KERRY LAO ONG, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Naturalization laws are strictly construed in the governments favor and against the
applicant.1 The applicant carries the burden of proving his full compliance with the
requirements of law.2
Before the Court is the Republics appeal of the appellate courts Decision 3 dated
May 13, 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 74794, which affirmed the trial courts grant of
citizenship to respondent Kerry Lao Ong (Ong). The Court of Appeals (CA) held:
With all the foregoing, We find no cogent reason to reverse the decision of the court
a quo.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, 7th Judicial
Region, Branch 9 in its Decision dated November 23, 2001, is AFFIRMED in toto and
the instant appeal is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.4
Factual Antecedents
On November 26, 1996, respondent Ong, then 38 years old, 5 filed a Petition for
Naturalization.6 The case was docketed as Nat. Case No. 930 and assigned to Branch
9 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City. As decreed by Commonwealth Act No. 473,
as amended by Republic Act No. 530, known as the Revised Naturalization Law, 7the
petition was published in the Official Gazette 8 and a newspaper of general
circulation,9 and posted in a public place for three consecutive weeks,10 six months
before the initial hearing.11 The Office of the Solicitor General entered its appearance
and authorized12 the city prosecutor to appear on its behalf. 13 Accordingly, Fiscals
Ester Veloso and Perla Centino participated in the proceedings below.
Respondent Ong was born at the Cebu General Hospital in Cebu City to Chinese
citizens Siao Hwa Uy Ong and Flora Ong on March 4, 1958. 14 He is registered as a
resident alien and possesses an alien certificate of registration 15 and a native-born
certificate of residence16 from the Bureau of Immigration. He has been continuously
and permanently residing17 in the Philippines from birth up to the present.18 Ong can
speak19 and write in Tagalog, English, Cebuano, and Amoy.20 He took his
elementary21 and high school22 studies at the Sacred Heart School for Boys in Cebu
City, where social studies, Pilipino, religion, and the Philippine Constitution are
taught. He then obtained a degree in Bachelor of Science in Management from the
Ateneo De Manila University on March 18, 1978.23
On February 1, 1981, he married Griselda S. Yap, also a Chinese citizen. 24 They have
four children,25 namely, Kerri Gail (born on April 15, 1983),26 Kimberley Grace (born
on May 15, 1984),27 Kyle Gervin (born on November 4, 1986),28 and Kevin Griffith
(born on August 21, 1993),29 who were all born and
raised in the Philippines. The children of school age were enrolled 30 at the Sacred
Heart School for Boys31 and Sacred Heart School for Girls.32 At the time of the filing
of the petition, Ong, his wife, and children were living at No. 55 Eagle Street, Sto.
Nio Village, Banilad, Cebu City.
Ong has lived at the following addresses:33
1. Manalili Street, Cebu City (when Ong was in Grade 2)34
2. Crystal Compound Guadalupe, Cebu City (until 1970) 35
3. No. 671 A.S. Fortuna Street, Cebu City (until 1992)36
4. No. 55 Eagle Street, Sto. Nio Village, Banilad, Cebu City (until 1998); 37 and
5. No. 50 Roselle Street, North Town Homes, Nasipit, Talamban, Cebu City
(present).38

Ong alleged in his petition that he has been a "businessman/business manager"

since 1989, earning an average annual income of P150,000.00.39 When he testified,
however, he said that he has been a businessman since he graduated from college
in 1978.40 Moreover, Ong did not specify or describe the nature of his business. 41
As proof of his income, Ong presented four tax returns for the years 1994 to
1997.42 Based on these returns, Ongs gross annual income was P60,000.00 for
1994; P118,000.00 for 1995; P118,000.00 for 1996; andP128,000.00 for 1997.
Respondent further testified that he socializes43 with Filipinos; celebrates the
Sinulog, fiestas, birthdays, and Christmas. 44 He is a member of the Alert/ React VII
Communications Group and the Masonic organization. 45
Respondent Ong presented a health certificate to prove46 that he is of sound physical
and mental health.47 As shown by the clearances from the National Bureau of
Investigation,48 the Philippine National Police,49 the trial courts,50 and the
barangay,51 he has no criminal record or pending criminal charges. 52
Respondent presented Rudy Carvajal (Carvajal) and Bernard Sepulveda (Sepulveda)
as his character witnesses. At that time, Sepulveda was the vice-mayor of Borbon,
Cebu.53 He has known Ong since 1970 because Ong is the close friend of
Sepulvedas brother.54 He testified that Ong is very helpful in the community and
adopts the Filipino culture.55 Meanwhile, Carvajal testified that he has known Ong
since the 1970s because they were high school classmates.56 He testified that Ong is
morally irreproachable and possesses all the qualifications to be a good citizen of
the Philippines.57 Carvajal is a businessman engaged in leasing office spaces. 58
On November 23, 2001, the trial court granted Ongs petition. Among other things,
the trial court held that:
xxxx
By the testimonial and documentary evidence adduced by the [respondent], the
following facts had been established.59
xxxx
x x x [Respondent] is a businessman/business manager engaged in lawful trade and
business since 1989 from which he derives an average annual income of more than
One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (Exhibit U, V, W, and X with sub-markings); x x
x60
The dispositive portion of the trial courts Decision reads:
From the evidence presented by [respondent], this Court believes and so holds that
[respondent] possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
provided for by law to become a citizen of the Philippines.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly,
[respondent] KERRY LAO ONG is hereby admitted as citizen of the Republic of the
Philippines.
SO ORDERED.61
Republics Appeal
On January 31, 2003, the Republic, through the Solicitor General, appealed to the
CA. The Republic faulted the trial court for granting Ongs petition despite his failure
to prove that he possesses a known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation
as required under Section 2, fourth paragraph of the Revised Naturalization Law. 62
The Republic posited that, contrary to the trial courts finding, respondent Ong did
not prove his allegation that he is a businessman/business manager earning an
average income of P150,000.00 since 1989. His income tax returns belie the value
of his income. Moreover, he failed to present evidence on the nature of his
profession or trade, which is the source of his income. Considering that he has four
minor children (all attending exclusive private schools), he has declared no other
property and/or bank deposits, and he has not declared owning a family home, his
alleged income cannot be considered lucrative. Under the circumstances, the

Republic v. Ong 1 of 14

Republic maintained that respondent Ong is not qualified as he does not possess a
definite and existing business or trade.63
Respondent Ong conceded that the Supreme Court has adopted a higher standard of
income for applicants for naturalization.64 He likewise conceded that the legal
definition of lucrative income is the existence of an appreciable margin of his income
over his expenses.65 It is his position that his income, together with that of his wife,
created an appreciable margin over their expenses.66 Moreover, the steady increase
in his income, as evidenced in his tax returns, proved that he is gainfully
employed.67
The appellate court dismissed the Republics appeal. It explained:
In the case at bar, the [respondent] chose to present [pieces of evidence] which
relates [sic] to his lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation. Judging from the
present standard of living and the personal circumstances of the [respondent] using
the present time as the index for the income stated by the [respondent], it may
appear that the [respondent] has no lucrative employment. However, We must be
mindful that the petition for naturalization was filed in 1996, which is already ten
years ago. It is of judicial notice that the value of the peso has taken a considerable
plunge in value since that time up to the present. Nonetheless, if We consider the
income earned at that time, the ages of the children of the [respondent], the
employment of his wife, We can say that there is an appreciable margin of his
income over his expenses as to be able to provide for an adequate support. 68
The appellate court denied the Republics motion for reconsideration 69 in its
Resolution dated November 7, 2006.70
Issue
Whether respondent Ong has proved that he has some known lucrative trade,
profession or lawful occupation in accordance with Section 2, fourth paragraph of
the Revised Naturalization Law.
Petitioners Arguments
Petitioner assigns as error the appellate courts ruling that "there is an appreciable
margin of (respondents) income over his expenses as to be able to provide for an
adequate support."71 The Republic contends that the CAs conclusion is not
supported by the evidence on record and by the prevailing law. 72
The only pieces of evidence presented by Ong to prove that he qualifies under
Section 2, fourth paragraph of the Revised Naturalization Law, are his tax returns for
the years 1994 to 1997, which show that Ong earns fromP60,000.00 to P128,000.00
annually. This declared income is far from the legal requirement of lucrative income.
It is not sufficient to provide for the needs of a family of six, with four children of
school age.73
Moreover, none of these tax returns describes the source of Ongs income, much
less can they describe the lawful nature thereof.74 The Republic also noted that Ong
did not even attempt to describe what business he is engaged in. Thus, the trial and
appellate courts shared conclusion that Ong is a businessman is grounded entirely
on speculation, surmises or conjectures. 75
The Republic thus prays for the reversal of the appellate courts Decision and the
denial of Ongs petition for naturalization.76
Respondents Arguments
Respondent asks for the denial of the petition as it seeks a review of factual findings,
which review is improper in a Rule 45 petition. 77 He further submits that his tax
returns support the conclusion that he is engaged in lucrative trade. 78
Our Ruling
The courts must always be mindful that naturalization proceedings are imbued with
the highest public interest.79Naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and
strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant. 80 The burden

of proof rests upon the applicant to show full and complete compliance with the
requirements of law.81
In the case at bar, the controversy revolves around respondent Ongs compliance
with the qualification found in Section 2, fourth paragraph of the Revised
Naturalization Law, which provides:
SECTION 2. Qualifications. Subject to section four of this Act, any person having
the following qualifications may become a citizen of the Philippines by
naturalization:
xxxx
Fourth. He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five thousand
pesos, Philippine currency, or must have some known lucrative trade, profession, or
lawful occupation;
x x x x82
Based on jurisprudence, the qualification of "some known lucrative trade, profession,
or lawful occupation" means "not only that the person having the employment gets
enough for his ordinary necessities in life. It must be shown that the employment
gives one an income such that there is an appreciable margin of his income over his
expenses as to be able to provide for an adequate support in the event of
unemployment, sickness, or disability to work and thus avoid ones becoming the
object of charity or a public charge." 83 His income should permit "him and the
members of his family to live with reasonable comfort, in accordance with the
prevailing standard of living, and consistently with the demands of human dignity, at
this stage of our civilization."84
Moreover, it has been held that in determining the existence of a lucrative
income, the courts should consider only the applicants income; his or her spouses
income should not be included in the assessment. The spouses additional income is
immaterial "for under the law the petitioner should be the one to possess some
known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation to qualify him to become a
Filipino citizen."85 Lastly, the Court has consistently held that the applicants
qualifications must be determined as of the time of the filing of his petition. 86
Going over the decisions of the courts below, the Court finds that the foregoing
guidelines have not been observed. To recall, respondent Ong and his witnesses
testified that Ong is a businessman but none of them identified Ongs business or
described its nature. The Court finds it suspect that Ong did not even testify as to
the nature of his business, whereas his witness Carvajal did with respect to his own
(leasing of office space). A comparison of their respective testimonies is reproduced
below:
Carvajals testimony
Q: You said earlier that you are a businessman?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: How long have you been a businessman?
A: Since 1980.
Q: And what is the business you are engaged in?
A: I am into leasing of office spaces.87
Kerry Lao Ongs testimony
Q: What is your present occupation, Mr. Ong?
A: Businessman.
Q: Since when have you engaged in that occupation?
A: After graduation from college.88
The dearth of documentary evidence compounds the inadequacy of the testimonial
evidence. The applicant provided no documentary evidence, like business permits,
registration, official receipts, or other business records to demonstrate his
proprietorship or participation in a business. Instead, Ong relied on his general
assertions to prove his possession of "some known lucrative trade, profession or

Republic v. Ong 2 of 14

lawful occupation." Bare, general assertions cannot discharge the burden of proof
that is required of an applicant for naturalization.
The paucity of evidence is unmistakable upon a reading of the trial courts decision.
The trial court held that respondent Ong "is a businessman engaged in lawful trade
and business since 1989"89 but did not cite the evidence, which supports such
finding. After poring over the records, the Court finds that the reason for the lack of
citation is the absence of evidence to support such conclusion. The trial courts
conclusion that Ong has been a businessman since 1989 is only an assertion found
in Ongs petition for naturalization.90 But, on the witness stand, Ong did not affirm
this assertion. Instead, he testified that he had been a businessman since he
graduated from college, which was in 1978.91
Further, the trial court, citing Exhibits U, V, W, and X (which are Ongs tax returns),
mistakenly found that Ong "derives an average annual income of more than One
Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos."92 This conclusion is not supported by the evidence.
The cited tax returns show that Ongs gross annual income for the years 1994 to
1997 were P60,000.00, P118,000.00, P118,000.00, and P128,000.00, respectively.
The average annual income from these tax returns is P106,000.00 only,
not P150,000.00 as the trial court held. It appears that the trial court again derived
its conclusion from an assertion in Ongs petition,93 but not from the evidence.
As for the CA, it no longer ruled on the question whether Ong has a known business
or trade. Instead, it ruled on the issue whether Ongs income, as evidenced by his
tax returns, can be considered lucrative in 1996. In determining this issue, the CA
considered the ages of Ongs children, the income that he earned in 1996, and the
fact that Ongs wife was also employed at that time. It then concluded that there is
an appreciable margin of Ongs income over his expenses.94
The Court finds the appellate courts decision erroneous. First, it should not have
included the spouses income in its assessment of Ongs lucrative income. 95 Second,
it failed to consider the following circumstances which have a bearing on Ongs
expenses vis--vis his income: (a) that Ong does not own real property; (b) that his
proven average gross annual income around the time of his application, which was
only P106,000.00, had to provide for the education of his four minor children; and (c)
that Ongs children were all studying in exclusive private schools in Cebu City. Third,
the CA did not explain how it arrived at the conclusion that Ongs income had an
appreciable margin over his known expenses.
Ongs gross income might have been sufficient to meet his familys basic needs, but
there is simply no sufficient proof that it was enough to create an appreciable
margin of income over expenses. Without an appreciable margin of his income over
his familys expenses, his income cannot be expected to provide him and his family
"with adequate support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or disability to
work."96
Clearly, therefore, respondent Ong failed to prove that he possesses the qualification
of a known lucrative trade provided in Section 2, fourth paragraph, of the Revised
Naturalization Law.97
The Court finds no merit in respondents submission that a Rule 45 petition
precludes a review of the factual findings of the courts below. 98 In the first place, the
trial court and appellate courts decisions contain conclusions that are bereft of
evidentiary support or factual basis, which is a known exception 99 to the general rule
that only questions of law may be entertained in a Rule 45 petition.
Moreover, a review of the decisions involving petitions for naturalization shows that
the Court is not precluded from reviewing the factual existence of the applicants
qualifications.1wphi1 In fact, jurisprudence holds that the entire records of the
naturalization case are open for consideration in an appeal to this Court. 100 Indeed,
"[a] naturalization proceeding is so infused with public interest that it has been
differently categorized and given special treatment. x x x [U]nlike in ordinary judicial

contest, the granting of a petition for naturalization does not preclude the reopening
of that case and giving the government another opportunity to present new
evidence. A decision or order granting citizenship will not even constitute res
judicata to any matter or reason supporting a subsequent judgment cancelling the
certification of naturalization already granted, on the ground that it had been
illegally or fraudulently procured. For the same reason, issues even if not raised in
the lower court may be entertained on appeal. As the matters brought to the
attention of this Court x x x involve facts contained in the disputed decision of the
lower court and admitted by the parties in their pleadings, the present proceeding
may be considered adequate for the purpose of determining the correctness or
incorrectness of said decision, in the light of the law and extant jurisprudence." 101 In
the case at bar, there is even no need to present new evidence. A careful review of
the extant records suffices to hold that respondent Ong has not proven his
possession of a "known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation" to qualify
for naturalization.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition of the Republic of the Philippines is
GRANTED. The Decision dated May 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 74794 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Petition for Naturalization of Kerry Lao
Ong is DENIED for failure to comply with Section 2, fourth paragraph, of
Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended.
SO ORDERED.
Citizenship
G.R. No. 176947
February 19, 2009
GAUDENCIO M. CORDORA, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and GUSTAVO S. TAMBUNTING, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus, with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
In EO Case No. 05-17, Gaudencio M. Cordora (Cordora) accused Gustavo S.
Tambunting (Tambunting) of an election offense for violating Section 74 in relation to
Section 262 of the Omnibus Election Code. The Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) En Banc dismissed Cordoras complaint in a Resolution1 dated 18 August
2006. The present petition seeks to reverse the 18 August 2006 Resolution as well
as the Resolution2 dated 20 February 2007 of the COMELEC En Banc which denied
Cordoras motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
In his complaint affidavit filed before the COMELEC Law Department, Cordora
asserted that Tambunting made false assertions in the following items:
That Annex A [Tambuntings Certificate of Candidacy for the 2001 elections] and
Annex B [Tambuntings Certificate of Candidacy for the 2004 elections] state, among
others, as follows, particularly Nos. 6, 9 and 12 thereof:
1. No. 6 I am a Natural Born/Filipino Citizen
2. No. 9 No. of years of Residence before May 14, 2001.
36 in the Philippines and 25 in the Constituency where I seek to be elected;
3. No. 12 I am ELIGIBLE for the office I seek to be elected. 3 (Boldface and
capitalization in the original)
Cordora stated that Tambunting was not eligible to run for local public office because
Tambunting lacked the required citizenship and residency requirements.
To disprove Tambuntings claim of being a natural-born Filipino citizen, Cordora
presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration which stated that, in two
instances, Tambunting claimed that he is an American: upon arrival in the Philippines

Republic v. Ong 3 of 14

on 16 December 2000 and upon departure from the Philippines on 17 June 2001.
According to Cordora, these travel dates confirmed that Tambunting acquired
American citizenship through naturalization in Honolulu, Hawaii on 2 December
2000. Cordora concluded:
That Councilor Gustavo S. Tambunting contrary to the provision of Sec 74 (OEC):
[sic] Re: CONTENTS OF CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY: which requires the
declarant/affiant to state, among others, under oath, that he is a Filipino (No. 6),
No. 9- residence requirement which he lost when [he was] naturalized as
an American Citizen on December 2, 2000 at [sic] Honolulu, Hawaii, knowingly and
willfully affirmed and reiterated that he possesses the above basic
requirements under No. 12 that he is indeed eligible for the office to which
he seeks to be elected, when in truth and in fact, the contrary is indubitably
established by his own statementsbefore the Philippine Bureau of Immigration x x
x.4 (Emphases in the original)
Tambunting, on the other hand, maintained that he did not make any
misrepresentation in his certificates of candidacy. To refute Cordoras claim that
Tambunting is not a natural-born Filipino, Tambunting presented a copy of his birth
certificate which showed that he was born of a Filipino mother and an American
father. Tambunting further denied that he was naturalized as an American citizen.
The certificate of citizenship conferred by the US government after Tambuntings
father petitioned him through INS Form I-130 (Petition for Relative) merely confirmed
Tambuntings citizenship which he acquired at birth. Tambuntings possession of an
American passport did not mean that Tambunting is not a Filipino citizen.
Tambunting also took an oath of allegiance on 18 November 2003 pursuant to
Republic Act No. 9225 (R.A. No. 9225), or the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition
Act of 2003.
Tambunting further stated that he has resided in the Philippines since birth.
Tambunting has imbibed the Filipino culture, has spoken the Filipino language, and
has been educated in Filipino schools. Tambunting maintained that proof of his
loyalty and devotion to the Philippines was shown by his service as councilor of
Paraaque.
To refute Cordoras claim that the number of years of residency stated in
Tambuntings certificates of candidacy is false because Tambunting lost his
residency because of his naturalization as an American citizen, Tambunting
contended that the residency requirement is not the same as citizenship.
The Ruling of the COMELEC Law Department
The COMELEC Law Department recommended the dismissal of Cordoras complaint
against Tambunting because Cordora failed to substantiate his charges against
Tambunting. Cordoras reliance on the certification of the Bureau of Immigration that
Tambunting traveled on an American passport is not sufficient to prove that
Tambunting is an American citizen.
The Ruling of the COMELEC En Banc
The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the findings and the resolution of the COMELEC Law
Department. The COMELEC En Banc was convinced that Cordora failed to support
his accusation against Tambunting by sufficient and convincing evidence.
The dispositive portion of the COMELEC En Bancs Resolution reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant complaint is hereby DISMISSED for
insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause.
SO ORDERED.5
Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento (Commissioner Sarmiento) wrote a separate
opinion which concurred with the findings of the En Banc Resolution. Commissioner
Sarmiento pointed out that Tambunting could be considered a dual citizen.
Moreover, Tambunting effectively renounced his American citizenship when he filed
his certificates of candidacy in 2001 and 2004 and ran for public office.

Cordora filed a motion for reconsideration which raised the same grounds and the
same arguments in his complaint. In its Resolution promulgated on 20 February
2007, the COMELEC En Banc dismissed Cordoras motion for reconsideration for lack
of merit.
The Issue
Cordora submits that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it declared that there is no sufficient evidence
to support probable cause that may warrant the prosecution of Tambunting for an
election offense.
Cordoras petition is not an action to disqualify Tambunting because of Tambuntings
failure to meet citizenship and residency requirements. Neither is the present
petition an action to declare Tambunting a non-Filipino and a non-resident. The
present petition seeks to prosecute Tambunting for knowingly making untruthful
statements in his certificates of candidacy.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit. We affirm the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc.
Whether there is Probable Cause to Hold Tambunting for Trial for Having
Committed an Election Offense
There was no grave abuse of discretion in the COMELEC En Bancs ruling that there
is no sufficient and convincing evidence to support a finding of probable cause to
hold Tambunting for trial for violation of Section 74 in relation to Section 262 of the
Omnibus Election Code.
Probable cause constitutes those facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed. Determining probable cause is an intellectual activity premised on the
prior physical presentation or submission of documentary or testimonial proofs
either confirming, negating or qualifying the allegations in the complaint. 6
Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code reads as follows:
Contents of certificate of candidacy. The certificate of candidacy shall state
that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and
that he is eligible for said office; x x x the political party to which he belongs; civil
status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all election purposes;
his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the
laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that
he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation
imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose
of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the
best of his knowledge.
xxx
The person filing a certificate of candidacy shall also affix his latest photograph,
passport size; a statement in duplicate containing his bio-data and program of
government not exceeding one hundred words, if he so desires.
Section 262 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the other hand, provides that violation
of Section 74, among other sections in the Code, shall constitute an election offense.
Tambuntings Dual Citizenship
Tambunting does not deny that he is born of a Filipino mother and an American
father. Neither does he deny that he underwent the process involved in INS Form I130 (Petition for Relative) because of his fathers citizenship. Tambunting claims that
because of his parents differing citizenships, he is both Filipino and American by
birth. Cordora, on the other hand, insists that Tambunting is a naturalized American
citizen.
We agree with Commissioner Sarmientos observation that Tambunting possesses
dual citizenship. Because of the circumstances of his birth, it was no longer

Republic v. Ong 4 of 14

necessary for Tambunting to undergo the naturalization process to acquire American

citizenship. The process involved in INS Form I-130 only served to confirm the
American citizenship which Tambunting acquired at birth. The certification from the
Bureau of Immigration which Cordora presented contained two trips where
Tambunting claimed that he is an American. However, the same certification showed
nine other trips where Tambunting claimed that he is Filipino. Clearly, Tambunting
possessed dual citizenship prior to the filing of his certificate of candidacy before the
2001 elections. The fact that Tambunting had dual citizenship did not disqualify him
from running for public office.7
Requirements for dual citizens from birth who desire to run for public
office
We deem it necessary to reiterate our previous ruling in Mercado v. Manzano,
wherein we ruled that dual citizenship is not a ground for disqualification from
running for any elective local position.
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises
when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more
states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For
instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a
state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows
the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on
his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering the
citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes
of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow
the principle of jus soli;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws
of their fathers country such children are citizens of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country the former are
considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have
renounced Philippine citizenship.
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without
performing any act, be also a citizen of another state; but the above cases are
clearly possible given the constitutional provisions on citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual
citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individuals volition.
xxx
[I]n including 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional
Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who
maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization.
Hence, the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. No. 7160, 40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854,
20 must be understood as referring to "dual allegiance." Consequently, persons
with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike
those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict
process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with
dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of
candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as
persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the
unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states. As Joaquin
G. Bernas, one of the most perceptive members of the Constitutional Commission,
pointed out: "[D]ual citizenship is just a reality imposed on us because we have no
control of the laws on citizenship of other countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino
mother. But whether or not she is considered a citizen of another country is
something completely beyond our control."

By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear

allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate
their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign
state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign
citizenship. That is of no moment as the following discussion on 40(d) between
Senators Enrile and Pimentel clearly shows:
SENATOR ENRILE. Mr. President, I would like to ask clarification of line 41, page 17:
"Any person with dual citizenship" is disqualified to run for any elective local
position. Under the present Constitution, Mr. President, someone whose mother is a
citizen of the Philippines but his father is a foreigner is a natural-born citizen of the
Republic. There is no requirement that such a natural-born citizen, upon reaching
the age of majority, must elect or give up Philippine citizenship.
On the assumption that this person would carry two passports, one belonging to the
country of his or her father and one belonging to the Republic of the Philippines,
may such a situation disqualify the person to run for a local government position?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. To my mind, Mr. President, it only means that at the moment
when he would want to run for public office, he has to repudiate one of his
citizenships.
SENATOR ENRILE. Suppose he carries only a Philippine passport but the country of
origin or the country of the father claims that person, nevertheless, as a citizen,? No
one can renounce. There are such countries in the world.1avvphi1
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Well, the very fact that he is running for public office would, in
effect, be an election for him of his desire to be considered a Filipino citizen.
SENATOR ENRILE. But, precisely, Mr. President, the Constitution does not require an
election. Under the Constitution, a person whose mother is a citizen of the
Philippines is, at birth, a citizen without any overt act to claim the citizenship.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes. What we are saying, Mr. President, is: Under the
Gentlemans example, if he does not renounce his other citizenship, then he is
opening himself to question. So, if he is really interested to run, the first thing he
should do is to say in the Certificate of Candidacy that: "I am a Filipino citizen, and I
have only one citizenship."
SENATOR ENRILE. But we are talking from the viewpoint of Philippine law, Mr.
President. He will always have one citizenship, and that is the citizenship invested
upon him or her in the Constitution of the Republic.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is true, Mr. President. But if he exercises acts that will
prove that he also acknowledges other citizenships, then he will probably fall under
this disqualification.8 (Emphasis supplied)
We have to consider the present case in consonance with our rulings in Mercado v.
Manzano,9 Valles v. COMELEC,10 and AASJS v.
Datumanong.11 Mercado and Valles involve similar operative facts as the present
case. Manzano and Valles, like Tambunting, possessed dual citizenship by the
circumstances of their birth. Manzano was born to Filipino parents in the United
States which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Valles was born to an Australian mother
and a Filipino father in Australia. Our rulings in Manzano and Valles stated that dual
citizenship is different from dual allegiance both by cause and, for those desiring to
run for public office, by effect. Dual citizenship is involuntary and arises when, as a
result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a
person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Thus, like any
other natural-born Filipino, it is enough for a person with dual citizenship who seeks
public office to file his certificate of candidacy and swear to the oath of allegiance
contained therein. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, is brought about by the
individuals active participation in the naturalization process. AASJS states
that, under R.A. No. 9225, a Filipino who becomes a naturalized citizen of another
country is allowed to retain his Filipino citizenship by swearing to the supreme

Republic v. Ong 5 of 14

authority of the Republic of the Philippines. The act of taking an oath of allegiance is
an implicit renunciation of a naturalized citizens foreign citizenship.
R.A. No. 9225, or the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003, was
enacted years after the promulgation of Manzano and Valles. The oath found in
Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 reads as follows:
I __________ , solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby
declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon
myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.
In Sections 2 and 3 of R.A. No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual
citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their
allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. 12 Section 5(3) of
R.A. No. 9225 states that naturalized citizens who reacquire Filipino citizenship and
desire to run for elective public office in the Philippines shall "meet the qualifications
for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and,
at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath" aside from the oath of allegiance prescribed in Section 3 of R.A.
No. 9225. The twin requirements of swearing to an Oath of Allegiance and executing
a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship served as the bases for our recent rulings
in Jacot v. Dal and COMELEC,13 Velasco v. COMELEC,14 and Japzon v. COMELEC,15 all of
which involve natural-born Filipinos who later became naturalized citizens of another
country and thereafter ran for elective office in the Philippines. In the present case,
Tambunting, a natural-born Filipino, did not subsequently become a naturalized
citizen of another country. Hence, the twin requirements in R.A. No. 9225 do not
apply to him.
Tambuntings residency
Cordora concluded that Tambunting failed to meet the residency requirement
because of Tambuntings naturalization as an American. Cordoras reasoning fails
because Tambunting is not a naturalized American. Moreover, residency, for the
purpose of election laws, includes the twin elements of the fact of residing in a fixed
place and the intention to return there permanently,16 and is not dependent upon
citizenship.
In view of the above, we hold that Cordora failed to establish that Tambunting
indeed willfully made false entries in his certificates of candidacy. On the contrary,
Tambunting sufficiently proved his innocence of the charge filed against him.
Tambunting is eligible for the office which he sought to be elected and fulfilled the
citizenship and residency requirements prescribed by law.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the Resolutions of the
Commission on Elections En Bancdated 18 August 2006 and 20 February 2007 in EO
Case No. 05-17.
SO ORDERED.
Citizenship
G.R. Nos. 192147 & 192149
August 23, 2011
RENALD F. VILANDO, Petitioner,
vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, JOCELYN SY
LIMKAICHONG AND HON. SPEAKER PROSPERO NOGRALES, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing
the March 24, 2010 Decision1of the House of Representatives Electoral

Tribunal (HRET) dismissing the petitions for quo warranto and declaring private
respondent Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong (Limkaichong) not disqualified as Member of the
House of Representatives representing the First District of Negros Oriental and its
Resolution2 dated May 17, 2010, denying the motion for reconsideration.
In the May 14, 2007 elections, Limkaichong filed her certificate of candidacy for the
position of Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental. She won over the
other contender, Olivia Paras.
On May 25, 2007, she was proclaimed as Representative by the Provincial Board of
Canvassers on the basis of Comelec Resolution No. 8062 3 issued on May 18, 2007.
On July 23, 2007, she assumed office as Member of the House of Representatives.
Meanwhile, petitions involving either the disqualification or the proclamation of
Limkaichong were filed before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) which
reached the Court.
The petitions, which questioned her citizenship, were filed against Limkaichong by
her detractors: Louis Biraogo (G.R. No. 179120);4 Olivia Paras (G.R. Nos. 17913233);5 and Renald F. Vilando (G.R. Nos. 179240-41).6 These three (3) petitions were
consolidated with the petition for certiorari filed by Limkaichong (G.R. Nos. 17883132) assailing the Joint Resolution issued by the COMELEC which resolved the
disqualification cases against her.
On April 1, 2009, the Court granted the aforesaid petition of Limkaichong, reversed
the Joint Resolution of the Comelec, dismissed the three (3) other petitions, and
directed the petitioners to seek relief before the HRET by way of a petition for Quo
Warranto.
On April 21, 2009 and May 27, 2009, petitioner Renald F. Vilando (Vilando), as
taxpayer; and Jacinto Paras, as registered voter of the congressional district
concerned, filed separate petitions for Quo Warranto against Limkaichong before the
HRET. These petitions were consolidated by the HRET as they both challenged the
eligibility of one and the same respondent. Petitioners asserted that Limkaichong
was a Chinese citizen and ineligible for the office she was elected and proclaimed.
They alleged that she was born to a father (Julio Sy), whose naturalization had not
attained finality, and to a mother who acquired the Chinese citizenship of Julio Sy
from the time of her marriage to the latter. Also, they invoked the jurisdiction of the
HRET for a determination of Limkaichongs citizenship, which necessarily included an
inquiry into the validity of the naturalization certificate of Julio Sy.
For her defense, Limkaichong maintained that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
She averred that the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by her father was regular
and in order and had already attained the status of res judicata. Further, she claimed
that the validity of such citizenship could not be assailed through a collateral attack.
On March 24, 2010, the HRET dismissed both petitions and declared Limkaichong
not disqualified as Member of the House of Representatives. Pertinent portions of
the HRET decision reads:
By and large, petitioners failed to satisfy the quantum of proof to sustain their
theory that respondent is not a natural-born Filipino citizen and therefore not
qualified as Representative of the First District, Negros Oriental. This being so, their
petitions must fail.
WHEREFORE, the Tribunal DISMISSES the instant petition for lack of merit and
declares that respondent Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong is not disqualified as Member of
the House of Representatives representing the First District, Negros Oriental.
As soon as the Decision becomes final and executory, notice of copies thereof shall
be sent to the President of the Philippines, the House of Representatives through the
Speaker, the Commission on Audit through the Chairman, pursuant to Rule 96 of the
2004 Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. Let a copy of this
Decision be furnished the Chairman, Commission on Elections, for his information
and appropriate action.

Republic v. Ong 6 of 14

SO ORDERED.7
The petitioners sought reconsideration of the aforesaid decision, but it was denied
by the HRET in its Resolution dated May 17, 2010.
Hence, this petition for certiorari filed by Vilando anchored on the following
GROUNDS:
THE ONE-SIDED RESOLUTION OF THE SUBJECT PETITION FOR QUO WARRANTO AND
THE UTTER FAILURE OF THE HRET TO DISQUALIFY LIMKAICHONG AS MEMBER OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES DESPITE MANIFEST EVIDENCE THAT SHE IS NOT A
NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO CITIZEN IS WHIMSICAL, CAPRICIOUS AND ARBITRARY
BECAUSE:
1. THE PETITION FOR QUO WARRANTO DOES NOT OPERATE AS A COLLATERAL
ATTACK ON THE CITIZENSHIP OF LIMKAICHONGS FATHER FOR THE REASON THAT
HER FATHERS CERTIFICATE OF NATURALIZATION IS OF NO FORCE AND EFFECT FROM
THE VERY BEGINNING, HENCE, THERE IS ACTUALLY NOTHING BEING ATTACKED OR
ASSAILED BY THE SAME.
2. LIMKAICHONG CANNOT DERIVE PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP FROM HER MOTHER
GIVEN THAT AT THE TIME OF HER BIRTH, HER MOTHER IS NOT ALREADY A FILIPINO
CITIZEN AS A RESULT OF HER MARRIAGE TO HER FATHER AS PROVIDED FOR UNDER
SECTION 1 (7) OF COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 63 IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 2 (1)
CHAPTER II OF THE CHINESE REVISED NATIONALITY LAW OF FEBRUARY 5, 1959.
3. HAVING THE PLENARY, ABSOLUTE AND EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE,
AMONG OTHERS, THE QUALIFICATIONS OF MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, THE HRET CAN LOOK INTO THE ELIGIBILITY OF LIMKAICHONG
EVEN IF, AS AN INCIDENT THERETO, IT WOULD MEAN LOOKING INTO THE VALIDITY
OF THE CERTIFICATE OF NATURALIZATION.8
It should be noted that Limkaichongs term of office as Representative of the First
District of Negros Oriental from June 30, 2007 to June 30, 2010 already expired. As
such, the issue questioning her eligibility to hold office has been rendered moot and
academic by the expiration of her term. Whatever judgment is reached, the same
can no longer have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of things, can no
longer be enforced.9 Thus, the petition may be dismissed for being moot and
academic.
Moreover, there was the conduct of the 2010 elections, a supervening event, in a
sense, has also rendered this case moot and academic. A moot and academic case
is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening
events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical value. As a rule, courts
decline jurisdiction over such case, or dismiss it on ground of mootness. 10
Citizenship, being a continuing requirement for Members of the House of
Representatives, however, may be questioned at anytime. 11 For this reason, the
Court deems it appropriate to resolve the petition on the merits. This position finds
support in the rule that courts will decide a question, otherwise moot and academic,
if it is "capable of repetition, yet evading review."12 The question on Limkaichongs
citizenship is likely to recur if she would run again, as she did run, for public office,
hence, capable of repetition.
In any case, the Court is of the view that the HRET committed no grave abuse of
discretion in finding that Limkaichong is not disqualified to sit as Member of the
House of Representatives.
Vilandos argument, that the quo warranto petition does not operate as a collateral
attack on the citizenship of Limkaichongs father as the certificate of naturalization
is null and void from the beginning, is devoid of merit.
In this petition, Vilando seeks to disqualify Limkaichong on the ground that she is a
Chinese citizen. To prove his point, he makes reference to the alleged nullity of the
grant of naturalization of Limkaichongs father which, however, is not allowed as it
would constitute a collateral attack on the citizenship of the father. In our

jurisdiction, an attack on a person's citizenship may only be done through a direct

action for its nullity.13
The proper proceeding to assail the citizenship of Limkaichongs father should be in
accordance with Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473. As held in Limkaichong
v. Comelec,14 thus:
As early as the case of Queto v. Catolico,15 where the Court of First Instance
judge motu propio and not in the proper denaturalization proceedings called to court
various grantees of certificates of naturalization (who had already taken their oaths
of allegiance) and cancelled their certificates of naturalization due to procedural
infirmities, the Court held that:
x x x It may be true that, as alleged by said respondents, that the proceedings for
naturalization were tainted with certain infirmities, fatal or otherwise, but that is
beside the point in this case. The jurisdiction of the court to inquire into and rule
upon such infirmities must be properly invoked in accordance with the procedure
laid down by law. Such procedure is the cancellation of the naturalization certificate.
[Section 1(5), Commonwealth Act No. 63], in the manner fixed in Section 18 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473, hereinbefore quoted, namely, "upon motion made in
the proper proceedings by the Solicitor General or his representatives, or by the
proper provincial fiscal." In other words, the initiative must come from these officers,
presumably after previous investigation in each particular case.
Clearly, under law and jurisprudence, it is the State, through its representatives
designated by statute, that may question the illegally or invalidly procured
certificate of naturalization in the appropriate denaturalization proceedings. It is
plainly not a matter that may be raised by private persons in an election case
involving the naturalized citizens descendant.
Vilando asserts that as an incident in determining the eligibility of Limkaichong, the
HRET, having the plenary, absolute and exclusive jurisdiction to determine her
qualifications, can pass upon the efficacy of the certificate of naturalization.
True, the HRET has jurisdiction over quo warranto petitions, specifically over cases
challenging ineligibility on the ground of lack of citizenship. No less than the 1987
Constitution vests the HRET the authority to be the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of its Members. This constitutional power is
likewise echoed in the 2004 Rules of the HRET. Rule 14 thereof restates this duty,
thus:
Rule 14. Jurisdiction. The Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives.
Time and again, this Court has acknowledged this sole and exclusive jurisdiction of
the HRET.16 The power granted to HRET by the Constitution is intended to be as
complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. 17 Such
power is regarded as full, clear and complete and excludes the exercise of any
authority on the part of this Court that would in any wise restrict it or curtail it or
even affect the same.18
Such power of the HRET, no matter how complete and exclusive, does not carry with
it the authority to delve into the legality of the judgment of naturalization in the
pursuit of disqualifying Limkaichong. To rule otherwise would operate as a collateral
attack on the citizenship of the father which, as already stated, is not permissible.
The HRET properly resolved the issue with the following ratiocination:
xxx We note that Jocelyn C. Limkaichong, not the father Julio Ong Sy, is the
respondent in the present case. The Tribunal may not dwell on deliberating on the
validity of naturalization of the father if only to pursue the end of declaring the
daughter as disqualified to hold office.
Unfortunately, much as the Tribunal wants to resolve said issue, it cannot do so
because its jurisdiction is limited to the qualification of the proclaimed respondent
Limkaichong, being a sitting Member of the Congress.

Republic v. Ong 7 of 14

Evidently, there is no basis to oblige the Tribunal to reopen the naturalization

proceedings for a determination of the citizenship of the ascendant of respondent. A
petition for quo warranto is not a means to achieve that purpose. To rule on this
issue in this quo warranto proceeding will not only be a clear grave abuse of
discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction, but also a blatant violation of
due process on the part of the persons who will be affected or who are not parties in
this case.19
Thus, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) wrote that "a collateral attack against
a judgment is generally not allowed, unless the judgment is void upon its face or its
nullity is apparent by virtue of its own recitals."20 Under the present situation, there
is no evidence to show that the judgment is void on its face:
As to the Order of the CFI, Negros Oriental dated July 9, 1957 and September 21,
1959 that were offered in evidence, far from proving an invalid oath of allegiance
and certificate of naturalization, being public records, they do in fact constitute
legitimate source of authority for the conferment of status of the father of
respondent as naturalized Filipino. Absent any contrary declaration by a competent
court, the Tribunal presumes the validity of the CFI Orders of July 9, 1957 and
September 21, 1959, and the resulting documentations of Julio Sys acquisition of
Filipino citizenship by naturalization as valid and of legal effect. The oath of
allegiance and certificate of naturalization are themselves proofs of the actual
conferment of naturalization.21
The HRET, therefore, correctly relied on the presumption of validity of the July 9,
1957 and September 21, 1959 Orders of the Court of First Instance (CFI) Negros
Oriental, which granted the petition and declared Julio Sy a naturalized Filipino
absent any evidence to the contrary.
Records disclose that Limkaichong was born in Dumaguete City on November 9,
1959. The governing law is the citizenship provision of the 1935 Constitution, the
pertinent portion thereof, reads:
Article IV
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
xxx
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age
of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
xxx
Indubitably, with Limkaichongs father having been conferred the status as a
naturalized Filipino, it follows that she is a Filipino citizen born to a Filipino father.
Even on the assumption that the naturalization proceedings and the subsequent
issuance of certificate of naturalization were invalid, Limkaichong can still be
considered a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born to a Filipino mother and
having impliedly elected Filipino citizenship when she reached majority age. The
HRET is, thus, correct in declaring that Limkaichong is a natural-born Filipino citizen:
Respondent Limkaichong falls under the category of those persons whose fathers
are citizens of the Philippines. (Section 1(3), Article IV, 1935 Constitution) It matters
not whether the father acquired citizenship by birth or by naturalization. Therefore,
following the line of transmission through the father under the 1935 Constitution,
the respondent has satisfactorily complied with the requirement for candidacy and
for holding office, as she is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
Likewise, the citizenship of respondent Limkaichong finds support in paragraph 4,
Section 1, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution.
Having failed to prove that Anesia Sy lost her Philippine citizenship, respondent can
be considered a natural born citizen of the Philippines, having been born to a mother
who was a natural-born Filipina at the time of marriage, and because respondent
was able to elect citizenship informally when she reached majority age. Respondent

participated in the barangay elections as a young voter in 1976, accomplished

voters affidavit as of 1984, and ran as a candidate and was elected as Mayor of La
Libertad, Negros Oriental in 2004. These are positive acts of election of Philippine
citizenship. The case of In re: Florencio Mallare, elucidates how election of
citizenship is manifested in actions indubitably showing a definite choice. We note
that respondent had informally elected citizenship after January 17, 1973 during
which time the 1973 Constitution considered as citizens of the Philippines all those
who elect citizenship in accordance with the 1935 Constitution. The 1987
Constitution provisions, i.e., Section 1(3), Article [IV] and Section 2, Article [IV] were
enacted to correct the anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father and
an alien mother was automatically accorded the status of a natural-born citizen,
while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect
Philippine citizenship yet if so elected, was not conferred natural-born status. It was
the intention of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to treat equally those born
before the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority either before or after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution.
Thus, those who would elect Philippine citizenship under par. 3, Section 1, Article [IV]
of the 1987 Constitution are now, under Section 2, Article [IV] thereof also naturalborn Filipinos. The following are the pertinent provisions of the 1987 Constitution:
Article IV
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3),
Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.22
Vilandos assertion that Limkaichong cannot derive Philippine citizenship from her
mother because the latter became a Chinese citizen when she married Julio Sy, as
provided for under Section 1 (7) of Commonwealth Act No. 63 in relation to Article 2
(1) Chapter II of the Chinese Revised Nationality Law of February 5, 1959, must
likewise fail.
As aptly pointed out by the HRET, Vilando was not able to offer in evidence a duly
certified true copy of the alleged Chinese Revised Law of Nationality to prove that
Limkaichongs mother indeed lost her Philippine citizenship. Verily, Vilando failed to
establish his case through competent and admissible evidence to warrant a reversal
of the HRET ruling.
Also, an application for an alien certificate of registration (ACR) is not an indubitable
proof of forfeiture of Philippine citizenship. It is well to quote the ruling of the HRET
on this matter, to wit:
An alien certificate of registration is issued to an individual who declares that he is
not a Filipino citizen. It is obtained only when applied for. It is in a form prescribed by
the agency and contains a declaration by the applicant of his or her personal
information, a photograph, and physical details that identify the applicant. It bears
no indication of basis for foreign citizenship, nor proof of change to foreign
citizenship. It certifies that a person named therein has applied for registration and
fingerprinting and that such person was issued a certificate of registration under the
Alien Registration Act of 1950 or other special law. It is only evidence of registration.
Unlike birth certificates registered pursuant to Act 3753 (The Civil Register Law), and
much less like other public records referred to under Section 23, Rule 132, an alien

Republic v. Ong 8 of 14

certificate of registration is not a public document that would be prima

facie evidence of the truth of facts contained therein. On its face, it only certifies
that the applicant had submitted himself or herself to registration. Therefore, there
is no presumption of alienage of the declarant. This is especially so where the
declarant has in fact been a natural-born Filipino all along and never lost his or her
status as such.23 1avvphi1
Thus, obtaining an ACR by Limkaichongs mother was not tantamount to a
repudiation of her original citizenship. Neither did it result in an acquisition of alien
citizenship. In a string of decisions, this Court has consistently held that an
application for, and the holding of, an alien certificate of registration is not an act
constituting renunciation of Philippine citizenship.24 For renunciation to effectively
result in the loss of citizenship, the same must be express. 25 Such express
renunciation is lacking in this case.
Accordingly, Limkaichongs mother, being a Filipino citizen, can transmit her
citizenship to her daughter.
Well-settled is the principle that the judgments of the HRET are beyond judicial
interference. The only instance where this Court may intervene in the exercise of its
so-called extraordinary jurisdiction is upon a determination that the decision or
resolution of the HRET was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion or upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident
use of its power to constitute a denial of due process of law, or upon a
demonstration of a very clear unmitigated error, manifestly constituting such grave
abuse of discretion that there has to be a remedy for such abuse. 26 In this case,
there is no showing of any such arbitrariness or improvidence. The HRET acted well
within the sphere of its power when it dismissed the quo warranto petition.
In fine, this Court finds sufficient basis to sustain the ruling of the HRET which
resolved the issue of citizenship in favor of Limkaichong.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Court affirms the March 24,
2010 Decision of the HRET declaring that Limkaichong is not disqualified as Member
of the House of Representatives representing the First District, Negros Oriental.
SO ORDERED.
Citizenship
G.R. No. 198742
August 10, 2012
TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, LUIS M. BAUTISTA, ROBELITO V. PICAR and
WILMA P. PAGADUAN,Respondents.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Failure to renounce foreign citizenship in accordance with the exact tenor of Section
5(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 renders a dual citizen ineligible to run for and
thus hold any elective public office.
The Case
At bar is a special civil action for certiorari1 under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court
seeking to nullify Resolution2dated September 6, 2011 of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) en banc in EAC (AE) No. A-44-2010. The assailed resolution (a)
reversed the Order3 dated November 30, 2010 of COMELEC Second Division
dismissing petitioners appeal; and (b) affirmed the consolidated Decision 4 dated
October 22, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Bauang, La Union, Branch 33,
declaring petitioner Teodora Sobejana-Condon (petitioner) disqualified and ineligible
to her position as Vice-Mayor of Caba, La Union.
The Undisputed Facts

The petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born of Filipino parents
on August 8, 1944. On December 13, 1984, she became a naturalized Australian
citizen owing to her marriage to a certain Kevin Thomas Condon.
On December 2, 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine citizenship
before the Philippine Embassy in Canberra, Australia pursuant to Section 3 of R.A.
No. 9225 otherwise known as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of
2003."5 The application was approved and the petitioner took her oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines on December 5, 2005.
On September 18, 2006, the petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation
of Australian Citizenship before the Department of Immigration and Indigenous
Affairs, Canberra, Australia, which in turn issued the Order dated September 27,
2006 certifying that she has ceased to be an Australian citizen. 6
The petitioner ran for Mayor in her hometown of Caba, La Union in the 2007
elections. She lost in her bid. She again sought elective office during the May 10,
2010 elections this time for the position of Vice-Mayor. She obtained the highest
numbers of votes and was proclaimed as the winning candidate. She took her oath
of office on May 13, 2010.
Soon thereafter, private respondents Robelito V. Picar, Wilma P. Pagaduan 7 and Luis
M. Bautista,8 (private respondents) all registered voters of Caba, La Union, filed
separate petitions for quo warranto questioning the petitioners eligibility before the
RTC. The petitions similarly sought the petitioners disqualification from holding her
elective post on the ground that she is a dual citizen and that she failed to execute a
"personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath" as imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No.
9225.
The petitioner denied being a dual citizen and averred that since September 27,
2006, she ceased to be an Australian citizen. She claimed that the Declaration of
Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she executed in Australia sufficiently complied
with Section 5(2), R.A. No. 9225 and that her act of running for public office is a clear
abandonment of her Australian citizenship.
Ruling of the RTC
In its consolidated Decision dated October 22, 2010, the trial court held that the
petitioners failure to comply with Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 rendered her
ineligible to run and hold public office. As admitted by the petitioner herself during
trial, the personal declaration of renunciation she filed in Australia was not under
oath. The law clearly mandates that the document containing the renunciation of
foreign citizenship must be sworn before any public officer authorized to administer
oath. Consequently, the RTCs decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court renders judgment in FAVOR of [private
respondents] and AGAINST (petitioner):
1) DECLARING [petitioner] TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON, disqualified and ineligible
to hold the office of Vice-Mayor of Caba, La Union;
2) NULLIFYING her proclamation as the winning candidate for Vice-Mayor of said
municipality; and
3) DECLARING the position of Vice-Mayor in said municipality vacant.
SO ORDERED.9
Ruling of the COMELEC
The petitioner appealed to the COMELEC but the appeal was dismissed by the
Second Division in its Order10dated November 30, 2010 for failure to pay the docket
fees within the prescribed period. On motion for reconsideration, the appeal was
reinstated by the COMELEC en banc in its Resolution 11 dated September 6, 2011. In
the same issuance, the substantive merits of the appeal were given due course. The
COMELEC en banc concurred with the findings and conclusions of the RTC; it also
granted the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal filed by the private respondents.

Republic v. Ong 9 of 14

The decretal portion of the resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered the Commission RESOLVED as it
hereby RESOLVES as follows:
1. To DISMISS the instant appeal for lack of merit;
2. To AFFIRM the DECISION dated 22 October 2010 of the court a quo; and
3. To GRANT the Motion for Execution filed on November 12, 2010.
SO ORDERED.12 (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, the present petition ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the COMELEC en
banc.
The Petitioners Arguments
The petitioner contends that since she ceased to be an Australian citizen on
September 27, 2006, she no longer held dual citizenship and was only a Filipino
citizen when she filed her certificate of candidacy as early as the 2007 elections.
Hence, the "personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship" imposed by
Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 to dual citizens seeking elective office does not apply
to her.
She further argues that a sworn renunciation is a mere formal and not a mandatory
requirement. In support thereof, she cites portions of the Journal of the House of
Representatives dated June 2 to 5, 2003 containing the sponsorship speech for
House Bill (H.B.) No. 4720, the precursor of R.A. No. 9225.
She claims that the private respondents are estopped from questioning her eligibility
since they failed to do so when she filed certificates of candidacy for the 2007 and
2010 elections.
Lastly, she disputes the power of the COMELEC en banc to: (a) take cognizance of
the substantive merits of her appeal instead of remanding the same to the COMELEC
Second Division for the continuation of the appeal proceedings; and (b) allow the
execution pending appeal of the RTCs judgment.
The Issues
Posed for resolution are the following issues: I) Whether the COMELEC en banc may
resolve the merits of an appeal after ruling on its reinstatement; II) Whether the
COMELEC en banc may order the execution of a judgment rendered by a trial court
in an election case; III) Whether the private respondents are barred from questioning
the qualifications of the petitioner; and IV) For purposes of determining the
petitioners eligibility to run for public office, whether the "sworn renunciation of
foreign citizenship" in Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 is a mere pro-forma requirement.
The Courts Ruling
I. An appeal may be simultaneously reinstated and definitively resolved by
the COMELEC en banc in a resolution disposing of a motion for
reconsideration.
The power to decide motions for reconsideration in election cases is arrogated unto
the COMELEC en banc by Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution, viz:
Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall
promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases,
including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and
decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be
decided by the Commission en banc.
A complementary provision is present in Section 5(c), Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure, to wit:
Any motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division shall be
resolved by the Commission en banc except motions on interlocutory orders of the
division which shall be resolved by the division which issued the order.
Considering that the above cited provisos do not set any limits to the COMELEC en
bancs prerogative in resolving a motion for reconsideration, there is nothing to
prevent the body from directly adjudicating the substantive merits of an appeal after

ruling for its reinstatement instead of remanding the same to the division that
initially dismissed it.
We thus see no impropriety much more grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
COMELEC en banc when it proceeded to decide the substantive merits of the
petitioners appeal after ruling for its reinstatement.
Further, records show that, in her motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en
banc, the petitioner not only proffered arguments on the issue on docket fees but
also on the issue of her eligibility. She even filed a supplemental motion for
reconsideration attaching therewith supporting documents 13 to her contention that
she is no longer an Australian citizen. The petitioner, after obtaining an unfavorable
decision, cannot be permitted to disavow the en bancs exercise of discretion on the
substantial merits of her appeal when she herself invoked the same in the first
place.
The fact that the COMELEC en banc had remanded similar appeals to the Division
that initially dismissed them cannot serve as a precedent to the disposition of the
petitioners appeal. A decision or resolution of any adjudicating body can be
disposed in several ways. To sustain petitioners argument would be virtually putting
a straightjacket on the COMELEC en bancs adjudicatory powers.
More significantly, the remand of the appeal to the COMELEC Second Division would
be unnecessarily circuitous and repugnant to the rule on preferential disposition of
quo warranto cases espoused in Rule 36, Section 15 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure.14
II. The COMELEC en banc has the power to order discretionary execution of
judgment.
We cannot subscribe to petitioners submission that the COMELEC en banc has no
power to order the issuance of a writ of execution and that such function belongs
only to the court of origin.
There is no reason to dispute the COMELECs authority to order discretionary
execution of judgment in view of the fact that the suppletory application of the Rules
of Court is expressly sanctioned by Section 1, Rule 41 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure.15
Under Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, execution pending appeal may be
issued by an appellate court after the trial court has lost jurisdiction. In Batul v.
Bayron,16 we stressed the import of the provision vis--vis election cases when we
held that judgments in election cases which may be executed pending appeal
includes those decided by trial courts and those rendered by the COMELEC whether
in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction.
III. Private respondents are not estopped from questioning petitioners
eligibility to hold public office.
The fact that the petitioners qualifications were not questioned when she filed
certificates of candidacy for 2007 and 2010 elections cannot operate as an estoppel
to the petition for quo warranto before the RTC.
Under the Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 (Omnibus Election Code), there are two
instances where a petition questioning the qualifications of a registered candidate to
run for the office for which his certificate of candidacy was filed can be raised, to wit:
(1) Before election, pursuant to Section 78 thereof which provides that:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. A
verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The
petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the
filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election; and
(2) After election, pursuant to Section 253 thereof, viz:

Republic v. Ong 10 of 14

Sec. 253. Petition for quo warranto. Any voter contesting the election of any
Member of the Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city officer on the ground
of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn
petition for quo warranto with the Commission within ten days after the
proclamation of the results of the election. (Emphasis ours)
Hence, if a person qualified to file a petition to disqualify a certain candidate fails to
file the petition within the twenty-five (25)-day period prescribed by Section 78 of
the Omnibus Election Code for whatever reasons, the elections laws do not leave
him completely helpless as he has another chance to raise the disqualification of the
candidate by filing a petition for quo warranto within ten (10) days from the
proclamation of the results of the election, as provided under Section 253 of the
Omnibus Election Code.17
The above remedies were both available to the private respondents and their failure
to utilize Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code cannot serve to bar them should
they opt to file, as they did so file, a quo warranto petition under Section 253.
IV. Petitioner is disqualified from running for elective office for failure to
renounce her Australian citizenship in accordance with Section 5(2) of R.A.
No. 9225.
R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship for
natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship 18 by taking an oath of
allegiance to the Republic, thus:
Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their
Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country
are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the
following oath of allegiance to the Republic:
"I, _____________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend
the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby
declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I imposed this obligation upon
myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion."
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become
citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the
aforesaid oath.
The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that restores ones Filipino
citizenship and all civil and political rights and obligations concomitant therewith,
subject to certain conditions imposed in Section 5, viz:
Sec. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain or re-acquire
Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be
subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the
Philippines and the following conditions:
(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the requirements
under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise
known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification
for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and,
at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath;
(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior
to their assumption of office: Provided, That they renounce their oath of allegiance
to the country where they took that oath;

(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply with the
proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice; and
(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the
Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who:
(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which they
are naturalized citizens; and/or
(b) are in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned officers in the armed
forces of the country which they are naturalized citizens. (Emphasis ours)
Under the provisions of the aforementioned law, the petitioner has validly reacquired her Filipino citizenship when she took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines on December 5, 2005. At that point, she held dual citizenship, i.e.,
Australian and Philippine.
On September 18, 2006, or a year before she initially sought elective public office,
she filed a renunciation of Australian citizenship in Canberra, Australia. Admittedly,
however, the same was not under oath contrary to the exact mandate of Section
5(2) that the renunciation of foreign citizenship must be sworn before an officer
authorized to administer oath.
To obviate the fatal consequence of her inutile renunciation, the petitioner pleads
the Court to interpret the "sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship" in
Section 5(2) to be a mere pro forma requirement in conformity with the intent of the
Legislature. She anchors her submission on the statement made by Representative
Javier during the floor deliberations on H.B. No. 4720, the precursor of R.A. No. 9225.
At the outset, it bears stressing that the Courts duty to interpret the law according
to its true intent is exercised only when the law is ambiguous or of doubtful
meaning. The first and fundamental duty of the Court is to apply the law. As such,
when the law is clear and free from any doubt, there is no occasion for construction
or interpretation; there is only room for application.19 Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 is
one such instance.
Ambiguity is a condition of admitting two or more meanings, of being understood in
more than one way, or of referring to two or more things at the same time. For a
statute to be considered ambiguous, it must admit of two or more possible
meanings.20
The language of Section 5(2) is free from any ambiguity. In Lopez v. COMELEC, 21 we
declared its categorical and single meaning: a Filipino American or any dual citizen
cannot run for any elective public position in the Philippines unless he or she
personally swears to a renunciation of all foreign citizenship at the time of filing the
certificate of candidacy. We also expounded on the form of the renunciation and held
that to be valid, the renunciation must be contained in an affidavit duly executed
before an officer of the law who is authorized to administer an oath stating in clear
and unequivocal terms that affiant is renouncing all foreign citizenship.
The same meaning was emphasized in Jacot v. Dal, 22 when we held that Filipinos reacquiring or retaining their Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 must explicitly
renounce their foreign citizenship if they wish to run for elective posts in the
Philippines, thus:
The law categorically requires persons seeking elective public office, who either
retained their Philippine citizenship or those who reacquired it, to make a personal
and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before a public officer
authorized to administer an oath simultaneous with or before the filing of the
certificate of candidacy.
Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who
have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or
retained their Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance under Section 3
of Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for those seeking elective public offices in the
Philippines, to additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all

Republic v. Ong 11 of 14

foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the

filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine
elections.
Clearly Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 (on the making of a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship) requires of the Filipinos
availing themselves of the benefits under the said Act to accomplish an undertaking
other than that which they have presumably complied with under Section 3 thereof
(oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines). This is made clear in the
discussion of the Bicameral Conference Committee on Disagreeing Provisions of
House Bill No. 4720 and Senate Bill No. 2130 held on 18 August 2003 (precursors of
Republic Act No. 9225), where the Hon. Chairman Franklin Drilon and Hon.
Representative Arthur Defensor explained to Hon. Representative Exequiel Javier
that the oath of allegiance is different from the renunciation of foreign citizenship;
xxxx
The intent of the legislators was not only for Filipinos reacquiring or retaining their
Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 to take their oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines, but also to explicitly renounce their foreign
citizenship if they wish to run for elective posts in the Philippines. To qualify as a
candidate in Philippine elections, Filipinos must only have one citizenship, namely,
Philippine citizenship.23 (Citation omitted and italics and underlining ours)
Hence, in De Guzman v. COMELEC,24 we declared petitioner therein to be disqualified
from running for the position of vice-mayor for his failure to make a personal and
sworn renunciation of his American citizenship.
We find no reason to depart from the mandatory nature infused by the above rulings
to the phrase "sworn renunciation". The language of the provision is plain and
unambiguous. It expresses a single, definite, and sensible meaning and must thus
be read literally.25 The foreign citizenship must be formally rejected through an
affidavit duly sworn before an officer authorized to administer oath.
It is conclusively presumed to be the meaning that the Legislature has intended to
convey.26 Even a resort to the Journal of the House of Representatives invoked by the
petitioner leads to the same inference, viz:
INTERPELLATION OF REP. JAVIER
Rep. Javier initially inquired whether under the Bill, dual citizenship is only limited to
natural-born Filipinos and not to naturalized Filipinos.
Rep. Libanan replied in the affirmative.
Rep. Javier subsequently adverted to Section 5 of the Bill which provides that
natural-born Filipinos who have dual citizenship shall continue to enjoy full civil and
political rights. This being the case, he sought clarification as to whether they can
indeed run for public office provided that they renounce their foreign citizenship.
Rep. Libanan replied in the affirmative, citing that these citizens will only have to
make a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship before any authorized
public officer.
Rep. Javier sought further clarification on this matter, citing that while the Bill
provides them with full civil and political rights as Filipino citizens, the measure also
discriminates against them since they are required to make a sworn renunciation of
their other foreign citizenship if and when they run for public office. He thereafter
proposed to delete this particular provision.
In his rejoinder, Rep. Libanan explained that this serves to erase all doubts
regarding any issues that might be raised pertaining to the citizenship of
any candidate. He subsequently cited the case of Afroyim vs. Rusk,
wherein the United States considered a naturalized American still as an
American citizen even when he cast his vote in Israel during one of its
elections.

Rep. Javier however pointed out that the matter of voting is different because in
voting, one is not required to renounce his foreign citizenship. He pointed out that
under the Bill, Filipinos who run for public office must renounce their foreign
citizenship. He pointed out further that this is a contradiction in the Bill.
Thereafter, Rep. Javier inquired whether Filipino citizens who had acquired foreign
citizenship and are now entitled to reacquire their Filipino citizenship will be
considered as natural-born citizens. As such, he likewise inquired whether they will
also be considered qualified to run for the highest elective positions in the country.
Rep. Libanan replied in the affirmative, citing that the only requirement is that they
make a sworn renunciation of their foreign citizenship and that they comply with the
residency and registration requirements as provided for in the Constitution.
Whereupon, Rep. Javier noted that under the Constitution, natural-born citizens are
those who are citizens at the time of birth without having to perform an act to
complete or perfect his/her citizenship.
Rep. Libanan agreed therewith, citing that this is the reason why the Bill seeks the
repeal of CA No. 63. The repeal, he said, would help Filipino citizens who acquired
foreign citizenship to retain their citizenship. With regard then to Section 5 of the
Bill, he explained that the Committee had decided to include this provision because
Section 18, Article XI of the Constitution provides for the accountability of public
officers.
In his rejoinder, Rep. Javier maintained that in this case, the sworn renunciation of a
foreign citizenship will only become a pro forma requirement.
On further queries of Rep. Javier, Rep. Libanan affirmed that natural-born Filipino
citizens who became foreign citizens and who have reacquired their Filipino
citizenship under the Bill will be considered as natural-born citizens, and therefore
qualified to run for the presidency, the vice-presidency or for a seat in Congress. He
also agreed with the observation of Rep. Javier that a natural-born citizen is one who
is a citizen of the country at the time of birth. He also explained that the Bill will, in
effect, return to a Filipino citizen who has acquired foreign citizenship, the status of
being a natural-born citizen effective at the time he lost his Filipino citizenship.
As a rejoinder, Rep. Javier opined that doing so would be discriminating against
naturalized Filipino citizens and Filipino citizens by election who are all disqualified to
run for certain public offices. He then suggested that the Bill be amended by not
considering as natural-born citizens those Filipinos who had renounced their Filipino
citizenship and acquired foreign citizenship. He said that they should be considered
as repatriated citizens.
In reply, Rep. Libanan assured Rep. Javier that the Committee will take note of the
latters comments on the matter. He however stressed that after a lengthy
deliberation on the subject, the Committees on Justice, and Foreign Affairs had
decided to revert back to the status of being natural-born citizens those natural-born
Filipino citizens who had acquired foreign citizenship but now wished to reacquire
their Filipino citizenship.
Rep. Javier then explained that a Filipina who loses her Filipino citizenship by virtue
of her marriage to a foreigner can regain her repatriated Filipino citizenship, upon
the death of her husband, by simply taking her oath before the Department of
Justice (DOJ).
Rep. Javier said that he does not oppose the Bill but only wants to be fair to other
Filipino citizens who are not considered natural-born. He reiterated that natural-born
Filipino citizens who had renounced their citizenship by pledging allegiance to
another sovereignty should not be allowed to revert back to their status of being
natural-born citizens once they decide to regain their Filipino citizenship. He
underscored that this will in a way allow such Filipinos to enjoy dual citizenship.
On whether the Sponsors will agree to an amendment incorporating the position of
Rep. Javier, Rep. Libanan stated that this will defeat the purpose of the Bill.

Republic v. Ong 12 of 14

Rep. Javier disagreed therewith, adding that natural-born Filipino citizens who
acquired foreign citizenships and later decided to regain their Filipino citizenship, will
be considered as repatriated citizens.
Rep. Libanan cited the case of Bengzon vs. HRET wherein the Supreme Court had
ruled that only naturalized Filipino citizens are not considered as natural-born
citizens.
In reaction, Rep. Javier clarified that only citizens by election or those whose
mothers are Filipino citizens under the 1935 Constitution and who elected Filipino
citizenship upon reaching the age of maturity, are not deemed as natural-born
citizens.
In response, Rep. Libanan maintained that in the Bengzon case, repatriation results
in the recovery of ones original nationality and only naturalized citizens are not
considered as natural-born citizens.
On whether the Sponsors would agree to not giving back the status of being naturalborn citizens to natural-born Filipino citizens who acquired foreign citizenship, Rep.
Libanan remarked that the Body in plenary session will decide on the matter. 27
The petitioner obviously espouses an isolated reading of Representative Javiers
statement; she conveniently disregards the preceding and succeeding discussions in
the records.
The above-quoted excerpts of the legislative record show that Representative
Javiers statement ought to be understood within the context of the issue then being
discussed, that is whether former natural-born citizens who re-acquire their Filipino
citizenship under the proposed law will revert to their original status as natural-born
citizens and thus be qualified to run for government positions reserved only to
natural-born Filipinos, i.e. President, Vice-President and Members of the Congress.
It was Representative Javiers position that they should be considered as repatriated
Filipinos and not as natural-born citizens since they will have to execute a personal
and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship. Natural-born citizens are those who
need not perform an act to perfect their citizenship. Representative Libanan,
however, maintained that they will revert to their original status as natural-born
citizens. To reconcile the renunciation imposed by Section 5(2) with the principle
that natural-born citizens are those who need not perform any act to perfect their
citizenship, Representative Javier suggested that the sworn renunciation of foreign
citizenship be considered as a mere pro forma requirement.
Petitioners argument, therefore, loses its point. The "sworn renunciation of foreign
citizenship" must be deemed a formal requirement only with respect to the reacquisition of ones status as a natural-born Filipino so as to override the effect of
the principle that natural-born citizens need not perform any act to perfect their
citizenship. Never was it mentioned or even alluded to that, as the petitioner wants
this Court to believe, those who re-acquire their Filipino citizenship and thereafter
run for public office has the option of executing an unsworn affidavit of renunciation.
It is also palpable in the above records that Section 5 was intended to complement
Section 18, Article XI of the Constitution on public officers primary accountability of
allegiance and loyalty, which provides:
Sec. 18. Public officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution
allegiance at all times and any public officer or employee who seeks to change his
citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during his
tenure shall be dealt with by law.
An oath is a solemn declaration, accompanied by a swearing to God or a revered
person or thing, that ones statement is true or that one will be bound to a promise.
The person making the oath implicitly invites punishment if the statement is untrue
or the promise is broken. The legal effect of an oath is to subject the person to
penalties for perjury if the testimony is false. 28

Indeed, the solemn promise, and the risk of punishment attached to an oath ensures
truthfulness to the prospective public officers abandonment of his adopted state
and promise of absolute allegiance and loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines.
To hold the oath to be a mere pro forma requirement is to say that it is only for
ceremonial purposes; it would also accommodate a mere qualified or temporary
allegiance from government officers when the Constitution and the legislature
clearly demand otherwise.
Petitioner contends that the Australian Citizenship Act of 1948, under which she is
already deemed to have lost her citizenship, is entitled to judicial notice. We
disagree.
Foreign laws are not a matter of judicial notice. Like any other fact, they must be
alleged and proven.29 To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a
copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of
Court which reads:
Sec. 24. Proof of official record. The record of public documents referred to in
paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by
an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal
custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in
the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in
which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a
secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice- consul, or
consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in
the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his
office. (Emphasis ours)
Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state. Whenever a copy of a document or
record is attested for the purpose of the evidence, the attestation must state, in
substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof,
as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting
officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal
of such court.
The Court has admitted certain exceptions to the above rules and held that the
existence of a foreign law may also be established through: (1) a testimony under
oath of an expert witness such as an attorney-at-law in the country where the
foreign law operates wherein he quotes verbatim a section of the law and states that
the same was in force at the time material to the facts at hand; and (2) likewise, in
several naturalization cases, it was held by the Court that evidence of the law of a
foreign country on reciprocity regarding the acquisition of citizenship, although not
meeting the prescribed rule of practice, may be allowed and used as basis for
favorable action, if, in the light of all the circumstances, the Court is "satisfied of the
authenticity of the written proof offered." Thus, in a number of decisions, mere
authentication of the Chinese Naturalization Law by the Chinese Consulate General
of Manila was held to be a competent proof of that law. 30
The petitioner failed to prove the Australian Citizenship Act of 1948 through any of
the above methods. As uniformly observed by the RTC and COMELEC, the petitioner
failed to show proof of the existence of the law during trial. Also, the letter issued by
the Australian government showing that petitioner already renounced her Australian
citizenship was unauthenticated hence, the courts a quo acted judiciously in
disregarding the same.
We are bound to arrive at a similar conclusion even if we were to admit as
competent evidence the said letter in view of the photocopy of a Certificate of
Authentication issued by Consular Section of the Philippine Embassy in Canberra,
Australia attached to the petitioners motion for reconsideration.
We have stressed in Advocates and Adherents of Social Justice for School Teachers
and Allied Workers (AASJS) Member v. Datumanong31 that the framers of R.A. No.

Republic v. Ong 13 of 14

9225 did not intend the law to concern itself with the actual status of the other
citizenship.
This Court as the government branch tasked to apply the enactments of the
legislature must do so conformably with the wisdom of the latter sans the
interference of any foreign law. If we were to read the Australian Citizen Act of 1948
into the application and operation of R.A. No. 9225, we would be applying not what
our legislative department has deemed wise to require. To do so would be a brazen
encroachment upon the sovereign will and power of the people of this Republic. 32
The petitioners act of running for public office does not suffice to serve as an
effective renunciation of her Australian citizenship. While this Court has previously
declared that the filing by a person with dual citizenship of a certificate of candidacy
is already considered a renunciation of foreign citizenship, 33 such ruling was already
adjudged superseded by the enactment of R.A. No. 9225 on August 29, 2003 which
provides for the additional condition of a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign
citizenship.34
The fact that petitioner won the elections can not cure the defect of her candidacy.
Garnering the most number of votes does not validate the election of a disqualified
candidate because the application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on
disqualification is not a matter of popularity.35
In fine, R.A. No. 9225 categorically demands natural-born Filipinos who re-acquire
their citizenship and seek elective office, to execute a personal and sworn

renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before an authorized public officer
prior to or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as
candidates in Philippine elections.36 The rule applies to all those who have reacquired their Filipino citizenship, like petitioner, without regard as to whether they
are still dual citizens or not. It is a pre-requisite imposed for the exercise of the right
to run for public office.
Stated differently, it is an additional qualification for elective office specific only to
Filipino citizens who re-acquire their citizenship under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225. It
is the operative act that restores their right to run for public office. The petitioner's
failure to comply therewith in accordance with the exact tenor of the law, rendered
ineffectual the Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she executed on
September 18, 2006. As such, she is yet to regain her political right to seek elective
office. Unless she executes a sworn renunciation of her Australian citizenship, she is
ineligible to run for and hold any elective office in the Philippines.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The
Resolution dated September 6, 2011 of the Commission on Elections en bane in EAC
(AE) No. A-44-2010 is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.

Republic v. Ong 14 of 14