THE LANGUAGE

OF DEMONSTRATION:
AND THE FORMATION
TRANSLATING
SCIENCE
OF TERMINOLOGY
IN ARABIC PHILOSOPHY
AND SCIENCE
ENDRESS
Universityof Bochum

GERHARD

The language of philosophy

and the sciences illuminates
the links,
or even constitutes
the common denominator,
between the intelof the Mediterranean
world-the
Near East,
lectual traditions
North Africa, Southern
and Northern
between
the
Europe-and
who
revived
and
transformed
the
of
received,
heritage
peoples
Ancient Greece. After the decline of the ancient languages of erudition and commerce,
the translators created a common system of
reference which until today renders possible-in
spite of the protand otherness-a
estations of autonomy
dialogue over the essential questions
of the human condition,
between speakers of the
Iranian and AraRomance,
Germanic,
languages,
Indo-European
and
a
between
bic,
Muslims;
Jews, Christians,
dialogue where the
words may differ but in the context of science and its conventions
continue to convey the same concepts sustained by a coherent tradition of teaching and textual transmission.
l. Language

and the rise of demonstrative science in Arabic Islamic society

Demonstrative
univocal
and unambiguous
language-terms,
definition
and
the
well-formed
formulas of
convention;
through
and
mathematical
the
proof
logical syllogism;
pragmatic signals of
and
to
linguistic
operators
literary genres-is
convey universal
concepts. But words, in science as in literature and everyday usage,
have their own fortunes. We cannot take their net contents at face
the technical
value. In each individual
term is constilanguage,
on
the
one
the
convention
tuted,
hand, by
(islillih) in Arabic, the
of
and scientists,
Aristotelian
the
of
scholars
community
syntheke,
of
the
other
scientific or
participants
philosophic,
professional
in a system of crossdiscourse. On the other hand, it is embedded
linked connotations
which differ from language to language. Lan-

232
so is the technical term, albeit its primary imguage is metaphor;
be
and
has carried
age
forgotten
ignored after the meta-meaning
the day, when the symbolical content will determine
the semantic
of the term in its new linguistic environment.
development
Consider the field of causation: 'Cause', the Latin causa, has to
do with the legal 'case' of litigation; so has the Arabic cilla, in this
a loan-word from the Aramaic (as against `illa,
specific meaning
'defect, disease'). But the Arabic sabab, competing with cilla for the
favours of the falasifa to denote the same concept, takes its primary
meaning from the 'rope' used to tie the tent-pole to its hook or
peg in the ground.
In many cases, the grid of semantic
fields linking the words
or
created
the
scientific
is incommensuraby
community
adopted
ble with the network of the original concepts,
conveyed by the
words found and counterfeited
of the sources.
by the translators
Within new contexts and new associations,
words will carry new
concepts. This will lead to linguistic change. Detached from their
social and cultural origins, words show a tendency to lead a life of
their own. Some will grow prominent,
to become anchors or catchwords in a set of terms implying a system of concepts; others will
fall into oblivion. This independence
of the semanor autonomy
tic development
is restricted,
on the other hand, by the special
conventions
If we
imposed by the closed circle of an institution.
as a frame providing its members with
may define an institution
and rules of discourse, and of other potentials
the conditions
of
of
social interaction,
is
one
the
basic
constituents
of
terminology
all institutions
founded
on the transmission
of knowledge-relior literary in the widest sense of paradigmatic
gious, scientific,
In distinction
communication.
from the signs, verbal or non-verwhich
even
in
informal
communication
bal,
may be limiting access
to outsiders, the terminology
of the scholars will achieve this delimitation explicitly and rigorously, denying access to the uninitiated. Terminology
is exclusive, and at the same time inclusive; like
the very institution it serves, it renders possible the communication
the univocity, disambiguity
of
among its members,
safeguarding
and
the
of
doctrinal
but
at
transmission,
interchange
continuity
the same time reducing
the permeability
the
of
among
groups
between schools of teaching;
society: horizontally,
vertically, between layers of society.
In the initial formative period of a scientific community
in Is-

233
lam, starting from the late second century of the Higra, we can
observe the beginning
interaction,
though marginal and tentative,
of concurrent
intellectual
traditions: a dual scientific tradition deof sources where the Greek Helpending on different inventories
lenistic sources gradually
the Iranian ones. On the
superseded
with Hellenized
other side, inspired
by theological
controversy
of the lawyer-rheand influenced
Christianity,
by the heritage
torician in disputation
and reasoning,
the schools of rationalist
of creational
(Kalam) , and of law, developed
concepts
theology
and
methods
of
those of
metaphysics
emulating
legal reasoning
their opponents.
This process of interaction
and conflict between two concurrent
and conflicting
modes of intellectual
discourse found its first participating and critical observer in the mutakallim al-Gahiz (d. 869),
of translation,
and appropriation
when the movement
adaptation
of the Hellenistic sciences was brought to its first culmination.
aland homme de lettres, who represented
the omGahiz, theologian
nivorous curiosity of his period, was a reader of the translations
of
Persian and Greek sources made available by his contemporaries;
at the same time, he was part of the movement
of rationalist theowhile
a
of the true faith,
rationalist
defence
logians who,
building
the
were united against
pressure group of traditionists
aspiring to
sole authority in guarding, interpreting
and applying the revealed
law; and finally, he was one of the principal builders of adab, courteous erudition,
which was to comprise the full multilingual
and
multicultural
of
the
bilad
al-Islam.
this
catholic
heritage
Against
moveview, adab was being gradually restricted by the traditionist
ment to the hermeneutics
of the 'Arabiyya (vide al-Gahiz's younger
Ibn Qutayba, d. 889). But this process was still in the
antipode,
making. al-Gahiz, while pouring scorn and disdain upon the translators because their Arabic was bad, continued
to read Aristotle.
His contemporary
al-Kindi (d. after 865), a scientist of Arab origin,
commissioner
of some of the translations
criticised by al-Gahiz,
undertook
to defend
his science-the
of
system and method
Greek natural philosophy
and Hellenistic
science-as
the
being
best defence of the Muslim creed, the tazuhad Allah ( `There is no
god but the [one] God'), and at the same time, took sides with the
Arabs against the courtly elite of the Iranians and their political
claims. In the long run, the professional
of astronomy
practicians
and astrology who in the first decades of the 'Abbasid caliphate

234
the sources of the Iranian
tradition
in the
guarding
the
Hizanat
were
also
to
al-hikma,
obliged
depend
Caliphal library,
(as is evident, e. g., in the astrology of Abu
upon Greek Hellenism
and
soon
came
to grasp for the richer resources
of the
Ma Car),
direct Greek tradition
and its Western Aramaic intermediaries.
into prestigious
Learned
transmission
and lucrative
developed
professionalism;
professional
language was its primary tool.
The translators who since the time of al-Mansur had been workfor the professional
ing on commission
groups of physicians and
scientists and for their sponsors in the courts and the echelons of
and a style
higher administration,
forged a coherent
terminology
of technical presentation
for each of their individual fields, lines
of tradition,
and competing
groups. As early as during the caliof
al-Mahdi,
phate
rivalry developed on a big scale: in hunting for
sources partly available, partly sunken and lost; and in offering to
of the crafts and sciences translations
the practicians
into Arabic
in the first
the
market
of
still
non-Arabs,
(and-for
significant
into
clear, precise and unamperiod-into
Syriac Aramaic),
put
biguous language. The progress they made in attaining this goal,
and the results of their efforts accompanied
the formation
of inand professional
tellectual groups and learned tradition,
schools
of basic texts considered
as
vying with one another. The reception
led
authoritative
such
to
the
simultaneous
concurrence,
by
groups
and successive, of Arabic versions of such texts. This again led to
the formation
of alternative
sets of terminologies,
gradually conof the
verging, and finally integrated
along with the integration
rational sciences into Muslim scholasticism.
had

been

2. The elements of demonstrative language

The literature of Hellenistic science, in the original Greek and in
Aramaic and Persian translations,
provided a full instrumentarium
of terms, paradigms and genres. The transposition
of these means
of expression
into analogous structures of Arabic was achieved by
various groups of translators,
and successively, in
simultaneously
several stages, and using different methods. We have to consider
three levels of discourse, (a) single words and syntagmas, (b) pragmatical phraseology,
and (c) genres of exposition and instruction.
On each level, discourse analysis of scientific writing must take into

235
traditions
regard different
1
and
usage.'
ceptualisation

of philosophical

and

scientific

con-

2.1. Terminology
In terminology,
we observe several methods used for the transposition and also-in
the subsequent
accomprocess of integration,
of
the
founders
Islamic
in
its
plished by
philosophy
proper sense
creation
the
of terms.
(al-Farabi, Ibn Sina)-for
1. Functional: The primitive, but (even in the first period of Arabic translations)
of funcby no means predominant
procedure
tional transposition
is that of the adoption
of loan-words-words
or borrowed,
with little modification,
from the source
adopted
from
loan-translations,
i.e.,
language-and
expressions
adopted
the source through translating
its semantic elements more or less
shells for the conliterally ( `calque' ) . These serve as functional
the
and
respective disciplines
systems.
cepts defined by
Some Greek loan-words had been current in Syriac, whence they
were adopted into Arabic: Greek hyle 'matter', Arabic hayuld (from
a Syriac transliteration
where yw represents
Greek y) ; Greek stoiArabic ustuquss. Some transliterated
terms were
cheion 'element',
of
with
an
Arabic
for
the
sake
coupled
equivalent
clarity, while the
Arabic word in itself was not deemed sufficiently specific as a technical term: taqs 'order', from Greek txis, appears in the syntagmas
taqs wa-martaba, taqs wa-arft (to be replaced soon by Arabic nizam).
But many of the ad hoc transliterations
of the early translations
fell
from use as soon as Arabic equivalents
gained acceptance,
except
terms figuring as titles of some parts of the Aristotelian
encycloin analogy to the parapaedia, or those naturalised
completely
digms of Arabic morphology:
safsata for the Sophistica, and falsafa,
from the more general Arabic
Greek philosophia, in distinction
'wise
'wisdom'.
4zkma, originally
saying',
like loan-words,
function
as shells for the
Loan-translations,
to represent:
From the root nataqa
they are appointed
concepts
the basic meaning of Greek lgein, are formed
'speak', translating
and mantiq 'logic'. In algebra,
natiq, for Greek logik6s 'rational',
Greek dnasthai (par ) 'to be equivalent with respect of the value
I A few
examples must suffice in the present context. For references and a
more detailed inventory including examples, see my article "Die Entwicklung der
Fachsprache", in W. Fischcr & H. Gatje (eds.), Grundiij3der arabischenPhilologie,3
vols. (Wiesbaden, 1982-1992), 3: 3-23.

236
of the square (to)' is a calque for the Arabic qawiya (`ala). While
these are semantically
of the Arabic words,
plausible applications
like
for
Euclid's
katatom kan6nos
transpositions
qanun guz' al-ta-'Iif
must have been incomprehensible
except to the experts of musical
theory.
From the earliest
of scientific
2. Paradigmatical:
reception
Arabic words were applied to
indigenous
professional
language,
technical concepts by analogy, extension or specification
of the inherent metaphors,
concrete
abstract univerimages representing
sals.
gawhar (from the Persian, jewel') never had a serious competitor as a term for 'substance'
(Greek oysia), even though the Iranian Ibn al-Muqaffa' used a different-Arabic-word
in his early
of
the
'the
itself'.
We already
rendering
Organon: Cayn 'eye',
thing
for
encountered
'cause'.
Arabic
sur
sabab, 'rope',
'wall, limit' is
used for the prosdiorismos 'quantifier
a
[of
proposition's
subject]'.
with the early group of translators
around al-Kindi,
Beginning
we observe the triumph of abstraction
In
by semantic derivation.
abstract
terms
from
such
of
the
common
landeriving
metaphors
is mainly achieved by two procedures:
guage, abstraction
The formation
of the verbal noun, masdar, is used to con[i]
vey the universal as a process.
of abstract
[ii] Derived from the concreta by the formation
nouns based on the relative adjective (-! > -iyya), the abstract is in
its turn hypostatized
('verdinglicht').
On the one side, we find qiyas 'taking measure'
> 'analogy',
>
'abstraction',
tagnd 'stripping, peeling'
idafa 'putting next to one
another' >
'relation',
?M<2?Mr'picturing, imagining' >
'conception',
as true' > judgment'.
On the other hand, a long
tasdaq 'declaring
of neologisms
repertory
appears in which abstract nouns are derived from pronouns
and particles with the Arabic nisba suffix, as
from ma 'what?', kayfiyya 'quality' from kayfa
mahiyya 'quiddity'
into
mediaeval Latin by the twelfth-century
trans'how?', imported
lators.
Both procedures
are equated as to their semantic content by alin
his
of 'being', startFarabi
impressive analysis of the terminology
to the
that Arabic has no equivalent
ing from the observation
Greek estin, the Persian hast, etc. (K. al-Hurffi ed. Mahdi, 112f.).
universals and of
The concepts of being qua being, of ontological
the categories, offered immense difficulties for which no uniform
solutions were found. Our translators developed a whole system of

237
to provide for the different
usages of Greek einai, Arabic
having no copula to indicate the predicate of existence: anniyya for
Greek to einai, to ti en einai 'to be, being, essence', huwiyya for to 6n
'being' (part. praes.), aysa versus laysa for 'being' versus 'non-being', and dhat for 'essence'. In the case of huzuiyya, an Arabic word
derived from a Syriac root hwa 'to be, become',
the apparent Arabic etymology from huwa ('he, it'), replacing the copula in a nominal clause ('A, it [is] B') gave way to a new semantic development
While this was a system of concurring
words,
('essence, identity').
none of which was well defined, it was superseded
a
by
system of
derivatives of a single Arabic root: wujud 'to be found'. Here, as in
other cases, the competition
between terms mirrored
the competition between translators.
of the pro3. Syntagmatical:
Simple, descriptive approximations
cessual or syntagmatical
elements of the concepts conveyed by a
not recognised
as preggiven term sometimes yielded expressions
nant renderings
of the underlying
and were discarded
terminology
in the usage of demonstrative
discourse, to be replaced by more
terms.
But
while
the
Arabic
mathematicians
had, from a
adequate
of
scientific
worked
of terms,
out
sets
fairly early stage
writing, fully
for
and
the
axioms
and
deductions
of
e.g.,
describing
deducing
the
had
not.
geometry,
philosophers
It is striking, for example,
that the translator
of Aristotle's
De
the concept
of analogia, using Arabic
canto is unable to render
and the verb ashbaha 'be similar' instead, and
iqtiran 'conjunction'
that in some of the Neoplatonic
texts, the crucial concept of mtha
exis is rendered
occasionally by simple fi 'in', 'A is in B' meaning
'A
in B', in other instances by expressions
with
that
participates
innayl 'taking', istfida 'making use of'. The degree of abstraction
volved here was mastered by the translators only after the philosophers had paved the way.
For the sake of univocity, even the concreta of natural designations were given up in favour of a 'scientific',
syntagmatic
paraof the term is specified
its
phrase, where the meaning
through
in
an
of
or
triads.
position
array
oppositional
pairs
Scientific terminology
replaced Arabic simplicia by binary syntagmas : Cirq 4Czn*b'artery' instead of iryan (from the Syriac), requiring the analogous
Cirq gayr darib 'vein' (Gr. phlebs).The early na't
for
Greek
'description'
kategoria goes together with hamil 'bearer'
for the substrate, Greek hypokeimenon. The 'scientific' maqula, 'predicate', derived from the root q-w-l 'to say' as Greek katigoria from
terms

238
kategoren, required a different set of terms where
was Arabic m<zzudu` 'posited [as a substrate]'.
2.2. Expository rhetoric and demonstrative
mathematics
and philosophy
2.2.1. Paradigmatic

the hypokeimenon

discourse

in

and demonstrative science

In his Commentary on Plato:5 Timaeus, Proclus (412-485),

one of the
of the school of Athens in the fifth cenlast great representatives
in this dialogue
tury of our era, says about the physics expounded
that it is "geometrical"
that
is
to
demonstrative:
scien(1 :7.24),
say,
tific in the sense agreed upon between mathematicians
and the
Platonic philosophers.
The true scientist (ho hos aleths geometriks),
on his way to the world of intelligible
being (eis ten dianoetiken
all images, extensions,
and pluoysian), aspires to 'take together'
and essenideas, unextended
rality, and to behold the geometrical
tial (Proclus, In Tim., prologus
This is the
II, p. 55 Friedlein).
Platonic
dialectic
of ideas, as against Aristotle's
assertory logic
more adequate
for the mathematician
in being an apodeixis not
but of being.
of statements,
and mathematicians
contended
about the true rePhilosophers
in
their
of
and
for ultimate
hence,
ality
respective objects
study,
and
in
In
the rational
competence
legitimating
leadership
society.
sciences inhcrited
from Antiquity, which was further developed in
Arabic Islamic society from the eighth century C.E., we find sucof the highest
cessive, and for a long time coexisting, perceptions
of
On
the
side
of
these
were transobject
knowledge.
philosophy,
mitted in texts under the name of Aristotle, and taught in a discourse informed
of
by his school and imbued by his conception
the
Science
of
Demonstration.
ap6deixis:
For the philosophers,
mathematics
had always been a model of
demonstrable
certainty: to akribs (at-yaqin in Arabic). Passing the
limitations
of this paradigmatic
science and arguing and explaining by means of images-the
geometrical
images of the mathemaAristotle
had
tician, the cosmic images of the eternal ideas-,
a
a
of
science
as
formal
axiomadeveloped
comprehensive
theory
tised system. But with Aristotle as with Plato, mathematics
is the
science par excellence,
both
the
and
providing
examples
general
problematic.
The role of axiomatic mathematics
as a background
to demonstrative method
in philosophy
is evident from its very concept-

239
ualization and terminology.
As early as in the fifth century B.C.E.,
had taken the step from simple demonstration,
Greek mathematics
from principles:
apdeixis, from visual evidence, to demonstration
definitions and axioms. Like the science of geometry, logical demhad "to rely on principles,
onstration
which, though unprovable
true and indisputable"
are nonetheless
this, Aris(A. Szabo) .-In
an intellectual
totle continued
tradition which recognised a fundamental affinity between mathematics
and dialectic. Even though
the mathematical
and physical sciences apprehend
their principles
in a different way, Aristotle regards mathematical
(axioprocedure
matisation and the use of hypotheses)
particularly
helpful for the
acquisition of all scientific knowledge. Even though syllogistic reamathematics
soning is absent from Greek mathematics,
provided
him with a model of deductive-demonstrative
science departing
from principles
(archai).
to
as a general
Aristotle's
According
theory, when presented
are
of subthe
sciences
to
deduce
the
properties
epistemology,
stances from their essences through syllogisms. Still, in expounding the sciences in a formal axiomatised
system, Aristotle proposed
for every branch of human knowledge what early Greek mathematics had done for mathematicals
(and what Euclid consummated
later on-influencing,
in his turn, an axiomatic
for geometry
in
to
and
and Neoapproach
ontology
cosmology
Neopythagorean
In following Aristotle in this overall orientaplatonic metaphysics).
tion, all subsequent
philosophical
systems, notably those of Islam,
are essentially Aristotelian-whatever
their particular allegiance to
a Platonic or Neoplatonic
paradigm and its allegories of the World
Above may have been.
While Aristotle's
was modelled
science of demonstration
upon
the system of definitions,
axioms and proofs which had first been
elaborated
this was further develby the Greek mathematicians,
classical
Greek
mathematics,
systematized
by Euclid in
oped by
of Aristotelian
and
reintroduced
emulation
by the
epistemology,
of
astronomers
and
into
geometers,
experts
applied mathematics,
the scientific discourse of mid-ninth
Carried
century Baghdad.
by
of al-Kindi's circle inside and outside of the Abbathe competitors
sid court and its administration,
above all by the activity of Qusta
ibn Luqa, of the Banu Musa, of Tabit ibn Qurra and those around
Ishaq, son of Hunayn ibn Ishaq, as translators and original authors
all of the scientific encyclopaedia,
science was raised
encompassing
from empeiria to apodeixis.

240
3. Mathematical

and logical demonstration.

Structures and genres of

exposition
The pioneers
of Arabic Islamic philosophy
were scientists,
and
their philosophy
was informed
of
foundations
by the theoretical
the mathematical
sciences: the mathematical
of
Neophilosophy
and the Neopythagorean
of number as
platonism,
hypostatization
the world's essence. For this reason, the discourse of early philoforms of
sophical writing in Arabic is moulded
by the language,
structures
of
common
and
exposition,
argument,
isagogical genres
to mathematical
lecture course
writing and the late Alexandrian
the works of Aristotle. In this, a long
and commenting
introducing
between geometry and Aristotelian
history of interaction
apodeixis,
Euclidean
and
deduction
more
logic
geometric and
methodology,
Proclean scholasticism
was continued.
in mathematical
and in philosophical
a) Phraseology.-Both
texts (translations
as well as original expositions),
we find a stylistic repertory, structuring
and organising the outline and sequence
of arguments:
an inventory of introductory,
transisummarising,
with an introductory
tional and connecting
phrases. Beginning
fa-naqfilu aydan 'further we say ...', positing a thesis, or the coordinates of a geometrical
with fal-yakun, fal-nunzil, falconstruction,
'let
be
us
the proof of the
...',
'let
nafri4
posit ...'),
announcing
wa-burhanu
and
dalika
with a final
...,
concluding
supposition:
erat
?Ma
aradna
demonstrandum':
wa-dalihd
an
'quod
nubayyin.
A corresponding
and remarkably
elaborate
of reaphraseology
of
in
and
evidence
is
found
a
of
soning
presenting
group
early
commissioned
of the
translations
by or made in the environment
scientist and philosopher,
al-Kindi, such as Ibn al-Bitriq's version
of Aristotle's De caelo und the Neoplatonic
sources current under
a topic or further
the title of the Theology of Aristotle: introducing
to
a
topic treated previously
argument
(wfi-naqtlu aydan), reverting
from established
a
conclusion
validating
( fa-nargi`u wa-naqlu),
kana
dalika
and stating the
premisses
( fa-in
ka-dalika fa-kana ... )
final result ( fa-qad istabana l-ana wa-xahha anna ... ) .
of mathb) Demonstrative
procedure.-The
general structure
in geometry
follows the model of Euclid's
ematical
arguments
Elementa. Departing from definitions
(4udfid) and postulates (musadardt), the mathematician
(aikat) which are
presents propositions
the
and yielding the
initial
being analysed, validating
assumption

241
elements

of synthesis for the required construction.

The heuristic
of
and
guidelines
analysis
synthesis-analysis
being analysis of a
in
view
of
its
as
a
scientific
realization,
goal
generalized
procedure
by Aristotle (cf. Eth. Nic. II1.5)-was
given its classical formulation
of analysis
(third century A.D.): In the approach
by Pappus
result is being regarded
as already
(Arabic, tahlil), the required
achieved or verified, whereupon
in a step-by-step
discussion
the
conditions
or consequences
are to be ascertained,
to
leading
prinIn the followciples or to partial results previously acknowledged.
is inverted,
from
ing synthesis (tarkb), this procedure
departing
the results of analysis, and following up the conditions,
determined in analysis, of the required reSUlt.2
In the work of al-Kindi, philosopher-scientist
of catholic interests and a devouring curiosity for all aspects of intellectual
pursuit,
the methods of mathematical
and of philosophical
argument
logic
compete and interact. His treatise ft T<27M/Mgtrm al-calam "On the
finitude of the world's body" (Rasa)il, ed. Abu Rida, 1 :186ff.) is a
modelled
on mathematical
demonfull-grown line of arguments
from
axioms
and
definistration, starting
(awii)il, ara)it zuad`iyycz)
tions, proceeding
by means of geometrical
proofs, bardhin, and
mitalat (Greek, kataskeye), and concluding
with a
constructions,
tractatus, but
q.e.d., less sober, it is true, than in a mathematical
with an nice flourish of triumph.
presented
are diaSyllogistic logic still plays a minor part. Most prominent
lectical proofs, structured
means
of
by
logical procedures:
proposithe evidence
tions, diaeresis, deductio ad absurdum, and underlining
of conclusions.
The parallels found in his "First Philosophy", which
contains
an extended
demonstration
of the unicity of the First
Cause, with Proclus's Elementatio Theologica and Theologica Platonica,
show the decisive influence
of the paradigmatic
science of Neoplatonism.
The triumph
from principles

of Aristotle's
evidently

Analytica-an
'analysis'
true, as against the propositions

departing
of geom-

' See also Galen, Ars medica,introd. 305 Kuhn (translated into Arabic order
by
of the Banu Musa); L. Oeing-Hanhoff, Historisches Wrterbuchder Philosophie 1
(1971), 232-48. s.v. "Analyse/Synthcsc", 2-A-4; R. Rashed, "La philosophie des
math6matiqiies d'Ibn al-Haytham", MIDEO, 20-22, 1992-4). A model proof by
deductio ad absurdum is presented by al-Kindi's contexnporary Sanad ibn 'Ali,
Maqala fiha bardhin 'ald tarq al-half (ed. A. M. Heinen, 1987), starting with "the
definitions (hudud) and the propositions (musadarat) preceding all proofs" and
going on to state his thesis followed by a deductio ad absurdum of the contrary
assumption.

242
initiated by the next
etry to be judged and verified by analysis-was
of translators
and by their Christian and Muslim discigeneration
as the Science of Demples, who together established
philosophy
onstration.
and philosopher-scientists
had an introc) Both mathematicians
and
as
the teachers
ductory programme, isagogic techniques
genres. Just
of logic and of physical philosophy
would repeat Aristotle's
four
be
in
scientific
taken
from
book
asked
11.2 of
questions to
inquiry,
the Analytica posteriora-seeking
the fact (if S is P), the reason why
(why S is P), if it (a certain S) is, and what it is (tb hti, tb di6ti, ei
the commentators
of Euclid would emphasize their
esti, ti estin)-,
with
such
of scientific inquiry:
compliance
general principles
Every kind of question that is a possible subject of inquiry is considered by
geometry, some of them being referred to problems, others to theorems.
Geometry asks the question "What is it?" and that in two senses: it wants
either the definition and notion or the actual being of the thing. I mean,
for example, when it asks "What is the homoeomeric line?" it wishes to find
the definition of such a line, ... In addition, geometry asks "Does the object
exist as defined?" This it does most of all in diorismi, examining whether the
question proposed is or is not capable of solution ... And of coursc geometry asks "What sort of thing is it?" For when it investigates the properties
that belong intrinsically to a triangle, or a circle, or to parallel lines, this is
clearly an attempt to determine what sort of thing it is. Many persons have
thought that geometry does not investigate the cause, that is, does not ask
the question "Why?"... But you will find that this question is also included
in geometry ...
Euclid's commentators
would then go on with a catalogue
essential parts of a geometrical
proof:

of the

Every problem and every theorem that is furnished with all its parts should
contain the following elements: an enunciation, an exposition, a specification, a construction, a proof, and a conclusion (/Jrtasis,ikthesis, diorisms,
Of these the enunciation states what is given
kataskey,apdeixis,.5ymperasma).
and what is sought from it, for a perfect enunciation consists of both these
parts. The exposition takes separately what is given and prepares it in advance for use in the investigation. The specification takes separately the
thing that is sought and makes clear precisely what it is. The construction
adds what is lacking in the given for finding what is sought. The proof draws
the proposed inference by reasoning scientifically from the propositions that
have been admitted. The conclusion reverts to the enunciation, confirming
what has been proved. (Proclus, In Eucl. Elem. I, 201f.; trans. Morrow, 158f.)
The same set, with one addition, appears in the Arabic glosses to
Euclid's Elements, and in notices by al-Kindi and al-Firabi: al habar
of the thesis, pr6lasis), alor negative 'enunciation'
(affirmative
of the thesis in the construction
of a diamil ('representation'
Greek kthesis, of the
gram (Greek kataskeui), al-nazar ('study',

243
in view of bringing it into the structure of proof), alproposition,
Greek diorisms, between possible and impossi('distinction',
faxl
ble solutions),
al-burhiin ('proof,
Greek apodeixis) , and al-tamam
the
as e.g., the familiar
(Greek, symprasma,
statement,
concluding
erat
in
the
third
demonstrandum),
quod
adding
place al-fiulf (eis
adnaton a?agoge) , deductio ad absurdum of contrary propositions.
In philosophy,
another set of introductory
definitions and capita
(Greek kePhlaia, Arabic abwab) was developed by the Alexandrian
commentators
of Aristotle, in the school of Ammonius,
and adopted by the Arabic readers of such texts, first of all by al-Kindi in his
"Book of Definitions"
and in his "Epistle on the Number of Aristotle's Books", but more regularly since the tenth century. In this
to philosophy was given as a preftradition, a general introduction
ace to Porphyry's Isagoge, containing
definitions
and classifications
of philosophy.
The commentaries
to Aristotle's
Categoriae started
with an introduction
to the study of Aristotle, explaining
(i) the
names of the philosophical
schools, the classification of Aristotle's
writings, the starting point of study, the final goal and the way to
this end, qualifications
for the student and for the teacher, Aristotle's style and the purpose of his obscurity; and going on to (ii)
of the individual work (to be taken up in introducing
preliminaries
each of Aristotle'
works), in six or eight capita, on 1. subject, 2.
4. title, 5. authenticity,
6. disposiusefulness, 3. order of treatment,
tion of the work, 7. the method
of instruction
used, and 8. the
section of philosophy
to which the work belongs.
It is interesting
to observe that one of the earliest authors to
adopt the points of this second scheme is the Iranian astrologer
Abu Ma`sar al-Balhi, a student of al-Kindi at Baghdad, who in his
"Great Introduction
to the Science of the Astrology" (al-M(tdhal alkabir ila cilm ahkam al-nugum, completed
in 848), starts with the full
set of kePhlaia familiar
from the Alexandrian
to
prooemia
the works of philosoph,
the
commentarintroducing
Neoplatonic
ies of the school of Ammonius:
garad, manfac a, ism wadi C al-kitab,
ism al kitab, li-man al-kitab, ft ayyi waqt yuqra', min ayyi agza' (sc. al
falsafa) huwa, qismat agza' al-kiib.'
For all of the practical sciences-analogous
observations
can be
made in the works of medicine, which are orientated
towards the
theoretical
foundations
set up by Galen-professionalisation
goes
I For the details, sec Charles Burnett's contribution to the
present volume on
Abu Ma'ar.

244
of standards
together with the establishment
discourse
and
ogy,
literary disposition.

of technical

terminol-

4. Logic and ,grammar

of the sciences
In the earliest period of translation
and reception
of Greek rationalism,
its students and practicians,
many of them
lived in intellectual
communities
different
from
non-Muslims,
of scripture,
and jurists. By
those of the interpreters
traditionists
for positions in the administration,
competing
assuming a competence more absolute as the sciences claimed to inform the masters
of definiof chancery and vizierate, and claiming the prerogative
tion for the intellectual
orientation
of Muslim society, the party of
the rational sciences soon clashed with the parties of religious tradition and legal exegesis, and this clash erupted over the issue of
demonstrative
language.
The scientists and philosophers
of Islam raised claims more abto the logic of
than those conceded
solute and more universal
the cilla, i.e., ratio legis based on the asl or princita7il: determining
of the Prophet.
The
pium of the divine word and the legislation
of traadvocates of universal reason were refuted by the defenders
of Scripture,
who disputed
the coherence
of
dition, interpreters
human reason with divine wisdom. But while denying their claims,
made the instruments
of demonstrative
the religious community
their own.
reasoning
There is a well-known-story,
reported
by the thirteenth-century
Ibn Abi Usaybi'a, which narrates how the philosopher
biographer
Ibn al-Sarrag (d.
al-Farabi (d. 950) used to meet the grammarian
Ibn al-Sarrag, in
in
order
to
with
while
him,
928)
study grammar
his turn, would learn logic from the philosopher.
Whatever the historical truth in the story: al-Farabi's interest in the relation of indiof
vidual language
and universal reasoning
and in the language
demonstration
is evident from his own writings. Equally incontestof his time and environment,
able is that among the grammarians
some were eager to adopt, however superficially and inadequately,
the concepts, definitions and methods of demonstrative
science as
of
One
Ibn
the
ashab
by
al-mantiq.
al-Sarrg's biograexpounded
phers says that he made grammar, which had been "out of mind",
al-Usw
magTZMM,to date, rational. In his "Principles of Grammar",
of
of
definitions
the
we
find
indeed
ft 1-nahw,
parts
speech influ-

245
De interpretatione. Like others among his
by the Aristotelian
the
of the religious sciences wanted
exponents
contemporaries,
the
hermeneutical
basis
for the study of the Scripture,
grammar,
to be taken seriously, not just as a :5inac a, a tchn, but as a rational
science.
The conditions of intellectual
communication
can be described,
taken from physics, as those of a system in resowith a metaphor
nance. The greater the differentiation
of a system, the better is its
to
filter
order
from
noise
and
the
lesser its sensibility to irability
ritations from outside. Pre-modern
societies were less differentiand Islamic
between philosophy
ated, but in the early interaction
in
its
formative
we
can
observe
the
lack
of resosociety
period,
nance between two systems 'out of tune', indicating a growing gulf
between professional
fields.
It is true that the early development
and theolof jurisprudence
was
influenced
some
extent
the
environment.
to
Hellenized
ogy
by
Its institutions,
however, were not, nor the formalised
systems of
transmission
and
authorisation
once
these
instituhermeneutic,
tion had been fonned. To some extent, communication
between
the rational sciences and the religious disciplines had been possible from the outset, and was even enhanced
when the Islamic inan axiomised
of
stitutions,
building
theory of usul, 'principles'
derivation
and legal reasoning,
emulated
their rivals of the culm
But the basic categories,
al-azua'il, the 'sciences of the Ancients'.
the terminology,
the divisions of knowledge, and the forms of discourse were different,
and for some time seemed irreconcilable
after the Islamic disciplines
had taken a decisive turn towards
traditionism.
Medicine and the applied sciences-astronomy
(in
union with astrology) acquiring
its specific role for Islamic timeleft to their own purposes, and in the discourse of
keeping-were
the Kindi school continued
to play the role of cup-bearers
to phifrom
But
as
a
the
sciart,
emancipated
losophy.
philosophy
ruling
its
a
with
demonstrative
method
of
remained
ences, along
logic,
because
it
with
stumbling block,
competed
theology and jurisprudence in their proper domains, and it became a scandalon when
in their studious efforts to
members of the religious community,
avail themselves of the scientific methodology
that was so successful in the applied sciences, were infected by the jargon of syllogistic
of philosophical
logic and worse, the gobbledygook
metaphysics.
Whereas the basic value-table of the religious disciplines
(al-Culm
enced

246
on the
(modelled
al shar`iyya), including grammar
al-fiqh, the
a
of
is
scaled
order
from
halal
jurisprudence),
ranging
paradigm
over mandftb and jazz to makruh and haram, the philosophers
were
to a binary code of true and false in logic, and of good
committed
the jargon,
and
and bad in ethics. All this-the
incompatibility,
the veheabove all the infection of grammar with logic-provoked
the propament reaction of Abu Sa'id al-Sirafi when he confronted
of
the
who
that
his
Christian
Matthew,
ganda
alleged
logic was
We
have
that
he
had
a reader
valid.
information
been
universally
of astronomy,
and
a
logic himself,
living example of the
geometry
of
the
domains
of
perviousness
learning
despite the attacks of
traditionist
kuttab. But when his own colleagues and disciples were
tempted to adopt for grammar the denitions, divisions and categoOn Interpretation (evident in the U5l fi L nahw of
ries of Aristotle's
Ibn al-Sarrag and in the X<Ihft 'ilal al-nahw of al-Zaggagi), the very
authority of his school was at stake. These were, to come back to
noise indeed.
our metaphor,
noise, and a very disturbing
The challenge of demonstrative
science as taught by the falasifa
was felt acutely, and expressed explicitly in a book on the theory
of grammar written by Ibn al-Sarrag's pupil, Abu 1-(?asim al-Zaggag! (d. between 948 and 950 A.D.). Scholars, he says, should be
in science and the ambition, with which
aware of "the competition
God Almighty has burdened
noble minds", and face their critics.
The critics of the grammarians
will question
their "unanimous
of
the
division
of
the
with
parts
language into nouns,
agreement"
verbs and particles, simply because Sibawayh, the founder of sysin grammar,
tematic reasoning
it:
proposed
If you accept this from him without demonstration or proof, in blind imitation (taqlidan bihi), then you are blind indeed, and in error. For what makes
you accept this from him, even though you know that grammar is a rational
science and a standard for most sciences in which nothing is accepted except after demonstration and presentation of evidence. An exception is constituted by the religious sciences, in which some things have to be accepted
[on faith], when all the evidence has been presented, and rational arguments have been advanced that are convincing from a logical point of view.'
The "unanimous
is the starting point for the
agreement"
Basrian grammarian,
as it is for the jurist: the consensus sapientium
based on the incontroon the validity of a deductive procedure,
' Abu
I-Qasim 'Abd-al Rahmaii b. Ishaq al-Zaggagi, The Exl)lanation of Li7agr.cistic Cause,5:Az-Zaggaif;'s
Theoryof Grammar, introduction, translation, commentary
by Kees Versteegh (Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1995), 2.

247
the case of grammaror-in
vertible authority of the scripture,
of the pure Arabic language. Yet he
of the authentic
testimonies
that every science, except for the relito his opponent
concedes
not on
gious sciences based on revealed law, should be founded,
with the authority of a recognised
teacher or a canoncompliance
ised text (taqlid), but on proof.
Aristotelian
al-Zaggagi instantly dons the hat of the orthodox
the credo of the Analytica posteriora (or, for that
and proclaims
matter, of Metaphysics IV 3):
There are things that are known axiomatically (bi-badihat al-'aql), without
proof (burhan) or sign (dalal). From these we can infer something about
obscurc mattcrs and difficult and abstruse questions. We know, for instance,
intuitively and without further evidence, that it is impossible for a body to
be simultaneously at rest and moving, or neither at rest nor moving [adding, it is true, a cautela in tune with the philologiasacra], except, of course, at
the moment of creation by God Almighty, as we know by inference just as
we know that it is impossible for a body not to be in a place at all.'
The examples given are taken from Aristotle as are the principles,
traditions of
conveyed, of course, by the ninth- and tenth-century
some common
notions of which are preArabic Aristotelianism,
sent in early Kalam as well as in Falsafa.
He goes on to show, by some sort of logical diaeresis, that the
in Sibawayh's Kitab ensues from the
tripartite division introduced
is a means of communication,
nature of language:
(a) language
of
(b) corresponding
consisting
speech signs signifying thoughts;
accidents and relations in the referent,
lanwith the substances,
(habar, ap6phansis), i.e. verbs, making
guage consists of statements
assertions
(muhbar) about their subjects (muhbar canhu, leg6mena
katti tinos), both represented
by nouns, and linked by operators
Here
he
is
and linguistic
(ribat, sndesmos).
using the hermeneutical
not
of
the
Arab
but
of
the
Hellenistic
terminology,
grammarians,
in
"On
his
treatise
the
words
as
e.
al-Farabi
tradition,
g.,
employed
in logic" (al-Alf!- al-mustaCmala ft 1-mantzq).
In the next chapter
'On the definition
of the noun, the verb,
and the particle' (, fi tahdld al-ism wa-l-ficl wa-l-ftarJ), he shows off his
of the Hellenists by going
proficiency in the isagogical procedures
motions
of
the
all
the
routine, familiar from
through
introductory
introductions
to philosophy.
the Alexandrian
Starting with the
standard definition of what is a definition,
to the tech"according
a concise way of expressnical terminology
of the philosophers ...
' Ibid., 42.

248
ing the nature of the thing to which is applied", and giving as an
definition of man as being "a rational and
example the traditional
mortal being", he explains, true to the model of Porphyry's Isagoge,
are given in terms of genus and species,
that "some definitions
others in terms of matter and form, matter resembling
genus, and
form resembling
his educated
reader,
species." When addressing
he shows his eagerness to adopt the latest in tech talk: "You are, of
who form the elite
course, aware of the fact that the philosophers,
of this science-I
mean the science of definitions, species, particuthemselves
the philosophers
have
lars, and similar notions-that
about the definition of philosophy
had their disagreements
itself",
and then enumerates
the traditional
definitions
of philosophy
familiar from the prolegomena to Porphyry's Isagoge. But he remains
in subject and method
and pleads for
aware of the differences
in such a way that they would
"consultation
of the philosophers
in such a way
understand
us and to make ourselves understood
that they would respond to it."6
was fuming. Under attack, Ibn
The grammarians'
establishment
both logic and the theory
is
to
have
renounced
al-Sarrag
reported
of music. His disciple, al-Rummani
(d. 994), wrote a small book of
in
the
on the
a
new
definitions,
field, and also modelled
genre
but
was
a
introductory
genre,
philosophers'
given
dressing-down
nor logiby his ambitious colleague al-Farisi: neither grammarians
of grammar
cians would take seriously such contamination
and
But
others
followed
their
Abu
al-'Amiri
1-Hasan
(d.
logic.
example;
992), spreading the spirit of Kindi's school in the East after taking
the measure of al-Sirafi (and giving him a hard time), wrote the
most detailed attempt to determine
the relation of the religious
and the philosophic
in
a harmonious
a
disciplines
symmetry,
of
of
the
Virtues
Islam"
"Proclamation
(all`lam bi-manaqib allslam).
The very title is an apologetic
the rational sciences
programme:
(al `ulum al-hikmiyya) are put into the service of Islam, the absolute
religion, and of the religious sciences (al-'ulum al-milliyya). Both
spheres "are based on tenets which agree with pure reason (al-Caql
al-sanh) and are supported
(al-burhan alby valid demonstration
ed.
6urab, 87.5)."
sarah) (al-I'ldm,

6 Ibid., 43-44.

249
5. The Paradigm of Demonstrative Science. Demonstrative Science and
Aristotelian Logic
5.1. The foundation
science

of Islamic philosophy

on demonstrative

which defined religion and

Islamic philosophy,
i.e., a philosophy
of theology in Islam, was founded
answered the questions
by alof certitude'
Farabi (d. 950), who based the 'Conditions
to
(burhan) according
at-yaqin) on the science of demonstration
On the foundation
laid by
Aristotle's syllogistic and epistemology.
al-Farabi, Ibn Sina (Avicenna, d. 1037) worked out a new encycloand
paedia of the sciences, including the elements of mathematics,
The integration
of
the applied sciences astronomy and medicine.
a final development
in the sciences and-in
discourse
rational
initiated by Ash'arite Sunni `ulama' and continued
by Shi'ite theowas
achieved
in
the
framework of
scholastic theology
logians-in
Avicennian
concepts and methods.
alPosterior Analytics, the Kitab al-Burhan, provided
Aristotle's
and
of
deduction
Farabi with a coherent
demonstration,
system
all levels of rational activity, and serving as a guide for
comprising
classification of the sciences, leading
the division and hierarchical
to
the
First
Philosophy, metaphysics. The basic text is the exorup
dium of the Analytica posteriora: "All teaching and all learning come
about from already existing knowledge"
(from the
by deduction
and individual
(from the particular),
'signs'
specific), induction
in descending
order
(dala'il) or, in the practical arts, experience,
conseown summary
contains
of certainty.
al-Farabi's
explicit
and ranking of the sciences. Since
quences as to the coherence
science was proven an unrenouncable
demonstrative
requisite for
of political science, Aristotle's burhdn surpassed and
the perfection
to the tasks of poreplaced Plato's dialectic, which was relegated
litical 'persuasion',
i.e., to the context of the Muslim religious comwould
munity : the theology of Kalam. Only the true philosophy
and mainstay of true religion, the conconstitute
the foundation
Hence the philosostitution or milla of the religious community.
universal
claim.
and
his
asserted
supreme
pher
Philosophy and religion, the universal rational sciences and the
such
disciplines specific to the religious and linguistic community,
are
shown
to
be
and grammar,
as theology, jurisprudence
compleand
system of cognition
mentary parts of the same hierarchical

250
not co-existing
interpretation,
parts of concurrent,
independent
of the universals
systems of knowledge.
Religion-`imitation'
in true images given to the Prophet-is
a
through representation
the
creeds
of
because
it
details
necessary complement
philosophy,
and laws for the benefit of every man and of every community.
Rhetoric is needed for the purposes of persuading
and convincing
those who cannot grasp scientific demonstration.
Here the conof
rhetoric
Aristotelian
and
were
cepts
poetics
employed to build
a theory of religious language: of prophecy and revelation.
al-Farabi's
for demonstrative
science is to
great achievement
have made conscious and to have analyzed in detail the relation
between things and words, concepts and terms, under the perspective of the linguistic-religious
In his studies of the
community.
'Words employed in Logic'
al-mustaCmala fa 1-mantis) and
the 'Letters' (a/-77MrM/) of philosophical
he determined
exposition,
the conditions of certitude on the basis of demonstrative
discourse
Arabic
their
firm
estabinto the
Thanks to
transposed
language.
and tasdiq
lishment in the work of Ibn Sina, tasawwur 'conception'
the difference
between a thing in the
'judgment',
explicitating
mind, a macna, i.e., a prgma qua being the object of thought or
and a statement
enunciation,
pronouncing
certainty about a pos
echon in the world outside the mind, became from now on the
fundamental
for the analysis of logical reasoning:
reaprinciples
on
and
confounded
discourse-definitions,
soning
propositions
informed
clusions-,
cognition
by language.
5.2. Mathematics

as demonstrative

science

generation
prior to al-Farabi, Qusta ibn Luqa (died c. 912and translator of Greek scienmathematician,
13)-a
philosopher,
tific texts-introduced
his epistle on catoptrics
with a praise of
"the
science
as
finest
of
the
and then
demonstrative
humaniora",
to commend
his own subject, optics, as being "the finest
continued
of the demonstrative
sciences: the one in which the natural science
since from the natural
and the science of geometry
partake,
and from the geometrical,
science it takes the sensual perception,
the demonstration
by means of lines [i.e., linear constructions] "is the science of rays (catoptric).
such, par excellence,
From here, and from the rules of demonstrative
science laid
down by al-Farabi, Ibn al-Haytam (d. 1039) was able to go on tomathematical
wards establishing
and optics as the noastronomy
One

251
blest of sciences about universalia in rebus. Evincing the principles
of his science, Ibn al-Haytam enjoins the true scientist to be a true
Remarks on
philosopher,
following the rules of demonstration.
method are frequent. For the general principles of physics, Ibn alor "those
Haytam turns to the opinions of "all the philosophers"
of the philosophers
who arrived at the truth" (al-muhaqqz*qu-n min
al falasifa) . Aristotle "laid down the principles from which the way
to the truth will be found, its nature and substance
be attained,
and its essence and quiddity be found" (ahkama l-usula llati fihli
tabt atuhu
yuslaku ila 1-haqqi fa-yudraku
zua-gawharuhu wa-tugadu
datuhu wa-mahiyyatuhu).
Aristotle's
was, as a
physical philosophy
matter of course, his point of departure,
an authority invoked freand commentaries
listed
quently, and the subject of summaries
his
But
in
the
Ibn
alremained
end,
among
early writings.
Haytam
an Aristotelian
orionly in the sense of a general methodological
In
an
earlier
"On
of
the
entation.
treatise
the Configuration
in a separate appendix,
World" ( fi paw) al-qamar), he expounds,
the principles
of celestial movement,
all of which can be traced
back to Aristotelian
physics. In the later treatise "On the Light of
he spurns all mention of Aristotle's
the Moon" (fi daw 'al-qamar),
celestial physics, such as the nature of the fifth body, alth?r, to be
used as premisses for his theory. Instead of metaphysical
doctrines,
such general principles
as can be observed behind his argument
from physical theory, but closer
are specific theorems,
developed
to the facts under discussion. Aristotle-the
aconly philosopher
but a symbolic authority of demonstrative
tually named-remains
method-a
virtual text, while his own writings fall into oblivion.'
The observance
of demonstrative
method by itself has become
for the pursuit of knowledge
in the
the passport of competence
in
of
When
his
"Solution
the
epistemic
community.
Aporias in
Euclid's Elements", Ibn al-HaYlam raises his own apodeictic method
above the time-honoured
authority of the master of demonstration
in geometry, he still refers to the principles of science pronounced
by Proclus and Aristotle, but claims to have achieved their ultimate
perfection:

' For references see A. I. Sabra, l'he

Opticsof Ibn al-Haytham,books I-III (London, 1989); and my article "Mathematics and Philosophy in Medieval Islam," in
The EnterjJriseof Sciencein Islam, eds. A. I. Sabra and Jan Hogendijk (Cambridgc,
Mass., 2003).

252
The causes in scientific matters are the premises employed in the geometrical proofs-these are the proximate causes; but what we seek in each construction is the remote and first cause-and this has not been pointed out
by any of the earlier nor any of the later authorities.
In Ibn al-Haytam's
remarks on his method of inquiry, the use of
is an explicit pointer to the logical
'induction')
istiqra' (epagoge,
described
in
the
final
of Aristotle's
Posterior
chapter
procedure
as
the
to
the
universals
used as
detect
or
Analytics
way
principles
in
a
that
valid
demonstration.
It
is
true
the
word
is used
premises
somewhat loosely by Ibn al- Haytam in many instances. According
to al-Farabi's reading of Aristotle, induction
(istiqrd") aims at estabAs a prolishing a universally affirmative or negative proposition.
induction
as the act of surveying all or
cedure, he understands
most of the particular
cases falling under a given universal to see
whether a certain predicate
applies or does not apply to the particulars surveyed. If complete,
the induction
is called 'perfect',
if
of
induction
in
al-Farabi's
incomplete,
'imperfect'.
understanding
examination
terms of a one-by-one
of the particulars
does not
in
to
the
of
this
term
the
relevant
Aristotecorrespond
meaning
lian passages. There, it is not attending to the particular cases, but
rather the advance from these particular
cases to the corresponding universal which is known as induction
(epagg being rendered
the individual
as istiqra' the Arabic Prior Analytics, 'collecting'
Ibn al-Haytam goes on from here to
cases). The mathematician
model by means of systematic
check the limits of the theoretical
observation
(iCtibar, 'experience').
But Ibn al-Haytam, starting from the familiar concepts of Aristotelian epistemology
and from the traditional models of astronomy
and optics, transformed
both. In his hands, the objective of inducof universals from the particulars
of
tion, instead of a collection
observation
became
focused
on
the
refinement
of
whatsoever,
any
to
criteria
the
of
for
the
complex procedures,
apt
provide
validity
models and hypotheses
they were to yield. While mathematical
models are based on the data of observation,
the philosophermathematician
is convinced
of the essential coherence
between
valid models and the plan-the
logos-of nature.
5.3. The integration

of the rational

sciences

of scientific language in the framework of a philoThe integration

not only of various sources, and their sets
sophical encyclopaedia,

253
but also of mediof terms, from the early schools of philosophy,
the
is
of Avicenna. Avicine and the mathematical
work
sciences,
cenna united and integrated
the early traditions offalsafa, both in
and professional
circles, and also
respect to groups of readership
in uniting the Platonic and Peripatetic
fundamentals.
Taking up
the work of al-Farabi, he projected the conceptual
and completing
of the Arabic Posterior Analytics onto all domains
framework
of
scientific
and philosophical
all
strata
of
knowledge,
conceiving
the
of
intuidiscursive
and
highest degrees
cognition-including
of its
tive thought
(the latter being the hads, bereft altogether
of
the
mystical connotation)-as
applications
syllogism: "Logic is
to give man a canonical
tool (dla qanilniyya < Greek
intended
knn 'rule') which, if attended to, preserves him from error in his
thought. "8
The tools of demonstrative
were recognized
reasoning
by the
critic
of
al-Gazali
as
a
balance'
(d. 1111),
(mi''just
greatest
falsafa,
zan) and a 'straight measure'
necessary for distinguishing
In challenging
valid proof from faulty reasoning.
the falasifa with
own
he
the
instrument
of
their
weapons,
gave
logic into the hand
al-Razi (d. 1210) and his school,
of the theologians.
Fahr-al-din
Avicenna against Razi's critique-Nasir-al-Din
aland-defending
and Shi'ite theologian,
Tusi (d. 1274), philosopher-scientist
forged
of demonstration
to be an instrument
of the true
the language
faith.
ABSTRACT
The reception of the rational sciences, scientific practice, discourse and
methodology into Arabic Islamic society proceeded in several stages of
exchange with the transmitters of Iranian, Christian-Aramaic and Byzantine-Greek learning. Translation and the acquisition of knowledge from
the Hellenistic heritage went hand in hand with a continuous refinement
of the methods of linguistic transposition and the creation of a standardized technical language in Arabic: terminology, rhetoric, and the genres
of instruction. Demonstration more geometrico,first introduced by the paradigmatic sciences-mathematics,
astronomy, mechanics-and
adopted by
philosophers embracing the cosmology of Neoplatonism, was complemented and superseded by the methods of syllogistic demonstration.
Faced with the establishment of philosophy as a demonstrative science,
which claimed absolute and universal knowledge, even the hermeneuti8 al-Iarat wa-l-tanbihat, 2,
p. Forget.