1

ARTICLES 2-3

Limiting ourselves to the question relative to the form of the

complaint in criminal matters, it is within the power of the
Legislature to prescribe the form of the criminal complaint as
long as the constitutional provision of the accused to be
informed of the nature of the accusation is not violated.

DIGESTS
Topic: Introduction
De Joya vs. The Jail Warden of Batangas City and Hon
Ruben Galvez GR No. 159418-19
Facts:
Norma De Joya was convicted for violating BP22, the decision
was released March 21, 1997. She remained at large and was
arrested December 3, 2002. On November 21, 2000, the
Supreme Court issued Court Administrative Circular No. 12-2000
giving courts option to impose penalty over imprisonment.

The Court holds that the provisions of sections 2 of General

Orders No. 58, as amended by Act No. 2886, do not partake of
the same character as the provisions of a constitution; that the
said Act No. 2886 is valid and is not violative of any
constitutional provisions and that the court a quo did not
commit any of the errors assigned.
The sentence was therefore affirmed.

Issue:
Norma De Joya contended that her detention was illegal and
that Administrative Circular No 12-2000 have erased the penalty
of imprisonment. This case also raises the issue: Are
Administrative Circulars or Jurisprudence sources of Criminal
Law.

Topic: Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code

Ruling:

Facts:

No. Administrative Circulars or Jurisprudence are not sources of

Criminal Law. The courts are given the discretion to choose
whether to impose a penalty of fine or a penalty of
imprisonment only or both fine and imprisonment. Therefore,
the petition was dismissed due to lack of merit.

he appellant was convicted in the Court of First Instance of a

violation of section 1 of Act No. 55, as amended by section 1 of
Act No. 275, and from the judgment entered thereon appealed
to this court, where under proper assignments of error he
contends: (1) that the complaint does not state facts sufficient
to confer jurisdiction upon the court; (2) that under the evidence
the trial court was without jurisdiction to hear and determine the
case; (3) that Act No. 55 as amended is in violation of certain
provisions of the Constitution of the United States, and void as
applied to the facts of this case; and (4) that the evidence is
insufficient to support the conviction. HN Bull was travelling with
cattles and did not observe proper care for the animals.

Topic: Introduction
People vs Gregorio Santiago GR No 17584 March 8, 1922
Facts:
Having caused the death of Porfirio Parondo, a boy, by striking
him with an automobile that he was driving, the herein appellant
was prosecuted for the crime of homicide by reckless
imprudence and was sentenced to one year and one day
imprisonment. He was prosecuted in conformity with Act No.
2886 of the Philippine Legislature and that the act is
unconstitutional and gave no jurisdiction in this case.
Issue:
If Act 2886 is unconstitutional and
Legislature have power to pass laws.

US vs. H.N. Bull GR No. 5270 January 15, 1910

Issue:
Act 55 as passed by the Philippine Congress was deemed
unconstitutional.
Ruling:

does

the

Philippine

Ruling:
For practical reasons, the procedure in criminal matters is not
incorporated in the Constitutions of the States, but is left in the
hand of the legislatures, so that it falls within the realm of public
statutory law.
This power of the States of the North American Union was also
granted to its territories such as the Philippines:
The plenary legislative power which Congress possesses over
the territories and possessions of the United States may be
exercised by that body itself, or, as is much more often the case,
it may be delegated to a local agency, such as a legislature, the
organization of which proceeds upon much the same lines as in
the several States or in Congress, which is often taken as a
model, and whose powers are limited by the Organic Act; but
within the scope of such act is has complete authority to
legislate, . . . and in general, to legislate upon all subjects within
the police power of the territory. (38 Cyc., 205-207.)

The legislative power of the Government of the Philippines is

granted in general terms subject to specific limitations. The
general grant is not alone of power to legislate on certain
subjects, but to exercise the legislative power subject to the
restrictions stated. It is true that specific authority is conferred
upon the Philippine Government relative to certain subjects of
legislation, and that Congress has itself legislated upon certain
other subjects. These, however, should be viewed simply as
enactments on matters wherein Congress was fully informed
and ready to act, and not as implying any restriction upon the
local legislative authority in other matters. (See Opinion of Atty.
Gen. of U. S., April 16, 1908.) Therefore, Act 55 is not
unconstitutional.
The defendant was found guilty, and sentenced to pay a fine of
two hundred and fifty pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The sentence and
judgment is affirmed. So ordered.

Topic: Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code

2
People vs Wong Cheng GR No. L-18924
Facts:
Wong Cheng is accused of having illegally smoked opium,
aboard the merchant vessel while the said vessel was anchored
in Manila Bay two and a half miles from the shores of the city.
Issue:
The point at issue is whether the courts of the Philippines have
jurisdiction over crime, like the one herein involved, committed
aboard merchant vessels anchored in our jurisdiction waters.
Ruling:
There are two fundamental rules on this particular matter in
connection with International Law; to wit, the French rule,
according to which crimes committed aboard a foreign merchant
vessels should not be prosecuted in the courts of the country
within whose territorial jurisdiction they were committed, unless
their commission affects the peace and security of the territory;
and the English rule, based on the territorial principle and
followed in the United States, according to which, crimes
perpetrated under such circumstances are in general triable in
the courts of the country within territory they were committed.
Of this two rules, it is the last one that obtains in this
jurisdiction, because at present the theories and jurisprudence
prevailing in the United States on this matter are authority in
the Philippines which is now a territory of the United States.
We have seen that the mere possession of opium aboard a
foreign vessel in transit was held by this court not triable by or
courts, because it being the primary object of our Opium Law to
protect the inhabitants of the Philippines against the disastrous
effects entailed by the use of this drug, its mere possession in
such a ship, without being used in our territory, does not being
about in the said territory those effects that our statute
contemplates avoiding. Hence such a mere possession is not
considered a disturbance of the public order.
But to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though
aboard a foreign merchant ship, is certainly a breach of the
public order here established, because it causes such drug to
produce its pernicious effects within our territory. It seriously
contravenes the purpose that our Legislature has in mind in
enacting the aforesaid repressive statute
The order appealed from is revoked and the cause ordered
remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings in
accordance with law, without special findings as to costs.

Topic: Article 2
People vs Look Chaw GR No 5887
Facts:
The first complaint filed against the defendant, in the Court of
First Instance of Cebu, stated that he carried, kept, possessed
and had in his possession and control, 96 kilogrammes of
opium, and that he had been surprised in the act of selling
1,000 pesos worth prepared opium.

Issue:
The defense moved for a dismissal of the case, on the grounds
that the court had no jurisdiction to try the same and the facts
concerned therein did not constitute a crime. The fiscal, at the
conclusion of his argument, asked that the maximum penalty of
the law be imposed upon the defendant, in view of the
considerable amount of opium seized.
Ruling:
The court ruled that it did not lack jurisdiction, inasmuch as the
crime had been committed within its district, on the wharf of
Cebu.
The appeal having been heard, together with the allegations
made therein by the parties, it is found: That, although the mere
possession of a thing of prohibited use in these Islands, aboard a
foreign vessel in transit, in any of their ports, does not, as a
general rule, constitute a crime triable by the courts of this
country, on account of such vessel being considered as an
extension of its own nationality, the same rule does not apply
when the article, whose use is prohibited within the Philippine
Islands, in the present case a can of opium, is landed from the
vessel upon Philippine soil, thus committing an open violation of
the laws of the land, with respect to which, as it is a violation of
the penal law in force at the place of the commission of the
crime, only the court established in that said place itself had
competent jurisdiction, in the absence of an agreement under
an international treaty.
Therefore, reducing the imprisonment and the fine imposed to
six months and P1,000, respectively, we affirm in all other
respects the judgment appealed from, with the costs of this
instance against the appellant.

US vs Ah Sing GR No. 13005 October 10, 1917

Facts:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu finding the defendant guilty of a violation of
section 4 of Act No. 2381 (the Opium Law), and sentencing him
to two years imprisonment, to pay a fine of P300 or to suffer
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the
costs.
The following facts are fully proven: The defendant is a
subject of China employed as a fireman on the steamship Shun
Chang. The Shun Chang is a foreign steamer which arrived at
the port of Cebu on April 25, 1917, after a voyage direct from
the port of Saigon. The defendant bought eight cans of opium in
Saigon, brought them on board the steamship Shun Chang, and
had them in his possession during the trip from Saigon to Cebu.
When the steamer anchored in the port of Cebu on April 25,
1917, the authorities on making a search found the eight cans of
opium above mentioned hidden in the ashes below the boiler of
the steamer's engine. The defendant confessed that he was the
owner of this opium, and that he had purchased it in Saigon. He
did not confess, however, as to his purpose in buying the opium.
He did not say that it was his intention to import the prohibited

3
drug into the Philippine Islands. No other evidence direct or
indirect, to show that the intention of the accused was to import
illegally this opium into the Philippine Islands, was introduced.

Whether Philippines has jurisdiction over the case.

Penal Code. They were sentenced "to suffer the penalty of

imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to seventeen
(17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased victim in the amount of
P40,000.00, plus moral damages in the sum of P14,000.00 and
to pay the costs." 2 The victim was Lloyd Peacerrada, 44,
landowner, and a resident of Barangay Aspera, Sara, Iloilo.
Custodio Gonzales was the only appellant in this case.

Ruling:

Issue:

Resolving whatever doubt was exist as to the authority of

the views just quoted, we return to an examination of the
applicable provisions of the law. It is to be noted that section 4
of Act No. 2381 begins, "Any person who shall unlawfully import
or bring any prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands."
"Import" and "bring" are synonymous terms. The Federal Courts
of the United States have held that the mere act of going into a
port, without breaking bulk, is prima facie evidence of
importation. (The Mary [U. S.], 16 Fed. Cas., 932, 933.) And
again, the importation is not the making entry of goods at the
custom house, but merely the bringing them into port; and the
importation is complete before entry of the Custom House. (U.
S. vs. Lyman [U. S.], 26, Fed. Cas., 1024, 1028; Perots vs. U. S.,
19 Fed. Cas., 258.) As applied to the Opium Law, we expressly
hold that any person unlawfully imports or brings any prohibited
drug into the Philippine Islands, when the prohibited drug is
found under this person's control on a vessel which has come
direct from a foreign country and is within the jurisdictional
limits of the Philippine Islands. In such case, a person is guilty of
illegal importation of the drug unless contrary circumstances
exist or the defense proves otherwise. Applied to the facts
herein, it would be absurb to think that the accused was merely
carrying opium back and forth between Saigon and Cebu for the
mere pleasure of so doing. It would likewise be impossible to
conceive that the accused needed so large an amount of opium
for his personal use. No better explanation being possible, the
logical deduction is that the defendant intended this opium to
be brought into the Philippine Islands. We accordingly find that
there was illegal importation of opium from a foreign country
into the Philippine Islands. To anticipate any possible
misunderstanding, let it be said that these statements do not
relate to foreign vessels in transit, a situation not present.

Whether Custudio Gonzales has criminal liability. When can a

person incur criminal liability?

Issue:

The defendant and appellant, having been proved guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt as charged and the sentence of the
trial court being within the limits provided by law, it results that
the judgment must be affirmed with the costs of this instance
against the appellant.

ARTICLE 3-FELONIES
People vs Gonzales G.R. No. 80762 March 19, 1990
Facts:
In a decision 1 dated October 31, 1984, the Regional Trial Court
of Iloilo, Branch XXXVIII (38), in Criminal Case No. 13661,
entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Fausta Gonzales, Augusto
Gonzales, Custodia Gonzales, Custodio Gonzales, Jr., Nerio
Gonzales and Rogelio Lanida," found all the accused, except
Rogelio Lanida who eluded arrest and up to now has remain at
large and not yet arrained, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of murder as defined under Article 248 of the Revised

Ruling:
After a careful review of the evidence adduced by the
prosecution, we find the same insufficient to convict the
appellant of the crime charged.
To begin with, the investigation conducted by the police
authorities leave much to be desired. Patrolman Centeno of the
Ajuy police force in his sworn statements 36 even gave the date
of the commission of the crime as "March 21, 1981." Moreover,
the sketch 37 he made of the scene is of little help. While
indicated thereon are the alleged various blood stains and their
locations relative to the scene of the crime, there was however
no indication as to their quantity. This is rather unfortunate for
the prosecution because, considering that there are two
versions proferred on where the killing was carried out, the
extent of blood stains found would have provided a more
definite clue as to which version is more credible. If, as the
version of the defense puts it, the killing transpired inside the
bedroom of the Gonzales spouses, there would have been more
blood stains inside the couple's bedroom or even on the ground
directly under it. And this circumstance would provide an
additional mooring to the claim of attempted rape asseverated
by Fausta. On the other hand, if the prosecution's version that
the killing was committed in the field near the linasan is the
truth, then blood stains in that place would have been more
than in any other place.
From his very testimony, Huntoria failed to impute a definite and
specific act committed, or contributed, by the appellant in the
killing of Lloyd Peacerrada.
It also bears stressing that there is nothing in the findings of the
trial court and of the Court of Appeals which would categorize
the criminal liability of the appellant as a principal by direct
participation under Article 17, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal
Code. Likewise, there is nothing in the evidence for the
prosecution that inculpates him by inducement, under
paragraph 2 of the same Article 17, or by indispensable
cooperation under paragraph 3 thereof. What then was the
direct part in the killing did the appellant perform to support the
ultimate punishment imposed by the Court of Appeals on him?
Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides how criminal
liability is incurred.
Art. 4. Criminal liability Criminal liability shall be incurred:
1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.

4
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense
against persons or property, were it not for the inherent
impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the
employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, one of the means by which criminal liability is incurred is
through the commission of a felony. Article 3 of the Revised
Penal Code, on the other hand, provides how felonies are
committed.
Art. 3. Definition Acts and omissions punishable by law are
felonies (delitos).
Felonies are committed not only by means of deceit (dolo) but
also by means of fault (culpa).
There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent;
and there is fault when the wrongful act results from
imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the elements of felonies in general are: (1) there must be
an act or omission; (2) the act or omission must be punishable
under the Revised Penal Code; and (3) the act is performed or
the omission incurred by means of deceit or fault.
Here, while the prosecution accuses, and the two lower courts
both found, that the appellant has committed a felony in the
killing of Lloyd Peacerrada, forsooth there is paucity of proof as
to what act was performed by the appellant. It has been said
that "act," as used in Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, must
be understood as "any bodily movement tending to produce
some effect in the external world." 40 In this instance, there must
therefore be shown an "act" committed by the appellant which
would have inflicted any harm to the body of the victim that
produced his death. This was not established by the prosecution.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE and the appellant is hereby ACQUITTED. Costs de
oficio.

Topic : Article 3
People vs Romana Silvestre and Martin Atienza GR No. L35748

houses were destroyed by the fire, jointly and severally, the

amount set forth in the information, with costs.
Issue:
Whether Romana Silvestre is criminally liable just because she
remained silent and did not report the crime?
Ruling:
For all the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so
hold, that: (1) Mere passive presence at the scene of another's
crime, mere silence and failure to give the alarm, without
evidence of agreement or conspiracy, do not constitute the
cooperation required by article 14 of the Penal Code for
complicity in the commission of the crime witnessed passively,
or with regard to which one has kept silent; and (2) he who
desiring to burn the houses in a barrio, without knowing whether
there are people in them or not, sets fire to one known to be
vacant at the time, which results in destroying the rest, commits
the crime of arson, defined and penalized in article 550,
paragraph 2, Penal Code.
By virtue wherefore, the judgment appealed from is modified as
follows: It is affirmed with reference to the accused-appellant
Martin Atienza, and reversed with reference to the accusedappellant Romana Silvestre, who is hereby acquitted with
one-half of the costs de oficio. So ordered.

Topic: Mistake of Fact vs Mistake of Law

Diego vs Castillo
Facts:
This is an administrative complaint against Judge Castillo
for allegedly knowingly rendering an unjust judgment in a
criminal case and rendering judgment in gross ignorance of law.
Lucena Escoto was acquitted of the crime of
bigamy, she
contracted a second marriage after filing a divorce in the state
of Texas for her first marriage. The decision states that the main
basis for the acquittal was good faith on the part of the
accused. Respondent Judge gave credence to the defense of
the accused that she acted without any malicious intent. The
combined testimonial and documentary evidence of the defense
was aimed at convincing the court that accused Lucena Escoto
had sufficient grounds to believe that her previous marriage to
Jorge de Perio had been validly dissolved by the divorce decree
and that she was legally free to contract the second marriage
with Manuel P. Diego.

Facts:
In rendering the decision, respondent Judge reasoned,
Martin Atienza and Romana Silvestre appeal to this court from
the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan convicting
them upon the information of the crime of arson as follows: The
former as principal by direct participation, sentenced to fourteen
years, eight months, and one day of cadena temporal, in
accordance with paragraph 2 of article 550, Penal Code; and the
latter as accomplice, sentenced to six years and one day
ofpresidio mayor; and both are further sentenced to the
accessories of the law, and to pay each of the persons whose

thus:
While it is true that in our jurisdiction the matrimonial bond
between Jorge de Perio and the accused are not yet annulled, it
remains undisputed that cessation of the same was decreed in
the Family District Court of Harris County, Texas, 247 th Judicial
District, effective February 15, 1978.
Issue:

5
Can Lucena Escoto be excused because of the misinterpretation
of the law? Is this case a mistake of fact or a mistake of law?
Ruling:
In his comment, respondent Judge stated: That the
accused married Manuel P. Diego in the honest belief that she
was free to do so by virtue of the decree of divorce is a mistake
of fact.
This Court, in People v. Bitdu,[4] carefully distinguished
between a mistake of fact, which could be a basis for the
defense of good faith in a bigamy case, from a mistake of law,
which does not excuse a person, even a lay person, from
liability. Bitdu held that even if the accused, who had obtained a
divorce under the Mohammedan custom, honestly believed that
in contracting her second marriage she was not committing any
violation of the law, and that she had no criminal intent, the
same does not justify her act. This Court further stated therein
that with respect to the contention that the accused acted in
good faith in contracting the second marriage, believing that
she had been validly divorced from her first husband, it is
sufficient to say that everyone is presumed to know the law, and
the fact that one does not know that his act constitutes a
violation of the law does not exempt him from the consequences
thereof.[5]
Moreover, squarely applicable to the criminal case for
bigamy, is People v. Schneckenburger, [6] where it was held that
the accused who secured a foreign divorce, and later remarried
in thePhilippines, in the belief that the foreign divorce was valid,
is liable for bigamy.
These findings notwithstanding, the issue before us is
whether or not respondent Judge should be held administratively
liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment and/or gross
ignorance of the law.
WHEREFORE, Regional Trial Court Judge Silverio Q.
Castillo is hereby FINED in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000) with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same
or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

People vs Bindoy G.R. L- 34665

Facts:
The appellant was sentenced by the Court of First Instance of
Occidental Misamis to the penalty of twelve years and one day
of reclusion temporal, with the accessories of law, to indemnify
the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P1,000, and to pay
the costs. The crime charged against the accused is homicide,
according to the following information:
That on or about the 6th of May, 1930, in the barrio of
Calunod, municipality of Baliangao, Province of
Occidental Misamis, the accused Donato Bindoy
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attacked and with
his bolo wounded Emigdio Omamdam, inflicting upon
the latter a serious wound in the chest which caused
his instant death, in violation of article 404 of the Penal
Code.

The accused appealed from the judgment of the trial court, and
his counsel in this instance contends that the court erred in
finding him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and in convicting
him of the crime of homicide.
The record shows that in the afternoon of May 6, 1930, a
disturbance arose in a tuba wineshop in the barrio market of
Calunod, municipality of Baliangao, Province of Occidental
Misamis, started by some of the tubadrinkers. There were
Faustino Pacas (alias Agaton), and his wife called Tibay. One
Donato Bindoy, who was also there, offered some tuba to Pacas'
wife; and as she refused to drink having already done so, Bindoy
threatened to injure her if she did not accept. There ensued an
interchange of words between Tibay and Bindoy, and Pacas
stepped in to defend his wife, attempting to take away from
Bindoy the bolo he carried. This occasioned a disturbance which
attracted the attention of Emigdio Omamdam, who, with his
family, lived near the market. Emigdio left his house to see what
was happening, while Bindoy and Pacas were struggling for the
bolo. In the course of this struggle, Bindoy succeeded in
disengaging himself from Pacas, wrenching the bolo from the
latter's hand towards the left behind the accused, with such
violence that the point of the bolo reached Emigdio Omamdam's
chest, who was then behind Bindoy.
Issue:
Whether Bindoy is criminally liable when there is no intent to kill
Emigdio Omamdam.
Ruling:
The testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution tends to
show that the accused stabbed Omamdam in the chest with his
bolo on that occasion. The defendant, indeed, in his effort to
free himself of Pacas, who was endeavoring to wrench his bolo
from him, hit Omamdam in the chest; but, as we have stated,
there is no evidence to show that he did so deliberately and with
the intention of committing a crime. If, in his struggle with
Pacas, the defendant had attempted to wound his opponent,
and instead of doing so, had wounded Omamdam, he would
have had to answer for his act, since whoever willfully commits
a felony or a misdemeanor incurs criminal liability, although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. (Art.
1 of the Penal Code.) But, as we have said, this is not the case.
The witness for the defense, Gaudencio Cenas, corroborates the
defendant to the effect that Pacas and Bindoy were actually
struggling for the possession of the bolo, and that when the
latter let go, the former had pulled so violently that it flew
towards his left side, at the very moment when Emigdio
Omamdam came up, who was therefore hit in the chest, without
Donato's seeing him, because Emigdio had passed behind him.
The same witness adds that he went to see Omamdam at his
home later, and asked him about his wound when he replied: "I
think I shall die of this wound." And then continued: "Please look
after my wife when I die: See that she doesn't starve," adding
further: "This wound was an accident. Donato did not aim at me,
nor I at him: It was a mishap." The testimony of this witness was
not contradicted by any rebuttal evidence adduced by the fiscal.
We have searched the record in vain for the motive of this kind,
which, had it existed, would have greatly facilitated the solution
of this case. And we deem it well to repeat what this court said
in United States vs. Carlos (15 Phil., 47), to wit:

6
The attention of prosecuting officers, and especially of
provincial fiscals, directed to the importance of
definitely ascertaining and proving, when possible, the
motives which actuated the commission of a crime
under investigation.
In many criminal cases one of the most important aids
in completing the proof of the commission of the crime
by the accused is the introduction of evidence
disclosing the motives which tempted the mind of the
guilty person to indulge the criminal act.
In view of the evidence before us, we are of opinion and so hold,
that the appellant is entitled to acquittal according to article 8,
No. 8, Penal Code. Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is
reversed, and the accused Donato Bindoy is hereby acquitted
with costs de oficio. So ordered.

ARTICLE 4
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Injurious Result is greater than that intended- praetor
intentionem
PP VS. CAGOCO, 58 PHIL 524
FACTS: About 8:30 on the night of July 24, 1932 Yu Lon and Yu
Yee, father and son, stopped to talk on the sidewalk. Yu Lon was
standing near the outer edge of the sidewalk, with his back to
the street. While they were talking, a man passed back and forth
behind Yu Lon once or twice, and when Yu Yee was about to take
leave of his father, approached Yu Lon from behind and
suddenly and without warning struck him with his fist on the
back part of the head. Yu Lon fell backwards. His head struck the
asphalt pavement; the lower part of his body fell on the
sidewalk. His assailants immediately ran away. Yu Yee pursued
but then lost sight of him. Two other Chinese, Chin Sam and Yee
Fung, who were walking by, saw the incident and joined him in
the pursuit of Yu Lons assailant. The wounded man was taken to
the Philippine General Hospital, were he died about midnight. A
post-mortem examination was made the next day by Dr.
Anastacia Villegas, who found that the deceased had sustained
a lacerated wound and fracture of the skull in the occipital
region, and that he had died from cerebral hemorrhage; that he
had tuberculosis, though not in an advanced stage, and a tumor
in the left kidney.
HELD: In the fifth assignment of error it is contended that the
appellant if guilty at all, should be punished for slight physical
injuries only instead of murder. Paragraph No. 1 of article 4 of
the Revised Penal Code provide that criminal liability shall be
incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he intended; but
in order that a person may be criminally liable for a felony
different from that which he proposed to commit, it is
indispensable that the two following requisites be present, to
wit: (a) That a felony was committed; and (b) that the wrong
done to the aggrieved person be the direct consequence of the
crime committed by the offender.
In the Brobst case, supra, it was held that death may result from
a blow over or near the heart or in the abdominal region,
notwithstanding the fact that the blow leaves no outward mark
of violence; that where death result as the direct consequence
of the use of illegal violence, the mere fact that the diseased or
weakened condition of the injured person contributed to his

death, does not relieve the illegal aggressor of criminal

responsibility; that one is not relieved, under the law in these
Islands, from criminal liability for the natural consequences of
ones illegal acts, merely because one does not intend to
produce such consequences; but that in such cases, the lack of
intention, while it does not exempt from criminal liability, is
taken into consideration as an extenuating circumstance. (U.S.
vs. Luciano, 2 Phil. 96.) The reasoning of the decisions cited is
applicable to the case at bar. There can be no reasonable doubt
as to the cause of the death of Yu Lon. There is nothing to
indicate that it was due to some extraneous case. It was clearly
the direct consequence of defendants felonious act, and the fact
that the defendant did not intend to cause so great an injury
does not relieve him from the consequence of his unlawful act,
but is merely a mitigating circumstance (U.S. vs. Rodriguez, 23
Phil. 22).

PEOPLE VS NATALIO ILLUSTRE GR NO L 32076

Facts:
That on or about June 24, 1929, in the municipality of Balayan,
Province of Batangas, Philippine Islands, the above-named
defendant willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously dealt Juan
Magsino a blow with his closed fist in the right hypochondriac
region, bruising his liver and producing an internal hemorrhage
resulting in the death of said Juan Magsino.
Issue:
The victim already suffered tuberculosis and the question is
whether this affects the defendants criminal liability.
Ruling:
Doctors Ilagan, Agoncillo, and Roxas agree, with this exception,
that while the first two who performed the autopsy on the body,
with their own eyes saw the result thereof, the latter, that is,
Doctor Roxas, simply considered the data hypothetically. We are
therefore convinced there is no fundamental disagreement
among the medical witnesses as to the cause of the victims
death; and that is was caused by the defendants blow on the
deceased right hypochondrium, which bruised the liver and
produced an internal hemorrhage.
The appellant denies having hit Magsino, protesting that he had
no motive for doing so; but the evidence shows that he punched
Magsino in the abdomen a little to the right, felling him to the
ground.
The fact that the deceased had a delicate constitution and
suffered from incipient pulmonary tuberculosis does not affect
the defendants criminal liability, for eve if it rendered the blow
more fatal, the efficient cause of the death remains the same.
(U. S. vs. Fenix, 11 Phil. 95) And the circumstance that the
defendant did not intend so grave an evil as the death of the
victim does not exempt him from criminal liability, since he
deliberately committed an act prohibited by law, but simply
mitigates his guilt in accordance with article 9, No. 3, of the
Penal Code. (U. S. vs. Samea, 15 Phil. 227.)

7
The instant case comes under the provision of article 404 of the
Penal Code providing the penalty ofreclusion temporal, which
must be imposed in its minimum degree in view of the
mitigating circumstance just mentioned, or twelve years and
one day, reclusion temporal. Therefore, the judgment appealed
from must be, as it is, hereby affirmed, with costs against the
appellant.1 So ordered.

US VS. MARASIGAN, 27 PHIL 181

FACTS: A fight ensued between the accused-appellant, Filomeno

Marasigan and one Francisco Mendoza. As a result of the fight
Mendoza received three wounds, two in the chest and one in the
left hand, the latter being the most serious. The middle finger of
the left hand was rendered useless. The accused asserts that he
should have a new trial upon the ground that if he should be
given another opportunity to present evidence he would be able
to show by a physician, Gregorio Limjoco, that the finger which
the court found to have been rendered useless by the cut
already described was not necessarily a useless member,
inasmuch as, if the accused would permit a surgical operation,
the finger could be restored to its normal condition. He also
asserts that he could demonstrate by the physician referred to
that it was not the middle finger that was disabled but the third
finger instead.
HELD: We do not regard the case made as sufficient to warrant a
new trial. It is immaterial for the purposes of this case whether
the finger, the usefullness of which was destroyed, was the
middle finger or the third finger. All agree that one of the fingers
of the left hand was rendered useless by the act of the accused.
It does not matter which finger it was.
Nor do we attach any importance to the contention that the
original condition of the finger could be restored by a surgical
operation to relieve the accused from the natural and ordinary
results of his crime. It was his voluntary act which disabled
Mendoza and he must abide by the consequences resulting
therefrom without aid from Mendoza.

US VS. MOLDES, GR NO. 42122

FACTS: There was a dance in a private house, and the deceased
was the master of ceremonies at that dance. The appellant
insisted on dancing out of turn and was reproved by the
deceased. Appellant then went to the porch of the house and
with his bolo began cutting down the decorations. He descended
into the yard of the house and challenged everyone to a fight.
Not attracting sufficient attention, he began chopping at the
bamboo trees and repeated his challenged for a fight. The
deceased, unarmed, started down the stairs, speaking to him in
a friendly manner, and as deceased had about reached the
ground, appellant struck at him with his bolo, inflicting a wound
on his left arm. As deceased fell to the ground, appellant
inflicted a slight wound in the back and ran away from the scene
of action. The wound was seen and treated the next morning by
the sanitary inspector of Abuyog, but the deceased remained in

the care of a local curandero. This treatment failed to stop the

hemorrhage, and the deceased died.
HELD: The attorney de oficio urges that appellant did not intend
to commit as serious a wound as was inflicted but struck only in
the dark and in self-defense. It is clear that there is no element
of self-defense in the case and that appellant was the aggressor.
When one resorts to the use of a lethal weapon and strikes
another with the force that must have been used in this case, it
must be presumed that he realizes the natural consequences of
his act. It is also contended by the attorney for the appellant
that if the deceased had secured proper surgical treatment, the
wound would not have been fatal. In the outlying barrio in which
this assault took place, proper modern surgical service is not
available.
The general rule is that he who inflicts the injury is not
relieved of responsibility if the wound inflicted is dangerous, that
is, calculated to destroy or endanger life, even though the
immediate cause of the death was erroneous or unskillful
medical or surgical treatment .

Doctrine of Proximate Cause

VDA BATACLAN VS. MEDINA, 102 Phil 181
FACTS: There were about eighteen passengers, including the
driver and conductor. While the bus was running within the
jurisdiction of Imus, Cavite, one of the front tires burst and the
vehicle began to zig-zag until it fell into a canal or ditch on the
right side of the road and turned turtle. Some of the passengers
managed to leave the bus the best way they could, others had
to be helped or pulled out, while four passengers could not get
out of the overturned bus. After half an hour, came about ten
men, one of them carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo with
a wick on one end, evidently fueled with petroleum. These men
presumably approach the overturned bus, and almost
immediately, a fierce fire started, burning and all but consuming
the bus, including the four passengers trapped inside it. It would
appear that as the bus overturned, gasoline began to leak,
spreading over and permeating the body of the bus and the
ground under and around it, and that the lighted torch brought
by one of the men who answered the call for help set it on fire.
HELD: There is no question that under the circumstances, the
defendant carrier is liable. The only question is to what
degree. The trial court was of the opinion that the proximate
cause of the death of Bataclan and the other trapped
passengers was not the overturning of the bus, but rather, the
fire that burned the bus. We disagree. Proximate Cause has
been defined as 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not
have occurred.' It may be that ordinarily, when a passenger bus
overturns, and pins down a passenger, merely causing him
physical injuries, if through some event, unexpected and
extraordinary, the overturned bus is set on fire, say, by
lightning, or if some highwaymen after looting the vehicle sets it
on fire, and the passenger is burned to death, one might still
contend that the proximate cause of his death was the fire and
not the overturning of the vehicle. But in the present case under
the circumstances obtaining in the same, we do not hesitate to
hold that the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus,
this for the reason that when the vehicle turned not only on its
side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from

8
the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of
the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help,
made not only by the passengers, but most probably, by the
driver and the conductor themselves, and that because it was
dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a
light with them, and coming as they did from a rural area where
lanterns and flashlights were not available; and what was more
natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach the
vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from
them. In other words, the coming of the men with a torch was to
be expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning of
the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for
outside help. What is more, the burning of the bus can also in
part be attributed to the negligence of the carrier, through is
driver and its conductor. According to the witness, the driver and
the conductor were on the road walking back and forth. They, or
at least, the driver should and must have known that in the
position in which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and
must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in
and around the bus, this aside from the fact that gasoline when
spilled, specially over a large area, can be smelt and directed
even from a distance, and yet neither the driver nor the
conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to
warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the
bus.

September 28, 1993 fight. From then on, Tomelden was in and
out of the hospital complaining of headache, among other pains,
until his demise 12 days after the blow was made. Significantly,
Dr. Arellano opined that the fist blow which landed on
Tomeldens head could have shaken his brain which caused the
cerebral concussion; and that the cause of the victims death
was "cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to cerebral concussion
with resultant cerebral hemorrhage due to mauling incident."
The combined effects of the testimonies of Salazar and Dr.
Arellano, buttressed by that of Rosario who related about her
husbands post September 28, 1993 severe head pain, clearly
establish beyond cavil the cause of Tomeldens death and who
was liable for it. It was through the direct accounts of the
prosecution witnesses of the events that transpired during the
fisticuff incident more specifically the landing of the "lucky
punch" on the face of [Tomelden], taken together with the result
of the medical examinations and autopsy report which described
the death of the victim as "cardio-respiratory arrest secondary
to cerebral concussion with resultant cerebral hemorrhage due
to mauling incident" that we are convinced that the "lucky
punch" was the proximate cause of [Tomeldens] death. The
prosecution had satisfactorily proven that it was only after the
incident that transpired on September 28, 1993 that the victim
was hospitalized on several occasions until he expired, twelve
days later. It is moreover of no consequence whether the victim
was able to report for work during the intervening days

URBANO VS. PP, GR NO. 182750

SEGURITAN VS. PP, G.R. NO. 172896
FACTS: The victim Brigido Tomelden and petitioner were at the
compound of the Lingayen Water District (LIWAD) having just
arrived from a picnic in the nearby town of Bugallon,
Pangasinan, where, they drunk beer in a restaurant with some
other co-workers While inside the compound, the two had a
heated altercation in the course of which Tomelden hurled
insulting remarks at petitioner. The exchange of words led to an
exchange of blows. Cooler heads succeeded in breaking up the
fight, but only for a brief moment as the protagonists refused to
be pacified and continued throwing fist blows at each other.
Then petitioner delivered a "lucky punch," as described by
eyewitness Orje Salazar, on Tomeldens face, which made
Tomelden topple down. Tomelden was on the verge of hitting his
head on the ground had their companions not caught him and
prevented the fall. The blow, however, caused Tomeldens nose
to bleed and rendered him unconscious. The deceased told his
wife of the mauling incident. Thereafter, the deceased was still
able to go to work however, his complaints to his wife of severe
pain in the head, prompted him to be admitted at the
community hospital. Finally, Tomelden died on October 10, 1993
due, per Dr. Arellano, to "cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to
cerebral concussion with resultant cerebral hemorrhage due to
mauling incident."
The defense presented petitioner who denied having any
intention to kill, asserting that hypertension, for which Tomelden
was receiving treatment, was the cause of the latters
death.Moreover, the Tomelden only died 12 days later after the
incident and was still able to report to work engenders doubt on
the proximate cause of victims death. Petitioner, thus, contends
that he could only be adjudged guilty of physical injuries.
HELD: The prosecution witness, Salazar, testified about
petitioners lucky punch hitting Tomelden right smack on the
face. And even if Tomeldens head did not hit the ground as his
co-workers averted that actuality, that punch gave him a
bleeding nose and rendered him unconscious right after the

FACTS: Petitioner was having a drinking session with his uncles

Lucrecio Seguritan (Lucrecio), Melchor Panis and Baltazar Panis
in the house of Manuel dela Cruz in Barangay Paradise,
Gonzaga, Cagayan. Petitioner, who was seated beside Lucrecio,
claimed that Lucrecios carabao entered his farm and destroyed
his crops. A heated discussion thereafter ensued, during which
petitioner punched Lucrecio twice as the latter was about to
stand up. Petitioners punches landed on Lucrecios right and left
temple, causing him to fall face-up to the ground and hit a
hollow block which was being used as an improvised stove.
Lucrecio lost consciousness but was revived with the assistance
of Baltazar. Thereafter, Lucrecio rode a tricycle and proceeded to
his house. Upon his arrival, his wife noticed blood on his
forehead. Lucrecio explained that he was stoned, then went
directly to his room and slept.
At around 9 oclock in the evening, Lucrecios wife and daughter
noticed that his complexion has darkened and foamy substance
was coming out of his mouth. Attempts were made to revive
Lucrecio but to no avail. He died that same night.
NBI Medico-Legal Officer Dr. Antonio Vertido exhumed Lucrecios
body and performed the autopsy. Dr. Vertido concluded that
Lucrecios cause of death was traumatic head injury. 7
HELD: Petitioner disputes the conclusion that the fracture on the
right middle fossa of the skull, beneath the area where a
hematoma developed was due to the blow he delivered because
according to the testimony of Dr. Vertido, the fracture may also
be caused by one falling from a height. Petitioner also maintains
that the punches he threw at Lucrecio had nothing to do with
the fatal head injuries the latter suffered. According to him,
Lucrecio sustained the head injuries when he accidentally hit the
hollow block that was used as an improvised stove, after falling

9
from the opposite end of the bench. Petitioner insists that
Lucrecio died due to a fatal heart attack.
We are not persuaded. It is on record that Lucrecio suffered two
external injuries and one internal injury in his head. The autopsy
report showed that Lucrecio died of internal hemorrhage caused
by head injuries. Melchors eyewitness account of the fist blows
delivered by petitioner to Lucrecio and the manner by which the
latter fell from the bench and hit his head on the improvised
stove is consistent with the autopsy findings prepared and
testified to by Dr. Vertido. The testimony of Dr. Vertido also ruled
out petitioners contention that Lucrecio died of a heart attack.
Art. 4 of the Revised Penal Code states that Criminal liability
shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito)
although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended. Petitioner committed an unlawful act by punching
Lucrecio, his uncle who was much older than him, and even if he
did not intend to cause the death of Lucrecio, he must be held
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for killing him pursuant to the
above-quoted provision. He who is the cause of the cause is the
cause of the evil caused.

PP VS. RAFAEL MARCO, DEFENDANT APPELLANT, GR NOS. L28324-5

FACTS: Simeon Marco, son of appellant Rafael, approached
Constancio Sabelbero and after asking him if he were the one
who boxed his (Simeon's) brother the year before, brandished a
hunting knife, which caused Constancio to run away. While thus
running, he passed by appellant who hit him with a cane causing
him slight physical injuries. When Simeon was about to pursue
Constancio, the latter's father, Vicente, who was in the crowd,
grabbed Simeon's hand that was holding the knife. When
Vicente, however, saw that appellant, who was holding a round
cane and a hunting knife, was approaching them, he shouted to
Constancio and to his other son Bienvenido who appeared in the
scene to run away, which they did, as he himself released
Simeon and ran away. Appellant followed Bienvenido and
stabbed him, but the latter parried the blow which caused
injuries to his left hand. Bienvenido tried to run farther but his
feet got entangled with some vines and he fell down.
Whereupon, Beltran, who came from nowhere, stabbed him near
the anus, followed by Simeon who stabbed him on the left side
of the breast. Thereafter, Bienvenido died. On the theory that
there was obvious conspiracy among appellants Rafael, Simoen,
and Beltran, the trial court convicted them of murder. Only
Rafael appealed.
The Supreme Court ruled that the act of appellant stabbing the
victim which caused injuries to the latter's left hand is separate
from the fatal stabs inflicted by his two co-accused, because the
existence of bad blood between the families of the deceased
and the accused which could have established commonality of
intent on the part of the three accused was denied by both
parties. Moreover, there was no clear evidence connecting the
act of appellant in trying to stab the victim which caused the
latter injuries on the left hand, with the fatal stabs inflicted by
his two other co-accused.
HELD: Appellant cannot be held liable for the death of decedent
under Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code. "Article 4,
paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code provides that, 'criminal
liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony
(delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that

which he intended.' Under this provision, one who commits an

intentional felony is responsible for all the consequences which
may naturally and logically result therefrom, whether foreseen
or intended or not.
It cannot be denied that the stabbing of the decedent by the
appellant which caused a slight wound on the former's hand was
intentionally made; hence, felony. However, the ensuing death
of the decedent was not the direct, natural, and logical
consequence of the wound inflicted by the appellant. There was
an active intervening cause, which was no other than the
sudden and unexpected appearance and participation of Simeon
Marco and Dulcisimo Beltran. And there is authority that if the
consequences produced have resulted from a distinct act or fact
absolutely foreign from the criminal act, the offender is not
responsible for such consequence.

PP VS. VILLACORTA, GR NO. 186412

FACTS: Mendeja narrated that on January 23, 2002, she was
tending her sari-sari store located at C-4 Road, Bagumbayan,
Navotas. Both Cruz and Villacorta were regular customers at
Mendejas store. At around two oclock in the morning, while
Cruz was ordering bread at Mendejas store, Villacorta suddenly
appeared and, without uttering a word, stabbed Cruz on the left
side of Cruzs body using a sharpened bamboo stick. The
bamboo stick broke and was left in Cruzs body. Immediately
after the stabbing incident, Villacorta fled. Mendeja gave chase
but failed to catch Villacorta. When Mendeja returned to her
store, she saw her neighbor Aron removing the broken bamboo
stick from Cruzs body. Mendeja and Aron then brought Cruz to
Tondo Medical Center.

Dr. Belandres was Head of the Tetanus Department at the San

Lazaro Hospital. When Cruz sustained the stab wound on
January 23, 2002, he was taken to the Tondo Medical Center,
where he was treated as an out-patient. Cruz was only brought
to the San Lazaro Hospital on February 14, 2002, where he died
the following day, on February 15, 2002. While admitting that
he did not personally treat Cruz, Dr. Belandres was able to
determine, using Cruzs medical chart and diagnosis, that Cruz
died of tetanus infection secondary to stab wound.

HELD: There is merit in the argument proffered by Villacorta that

in the event he is found to have indeed stabbed Cruz, he should
only be held liable for slight physical injuries for the stab wound
he inflicted upon Cruz. The proximate cause of Cruzs death is
the tetanus infection, and not the stab wound.

Proximate cause has been defined as that cause, which, in

natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred.

10
In this case, immediately after he was stabbed by Villacorta in the
early morning of January 23, 2002, Cruz was rushed to and
treated
as
an
out-patient
at
the
Tondo
Medical
Center. On February 14, 2002, Cruz was admitted to the San
Lazaro Hospital for symptoms of severe tetanus infection, where
he died the following day, on February 15, 2002. The prosecution
did not present evidence of the emergency medical treatment
Cruz received at the Tondo Medical Center, subsequent visits by
Cruz to Tondo Medical Center or any other hospital for follow-up
medical treatment of his stab wound, or Cruzs activities between
January 23 to February 14, 2002.

There are doubts in the instant case that compel us to set aside
the conviction of Villacorta for murder. There had been an
interval of 22 days between the date of the stabbing and the date
when Cruz was rushed to San Lazaro Hospital, exhibiting
symptoms of severe tetanus infection. If Cruz acquired severe
tetanus infection from the stabbing, then the symptoms would
have appeared a lot sooner than 22 days later. As the Court
noted in Urbano, severe tetanus infection has a short incubation
period, less than 14 days; and those that exhibit symptoms with
two to three days from the injury, have one hundred percent
(100%) mortality. Ultimately, we can only deduce that Cruzs stab
wound was merely the remote cause, and its subsequent
infection with tetanus might have been the proximate cause of
Cruz's death. The infection of Cruzs stab wound by tetanus was
an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Cruz
was stabbed to the time of his death.

However,
Villacorta
is
not
totally
without
criminal
liability. Villacorta is guilty of slight physical for the stab wound
he inflicted upon Cruz.

physical differences between the two and the wide gap between
their ages. Grate immediately reported the matter to two
barangay tanods when his passengers alighted from the tricycle.
Grate and the tanods went after the two and saw the man
dragging the boy. Noticing that they were being pursued, the
man told Enrico to run fast as their pursuers might behead
them. Somehow, the man managed to escape, leaving Enrico
behind. Enrico was on his way home in a passenger jeep when
he met his parents, who were riding in the hospital ambulance
and already looking for him. 2
At about 1:45 in the afternoon of the same day, after Enrico's
return, Agra received an envelope containing a ransom note.
The note demanded P1 million for the release of Enrico and
warned that otherwise the boy would be killed. Agra thought the
handwriting in the note was familiar. After comparing it with
some records in the hospital, he gave the note to the police,
which referred it to the NBI for examination. 3
The test showed that it had been written by Dr. Samson
Tan. 4 On the other hand, Enrico was shown a folder of pictures
in the police station so he could identify the man who had
detained him, and he pointed to the picture of Pablito
Domasian.
Tan claims that the lower court erred in not finding that the
sending of the ransom note was an impossible crime which he
says is not punishable. His reason is that the second paragraph
of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal
liability shall be incurred "by any person performing an act
which would be an offense against persons or property, were it
not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on
account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means."
As the crime alleged is not against persons or property but
against liberty, he argues that it is not covered by the said
provision.
HELD: Tan conveniently forgets the first paragraph of the same
article, which clearly applies to him, thus: Criminal liability shall
be incurred: By any person committing a felony (delito) although
the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.

IMPOSSIBLE CRIMES

PP VS. DOMASIAN, GR NO. 95322

FACTS: In the morning of March 11, 1982, while Enrico was
walking with a classmate, he was approached by a man who
requested his assistance in getting his father's signature on a
medical certificate. Enrico agreed to help and rode with the man
in a tricycle to Calantipayan, where he waited outside while the
man went into a building to get the certificate. Enrico became
apprehensive and started to cry when, instead of taking him to
the hospital, the man flagged a minibus and forced him inside,
holding him firmly all the while. The man told him to stop crying
or he would not be returned to his father. When they alighted at
Gumaca, they took another tricycle, this time bound for the
municipal building from where they walked to the market. Here
the man talked to a jeepney driver and handed him an envelope
addressed to Dr. Enrique Agra, the boy's father. The two then
boarded a tricycle headed for San Vicente, with the man still
firmly holding Enrico, who continued crying. This aroused the
suspicion of the driver, Alexander Grate, who asked the man
about his relationship with the boy. The man said he and the boy
were brothers, making Grate doubly suspicious because of the

Even before the ransom note was received, the crime of

kidnapping with serious illegal detention had already been
committed. The act cannot be considered an impossible crime
because there was no inherent improbability of its
accomplishment or the employment of inadequate or ineffective
means. The delivery of the ransom note after the rescue of the
victim did not extinguish the offense, which had already been
consummated when Domasian deprived Enrico of his liberty. The
sending of the ransom note would have had the effect only of
increasing the penalty to death under the last paragraph of
Article 267 although this too would not have been possible
under the new Constitution.

INTOD VS. PP, GR NO. 103119

FACTS: Petitioner together with other men, all armed with
firearms, arrived at Palangpangan's house. Thereafter,
Petitioner, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig fired at bedroom of
Palangpangan. It turned out, however, that Palangpangan was in
another city and her home was then occupied by her son-in-law
and his family. No one was in the room when the accused fired
the shots. No one was hit by the gun fire.

11
After trial, the Regional Trial Court convicted Intod of attempted
murder. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the trial court's
decision. This petition questions the decision of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, holding
that Petitioner was guilty of attempted murder. Petitioner seeks
from this Court a modification of the judgment by holding him
liable only for an impossible crime,
HELD: Article 4, paragraph 2 is an innovation of the Revised
Penal Code. This seeks to remedy the void in the Old Penal Code
where: it was necessary that the execution of the act has been
commenced, that the person conceiving the idea should have
set about doing the deed, employing appropriate means in order
that his intent might become a reality, and finally, that the result
or end contemplated shall have been physically possible. So
long as these conditions were not present, the law and the
courts did not hold him criminally liable.
Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot
produce an offense against persons or property because: (1) the
commission of the offense is inherently impossible of
accomplishment; or (2) the means employed is either (a)
inadequate or (b) ineffectual. That the offense cannot be
produced because the commission of the offense is inherently
impossible of accomplishment is the focus of this petition. To be
impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender
must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. There
must be either (1) legal impossibility, or (2) physical
impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in order to
qualify the act as an impossible crime. Legal impossibility occurs
where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount
to a crime. Thus: Legal impossibility would apply to those
circumstances where (1) the motive, desire and expectation is
to perform an act in violation of the law; (2) there is intention to
perform the physical act, (3) there is a performance of the
intended physical act; and (4) the consequence resulting from
the intended act does not amount to a crime. The impossibility
of killing a person already dead falls in this category. On the
other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous
circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control
prevent the consummation of the intended crime. One example
is the man who puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with
the intention to steal the latter's wallet and finds the pocket
empty. The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner
shoots the place where he thought his victim would be, although
in reality, the victim was not present in said place and thus, the
petitioner failed to accomplish his end.
In the United States, where the offense sought to be committed
is factuallyor physically impossible of accomplishment, the
offender cannot escape criminal liability. He can be convicted of
an attempt to commit the substantive crime where the elements
of attempt are satisfied. It appears, therefore, that the act is
penalized, not as an impossible crime, but as an attempt to
commit a crime. On the other hand, where the offense is legally
impossible of accomplishment, the actor cannot be held liable
for any crime neither for an attempt nor for an impossible
crime. The only reason for this is that in American law, there is
no such thing as an impossible crime. Instead, it only recognizes
impossibility as a defense to a crime charge that is, attempt.

impossibility. Ubi
debemos.

lex

non

distinguit

nec

nos

distinguere

The factual situation in the case at bar presents physical

impossibility which rendered the intended crime impossible of
accomplishment. And under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the
Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an
impossible crime.

PP VS. ENOJA, GR NO. 102596

SYNOPSIS: The five appellants here, all farmers and residents of
Barangay Caraudan, Janiuay, Iloilo, are related to each other.
The victim, Siegfred G. Insular, was a suspected commander of
the "New People's Army" (NPA). The provincial fiscal filed an
nformation for murder against herein appellants and their three
companions who remained at-large. They were arraigned and
entered pleas of not guilty. The trial court rendered a decision
finding appellants herein guilty as charged. The trial court did
not give credence to the claim of self-defense and found
conspiracy in committing the crime. The appellants filed this
appeal before the Supreme Court. DIET
In this case, circumstances indubitably showed that appellants
acted concertedly to kill Siegfred. Here, the Supreme Court
found that the trial court did not err in finding that conspiracy
was present in this case. Both the victim and the assailant knew
each other and the victim gave no provocation in the attack.
Clearly the qualifying circumstance was present in this case. The
defense of alibi did not prosper when the appellants failed to
prove the physical impossibility of their presence at the crime
scene at the time of its commission. The decision of the
Regional Trial Court was affirmed with modification that the
award of actual damages was deleted.
As an alternative defense, appellants present the theory that
even assuming they participated in the killing of Siegfred, they
should only be held liable for the commission of an impossible
crime under Article 4, Par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code,
penalized under Article 59 thereof. Appellants theorize that the
shots fired by Armada already resulted in the death of the
victim, and hence, their subsequent shooting of the victim
merely constitutes the impossible crime of killing an already
dead person. The proposition not only completely contradicts
their defense of alibi and denial, it is also speculative as to
cause of death. The defense of impossible crime is irreconcilable
with alibi.

ARTICLE 6
Attempted, Frustrated and Consummated Stages

ATTEMPTED STAGE
This is not true in the Philippines. In our jurisdiction, impossible
crimes are recognized. The impossibility of accomplishing the
criminal intent is not merely a defense, but an act penalized by
itself. Furthermore, the phrase "inherent impossibility" that is
found in Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code makes no
distinction between factual or physical impossibility and legal

PP VS. LAMAHANG, GR NO. L-43530

FACTS: At early dawn on March 2, 1935, policeman Jose
Tomambing, who was patrolling his beat on Delgado and CR
Fuentes streets of the City of Iloilo, caught the accused in the
act of making an opening with an iron bar on the wall of a store
of cheap goods located on the last named street. At the time the

12
owner of the store, Tan Yu, was sleeping inside with another
Chinaman. The accused had only succeeded in breaking one
board and in unfastening another from the wall, when the
policeman showed up, who instantly arrested him and placed
him under custody.
HELD: There is no doubt in the case at bar it was the intention of
the accused to enter Tan Yus store by means of violence,
passing through the opening which he has started to make in
the wall, in order to commit an offense which, due to the arrival
of policeman Tomambing did not develop beyond the first steps
of execution. But it is not sufficient, for the purpose of imposing
penal sanction, that an act objectively performed constitute a
mere beginning of execution; it is necessary to establish its
unavoidable connection, like the logical and natural relation of
the cause and its effect, with the deed which, upon its
consummation, will develop into one of the offenses defined and
punished by the Code; it is necessary to prove that said
beginning of execution, if carried to its complete termination
following its natural course, without being frustrated by external
obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will
logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. Thus, in
the case of robbery, in order that the simple act of entering by
means of force or violence another persons dwelling may be
considered an attempt to commit this offense, it must be shown
that the offender clearly intended to take possession, for the
purpose of gain, of some personal property belonging to
another. In the instant case, there is nothing in the record from
which such purpose of the accused may reasonably be inferred.
The fact under consideration does not constitute attempted
robbery but attempted trespass to dwelling.

PEOPLE VS LIZADA GR NO 143468-71, JANUARY 24, 2003

Facts:
Accused-appellant[2] was charged with four (4) counts of
qualified rape under four separate Information for raping his
stepdaughter.
Issue:
Will Lizada be
lasciviousness

charged

with

attempted

rape

or

act

of

Principles Applied:
In light of the evidence of the prosecution, there was no
introduction of the penis of accused-appellant into the aperture
or
within
the pudendum of
the
vagina
of
private
complainant. Hence, accused-appellant is not criminally liable
[36]
for consummated rape.
The issue that now comes to fore is whether or not
accused-appellant is guilty of consummated acts of
lasciviousness defined in Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code
or attempted rape under Article 335 of the said Code, as
amended in relation to the last paragraph of Article 6 of the
Revised Penal Code. In light of the evidence on record, we
believe that accused-appellant is guilty of attempted rape and
not of acts of lasciviousness.
Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
Art. 336. Acts of Lasciviousness.Any person who shall commit
any act of lasciviousness upon other persons of either sex,
under any of the circumstances mentioned in the preceding
article, shall be punished by prision correccional.[37]

PP VS. RIVERA et. al. GR No. 16632

FACTS: The accused, all surnamed Rivera, attacked and
assaulted one Ruben Rudil, hitting him with a piece of hollow
block while the latter went to a nearby store to buy food
together with his daughter. People who saw the incident called
for them to stop. Policemen arrived in the scene prompting the
three accused to fled to their house. Ruben was rushed to the
hospital where the attending physician declared that the wounds
sustained by Ruben were slight and superficial and would heal in
about 7 days. The RTC and the CA convicted the accused of
attempted murder. Accused, now petitioners, aver that the
prosecution had failed to prove that they had intention to kill
Ruben. They aver that based on the testimony of the attending
physician, the victim did not sustained a fatal wound.
HELD: As stated by the attending physician, appellants could
have killed the victim had the hollow block hit his head and had
the police not promptly intervened. When a wound is not
sufficient to cause death, but intent to kill is evident, the crime
is attempted. Intent to kill was shown by the fact that the three
brothers helped each other maul the defenceless victim, and
even if he had already fallen to the ground; that one of them
proceeded to hit the victim with a hollow block had not the
police arrived. The accused commenced of the felony directly by
overt acts, but failed to perform all acts of execution which
would produce the crime of murder by reason of some causes
other than their own spontaneous desistance, that is, Ruben
Rodil was able to run away and the timely response of the
policemen. Furthermore, petitioners also draw attention to the
fact that the injury sustained by victim was superficial and thus
not life threatening. However, the nature of the injury does not
negate the intent to kill. An essential element of murder and
homicide, whether, consummated, frustrated or attempted, is
intent of the offenders to kill the victim immediately before or
simultaneously with the infliction of injury. Intent to kill is a
specific intent which the prosecution must prove by direct or
circumstantial evidence while general criminal intent is
presumed from the commission of a felony by dolo.

The last paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code

reads:
There is an attempt when the offender commences the
commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not
perform all the acts of execution which should produce the
felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance.
The essential elements of an attempted felony are as
follows:
1. The offender commences the commission of the felony
directly by overt acts;
2. He does not perform all the acts of execution which should
produce the felony;
3. The offenders act be not stopped by his own
spontaneous desistance;
4. The non-performance of all acts of execution was due
to cause or accident other than his spontaneous desistance.[40]
The first requisite of an attempted felony consists of two
elements, namely:
(1) That there be external acts;
(2) Such external acts have direct connection with the
crime intended to be committed.[41]
Ruling:
In Criminal Case No. 99-171391, accused-appellant is hereby
found guilty of attempted rape under Article 335 of the Revised

13
Penal Code as amended in relation to Article 6 of the said Code
and is hereby meted an indeterminate penalty of from six years
of prision correccional in its maximum period, as minimum to
ten years of prision mayor in its medium period, as
maximum. Accused-appellant

ARANETA VS CA JULY 30, 1990

Facts:
In an Information filed before the Circuit Criminal Court
of Manila, 6th Judicial District on May 14, 1973, Eliseo
Araneta, Jr. y Macute, herein petitioner, Benjamin
Bautista y Mendoza, also a petitioner, Eden Ng y
Dumantay and Joselito "Boy" Santiago were charged with
murder for the death of one Manuel Esteban, Jr. due to
multiple gun shot wounds on March 23, 1972.

Issue:
Should an accused who admittedly shot the victim but is shown
to have inflicted only a slight wound be held accountable for the
death of the victim due to a fatal wound caused by his coaccused?

Principles Applied:
The gunshot wound inflicted by petitioner Araneta, Jr. was a
slight wound which did not cause the death of the victim nor
materially contributed to it in order that he may be held liable
for homicide. 18His liability should therefore be limited to the
slight injury he caused. However, the fact that petitioner
Araneta Jr. inflicted a gunshot wound on the victim shows the
intent to kill. The use of a gun fired at another certainly leads to
no other conclusion than that there is intent to kill. He is
therefore liable for the crime of attempted homicide and not
merely for slight physical injury.

the mind of the person to whom it is directed. That the victim,

after the incident, cried while relating to her classmates what
she perceived to be a sexual attack and the fact that she filed a
case for attempted rape proved beyond reasonable doubt that
she was disturbed, if not, distressed, by the acts of the
petitioner.

FRUSTRATED STAGE
US VS. EDUAVE, GR NO L-12155
FACTS: The accused rushed upon the girl, suddenly an struck
her from behind, in part at least, with a sharp bolo. A deadly
weapon was used. The motive of the crime was that the accused
was incensed at the girl for the reason that she had theretofore
charged him criminally before the local officials with having
raped her and causing her pregnancy.
HELD: The crime was frustrated, not attempted murder. A felony
is frustrated when the offender performs all acts of execution
which would produce the felony as a consequence, but which,
nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent
of the will of the perpetrator. There is no intervention of a
foreign or extraneous cause between the beginning of the
commission of the act and the moment when all the acts have
been performed which would result in the consummate crime. In
other words, the subjective phase had been passed. In the case
at bar, the blow was directed toward a vital part of the body. The
aggressor stated his purpose to kill, thought he had killed and
threw the body into the bushes. When he gave himself up, he
declared that he had killed the complainant. Subjectively, the
crime is complete. Nothing interrupted the offender while he
was passing through the subjective phase. The crime, however,
is not consummated by reason of the intervention of causes
independent of the will of the offender. He did all that was
necessary to commit the crime. If the crime did not result as a
consequence it was due to something beyond his control. In this
case, he thought he already killed the victim.

Ruling:

PP VS. DAGMAN, et al GR NO. L-23133

Considering the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender

without any other attendant circumstances, petitioner Araneta,
Jr. is imposed the penalty of imprisonment for ten (10) months
of prision correccional. Although, he is still guilty of attempted
homicide.

FACTS: On the 2nd of May, 1924, Elias Magbual, was attacked by

a crowed of persons and was nearly killed. The motive of the
crime was that the persons who harbored enmity against
Magbual had previously been dispossessed of portions of the
land by judicial order. Magbual managed to escape death from
his tormentors by the use of feigning death.

PP VS. BALEROS, JR. GR NO. 138033

SYNOPSIS: About 1:50 in the morning of December 13, 1991 in
Manila, the accused Renato Baleros Jr., forcefully covered the
face of Martina Lourdes T. Albano with a piece of cloth soaked in
chemical with dizzying effects, and commenced the commission
of rape by lying on top of her with the intention to have carnal
knowledge with he but was unable to perform all acts of
execution by reason of some cause or accident other than his
own spontaneous desistance, said acts being committed against
her will and consent to her damage and prehudice. The
petitioner argues, however, that the above mentioned
information, does not allege the complained act of covering the
face of the victim with a piece of cloth soaked in chemical
caused her annoyance, irritation, torment, distress and
disturbance.
HELD: Malice, compulsion, or restraint need not be alleged in an
information for unjust vexation. The paramount question (in a
prosecution for unjust vexation) is whether the offenders act
causes annoyance, irritation, torment, distress, or disturbance to

HELD: The murder should be regarded as frustrated because the

offenders performed all acts of execution which should precede
the felony as consequence but which nevertheless did not
produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the
perpetrators; in this instance, the playing possum by Magbual.
There was an intent upon the part of the assailants to take the
life of the person attacked, which intent may be gathered from
the circumstances surrounding the attack; in this instance, the
nature of the wounds, the cry of the accused and their fingering
of the nose of Magbual to see if respiration continued. Deadly
weapons were used, blows were directed at the vital parts of the
body, the aggressors stated their purpose to kill and thought
they had killed. The subjective phase of the crime was entirely
passed, and subjectively speaking, the crime was complete. The
particular parts of the body of the person struck during the
assault, the deadly character of the weapons used, the violence
of the attack, and the accomplishment of the crime with
alevosia, classifies the crime as frustrated murder. And finally,
the victim did not die, was owing to a chance or accident or
reason independent of the criminal act performed.

VALENZUELA vs. Pp, GR NO. 160188

14
FACTS: Petitioner was seen outside the Super Sale Club within
the SM Complex by security guard, Lorenzo Lago. Petitioner was
seen unloading cased of Tide detergent with an accomplice.
Valenzuela then haled a taxi, loaded the detergent inside and
boarded the same. Lago proceeded to stop the taxi and asked
for the receipt of the merchandise. Petitioner and accomplice
was about to flee when Largo fired a warning shot to alert his
fellow security guards. Valenzuela and accomplice was then
apprehended at the scene. The trial convicted the two with
consummated theft. Only Valenzuela appealed to the CA
asserting that he should only be convicted of frustrated theft. CA
affirmed decision of the trial court hence the present petition.
HELD: Valenzuela invoked the Dio and Flores cases. In both
cases, the accused were convicted of frustrated theft, of which it
was held the fact determinative of consummation is the ability
of the thief to dispose freely of the articles stolen, even if it were
more or less momentary. Under Article 308 of the RPC, Theft is
committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without
violence against or intimidation of persons not force upon
things, shall take personal property of another without the
latters consent. Reading the Dio and Flores cases, the ability
of the offender to freely dispose of the property stolen is not a
constitutive element of the crime of theft defined under Article
308 of the RPC. In the present case, for the purpose of
ascertaining whether theft is susceptible of commission in the
frustrated stage, the question is, when is the crime of theft
produced? Theft is produced when there is the deprivation of
personal property due to its taking by one with intent to gain.
Viewed from that perspective, it is immaterial to the product of
the felony that the offender, once having committed all acts of
execution for theft, is able to unable to freely dispose of the
property stolen since the deprivation from the owner alone has
already ensued from such acts of execution. Unlawful taking is
deemed complete from the moment the offender gains
possession of the thing even if he has no opportunity to dispose
of the same. Hence, theft cannot have a frustrated stage, it can
only be consummated or attempted.

ARTICLE 8
CONSPIRACY
CONSPIRACY AND PROPOSAL

PP VS. ALETA, ET AL, GR NO. 179708

Marcelo, Ferdinand, Rogelio, Marlo and Jovito, all surnamed Aleta
was charged for the murder of Celestino Duldulao y Yadao and
Ferdinand Acob. All above-named accuse club with the use of
hard objects both the victims. The Court upholds the version of
the prosecution: While the deceased Acobs mother, Marina,
went to the community center, she heard a commotion on the
yard of the appellants. Returning home, she told Acob of the
quarrel. Acob went to the appellants compound. Upon following
her son, Marina witnessed Rogelio striking Acob with a piece of
wood, causing the latter to fall. She thereafter saw Rogelio
striking Duldulao causing the latters eyes to pop out. Rogelio
then ran towards the family house whereupon Marina heard
gunshots. Jovito, Marlo and Ferdinand continued to hit them.
When Rogelio emerged from the house, he got another piece of
wood and clubbed the victims.
Held: Conspiracy was present during the attack. When two or
more persons aim their acts towards the accomplishment of the
same unlawful object, each doing a part of their acts, though
apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative
indicating closeness of personal association and a concurrence
of sentiment, conspiracy may be inferred. And where there is
conspiracy, the act of one is deemed the act of all.

PP VS. LOPEZ, REGALADO AND ARAGON GR NO. 177302

FACTS: Appellant Rogelio Regalado who was outside a tailoring
shop, called out to victim, Edencito Chu and prompted him to
come out of his mothers bakery. Chu thereupon emerged from
the bakery, put his arms around Regalados shoulders and asked
forgiveness. Regalado however pushed his arms aside, drew a
curved knife and stabbed Chu on the left nipple. As Chu ran
towards Villaluz Street, Regalado chased him and picked up two
pieces of firewood along the way with which he hit Chu.
Appellant Jaime Lopez in the meantime surfaced from the back
of the tailoring shop and also joined the chase. Soon appellant
Aragon also surfaced from the back of the tailoring shop and
joined the chase. The three caught up with Chu. Aragon boxed
Chu, causing the latter to fall. He then kicked the victim. Lopez
stabbed Chu several times as Regalado looked on. When Chu
was no longer moving, the three appellants left.
HELD: Appellants disclaimer of the presence of conspiracy fails.
The evidence shows that they cooperated in a common design
to kill Chu. Regalado initiated the killing when he stabbed Chu
on the chest, and the two other appellants joined Regalado in
chasing Chu, with Regalado hitting Chu with firewood along the
way. Then, when the three of them had cornered Chu, Aragon
boxed and kicked Chu enabling Lopez to stab him several times.
These indicates a conspiracy.

DIRECT PROOF OF CONSPIRACY IS NOT REQUIRED

PP vs. PABLO AMODIA, accused-appellant, GR NO. 17391
FACTS: Romildo Ceno testified that he along with two friends
were talking and watching television when he heard a noise
coming somewhere below the C-5 Bridge, located 40-50 meters
away from their house. He also heard somebody shouted may
away doon. Curious, he and Mario went to the bridge and saw
five persons whom he identified as the victim (Felix Olandria
Bergao), Pablo Amodia, Arnold Partosa, George Palacio and
Damasio Amodia. He knew these men as they were neighbors.
Illuminated by light coming from a post, he saw the victim being
held in the right hand by Pablo, while the other hand was held
by Arnold. George was positioned at the victims back and
clubbed the victim on the head; Damaso was in front of the
victim and stabbed him three times. Luther Caberte who
happened to be passing by the C-5 bridge at that time, also saw
what happened. He testified that he saw men fighting under the
C-5 bridge which was illuminated by a light from a lamppost. He
saw Pablo, Damaso, George and Arnold ganging up on the
victim. He saw Pablo holding the victims hand while Damaso
was stabbing him. He also affirmed that George was positioned
behind the victim. He personally knew both the victim and Pablo
as they have been neighbors. Both eyewitnesses left the scene
after the stabbing; Romildo was chased away by George and
Damaso while Luther went on home immediately.
The accused-appellant Pablo Amodia invoked the defense of
alibi. In his appeal, Pablo argues that the trial court and the CA
erred in failing to give evidentiary weight to his alibi. He
alternatively argues that granting that he was part of Damasos
group and that the group killed the victim, the prosecution failed
to establish the conspiracy among them. There was no evidence

15
adduced to establish how the incident that led to the stabbing
began.
HELD: As an alternative argument, Pablo puts into issue the
failure of the prosecutions evidence to establish the conspiracy
between him and his other co-accused to make him liable for
murder. He emphasizes that the evidence, as testified by the
eyewitnesses, only relate to events during and not prior to the
assault and the stabbing of the victim. He argues that no
evidence was adduced to show that the accused all agreed to
kill the victim.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it. It arises the very instant the plotters agrees,
expressly or impliedly, to commit a felony and forthwith decide
to pursue it. It may be proved by direct or circumstantial
evidence. Direct proof of conspiracy is rarely found;
circumstantial evidence is often resorted to in order to prove its
existence. Absent of any direct proof as in the present case,
conspiracy may be deduced from the mode, method, and
manner the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of
the accused themselves, when such acts point to a joint purpose
and design, concerted action, and community of interest. An
accused participates as a conspirator if he or she has performed
some overt acts as a direct or indirect contribution in the
execution of the crime planned to be committed. The overt act
may consist of active participation in the actual commission of
the crime itself, or it may consist of moral assistance to his coconspirators by being present at the commission of the crime, or
by exerting moral ascendancy over the other co-conspirators.
Stated otherwise, it is not essential that there be proof of the
previous agreement and decision to commit the crime, it is
sufficient that the malefactors acted in concert pursuant to the
same objective.
Although there was no evidence in the present case showing a
priot agreement of Pablo, Arnold, George and Damaso, the
following chain of events however show their commonality of
purpose in killing the victim: first, the accused surrounded the
victims on all sides; Damaso at the front, George at the victims
rear; while Pablo and Arnold flanked the victim on each side;
second, Pablo then wrested the right arm of the victim and
restrained his movement; while Arnold did the same to the left
arm of the victim; third, George then hit the victims head with a
piece of wood; and fourth. Damaso stabbed the victim three
times.

Certificate of Registration and Official Receipt issued by the LTO

in the name of Jose Biag. The accused voluntarily admitted that
the name in the papers is that of the owner of the tricycle whom
they killed and dumped along the Agadanan and Guillermo Road
when they carnapped the tricycle. Prosecution witness P02
Ignacio testified that the accused told the police that they
rented a tricyle from Santiago to Alicia but they proceeded to
Angadanan. And upon arrival at the site, they poked a knife to
the driver and the driver ran away. They chased him and
stabbed him.
HELD: Circumstancial evidence is that evidence which proves a
fact or series of facts from which the facts in issue may be
established by inference. Such evidence is founded on
experience and observed facts and coincidences establishing a
connection between the known and the proven facts and the
facts sought to be proved. Hence, to justify a conviction based
on circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances
must be interwoven in such a way as to leave no reasonable
doubt as to the guilt of the accused. An exhaustive examination
of the evidence presented show that the circumstantial evidence
when viewed as a whole establishes the guilt of Lagat and
Palalay beyond reasonable doubt:
First, Lagat and Palalay were found in possession of the tricycle,
the same day that, together with its owner Biag, was reported
missing. Second, Lagat and Palalay were found at a palay buying
station, with the stolen tricycle packed with the cavans of palay
allegedly stolen. Third, Lagat and Palalay who were then on
board the tricycle jumped and ran the moment they saw the
Alicia PNP approaching them. Fourth, Lagat and Palalay could
not explain to the police why they were in possession of Biags
tricycle. Fifth, Biags wallet and his tricycles registration papers
were found in the tricycle upon its inspection. Sixth, Biags body
bore hack wounds as evidenced by the post-mortem autopsy
done on him, while the tricycle had bloodstains.
The foregoing circumstantial evidence only leads to the
conclusion that Lagat and Palalay conspired to kill Biag in order
to steal his tricycle. Direct proof that the two conspired is not
essential as it may be inferred from their conduct before, during,
and after their commission of the crime that they acted with a
common purpose and design. The pieces of evidence presented
by the prosecution are consistent with one another and the only
rational proposition that can be drawn therefore is that the
accused are guilty of killing Biag to carnap his tricycle.

PP vs. LAGAT and PALALAY, GR No. 187044

PP VS. MUIT, PANCHO JR., HERMANO, DEQUILLO, PANCHO, AND

FAERRER, GR NO. 181043

FACTS: The accused-appellants were convicted of the crime of

Qualified Carnapping and the crime of Homicide for the killing of
one Jose Biag, owner of the tricycle which the accusedappellants stole. Prosecution witness SPO2 Arthur Salvador
testified that he was on duty with other colleagues when they
received a report from one Jimmy Esteban that the cavans of
palay stolen from him were seen at the Alice Palay Buying
Station in a tricycle commandeered by two unidentified male
persons. The police then proceeded to verify the report. At the
buying station they saw the tricycle described to them with the
cavans of palay and the two accused. They then brought the two
to the police station together with the tricycle and its contents.
Salvador then contended that when they unloaded the contents
of the tricycle, they saw bloodstains inside and outside of the
vehicle. They also found a wallet containing the tricycles

FACTS: Accused appellants were convicted with the crime of

kidnapping for ransom with homicide and carnapping.
Conviction was established by the direct testimony of Faerrer
and the witnesses of the prosecution, Seraspe and Chavez.
Faerrer testified on how the group approached and convinced
him to let them use his house to keep the victim they planned to
kidnap. They planned the crime in Faerrers house and waited
for the call from Romeo to inform them when the victim was
already at the construction site. The group received a call from
Romeo on December 2,1997 informing them that the victim was
already at the construction site and so they went there to carry
out their plan. At the construction site, as testified by Seraspe
and Chavez, Muit and the other members of the group pointer
their guns at the victim and his companions and ordered them
to lie prostrate on the ground. After getting the keys to the

16
Pajero from Seraspe, they forced the victim to board the vehicle
with Muit driving it. They immediately reported the kidnapping
of the victim to the police and the kidnappers were intercepted.
The kidnappers refused to surrendered and engaged the police
in a shoot out in which the victim was among the casualties.
Muit was one of the two persons who survived the shoot out, but
was apprehended by the police. Pancho Jr. and Pancho Sr.
learned from the news that the group engaged the police in a
shoot out and most of them were killed and that Muit was
arrested by the police. After investigation, the police were able
to apprehend appellants Pancho Jr., Romeo and Dequillo who all
took part in the botched criminal conspiracy to kidnap the
victim. During the investigation, Pancho Jr., Dequillo and Muit
with the assistance of their counsels and family members,
executed extra-judicial confessions divulging their respective
roles in the planning and execution of the crimes. In their
respective briefs, one of the errors assigned by defendants to
court is the finding of the RTC that they acted in conspiracy in
the commission of the crimes against them.
HELD: Even though Pancho Jr., Dequillo and Romeo did not
participate in the actual abduction of the victim, they should still
be held liable because of the existence of conspiracy. Conspiracy
is a unity of purpose and intention in the commission of a crime.
Where conspiracy is established, the precise modality or extent
of the participation of each individual conspirator becomes
secondary since the act of one is the act of all. The degree of
participation in the commission of the crime is immaterial. The
conspiracy to kidnap the victim was proven through
circumstantial evidence. The group thoroughly planned the
kidnapping in Faerrers house and patiently waited for the day
when the victim would be at the construction site and upon
victims arrival at the site, the group received a call from Romeo
so they proceeded to the construction and carried out their plan.
All the appellants took active part in the criminal conspiracy and
performed different roles to consummate their common plan.
The roles which Muit and his other companions played in the
actual abduction were described earlier. As for Dequillo, he was
the one who procured the guns used by the group. Pancho Jr.
served as the driver of the back-up vehicle, and Romeo was the
groups informant.

HELD "Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an

agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it." In conspiracy, it is not necessary to adduce direct
evidence of a previous agreement to commit a crime. It "may be
shown through circumstantial evidence, deduced from the mode
and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred
from the acts of the accused themselves when such lead to a
joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of
interest." 25 Proof of a previous agreement and decision to
commit the crime is not essential but the fact that the
malefactors acted in unison pursuant to the same objective
suffices.
Here, while there is no proof of any previous agreement among
appellants to commit the crime and while it was established
during trial that Eddie alone shot Cesario, the acts of all
appellants before, during and after the incident establish the
existence of conspiracy to kill Cesario beyond reasonable doubt.
First, all of them emerged at the same time from a banana
plantation beside the ricefield. Second, they surprised Cesario
by immediately surrounding him. Third, all of them were armed
at the time of the incident. Eddie had a shotgun concealed in a
sack, Florencio was armed with a bolo, Elynor had a bow and
arrow, while Eric and Franklin had stones in their hands. Fourth,
Eric and Franklin struck Cesario with stones moments before the
shooting. Fifth, Eddie immediately shot Cesario at close range
while the latter was approaching the group of appellants upon
being summoned by Florencio. Sixth, Florencio, Franklin, Eric
and Elynor stood just a meter away from Eddie when he shot
Cesario, but did not do anything to stop or dissuade Eddie from
the assault. Seventh, after Cesario was shot, all appellants
departed from the scene of the crime together.
Undoubtedly, the acts of the assailants constitute proof of their
unanimity in design, intent and execution. 27 They "performed
specific acts with closeness and coordination as to unmistakably
indicate a common purpose and design" to ensure the death of
Cesario. We thus uphold the lower courts' finding that appellants
conspired to commit the crime of murder against Cesario.

Having established conspiracy, appellants' assertion that each

of them can only be made liable for his own acts deserves no
merit. Evidence as to who among the appellants delivered the
fatal blow is therefore no longer indispensable since in
conspiracy, a person may be convicted for the criminal act of
another. 29 In a conspiracy, the act of one is deemed the act of
all.

PP vs. AGACER, GR No. 177751

FACTS: Cesario was a farmer and owner of a ricefield. He was
then clearing a section of section of his farm and preparing the
beddings for the rice seedling intended for the coming planting
season. Farm laborers, were nearby in a separate section of the
same ricefield harvesting Cesarios palay. According to
prosecution witnesses and farm laborers, Genesis and Roden, it
was at that moment while Cesario was tending to his farm that
appellants suddenly emerged from a nearby banana plantation
and surrounded Cesario. Intimidated, Cesarion retreated to
where the other farm laborers were working. However, Franklin
Agacer set fire to the rice straw which prompted the Cesarion to
return and save his seedlings. At this point, Franklin and Eric
started throwing stones at him. Thereafter, Florencio motioned
for Cesario to come closer upon which the latter did. Eric Agacer
then shot at Cesario. Almost simultaneously, Elynor took aim at
Cesario with his bow and arrow. Thereafter, a short firearm was
thrown from where appellants ran towards the direction of
Cesarios body. Appellants immediately left the scene of the
crime. In their present appeal, appellants contend that the RTC
erred in finding that conspiracy existed among the appellants in
the killing of Cesario Agacer.

PP vs. MALIBIRAN, GR No. 178301

FACTS: Rolando "Botong" Malibiran and Beverly Tibo-Tan were
convicted of Murder and Parricide, respectively, and sentencing
them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The conviction
arose from the death of Reynaldo Tan on February 5, 1995. The
antecedents that led to Reynaldo's death, however, go way back
in the 70's when Reynaldo left his common-law wife, Rosalinda
Fuerzas and their two children, Jessie and Reynalin, in Davao,
and went to Manila to seek greener pastures. While in Manila,
Reynaldo met and had a relationship with appellant. They
eventually married in 1981. Reynaldo and appellant begot three
children Renevie, Jag-Carlo and Jay R. In 1984, Reynaldo's
and Rosalinda's paths crossed again and they resumed their
relationship. This led to the "souring" of Reynaldo's relationship
with appellant; and in 1991, Reynaldo moved out of the conjugal
house and started living again with Rosalinda, although
Reynaldo maintained support of and paternal ties with his
children. On that fateful day of February 5, 1995, Reynaldo and
appellant were in Greenhills with their children for their usual
Sunday gallivant. After finishing lunch at the Kimpura
restaurant, the family separated at around 2:00 o'clock in the
afternoon to do some shopping. Later, they regrouped and
purchased groceries at Unimart. At around 4:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, the family stepped out of the shopping mall and

17
Reynaldo proceeded to the parking lot to get his red Honda
Accord, while the rest of his family stayed behind and waited.
Immediately thereafter, the family heard an explosion coming
from the direction where Reynaldo parked his car. Appellant and
Renevie got curious and proceeded to the parking lot. There,
they saw the Honda Accord burning, with Reynaldo lying beside
the driver's seat, burning, charred and bleeding profusely. A taxi
driver named Elmer Paug (Elmer) appeared and pulled Reynaldo
out of the car. Reynaldo was then rushed to the Cardinal Santos
Medical Hospital where he eventually died because of the severe
injuries he sustained. 3 The underlying cause of his death was
Multiple Fracture & Multiple Vascular Injuries Secondary to Blast
Injury.
HELD: The testimonies of prosecution witnesses Janet and
Oswaldo clearly link appellant to the planning of the crime. True,
as intimated by appellant, she may not have been at the scene
of the crime at the time of the explosion; but then again, if she
was, then she would have suffered the same fate as Reynaldo.
Moreover, the nature of the crime and the manner of its
execution, i.e., via a booby trap, does not demand the physical
presence of the perpetrator at the very time of its commission.
In fact, the very manner in which it was carried out
necessitated prior scheming and execution for it to succeed.
Thus, appellant's absence from the actual scene of the crime
does not negate conspiracy with Rolando in plotting the death of
her husband. A conspiracy exists even if not all the parties
committed the same act, but the participants performed specific
acts that indicated unity of purpose in accomplishing a criminal
design. Moreover, direct proof of previous agreement to commit
an offense is not necessary to prove conspiracy conspiracy
may be proven by circumstantial evidence.
The testimonies of Janet and Oswaldo established the following
set of circumstances which, if taken collectively, show the guilt
of appellant: that appellant and Rolando conspired, planned and
agreed to kill Reynaldo using a grenade; that appellant
duplicated the key to the red Honda Accord of Reynaldo so that
Rolando could gain access to the car; that appellant thereafter
gave the duplicate key to Rolando; that on February 5, 1995,
appellant told Oswaldo to follow the red Honda Accord of
Reynaldo until the latter parked the car; that appellant told
Oswaldo to thereafter pick up Rolando at Katipunan and bring
the latter to where Reynaldo parked his red Honda Accord.
Reynaldo died soon after due to injuries he sustained from an
explosion caused by grenades planted in his car.
Another notable fact is that according to the expert opinion of
Inspector Selverio Dollesin, Chief of the Bomb Disposal Unit of
the Eastern Police District, the perpetrator had information
about the victim's movements. Dollesin also observed that the
perpetrator knew his intended victim, since the grenade was
specifically placed in between the driver's seat and the front
door. That the perpetrator knew the victim's movements was
further corroborated by the affidavits executed by the Tan
children, Renevie 37 and Jag Carlo, 38 attesting that while they
spent their Sundays with their father, this was the only time that
they spent a Sunday in Greenhills. Only someone who had close
personal contact with Reynaldo would know his movements,
where the car would be parked, and that he was the one who
usually drove the red Honda Accord, such that it was precisely
positioned to ensure damage to the intended victim.

PP vs. REYES, ARNALDO and FLORES, accused-appellants GR

NO. 178300

FACTS: The Yao family is composed of Yao San (father), Chua

Ong Ping Sim (mother), Robert and Raymond (children), Lenny
(daughter-in-law, wife of Robert), Matthew and Charlene
(grandchildren), and Jona Abagatnan and Josephine Ortea
(housemaids).
The Yao family owns and operates a poultry farm in Barangay
Santo Cristo, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan. On 16 July 1999, at
about 11:00 p.m., the Yao family, on board a Mazda MVP van,
arrived at the their poultry farm. Yao San alighted from the van
to open the gate of the farm. At this juncture, appellant Reyes
and a certain Juanito Pataray (Pataray) approached, poked their
guns at Yao San, and dragged him inside the van. Appellant
Reyes and Pataray also boarded the van. Thereupon, appellants
Arnaldo and Flores, with two male companions, all armed with
guns, arrived and immediately boarded the van. Appellant Flores
took the driver's seat and drove the van. Appellants Reyes and
Arnaldo and their cohorts then blindfolded each member of the
Yao family inside the van with packaging tape. After about 30
minutes of traveling on the road, the van stopped. Per order of
appellants and their cohorts, Chua Ong Ping Sim, Robert,
Raymond and Jona Abagatnan (Abagatnan) stepped out of the
van with appellants Reyes and Arnaldo, Pataray and one of their
male companions. Appellant Flores, with the other male
companion, drove the van with the remaining members of the
Yao family inside the vehicle.
Later, the van stopped again. Appellant Flores and his male
companion told Yao San to produce the amount of five million
pesos as ransom in exchange for the release of Chua Ong Ping
Sim, Robert, Raymond and Abagatnan. Thereafter, appellant
Flores and his male companion left the van and fled; while Yao
San, Lenny, Matthew, Charlene and Josephine remained inside
the van. Yao San then drove the van towards the poultry farm
and sought the help of relatives.
Meanwhile, Chua Ong Ping Sim, Robert, Raymond and
Abagatnan were taken on foot by appellants Reyes and Arnaldo,
Pataray and one male companion to a safe-house situated in the
mountainous part of San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan where they
spent the whole night.
On the morning of the following day, the kidnappers tried to
contact Yao San regarding the ransom demanded, but the latter
could not be reached. Thus, appellants instructed Abagatnan to
look for Yao San in the poultry farm. Upon arriving therein,
Abagatnan searched for Yao San, but the latter could not be
found. Appellants Reyes and Arnaldo told Abagatnan to remind
Yao San about the ransom. Thereafter, appellants Reyes and
Arnaldo and their male companion left Abagatnan in the poultry
farm and went back to the safe-house.
In the safe-house, appellants told Robert that they would release
him so he could help Abagatnan in locating Yao San. Abandoned
by the appellants and upon arriving at the poultry farm, Robert
found Yao San and informed him about the ransom demanded
by the appellants for the remaining held victims.
A series of calls were made between Yao San and the kidnappers
in which he was instructed to deliver the ransom and not tell the
authorities. However, kidnappers did not show up when Yao San
delivered the ransom money.
On 23 July 1999, the corpses of Chua Ong Ping Sim and
Raymond were found at the La Mesa Dam, Novaliches, Quezon
City. Both died of asphyxia by strangulation.
HELD: Apropos the second assigned error, appellants contend
that the prosecution failed to prove that they conspired in
kidnapping the Yao family. Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal
Code, there is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to
commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy
presupposes unity of purpose and unity in the execution of the
unlawful objective among the accused. When the accused by
their acts aimed at the same object, one performing one part
and the other performing another part as to complete the crime,
with a view to the attainment of the same object, conspiracy
exists. As can be gleaned from the credible testimonies and
sworn statements of Abagatnan, Robert and Yao, appellant

18
Reyes and Pataray approached and poked their guns at Yao San,
and thereafter dragged the latter into the van. Appellant Flores
then took the driver's seat and drove the van, while each
member of the Yao family was blindfolded by appellants Reyes
and Arnaldo and their cohorts inside the van. Thereafter,
appellant Flores instructed Yao San to produce the amount of P5
million as ransom money in exchange for the release of Chua
Ong Ping Sim, Robert, Raymond and Abagatnan. Appellant
Reyes and appellant Arnaldo were among the kidnappers who
guarded Abagatnan, Robert, Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond in
the safe-house. They also accompanied Abagatnan and Robert
in going to the poultry farm to search for and remind Yao San
about the ransom demanded. Further, appellants Arnaldo and
Flores narrated in their respective extra-judicial confessions how
they planned and executed the kidnapping of the Yao family.
Their extra-judicial confessions also detailed the particular
role/participation played by each of appellants and their cohorts
in the kidnapping of the family. Clearly, the foregoing individual
acts of appellants and their cohorts demonstrated their unity of
purpose and design in kidnapping the Yao family for the purpose
of extorting ransom.

PP vs. EVANGELIO, GR No. 18902

FACTS: Appellant Joseph Evangelio (Joseph), accused Edgar
Evangelio y Gallo (Edgar), Atilano Agaton y Obico (Atilano) and
Noel Malpas y Garcia (Noel) are charged with the crime of
Robbery with Rape.
On October 3, 2001, at 6:30 in the evening, while AAA, a 17year-old househelper, was cooking in the kitchen of the house of
BBB, four persons, suddenly barged inside the house through
the open kitchen door. She was brought to the living room.
There, they herded all the other members of the household and
bound their hands and feet, and thereafter, placed masking
tapes over their captives' eyes. With her eyes partially covered
by the tape, AAA was brought by the appellant inside the
comfort room and thereat, appellant and one of the robbers
stripped off AAA's clothes and removed her panty. AAA resisted
and fought back but they slammed her head twice against the
concrete wall, causing her to lose consciousness. When she
regained her senses, appellant and the other robbers were
already gone, and she found herself lying on the side on the
floor of the comfort room with her feet untied and her hands still
tied behind her back. She saw her shorts and panty strewn at
her side. She suffered pain in her knees, head, stomach, and her
vagina, which was bleeding. Later on, AAA was freed from the
comfort room by the other occupants of the house, who were
earlier freed.
Prosecution witness Evelyn was in the living room when the
incident happened. She was tutoring her nieces when the four
men barged inside the house. Upon the instruction of accused
Edgar, Edelyn was divested of her earrings, bracelet, watch, and
ring. Thereafter, appellant tied her hands and feet, and
blindfolded her with masking tape. She was hit on the head with
a firearm, causing a cut and her losing consciousness. When she
regained her senses, she found herself in the maids' room. She
heard accused Edgar ask her nieces where their father kept their
pieces of jewelry and firearm. When her nieces told him that the
valuables were kept upstairs, accused Edgar brought one of
them there.
BBB came home around 7:00 in the evening and when he
entered the sliding door facing the garage, he saw the four

accused inside. When he entered, he was immediately accosted

and warned to keep quiet. Upon accused Edgar's command, the
other three accused, tied him up. Accused Edgar, then struck
him with the gun on his head, causing him to fall face down on
the floor with blood oozing from his left eyebrow. After a while,
appellant and the three accused went out of the house, through
the kitchen door, carrying two traveling bags and the jewelry
box of his wife.
CCC, the wife of BBB, came home from the office in the early
evening of October 3, 2001. Upon arriving thereat, she tried to
open the door but was not able to do so. She then called out the
names of her children, but nobody responded. She peeped
through the window screen and saw people inside the house
with whom she did not recognize. One of the accused then
poked a gun at her head and told her to come inside. She ran
away from their house, and cried out for help from the
neighbors. They called the police. Shortly thereafter, the
policemen arrived. They found the house in complete disarray,
the cabinets were forcibly opened, CCC's jewelry box and her
pieces of jewelry stolen, and the members of the household
traumatized. An inventory was taken of the stolen valuables
which amounted to PhP336,000.00, more or less. Some of the
stolen items were later recovered from the house of accused
Edgar.
HELD: For a conviction of the crime of robbery with rape to
stand, it must be shown that the rape was committed by reason
or on the occasion of a robbery and not the other way around.
This special complex crime under Article 294 of the Revised
Penal Code contemplates a situation where the original intent of
the accused was to take, with intent to gain, personal property
belonging to another and rape is committed on the occasion
thereof or as an accompanying crime. 29 In the case at bar, the
original intent of the appellant and his co-accused was to rob
the victims and AAA was raped on the occasion of the robbery.
The trial court also found the presence of conspiracy between
the perpetrators. Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code,
there is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning a felony and decide to commit it. It may
be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during or after
the commission of the crime which, when taken together, would
be enough to reveal a community of criminal design, as the
proof of conspiracy is frequently made by evidence of a chain of
circumstances. 30 To be a conspirator, one need not participate
in every detail of the execution; he need not even take part in
every act or need not even know the exact part to be performed
by the others in the execution of the conspiracy. Each
conspirator may be assigned separate and different tasks which
may appear unrelated to one another but, in fact, constitute a
whole collective effort to achieve their common criminal
objective. Once conspiracy is shown, the act of one is the act of
all the conspirators. The precise extent or modality of
participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the
conspirators are principals. 31
In the instant case, conspiracy was shown by the coordinated
acts of the four persons. From the time they gained entry into
the victims' residence, they tied and blindfolded the members of
the household; inflicted physical injuries on some of the victims;
some went upstairs and proceeded to ransack the house; the
others brought AAA in the comfort room and sexually abused
her; they then left the house together carrying the loot. With the
foregoing circumstances, there can be no other conclusion than
that the successful perpetration of the crime was done through
the concerted efforts of the four armed men. EScAID

19
In People v. Suyu, we ruled that once conspiracy is established
between several accused in the commission of the crime of
robbery, they would all be equally culpable for the rape
committed by anyone of them on the occasion of the robbery,
unless anyone of them proves that he endeavored to prevent
the others from committing rape. There is no showing that the
other accused prevented appellant from sexually abusing AAA.

PP VS. BOKINGO, GR No. 187536

FACTS: The victim, Noli Pasion (Pasion) and his wife, Elsa,
pawnshop, which formed part of his house and a series of
apartments. Appellants were among the 13 construction workers
employed by Pasion.
Witness Vitalicio was spin-drying his clothes inside his
apartment when Pasion came from the front door, passed by
him and went out of the back door. A few minutes later, he
heard a commotion from Apartment No. 3 and headed to said
unit to check. He peeped through a screen door and saw
Bokingco hitting something on the floor. Upon seeing Vitalicio,
Bokingco proceeded attacked him with a hammer in his hand. A
struggle ensued and Vitalicio was hit several times. Vitalicio bit
Bokingco's neck and managed to push him away. Bokingco tried
to chase Vitalicio but was eventually subdued by a co-worker.
Vitalicio proceeded to his house and was told by his wife that
Pasion was found dead in the kitchen of Apartment No. 3.
Vitalicio went back said apartment and saw Pasion's body lying
flat on the kitchen floor.
Elsa testified that she was in the master's bedroom on the
second floor of the house when she heard banging sounds and
her husband's moans. She immediately got off the bed and went
down. Before reaching the kitchen, the accused-appellant, Col,
blocked her way. Elsa asked him why he was inside their house
but Col suddenly ran towards her, sprayed tear gas on her eyes
and poked a sharp object under her chin. Col then instructed her
to open the vault of the pawnshop but Elsa informed him that
she does not know the combination lock. Elsa tried offering him
money but Col dragged her towards the back door by holding
her neck and pulling her backward. Before they reached the
door, Elsa saw Bokingco open the screen door and heard him tell
Col: "tara, patay na siya." Col immediately let her go and ran
away with Bokingco. Elsa proceeded to Apartment No. 3 where
she saw her husband lying on the floor.
HELD: Bockingco was convicted of Homicide by the lower court.
Col, on the other hand, was charged as a co-conspirator. He
contends that to hold him guilty as co-conspirator, it must be
established that he performed an overt act in furtherance of the
conspiracy. Applying Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
Col asserts that Bokingco's uncounselled testimony that
appellants planned to kill Pasion bears no relevance considering
the fact that there was no other evidence which will prove the
conspiracy. Col also claims that Elsa's statements during trial,
such as the presence of Col inside her house and his forcing her
to open the vault of the pawnshop, as well as the alleged
statement she heard from Bokingco "Tara, patay na siya," are
not adequate to support the finding of conspiracy. This decision
was affirmed by the OSG. We disagree.
In order to convict Col as a principal by direct participation in the
case, it is necessary that conspiracy between him and Bokingco
be proved. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to
an agreement to commit an unlawful act. It may be inferred

from the conduct of the accused before, during, and after the
commission of the crime. Conspiracy may be deduced from the
mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated or
inferred from the acts of the accused evincing a joint or common
purpose and design, concerted action, and community of
interest. Unity of purpose and unity in the execution of the
unlawful objective are essential to establish the existence of
conspiracy. As a rule, conspiracy must be established with the
same quantum of proof as the crime itself and must be shown
as clearly as the commission of the crime.
The finding of conspiracy was premised on Elsa's testimony that
appellants fled together after killing her husband and the
extrajudicial confession of Bokingco. Nobody witnessed the
commencement of the attack. Col was not seen at the
apartment where Pasion was being attacked by Bokingco. In
fact, he was at Elsa's house and allegedly ordering her to open
the pawnshop vault.
Based on these acts alone, it cannot be logically inferred that
Col conspired with Bokingco in killing Pasion. At the most, Col's
actuations can be equated to attempted robbery.
Elsa testified that she heard Bokingco call out to Col that Pasion
had been killed and that they had to leave the place. This does
not prove that they acted in concert towards the consummation
of the crime. It only proves, at best, that there were two crimes
committed simultaneously and they were united in their efforts
to escape from the crimes they separately committed.
Their acts did not reveal a unity of purpose that is to kill Pasion.
Bokingco had already killed Pasion even before he sought Col.
Their moves were not coordinated because while Bokingco was
killing Pasion because of his pent-up anger, Col was attempting
to rob the pawnshop.
In as much as Bokingco's extrajudicial confession is inadmissible
against him, it is likewise inadmissible against Col, specifically
where he implicated the latter as a cohort. Under Section 28,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the rights of a party cannot be
prejudiced by an act, declaration or omission of another. Res
inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet. Consequently, an
extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant, is not
admissible against his or her co-accused, and is considered as
hearsay against them. An exception to the res inter alios
acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator. Section 30,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that the act or
declaration of the conspirator relating to the conspiracy and
during its existence may be given in evidence against the coconspirator provided that the conspiracy is shown by evidence
other than by such act or declaration. In order that the
admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her
co-conspirators, it is necessary that first, the conspiracy be first
proved by evidence other than the admission itself; second, the
admission relates to the common object; and third, it has been
made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the
conspiracy. As we have previously discussed, we did not find any
sufficient evidence to establish the existence of conspiracy.
Therefore, the extrajudicial confession has no probative value
and is inadmissible in evidence against Col.
Bokingco's judicial admission exculpated Col because Bokingco
admitted that he only attacked Pasion after the latter hit him in
the head. All told, an acquittal for Col is in order because no
sufficient evidence was adduced to implicate him.

20

ARTICLE 12-CASES
INSANITY OR IMBECILITY
PP VS. AMBAL
FACTS: The accused was convicted of parricide for the death his
wife, Felicula. In the morning of January 20, 1977, the barangay
captain found Felicula Vicente-Ambal, mortally wounded. She
was subsequently brought to the hospital where she died forty
minutes after arrival thereat. On that same morning, Honorato
Ambal went to the house of the barangay captain and informed
the latter's spouse that he had killed his wife. After making that
oral confession, Ambal went to the municipal hall and
surrendered to a policeman, also confessing to the latter that he
had liquidated his wife. The killing was the climax of a fifteenyear-old marriage featured by quarrels and bickering. The
immediate provocation for the assault was a quarrel induced by
Felicula's failure to buy medicine for Ambal who was afflicted
with influenza. The two engaged in a heated alteration. Felicula
told her husband that it would be better if he were dead. That
remark infuriated Ambal and impelled him to attack his wife.
Accused's counsel de oficio manifested that the defense of
Ambal was insanity.
HELD: A doctor attending to Ambal is of opinion that he was
normal before and after the commission of the crime and that
he suffered from prsychosis. Another doctor testified that Ambal
suffered from a psychoneurosis, a disturbance of the functional
nervous system which is not insanity. The doctor concluded that
Ambal was not insane. He was normal and had no mental
disorder whatsoever.
For his part, Ambal said that at the time of the killing he did not
know what he was doing because he was allegedly not in full
possession of his normal mental faculties. He pretended not to
know that he was charged with the capital offense of having
killed his wife. But he admitted that he knew that his wife was
dead because he was informed of her death. During his
confinement in jail he mopped the floor and cooked food for his
fellow prisoners. Sometimes, he worked in the town plaza or was
sent unescorted to buy food in the market. He recalled incidents
prior to the commission of the crime. The trial court concluded
from Ambal's behavior immediately after the incident that he
was not insane and that he acted like a normal human being.
The Court agrees with the conclusion of the trial court. in order
that a person could be regarded as an imbecile within the
meaning of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, he must be
deprived completely of reason or discernment and freedom of
the will at the time of committing the crime. In order that
insanity may be taken as an exempting circumstance, there
must be complete deprivation of intelligence in the commission
of the act or that the accused acted without the least
discernment. Mere abnormality of his mental faculties does not
exclude imputability. The law presumes that every person is of
sound mind, in the absence of proof to the contrary. The burden
is upon the defendant to overcome this presumption. In the
instant case, the alleged insanity of Ambal was not
substantiated by any sufficient evidence. The presumption of
sanity was not overthrown. He was not completely bereft of
reason or discernment and freedom of will when he mortally
wounded his wife. He was not suffering from any mental disease
or defect. The fact that immediately after the incident he
thought of surrendering to the law-enforcing authorities is
incontestable proof that he knew that what he had done was
wrong and that he was going to be punished for it.
PP VS. BASCOS
FACTS: The accused Donato Bascos was convicted of homicide
for the death Victoriano Romero. The proof for the prosecution
established that the accused was the one who had killed
Victoriano Romero, while the latter was sleeping. The defense
was that of insanity.

HELD: The wife of the accused and his cousin testified that the
accused had been more or less continuously out of his mind for
many years. The assistant district health officer, who examined
the accused and conducted an investigation, found that the
accused is a violent maniac, and that from the information he
had received from the neighbors of the accused, the latter had
been insane for some time. The physician expressed the opinion
that the accused was probably insane when Victoriano Romero
was killed. The total lack of motive of Bascos to kill Romero
bears out the assumption that the former was insane. The Court
is convinced that the accused was a lunatic when he committed
the grave felony described in the record and that consequently
he is exempt from criminal liability, and should be confined in an
insane asylum.
PP v BONOAN
FACTS: The defendant Celestino Bonoan was charged with
murder for the killing of one Carlos Guison. Accused was
subsequently confined in the Psychopathic Hospital. Trial was
suspended as the doctors who examined the accused testified
that the accused was not in at condition to defend himself. Trial
resumed upon the report of the attending doctor that he
defendant could be discharged from the hospital and appear for
trial, as he was "considered a recovered case." The accused was
convicted of the crime charged against him. Upon appeal,
counsel for the accused averred that the trial court erred in
finding that the evidence establishes that the accused has had
dementia praecox only occasionally and intermittently and has
not had it immediately prior to the commission of the offense.
HELD: As the killing of the deceased by the defendant-appellant
is admitted, it does not seen necessary to indulge in any
extended analysis of the testimony of the witnesses for the
prosecution. The defense set up being that of insanity, the only
question to be determined in this appeal is whether or not the
defendant-appellant. Proof of insanity at the time of committing
the criminal act should be clear and satisfactory in order to
acquit the accused on the ground of insanity. To ascertain a
person's mental condition at the time of the act, it is permissible
to receive evidence of the condition of his mind a reasonable
period both before and after that time. Direct testimony is not
required nor are specific acts of derangement essential (People
vs. Tripler, supra) to establish insanity as a defense. Mind can
only be known by outward acts. Thereby, we read the thoughts,
the motives and emotions of a person and come to determine
whether this acts conform to the practice of people of sound
mind. To prove insanity, therefore, circumstantial evidence, if
clear and convincing, suffice. Courts should be careful to
distinguish insanity in law from passion or eccentricity, mental
weakness or mere depression resulting from physical ailment.
The State should guard against sane murderers escaping
punishment through a general plea of insanity. In the case at
bar, however, we are not concerned with connecting two or
more attacks of insanity to show the continuance thereof during
the intervening period or periods but with the continuity of a
particular and isolated attack, beginning with the demonstration
of symptoms thereof prior to the commission of the crime
charged, and ending with a positive diagnosis of insanity
immediately following the commission of the act complained of.
To prove motive and premeditation and, indirectly, mental
normalcy of the accused at the time of the commission of the
crime, the prosecution called on policeman D. A. who testified as
to certain statements made to him by the defendant-appellant
after his arrest. A detective corroborated the policeman's
testimony. That such kind of evidence is not necessarily proof of
the sanity of the accused during the commission of the offense.
Expert findings concluded that the accused is suffering from a
type of dementia praecox called manic depressive psychosis. In
the type of dementia praecox "the crime is usually preceded by
much complaining and planning. In these people, homicidal
attacks are common, because of delusions that they are being
interfered with sexually or that their property is being taken."
The Court is of the opinion that the defendant-appellant was
demented at the time he perpetrated the serious offense
charged in the information and that consequently he is exempt
from criminal liability.
PP vs. LIBAO

21
FACTS: Accused-appellant Libao was charged with the crimes of
rape and robbery. The victim, Honorata Ong, while sleeping with
her daughters, was awakened by a man armed with a knife
standing by her feet. The man already had his pants and briefs
down on his knees and he was pointing to her eldest daughter.
Alarmed, Honorata told the man not to touch her daughter. The
man poked his knife at her and told her to stand up and then
was made to lie down on the adjacent sofa where he raped her.
All this time, he had his knife at Honorata's neck. Honorata
noticed that the man reeked of alcohol. Afterwards, Honorata's
assailant stood up then asked for money. The trial court
convicted the accused of the crimes charged against him. In
accused-appellant's last assignment of error, he claims that the
trial court erred in not ruling that he is entitled to the exempting
circumstance of insanity.
HELD: For insanity to be considered, Paragraph 1, Article 12 of
the Revised Penal Code requires a complete deprivation of
rationality in committing the act, i.e., that the accused be
deprived of reason, that there be no consciousness of
responsibility for his acts, or that there be complete absence of
the power to discern. The defense of insanity or imbecility must
be clearly proved, however, for there is a presumption that acts
penalized by law are voluntary. To prove his insanity, accusedappellant's counsel points to his confinement at the National
Center for Mental Health prior to the incident in question.
Likewise, his counsel claims that when Honorata saw accusedappellant, the latter's pants and briefs were already down on his
knees. He takes this to be an indicium of insanity. Mere prior
confinement does not prove that accused-appellant was
deprived of reason at the time of the incident. Firstly, accusedappellant did not submit proof that he was adjudged insane by
the National Center for Mental Health, only that he had been
confined therein. Accused-appellant had already been
discharged from the Center prior to the incident. Even if
accused-appellant were adjudged insane prior to the incident,
his discharge implies that he was already considered well. In
fact, the psychiatric evaluation report of accused-appellant
states that his disorder "runs a chronic course with periods of
exacerbations and remissions." If the insanity is only occasional
or intermittent in nature, the presumption of its continuance
does not arise. He who relies on such insanity proved at another
time must prove its existence also at the time of the commission
of the offense. Neither does having one's pants and briefs on
one's knees indicate deprivation of reason. If anything else, it
shows the lechery and moral depravity of accused-appellant
which results not from any disease of the mind, but from a
perverted condition of the moral system. The Court cannot,
therefore, appreciate the defense of insanity brought by
accused-appellant.
Pp vs. MADARANG
FACTS: Accused-appellant Fernando Madarang y Magno was
charged with parricide for killing his wife. Appellant put up
insanity as his defense. Accused was previously confined in the
National Center for Mental Health and was diagnosed with
schizophrenia.The accused claimed that he had absolutely no
recollection of the stabbing incident. He could not remember
where he was on that fateful day. He did not know the
whereabouts of his wife. It was only during one of the hearings
when his mother-in-law showed him a picture of his wife in a
coffin that he learned about her death. He, however, was not
aware of the cause of her demise. The trial court convicted
appellant as his evidence failed to refute the presumption of
sanity at the time he committed the offense. Hence, the present
appeal. Appellant insisted that at the time he stabbed his wife,
he was completely deprived of intelligence, making his criminal
act involuntary. He further contended that the fact that he and
his wife never engaged in a fight prior to that fateful day should
be considered. The marked change in his behavior when he
uncharacteristically quarreled with his wife on that day and
suddenly turned violent on her confirmed that he was mentally
disturbed when he committed the crime.
HELD: The Supreme Court affirmed appellant's conviction. In
the case at bar, the appellant was diagnosed to be suffering
from schizophrenia when he was committed to the NCMH
months after he killed his wife. None of the witnesses presented
by the appellant declared that he exhibited any of the myriad

symptoms associated with schizophrenia immediately before or

simultaneous with the stabbing incident. To be sure, the record
is bereft of even a single account of abnormal or bizarre
behavior on the part of the appellant prior to that fateful day.
Although there is a high possibility that the appellant was
already suffering from schizophrenia at the time of the stabbing,
the doctor who diagnosed him also declared that schizophrenics
have lucid intervals during which they are capable of
distinguishing right from wrong. Hence the importance of
adducing proof to show that the appellant was not in his lucid
interval at the time he committed the offense. Although the
appellant was diagnosed with schizophrenia a few months after
the stabbing incident, the evidence of insanity after the fact of
commission of the offense may be accorded weight only if there
is also proof of abnormal behavior immediately before or
simultaneous to the commission of the crime. Evidence on the
alleged insanity must refer to the time preceding the act under
prosecution or to the very moment of its execution. In the case
at bar, we find the evidence adduced by the defense insufficient
to establish his claim of insanity at the time he killed his wife.
The arguments advanced by the appellant to prove his insanity
are speculative and non-sequitur. His claim that he had
absolutely no recollection of the stabbing incident was to a mere
general denial that can be made with facility. Neither is the
appellant's seemingly non-repentant attitude immediately after
he stabbed his wife an indicium of his alleged insanity because
even criminals of stable mental condition take this nonremorseful stance. That the appellant and his wife were never
seen quarreling prior to that fateful day does not by itself prove
the appellant's unstable mental condition. Neither can it be said
that jealousy is not a sufficient reason to kill a pregnant spouse
because jurisprudence is replete with cases where lives had
been terminated for the flimsiest reason.
PP VS. OPURAN
FACTS: Appellant Anacito Opuran was charged with two counts
of murder for the death of Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr., and Allan
Dacles. The accused invokes the exempting circumstance of
insanity. The defense relied on testimonies of witness that could
show the abnormal behaviour of the accused as constituting
insanity and the expert testimony of Dr. Verona who diagnosed
that the accused was psychotic before and during the
commission of the crime and even up to the present. Her
diagnosis was that Anacito was suffering from schizophrenia.
HELD: A careful scrutiny of the records, indicates that Anacito
failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the defense of
insanity. For one thing, it was only Bambi's personal perception
that there was no reason or occasion for Anacito to wear Barong
Tagalog. Tested against the stringent criterion for insanity to be
exempting, such deportment of Anacito, his occasional silence,
and his acts of laughing, talking to himself, staring sharply, and
stabbing his victims within a 15-minute interval are not
sufficient proof that he was insane immediately before or at the
time he committed the crimes. Such unusual behavior may be
considered as mere abnormality of the mental faculties, which
will not exclude imputability Insanity is evinced by a deranged
and perverted condition of the mental faculties which is
manifested in language and conduct. However, not every
aberration of the mind or mental deficiency constitutes insanity.
Anacito's psychiatric history likewise fails to meet the stringent
yardstick established by case law. What it shows is that Anacito
was prescribed thorazine and evadyne, and later an injectable
medicine to remedy "his lack of sleep and noisiness." It was
never shown that these drugs were for a mental illness that
deprived Anacito of reason. Further, Anacito was just an outpatient at the NCMH, EVRMC, and Samar Provincial Hospital. The
records are likewise clear that Anacito was not subjected to
treatment from 1991 until 1999. While Remedios insisted that
the medicine prescribed for Anacito ran out of stock allegedly in
1990, there was no proof that Anacito needed the medicine
during that period. Moreover, as found by the trial court, the
results of Dr. Verona's examinations on Anacito were based on
incomplete or insufficient facts. She failed to demonstrate how
she arrived at her conclusions. She failed to show her method of
testing. Further, she did not have Anacito's complete behavioral
and psychiatric history. The most that we can conclude is that
her findings refer to the period after the stabbing accident and,
hence, would prove Anacito's mental condition only for said

22
time. It could be that Anacito was insane at the time he was
examined by Dr. Verona. Moreover, Anacito failed to raise
insanity at the earliest opportunity. He invoked the defense of
insanity only after he had already testified on his defenses of
alibi and denial. It has been held that the invocation of denial
and alibi as defenses indicates that the accused was in full
control of his mental faculties. Further, the trial judge observed
that, during the hearings, Anacito was attentive, well-behaved,
and responsive to the questions propounded to him. Thus, the
shift in theory from denial and alibi to a plea of insanity, made
apparently after the appellant realized the futility of his earlier
defenses, is a clear indication that insanity is a mere concoction
or an afterthought.
INJURY BY MERE ACCIDENT WITHOUT FAULT OR
INTENTION OF CAUSING IT
PP vs. GENITA
FACTS: While the victims Reynaldo Timbal and Jesus Bascon
were loading firewood in a truck, appellant who was drunk and
armed with an M-14 rifle, asked for a Christmas gift. He was told
to come back because they were still loading
firewood. Appellant left the place. Not long after, he returned
and fired his gun at the victims. Appellant, relying on the
exempting circumstance of accident as his defense, presented a
different version. He testified that he was a member of the
CAFGU hence, he was officially issued an M-14 rifle. On the
evening of the incident, while on his way to his camp, he saw a
truck parked at the right side of the road with its rear lights
on. While approaching the vehicle, somebody grasped his
neck. As a consequence, he accidentally pulled the trigger of
the M-14 rifle slung on his shoulder. The weapon automatically
fired. At this instance, his assailant set him free. Immediately
he rushed to the camp and reported the incident. Appellant
stayed in the camp during the entire evening. The following
morning, he learned that two persons were killed.
HELD: Apellants version that he accidentally shot the two
victims is incredible. For accident to be an exempting
circumstance, appellant must show with clear and convincing
proofs that: 1) he was performing a lawful act with due
care, 2) the injury caused was by a mere accident, and 3) he
had no fault or intention of causing the injury. Considering
appellants evidence, it is clear that the requisites of accident as
an exempting circumstance were not proven. First, appellants
manner of carrying his M-14 rifle negates his claim of due care
in the performance of an act. Knowing that his rifle was
automatic, he should have seen to it that its safety lock was
intact. Worse, he admitted that his finger was constantly on the
trigger. With the safety lock released and his finger on the
trigger, how can we conclude that he acted with due care? We
cannot accept his version that he was just following his trainers
instruction to release the safety lock while in a critical area. For
one, he never presented his trainer to corroborate his
statement; and for another, he was not in a critical
area. Second, the number of wounds sustained by the victims
shows that the shooting was not merely accidental. Both
victims sustained more than one wound. While it could have
been possible that the first wound sustained by both victims was
by accident, however, the subsequent wounds sustained by
them in different parts of their bodies could not have been
similarly inflicted. And third, appellant manifested an
unmistakable intent to kill the victims when he reloaded his
rifle after his first unsuccessful attempt to kill them. Jesus had
already sought refuge by jumping into the truck when another
bullet hit his right leg. Reynaldo was already running away
when he was shot on his nape and right hand. That appellant
chased the victims and shot them several times clearly show
that he had the intent to kill them. His defense must necessarily
fail.
Moreover, if it were true that someone attacked appellant, thus
causing him to accidentally pull the trigger of his rifle, then his
natural reaction should have been to defend himself. Instead, he
rushed towards the camp. Furthermore, he did not present any
evidence to support his allegation that the CAFGU was placed on
alert. And not a single witness corroborated his version of
accidental shooting, an indication that it is fabricated

PP VS. AGLIDAY
FACTS: Appellant was convicted of parricide for fatally shooting
his own son with a shotgun. Appellant, however, alleged that he
was cleaning his homemade shotgun when the same
accidentally went off and hit his son. Thus, he should be
exempted from criminal liability under par. 4 of Art. 12 of the
RPC.
HELD: The Court found no reason to reverse the ruling of the
trial court. Before the accused may be exempted from criminal
liability by reason of Article 12 (paragraph 4), the following
elements must concur: (1) a person is performing a lawful act
(2) with due care, and (3) he causes an injury to another by
mere accident and (4) without any fault or intention of causing
it. For an accident to become an exempting circumstance, the
act has to be lawful. The act of firing a shotgun at another is not
a lawful act. An accident is an occurrence that "happens outside
the sway of our will, and although it comes about through some
act of our will, lies beyond the bounds of humanly foreseeable
consequences." It connotes the absence of criminal intent.
Intent is a mental state, the existence of which is shown by a
person's overt acts. In the case at bar, appellant got his shotgun
and returned to the kitchen to shoot his son, who had
intervened in the quarrel between the former and his wife. It
must also be pointed out that the firearm was a shotgun that
would not have fired off without first being cocked. Undoubtedly,
appellant cocked the shotgun before discharging it, showing a
clear intent to fire it at someone. Appellant cannot claim the
exempting circumstance of accident.
ANY PERSON WHO ACTS UNDER THE IMPULSE OF AN
IRRESISTIBLE FORCE
POMOY VS. PP
FACTS: The version of the prosecution is as follows: The
deceased, was a suspect of a robbery that took place in the
municipality. He was arrested and thereby detained. While in
detention, Balboa was directed by the petitioner to come out of
his cell, purportedly for tactical interrogation at the investigation
room. When petitioner and Balboa were near the investigation
room, two gunshots were heard. When the source of the shots
was verified, petitioner was seen still holding a .45 caliber pistol,
facing Balboa, who was lying in a pool of blood, about two feet
away. The version of defense is as follows: Petitioner (Pomoy)
testified that he got Tomas Balboa from their stockade for
tactical interrogation; as he was already holding the door knob
of their investigation room and about to open and enter it, all of
a sudden he saw Tomas Balboa approach him and take hold or
grab the handle of his gun. The deceased was not able to take
actual hold of the gun because of his efforts in preventing him
(Balboa) from holding the handle of his gun. Tomas Balboa was
not able to take actual hold of the gun because of his efforts in
preventing him (Balboa) from holding the handle of his gun. His
gun was already loaded in its chamber and cocked when he left
his house, and it was locked when it fired; during the grappling
he used his left hand to prevent Balboa from holding his gun,
while the victim used his right hand in trying to reach the gun;
after the gun fired, they were separated from each other and
Balboa fell. Findings of the Rural Health Physician who
conducted the autopsy on the cadaver of Tomas Balboa revealed
that the location of the wounds found on the body of the
deceased did not support the assertion of petitioner that there
had been a grappling for the gun. The trajectory of the wounds
was front-to-back belying the allegation of petitioner that he and
the victim were side-by-side each other when the grappling
ensued. Furthermore, a deformed slug in the pocket of the
jacket of the victim. Petitioner claims that the shooting was a
mere accident. He also invokes self-defense as alternative.
HELD: In determining whether an "accident" attended the
incident, courts must take into account the dual standards of
lack of intent to kill and absence of fault or negligence. This
determination inevitably brings to the fore the main question in
the present case: was petitioner in control of the .45 caliber
pistol at the very moment the shots were fired? Petitioner did
not have control of the gun during the scuffle. The deceased
persistently attempted to wrest the weapon from him, while he

23
resolutely tried to thwart those attempts. In the course of
grappling for the gun, both hands of petitioner were fully
engaged. It would be difficult to imagine how, under such
circumstances, petitioner would coolly and effectively be able to
release the safety lock of the gun and deliberately aim and fire it
at the victim. It is undisputed that both petitioner and the victim
grappled for possession of the gun. The eyewitness account
amply illustrated the logical conclusion that could not be
dismissed: that in the course of the scuffle, the safety lock could
have been accidentally released and the shots accidentally fired.
Ordinarily, the location of gunshot wounds is indicative of the
positions of the parties at the precise moment when the gun
was fired. Their positions would in turn be relevant to a
determination of the existence of variables such as treachery,
aggression and so on. In the present case, however, the location
of the wounds becomes inconsequential. Where, as in this case,
both the victim and the accused were grappling for possession
of a gun, the direction of its nozzle may continuously change in
the process, such that the trajectory of the bullet when the
weapon fires becomes unpredictable and erratic.
All these elements were present. At the time of the incident,
petitioner was a member PNP thus, it was in the lawful
performance of his duties as investigating officer that to fetch
the victim for a routine interrogation. Thus there is the lawfull
exercise of duty. Petitioner cannot be faulted for negligence
either. He exercised all the necessary precautions to prevent his
service weapon from causing accidental harm as he had kept his
service gun locked when he left his house; he kept it inside its
holster at all times, especially within the premises of his working
area. At no instance during his testimony did the accused admit
to any intent to cause injury to the deceased, much less kill him.
The participation of petitioner, if any, in the victim's death was
limited only to acts committed in the course of the lawful
performance of his duties as an enforcer of the law.
Petitioner advanced self-defense as an alternative. Granting
arguendo that he intentionally shot Balboa, he claims he did so
to protect his life and limb from real and immediate danger. Selfdefense is inconsistent with the exempting circumstance of
accident, in which there is no intent to kill. On the other hand,
self-defense necessarily contemplates a premeditated intent to
kill in order to defend oneself from imminent danger. Apparently,
the fatal shots in the instant case did not occur out of any
conscious or premeditated effort to overpower, maim or kill the
victim for the purpose of self-defense against any aggression;
rather, they appeared to be the spontaneous and accidental
result of both parties' attempts to possess the firearm.
ANY PERSON WHO ACTS UNDER THE COMPULSION OF AN
IRRESISTIBLE FORCE
PP VS. LORENO
FACTS: Eustaquio Loreno Malaga and Jimmy Marantal Londete
were charged with the crime of Robbery with Double Rape.
Appellants Loreno and Marantal claimed that they acted under
the compulsion of an irresistible force and/or under the impulse
of uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury. They admitted
that they were in the house of Elias Monge on the night of
January 7, 1978, 4 but they were only forced by a man wearing
black sweater and his five companions who claimed to be
members of the New People's Army (NPA), operating in the
locality, with the threat that if they did not obey, appellants and
their families would be killed.
HELD: The Court finds the contention untenable. A person who
acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like one who
acts under the impulse of uncontrollable fear of equal or greater
injury is exempt from criminal liability because he does not act
with freedom. The force must be irresistible to reduce him to a
mere instrument who acts not only without will but against his
will. The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present,
imminent and impending and of such a nature as to induce a
well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if
the act is not done. A threat of future injury is not enough. The
compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no
opportunity to the accused for escape or self-defense in equal
combat.

In the case at bar, a perusal of the appellants' statement of the

robbery-rape incident as, summarized in their joint brief, showed
that they admitted their participation in the commission of the
crime of robbery and rape against Elias Monge and his family on
January 7, 1978. Further established were facts inconsistent with
appellant's claim of having acted under the compulsion of an
irresistible force and/or under the impulse of an uncontrollable
fear of equal or greater injury. The records likewise revealed that
on the two occasions Eustaquio Loreno brought Beata Monge to
the master's room and the teacher's room where he made her
open the trunk and the "aparador" with her keys and got the
contents which he brought and poured on the floor of the sala,
appellant Loreno acted alone, without the threat and assistance
of the man in dark sweater. And after the man in the dark
sweater consummated his lust on Cristina Monge in the
teacher's room and seeing Cristina Monge lying on the floor,
Loreno embraced her and tried to kiss her and touch her private
parts.
All these demonstrated the voluntary participation and the
conspiracy of the appellants.
ANY PERSON WHO ACTS UNDER THE IMPULSE OF AN
UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR OF AN EQUAL OR GREATER
INJURY
PP VS. SALDAA
FACTS: Fernando Morales and Arturo Malit, and their co-accused
Narciso Saldaa and Elmer Esguerra were found guilty of the
crime of kidnapping for ransom and imposing on them the
penalty of death. Appellant Fernando Morales similarly
maintains that he acted due to an uncontrollable fear of an
equal or greater injury. He argues that Romeo Bautista's threat
against him and appellant Malit constituted a clear and
imminent danger to their lives and instilled fear in them which
made them incapable of acting with deliberate or criminal
intent. This fear existed even at the time they received the
ransom from Feliciano Tan because at that time, accused
Narciso Saldaa, Elmer Esguerra, and Romeo Bautista were only
one (1) kilometer away. Had he not joined the group that met
Feliciano Tan to get the ransom money as instructed, or had
anything gone wrong at that time, their lives or the lives of their
families would have been endangered.
HELD: Under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, a person is
exempt from criminal liability if he acts under the compulsion of
an irresistible force, or under the impulse of an uncontrollable
fear of equal or greater injury, because such person does not act
with freedom. For such defense to prosper the duress, force, fear
or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and
of such nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of
death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat of
future injury is not enough.
In this case, the evidence on record shows that at the time the
ransom money was to be delivered, appellants Arturo Malit and
Fernando Morales, unaccompanied by any of the other accused,
entered the van wherein Feliciano Tan was. At that time, the
other accused were waiting for both appellants from a distance
of about one (1) kilometer. By not availing of this chance to
escape, appellants' allegation of fear or duress becomes
untenable. We have held that in order that the circumstance of
uncontrollable fear may apply, it is necessary that the
compulsion be of such a character as to leave no opportunity to
escape or self-defense in equal combat.
Appellant Morales' contention that their families were similarly
threatened finds no support in the evidence. The records are
bereft of any showing that such threats to appellants' families
were made at all. Duress as a valid defense should not be
speculative or remote. Even granting arguendo that the other
accused threatened to harm appellants' families to coerce
appellants to receive the ransom money, such threats were not
of such imminence as to preclude any chance of escape. In fact,
as already discussed, appellants had a real chance to escape
when they went to Feliciano's van. Under the circumstances,

24
even if true, the fear that appellants allegedly suffered would
not suffice to exempt them from incurring criminal liability.
Moreover, kidnap victim Jefferson Tan categorically testified that
each of the kidnappers acted of his own accord and that nobody
commanded anyone. The trial court found Jefferson's testimony
worthy of credence. Based on the evidence at hand, we find no
sufficient reason to disturb the trial court's assessment of the
defense presented by appellants. The crime of kidnapping is not
committed on impulse. It requires meticulous planning to
determine who would be the prospective victim or victims. Its
execution needs precise timing and coordination among the
malefactors. It is improbable that a group of kidnappers would
risk the success of their well-planned criminal scheme by
involving unwilling persons, much less strangers, who could
abort the kidnapping by refusing to cooperate in its execution.
Worse, such unwilling companions could easily expose their plan
to the authorities and subsequently even testify against them in
court. Thus, we find the defense claimed by appellants neither
logical nor satisfactory, much less consistent with human
experience and knowledge.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN INSTIGATION AND ENTRAPMENT
PP VS. VALENCIA
FACTS: Accused-appellants were charged with violation of
Section 15 of Republic Act 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act, for unlawfully selling or offering to sell
634.0 grams of Psuedoephedrine Hydrochloride which is a
regulated drug, after a buy-bust operation was conducted by
police officers. The trial court convicted accused of the crime
charged and sentenced each of them to death.
HELD: In affirming the conviction of appellants, the Supreme
Court ruled that a buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment
which in recent years has been accepted as a valid means of
arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law. It is commonly
employed by police officers as an effective way of apprehending
law offenders in the act of committing a crime. In a buy-bust
operation, the idea to commit a crime originates from the
offender, without anybody inducing or prodding him to commit
the offense. Its opposite is instigation or inducement, wherein
the police or its agent lures the accused into committing the
offense in order to prosecute him. Instigation is deemed
contrary to public policy and considered an absolutory cause. In
this case, appellants apparently have, for some time, been
engaged in drug dealing. They were in fact the subject of a
surveillance conducted by the operatives of the PNP Narcotics
Group. The police engaged the services of a confidential
informant to lead them to transact with them. The confidential
agent facilitated the meeting of appellants and the poseur
buyer. Hence, it was not the police nor the confidential agent
who induced appellants to commit a violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Law. They were already violating the law and the police
only used the buy-bust operation to apprehend them in the act
of unlawfully selling drugs. This is certainly a legitimate
entrapment operation and not instigation.
PP VS. TIU
FACTS: Accused William Ong Li, Ching De Ming @ Robert Tiu
were charged with violation of Republic Act No. 6425 otherwise
known as The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 for offering for sale
980.50 grams of Methyl Amphetamine Hydrochloride, which is a
regulated drug.
The prosecution, sought to establish a confidential informant
(CI) of the Special Operations Division (SOD), PNP Narcotics
Group, reported to the Chief Inspector about the alleged illicit
drug activities of a certain William Ong and an unidentified
Chinese male partner. Chief Inspector Ferro decided to conduct a
buy-bust operation. He constituted a team of eight with SPO1
Gonzales as poseur-buyer and the rest as back-up support.
According to SPO1 Gonzales, the CI called up the alleged pusher,
placed an order for one kilo of shabu. The CI likewise agreed to
meet with his contact. The boodle money was prepared. The
team, together with the CI, proceeded to the meeting place. The

CI rode with SPO1 Gonzales. They parked their car along 6th
Street corner Gilmore Avenue while the rest of the team posted
themselves at their back and their right side.
A little while, accused Ong approached their car. SPO1 Gonzales
showed him the slightly opened plastic bag containing the
boodle money. SPO1 Gonzales then demanded to see the shabu.
Accused Ong went out of the car and then waved his right hand
to somebody. A green Toyota Corolla parked in front of their car
and a Chinese-looking male, later identified as accused Ching
De Ming @ Robert Tiu alighted, approached accused Ong and
handed to him a gift-wrapped package. Accused Ong then
demanded for its payment. SPO1 Gonzales gave to accused Ong
the boodle money. Thereafter, the SPO1 Gonzales arrested
accused Ong while the CI and the back-up agents arrested
accused De Ming. Accused foisted the defense of instigation
which is in sharp contrast to the claim of entrapment by the
prosecution.
HELD: A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment, which in
recent years has been accepted as a valid means of arresting
violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law. It is commonly employed
by police officers as an effective way of apprehending law
offenders in the act of committing a crime. In a buy-bust
operation, the idea to commit a crime originates from the
offender, without anybody inducing or prodding him to commit
the offense. Its opposite is instigation or inducement, wherein
the police or its agent lures the accused into committing the
offense in order to prosecute him. Instigation is deemed
contrary to public policy and considered an absolutory cause.
To determine whether there was a valid entrapment or whether
proper procedures were undertaken in effecting the buy-bust
operation, it is incumbent upon the courts to make sure that the
details of the operation are clearly and adequately laid out
through relevant, material and competent evidence. For, the
courts could not merely rely on but must apply with studied
restraint the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty by law enforcement agents. This presumption
should not by itself prevail over the presumption of innocence
and the constitutionally protected rights of the individual. 27 It
is the duty of courts to preserve the purity of their own temple
from the prostitution of the criminal law through lawless
enforcement. Courts should not allow themselves to be used as
instruments of abuse and injustice lest innocent persons are
made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses.
In the case at bar, the prosecution evidence about the buy-bust
operation is incomplete. The confidential informant who had sole
knowledge of how the alleged illegal sale of shabu started and
how it was perfected was not presented as a witness. His
testimony was given instead by SPO1 Gonzales who had no
personal knowledge of the same. On this score, SPO1 Gonzales'
testimony is hearsay and possesses no probative value unless it
can be shown that the same falls within the exception to the
hearsay rule. To impart probative value to these hearsay
statements and convict the appellant solely on this basis would
be to render nugatory his constitutional right to confront the
witness against him, in this case the informant, and to examine
him for his truthfulness. As the prosecution failed to prove all
the material details of the buy-bust operation, its claim that
there was a valid entrapment of the appellants must fail.
Appellants are hereby acquitted from the crime of violation R.A.
No. 6425.
PP V. LEGASPI
FACTS: Accused-appellant Nenita Legaspi Lucas was charged
for violation of Republic Act No. 9165 having sold, delivered and
give away to Police Officer Arturo San Andres, a police poseur
buyer, one plastic sachet containing of shabu, a dangerous drug.
A confidential informant, approached San Andres to report about
the rampant incidence of drug abuse at Centennial Village, Pasig
City and about the drug pusher who was identified as Legaspi. A
buy-bust operation was thereby conducted by the Mayor Special
Action Team. San Andres was to act as the poseur-buyer. San
Andres, together with the informant, proceeded to Legaspi's
house, while the rest of the team strategically placed
themselves in the entrapment area. Upon seeing Legaspi, the
informant introduced San Andres to her as a "scorer." Legaspi

25
asked them how much they wanted to "score," to which San
Andres replied "P200.00 panggamit lang." Afterwards, San
Andres gave Legaspi the buy-bust money. As soon as San
Andres got the sachet, he signalled his team that the
transaction was over. Legaspi was thereafter arested. Legaspi
contends that she was instigated to commit the crime, as she
was not the one who sought out San Andres to sell him shabu.
She avers that San Andres's own testimony clearly shows that
he had suggested the commission of the crime by offering her
P200.00 for the purchase of shabu. Legaspi claims that this is
supported by her testimony wherein she denied selling shabu to
San Andres or to anyone for that matter. This, she says, is
confirmed by the fact that she has no police or criminal record.
HELD: Entrapment is sanctioned by the law as a legitimate
method of apprehending criminals. Its purpose is to trap and
capture lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan.
Instigation, on the other hand, involves the inducement of the
would-be accused into the commission of the offense. In such a
case, the instigators become co-principals themselves. Where
the criminal intent originates in the mind of the instigating
person and the accused is lured into the commission of the
offense charged in order to prosecute him, there is instigation
and no conviction may be had. Where, however, the criminal
intent originates in the mind of the accused and the criminal
offense is completed, even after a person acted as a decoy for
the state, or public officials furnished the accused an
opportunity for the commission of the offense, or the accused
was aided in the commission of the crime in order to secure the
evidence necessary to prosecute him, there is no instigation and
the accused must be convicted. Instigation is recognized as a
valid defense that can be raised by an accused. To use this as a
defense, however, the accused must prove with sufficient
evidence that the government induced him to commit the
offense. Legaspi claims that she was induced into committing
the crime as charged, as she was the one approached by San
Andres, who was then looking to buy shabu. We find, however,
that Legaspi's defense of instigation must fail.
In the case at bar, the police officers, after receiving a report of
drug trafficking from their confidential informant, immediately
set-up a buy-bust operation to test the veracity of the report and
to arrest the malefactor if the report proved to be true. The
prosecution evidence positively showed that Legaspi agreed to
sell P200.00 worth of shabu to San Andres, who was then posing
as a buyer. Legaspi was never forced, coerced, or induced to
source the prohibited drug for San Andres. In fact, San Andres
did not even have to ask her if she could sell him shabu. Legaspi
was merely informed that he was also a "scorer"; and as soon as
she learned that he was looking to buy, she immediately asked
him how much he needed. Under the circumstances, the police
officers were not only authorized but were under an obligation to
arrest Legaspi even without an arrest warrant as the crime was
committed in their presence.
Furthermore, when Legaspi testified in court, her defense was
one of denial and not instigation. While instigation is a positive
defense, it partakes of the nature of a confession and avoidance.
In instigation, the crime is actually performed by the accused,
except that the intent originates from the mind of the inducer.
Thus, it is incompatible with the defense of denial, where the
theory is that the accused did not commit the offense at all.
Instigation and denial, therefore, cannot be present concurrently.

Article 13
1.

ALL REQUISITES NECESSARY TO JUSTIFY OR TO

EXEMPT FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY ARE NOT
ATTENDANT

PP VS. LIBRANDO
FACTS: On their way home from the market, Edwin Labandero,
his 8-year old daughter, Aileen, and a relative, Fernando de los
Santos, traversed a hilly portion of the trail leading to Barangay

Purok Maisan when they met accused-appellants Raelito

Librando, Larry Surdillas and Eddie Purisima. Raelito inquired
from Edwin the whereabouts of Fernando and without any
warning hit Edwin with a piece of wood. Eddie Purisima followed
suit and delivered another blow to Edwin. Edwin ran but he was
chased by Raelito. Thereafter, the three men took turns hitting
Edwin with pieces of wood until the latter fell and died. Although
it was already dark at that time, Aileen had no trouble
identifying the accused-appellants since Edwin was carrying a
lighted torch. Thereby, accused-appellants were found guilty of
the crime of murder. Accused-appellant Raelito Librando claims
that the trial court erred in failing to appreciate the mitigating
circumstances of incomplete self defense in his favour.
HELD: Accused-appellant Raelito Librando claims that he was
"waylaid" by the deceased, Edwin Labandero, on his way home.
He was forced to defend himself when the deceased tried to hit
him with a piece of wood but, unfortunately, in the process of
defending himself from the blows delivered by the deceased, he
accidentally killed the latter. The Court, however, is not inclined
to consider the mitigating circumstance of incomplete self
defense in Raelito Librando's favor. To avail of the mitigating
circumstance of incomplete self defense, there must be unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim. In the case at bar,
prosecution witness Aileen testified that it was in fact the said
accused-appellant who after inquiring from Edwin the
whereabouts of Fernando, delivered the first blow without any
warning to the deceased. The severity of the injuries inflicted on
the deceased as well as the fact that Raelito who admitted that
he was of bigger built than the deceased, could hardly present
any evidence of injuries allegedly inflicted on him by the
deceased belie his claim of self defense.

2.

MINORITY

PP V. ARPON
Facts: Accused-appellant Henry Arpon y Juntilla guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of one (1) count of statutory rape and seven
(7) counts of rape against the private complainant AAA. The
victim testified that she was born on November 1, 1987. In one
afternoon in 1995, when she was only eight years old, she
stated that the accused-appellant raped her inside their house.
AAA also testified that the accused-appellant raped her again in
July 1999 for five times on different nights AAA further related
that the accused-appellant raped her again twice in August
1999 at nighttime. The trial court and the Court of Appeals
sentenced the accused to death penalty. In the present case, the
accused-appellant asserted that the trial court failed to consider
his minority as a privileged mitigating circumstance. As stated in
his direct examination, the accused-appellant claimed that he
was born on February 23, 1982, such that he was only 13 and 17
years old when the incidents of rape allegedly occurred in 1995
and 1999, respectively.
HELD: Article 355 of the RPC provides that rapes when
committed to a woman below 18 years of age is punishable by
death and the offender is a relative by consanguinity or affinity
within the third civil degree. In the case at bar, the victim was
below 18 and the accused was a relative of the victim.
Nonetheless, a reduction of the above penalty is in order. In the
instant case, the accused-appellant testified that he was born on
February 23, 1982 and that he was only 13 years old when the
first incident of rape allegedly happened in 1995. Other than his
testimony, no other evidence was presented to prove the date
of his birth. However, the records of this case show neither any
objection to the said testimony on the part of the prosecution,
nor any contrary evidence to dispute the same. Thus, the RTC
and the Court of Appeals should have appreciated the accusedappellant's minority in ascertaining the appropriate penalty.

26
Although the acts of rape in this case were committed before
Republic Act No. 9344 took effect on May 20, 2006, provisions
under the Act is still applicable to the case at bar.
Accordingly, for the first count of rape, which was allegedly
committed in 1995, the testimony of the accused-appellant
sufficiently established that he was only 13 years old at that
time. In view of the failure of the prosecution to prove the exact
date and year of the first incident of rape, any doubt therein
"should be resolved in favor of the accused, it being more
beneficial to the latter." The Court, thus, exempts the accusedappellant from criminal liability for the first count of rape
pursuant to RA No. 9344. The accused-appellant, nevertheless,
remains civilly liable therefor. For the second and third counts of
rape that were committed in the year 1999, the accusedappellant was already 17 years old. We likewise find that in the
said instances, the accused-appellant acted with discernment. In
this case, the fact that the accused-appellant acted with
discernment was satisfactorily established by the testimony of
AAA, which we had already found to be credible. Verily, AAA
testified that she at first did not tell anybody about the sexual
assault she suffered at the hands of the accused-appellant
because the latter told her that he would kill her mother if she
did so. That the accused-appellant had to threaten AAA in an
effort to conceal his dastardly acts only proved that he knew full
well that what he did was wrong and that he was aware of the
consequences thereof. For purposes of determining the proper
penalty because of the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority, the penalty of death is still the penalty to be reckoned
with. Thus, for the second and third counts of rape, the proper
penalty imposable upon the accused-appellant is reclusion
perpetua for each count. D

3.

OFFENDER HAD NO INTENTION TO COMMIT SO GRAVE

A WRONG AS THAT COMMITTED

US V. REYES
FACTS: For stabbing Alfredo Senador from behind, done in a
sudden and unexpected manner while the latter was sitting
close to the ground and while his attention was focused on the
ongoing cara y cruz game, Elbert Callet was convicted of the
crime of murder and sentenced to suffer the penalty ofreclusion
perpetua. The accused also claims that his liability should be
mitigated by the fact that he had no intention to commit so
grave a wrong.
HELD: The lack of "intent" to commit a wrong so grave is an
internal state. It is weighed based on the weapon used, the part
of the body injured, the injury inflicted and the manner it is
inflicted. The fact that the accused used a 9-inch hunting knife
in attacking the victim from behind, without giving him an
opportunity to defend himself, clearly shows that he intended to
do what he actually did, and he must be held responsible
therefor, without the benefit of this mitigating circumstance.
URBANO V. PP
FACTS: The victim Brigido Tomelden and petitioner were at the
compound of the Lingayen Water District (LIWAD) having just
arrived from a picnic in the nearby town where, they drunk beer
in a restaurant with some other co-workers While inside the
compound, the two had a heated altercation in the course of
which Tomelden hurled insulting remarks at petitioner. The
exchange of words led to an exchange of blows. Cooler heads
succeeded in breaking up the fight, but only for a brief moment
as the protagonists refused to be pacified and continued
throwing fist blows at each other. Then petitioner delivered a
"lucky punch," as described by eyewitness Salazar, on
Tomeldens face, which made Tomelden topple down. Tomelden
was on the verge of hitting his head on the ground had their

companions not caught him and prevented the fall. The blow,
however, caused Tomeldens nose to bleed and rendered him
unconscious. The deceased told his wife of the mauling incident.
Thereafter, the deceased was still able to go to work however,
his complaints to his wife of severe pain in the head, prompted
him to be admitted at the community hospital. Finally, Tomelden
died on October 10, 1993 due, per Dr. Arellano, to "cardiorespiratory arrest secondary to cerebral concussion with
resultant cerebral hemorrhage due to mauling incident."
With the decision of the trial court and the Court of Appeals
convicting the accused of homicide, the petitioner now contends
that the trial Court and the CA erred in not appreciating the
mitigating circumstances the lack of intent to commit so grave a
wrong in favor of the petitioner
HELD: The mitigating circumstance that petitioner had no
intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed should
also be appreciated in his favor. While intent to kill may be
presumed from the fact of the death of the victim, this
mitigating factor may still be considered when attendant facts
and circumstances so warrant, as in the instant case.
Consider: Petitioner tried to avoid the fight, being very much
smaller than Tomelden. He tried to parry the blows of Tomelden,
albeit he was able, during the scuffle, to connect a lucky punch
that ended the fight. And lest it be overlooked, petitioner helped
carry his unconscious co-worker to the office of the LIWAD's
general manager. Surely, such gesture cannot reasonably be
expected from, and would be unbecoming of, one intending to
commit so grave a wrong as killing the victim. A bare-knuckle
fight as a means to parry the challenge issued by Tomelden was
commensurate to the potential violence petitioner was facing. It
was just unfortunate that Tomelden died from that lucky punch,
an eventuality that could have possibly been averted had he
had the financial means to get the proper medical attention.
Thus, it is clear that the mitigating circumstance of "no intention
to commit so grave a wrong as that committed" must also be
appreciated in favor of petitioner while finding him guilty of
homicide. That petitioner landed a lucky punch at Tomelden's
face while their co-workers were trying to separate them is a
compelling indicium that he never intended so grave a wrong as
to kill the victim. TI
PENALTY: With no aggravating circumstance and two mitigating
circumstances appreciable in favor of petitioner, we apply par. 5
of Art. 64, RPC, which pertinently provides: When there are two
or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating
circumstances are present, the court shall impose the penalty
next lower to that prescribed by law, in the period that it may
deem applicable, according to the number and nature of such
circumstances.
The prescribed penalty for homicide under Art. 249 of the RPC
is reclusion temporal or from 12 years and one day to 20 years.
With the appreciation of two mitigating circumstances of no
intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed and of
sufficient provocation from the victim, and the application of par.
5 of Art. 64, RPC, the imposable penalty would, thus, be the next
lower penalty prescribed for homicide and this should be prision
mayor or from six years and one day to 12 years.

PP. VS. GONZALES

27
FACTS: The vehicles of the accused and the victims family
almost collided at an intersection inside the memorial park. A
heated exchange of remarks followed the near collision in which
case, the accused-appellant, was augmented by the improvident
use of a firearm resulting to the death of Feliber Andres, wife of
Noel Andres and their children, sustaining injuries. The trial
court found the accused guilty of the complex crime of murder
and two counts of frustrated murder and accordingly sentenced
him to death.
HELD: The plea for the appreciation of the mitigating
circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong is
devoid of merit. This mitigating circumstance is obtaining when
there is a notable disparity between the means employed by the
accused to commit a wrong and the resulting crime committed.
The intention of the accused at the time of the commission of
the crime is manifested from the weapon used, the mode of
attack employed and the injury sustained by the victim. The
appellant's use of a gun, although not deliberately sought nor
employed in the shooting, should have reasonably placed the
appellant on guard of the possible consequences of his act. The
use of a gun is sufficient to produce the resulting crimes
committed.
PP V. ENRIQUEZ
FACTS: The accused-appelant Candido Enriquez bordered
enmity towards the victim Ciriaco Gines. Enriquez was the son of
the owner of a bus-operating company which has been filed with
various complaints before the Public Service Commission for
infractions of its rules. The victim was an inspector of the rival
bus Co. who was allegedly the one who had supplied the
material for these complaints. He hired ruffians in Manila who
would beat up Gines so that he would not interfere in the future
with the business of the Mallorca Transportation. Gines was left
unconscious upon the ground as his assailants fled. As he
recovered consciousness, he called for help, and his cries
attracted the attention of his father and other who came to his
aid. After he was mauled by the ruffians, Gines died from shock
and loss of blood.
HELD: Upon the circumstances that the wound made with the
knife on the leg of the person assaulted was the primarily cause
of death and that the author of this injury has not been
identified, the attorney for the accused chiefly plant their
defense, and in this connection it is insisted that the conspiracy
to attack Gines contemplated only beating him up and did not
include the infliction of injury by means of a cutting instrument.
Such an Act, so it is said, was not within the scope of the
agreement; and it is insisted that only the individual who
inflicted the cut could be held responsible for the death, if that
person were known. It resulted, in this view, that none of the
appellants can be held liable further than for the bruises
inflicted by means of the iron bars. These injuries, so it is
claimed, would in the natural course of events have been
curable in a few days. The accused had undoubtedly conspired
to do grave personal injury to the deceased, and now that the
injuries actually inflicted have resulted in death, they cannot
escape from the legal effect of their acts on the ground that one
of the wounds was inflicted in a different way from that which
had been intended. The crime committed in this case was
murder but all of the accused are entitled to the benefit of the
mitigating circumstance that the offender had no intention to
commit so grave a wrong. The estimation of this circumstance
was proper, and its allowance was not inconsistent with the
finding that the crime was murder.

PP VS. PAJENADO
FACTS: Eyewitnesses for the prosecution testified they saw
appellant holding the now deceased Carlos Tapong by the neck.
As the two were apparently wrestling with each other, Carlito
Pajenado, appellant's cousin, intervened and the two Pajenados
were able to throw Tapong to the ground. Carlito Pajenado held
Tapong by the shoulder and pinned him down to the ground,
while appellant held him by one leg. As they thus held Carlos
Tapong helpless, appellant drew his gun and fired at him.
Thereupon, Carlito Pajenado stood up and ran away, while
appellant remained at the scene of the crime until he

4.

SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION OR THREAT OF THE

OFFENDED PARTY IMMEDIATELY PRECEDED THE ACT

PP VS. URBANO
FACTS (see facts in PP vs. URBANO in no. 3)
HELD: Tomelden's insulting remarks directed at petitioner and
uttered immediately before the fist fight constituted sufficient
provocation. This is not to mention other irritating statements
made by the deceased while they were having beer in Bugallon.
Petitioner was the one provoked and challenged to a fist fight.
Petitioner's unrebutted testimony on the events immediately
preceding the fisticuff and earlier dovetails with the testimony of
Salazar.
In gist, petitioner testified being, in the afternoon of September
28, 1993, in the nearby town of Bugallon for a picnic. He was
with Tomelden and several others, including Dominador Navarro,
Chairperson of LIWAD. At a restaurant in Bugallon, the group
ordered goat's meat and drank beer. When it was time to
depart, Navarro asked petitioner to inform Tomelden, then
seated in another table, to prepare to leave.
When so informed, Tomelden insulted petitioner, telling the
latter he had no business stopping him from further drinking as
he was paying for his share of the bill. Chastised, petitioner
returned to his table to report to Navarro. At that time, petitioner
saw that Tomelden had already consumed 17 bottles of beer. In
all, the group stayed at the picnic place for three and a half
hours before returning to the LIWAD.
Upon reaching the LIWAD compound, Tomelden allegedly
slapped and hurled insults at him, calling him "sipsip" just to
maintain his employment as Navarro's tricycle driver. Tomelden
allegedly then delivered several fist and kick blows at petitioner,
a couple of which hit him despite his evasive actions. Petitioner
maintained that he only boxed the victim in retaliation, landing
that lucky punch in the course of parrying the latter's blows.
Hence, there is no rhyme or reason why the same mitigating
circumstance should not be considered in favor of petitioner.

IMMEDIATE VINDICATION OF A GRAVE OFFENSE

28
PP VS. PARANA
FACTS: The deceased took part in said game where the
appellant was designated to attend to the players. A discussion
ensued between him appellant and one Lamay. As both raised
their voices, they were admonished by the deceased. As the
appellant disregarded said admonition, the deceased slapped
him and ordered him to leave the house. The following day, the
deceased took part in another game of monte, this time in
another house. As he was about to leave the place in his car, the
chauffer, who saw the appellant behind the deceased in the
attitude of stabbing him with a dagger, shouted to warn him of
the danger. The deceased, looking behind, really saw the
appellant about to stab him. Defending himself, he retreated
until he fell on his back into a ditch two meters wide and 1.7
meters deep. Without lessening the aggression the appellant
mounted astride of the deceased and continued to stab him with
the dagger.
HELD: The mitigating circumstance that he had acted in the
immediate vindication of a grave offense committed against him
a few hours before, when he was slapped by the deceased in the
presence of many persons, must likewise be taken into
consideration. Although this offense, which engenders
perturbation of mind, was not so immediate, this court is of the
opinion that the influence thereof, by reason of its gravity and
the circumstances under which it was inflicted, lasted until the
moment the crime was committed.
PP VS. VENTURA
FACTS: When appellant Ventura arrived in Negros Occidental
from Manila where he had been working as a security guard, he
noticed that his wife, Johanna, who had previously been
employed as a house helper of the Bocateja spouses, was
wearing a new ring. When he confronted her, she said that it
came from Jaime (the deceased) who was courting her, and that
it was because Jaime's wife, Aileen, had discovered their illicit
relationship that she had been dismissed from the Bocateja
household. Incensed at the revelation, he slapped his wife
whereupon she left the conjugal home. That same day,
appellant Flores visited his uncle-appellant Ventura. The two
spoke at length and appellant Flores, who had previously worked
for a day at the meat shop of the Bocateja spouses, confirmed
that Johanna and Jaime were having an affair. Since appellant
Flores knew where the Bocateja spouses lived, appellant Ventura
asked him to go with him to their residence so he could confront
Jaime about his affair with Johanna. Appellants, armed with an
unlicensed revolver and a knife, thus repaired to the Bocateja
residence where the killing took place.
HELD: No mitigating circumstances are present in the case at
bar. While the trial Court noted that appellants were apparently
motivated by their belief that Johanna and Jaime were carrying
on an illicit relationship, it nevertheless ruled out immediate
vindication of a grave offense as mitigating circumstance.
While "immediate" vindication should be construed as
"proximate" vindication in accordance with the controlling
Spanish text of the Revised Penal Code, still this mitigating
circumstance cannot be considered where sufficient time
elapsed for the accused to regain his composure. In this case,
appellant Ventura's suspicions were aroused as early as
February 17, almost a week before the stabbing incidents on
February 23, when he first confronted his wife about her ring.
Moreover, as previously noted, ten hours had elapsed from the
time appellants left Murcia, Negros Occidental, weapons in hand,
to the time they entered the Bocateja residence in Bacolod City.
Within that period appellant Ventura had opportunity to change

his clothes at a relatives' house in a neighboring barangay and

both appellants were able to take their dinner at the Burgos
Market in Bacolod City. They even waited three hours outside
the Bocateja residence before carrying out their plan. Without
question, sufficient time had passed for appellants' emotions to
cool and for them to recover their equanimity.

6. PASSION OR OBFUSCATION
PP vs. NOYNAY
FACTS: A carabao belonging to Martin Noynay was destroying
sugar cane planted by the deceased Silvestre Arriesgado. The
deceased caught the carabao and took it to the house of Martin
Noynay. The deceased was accompanied by his son, Jose. When
they reached the house of Martin Noynay, they found him and
the appellant Buenaventura Ruiz. The deceased told Noynay
that his carabao had destroyed the sugar cane and that he had
to pay the damages. Noynay replied that he did not have to pay
anything because his carabao was tied. The deceased then told
Noynay that if he did not wish to pay, he would take the carabao
to the lieutenant of the barrio, and started to do so. Thereupon
Noynay grabbed a spear from the azotea of his house, and he
and Buenaventura Ruiz pursued the deceased. The deceased
began to run, but he was over taken and stabbed by the
accused.
HELD: The finding that the defendants acted upon an impulse
so powerful as naturally to have produced passion or
obfuscation was not justified by the evidence of record. The
deceased, was clearly within his right in what he did. The
defendants, without any rational cause for provocation, pursued
the deceased and deliberately killed him. In order to be entitled
to this mitigating circumstance, it must appear that the
obfuscation of the accused arose from lawful sentiments. The
fact that an offense was committed in an uncontrollable burst of
passion should not be taken into consideration as an
extenuating circumstance unless it appears that it was provoked
by prior unjust or improper acts.
PP VS. LAYSON
FACTS: Layson, Ragub and Fugoso admitted that they killed
Gasang because the latter urinated on their coffee cups a
number of times. Garces stated that he killed Gasang because
the latter spat on him a week before. The four plotted to kill
Gasang a few days prior to the actual slaying. In the early
morning of that hapless day, the four accused, armed with
bladed weapons, entered the cell where the unsuspecting
victim, prisoner Regino Gasang, was. Layson locked the door of
the room. Without warning and acting in concert they then
swiftly took turns in stabbing Gasang.
HELD: Three of the accused admitted that they harbored illfeeling against Gasang because the latter urinated on their
coffee cups several times, all these taking place at least ten
days before the actual slaying. Gasang spat on Garces a week
before the day of the killing. All of the accused plotted to kill
Gasang a few days before January 17, 1964. In the light of these
circumstances, it is evident that sufficient time had elapsed
during which the accused regained their equanimity. They
moved their evil scheme forward to consummation after
obtaining weapons from their fellow inmates whose aid they had
solicited. The aforenarrated circumstances negate the presence
of passion and obfuscation; upon the contrary, they prove the
attendance of the aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation.
PP VS. GRAVINO

29
FACTS: The defendant-appellant Nonceto Gravino, a 27 year old
farmer at the time the offenses were committed, had been
courting Zosima Diagbel, a 20 year old student, for about a year.
In fact the two had been sweethearts until Zosima told the
accused-appellant that she did not wish to marry him because
her parents did not want him to be Zosima's husband. In the
evening of June 10, 1969, accused-appellant went to the house
of the Diagbels. He entered the house surreptitiously, but he
was discovered or in his own words "I was noticed by the
parents" whereupon he committed the crimes that led to the
deaths of two persons and almost led to the death of the third
victim. The accused was held guilty of murder in the trial court.
HELD: Accused-appellant argues that he was in love with
Zosima and that she reciprocated this love; that for almost a
year, they were sweethearts; that he once asked her hand in
marriage; that the refusal caused the tragedy and that this
tragedy was the product of legitimate passion and obfuscation.
There is no merit in this contention.

FACTS: The accused, killed the deceased, who had theretofore

been his querida (concubine or lover) upon discovering her in
flagrante in carnal communication with a mutual acquaintance..
HELD: The facts in this case distinguished from those in the
case of U. S. vs. Hicks (14 Phil. Rep., 217), wherein the
defendant was held not to be entitled to the benefits of the
provisions of the above-mentioned article of the code.In the
former case the cause of the alleged "passion and obfuscation"
of the aggressor was the convict's vexation disappointment and
anger engendered by the refusal of the woman to continue to
live in illicit relations with him, which she had a perfect right to
do, his reason for killing her being merely that she had elected
to leave him and with his full knowledge to go and live with
another. In the case at bar the impulse upon which the
defendant acted, and which naturally produced 'passion and
obfuscation," was not that the woman declined to have illicit
relations with him, but the sudden revelation that she was
untrue to him, and his discovery of her in flagrante in the arms
of another.
PP VS. HERRERA

To appreciate the mitigating circumstance of passion and

obfuscation, the following requisites must concur: (1) that there
be an act both unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition
of mind; and (2) that said act which produces the obfuscation
was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a
considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might
recover his normal equanimity. The only provocative act which
the records reveal came from the parents of Zosima who did not
approve of the accused appellant's proposal to marry their
daughter. Clearly, this act was not unlawful. Neither was it
sufficient to sustain passion and obfuscation. Accused-appellant
was actuated more by a spirit of lawlessness and revenge rather
than any sudden and legitimate impulse of natural and
uncontrollable fury.
Passion and obfuscation as affecting the mind and resulting in
lack of reason and self-control must originate from lawful
sentiments. The Solicitor-General also correctly observed that
the said act of Anita Diagbel in refusing the proposal of the
accused-appellant to marry her daughter was far removed from
the commission of the crimes. There was more than enough
time for accused-appellant to have recovered his personal
equanimity.
US VS. HICKS
FACTS: For about five years, Augustus Hicks and Agustinal Sola,
a Christian Moro woman, illicitly lived together, until after the
trouble arising between them in 1907, Agustina quitted Hick's
house, and, separating from him, she contracted new relations
with another negro named Wallace Current. Thereafter, Hicks
shot Agustina to death.
HELD: The alleged "passion and obfuscation" of the aggressor
was the convict's vexation disappointment and anger
engendered by the refusal of the woman to continue to live in
illicit relations with him, which she had a perfect right to do, his
reason for killing her being merely that she had elected to leave
him and with his full knowledge to go and live with another.

PP VS. DE LA CRUZ

FACTS: The accused wounded Silvestre Bautista at the moment

when the latter was getting into his vehicle after a fight between
them, in which they wrestled together without using any
weapon. After they were separated for the third time, Silvestre
Bautista recovered his hat, and just as he was getting into his
vehicle Ciriaco followed him up and wounded him in the right
sacrolumbar region, causing a lesion which necessitated medical
attendance for more than eight days.
HELD: Where two individuals have been wrestling together and
after being separated one of them follows up the other and
wounds him on the buttock with a penknife as he was entering a
vehicle, and without the wounded party noticing it until after he
was so wounded, the aggressor can not claim in his favor that
the previous struggle produced in him entire loss of reason or
self-control, for the existence of such excitement as is inherent
in all who quarrel and come to blows does not constitute said
mitigating circumstance; it is necessary that the guilty party
must have acted under the impulse of special motives which
may be classified according to the attending circumstances.
ROMERA vs. PP
FACTS: Petitioner contends that the victim provoked him to a fit
of anger when the latter woke him up and thrust a bolo at him
without warning as petitioner opened the door. Moreover, by
hacking and destroying the bamboo wall of his house, and
endangering the lives of his children, the victim also obfuscated
his thinking and reasoning processes.
HELD: Thrusting his bolo at petitioner, threatening to kill him,
and hacking the bamboo walls of his house are, in our view,
sufficient provocation to enrage any man, or stir his rage and
obfuscate his thinking, more so when the lives of his wife and
children are in danger. Petitioner stabbed the victim as a result
of those provocations, and while petitioner was still in a fit of
rage. In our view, there was sufficient provocation and the
circumstance of passion or obfuscation attended the
commission of the offense.
But, we must stress that provocation and passion or obfuscation
are not two separate mitigating circumstances. Well-settled is
the rule that if these two circumstances are based on the same
facts, they should be treated together as one mitigating
circumstance. From the facts established in this case, it is clear
that both circumstances arose from the same set of facts
aforementioned. Hence, they should not be treated as two
separate mitigating circumstances.

30
7. VOLUNTARY SURRENDER
PP VS. OBLIGADO
FACTS: Appellant Alejo Obligado was charged with murder in
the RTC. The defense presented SPO4 David Sarto, police
community officer of the PNP Buhi station. According to SPO4
Sarto, he and his fellow police officers were ordered to arrest
appellant on March 13, 2000. They met appellant while
traversing the lone footpath leading to his residence. Appellant
surrendered his person and the bolo. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the guilt of the appellant but modified the civil liabilities
imposed by the RTC. Because SPO4 Sarto testified that appellant
intimated a desire to surrender, the appellate court appreciated
the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
HELD: There was no voluntary surrender. For this mitigating
circumstance to be appreciated, the defense must prove that:
(a)the offender had not been actually arrested;
(b)the offender surrendered himself to a person in
authority;
(c)the surrender was spontaneous and voluntary.

In this case, SPO4 Sarto testified that appellants residence

could be accessed only through a footpath where they met
appellant. Inasmuch as he was intercepted by the arresting
officers there, appellant had no means of evading arrest. His
surrender therefore was neither voluntary nor spontaneous. On
the contrary, the aforementioned circumstances revealed that
he had no option but to yield to the authorities.

surrender of weapons as mitigating circumstance of voluntary

surrender.
HELD: Surrender of weapons is not analogous to voluntary
surrender to a person in authority or his agent. Moreover, in the
case at bar, there is nothing in the record to show that the
surrender was made voluntarily or with spontaneity. In fact, the
surrender of the weapons did not take place where the incident
took place but in Dormitory 4-C which was occupied by the
appellants.
PP VS. PALO
FACTS: Ildefonso Palo and his brother Pedro were charged for
the murder of Candido Catapang, their own brother-in-law. The
trial court sentenced each of them to life imprisonment. The
defense invokes the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender as the accused Ildefonso Palo handed the gun used in
shooting the victim to the barrio lieutenant upon the latter's
demand.
HELD: Murder was undoubtedly committed, qualified by
treachery. It is said that voluntary surrender may mitigate
defendants' offense. Although Ildefonso Palo handed the gun to
the barrio lieutenant upon the latter's demand, there is no
evidence that he willingly delivered himself to the authorities.
On the contrary, Pedro Palo denied having voluntarily
surrendered, alleging he had been taken from his house the
following morning by some policemen. Anyway this mitigation is
compensated by the aggravating circumstance of relationship,
the deceased being brother-in-law of the offenders (Art. 15
Revised Penal Code).Therefore in the absence of other modifying
circumstances, life imprisonment was properly imposed upon
these appellants.
PP VS. LAGRANA

PP VS. CONCILLADO
FACTS: Diosdado Pado was shot, stabbed and hacked by Edgar,
Erlito and Dolores, all surnamed Concillado, Deceased sustained
a total of 26 wounds. He instantly died from the blows
sustained. Edgar, one of the accused and appellant herein
invoked self-defense. He admitted that he was the one who
inflicted all 26 injuries and that he acted in self-defense after
deceased suddenly appeared before him and challenged him to
a fight while he was urinating near the fence of his house.
Contrary to the prosecutions version, Edgar testified that it was
the deceased who attacked first using a bolo hitting accussed on
the right chest. Getting his surit from inside his house, he fired
at the deceased who continued on hacking him. Accussed was
able to parry his blows and grab a bolo. Concillado and Diosdado
continued exchanging blows and after some time, the deceased
turned his back on Edgar. Thinking that Diosdado was already
fleeing, Edgar went back to his house and eventually
surrendered himself at the police station and have his wound
treated by a Dr. De Veyra.

PP VS. VERGES
FACTS: Inmates of Dormitory 5-B of the New Bilibid Prisons, all
members of the Sigue-Sigue Sputnik gang, were on their way to
Dormitory 4-D where they were to be transferred, when the
prisoners confined at Dormitory 4-C, members of the rival SigueSigue Commando gang, suddenly bolted out and attacked them
with improvised weapons, killing three of them. Accused claimed

FACTS: Accused LAgrana and his nephew, Salazar were found

guilty of the crime of murder by the trial court, the former as
principal and the latter as accomplice. Only Lagrana appealed
the decision of the lower court. On appeal, Lagrana did not
question his conviction nor the characterization of the crime, but
merely assigned the error to the trial courts decision of not
appreciating the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
Lagrana claimed they went to the police station to report but
that they were both sent home.
HELD: The evidence on record does not support voluntary
surrender, as contended. As aptly pointed out by the Trial Court:
"Although both accused reported to the police
authorities the following day after the commission of
the crime, it was not for the purpose of submitting
themselves unconditionally. Accused Carlo Lagrana
claimed self-defense when interrogated, while accused
Frangeline Salazar did not give any statement, either
verbal or written. Accused did not go to the police
authorities to surrender but merely to report the
incident. Indeed, they never evinced any desire to own
the responsibility for the killing of the deceased.
Indeed, wanting in this case are the following requisites for
voluntary surrender to be considered mitigating:

31
"A surrender to be voluntary must be spontaneous, showing the
intent of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the
authorities, either (1) because he acknowledges his guilt, or (2)
because he wishes to save them the trouble and expenses
necessarily incurred in his search and capture."

affirmative. The trial court deemed the case submitted for

decision and rendered the assailed decision finding the accused
guilty of the crime charged against him and sentencing him to
the penalty of death.

PP v. CRISOSTOMO

On appeal, Dalacat waxes lyrical on the lower court's imposition

of the penalty of death upon him on the basis of his plea of
guilty sans his full comprehension of its sense and substance.
He bemoans the trial court's failure to propound sufficient
questions to ascertain if he had indeed intelligently understood
such plea. He remonstrates that the trial court did not proceed
with the reception of his evidence, which he says was in flagrant
violation of law and jurisprudence concerning a plea of guilt to a
capital offense.

FACTS: Eugenio Crisostomo was convicted of the crime of

murder in the trial court. Accused assigns the error that the
lower court failed to appreciate his plea of guilty as a mitigating
circumstance.

HELD: Based on Sec. 3, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on

Criminal Procedure, there are three conditions that the trial
court should kowtow to in order to forestall the entry of an
improvident plea of guilty by the accused:

HELD: He cannot be credited with the mitigating circumstance

of a plea of guilty to a lesser offense of the charge of homicide
as invoked under the sixth assigned error. The requisites of the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty are: (1) that
the offender spontaneously confessed his guilt; (2) that the
confession of guilt was made in open court, that is, before the
competent court that is to try the case; and (3) that the
confession of guilt was made prior to the presentation of
evidence for the prosecution.

1.The court must conduct a searching inquiry into

the voluntariness and full comprehension [by
the accused] of the consequences of his plea;

PLEA OF GUILTY

In the present case the appellant offered to enter a plea of guilty

to the lesser offense of homicide only after some evidence of
the prosecution had been presented. He reiterated his offer after
the prosecution rested its case. This is certainly not mitigating.
PP V. ORTIZ
FACTS: Appellant was charged with murder and frustrated
murder. Upon arraignment, he pleaded not guilty. After two
witnesses for the prosecution had testified, appellant manifested
his willingness to plead guilty to the lesser offenses of homicide
and frustrated homicide. Consequently, the Fiscal, with leave of
court, amended the information accordingly, and upon new
arraignment, appellant entered a plea of guilty to the amended
information.
HELD: The amended information was an entirely new
information and no evidence had been presented to prove the
charges made therein when appellant entered his plea of guilty.
Therefore, he was entitled to have the mitigating circumstance
of plea of guilty considered in his favor in connection with the
imposition of the corresponding penalty.
PP vs. ESPIDO
FACTS: Appellant Dalacat was arraigned and with the
assistance of his counsel, he pleaded not guilty. At the ensuing
trial, the prosecution presented its two witnesses. Shortly after
the prosecution's third witness was sworn in, appellant changed
his tune and his counsel manifested in open court about
appellant's desire to change his plea to guilty. Appellant was rearraigned and to the charge of robbery with homicide in a Band,
he pleaded guilty.
The trial court set another hearing to assess appellant's
comprehension of his plea and inquired from appellant if his new
counsel clearly explained to him the legal effects and
consequences of his plea of guilty. He answered in the

2.The court must require the prosecution to present

evidence to prove the guilt of the accused
and the precise degree of his culpability; and
3.The court must ask the accused whether he desires
to present evidence on his behalf, and allow
him to do so if he so desires.
The mandatory nature of these three requisites for a valid plea
of guilty to a capital offense is easily deducible from the letter of
the law. Lamentably, the court a quo failed to play the rules of
the game.
In the case at bar, a cursory look at the transcripts easily reveal
the fact that appellant's plea of guilty was far from spontaneous
and persistent as envisioned by Section 3, Rule 116 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The trial court not only
failed to probe into the spontaneity of appellant's plea, it made
no effort to apprise him of the impact of his change of plea as
the accused herein was merely told that he could face the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. A mere warning that the
accused faces the supreme penalty of death is insufficient, for
more often than not, an accused pleads guilty upon bad advice
or because he hopes for a lenient treatment or a lighter penalty.
Like the first requirement of a searching inquiry, the second and
third indispensable requirements have, likewise, remained intact
through the years.
Given the unchanging state of the three-tiered requisites in
Section 3, Rule 116, there is, indeed, no justification for the trial
court's failure to observe them.
Thus, we purge the decision under review of its errors and
remand the case to the trial court for further re-arraignment, a
more incisive searching inquiry and the reception of evidence
for the prosecution and the defense, if the latter so desires.

8. THE OFFENDER IS DEAF, DUMB, BLIND OR SUFFERING

FROM SOME PHYSICAL DEFECT
PP V. FRANCISCO
FACTS: Accused-appellants Ricardo, Reynaldo, and Teodoro, all
surnamed Francisco, and Antonio Sioco were convicted by the

32
Regional Trial Court of Malabon of the crimes of murder and
frustrated murder. The accused-appellants fault the RTC for not
appreciating as mitigating circumstances accused RICARDO's
physical disability.
HELD: After a careful assessment of the established facts, we
find that these circumstances cannot be appreciated in their
favor. The limp allegedly suffered by RICARDO has not been
shown to restrict his means of action, defense or communication
with his fellow beings as required by Article 13(8) of the Revised
Penal Code as no evidence was presented in relation thereto
other than the bare allegation that he suffered from such a
physical defect.
PP V. DEOPANTE
FACTS: Rogelio Deopante was convicted of the crime of murder
and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant
stabbed one Dante Deopante with a fan-knife. Witnesses
presented by the prosecution testified that appellant and victim
grappled with each other and both fell on the ground. Appellant
was able to assume the dominant position and as Dante lay flat
on his back the former proceeded to stab the latter twice with
his fan knife. Immediately thereafter, appellant stood up and
fled the scene leaving Dante mortally wounded. Appellant
assigns the error that the RTC has failed to appreciate the
mitigating circumstance of physical defect as attendant to the
crime, appellant having only one hand.

wife for the reason that he often saw her in the company of his
brother Zacarias.
HELD: The appeal is based merely on the theory that the
appellant is an imbecile and therefore exempt from criminal
liability under article 12 of the Revised Penal Code. His counsel
presented the testimony of two guards of the provincial jail
where Abelardo was confined to the effect that his conduct there
was rather strange and that he behaved like an insane person.
In order to be appreciated, imbecility or insanity at the time of
the commission of the act should absolutely deprive a person of
intelligence or freedom of will, because mere abnormality of his
mental faculties does not exclude imputability. After a careful
study of the record, we are convinced that the appellant is not
an imbecile. As to the strange behaviour of the accused during
his confinement, assuming that it was not feigned to stimulate
insanity, it may be attributed either to his being feebleminded or
eccentric, or to a morbid mental condition produced by remorse
at having killed his wife. fact that the accused is feebleminded
warrants the finding in his favor of the mitigating circumstance
provided for in either paragraph 8 or paragraph 9 of article 13 of
the Revised Penal Code, namely, that the accused is "suffering
some physical defect which thus restricts his means of action,
defense or communication with his fellow beings," or such
illness "as would diminish the exercise of his will power." To this
we may add the mitigating circumstance in paragraph 6 of the
same article, that of having acted upon an impulse so
powerful as naturally to have produced passion or obfuscation.
The accused evidently killed his wife in a fit of jealousy.

HELD: The fact that appellant suffers from a physical defect, a

severed left hand, does not mean that he should automatically
be credited with the mitigating circumstance contained
in paragraph 8, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code. In order for
this condition to be appreciated, it must be shown that such
physical defect limited his means to act, defend himself or
communicate with his fellow beings to such an extent that he
did not have complete freedom of action, consequently resulting
in diminution of the element of voluntariness. Such cannot be
appreciated in the case at bar where the appellant's physical
condition clearly did not limit his means of action, defense or
communication, nor affect his free will. In fact, despite his
handicap, appellant nevertheless managed to attack, overcome
and fatally stab his victim.

PENALTY: The penalty applicable for parricide under article 246

of the Revised Penal Code is composed only of two indivisible
penalties, to wit, reclusion perpetua to death. Although the
commission of the act is attended by some mitigating
circumstance without any aggravating circumstance to offset
them, article 63 of the said code is the one applicable and must
be applied where the lesse penalty should be applied. Article 64
is not applicable as it refers to the application of penalties which
contain three periods whether it be a single divisible penalty or
composed of three different penalties, each one of which forms
a period in accordance with the provisions of articles 76 and 77,
which is not true in the present case where the penalty
applicable for parricide is composed only of two indivisible
penalties. Appellant is sentenced to reclusion perpetua.

At this point, one might wonder how a one-handed attacker can

open a fan knife and grapple with and overcome his two-handed
prey. This was answered by the testimony of Renato Molina who
revealed that at the time the accused closed in for the kill,
his balisong was already open and ready for use in his back
pocket, and that he had already drawn the same even during
the chase. Hence, at the time the accused-appellant chased the
victim, the former already had the balisong in hand. Clearly, the
fact that he had only one hand in no way limited his freedom of
action to commit the crime.

10. ANALOGOUS CIRCUMSTANCES

9. ILLNESS OF THE OFFENDER

PP V. FORMIGENES
FACTS: The accused, without any previous quarrel or
provocation whatsoever, took his bolo from the wall of the house
and stabbed his wife, Julia, in the back, the blade penetrating
the right lung and causing a severe hemorrhage resulting in her
death not long thereafter. The blow sent Julia toppling down the
stairs to the ground, immediately followed by her husband
Abelardo who, taking her up in his arms, carried her up the
house, laid her on the floor of the living room and then lay down
beside her. The motive was admittedly that of jealousy because
according to his statement he used to have quarrels with his

PP V. VENTURA
FACTS: In the midst of their merriment, petitioner's wife arrived
and started an argument with him. The argument turned violent
and his wife lunged at him with a chair, but he was able to parry
the blow. The scene was witnessed by his neighbors who were
next door playing "panya." They began laughing at him and
petitioner felt humiliated as a result. Because of his annoyance,
petitioner said he kicked the "panya" table. This incensed his
neighbors and a melee erupted with three of his nighbors
ganging up on him. Petitioners said he received a beating, but
he was able to run home. Once home, the enraged petitioner
got hold of a knife. He soon went out of the assailants where he
went bersek and killed one of his assailants.
HELD: Passion and obfuscation exist when (1) there is an act,
both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of the
mind, and (2) the said act which produced the obfuscation was
not far removed from the commission of the crime by a
considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might
recover his normal equanimity. There is passion and obfuscation
when the crime was committed due to an uncontrollable burst of
passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts, or due to a

33
legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason. In this
case it was established that petitioner and his wife had a violent
altercation and that petitioner was mauled by his neighbors
after he kicked some of them for laughing at him. These events
and circumstances prior to the killing of Alfredo Gonzales could
have caused unusual outbursts of passion and emotion on
petitioner's part. These resulted in the tragic stabbing of the
victim thus entitling petitioner to the mitigating circumstance
analogous to passion and obfuscation.
PENALTY: Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, the
imposable penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal, whose
duration in its entirety is from 12 years and 1 day to 20 years.
Since there is one mitigating circumstance, under Article 64 of
the Revised Penal Code, the penalty should be imposed in its
minimum period, or from 12 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8
months of imprisonment.

was then dragged to the banana plantation where she was

raped by the accused.
HELD: We agree with accused-appellant that the trial court erred
in appreciating the aggravating circumstances of dwelling,
nighttime, and uninhabited place in order to justify the
imposition of the death penalty.
Dwelling is considered as an aggravating circumstance primarily
because of the sanctity of privacy the law accords to the human
abode. However, in the present case, Rosalyn was not raped
therein. Although she was abducted therefrom, accusedappellant was not charged with forcible abduction with rape but
only with rape. Considering that she was not raped in her home,
dwelling cannot be appreciated.

NIGHTTIME
Article 14
DWELLING
PP VS. ALCALA
FACTS: About midnight, his wife, who was sleeping within the
house, was awaked by the noise produced by a blow. She got
up, looked out, and saw at the foot of the staircase of the house,
the accused Valentine Alcala upon Eugenio Rubion, holding the
latter by the neck, while the appellant, Paulo Alcala, who had a
club in his hand, held the knees of the deceased.
HELD: The foot of the staircase of a house is considered an
integral part thereof for the purposes of the aggravating
circumstance of the crime being committed in the dwelling of
the offended part of the house, said circumstance must be taken
into consideration.
PP VS.DEQUIA
Appellant's attorney contends that the fact that the deceased
was killed in his own dwelling should not constitute an
aggravating circumstance in the present case, because that fact
or circumstance was likewise inherent in the qualifying
circumstance of treachery or premeditation, and for the further
reason that the offended party provoked the crime by his illicit
relations with the defendant's wife.
HELD: Although the Code provides that the aggravating
circumstance of dwelling cannot be properly taken into account
if the provocation was given by the offended party, this is only
true when there exists a close relation between the provocation
and the commission of the crime in the dwelling of the person
from whom the provocation came. The provocation was not
given immediately prior to the commission of the crime and had
no particular relation to the house of the deceased. If the
defendant had entered the house of the deceased and surprised
the deceased and the wife of the defendant in the act of
adultery, the aggravating circumstance of morada would not
exist.
Obiter: Dwelling is not included in treachery.
PP VS. AGONCILLO
FACTS: While she was sleeping in their house, the victim was
roused to look at their wall clock if it is already time to
prepare their breakfast; when suddenly, somebody covered
her mouth and told her not to shout or else, he will cut off her
head; that the said person was armed with a scythe; that she

PP VS. SILVA
By and of itself, nighttime is not an aggravating circumstance,
however, it becomes aggravating only when: (1) it is especially
sought by the offender; or (2) it is taken advantage of by him; or
(3) it facilitates the commission of the crime by ensuring the
offender's immunity from capture. 33 In this case, the trial court
correctly appreciated nighttime as aggravating considering that
nighttime facilitated the abduction of the Ceriales brothers, the
killing of Manuel Ceriales and the attempt to kill Edmundo
Ceriales. Evidence shows that accused-appellants took
advantage of the darkness to successfully consummate their
plans. The fact that they brought with them a flashlight clearly
shows that they intended to commit the crime in darkness
PP VS. CARIO
The records reveal that the crime was committed during
nighttime. This circumstance is considered aggravating only
when it facilitated the commission of the crime, or was
especially sought or taken advantage of by the accused for the
purpose of impunity. The essence of this aggravating
circumstance is theobscuridad afforded by, and not merely the
chronological onset of, nighttime. Although the offense was
committed at night, nocturnity does not become a modifying
factor when the place is adequately lighted and, thus, could no
longer insure the offenders immunity from identification or
capture. 56 In the case at bar, it was not shown that nighttime
was especially sought for or used to insure the offenders
immunity from identification or capture.

BAND
PP VS. MAGDAMIT
The aggravating circumstance of band was properly appreciated
by the trial court. An offense is committed en cuadrilla when
more than three armed malefactors shall have acted together in
the commission thereof. In the present case, there were seven
armed conspirators involved in the commission of the composite
crime.
PP VS. DINAMLING
The trial court correctly appreciated band as an aggravating
circumstance. Whenever more than three armed malefactors
shall have acted together in the commission of an offense, it
shall be deemed to have been committed by a band. All four
accused-appellants were armed, three with long firearms and

34
the other with a short one. They all took part in the commission
of the robbery with homicide, poking their guns at their victims'
heads, tying them up, ransacking the house, and killing the two
victims.

strength of the parties. It is considered whenever there is a

notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the
aggressor, assessing a superiority of strength notoriously
advantageous for the aggressor which is selected or taken
advantage of by him in the commission of the crime. ACEIac

PP VS. LOZANO
We find that the offenses were not committed by a band. A
crime is deemed to have been committed by a band or en
cuadrilla when more than three armed malefactors take part in
its commission. The four armed persons contemplated in this
circumstance must all be principals by direct participation who
acted together in the execution of the acts constituting the
crime. The Code does not define or require any particular arms
or weapons; any weapon which by reason of its intrinsic nature
or the purpose for which it was made or used by the accused, is
capable of inflicting serious or fatal injuries upon the victim of
the crime may be considered as arms for purposes of the law
on cuadrilla. In the case at bar, the prosecution alleged that the
accused and his three other co-conspirators used unlicensed
firearms in the perpetration of the offenses. However, the
evidence on record shows that only two of them carried
firearms. En cuadrilla, as an aggravating circumstance, cannot
therefore be appreciated.
AID OF ARMED MEN
PP VS. LOZANO
There was also no evidence presented to show that the offenses
were committed with the aid of armed men. Aid of armed men
or persons affording immunity requires that the armed men are
accomplices who take part in minor capacity, directly or
indirectly. We note that all four accused were charged as
principal. The remaining suspects John Doe, Jane Doe and
Peter Doe were never identified and charged. Neither was
proof adduced as to the nature of their participation.
ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH
PP VS. DREW
Antonio Cordial, Jr., was walking towards an eatery. Suddenly,
appellants Drew and Ramos, with the 11 other accused waylaid
him. Drew was armed with a 2" x 2" piece of wood with which he
clubbed the unarmed Cordial. Ramos then struck him on the
back of his head with a lead pipe, followed by several blows on
the body. The victim fell. As he lay prostrate on the ground, the
others joined in beating him with blows and kicks. Appellants
and their co-accused then fled.
For the qualifying circumstance of taking advantage of superior
strength to be appreciated, the prosecution must show that the
accused were physically stronger than the victim, and that they
abused such superiority by taking advantage of their combined
strength to consummate the offense. In the present case, we
find that appellants and their 11 confederates took advantage of
their collective strength to inflict fatal injuries upon the victim by
rendering him defenseless and preventing his escape from the
attackers. The unarmed victim could not match the combined
strength of the 13 maulers. Appellants Drew and Ramos, who
were armed with a wooden club and a lead pipe, respectively,
reduced the unarmed victim into helplessness. The weapons
used by appellants negated any defense the victim could put
up. Alone and unarmed, the victim was no match to appellants
and their co-accused.
PP VS. BARCELON
To take advantage of superior strength means to use purposely
excessive force, out of proportion to the means of defense
available to the person attacked. The aggravating circumstance
of abuse of superior strength depends on the age, size and

As held in People vs. Ocumen, an attack by a man with a deadly

weapon upon an unarmed woman constitutes the circumstance
of abuse of that superiority which his sex and the weapon used
in the act afforded him, and from which the woman was unable
to defend herself.
The disparity in age between the assailant and the victim, aged
29 and 69, respectively, indicates physical superiority on
appellant's part over the deceased. It did not matter that
appellant was "dark" with a "slim body build" or "medyo
mataba." What mattered was that the malefactor was male and
armed with a lethal weapon that he used to slay the victim.
Thus, abuse of superior strength was present in the commission
of the crime. But should it be considered as qualifying or
aggravating? We note that the amended information states:
"That in the commission of the crime, the qualifying aggravating
circumstances of treachery and abuse of superior strength were
present." In its decision, the trial court considered abuse of
superior strength as a generic aggravating circumstance and
deemed it absorbed in treachery. We agree that here abuse of
superior strength should be treated as merely aggravating. And
we find it is present in this case, although there is no treachery.

PP VS. VENTURA
With respect to the death of Aileen, the trial court found both
appellants guilty of murder qualified not by evident
premeditation but by taking advantage of superior
strength, 58 to wit:
The killing of Aileen Bocateja is qualified by
the aggravating circumstance of abuse of
superior strength. The accused Arante
Flores who delivered the stabbing blow is
big and strong, standing about five feet
and six (5'6") inches tall. His weapon was
a 14 inch dagger. Aileen Bocateja [stood]
only about five (5'0") feet tall. The
disparity of their strength is
enormous. 59 (Emphasis supplied)
To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use
excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense
available to the person attacked. 60 The appreciation of this
aggravating circumstance depends on the age, size and
strength of the parties, and is considered whenever there is a
notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the
aggressor, assuming a superiority of strength notoriously
advantageous to the aggressor, which is selected or taken
advantage of by him in the commission of the crime. 61
Appellants "agree with the trial court that accused-appellant
Arante Flores is taller, and probably stronger than the victim
Aileen Bocateja because of their difference in sex as well as the
fact that the accused appellant Flores was armed at that
time . . ." Nevertheless, they argue that Aileen's death was not
attended by abuse of superior strength since: (1) though
ultimately unsuccessful, she was able to put up a defense

35
against appellant Flores; and (2) the prosecution failed to show
that appellant Flores deliberately took advantage of the
disparity in their size and sex in order to facilitate the
commission of the crime.
Unlike in treachery, where the victim is not given the
opportunity to defend himself or repel the aggression, taking
advantage of superior strength does not mean that the victim
was completely defenseless. Abuse of superiority is determined
by the excess of the aggressor's natural strength over that of
the victim, considering the momentary position of both and the
employment of means weakening the defense, although not
annulling it. Hence, the fact that Aileen attempted to fend off
the attack on her and her husband by throwing nearby objects,
such as an electric cord, at appellant Flores does not
automatically negate the possibility that the latter was able to
take advantage of his superior strength.
On the contrary, this Court in a very long line of cases has
consistently held that an attack made by a man with a deadly
weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes
the circumstance of abuse of that superiority which his sex and
the weapon used in the act afforded him, and from which the
woman was unable to defend herself.
By deliberately employing a deadly weapon against Aileen,
appellant Flores clearly took advantage of the superiority which
his strength, sex and weapon gave him over his unarmed victim.

EVIDENT PREMEDITATION
PP VS. HILARIO
Keyword: White Shirt
It is to be noted that the lower court, in finding the appellant
guilty of murder, qualified the killing by evident premeditation.
Evident premeditation, however, may not properly be taken into
account when the person whom the defendant proposed to kill
was different from the one who became his victim. 12 When the
person decided to kill a different person and premeditated on
the killing of the latter, but when he carried out his plan he
actually killed another person, it cannot properly be said that he
premeditated on the killing of the actual victim. Thus
premeditation was not aggravating in the case ofPeople
vs. Guillen, 13 where the accused had deliberately intended to
assassinate former President Manuel Roxas but he killed instead
Simeon Varela and wounded others. This doctrinal rule applies
here.
PP VS. TOBECHUKWU
Keywords: Nigerian, sex worker
Similarly, the elements of evident premeditation must be
established with equal certainty as the criminal act itself before
it can be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance. These
elements are: (1) the time when the accused determined to
commit the crime; (2) an overt act manifestly indicating that
they clung to their determination to commit the crime; and (3) a
sufficient lapse of time between the decision to commit the
crime and the execution thereof to allow the accused to reflect
upon the consequences of their act. The essence of evident
premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act is
preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to
carry out the criminal intent within a space of time sufficient to
arrive at a calm judgment. In the case at bar, there is no

showing that the killing of Atin was the product of cool thought
and reflection. There is absolutely no showing how and when the
plan was hatched or how much time elapsed before the crime
was carried out. On the contrary, what appears very much
evident is that he was killed on the occasion of an altercation
with accused-appellant in the latter's rented room. Suffice it to
state that without such evidence, mere presumptions and
inferences, no matter how logical and probable, will not suffice.
In other words, the evidence falls short of proving evident
premeditation. cDTSHE
PP VS. CONCILLADO
Keywords: 26 wounds
Evident premeditation "requires proof showing: (1) the time
when the accused decided to commit the crime; (2) the overt
act manifestly indicating that he clung to his determination; (3)
a sufficient lapse of time between the decision and the
execution, allowing the accused to reflect upon the
consequences of his act. Such proof must be based on external
acts that are not merely suspicious but also notorious, manifest,
evident and indicative of deliberate planning. The evidence
must show [that] the decision to kill prior to the moment of its
execution was the result of meditation, calculation, reflection or
persistent attempts. Absent such evidence, mere presumptions
and inferences are insufficient. Evident premeditation may not
be appreciated where there is no proof as to how and when the
plan to kill was hatched or the time that elapsed before it was
carried out. The premeditation must be evident and not merely
suspected."
In the instant case, the testimony of Lorenzo having been
properly discredited by the CA, the prosecution has no evidence
to show how the attack was commenced or how it was
perpetrated. There is also no evidence to show that Edgar
decided to kill Diosdado and has clung to such determination
even after a sufficient time has elapsed. Consequently, there is
no basis for us to appreciate the qualifying aggravating
circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation.
PP VS. DUAVIS
Keywords: long bolo about twenty-four (24) inches in length
In finding that appellant is guilty of homicide, instead of murder,
the CA ruled that there was an absence of the qualifying
circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery. The
essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of the
criminal act must be preceded by cool thought and reflection
upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a
space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. 23 For it to
be appreciated, the following must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt: (1) the time when the accused determined to
commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the
accused clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of
time between such determination and execution to allow him to
reflect upon the circumstances of his act. 24 On the other hand,
to appreciate treachery, two (2) conditions must be present,
namely, (a) the employment of means of execution that gives
the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to
retaliate, and (b) the means of execution were deliberately or
consciously adopted. 25 The CA, therefore, did not err when it
ruled that the killing of the victim was neither attended by
evident premeditation nor treachery, thus: HI
The element of evident premeditation is
manifested by the careful planning and

36
preparation undertaken by the offender
prior to the commission of the crime. A
perusal of the evidence on record
shows that the altercation between
appellant Duavis and Dante Largado,
Sr. took place at around 3:00 o'clock
in the afternoon of May 2, 2003, and
the hacking incident took place at
around 5:30 in the afternoon of the
same day. To the mind of the Court, the
lapse of time between the decision
and the execution is not sufficient to
allow appellant to fully reflect upon
the consequences of his act and to
effectively and efficiently prepare and
plan his actions prior to the
commission of the crime. Although it
may be argued that there was some kind
of premeditation on the part of appellant
Duavis, it was not proved to be evident.
This Court further finds that the qualifying
circumstance of treachery is not present in
the instant case because evidence on
record show thatappellant Duavis
chased Dante Largado, Sr. before the
latter was hacked; hence, it cannot be
concluded that appellant Duavis
employed means of execution which
gives Dante Largado, Sr. no
opportunity to retaliate or escape.
Moreover, the location of the hack
wound on the left side of the face of
the victim will also show that a frontal
attack was made.
Thus, in the absence of any circumstance
which would qualify the killing of Dante
Largado, Sr., appellant Duavis can only be
convicted of Homicide, not murder.
TREACHERY

PP VS. SICAD

There is treachery when one commits any of the crimes

against persons by employing means, methods or forms in
the execution thereof without risk to oneself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make. Here, the
accused-appellants attacked the victim from behind in a swift,
deliberate and unexpected manner. Without warning and
without risk to themselves, they threw a dynamite at him and
shot him even as he had already fallen to the ground. The
attack was thus treacherous, affording the victim no
opportunity to resist or escape or defend himself.

PP VS. YANSON
Both the trial court and the CA correctly appreciated the
qualifying aggravating circumstance of treachery. "There is

treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against

persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution,
which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without
risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended
party might make. The essence of treachery is that the attack
comes without a warning and in a swift, deliberate, and
unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and
unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. For treachery
to be considered, two elements must concur: (1) the
employment of means of execution that gives the persons
attacked no opportunity to defend themselves or retaliate; and
(2) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously
adopted." 44
The prosecution established that appellant suddenly stabbed
the victim from behind thereby giving him no opportunity to
resist the attack or defend himself. As correctly observed by the
appellate court: SEcTHA
It is apparent that there was treachery in
the killing of [Magan]. As surely testified by
[Galfo], [appellant] followed the
unsuspecting victim when he was going
home and thereafter, deliberately stabbed
him in the back which resulted in the
falling of [Magan] to the ground and
rendering him defenseless to [appellant's]
further attacks. Verily, [appellant]
employed means which insured the killing
of [Magan] and such means assured him
from the risk of [Magan's] defense had he
made any. It must also be noted that
[Magan] was stabbed four times in the
back and two of these wounds were the
proximate cause of his death. Stabbing
from behind is a good indication of
treachery.
PP. VS. ABDULLAH
Treachery and evident premeditation, the circumstances alleged
in the informations, cannot be appreciated to qualify the killing
to murder, considering that these were not proven during the
trial. It is an ancient but revered doctrine that qualifying and
aggravating circumstances before being taken into
consideration, for the purpose of increasing the penalty to be
imposed, must be proved with equal certainty as those which
establish the commission of the criminal offense. It is not only
the central fact of a killing that must be shown beyond
reasonable doubt; every qualifying or aggravating circumstance
alleged to have been present and to have attended such killing
must similarly be shown by the same degree of proof.
PP. VS. GIDOC
As to the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery,
we find the same to be present in these cases.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the
execution thereof, which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense that
the offender might make. 21 The essence of treachery is a swift
and unexpected attack on an unarmed victim without the
slightest provocation on the latter's part. 22

37
In these cases, the circumstances showing how the victims were
stabbed reveal that they had no opportunity to defend
themselves. They were unarmed and unsuspecting, as they
were just singing and drinking when accused-appellant stabbed
them. As properly observed by the trial court, the swift and
unexpected attack by the accused rendered them helpless.
There was also no provocation on their part to justify the ire of
appellant. Treachery thus qualifies the killings to Murder.

PP VS. AGACER

PP VS. LOPEZ

"There is treachery when the offender commits any of the

crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms
in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to
insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any
defense which the offended party might make." 31 Two
conditions must concur for treachery to be appreciated. First, is
the employment of means of execution that gives the person
attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate.
Second, the means of execution was deliberate or consciously
adopted. 32 "The essence of treachery is the sudden attack by
an aggressor without the slightest provocation on the part of the
victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend himself,
thereby ensuring the commission of the crime without risk to the
aggressor." 33

The essence of treachery is a deliberate and sudden attack that

renders the victim unable and unprepared to defend himself by
reason of the suddenness and severity of the attack. 21
In the case at bar, Chu was caught off-guard when, after he was
asking forgiveness from Regalado, the latter suddenly drew a
curved knife and stabbed and pursued the following victim. And
once Regalado and his co-appellants cornered Chu, Aragon
kicked and punched him while Lopez stabbed him several times
to thus preclude Chua * from defending himself.

PP V. DELA PEA
The RTC also correctly ruled that treachery attended the killing,
thus:
It is undisputed that the gunshot wound sustained by
the victim was located at the left back portion of the
chest and he has no other injuries apart from this
wound. Thus, it is evident that the victim was shot
from behind, with his back towards the assailant. It has
many times been held that treachery exists when the
defenseless victim was shot from behind and that this
shows that accused had employed means of attack
which offered no risk to himself from any defensive or
retaliatory act which the victim might have taken. It is
clear, therefore, that the victim has not even thought
that he will be shot by the accused while scooping with
a laddle (sic) rice inside the pot. Accused employed
deliberately the kind of attack which offered no risk to
himself what the victim might do.
Treachery was employed by the accused because he
sought the cover of darkness to shot (sic) the victim to
avoid his recognition. Accused likewise shot the victim
while he was behind the railings of the kitchen and it
would be hard for the victim to retaliate even if he had
the knowledge that he could be shot by the accused.
With all these circumstances attendant to the instant
case no doubt could be entertained by this court that
the accused shot the victim treacherously. SaAcHE
Nighttime, however, as aggravating circumstance is
absorbed by treachery. 43
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack
by the aggressor on an unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter
of any real chance to defend himself, thereby ensuring its
commission without risk to the aggressor, and without the
slightest provocation on the part of the victim. 44 In this case,
the victim was unarmed; and was attacked from behind and at
close range. The assailant further hid behind the window to
mask his presence and identity.

We are also unimpressed with appellants' contention that both

the trial and appellate courts erred in ruling that treachery
qualified the killing of Cesario to murder. They maintain that
since the attack on Cesario was frontal, there was therefore no
element of surprise on the victim or suddenness of the assault
that characterizes treachery.

In this case, treachery is evident from the same circumstances

we have already discussed above. From the facts, Cesario could
not have been aware that he would be surrounded, attacked and
killed by the appellants who were all related to him. He could
not have also been aware that Eddie had a shotgun concealed in
a sack because if he was, he would not have casually
approached Florencio when the latter summoned him.
Unfortunately, while Cesario was advancing towards Florencio,
Eddie shot him at close range without any warning whatsoever.
Evidently, the crime was committed in a manner that there was
no opportunity for Cesario to defend himself. Also, the mode of
attack did not spring from the unexpected turn of events but
was clearly thought of by the appellants. Hence, it no longer
matters that the assault was frontal since its swiftness and
unexpectedness deprived Cesario of a chance to repel it or offer
any resistance in defense of his person. 34
Appellants' contention that treachery was not alleged with
certainty in the Information is also devoid of merit. In People v.
Villacorta 35 the Court appreciated treachery as an aggravating
circumstance, it having been alleged in the Information and
proved during trial that the ". . . accused, armed with a
sharpened bamboo stick, with intent to kill, treachery and
evident premeditation, did then and there willfully and
feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said weapon one
DANILO SALVADOR CRUZ . . . ."
Similarly, we hold that treachery was sufficiently alleged in the
Information
PP VS. MANINGDING
There is treachery when "the offender commits any of the
crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in
the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense
which the offended party might make." 39 These means or
methods are made in the form of a swift, deliberate and
unexpected attack, without any warning and affording the
victim, which is usually unarmed and unsuspecting, no chance
at all to resist or escape the impending attack. 40

38
In this case, it is undisputed that it was accused-appellant who
stabbed and killed the victim, which is neither a crime of
parricide nor infanticide. We are, therefore, left with the issue of
whether there was treachery in the attack. Going over the
records of the case, We are convinced that, indeed, treachery
was employed and present in the stabbing by accused-appellant
of the victim, which led to the latter's ultimate death.

be taken into account even if the victim of the attack was not
the person whom the accused intended to kill.

From the testimonies of Aladino and Rommel, it cannot be

gainsaid that accused-appellant without any warning or
suspicion, and taking advantage of the circumstances,
immediately attacked the victim. The victim did not have any
suspicion that could have alerted him of the impending attack.
As clearly demonstrated in the trial court, the attack was swift
and unexpected, even to the eyewitnesses, Aladino and
Rommel. We, therefore, agree with the RTC's ruling and finding,
and We find no reason to veer away from them.

The circumstance of ignominy was not present because no

means were employed nor did any circumstances surround the
act tending to make the effects of the crime more humiliating.
Ignominy is a circumstance pertaining to the moral order, which
adds disagree and obloquy to the material injury caused by the
crime. The fact that the deceased was killed in the presence of
his wife certainly could not have such a signification, and this is
the circumstance which the court below had in view when
declaring that this circumstance had concurred.

IGNOMINY
PP VS. ABAIGAR

PP VS. GUEVARRA
PP VS. ACAYA
It is settled that aggravating/qualifying circumstances must be
alleged in the information and proven during the trial before
they can be appreciated. 51
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from any defensive or
retaliatory act which the victim might make. 52 The essence of
treachery is a deliberate and sudden attack that renders the
victim unable and unprepared to defend himself by reason of
the suddenness and severity of the attack. Two essential
elements are required in order that treachery can be
appreciated: (1) The employment of means, methods or manner
of execution that would ensure the offender's safety from any
retaliatory act on the part of the offended party who has, thus,
no opportunity for self-defense or retaliation; and (2) deliberate
or conscious choice of means, methods or manner of
execution. 53

Neither should the aggravating circumstance of ignominy be

appreciated, defined as "a circumstance pertaining to the moral
order which adds disgrace and obloquy to the material injury
caused by the crime" (U.S. vs. Abaigar, 2 Phil. 417 [1903]). The
fact that the crime was committed in a public place and in the
presence of many persons did not necessarily tend to make the
effects of the crime more humiliating or put the offended party
to shame.
PP VS. SIAO
Accused-appellant was held guilty of rape with the use of a
deadly weapon, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death. 23 But the trial court overlooked and did not take into
account the aggravating circumstance of ignominy and
sentenced accused-appellant to the single indivisible penalty
ofreclusion perpetua. It has been held that where the accused in
committing the rape used not only the missionary
position, i.e. male superior, female inferior but also the dog
position as dogs do, i.e. entry from behind, as was proven like
the crime itself in the instant case, the aggravating
circumstance of ignominy attended the commission thereof.

In the case at bar, treachery was alleged in the information and

all its elements were duly established by the prosecution.
Inspector Barte was sitting inside the jeep when appellant
suddenly appeared and approached him. Appellant asked
Inspector Barte if he was "Major Barte". However, before
Inspector Barte could respond or utter a word, appellant quickly
shot him several times in the head and chest with a caliber .45
pistol. The suddenness and unexpectedness of the appellant's
attack rendered Inspector Barte defenseless and without means
of escape. There is no doubt that appellant's use of a caliber .45
pistol, as well as his act of waiting for Inspector Barte to be
seated first in the jeep before approaching him and of shooting
Inspector Barte several times on the head and chest, was
adopted by him to prevent Inspector Barte from retaliating or
escaping. Considering that Inspector Barte was tipsy or drunk
and he was seated inside the jeep where the space is narrow,
there was absolutely no way for him to defend himself or
escape. cTAaDC

Article 15 Case Digests

-RelationshipPp v. Calongui
FACTS: Accused-appellant was guilty of two-counts of rape.
Accused-appellant and the victim were first cousins.
HELD: relationship is not aggravating because the relationship
between Marinel and the appellant as first cousins is not within
the concept contemplated in Article 15 of the Revised Penal
Code.

PP VS. TRINIDAD
The crime committed was murder with the qualifying
circumstance of treachery, as characterized by the fact that the
victim was shot at close range while she was asleep, thus
ensuring the commission of the crime without risk to the
assailants [People v. Dequina, 60 Phil. 279 (1934)]. That Juan
Angel, and not his mother, was apparently the intended victim is
not incompatible with the existence of treachery. Treachery may

PP v. Capareda
FACTS: Accussed-appellant was guilty of four counts of rape.
The victim was the step-granddaughter of the accused.
HELD: The alternative aggravating circumstance of relationship
under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code cannot be considered

39
in the instant case considering that the relationship between a
step-grandniece and her step-grandfather is not one of the
relatives specifically enumerated therein

is reclusion perpetua by virtue of Article 266-A of the

Revised Penal Code.

Pp v. Orillosa

-Intoxication-

FACTS: Accused-appellant was found guilty of acts of

lasciviousness and two counts of rape. Accused was the father
of the victim.
PP v. Borbon
HELD: The alternative circumstance of relationship under Article
15 of the Revised Penal Code should be appreciated against
appellant. In crimes of chastity such as acts of lasciviousness,
relationship is considered as aggravating. Inasmuch as it was
expressly alleged in the information and duly proven during trial
that the offended party is the daughter of appellant,
relationship, therefore, aggravated the crime of acts of
lasciviousness.
Penalty: Under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime
of acts of lasciviousness is punished by prision correccional.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law and appreciating
relationship as an aggravating circumstance, appellant could be
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of six months
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to six years of prision
correccional, as maximum, and to pay the victim P30,000.00 as
moral damages.

PP v. Glodo
FACTS: Appellant was found guilty of rape by the trial court. The
victim was appellants own daughter.
HELD: The Information alleges that Maricel was only 15 years
old at the time the crime was committed and that she is the
daughter of appellant. However, the prosecution merely
presented the oral testimony and sworn statement of Maricel. It
failed to present independent evidence proving the age of the
victim and her relationship with appellant so as to warrant the
imposition of death penalty. In People vs. Viajedor, we held:
The minority of the victim and the offender's
relationship to the victim, which constitute
only one special qualifying circumstance,
must be alleged in the Information and
proved with certainty. Recent rulings of the
Court relative to the rape of minors
invariably state that in order to justify the
imposition of the penalty of death, there
must be independent evidence proving the
age of the victim, other than the testimonies
of prosecution witnesses and the absence of
denial by the accused . . . The prosecution
has the burden of proving all the elements of
a crime, including the qualifying
circumstances, especially in death penalty
cases.
Thus, for failure of the prosecution to present independent
evidence to prove the age of victim Maricel and her
relationship with appellant, the trial court erred in
considering the special qualifying circumstance of minority
and relationship as basis for the imposition of the death
penalty. Appellant should have been found guilty of simple
rape and the penalty that should be imposed on appellant

FACTS: Appellant was in front of the house of a certain Aling Pet

Pingol having conversation with one Jaime Talibangan and
Cristina David, appellants neice. The appellant reeked of liquor
and appeared to be drunk. The group of the deceased arrived
and talked about the basketball game they had seen earlier.
Cristina took leave of the group. Appellant meanwhile, did not
take part in the conversation. Suddenly he expressed to Jaime
his intention to kill. The latter went inside the house of Aling Pet
for fear. The group of the deceased remained in conversation.
Appellant then went into the house and brought back with him
two knives. Immediately and without warning, he stabbed the
deceased at the right side of the belly with one of the knives.
The victim died along the way to the hospital. The trial court
convicted the appellant of murder with the mitigating
circumstance of intoxication.
HELD: In its decision, the court a quo appreciated the mitigating
circumstance of intoxication in favor of the appellant. This Court,
however, disagrees with such finding. Under the third paragraph
of Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code, intoxication is
considered as an alternative circumstance, it may either be
taken as an aggravating or a mitigating circumstance. For
intoxication to be considered as a mitigating circumstance, the
following conditions must be present: (1) the same is not
habitual or is not subsequent to a plan of the commission of a
felony; otherwise, it is aggravating if it is habitual and
intentional; and (2) the consumption of alcoholic drinks was in
such quantity as to blur the accused's reason and deprive him of
certain degree of control.
Jaime testified that he noticed that the appellant was drunk as
his movement was swaying and he smelled of liquor. Nothing
else was mentioned about the appellant's drunkenness during
the incident. For his part, the appellant presented nothing to
prove that he was, indeed, not drunk. Having failed to prove that
intoxication was neither habitual nor intentional, the mitigating
circumstance of intoxication cannot be appreciated against or in
favor of the appellant.
PP v. Inggo
FACTS: Accused bought a bottle of beer from the store of the
deceaseds father. The helper tried to give him his change but
the accused refused saying that he wanted the original amount
back. Heated words were exchanged between accused and the
helper. Afterwards, the victim arrived and offered to give the
accused his change. The accused, however, refused and an
argument between accused and deceased ensued. While
appellant and the deceased were thus arguing, appellant
suddenly rushed to the deceased. When he was already near
her, he loosened his belt and removed it from his waist.
Rosemarie Reinante consequently ran. Appellant chased her and
when he caught up with her, appellant stabbed her. The helper
tried to separate the two. Rosemarie then ran to the road but
appellant continued to chase her. When he failed to catch up to
the deceased, he ran instead towards the cemetery. Rosemarie

40
was rushed to the hospital where she was pronounced dead on
arrival. The trial court found the evidence for the prosecution
credible and sufficient to convict appellant of murder beyond
reasonable doubt.
HELD: We find the alternative circumstance of intoxication in
existent. Intoxication to be aggravating must have been the
source of bravado that propelled the accused to commit the
crime. As we have previously held:
Our penal laws do not look kindly on
habitual drunkards, or if the accused
already resolved to commit the crime,
then got intoxicated so as to fortify that
resolve with false courage dictated by
liquor, his liability should be aggravated.
Although there is no hard and fast rule on
the amount of liquor that the accused
imbibed on that occasion, but the test is
that it must have sufficed to affect his
mental faculties, to the extent of blurring
his reason and depriving him of selfcontrol.
Here, appellant's degree of intoxication was not proved with
certainty. He had allegedly been drinking tuba earlier that day,
and he did buy a bottle of beer at the store of the victim's inlaws. But these facts are not sufficient to establish that indeed
appellant was intoxicated at the time he committed the crime,
much less that he sought intoxication to fortify his resolve in
committing it. Absent clear and convincing proof as to
appellant's state of intoxication, we are unable to agree that the
alternative circumstance of intoxication was present to
aggravate the offense.
In any event, intoxication as well as disregard of sex were not
alleged in the information, hence, these may not be considered
to aggravate the crime for the imposition of a higher penalty,
whether by degrees or periods. This is pursuant to the
amendments made to the Revised Rules of Court, particularly
toSec. 8 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

PP v. Bernal
FACTS: Accused-appellant was found guilty by the trial court of
the crime of murder for which he was sentenced to death,
violation of the gun ban and illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition for which he was sentenced to suffer indeterminate
prison terms. Appellant together with deceased and a group of
men, were on board a tricycle on their way to the Benedisco pub
house. Upon reaching the pub house, the deceased, Pedrito,
invited the group to go inside to dance. Pedrito, Rey and the
appellant, Arnel, went inside while Felix and Fernando were left
outside. Later, Fernando went inside to look for the three and
found them asleep. He brought each to the tricycle where Felix
was waiting to bring them home. Fernando first fetched the
deceased and then the accused. Upon fetching Rey, he heard a
gunshot and upon returning to the tricycle, he saw appellant
holding a gun. He heard another gunshot. It turned out the
accused had shot Pedrito. Fernando and the appellant grappled
with the gun where at that point, policemen arrived.
HELD: Accused-appellant argues that the trial court committed
an error when it imposed the death penalty on him on account
of the alternative aggravating circumstance of habitual
drunkenness. He claims that the prosecution was not able to
prove the same at the trial, much less that he intentionally got
drunk to commit the crime. We agree.

The general rule is that intoxication may be considered either as

aggravating or mitigating, depending upon the circumstances
attending the commission of the crime. Intoxication is mitigating
and therefore has the effect of decreasing the penalty if the
intoxication is not habitual or attendant to the plan to commit
the contemplated crime. On the other hand, when intoxication is
habitual or done intentionally to embolden the malefactor and
facilitate the plan to commit the crime, it is considered as an
aggravating circumstance.
In the instant case, accused-appellant's intoxication cannot be
considered aggravating because there was no showing that it
was habitual or intentional. As testified to by prosecution
witness Felix Bernal, their group drink liquor only occasionally,
that is, if they had visitors. His testimony that if they had visitors
everyday, they drank everyday does not suffice to prove that
accused-appellant was a habitual drunkard. Nor should such
statement be taken against the accused-appellant. Undeniably,
accused-appellant was a mere visitor at that time. He came to
Bangued to attend a hearing and from there went to Barangay
Dangdangla, Bangued to visit his relatives.
Further, the prosecution failed to prove that accused-appellant
got drunk on the day the murder occurred for the purpose of
committing the same. Neither did accused-appellant initiate the
drinking spree. He merely acceded to the invitation of the victim
to join his group in their drinking spree. Thus, in the absence of
clear and convincing proof that the intoxication was habitual or
intentional on the part of accused-appellant, it is improper to
consider the same as an aggravating circumstance.
But his intoxication cannot likewise be considered mitigating
because accused-appellant failed to show that his intoxication
impaired his will power or his capacity to understand the
wrongful nature of his acts. The person pleading intoxication
must prove that he took such quantity of alcoholic beverage,
prior to the commission of the crime, as would blur his reason.
This accused-appellant failed to do. No proof was presented by
accused-appellant that the amount of liquor he had taken was of
such quantity as to affect his mental faculties. The mere claim of
intoxication does not entitle him to the mitigating circumstance
of intoxication.

-Lack of InstructionPP v. Mangsant

FACTS: The defendant appealed from the judgment of the Court
of First Instance of Manila finding him guilty of the crime of
murder and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua. The
information against him alleged that the said accused attack
Demetria Ferrer, a girl 14 years of age, stabbing her from behind
with a knife and inflicting upon her various wounds in different
parts of the body which produced her instantaneous death.
HELD: As to the mitigating circumstances, it is not proper to
consider lack of instruction in favor of the defendant, inasmuch
as he admitted that he had studied in the first grade in a public
elementary school. Lack of instruction cannot apply to one who
has studied in the first grade in a public school, but only to him
who really has not received any instruction (art. 15, first
paragraph, Revised Penal Code).

41

Article 17-Principals
Indicators of conspiracy
PP V. SICAD
FACTS: Accused-appellant, Melchor Sicad went to his parents'
house to attend to his ailing mother who suffered a stroke.
Present in the house were his co-accused, namely, Jimmy
Asturias, Rudy Sicad and Camelo Lobaton. The deceased,
Roberto Asturias, Sr., Melchor's cousin, also arrived. Melchor
offered Roberto a bottle of beer, but he refused. This resulted in
a verbal clash and an exchange of fist blows between
them. Roberto finally left, while Melchor returned to the bedside
of his mother who, shortly thereafter, died.
Later that evening, Roberto Asturias, Sr. was found dead near
his fishing banca. The victim's 11-year old son, and Jimmy
Asturias pointed to accused-appellants Rudy Sicad, Camelo
Lobaton, Melchor Sicad, and the latter's employees, Paquito
Bernil and Johnny Guiez, as the assailants.
Roberto Asturias, Jr. testified that he saw Paquito Bernil throwing
a dynamite at his father which exploded and hit his father's
back. Then Rudy Sicad fired a gun at his father. While his father
was already lying on the ground with his face down, Camelo
Lobaton also shot him. All the while, Melchor Sicad and Johnny
Guiez stood as lookouts under a nearby. Thereafter, the five
accused-appellants escaped toward the house of Melchor. Jimmy
Asturias corroborated the testimony of Roberto Asturias, Jr.
HELD: There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to
an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide
to commit it. As a rule, conspiracy must be proved as
convincingly and indubitably as the crime itself. It is not
necessary, however, that conspiracy be proved by direct
evidence of a prior agreement to commit the crime. Conspiracy
may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the
offense was perpetrated or inferred from the acts of the accused
which show a joint or common purpose and design, a concerted
action and a community of interest among the accused.
This Court holds that the trial court did not err when it found
that conspiracy exists in this case. While there is no direct
evidence to show that accused-appellants agreed to commit the
crime, however, their acts and the attendant circumstances
surrounding the commission of the crime disclose a common
design that would make all of them co-principals in the crime
committed.
As shown by the records, accused-appellants Paquito Bernil,
Rudy Sicad and Camelo Lobaton threw a dynamite and fired at
the victim, while accused-appellants Melchor Sicad and Johnny
Guiez stood guard and acted as lookouts. All of them
performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as
to unmistakably indicate a common purpose of bringing about
the death of the victim. Moreover, the simultaneous
convergence of the accused-appellants at the crime scene, their
specific acts in the commission of the crime, and their
simultaneous flight toward the house of Melchor Sicad pointed
to a conspiracy among them.

The contention of Melchor Sicad and Johnny Guiez, who acted

as lookouts, that their mere presence in the scene of the crime
did not make them co-conspirators does not persuade us. One
who participates in the material execution of the crime by
standing guard or lending moral support to the actual
perpetrators thereof is criminally responsible to the same extent
as the latter. In a conspiracy, it is not necessary to show that all
the conspirators actually hit and killed the victim. Indeed, the
accused-appellants' synchronous presence at the place was not
a mere coincidence but was in pursuance of a design to kill
Roberto Asturias, Sr., with whom Melchor Sicad had a previous
fight.
There being conspiracy among the accused-appellants, they are
liable as co-principals regardless of the manner and extent of
their participation since, in point of law, the act of one is the act
of all.
The trial court's appreciation of the aggravating circumstance of
evident premeditation cannot be sustained. Proof of conspiracy
does not imply the existence of evident premeditation. The rule
is that evident premeditation may not be taken into account
where, as here, conspiracy is not based on direct proof but is
inferred from the acts of the accused in the perpetration of the
crime.
The Court sustains the trial court's finding that the accusedappellants are guilty of murder, qualified by treachery.

PP vs. REYES
FACTS: The Yao family is composed of Yao San (father), Chua
Ong Ping Sim (mother), Robert and Raymond (children), Lenny
(daughter-in-law, wife of Robert), Matthew and Charlene
(grandchildren), and Jona Abagatnan and Josephine Ortea
(housemaids).
The Yao family owns and operates a poultry farm in Barangay
Santo Cristo, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan. On 16 July 1999, at
about 11:00 p.m., the Yao family, on board a Mazda MVP van,
arrived at the their poultry farm. Yao San alighted from the van
to open the gate of the farm. At this juncture, appellant Reyes
and a certain Juanito Pataray (Pataray) approached, poked their
guns at Yao San, and dragged him inside the van. Appellant
Reyes and Pataray also boarded the van. Thereupon, appellants
Arnaldo and Flores, with two male companions, all armed with
guns, arrived and immediately boarded the van. Appellant Flores
took the driver's seat and drove the van. Appellants Reyes and
Arnaldo and their cohorts then blindfolded each member of the
Yao family inside the van with packaging tape. After about 30
minutes of traveling on the road, the van stopped. Per order of
appellants and their cohorts, Chua Ong Ping Sim, Robert,
Raymond and Jona Abagatnan (Abagatnan) stepped out of the
van with appellants Reyes and Arnaldo, Pataray and one of their
male companions. Appellant Flores, with the other male
companion, drove the van with the remaining members of the
Yao family inside the vehicle.
Later, the van stopped again. Appellant Flores and his male
companion told Yao San to produce the amount of five million
pesos as ransom in exchange for the release of Chua Ong Ping
Sim, Robert, Raymond and Abagatnan. Thereafter, appellant
Flores and his male companion left the van and fled; while Yao
San, Lenny, Matthew, Charlene and Josephine remained inside
the van. Yao San then drove the van towards the poultry farm
and sought the help of relatives.
Meanwhile, Chua Ong Ping Sim, Robert, Raymond and
Abagatnan were taken on foot by appellants Reyes and Arnaldo,

42
Pataray and one male companion to a safe-house situated in the
mountainous part of San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan where they
spent the whole night.
On the morning of the following day, the kidnappers tried to
contact Yao San regarding the ransom demanded, but the latter
could not be reached. Thus, appellants instructed Abagatnan to
look for Yao San in the poultry farm. Upon arriving therein,
Abagatnan searched for Yao San, but the latter could not be
found. Appellants Reyes and Arnaldo told Abagatnan to remind
Yao San about the ransom. Thereafter, appellants Reyes and
Arnaldo and their male companion left Abagatnan in the poultry
farm and went back to the safe-house.
In the safe-house, appellants told Robert that they would release
him so he could help Abagatnan in locating Yao San. Abandoned
by the appellants and upon arriving at the poultry farm, Robert
found Yao San and informed him about the ransom demanded
by the appellants for the remaining held victims.
A series of calls were made between Yao San and the kidnappers
in which he was instructed to deliver the ransom and not tell the
authorities. However, kidnappers did not show up when Yao San
delivered the ransom money.
On 23 July 1999, the corpses of Chua Ong Ping Sim and
Raymond were found at the La Mesa Dam, Novaliches, Quezon
City. Both died of asphyxia by strangulation.
HELD: Apropos the second assigned error, appellants contend
that the prosecution failed to prove that they conspired in
kidnapping the Yao family. Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal
Code, there is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to
commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy
presupposes unity of purpose and unity in the execution of the
unlawful objective among the accused. When the accused by
their acts aimed at the same object, one performing one part
and the other performing another part as to complete the crime,
with a view to the attainment of the same object, conspiracy
exists. As can be gleaned from the credible testimonies and
sworn statements of Abagatnan, Robert and Yao, appellant
Reyes and Pataray approached and poked their guns at Yao San,
and thereafter dragged the latter into the van. Appellant Flores
then took the driver's seat and drove the van, while each
member of the Yao family was blindfolded by appellants Reyes
and Arnaldo and their cohorts inside the van. Thereafter,
appellant Flores instructed Yao San to produce the amount of P5
million as ransom money in exchange for the release of Chua
Ong Ping Sim, Robert, Raymond and Abagatnan. Appellant
Reyes and appellant Arnaldo were among the kidnappers who
guarded Abagatnan, Robert, Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond in
the safe-house. They also accompanied Abagatnan and Robert
in going to the poultry farm to search for and remind Yao San
about the ransom demanded. Further, appellants Arnaldo and
Flores narrated in their respective extra-judicial confessions how
they planned and executed the kidnapping of the Yao family.
Their extra-judicial confessions also detailed the particular
role/participation played by each of appellants and their cohorts
in the kidnapping of the family. Clearly, the foregoing individual
acts of appellants and their cohorts demonstrated their unity of
purpose and design in kidnapping the Yao family for the purpose
of extorting ransom.

PP VS. ALETA, ET AL
FACTS: Marcelo, Ferdinand, Rogelio, Marlo and Jovito, all
surnamed Aleta was charged for the murder of Celestino
Duldulao y Yadao and Ferdinand Acob. All above-named accuse
club with the use of hard objects both the victims. The Court
upholds the version of the prosecution: While the deceased
Acobs mother, Marina, went to the community center, she
heard a commotion on the yard of the appellants. Returning
home, she told Acob of the quarrel. Acob went to the appellants

compound. Upon following her son, Marina witnessed Rogelio

striking Acob with a piece of wood, causing the latter to fall. She
thereafter saw Rogelio striking Duldulao causing the latters
eyes to pop out. Rogelio then ran towards the family house
whereupon Marina heard gunshots. Jovito, Marlo and Ferdinand
continued to hit them. When Rogelio emerged from the house,
he got another piece of wood and clubbed the victims.
HELD: Conspiracy was present during the attack. When two or
more persons aim their acts towards the accomplishment of the
same unlawful object, each doing a part of their acts, though
apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative
indicating closeness of personal association and a concurrence
of sentiment, conspiracy may be inferred. And where there is
conspiracy, the act of one is deemed the act of all.

PP vs. PABLO AMODIA

FACTS: Romildo Ceno testified that he along with two friends
were talking and watching television when he heard a noise
coming somewhere below the C-5 Bridge, located 40-50 meters
away from their house. He also heard somebody shouted may
away doon. Curious, he and Mario went to the bridge and saw
five persons whom he identified as the victim (Felix Olandria
Bergao), Pablo Amodia, Arnold Partosa, George Palacio and
Damasio Amodia. He knew these men as they were neighbors.
Illuminated by light coming from a post, he saw the victim being
held in the right hand by Pablo, while the other hand was held
by Arnold. George was positioned at the victims back and
clubbed the victim on the head; Damaso was in front of the
victim and stabbed him three times. Luther Caberte who
happened to be passing by the C-5 bridge at that time, also saw
what happened. He testified that he saw men fighting under the
C-5 bridge which was illuminated by a light from a lamppost. He
saw Pablo, Damaso, George and Arnold ganging up on the
victim. He saw Pablo holding the victims hand while Damaso
was stabbing him. He also affirmed that George was positioned
behind the victim. He personally knew both the victim and Pablo
as they have been neighbors. Both eyewitnesses left the scene
after the stabbing; Romildo was chased away by George and
Damaso while Luther went on home immediately.
The accused-appellant Pablo Amodia invoked the defense of
alibi. In his appeal, Pablo argues that the trial court and the CA
erred in failing to give evidentiary weight to his alibi. He
alternatively argues that granting that he was part of Damasos
group and that the group killed the victim, the prosecution failed
to establish the conspiracy among them. There was no evidence
adduced to establish how the incident that led to the stabbing
began.
HELD: As an alternative argument, Pablo puts into issue the
failure of the prosecutions evidence to establish the conspiracy
between him and his other co-accused to make him liable for
murder. He emphasizes that the evidence, as testified by the
eyewitnesses, only relate to events during and not prior to the
assault and the stabbing of the victim. He argues that no
evidence was adduced to show that the accused all agreed to
kill the victim.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it. It arises the very instant the plotters agrees,
expressly or impliedly, to commit a felony and forthwith decide
to pursue it. It may be proved by direct or circumstantial

43
evidence. Direct proof of conspiracy is rarely found;
circumstantial evidence is often resorted to in order to prove its
existence. Absent of any direct proof as in the present case,
conspiracy may be deduced from the mode, method, and
manner the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of
the accused themselves, when such acts point to a joint purpose
and design, concerted action, and community of interest. An
accused participates as a conspirator if he or she has performed
some overt acts as a direct or indirect contribution in the
execution of the crime planned to be committed. The overt act
may consist of active participation in the actual commission of
the crime itself, or it may consist of moral assistance to his coconspirators by being present at the commission of the crime, or
by exerting moral ascendancy over the other co-conspirators.
Stated otherwise, it is not essential that there be proof of the
previous agreement and decision to commit the crime, it is
sufficient that the malefactors acted in concert pursuant to the
same objective.
Although there was no evidence in the present case showing a
prior agreement of Pablo, Arnold, George and Damaso, the
following chain of events however show their commonality of
purpose in killing the victim: first, the accused surrounded the
victims on all sides; Damaso at the front, George at the victims
rear; while Pablo and Arnold flanked the victim on each side;
second, Pablo then wrested the right arm of the victim and
restrained his movement; while Arnold did the same to the left
arm of the victim; third, George then hit the victims head with a
piece of wood; and fourth, Damaso stabbed the victim three
times.

PP VS. REGALARIO
FACTS: Accused-appellants, all surnamed Regalario, are
barangay officials and related to one another. Appellants Sotero
and Bienvenido Regalario were seen striking Rolando Sevilla
several times with their nightsticks. The blows caused Sevilla to
fall down in a sitting position but after a short while he was able
to get up. He ran away in the direction of the house of appellant
Mariano Regalario, the barangay captain. Bienvenido and Sotero
Regalario chased Sevilla. When Sevilla was already near
Marciano's house, he was waylaid by appellant Ramon Regalario
and at this point, Marciano Regalario and his son Noel Regalario
came out of their house. Noel was carrying a seven-inch knife.
The five appellants caught the victim in front of Marciano's
house. Armed with their nightsticks, they took turns in hitting
the victim until he slumped to the ground face down. In that
position, Sevilla was boxed by Marciano in the jaw. After a while,
when Sevilla was no longer moving, Marciano first ordered the
others to kill the victim and to tie him up. Upon hearing the
order, Bienvenido, with the help of Sotero, tied the neck, hands
and feet of the victim with a nylon rope used by farmers for
tying carabao. The rest of the group just stood by watching.
HELD: The Court agrees with the findings of the lower courts as
to the presence of conspiracy. Conspiracy exists when two or
more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Direct proof of
conspiracy is rarely found. The agreement to commit a crime,
however, may be deduced from the mode and manner of the
commission of the offense or inferred from acts that point to a
joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of
intent. It does not matter who inflicted the mortal wound, as the
act of one is the act of all, and each incurs the same criminal
liability. We quote with approval the findings and observations of
the CA, thus:
The eyewitnesses' account surrounding Rolando Sevilla's death
shows that the accused-appellants performed concerted acts in
pursuit of a common objective. Sotero, Bienvenido, and Ramon,
armed with nightsticks, and Noel armed with a knife, seven
inches in length, beat Rolando Sevilla. All five accusedappellants caught up with the victim, blocked all means through

which the victim could escape and ensured the achievement of

their plan to kill Rolando Sevilla even as the latter already fell to
the ground. Accused-appellant Marciano hit the victim on his
jaw and later, ordered his co-accused to kill and tie the victim.
Upon hearing Marciano's instruction, Bienvenido Regalario tied
Rolando's neck, hands and feet with a rope. The collective act of
the accused-appellants is sufficient to make them co-principals
to the killing.
Considering the foregoing, as well as the manner in which the
attack against Rolando was carried out, and the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses positively identifying the accusedappellants as the assailants, we concur in the rulings of the CA,
affirming those of the trial court, in (a) disregarding Ramon
Regalario's declaration that he attacked the victim in selfdefense and (b) holding that all the accused-appellants acted in
concert and killed Rolando.

PP vs. MALIBIRAN
FACTS: Rolando "Botong" Malibiran and Beverly Tibo-Tan were
convicted of Murder and Parricide, respectively, and sentencing
them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The conviction
arose from the death of Reynaldo Tan on February 5, 1995. The
antecedents that led to Reynaldo's death, however, go way back
in the 70's when Reynaldo left his common-law wife, Rosalinda
Fuerzas and their two children, Jessie and Reynalin, in Davao,
and went to Manila to seek greener pastures. While in Manila,
Reynaldo met and had a relationship with appellant. They
eventually married in 1981. Reynaldo and appellant begot three
children Renevie, Jag-Carlo and Jay R. In 1984, Reynaldo's
and Rosalinda's paths crossed again and they resumed their
relationship. This led to the "souring" of Reynaldo's relationship
with appellant; and in 1991, Reynaldo moved out of the conjugal
house and started living again with Rosalinda, although
Reynaldo maintained support of and paternal ties with his
children. On that fateful day of February 5, 1995, Reynaldo and
appellant were in Greenhills with their children for their usual
Sunday gallivant. After finishing lunch at the Kimpura
restaurant, the family separated at around 2:00 o'clock in the
afternoon to do some shopping. Later, they regrouped and
purchased groceries at Unimart. At around 4:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, the family stepped out of the shopping mall and
Reynaldo proceeded to the parking lot to get his red Honda
Accord, while the rest of his family stayed behind and waited.
Immediately thereafter, the family heard an explosion coming
from the direction where Reynaldo parked his car. Appellant and
Renevie got curious and proceeded to the parking lot. There,
they saw the Honda Accord burning, with Reynaldo lying beside
the driver's seat, burning, charred and bleeding profusely. A taxi
driver named Elmer Paug (Elmer) appeared and pulled Reynaldo
out of the car. Reynaldo was then rushed to the Cardinal Santos
Medical Hospital where he eventually died because of the severe
injuries he sustained. The underlying cause of his death was
Multiple Fracture & Multiple Vascular Injuries Secondary to Blast
Injury.
HELD: The testimonies of prosecution witnesses Janet and
Oswaldo clearly link appellant to the planning of the crime. True,
as intimated by appellant, she may not have been at the scene
of the crime at the time of the explosion; but then again, if she
was, then she would have suffered the same fate as Reynaldo.
Moreover, the nature of the crime and the manner of its
execution, i.e., via a booby trap, does not demand the physical
presence of the perpetrator at the very time of its commission.
In fact, the very manner in which it was carried out necessitated
prior scheming and execution for it to succeed. Thus, appellant's
absence from the actual scene of the crime does not negate
conspiracy with Rolando in plotting the death of her husband. A
conspiracy exists even if not all the parties committed the same
act, but the participants performed specific acts that indicated
unity of purpose in accomplishing a criminal design. Moreover,
direct proof of previous agreement to commit an offense is not
necessary to prove conspiracy conspiracy may be proven by
circumstantial evidence.

44

The testimonies of Janet and Oswaldo established the following

set of circumstances which, if taken collectively, show the guilt
of appellant: that appellant and Rolando conspired, planned and
agreed to kill Reynaldo using a grenade; that appellant
duplicated the key to the red Honda Accord of Reynaldo so that
Rolando could gain access to the car; that appellant thereafter
gave the duplicate key to Rolando; that on February 5, 1995,
appellant told Oswaldo to follow the red Honda Accord of
Reynaldo until the latter parked the car; that appellant told
Oswaldo to thereafter pick up Rolando at Katipunan and bring
the latter to where Reynaldo parked his red Honda Accord.
Reynaldo died soon after due to injuries he sustained from an
explosion caused by grenades planted in his car.
Another notable fact is that according to the expert opinion of
Inspector Selverio Dollesin, Chief of the Bomb Disposal Unit of
the Eastern Police District, the perpetrator had information
about the victim's movements. Dollesin also observed that the
perpetrator knew his intended victim, since the grenade was
specifically placed in between the driver's seat and the front
door. That the perpetrator knew the victim's movements was
further corroborated by the affidavits executed by the Tan
children, Renevie and Jag Carlo, attesting that while they spent
their Sundays with their father, this was the only time that they
spent a Sunday in Greenhills. Only someone who had close
personal contact with Reynaldo would know his movements,
where the car would be parked, and that he was the one who
usually drove the red Honda Accord, such that it was precisely
positioned to ensure damage to the intended victim.

Where there is no conspiracy

PP vs. GENSOLA
FACTS: Rufino Gensola was the driver, while Fidelina Tan and
Felicisimo Tan were the conductors, of a passenger truck. They
suspected Miguel Gayanilo of having punctured the tires of the
truck while it was parked in front of his carinderia. Passengers
overheard Fidelina Tan mutter to herself, obviously referring to
someone she did not name: "He does not appear because I will
kill him."
A day later, Miguel Gayanilo was crossing the street
from the public market in the direction of his carinderia with
Rufino Gensola, holding in his right hand a stone as big as a
man's fist, following closely behind. At this time, Felicisimo and
Fidelina Tan were standing in the middle of the street After
Miguel Gayanilo had crossed the middle of the street near the
two, Fidelina Tan shouted, "Rufino, strike him." Upon hearing the
shout Miguel looked back and Rufino suddenly struck him on the
left face with the stone. Felicisimo then struck Miguel with a
piece of iron on the back of the head causing serious wounds
and fracture of the skull. Not content with the two blows already
given, Fidelina struck Miguel with another piece of iron on the
left forehead causing serious wounds and fracture of the skull.
Miguel fell to the ground near the canal along the side of the
street. Rufino Gensola immediately left for his house situated on
Gonzales St. Felicisimo and Fidelina observed the prostrate body
for a few seconds until Fidelina muttered: "He is already dead."
The two then left the scene of the crime. The lower court found
the three defendants guilty as principals of the crime of murder.
HELD: Let us now consider the criminal liability of the three
appellants. The lower court found them guilty as principals of

the crime of murder on the assumption that there was

conspiracy among them. We do not agree, for the following
reasons: (1) Fidelina Tan's intention revealed by the words she
muttered to herself, "He does not appear because I will kill him,"
was not shared by Felicisimo Tan who kept silent. Silence is not a
circumstance indicating participation in the same criminal
design. With respect to Rufino Gensola, he was not even in the
truck at the time (2) When Miguel Gayanilo was crossing Gerona
St., it was only Rufino Gensola who followed closely behind
Fidelina Tan and Felicisimo Tan were in the middle of the street.
The words shouted by Fidelina Tan, "Rufino, strike him," were
meant as a command and did not show previous concert of
criminal design. (3) The blows given with pieces of iron on the
back of the head and on the forehead by Felicisimo and Fidelina
after Rufino had struck with a piece of stone the left face of
Miguel, do not in and by themselves show previous concert of
criminal design. Particularly when it is considered that Rufino
immediately left thereafter while Felicisimo and Fidelina
remained for a few seconds observing the prostrate body of
Miguel until Fidelina muttered, "He is already dead."
In the absence of conspiracy, the liability of the three appellants
is individual, that is, each appellant is liable only for his own act.
Appellant Rufino Gensola is liable only for the lacerated wounds
inflicted by him on the left face of Miguel Gayanilo.
Is appellant Fidelina Tan also liable for the offense considering
that she gave the command "Rufino, strike him"? The second
class of principals, according to Article 17 of the Revised Penal
Code, comprises "those who directly force or induce others to
commit it (the act)." Those who directly induce others to commit
the act are called "principals by inducement" or "principals by
induction," from the Spanish "autores por induccin." The word
"inducement" comprises, in the opinion of Viada and the
Supreme Court of Spain, reward, promise of reward, command,
and pacto. With respect to command, it must be the moving
cause of the offense. In the case at bar, the command shouted
by Fidelina, "Rufino, strike him," was not the moving cause of
the act of Rufino Gensola. The evidence shows that Rufino would
have committed the act of his own volition, even without said
words of command.

PP VS. PADRONES
FACTS: The victim was at the MGR Family Disco and Restaurant,
celebrating his birthday. Biare arrived thereafter and about ten
minutes later, Alex Padrones appeared. It seems that the two
had been old acquaintances who, up to then, had not seen each
other. The two apparently exchanged pleasantries, shook hands,
but separated immediately. Padrones sat at a table where he
met certain women while Biare sat alone on another table. The
victim then approached Padrones and apparently challenged
him to a fight. A brawl ensued where both Padrones and Sison
struggled in possession of a knife. A while later, the companions
of the victim ganged up on Padrones. Biare, all the while,
remained seated. When the dust settled and the lights went on,
Padrones lay crawling on the dis
co floor, bloodied and his
head bowed. According to Biare, Padrones had his hands raised
in surrender and he allegedly pleaded.Biare then allegedly
offered to bring him to a hospital, but the latter declined and
instead asked that he be brought home. What turned out,
however, is that while Padrones nursed his injuries, Lorenzo
Sison had also in fact been wounded, as a result also of a
knifing, although both Padrones and Biare denied harming him.

45
Meanwhile, Lorenzo Sison signed a handwritten statement in his
hospital bed to the Surallah police accusing Padrones of having
inflicted one stab wound on him. He also implicated Biare and
charged him with stabbing him once. He later on expired due to
respiratory failure and internal bleeding.
The star witness for the prosecution, Llaneta, testified that he
was involved in that brawl that he was one of those who ganged
up on Padrones. He testified that as he beat up Padrones, the
latter slipped out a knife and so did Biare. He allegedly retreated
whereupon, saw Padrones bury his knife on Sison. Dr. Velasquez,
testifying for the prosecution, added that the victim had been
stabbed by two different instruments, belonging to two different
persons, "or one person, if he changed his instrument. The trial
court found the existence of conspiracy and convicted both
accused of murder.
HELD: The trial judge portrays the accused-appellants' "chance
meeting" as an effort "to establish no conspiracy between them
took place." What he, the trial judge, loses sight of is the fact
that the accused were not called upon to discredit the
prosecution's theory of conspiracy. It was the prosecution's duty
to establish the existence of what the prosecution alleged to be
conspiracy.
The trial judge also expresses doubts whether or not the
accused, Joseph Biare, indeed just minded his own business
while the Sisons ganged up on his co-accused. "Would one
permit his friend molested," he inquired, "without raising a voice
of protest?" His rich imagination is fascinating, but that hardly
belongs to a judge. As Biare averred, he did come to the aid of
his co-accused, although after the damage had been done and
the latter lay battered on the ground. What the judge would
make out, however, from the defense's version is that either
Padrones or Biare merely contrived the whole yarn, and that the
melee never occurred at all (because as he states, if there
indeed was one, Biare would have allegedly stood up for a friend
in distress). But the very testimony of Antonio Llaneta, witness
for the prosecution, is arrayed against him, the latter having
admitted "that he boxed [sic] Alex [Padrones]."
Padrones' parting statement: "Diputa kamo, lenti kamo,
magkita-ay kita buas," and the fact that both accused left
together can not be accepted by the Court as a piece of
evidence of conspiracy. It has been held that conspiracy, like the
offense itself, must be shown to exist beyond reasonable
doubt. So also has it been held that conspiracy "transcends
companionship." Hence, the fact that the two accused may have
happened to leave together, and one of them left a closing
warning, can not instantly support a finding of conspiracy. The
prosecution is, in addition, hard put to adduce evidence
demonstrating facts that the parties had priorly come to an
agreement to commit the crime with which they are charged.
Although the act of agreeing need not be demonstrated,
evidence of the fact of agreement must nonetheless be
convincingly shown. The accused's acts after the fact, by
themselves, are inadequate to show that previous agreement.

Principal by Induction
PP VS. YANSON-DUMANCAS
FACTS: Of the 13 accused charged with Kidnapping for Ransom
with Murder of one Rufino Gargar, Jr., 3 accused were acquitted,

9 were convicted as principals and 1 accused was convicted as

accessory. On appeal, the Supreme Court acquitted 3 more
accused including Jeanette Yanson-Dumancas.
HELD: On the case of accused-appellant Jeanette YansonDumancas, the information charged her of the crime of
kidnapping for ransom with murder as principal by induction
together with her husband, Charles, who was found by the trial
court not guilty of the crime.
What the Court now has to examine is whether or not sufficient
evidence was adduced by the prosecution to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that Jeanette indeed performed any of the
following acts: (a) directly forcing the killers to commit the
crime, or (b) directly inducing them to commit the crime.
There are 2 ways of directly forcing another to commit a crime,
namely:
(i)
by
using irresistible
force,
or
(ii)
by
causing uncontrollable fear. Upon review of the testimony of all
the witnesses of the prosecution, we find nothing to conclude
that Jeanette used irresistible force or caused uncontrollable fear
upon the other accused-appellants. From the factual findings of
the trial court, it is patent that the plan to abduct and liquidate
the victims was hatched on August 5, 1992 (10:30 A.M.) without
Jeanette's involvement or participation whatsoever. The record
is entirely bereft of any evidence to show that Jeanette directly
forced the participants of the said meeting to come up with such
plan, by either using irresistible force or causing uncontrollable
fear. The only basis relied upon by the trial court in arriving at its
conclusion that Jeanette is guilty of the crime as principal by
inducement, is the supposed "commands" or order given by her
to accused-appellant Dominador Geroche on two occasions. By
no stretch of the imagination may these so-called "commands",
standing alone, be considered as constituting irresistible force or
causing uncontrollable fear.
Likewise, there are 2 ways of directly inducing another to
commit a crime, namely: (i) by giving a price, or
offering reward or promise, and (ii) by usingwords of command.
The Court finds no evidence, as did the trial court, to show that
Jeanette offered any price, reward, or promise to the rest of
accused-appellants should they abduct and later kill the victims
in this case. If at all, the prosecution witness mentioned the
name of Ricardo Yanson as having lent money to accusedappellant Col. Torres to be used for paying the latter's debts or
obligations. But definitely, no money ever came from Jeanette
herself. The trial court's surmise that the money delivered by
Ricardo Yanson to the group was with the knowledge and
approval of Jeanette is completely baseless.
The only matter left for consideration is whether the order
supposedly given by Jeanette to accused-appellant Geroche "to
take care of the two" constitutes words of command which may
be considered sufficient basis to convict Jeanette as principal by
inducement. prLL
In order that a person may be convicted as principal by
inducement, the following must be present: (1) the inducement
be made with the intention of procuring the commission of the
crime, and (2) such inducement be the determining cause of the
commission by the material executor. To constitute inducement,
there must exist on the part of the inducer the most positive
resolution and the most persistent effort to secure the
commission of the crime, together with the presentation to the
person induced of the very strongest kind of temptation to
commit the crime.

46
By the foregoing standards, the remark of Jeanette to "take care
of the two" does not constitute the command required by law to
justify a finding that she is guilty as a principal by inducement.
A chance word spoken without reflection, a wrong appreciation
of a situation, an ironical phrase, a thoughtless act, may give
birth to a thought of, or even a resolution to crime in the mind of
one for some independent reason predisposed thereto without
the one who spoke the word or performed the act having any
expectation that his suggestion would be followed or any real
intention that it produce the result. In such case, while the
expression was imprudent and the results of it grave in the
extreme, he (the one who spoke the word or performed the act)
would not be guilty of the crime committed."
Furthermore, the utterance which was supposedly the act of
inducement, should precede the commission of the crime itself.
In the case at bar, the abduction, which is an essential element
of the crime charged (kidnapping for ransom with murder) has
already taken place when Jeanette allegedly told accusedappellant Geroche to "take care of the two." Said utterance
could, therefore, not have been the inducement to commit the
crime charged in this case.
Most importantly, it was duly proven by no less than the
prosecution witness himself, Moises Grandeza, that the intention
of Jeanette was but to allow the law to its course.

Principal by Indispensible Cooperation

PP VS. CARIAGA
FACTS: The victim Ernesto de Guzman, Sr. confided to his
brother, Balbino de Guzman, that appellants Cosme and Nestor
Carriaga were grabbing his land and that they threatened to kill
him. Ernesto became the object of their ire since he started to
improve the river as a source of livelihood. On one occasion, the
appellants Carriaga brothers told Ernesto not to continue
working the area or else something might happen to him and his
family. Appellant Ben Palis accused Ernesto of informing the
police that the Carriaga brothers owned guns.
On the night of December 3, 1933, accused-appellants
proceeded to the house of the victim. The wife of the accused
testified that she then saw appellants Cosme and Nestor, each
holding a bolo, and Palis, standing by the door, with both hands
placed at his back. Nestor and Cosme went directly to where
Ernesto was sleeping and immediately began hacking him. Both
the wife and the son of the victim escaped from the house for
fear. As they were escaping, they heard a vehicle approaching.
Thinking that the killers might have boarded the same, they hid
among the tall grasses. When they peeped, they saw the three
appellants in the front seat of a blue passenger jeepney. After
the vehicle passed, the two continued to run until they reached
the poblacion.

HELD: Conspiracy having been established, the Court deems it

necessary to distinguish the nature of the participation of
appellants Nestor, Cosme and Palis. in the commission of a
crime by two or more persons, those who take direct
participation are principals by direct participation; those who
directly force or induce others to commit the crime are
principals by induction; while those who cooperate in the
commission of the crime by another act without which the
commission of the offense would not have been accomplished
are principals by indispensable cooperation under paragraph 3
of Article 17.
In the present case, it is clear that appellants Nestor and Cosme
are principals by direct participation. Both of them with the
same purpose and design hacked Ernesto repeatedly to kill the
victim.
The question is: What is the nature of participation of appellant
Palis? It is an established fact borne by the prosecution evidence
that the three appellants went inside the house of Ernesto
without prior notice or permission from the occupants of the
house; that appellant Palis merely stood by the door of the
house while his co-appellants hacked Ernesto to death; that he
left the scene of the crime together with the other appellants;
and that they were altogether found riding in a jeepney and
arrested by the police. That Palis just stood by the door without
saying anything cannot therefore be considered as a mere
passive presence that would have negated his participation as a
conspirator. However, there are no other facts established by
the prosecution that would prove beyond reasonable doubt that
appellant Palis committed acts in the killing of Ernesto that
would categorize him as a principal by induction, by direct
participation or by indispensable cooperation. What is certain
from the facts established by the prosecution, is that he had the
same purpose and design as the other appellants as shown by
the fact that he went inside the house of the victim, uninvited
and unannounced together with his co-appellants Nestor and
Cosme who were armed with bolos; and that after the hacking,
he left the house together with appellants Nestor and Cosme
and rode a jeepney together.
In such case, we apply our ruling in People vs. Ubia where we
held that when an accused does not fall under any of the three
concepts defined in Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code, he
may only be considered guilty as an accomplice.

Penalties
PEOPLE VS. LUCAS
FACTS: In the decision in this case, the First Division touched on
the nature of the penalty of reclusion perpetua in the light of
Section 21 of R.A. No. 7659 which amended Article 27 of the
Revised Penal Code by specifically fixing the duration
of reclusion perpetua at twenty (20) years and one (1) day to
forty (40) years. It opined that since no corresponding
amendment to Article 76 of the Revised Penal Code was made,
the said law has not made explicit an intention to
convert reclusion perpetua into a divisible penalty. Nevertheless,
it applied Article 65 of the Revised Penal Code and stated:
"Accordingly, the time included in the
penalty of reclusion perpetua (twenty [20]
years and one [1] day to forty [40] years)
can be divided into three equal portions
with each composing a period. The periods
of reclusion perpetua would then be as
follows:

47
minimum20 years and 1 day to
26 years and 8 months
PDEA V. BRODETT
medium26 years, 8 months and
1 day to 33 years and 4 months
maximum34 years, 4 months
and 1 day to 40 years.
Taking into account the presence of the
aggravating circumstance of relationship in
Criminal Case No. Q-91-18465, the
accused may finally be sentenced to thirtyfour (34) years, from (4) months and one
(1) day of reclusion perpetua."
In a motion for clarification seasonably filed by the appellee on
28 June 1994 which was not opposed by the accused-appellant
in his comment, the appellee asks the Court to correct the
duration of the maximum period of reclusion perpetua from
thirty-four (34) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to forty
(40) years, as stated in the decision, to thirty-three (33) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day to forty (40) years.
HELD: After deliberating on the motion and re-examining the
legislative history of R.A. No. 7659, the Court concludes that
although Section 17 of R.A No. 7659 has fixed the duration
of reclusion perpetua from twenty (20) years and one (1) day to
forty (40) years, there was no clear legislative intent to alter its
original classification as an indivisible penalty. [I]f reclusion
perpetua was reclassified as a divisible penalty, then Article 63
of the Revised Penal Code would lose its reason and basis for
existence. To illustrate, the first paragraph of Section 20 of the
amended R.A. No. 6425 provides for the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death whenever the dangerous drugs involved are
of any of the quantities stated therein. If Article 63 of the Code
were no longer applicable because reclusion perpetua is
supposed to be a divisible penalty, then there would be no
statutory
rules
for
determining
when
either reclusion
perpetua or death should be the imposable penalty. In fine,
there would be no occasion for imposing reclusion perpetuaas
the penalty in drug case, regardless of the attendant modifying
circumstances.
This problem revolving around the non-applicability of the rules
in Article 63 assumes serious proportions since it does not
involve only drug cases, as aforesaid. Under the amendatory
sections of R.A. No. 7659, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death is also imposed on treason by a Filipino (Section 2),
qualified piracy (Section 3), parricide (Section 5), murder
(Section 6), kidnapping and serious illegal detention (Section 8),
robbery with homicide (Section 9), destructive arson (Section
10), rape committed under certain circumstances (Section 11),
and plunder (Section 12). Now then, if Congress had intended
to reclassify reclusion perpetua as a divisible penalty, then it
should have amended Article 63 and Article 76 of the Revised
Penal Code. The latter is the law on what are considered
divisible penalties under the Code and what should be the
duration of the periods thereof. There are, as well, other
provisions of the Revised Penal Code involving reclusion
perpetua, such as Article 41 on the accessory penalties thereof
and paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 61, which have not been
touched by a corresponding amendment. What then may be the
reason for the amendment fixing the duration of reclusion
perpetua? The deliberations in the Bicameral Conference
Committee and in both Chambers of Congress do not enlighten
us on this, except the cryptic statement of Senator Tolentino
adverted to above on the elimination of the "new penalty" of life
imprisonment by the Bicameral conference Committee. It may
however, be pointed out that although the Revised Penal Code
did not specify the maximum of reclusion perpetua, it is
apparent that the maximum period for the service of this
penalty shall not exceed forty (40) years. At most then, in fixing
a specific duration for reclusion perpetua Section 21 of R.A. No.
7659 merely restated the existing jurisprudence.

FACTS: Richard Brodett and Jorge Joseph

were
charged with a violation of Section 5, in relation to
Section 26 (b), of Republic Act No. 9165 otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act in the Regional Trial
Court in Muntinlupa City. Likewise, the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa City; filed another
information charging only Brodett with a violation of
Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165.
Brodett
filed
a Motion
to
Return
Non-Drug
Evidence. He averred that during his arrest, PDEA had
seized several personal non-drug effects from him,
including a 2004 Honda Accord car with license plate
no. XPF-551; and that PDEA refused to return his
personal effects despite repeated demands for their
return.
The Office of the City Prosecutor objected to the return
of the car because it appeared to be the instrument in
the commission of the violation of Section 5 of R.A. No.
9165 due to its being the vehicle used in the
transaction of the sale of dangerous drugs. The RTC
directed the release of the car.
PDEA contend that Brodetts Motion to Return Non-Drug
Evidence did not intimate or allege that the car had belonged to
a third person; and that even if the car had belonged to Ms.
Brodett, a third person, her ownership did not ipso
facto authorize its release, because she was under the
obligation to prove to the RTC that she had no knowledge of the
commission of the crime.
HELD:
It is undisputed that the ownership of the confiscated car
belonged to Ms. Brodett, who was not charged either in
connection with the illegal possession and sale of illegal drugs
involving Brodett and Joseph that were the subject of the
criminal proceedings in the RTC, or even in any other criminal
proceedings.
The Court agrees with the finding of the CA that:
A careful reading of the above provision
shows
that confiscation
and
forfeiture in drug-related cases pertains
to "all the proceeds and properties
derived from the unlawful act, including
but not limited to, money and other
assets obtained
thereby,
and the
instruments or tools with which the
particular
unlawful
act
was
committed unless
they
are
the
property of a third person not liable
for the unlawful act." Simply put, the
law exempts from the effects of
confiscation
and
forfeiture
any
property that is owned by a third
person who is not liable for the
unlawful act.
Here, it is beyond dispute that the Honda
Accord subject of this petition is owned
by and registered in the name of Myra

48
S. Brodett, not accused Richard
Brodett. Also, it does not appear from the
records of the case that said Myra S.
Brodett has been charged of any crime,
more particularly, in the subject cases of
possession and sale of dangerous drugs.
Applying Section 20 of the law to the
dispute at bar, We therefore see no cogent
reason why the subject Honda Accord may
not be exempted from confiscation and
forfeiture.
Even PDEA has itself pointed out, that the text of Section 20 of
R.A. No. 9165 relevant to the confiscation and forfeiture of the
proceeds or instruments of the unlawful act is similar to that of
Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that Such
proceeds and instruments or tools shall be confiscated and
forfeited in favor of the Government, unless they be the
property of a third person not liable for the offense, but
those articles which are not subject of lawful commerce shall be
destroyed.
To bar the forfeiture of the tools and instruments belonging to a
third person, therefore, there must be an indictment charging
such third person either as a principal, accessory, or accomplice.
Less than that will not suffice to prevent the return of the tools
and instruments to the third person, for a mere suspicion of that
person's participation is not sufficient ground for the court to
order the forfeiture of the goods seized.
However, the Court also agrees with PDEA and the Office of the
City Prosecutor that the release was premature:
We note that the RTC granted accused Brodett's Motion to
Return Non-Drug Evidence on November 4, 2009 when the
criminal proceedings were still going on, and the trial was yet to
be completed. Ordering the release of the car at that point of
the proceedings was premature, considering that the third
paragraph
of
Section
20, supra,
expressly
forbids
the disposition, alienation, or transfer of any property, or income
derived therefrom, that has been confiscated from the accused
charged under R.A. No. 9165 during the pendency of the
proceedings in the Regional Trial Court. Section 20 further
expressly requires that such property or income derived
therefrom should remain in custodia legis in all that time and
that no bond shall be admitted for the release of it.
Indeed, forfeiture, if warranted pursuant to either Article 45 of
the Revised Penal Code and Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165, would
be a part of the penalty to be prescribed. The determination of
whether or not the car (or any other article confiscated in
relation to the unlawful act) would be subject of forfeiture could
be made only when the judgment was to be rendered in the
proceedings. Section 20 is also clear as to this.
The status of the car (or any other article confiscated in relation
to the unlawful act) for the duration of the trial in the RTC as
being in custodia legis is primarily intended to preserve it as
evidence and to ensure its availability as such. To release it
before the judgment is rendered is to deprive the trial court and
the parties access to it as evidence.

We rule that henceforth the Regional Trial Courts shall

comply strictly with the provisions of Section 20 of R.A.
No. 9165, and should not release articles, whether
drugs or non-drugs, for the duration of the trial and
before the rendition of the judgment, even if owned by
a third person who is not liable for the unlawful act.

PP VS. MATEO
FACTS: Accused-appellant was convicted of ten counts
rape. The trial court imposed the penalty of death.
HELD: While the Fundamental Law requires a
mandatory review by the Supreme Court of cases
where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life
imprisonment, or death, nowhere, however, has it
proscribed an intermediate review. If only to ensure
utmost circumspection before the penalty of
death,reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment is
imposed, the Court now deems it wise and compelling
to provide in these cases a review by the Court of
Appeals before the case is elevated to the Supreme
Court. Where life and liberty are at stake, all possible
avenues to determine his guilt or innocence must be
accorded an accused, and no care in the evaluation of
the facts can ever be overdone. A prior determination
by the Court of Appeals on, particularly, the factual
issues, would minimize the possibility of an error of
judgment. If the Court of Appeals should affirm the
penalty
of
death, reclusion
perpetua or
life
imprisonment, it could then render judgment imposing
the corresponding penalty as the circumstances so
warrant, refrain from entering judgment and elevate
the entire records of the case to the Supreme Court for
its final disposition.
Procedural matters, first and foremost, fall more squarely within
the rule-making prerogative of the Supreme Court than the lawmaking power of Congress. The rule here announced
additionally allowing an intermediate review by the Court of
Appeals, a subordinate appellate court, before the case is
elevated to the Supreme Court on automatic review, is such a
procedural matter.
Pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure,
more particularly Section 3 and Section 10 of Rule 122, Section
13 of Rule 124, Section 3 of Rule 125, and any other rule insofar
as they provide for direct appeals from the Regional Trial Courts
to the Supreme Court in cases where the penalty imposed is
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, as well as the
resolution of the Supreme Court en banc, dated 19 September
1995, in "Internal Rules of the Supreme Court" in cases similarly
involving the death penalty, are to be deemed modified
accordingly.
WHEREFORE, the instant case is REMANDED, and all pertinent
records thereof ordered to be FORWARDED, to the Court of
Appeals for appropriate action and disposition, consistent with
the discussions hereinabove set forth. No costs.

PEOPLE V. DE LOS SANTOS

FACTS: The accused was charged with the crimes of
Multiple Murder, Multiple Frustrated Murder, and
Multiple Attempted Murder in an information filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City for
having run over with a vehicle, several members of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) who were undergoing
an "endurance run" as part of the Special Counter
Insurgency Operation Unit Training.

49
HELD: Considering that the incident was not a product of a
malicious intent but rather the result of a single act of reckless
driving, GLENN should be held guilty of the complex crime of
reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide with serious
physical injuries and less serious physical injuries.
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when the
single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies,
or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the
other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed,
the same to be applied in its maximum period. Since Article 48
speaks of felonies, it is applicable to crimes through negligence
in view of the definition of felonies in Article 3 as "acts or
omissions punishable by law" committed either by means of
deceit (dolo) or fault (culpa).
The slight physical injuries caused by GLENN to the ten other
victims through reckless imprudence, would, had they been
intentional, have constituted light felonies. Being light felonies,
which are not covered by Article 48, they should be treated and
punished as separate offenses. Separate informations should
have, therefore, been filed.
It must be noted that only one information (for multiple murder,
multiple frustrated murder and multiple attempted murder) was
filed with the trial court. However, nothing appears in the record
that GLENN objected to the multiplicity of the information in a
motion to quash before his arraignment. Hence, he is deemed to
have waived such defect. Under Section 3, Rule 120 of the
Rules of Court, when two or more offenses are charged in a
single complaint or information and the accused fails to object
to it before trial, the court may convict the accused of as many
offenses as are charged and proved, and impose on him the
penalty for each of them.
Now, we come to the penalty. Under Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code, any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall
commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute
a grave felony shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period;
and if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty
of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed. The
last paragraph thereof provides that the penalty next higher in
degree shall be imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on
the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in his hand
to give. This failure to render assistance to the victim, therefore,
constitutes a qualifying circumstance because the presence
thereof raises the penalty by one degree. Moreover, the fifth
paragraph thereof provides that in the imposition of the penalty,
the court shall exercise its sound discretion without regard to
the rules prescribed in Article 64. Elsewise stated, in felonies
through imprudence or negligence, modifying circumstances
need not be considered in the imposition of the penalty.
In the case at bar, it has been alleged in the information and
proved during the trial that GLENN "escaped from the scene of
the incident, leaving behind the victims." It being crystal clear
that GLENN failed to render aid to the victims, the penalty
provided for under Article 365 shall be raised by one degree.
Hence, for reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide
with serious physical injuries and less serious physical injuries,
the penalty would be prision correccional in its maximum period
to prision mayor in its medium period. Applying Article 48, the
maximum of said penalty, which is prision mayor in its medium
period, should be imposed. For the separate offenses of reckless
imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries, GLENN may be
sentenced to suffer, for each count, the penalty of arresto
mayor in its minimum period.
Although it was established through the testimonies of
prosecution witness Lemuel Pangca and of GLENN that the latter
surrendered to Governor Emano of Misamis Oriental, such
mitigating circumstance need not be considered pursuant to the
aforestated fifth paragraph of Article 365.

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, GLENN may

be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty whose
minimum is within the range of the penalty next lower
in degree to that prescribed for the offense, and whose
maximum is that which could properly be imposed
taking into account the modifying circumstances.
Hence, for the complex crime of reckless imprudence
resulting in multiple homicide with serious physical
injuries and less serious physical injuries, qualified by
his failure to render assistance to the victims, he may
be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty
ranging from arresto mayor in its maximum period
to prision correccional in its medium period, as
minimum, to prision mayor in its medium period, as
maximum. As to the crimes of reckless imprudence
resulting in slight physical injuries, since the maximum
term for each count is only two months the
Indeterminate Sentence Law will not apply.

PP VS. CELINO
FACTS: Two separate informations were filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Roxas City charging petitioner with
violation of Section 2 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 6446 (gun
ban), and Section 1, Paragraph 2 of Republic Act No. (R.A.)
8294 (illegal possession of firearm).
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the gun ban
violation charge. Prior to his arraignment, petitioner filed a
Motion to Quash contending that he "cannot be prosecuted for
illegal possession of firearms . . . if he was also charged of
having committed another crime of violating the Comelec gun
ban under the same set of facts.
Petitioner, citing Agote v. Lorenzo, People v. Ladjaalam, and
other similar cases, 25 contends that the mere filing of an
information for gun ban violation against him necessarily bars
his prosecution for illegal possession of firearm.
The trial court denied the Motion to Quash hence the present
petition.
HELD: The accused can be convicted of illegal possession of
firearms, provided no other crime was committed by the person
arrested. Petitioner's reliance on Agote, Ladjaalam, Evangelista,
Garcia, Pangilinan, Almeida, and Bernal iscmisplaced. In each
one of these cases, the accused were exonerated of illegal
possession of firearms because of their commission, as shown
by their conviction, of some other crime. In the present case,
however, petitioner has only been accused of committing a
violation of the COMELEC gun ban. As accusation is not
synonymous with guilt, there is yet no showing that petitioner
did in fact commit the other crime charged.
In sum, when the other offense involved is one of those
enumerated under R.A. 8294, any information for illegal
possession of firearm should be quashed because the illegal
possession of firearm would have to be tried together with such
other offense, either considered as an aggravating circumstance
in murder or homicide, or absorbed as an element of rebellion,
insurrection, sedition or attempted coup d'etat. Conversely,
when the other offense involved is not one of those enumerated
under R.A. 8294, then the separate case for illegal possession of
firearm should continue to be prosecuted.

50
PP VS. REYNES

FACTS: For shooting one Claro Bernardino to death, appellant

Celso was convicted of murder aggravated by treachery. He was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of death and hence, this appeal.
HELD: The Court sustained the conviction of appellant for the
crime of murder, it ruled that the penalty imposed should be
reduced to reclusion perpetua. Murder exists when one of the
circumstances described in Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by RA 7659, is present. When more than one
of said circumstances is proven, the others must be considered
as generic aggravating. However, when the other circumstances
are absorbed or included in one qualifying circumstance, they
can not be considered as generic aggravating. Certainly, once a
circumstance is used to qualify a crime, the same could no
longer be considered as generic aggravating. Since treachery
qualified the commission of the crime to murder, this
circumstance could no longer be appreciated anew as a generic
aggravating circumstance to warrant the imposition of the
supreme penalty of death.
The penalty for the crime of murder is reclusion perpetua to
death. The two penalties being both indivisible, and there being
neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the
commission of the deed, the lesser of the two penalties should
be applied pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 63 of the
Revised Penal Code.