Melendres # 795 - D.ariz. 2-07-Cv-02513 795 ORDER W Report Attached

Case 2:07-cv-02513-GMS Document 795 Filed 11/20/14 Page 1 of 21
1
2
3
4
5
6
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
8
9
Manuel de Melendres, et al.,

Plaintiffs,
10
11
v.
12
Maricopa, County of, et al.,
13
No. CV-07-02513-PHX-GMS
ORDER
Defendants.
14
Pending before this Court are Defendants (1) Application to Withdraw as Counsel
15
of Record for Defendants (Doc. 773) and (2) Request to Redact the Monitor Report, the
16
Brief and Response to which have been filed under seal. (Docs. 784, 791.) After
17
considering such matters in briefing and at oral argument the Court further perceives the
18
need to set forth specifications for further proceedings under its order. The Court
19
therefore determines as follows.
20
I.
BACKGROUND
21
Approximately one year after the Court entered its Findings of Fact and
22
Conclusions of Law (Doc. 579), and seven months after it entered its Supplemental
23
Injunction (Doc. 606), it was informed by Defendants that MCSO had assumed the
24
investigation of Deputy Charley Armendariz from the Phoenix Police Department.
25
Armendariz was an MCSO deputy who was assigned to the Human Smuggling Unit
26
(HSU). He testified at the underlying trial and his arrest statistics were admitted into
27
evidence and proved relevant to the outcome for Plaintiffs. Armendariz was also
28
personally implicated by some of the specific allegations made by two representatives of
the Plaintiff class.
After MCSOs criminal investigation into Deputy Armendariz began, MCSO
obtained a search warrant for his home. During their execution of the search warrant,
MCSO discovered significant quantities of illegal drugs as well as hundreds of personal
items belonging to unknown individualsincluding credit cards, drivers licenses,
Mexican identification cards, and other personal property. Many of these items
potentially belonged to members of the Plaintiff class.
numerous video recordings, apparently going back several years, of traffic stops
Armendariz had made while on patrol with a camera mounted in his eyeglasses. The
10
video from that eyeglass camera also revealed that a camera was mounted on the
11
dashboard of his patrol vehicle. Deputy Armendariz was arrested, and after he failed to
12
report to probation the following week officers discovered Armendarizs body in his
13
home after an apparent suicide.
Officers also discovered
14
MCSO reviewed a few of Armendarizs videotaped stops prior to the hearing with
15
the Court on May 14, 2014 and determined that, in a number of them, Deputy
16
Armendariz engaged in what MCSO classified as problematic behaviore.g. behavior
17
that was contrary to departmental policy, the law, the constitutional rights of those he
18
stopped, or otherwise in violation of this Courts orders. Further, MCSO determined that
19
other officers, and at least one supervisor of Deputy Armendariz who also testified at the
20
trial in this action, were present during one or more problematic stops.
21
Upon questioning by the Court at the hearing, Chief Deputy Sheridan
22
acknowledged that there was no departmental policy that prevented deputies from
23
videotaping their own traffic stops and that there was reason to believe that some deputies
24
did so. Further many, if not all, deputies made audio recordings of their traffic stops
25
pursuant to departmental practice and had done so for some time, and there were other
26
video devices, both dashboard and body-mounted, that had been used by MCSO. There
27
was no procedure by which such recordings were collected and catalogued by the MCSO.
28
No such materials had been provided to Plaintiffs, although Plaintiffs avowed that they
-2-
asked for such materials prior to trial.
This Courts supplemental injunctive order (Doc. 606) was fashioned to a great
extent with the participation of the parties, both by brief and at the Status Conference
held on August 30, 2013. The Supplemental Injunction was based upon the factual
determinations made at trial concerning both specific instances of past MCSO operations
that ran afoul of the Constitution, as well as the general policies and practices in place
within MCSO that required systematic correction to cure the ongoing deprivation of the
constitutional rights of the Plaintiff class. These flawed practices included erroneous
police training, MCSOs failure to adequately supervise rank-and-file officers, and other
10
deficits. The measure of the Courts injunctive relief, however, was necessarily based on
11
the evidence admitted at trial of these various shortcomings. Thus, if there was not
12
sufficient evidence of system-wide deficiencies on the part of the MCSO admitted at trial,
13
the Court did not enter remedies to the extent requested by the Plaintiff class. (See, e.g.,
14
Doc. 603 at 8991 (declining to incorporate into the Supplemental Order Plaintiffs
15
suggestions regarding the inadequacy of MCSOs existing internal investigative practices
16
due to the lack of evidence presented at trial on that issue).)
17
18
19
The matters raised by the Armendariz materials implicated a number of different

concerns for the Court:
1.
In light of the property found in the possession of Deputy Armendariz,
20
some of which apparently came from members of the Plaintiff class, and the generalized
21
allegations he made, the Plaintiff class may have had their constitutional rights
22
systematically deprived by the MCSO and the HSU in ways in addition to those
23
previously identified by the Court.
24
2.
The failure of MCSO to produce the materials properly requested by
25
Plaintiffs, and which the MCSO was under an obligation to provide, may have denied
26
Plaintiffs the opportunity to present such evidence at the original trial.
27
28
3.
Because of MCSOs apparent failure to proffer such materials at an earlier
juncture, many pieces of evidence that may once have been available and highly relevant
-3-
to the Plaintiffs rights to relief may have since been destroyed.

4.
The Plaintiffs may have also been precluded from presenting evidence
related to deficiencies in MCSOs investigation of complaints against deputies, the
adequacy of employee supervision within MCSO and the HSU specifically, and the
overall sufficiency of the internal investigation process within MCSO, as revealed by the
Armendariz materials and their sequelae.

5.
Evidence kept from Plaintiffs may have hampered Plaintiffs ability to
impeach the testimony of various MCSO witnesses. Such evidence now may suggest that
some witnesses were untruthful on the witness stand or in pretrial discovery processes.
6.
10
This evidence and impeachable testimony, if admitted at the trial of this
11
matter, could have resulted in a significantly expanded scope of injunctive relief entered
12
by this Court.1
13
7.
To the extent that officers had recorded problematic behavior, and MCSO
14
had no policy regarding the collection or maintenance of these recordings, there was a
15
substantial risk of which MCSO should have been aware that officers might destroy
16
existing recordings rather than surrender them to the MCSO once they understood they
17
were being gathered in light of the Armendariz videotapes.
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
In making this observation the Court observes that, among other things, before trial in
this matter, Plaintiffs established that Defendants had destroyed other documents that
may have pertained to whether Defendants were violating the constitutional rights of the
Plaintiff class. (Doc. 493.) Plaintiffs nevertheless succeeded at trail in establishing that
the Defendants were violating their constitutional rights without recourse to the
evidentiary inferences that such destruction might have permitted. Plaintiffs also proved
at trial that at least some MCSO deputies were violating the preliminary injunction
entered by this Court on December 23, 2011. (Doc. 494.) Further, as they have
acknowledged, after this Court made findings of fact and conclusions of law, both Sheriff
Arpaio Chief Deputy Sheridan and Chief Trombi mischaracterized this Courts findings
and subsequent Orders to MCSO deputies and to the public. Despite MCSOs
compliance with some of the Orders of the Court, the above occurrences do not inspire
confidence in the MCSOs willingness to comply with its legal obligations or with this
Courts Orders.
28
-4-
At the May 14, 2014 hearing in which the MCSO presented the Court with the
Armendariz material, the Court was concerned with how best to ensure the rapid and
department-wide retrieval of all outstanding, relevant recordings made by officers that
might still be in existence. The Court thus sealed the hearing and ordered that its
substance was not to be shared with those outside the Courtroom. (Doc. 700 at 3940,
69.) The Court further noted that MCSO was to immediately formulate and obtain the
Monitors approval of a plan designed to quietly retrieve such recordings from its officers
and employees. (Id. at 2527.) Approximately two hours later, the Monitor then held a
lengthy meeting with the higher officials of MCSO and members of the monitoring team
10
in which an investigative course of action was agreed upon. Immediately after that
11
meeting, however, Chief Deputy Jerry Sheridan informed the Monitor that between the
12
hearing in the morning and the meeting with the Monitor in the early afternoon, he and
13
Sheriff Joseph Arpaio had met with MCSOs lawyers. At some point, Chief David
14
Trombi was called into the meeting and instructed to send an e-mail to all Departmental
15
Commanders, including the supervisor who had been present during one of Armendarizs
16
problematic stops, to advise them that they should collect all such recordings from their
17
personnel. This department-wide email compromised the plan arrived at by MCSO and
18
the Monitor for collecting such recordings. Neither the Sheriff nor Chief Deputy Sheridan
19
informed the Monitor during their meeting that MCSO had already subverted the plan at
20
which they subsequently arrived. As a result, the hearings related to the Armendariz
21
recordings were taken out from under seal, as there was no longer any reason to suppose
22
that deputies would not be warned in advance that the MCSO was collecting such
23
recordings. Following this, MCSO conducted a survey-approach of its present and past
24
employees to collect any outstanding recordings.
25
During this same period, MCSO also uncovered and disclosed the existence of
26
systematic recordings undertaken by HSU and recordings made at the apparent direction
27
of other MCSO departments. There was also evidence that recordings were made during
28
the relevant period and that are apparently no longer in existence. Apparently at least
-5-
some of these recordings were requested by Plaintiffs in pre-trial discovery, but were not
provided to Plaintiffs prior to trial.
MCSO began an internal criminal and administrative investigation into HSU,
triggered both by the Armendariz evidence and by the allegations of Deputy Cisco
Pereza former MCSO deputy who had been dismissed for misconduct. The
administrative investigations were placed on hold while the HSU criminal investigation
proceeded. Experienced members of the Monitor team observed the internal
investigations, provided questions for both the criminal investigation and the
administrative investigation when it recommenced, and offered suggestions as to various
10
areas of inquiry.
11
When the Monitor was informed that MCSO had completed and closed the
12
criminal investigation into HSU, it prepared an initial evaluative report for the Court on
13
which both parties were allowed to comment. The Report found the conduct of two of the
14
assigned investigators, Lieutenant Seagraves and Sergeant Fax, satisfactory and even
15
praiseworthy. Lieutenant Seagraves was assigned to investigate the cause of Deputy
16
Armendarizs death. Sergeant Fax was assigned to compile the complaints and other
17
issues surrounding Deputy Armendarizs service within the MCSO.
18
In addition to the satisfactory work of Lieutenant Seagraves and Sergeant Fax in
19
their limited roles, however, the Report also found a great number of deficiencies in the
20
investigation of alleged misconduct of HSU deputies generally. These investigations
21
were conducted by other department personnel. The Report determined that in this
22
investigation the MCSO employed deficient investigative tactics, suffered from serious
23
irregularities in departmental processes as it related to persons under investigations, and
24
suffered from potential conflicts of interest. During the process of responding to the
25
report, MCSO identified under seal (and with more specificity than it previously had)
26
pending administrative investigations and their identified targets that were spawned by
27
the two investigations.
28
The Court then held a status hearing on October 28, 2014 to evaluate the adequacy
-6-
of MCSOs self-investigation. The part of the hearing that related to the ongoing
administrative investigations identified by Defendants was held under seal. During the
public portion of the hearing the Court expressed its concern that the internal criminal
investigation conducted by MCSOs Professional Standards Bureau (PSB) was
inadequate and prematurely closed. Since the hearing, additional evidence has come to
light further demonstrating the inadequacy of that investigation.
In addition, the Court questioned the Defendants assertion of privilege to attempt
to justify their countermand of the Courts mandate regarding the collection of recordings
made by officers that had previously been uncollected by the MCSO. At the hearing, and
10
in the briefing that preceded it, MCSO defended the instructions to Chief Trombi to
11
broadcast their collection efforts to all departmental commanders, even though such
12
instructions violated the direct order of this Court, by claiming that the original plan was
13
inconsistent with protections offered to MCSO employees by Title 38 of the Arizona
14
Revised Statutes. Defendants further represented that MCSO will continue to resist the
15
Monitors directives to the extent that they are inconsistent with such rights. See Ariz.
16
Rev. Stat. 38-1101.
17
After the October 28 hearing, significant additional materials responsive to both
18
Plaintiffs pretrial discovery requests, and apparently relevant to the criminal
19
investigation closed by Defendants was discovered and subsequently revealed to this
20
Court.
21
The failures to follow the Courts directives, the substantive inadequacies of many
22
of the MCSOs internal investigations, the narrowness of the scope of the continuing
23
administrative investigations noticed by the MCSO, and the subsequent materials found
24
after the closure of the MCSO internal criminal investigation are troubling for the Court.
25
In addition to the concerns set forth above, the matters above suggest that Defendants
26
and/or some of their employees may continue to be engaged in efforts to frustrate the
27
implementation of this Courts Orders, and may in fact be using the internal investigative
28
processes to conceal widespread departmental misconduct, as alleged at least in part by
-7-
Deputies Armendariz and Perez, that occurred during the periods relevant to this lawsuit
and this Courts subsequent Orders. The statements previously made by Deputies
Armendariz and Perez substantiate these suspicions in part. Accordingly, the Court
makes the following rulings regarding MCSOs redaction request, and issues the
following clarification of the Monitors independent authority to investigate under its
previous orders.
II.
PRIVILEGE
As this Court has previously articulated, MCSOs assertions of statutory and
common law privileges over its evidence-collection and investigative efforts are largely
10
without colorable merit.
11
Issues of privilege in federal question cases are determined by federal law. Fed. R.
12
Evid. 501; Lewis v. United States, 517 F.2d 236, 237 (9th Cir. 1975). The privilege and
13
personal privacy doctrines embodied in state statutes and constitutions may warrant
14
consideration by this Court for reasons of logic and comity, but they are not controlling.
15
Breed v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for N. Dist. of Cal., 542 F.2d 1114, 1115 (9th Cir. 1976); Kerr v.
16
U.S. Dist. Ct. for N. Dist. of Cal., 511 F.2d 192, 19899 (9th Cir. 1975). Federal courts
17
adopt new evidentiary privileges only to the very limited extent they promote[]
18
sufficiently important interests to outweigh the need for probative evidence. Univ. of Pa.
19
v. E.E.O.C., 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990) (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40,
20
51 (1980)). A strong presumption in favor of access is the starting point for any
21
privilege analysis, which can be overcome only if the party seeking to seal a judicial
22
record establishes compelling reasons, supported by specific factual findings, for the
23
application of the asserted privilege. Kamakana v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d
24
1172, 117879 (9th Cir. 2006). Moreover, courts strictly construe the rules governing
25
claims of privilege. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 50.
26
Federal civil rights cases brought against state and local law enforcement
27
crystallize the tension between the confidentiality interests reflected in the privilege rules
28
and the overarching truth-seeking principles that demand open access to judicial records
-8-
in the administration of justice. Cf. Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178. Federal statutes that
empower plaintiffs to check abuses of power by state governments would be impotent if
state authorities could effectively insulate themselves from constitutional norms simply
by developing privilege doctrines that frustrate plaintiffs ability to develop the kind of
information they need to prosecute their federal claims. Kelly v. City of San Jose, 114
F.R.D. 653, 656 (N.D. Cal. 1987). Nevertheless, the courts calculus must also
accommodate the legitimate risk that law-enforcement interests might be compromised
by the disclosure of certain kinds of sensitive information to the general public.
It is against this backdrop that the Court considers the applicability of the
10
identified privileges to portions of the Monitors Report dated September 28, 2014, as
11
well as the argument Defendants advanced during the October 28, 2014 Status
12
Conference that Arizona law justified their subversion in advance of the agreed-upon
13
course of action in retrieving audio and video recordings by rank-and-file officers. The
14
Report was made pursuant to the Monitors obligations under the Supplemental
15
Permanent Injunction (Doc. 606) to provide an update and assessment to the Court on the
16
sufficiency of ongoing MCSO investigations. Defendants primary justification for the
17
requested redactions of the Report is section 38-1101 of the Arizona Revised Statutes,
18
which gives rise to limited protections for a statutorily-defined law enforcement officer
19
when he or she is being questioned by his or her employer and the officer or the
20
employer reasonably believes the investigation could result in a dismissal, demotion, or
21
suspension. Id. 38-1101(A). Section 38-1101(L) also creates a narrow exception to
22
information in an officers personnel file that otherwise must be available for public
23
inspection.
24
The Court rejects Defendants overly broad use of section 38-1101 for three
25
reasons. First, nothing in the language of the Arizona Revised Statutes lends itself to the
26
conclusion that section 38-1101 creates a civil litigation privilege that could be invoked
27
in the face of Court-ordered disclosure requirements. In other instances in which a state
28
statute creates litigation privileges, it does so explicitly. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. 12-2232
-9-
2235. In contrast, the plain language of section 38-1101 merely sets forth procedural
rights conferred on state law enforcement officers facing administrative inquiries, such as
limitations on what portions of the officers personnel files are publically accessible
during the investigation. Compare id. 38-1101 with id. 39-121 (requiring that public
records be open for inspection by any person at all times). Apart from the Minute
Entry cited to by Defendants (Doc. 783, Ex. B), which is from a state Superior Court and
is, at any rate, not binding on this Court for the reasons set forth above, the Court has
found no Arizona case holding that section 38-1101 creates the kind of privilege
Defendants assert. Given that privilege rules are strictly construed, see Trammel, 445
10
U.S. at 50, the Court declines to adopt Defendants construction of Title 38.
11
Second, the narrow provision relied upon by Defendants (specifically, sub-section
12
(L)) does not excuse Defendants deviation from the Orders of this Court. Defendants
13
have indicated that MCSO had no policy prohibiting an officer from self-recording a
14
traffic stop, and, in fact, issued audio and video equipment to officers and directives to
15
record such stops. As such, neither MCSO nor its employees had a reasonable basis for
16
believing that the collection and inventory of these recordings would result in an
17
employees dismissal, demotion, or suspension. Ariz. Rev. Stat. 38-1101(A).
18
Moreover, section 38-1101(C) states that employers need not [d]isclose any fact to the
19
law enforcement officer . . . that would impede the investigation, and section 38-
20
1101(D)(2) further exempts employers from the process requirements of sub-section (A)
21
when engaging in [p]reliminary questioning to determine the scope of the allegations or
22
if an investigation is necessary. Thus, even section 38-1101, by its own terms, reflects a
23
legislative prioritization of efficacy and integrity in internal investigations over some of
24
its enumerated process rights. MCSOs insistence that section 38-1101 mandated that it
25
inform officers of its retrieval efforts prior to recovering the recordings is without merit.
26
Third, this action was instituted in federal court pursuant to a federal statute;
27
accordingly, it is federal lawnot Arizona lawthat governs the existence and scope of
28
an asserted privilege. See Kerr, 511 F.2d at 197. The Arizona legislatures choice to
- 10 -
create some statutory protection may inform the calculus this Court employs to determine
questions of privilege in federal question cases, but it is not determinative. There is no
reason state officials who violate federal laws should receive preferential treatment in
asserting privileges based on their state of residency. To conclude otherwise would
undermine two major federal policies: ensuring the vigorous enforcement of civil rights
statutes against persons who violate the Constitution under the color of state law, and
maintaining the broadest scope of access to relevant evidence in civil litigation.
In spite of the foregoing, the Court recognizes that full public disclosure of the
record is often injudicious and may even threaten Defendants ability to observe the
10
Orders of this Court. In instances like this in which discretion may be warranted, the
11
party seeking to seal the record must, by Motion, set forth compelling reasons for
12
withholding particular pieces of information from the public. Kamakana, 447 F.3d at
13
117879. In determining whether to seal the challenged materials, the Court will consider
14
all relevant factors including, on the one hand, the publics history of access and the civic
15
interest in judicial oversight, accountability, and overall understanding of the judicial
16
process, and, on the other, the likelihood that disclosure would result in improper use of
17
the material for scandalous or libelous purposes or infringe on the needs of law
18
enforcement officials. See id. at 1179; Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d
19
1122, 113435 (9th Cir. 2003). Invoking a general category of privilege, without further
20
elaboration or specific linkage with particular evidence, is insufficient to satisfy the
21
compelling reasons standard. See Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1184. Nor will hypothetical
22
harms to law enforcement interests, or the potential that disclosure would expose a party
23
to embarrassment, incrimination, or . . . further litigation, compel the Court to seal its
24
records. Id.
25
Despite this Courts earlier Order that Defendants articulate compelling reasons
26
for redacting the Monitors Report, Defendants still insist that a showing of good cause
27
suffices. The Ninth Circuit has identified two exceptions to the compelling reasons
28
standard, neither of which applies here. First, the standard of review is relaxed for
- 11 -
documents that have traditionally been kept secret for important policy reasons. Id. The
class of materials covered by this exception is small: it extends only to those documents
for which there is neither a history of access nor an important public need justifying
access. Id. (quoting Times Mirror Co. v. United States, 873 F.2d 1210, 1219 (9th Cir.
1989)). Courts have found only two types of records to fall within this category: grand
jury transcripts and pre-indictment warrant materials. Id. The Kamakana court
emphasized that documents are not sealed on the grounds that they are traditionally kept
secret simply because such documents are usually or often deemed confidential, and it
rejected the argument that documents subject to the privacy, law enforcement, and
10
official information privileges automatically merit this exception. Id. at 1185. In other
11
words, while federal common law does recognize these qualified privileges, see Sanchez
12
v. City of Santa Ana, 936 F.2d 1027, 103334 (9th Cir. 1990), litigants must still satisfy
13
the compelling reasons test in demonstrating that the potential disadvantages of
14
disclosure outweigh the potential benefits.
15
A second exception to the compelling reasons standard exists for materials
16
unrelated, or only tangentially related, to the underlying cause of action. Foltz, 331
17
F.3d at 1135. Specifically, in drawing this distinction, the Ninth Circuit concluded that a
18
particularized showing of good cause suffices to preserve the secrecy of documents
19
attached to non-dispositive motions that are already the subject of a protective order, such
20
as private materials unearthed during discovery. Id.
21
Although the Monitors Report was not filed in connection with a dispositive
22
motion, it is a court-ordered compliance report that not only constitutes one of the court-
23
required remedies in this case, but also springs from allegations that are directly relevant
24
to the underlying causes of action and the Defendants failure to comply with its
25
discovery obligations. Accordingly, under the reasoning of Kamakana, the presumption
26
of access attaches to the Report unless Defendants can establish compelling reasons for
27
its sealing. See Rocky Mountain Bank v. Google, Inc., 428 Fed. Appx. 690, 692, 2001
28
WL 145832 (9th Cir. Apr. 15, 2011) (concluding that a compliance report lodged with
- 12 -
the district court was a quintessential judicial document and that [a]bsent some further
determination, the public would be entitled to access to it).
While Defendants identified the redactions they seek by page number, they have
not provided similarly specific explanations to justify the redactions. See Kamakana, 447
F.3d at 118384. Instead, Defendants offer only generalized reasons for withholding
categories of information from the public, such as that disclosure threatens both the
integrity and effectiveness of such investigations and that the information for which
redaction is sought fall[s] squarely within the domain protected by the constitutional
right to informational privacy. This is precisely the type of justification the court
10
rejected in Kamakana. Id. at 1184 (Simply mentioning a general category of privilege,
11
without any further elaboration or any specific linkage with the documents, does not
12
satisfy the burden.). Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendants have not demonstrated
13
compelling reasons to redact the following items in the record.2
14
A.
References to the Status of the Armendariz Investigation
15
Defendants have proposed redactions to several generic references to forensic
16
examinations being conducted on Armendarizs personal computer and cell phone, but
17
have not specified how their investigations would be affected by the publication of this
18
information. Defendants also object to the Monitors description of a timeline of
19
Armendarizs employment historyincluding citizen complaints, internal investigations,
20
and other incidentsthat was constructed by a sergeant within MCSO. Incongruously,
21
Defendants do not request redaction of the timeline itself, which is also published in the
22
Report. In any case, as the Kamakana court made clear, blanket claims of harm to law
23
enforcement interests do not constitute compelling reasons to keep information out of
24
the public record. See 447 F.3d at 1185. Without more, redaction is unmerited.
25
26
27
28
An appropriately redacted version of the Monitors Report has, thus, been made
available, withholding only those portions for which compelling reasons favor nondisclosure.
- 13 -
B.
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Statements by Armendariz Relating to Property and Evidence

Mishandling by HSU
Defendants have proposed to redact statements made by Deputy Armendariz

during a criminal interview that it was common for other members of HSU to leave
items like identifications laying around the office and that a Detention Officer would
just gather them up and take them up to his house and put them in the garage. (Monitors
Report at 1819.) Defendants offer only that disclosure of this information would
undermine the effectiveness of their ongoing investigations. Nevertheless, information
regarding Armendariz and possible evidence mishandling by HSU is already widely
known, has been discussed in hearings open to the public, and has been reported on by
the media. See Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1184 (concluding that sealing documents was
unwarranted where the information sought to be redacted was already publicly available).
Moreover, the property discovered at Armendarizs residence is discussed elsewhere in
the Monitors Report without redaction. (See Monitors Report at 18.) Although
Defendants also contend that disclosing this information would contravene the purpose
of section 38-1101(L), the proposed redactions do not implicate any identifiable law
enforcement officers other than the deceased Armendariz. Again, such undifferentiated
statements do not establish compelling reasons to seal the record.
C.
Information Concerning Armendarizs Mental Health Records
The Monitors Report contains several mentions of Armendarizs voluntary

entrance into and subsequent release from a Behavioral Treatment Center, at which time
he was deemed fit for duty. The reasons given in support of these redactions are
grounded in the personal privacy rights of Deputy Armendariz. The Court concludes
these do not constitute compelling justification for withholding these statements.
Individuals have a constitutional right to privacy in avoiding disclosure of
personal matters, which extends to medical information. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589,
599 (1977); Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260, 1269 (9th Cir.
1998). However, this right is conditional, and subject to limited impairment if properly
- 14 -
justified. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 602. Like all qualified privileges, the individuals right to
privacy in this regard must be balanced against the publics interest in disclosure. Carlson
v. Pima Cnty., 141 Ariz. 487, 491, 687 P.2d 1242, 1246 (1984); see also Scottsdale
Unified Sch. Dist. No. 48 of Maricopa Cnty. v. KPNX Broad. Co., 191 Ariz. 297, 302,
955 P.2d 534, 539 (1998).
With respect to Armendarizs history of mental health and substance abuse
problems, several factors weigh in favor of disclosure. First, Defendants have cited no
cases establishing that an employer can invoke a deceased employees right to privacy to
withhold information in litigation. To the extent that the right to privacy exists for this
10
sort of information, the privilege is intended for Armendarizs benefit alone and is
11
personal to him. Furthermore, Armendarizs mental health and suicide are already a
12
matter of public record. While an individuals right to privacy in information does not
13
vanish merely because the information may be available through some other public
14
source, the expectation of privacy in it is certainly diminished. See Scottsdale Unified,
15
191 Ariz. at 303, 955 P.2d at 540. Finally, and most importantly, the information bears on
16
several important issues in this case: Armendariz was a witness at the initial trial, and a
17
participant in many of the activities that gave rise to Plaintiffs claims. Further, his
18
competency as an officer and his performance before and after trial and this Courts
19
Orders relate directly to both the underlying police practices that gave rise to this
20
litigation and the quality of supervision within MCSO. Because public policy supports
21
disclosure and Defendants have not demonstrated that withholding this information is
22
justifiable, the redactions are rejected.
23
D.
Non-specific Information Regarding Ongoing Investigations
24
Defendants have also requested that generic references to the existence of ongoing
25
investigations be redacted, such as the phrases two lieutenants, two sergeants, and 4
26
detectives, to do what he referred to as thematic interviews, supervisory
27
investigation, and the property investigation, among other things. Again, Defendants
28
have not explained how their investigations will be in any way impeded by the release of
- 15 -
this information, and the request for redaction is denied.
E.
Defendants have proposed redactions to several other sentences on page nineteen
of the Monitors Report but do not offer any explanation for why redaction is warranted.
Because Defendants have made no effort to comply with Kamakana, those portions of
the Report will not be sealed.
Other Proposed Redactions for Which No Justification Is Offered.
III.
ORDERS CONCERNING ONGOING INVESTIGATIONS
It is obviously one of the fundamental goals of the supplementary injunctive relief
to bring MCSOs regular PSB operations up to the standard required to ensure that the
10
Constitutional rights of the members of the Plaintiff class are guaranteed by MCSO going
11
forward. In satisfaction of its injunctive obligations, MCSO must both investigate past
12
and potential ongoing violations by MCSO officers and their supervisors and also
13
evaluate the adequacy of their investigations. (Id. at 4445.) This applies both to routine
14
PSB operations, and to PSB investigations like this one that are directly related to the
15
underlying case involving alleged widespread MCSO misconduct. MCSO has admitted
16
indeed, insistedon numerous occasions that it understood its responsibilities under this
17
Courts Orders to undertake investigations where appropriate and to generally cooperate
18
with the appointed Monitor in doing so. (See, e.g., Doc. 700 at 38, 62.)
19
The Monitor is under a duty from this Court to certify when the MCSOs internal
20
investigation procedures render it in full and effective compliance with the requirements
21
of the injunction, which carries with it the concomitant responsibility to evaluate the
22
extent to which individual investigations comply with the Order. For example, under the
23
Supplemental Injunction the Monitor is specifically tasked with evaluating the
24
effectiveness of the MCSOs changes in the areas of supervision and oversight and
25
reporting the same to the parties and the Court; with reviewing the corrective action
26
taken by the MCSO concerning any possible violations of this Order or MCSO policy
27
and procedures and reporting the same to the parties and the Court; and with
28
assess[ing] and report[ing] on the Defendants implementation of this Order, in
- 16 -
addition to appraising MCSOs compliance with the Order generally. (Id. at 47, 50.) The
Order also provides that the Monitor may make additional recommendations to the
Parties regarding measures necessary to ensure timely, Full and Effective Compliance
with this Order and its underlying objectives. (Id. at 54.)
In making such assessments, cases like the present onewhich provide the MCSO
with both significant allegations of departmental misconduct and significant motivation
to obfuscate the truth to avoid embarrassmentpublic exposure should the allegations
prove true in whole or in part, provide the Monitor with a unique opportunity to assess
MCSOs willingness to implement an appropriate investigation and make appropriate
10
determinations in cases in which it might have significant impulse to do otherwise. An
11
adequate internal affairs division must be willing to engage in thorough examination and,
12
in appropriate cases, agency exposure to discipline and painful public accountability. Of
13
course, to make an appropriate assessment of whether MCSOs PSB is so acting, the
14
Monitor must necessarily have complete access to Defendants internal affairs
15
investigations. This includes familiarity with the manner in which MCSO pursues an
16
investigationbe it criminal or administrative in naturethe investigations initial and
17
continuing scope in light of the information the investigation uncovers, the performance
18
of the investigators, and the kind of disciplineif anyultimately imposed at its
19
conclusion.
20
To protect that information gathered by MCSO in internal administrative
21
processes that are adequately conducted from being publicly disclosed contrary to
22
relevant state law or policy, or from being drawn upon by the Monitor in whatever other
23
independent investigations he or the Court deems necessary to implement, the Monitor
24
shall implement the following procedure:
25
1.
The Monitor shall assign two or more dedicated members of the
26
Monitoring team who shall be specifically identified to all parties as such (hereafter IA
27
Monitors).
28
2.
These IA Monitors will continue to oversee MCSO internal investigations,
- 17 -
and are to evaluate, educate, assist, and provide investigative suggestions and/or
suggested appropriate investigate subjects and targets to MCSO.
3.
The IA Monitors shall be walled off from other members of the Monitoring
team, and, with the exception of the Monitor or either of the two Deputy Monitors, and
this Court, the IA Monitors shall not share with anyone the information obtained through
any PSB investigation or MCSO personnel file. Nor, except as set forth in Clause 8
below, shall the IA Monitors play any role in any independent investigation conducted by
the Monitor. Nothing in this Order prevents the Monitor from communicating any
information to the Court.
10
4.
To the extent that the IA Monitors suggest possible subjects and targets for
11
internal investigation to the MCSO that are related to the MCSOs compliance with this
12
Courts Orders, the subject matter of this lawsuit, or investigations related to or arising
13
from the allegations of Deputies Armendariz and Perez, such suggestions shall be in a
14
dated writing or electronic format submitted to the Captain of PSB and to the Monitor
15
and his Deputy Monitors.
16
5.
When MCSO undertakes a new investigation that relates to (a) the MCSOs
17
compliance with its discovery and/or disclosure obligations in this case, (b) the MCSOs
18
compliance with the resulting orders of the Court in this case, or, (c), any criminal or
19
administrative investigations arising from or related to the Armendariz or Perez
20
investigations, it is ordered to lodge under seal with the Court and to provide the Monitor
21
written notice specifically identifying the subjects and targets under inquiry and
22
specifically referencing the administrative number assigned to the investigation.
23
Moreover, Defendants are to update the Court, through lodging a document under seal,
24
and the Monitor by a separate writing when new subjects are added as targets of an
25
existing investigation. The Monitor, Deputy Monitor or IA Monitors may have access to
26
such information but may not disclose it to the public or other members of the Monitor
27
team without the authorization of the Court. The MCSO will similarly inform the Court
28
when it closes such an investigation without action, when it closes an investigation with
- 18 -
adverse action to the employee, if the adverse action is appealed, and if so, when the
appeal is abandoned, terminated or dismissed, or the matter is otherwise terminated.
6.
If the IA Monitors offer suggested investigative topics or targets that are
not adopted or implemented by MCSO, the IA Monitors are directed to communicate
MCSOs inaction to the Monitor and his Deputies, and the Monitor is entitled to consider
such declinations in assessing MCSOs full and effective compliance with the Courts
Orders.
7.
The IA Monitors will evaluate the diligence, efficiency, and thoroughness
with which MCSO undertakes and completes the internal investigations that it
10
undertakes. To the extent that the Monitor with or without consultation with his Deputy
11
Monitors and IA Monitors, concludes that MCSO investigations are needlessly
12
prolonged, underinclusive, otherwise do not comply with adequate standards of
13
investigation or are not being conducted in good faith, he shall immediately communicate
14
such an assessment to MCSO and to the Monitor and his Deputies.
15
8.
Should the Monitor desire to undertake an independent investigation of
16
such matters, the Monitor will then raise the matter with the Court and the parties. The
17
Court will then determine, after affording the parties an opportunity to be heard, whether
18
the MCSOs investigation is being adequately conducted, and whether the Monitor may
19
initiate his own investigation, and/or whether, in doing so, the Monitor may have access
20
to any information uncovered in MCSOs PSB investigation.
21
Under the provisions of the Supplemental Injunctive Order, the Monitor also has
22
the authority to conduct independent investigations that he, or the Court, deems
23
necessary. In addition to any authority explicitly contained in the Order, the Court also
24
has the inherent authority necessary to ensure the compliance with its own orders.
25
Federal courts may freely invoke the weight of judicial authority if state and local
26
authorities, who have the primary responsibility for curing constitutional violations, fail
27
in their affirmative obligations. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 281 (1977). Where
28
rights secured by the Constitution have been traduced, federal courts possess whatever
- 19 -
powers are necessary to remedy [these] violations because they are charged with
protecting these rights. Stone v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 968 F.2d 850, 861 (9th Cir. 1992).
To this end, federal courts are not reduced to issuing injunctions against state officers
and hoping for compliance. Once issued, an injunction may be enforced. Hutto v.
Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 690 (1978). The Courts delegation to the Monitor of the authority
to conduct investigations is not exclusive of the Court retaining authority to make its own
inquiries and to compel attendance of MCSO officials necessary to undertake such
inquiries as it pertains to the enforcement of the orders of this Court. See Degen v. United
States, 517 U.S. 820, 827 (1996).
10
11
12
13
14
When the Monitor conducts inquiries at the Courts behest or pursuant to his
independent authority in the Order:
1.
MCSOs cooperation with such investigations is required. MCSO shall also
provide any necessary facilities or resources to facilitate such investigations.

2.
Neither the Monitor nor the Court is required to first offer topics or subjects
15
for internal investigation to MCSO that MCSO is not otherwise internally investigating
16
prior to initiating their own investigation.
17
3.
The Monitor shall not initiate independent investigations into matters that
18
the PSB is investigating when the Monitor believes that MCSO is adequately, timely and
19
reasonably conducting the investigation.
20
4.
Nothing in this Order waives any of the applicable rights or privileges
21
belonging to subjects of the Monitors investigations or interviews, including those
22
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment, see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966);
23
Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967), and the common law.
24
5.
To the extent that the subjects of these investigations claim any recourse to
25
the statutory rights outlined in section 38-1101, however, those rights are limited to those
26
set forth in the statute itself. Investigations initiated by the Monitor at the direction of the
27
Court are not investigations conducted by an employer, and do not implicate the
28
statutory protections of section 38-1101. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. 38-1101(A). There are
- 20 -
also no statutory protections for persons that are not subject to being dismissed, demoted
or suspended as the result of an administrative process. Nor is there ongoing protection
for materials generated in investigations that are terminated without action, that are
terminated because any adverse action is not timely appealed, or are terminated because
the appeal is terminated. See id. 38-1101(L).
6.
To the extent that the MCSO claims that it is privileged or otherwise
protected from providing information to the Monitor in an independent investigation or
otherwise, and the Monitor contests the existence of the privilege or the protection, the
matter shall be decided by the Court.
10
11
12
13
14
15
The parties and the Monitor will proceed pursuant to these protocols.
CONCLUSION
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants Redactions to the Monitors
Report are ACCEPTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting Application to Withdraw as Counsel of
Record for Defendants, Doc. 773, subject to the conditions set forth on the record,
16
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED setting a hearing on Thursday, December 4,
17
2014 at 8:30 a.m. in Courtroom 602 of the Sandra Day OConnor Courthouse at 401 W.
18
Washington Street, Phoenix, Arizona 85003. The Court may, upon further notice require
19
MCSO command staff and other personnel to be present to respond to inquiries
20
concerning their compliance with the Courts orders on this date.
21
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a copy of this Order shall be delivered to the
22
Maricopa County Administrative Offices to the extent that it may require the
23
augmentation of the Monitors investigative staff.
24
Dated this 20th day of November, 2014.
25
26
27
28
- 21 -
Case 2:07-cv-02513-GMS Document 795-1 Filed 11/20/14 Page 1 of 40
TO:
Honorable G. Murray Snow
FROM:
Chief (Ret) Robert S. Warshaw, Monitor
DATE:
September 28, 2014
SUBJECT:
Update and Assessment ofMCSO's Armendariz and Related Investigations
BACKGROUND
On April 30, 2014, Former Deputy Charlie Annendariz was arrested by the Maricopa County
Sheriffs Office on various drug charges, stemming from a police response to the Armendariz
home by the Phoenix Police Department (PPD). PPD responded for a burglary in progress call.
There was no merit to the call - Armendariz was essentially hallucinating - but PPD Officers
observed narcotics and potential evidentiary property which should have been in the custody of
MCSO. MCSO served a search warrant and recovered marijuana and other narcotics, numerous
license plates, United States and Mexico driver licenses, other types of identification, credit
cards, and over 500 DVDs which were later determined to contain videos of thousands of
enforcement actions taken by Armendariz.
On May 8, 2014 at approximately 1435 hours, the MCSO Special Investigations Unit and the
MCSO Tactical Operations Unit found Ramon C. "Charlie" Ramirez-Armendariz deceased at his
home located at 3214 W. Eugie Ave., Phoenix, AZ. Armendariz was found lying face down on
the floor with his head suspended 4-6 inches off the floor by a rope affixed to a pool table. His
death was ultimately ruled a suicide.
These events were the subject of a May 14, 2014 hearing before the Court. Further, there were
several meetings involving me and my staff, who were present for a site visit from May 13-15.
On May 15th, the Court issued an extensive Order (originally under seal), requiring that several
steps be taken to gather evidence and fully investigate the activities of Armendariz and any other
MCSO employees who may have been using recording devices - either personally owned or
agency issued - during the course of their duties. This Order also mandated that MCSO work
closely with the Monitor on this investigation.
From the start, the investigation was poorly planned and executed. Rather than taking the
targeted and more invasive approach we suggested, MCSO initiated an ill-conceived survey
process designed to capture the existence of audio and video recording devices in use by MCSO
personnel, as well as any saved recordings. Internal Affairs, currently Professional Standards
Bureau (PSB), received hundreds of CDs and DVDs of motor vehicle stops, contacts and
interactions with residents and individuals in Maricopa County, including from the Armendariz
residence and the Human Smuggling Unit (HSU).
In the midst of the Armendariz investigation, a tern1inated deputy, Cisco Perez, alleged during an
unemployment hearing that it was common for HSU members to retrieve items from raids and
safe houses and retain them for personal or MCSO use. These statements seemed to corroborate
Page 1of40
the activity which led to the finding of many seized personal items at the Armendariz home. This
revelation derailed the in-progress administrative investigation, and prompted a criminal
investigation into the activities of current and former HSU members.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
A voluntary, self-survey instrnment was hastily designed and deployed in response to the
requirements of the Court Order. This self-survey instrnment was not provided careful
developmental attention and as a result was designed in what the Monitoring Team considers to
be a flawed manner. The instrnment failed to adequately and completely address the needs as
expressed in the Court Order to obtain specific information. Additionally, the instrnment was
designed as a "voluntary" instrnment that also led to delayed responses, incomplete responses,
and no response at all from members of the MCSO. As a result of the use of this instrnment, data
received has been inconsistent and incomplete and remains so to this date.
MCSO failed to recognize the complexities of the Armendariz suicide investigation from its
initiation. The pursuit of this investigation by the MCSO has uncovered severe deficiencies in
several areas of MCSO operations. Flaws have been identified in critical areas such as
investigatory training and intenogation techniques. Poor interrogation skills were observed
during the administrative and criminal interviews conducted in response to allegations made by
Deputy Cisco Perez, who had been terminated. The lack of a properly prepared investigative
plan prior to initiating the interview process highlighted the lack of training and established
protocols for investigators assigned to the Professional Standards Bureau.
Also revealed were weaknesses in the evidence collection and cataloging mechanisms employed
by the department. As a result, witnesses were subject to secondary interviews and the
cataloging of evidence has remained in constant turmoil. This turmoil has caused extensive
investigatory delays in attempts to conelate multiple items of seized evidence with individuals,
property and audio and/or video recordings.
Video reviews have been conducted without a standardized review process and are subject to
personal views and bias. This lack of standardized process has exacerbated problems with the
cataloging of evidence that was seized from the Armendariz residence, as well as the
documentation of the individual reviews themselves.
The established chronology of the MCSO tenure of Deputy Armendariz highlighted problems in
the performance review and appraisal process for MCSO personnel. Lacking were supervisor
reviews that included developmental programs and documentation, and the follow through with
progressive discipline. His career has provided insight into institutional problems with the
receipt and logging of citizen complaints, the initiation and investigation of internal
investigations, and the cataloging of PSB proceedings. Also of concern is the lack of a viable
and consistently utilized disciplinary system department wide.
I.
SELF-SURVEYS
1. INITIAL OBSERVATIONS
Page 2 of 40
Following the court hearing of May 14, 2014, Monitoring Team members Chief Martinez, Ms.
Ramirez and I met with Chief Deputy Sheridan, Captain Holmes and Ms. Christine Stutz from
the Maricopa County Attorney's Office (MCAO) to develop an investigative strategy that would
incorporate the coercive powers of Internal Affairs to ascertain information regarding deputies'
personal use, capture, and cataloging of audio and video recordings. Chief Deputy Sheridan
initially advocated for a softer approach. I expressed my strong opinion that MCSO should use a
more elevated approach. After MCAO attorney Christine Stutz supported my position, Chief
Deputy Sheridan then announced that it was always his position to employ the Internal Affairs
methodology. During the course of this meeting Sheriff Arpaio made an appearance, but offered
no substantive contribution prior to his departure approximately 10 minutes later. As all of us
departed the meeting, it was my belief that the attendees were in clear agreement of the future
process that would be undertaken.
At approximately 5: 15PM, while returning to your chambers, I received a phone call from Chief
Deputy Sheridan. He notified me that without his knowledge, Deputy Chief Trombi distributed
an email in direct conflict with the decisions of our collective group. This email follows.
From: David Trombi - SHERIFFX <D Trombi(c41vfCS0.1Vlaricopa.gov>
Date: JV!ay 14, 2014 at 15:41:22 }.;JST
To: Bill VanAusdal - SHERIFFX <w vanausdal@1VICSO.maricopa.gov>, Dan Whelan SHERIFFX
<D Whelan@iVJCSO.maricopa.gov>,
Dante
Proto
SHERIFFX
<D Proto@1vfCSO.maricopa.gov>,
Dmdd
Toporek
SHERIFFX
Donald
Rosenberger
SHERIFFX
<D Toporek@1VICSO.maricopa.gov>,
<D Rosenberger@iVJCSO.Maricopa.gov>,
Fred
ivlcCann
SHERIFFX
<F }.;fcCann@}.;JCSO.maricopa.gov>,
George
Hawthorne
SHERIFFX
<G Hawthorne@1VICSO.maricopa.gov>,
Jmnes
Schoeninger
SHERIFFX
<J Schoeninger@1vJCSO.maricopa.gov>,
Joe
Rodriquez
SHERIFFX
SHERIFFX
<J Rodriquez@iVJCSO.maricopa.gov>,
John
D'Amico
<j damico@1vJCSO.maricopa.gov>,
"John
Kleinheinz
(Capt)
SHERIFFX"
<J Kleinheinz@}.;JCSO.Nfaricopa.gov>,
Joseph
Sousa
SHERIFFX
SHERIFFX
<J Sousa@1VICSO.maricopa.gov>,
Ken
Booker
<Ki Booker@AIJCSO.maricopa.gov>,
Kristina
Henderson
SHERIFFX
<K Henderson@}.;JCSO.maricopa.gov>,
Larry
Kratzer
SHERIFFX
SHERIFFX
<L Kratzer@NICSO.maricopa.gov>,
iVlaLinda
Johanning
SHERIFFX
<Alf Johanning@AIJCSO.maricopa.gov>,
}.;farkley
Johnson
SHERIFFX
<markley johnson@iVJCSO.maricopa.gov>,
Paul
Ellis
SHERIFFX
<P Ellis@NICSO.maricopa.gov>,
Peter
Nfetzler
SHERIFFX
<P Metzler@JVICSO.maricopa.gov>,
Randy
Brice
SHERIFFX
<R Brice@1VICSO.maricopa.gpv>,
Todd
Hoggatt
<T Hoggatt@MCSO.maricopa.gov>,
William
Hindman
SHERIFFX
SHERIFFX
<W Hindman@AIJCSO.maricopa.gov>,
Brian
Jakowinicz
<B Jakowinicz@}.;JCSO.maricopa.gov>
Cc: Jerry Sheridan - SHERIFFX <J Sheridan@MCSO.Maricopa.gov>, "Ken Holmes (A)
<Captain> - SHERIFFX" <K Holmes@1VICSO.maricopa.gov>, Lany Farnsworth - SHERIFFX
<L Farnsworth@AIJCSO.maricopa.gov>,
Edward
Lopez
SHERIFFX
Page 3 of 40
<E_i2Rz@Af'CS0.1v[gricopa.gov>
Subject: Past Video Recordings
Several weeks back we collected information fiom your districts/divisions regarding how many
video cameras (dash and body) were being utilized in your normal patrol fimctions. A general
list was compiled by district/division outlining how many, personal or issued and what is done
with the video when obtained. I am now directing all district /division commanders
to immediately ascertain where these past videos are or what has been done with them. J'vfore
importantly, I need to have ALL these videos gathered and sent to Internal Affairs ASAP Attn:
Sgt. iV!ike Reese. Please note;* ALL VIDEO JS TO BE PRESERVED. Simply gather it and send
as directed. If video is currently in Property and Evidence, please note that on a spreadsheet
along with the name of the deputy. Ensure we go back as far as possible to gather all video. It is
imperative that we are as thorough as possible in this endeavor. Ifyou have questions please call
me directly.
At approximately 6:00pm that evening, Chief Martinez spoke with Chief Deputy Sheridan by
phone, reaffim1ing the retention of video data requirements as directed by your Order. It is
during this conversation that Deputy Chief Sheridan described another early afternoon meeting
that had occurred at MCSO and included Sheriff Arpaio, Chief Deputy Sheridan, Attorney Tom
Liddy, Attorney Tim Casey, and Attorney Christine Stutz. Chief Deputy Sheridan stated that
towards the end of the meeting, Deputy Chief Trombi was summoned into the meeting and was
directed to pursue the course of action outlined in his email.
Chief Martinez attempted to ascertain why Chief Deputy Sheridan would allow our meeting to
continue for two and a half hours, identifying a preferred investigative strategy, when MCSO
executive staff with counsel present had already made and communicated a contrary decision to
subordinate personnel. Chief Deputy Sheridan appeared dumbfounded and could not recall that
Deputy Chief Trombi had been directed to pursue this course of action in a meeting in which
Chief Deputy Sheridan was present. I note that Attorney Christine Stutz was present in both
meetings as well, and did not volunteer that an alternative course of action had already been
instituted.
'
At approximately 7:00pm that evening, Chief Martinez, Ms. Ramirez and I met with Chief
Deputy Sheridan. The Chief Deputy incredul01,1Sly had no recollection of Deputy Chief Trombi
being advised to take the course of action he had taken. Chief Deputy Sheridan attributed his
mental lapse to fatigue, stress and distractions. He would later write in a letter to me dated May
14, 2014, "The fact that Chief Trombi had been directed earlier to make contact with the
Division Commanders never occurred to me. Whether it was from mental fatigue, confusion
from many options presented throughout the day I simply do not know why I did not recall."
Deputy Chief Trombi was then summoned into the meeting in order to assess what responses and
actions he had received from recipients of his email. More specifically, had the recipients
forwarded the directive to their subordinates as provided or did they alter the direction in any
way? In an attempt to obtain this infomrntion, Deputy Chief Trombi entered and left the meeting
on several occasions. At one point he indicated that some recipients had seen his email, while
others had not.
Page 4 of 40
During this meeting, I requested that Captain Holmes, the then commanding officer of Internal
Affairs (who has since been promoted to Deputy Chief), come into the meeting, to assess the
viability of resurrecting the originally agreed upon Internal Affairs approach with the Trombi
email directive as a possible parallel approach. Captain Holmes reluctantly supported the Internal
Affairs investigative approach.
During our meeting, we discussed the prospects of there being additional MCSO personnel who,
like Armendariz, had kept recordings. Deputy Chief Trombi stated that he did not believe other
MCSO deputies would do what Armendariz had done and that any deputies that may be in
possession of videos would come forward with their files. This was illustrative of the MCSO's
preconceived notion that appears to pern1eate through this entire investigation - that Charlie
Armendariz was a rogue employee and no other MCSO employees would engage in the same
types of activity.
We left MCSO at approximately 9:30 PM, somewhat dismayed at the events which had
unfolded. We reaffirmed the contents of your Order and advised Chief Deputy Sheridan that he
could expect continued follow up in the morning of May 15, 2014.
On May 15, 2014, an email was forwarded to all MCSO deputies requesting a response to the
requirements of the May 15 111 Court Order issued by Judge Snow in response to the arrest and
subsequent suicide of MCSO Deputy Ramon "Charlie" Ramirez-Armendariz. This email
contained a self-reporting survey. The target date for return of these surveys was May 21, 2014,
but by that date only 466 surveys had been returned. It was anticipated that the remaining 266
surveys would be returned no later than June 14, 2014.
The self-reporting survey as created was a flawed instrument that, although intended to retrieve
the desired infonnation as ordered by the Court, would ultimately return incomplete and
inconsistent data, and would cause frustration and lead to the need for further inquiries.
As of September 26, 2014, 1408 self-reporting surveys have been received. A total of 521
individuals have reported access to audio/video recording devices. A total of 100 individuals
reported the use of 142 recording devices from 2007 to the present. Of these, 77 devices are
county owned, and 67 are personally owned devices. Currently 991 Posse members have
responded to the survey. The initial slow response from the posse was troubling, but not
unexpected given the voluntary nature of the survey instrument. As a result of the flawed
methodology utilized to gain insight into the use of recording devices, the investigatory element
of surprise was lost. It is our belief the methodology failed to produce an accurate accounting of
recording devices that were in use throughout the period in question, as well as the total number
of actual recordings. The survey period covers any recording devices used for traffic stops from
2007 until present.
The survey failed to capture not only the Manufacturer of the device, but the type of recording
device (i.e.: audio, video, and audio/video). This has hampered the cataloging of reported
devices, and the number of devices inventoried has fluctuated upward, almost weekly.
Page 5 of 40
To date 121 CDs have been turned in with the survey. MCSO command, believing this inquiry
to be a "fishing expedition", has hesitated to initiate a full investigation until each CD is
reviewed individually and an assessment made as to whether any criminal or departmental
violations have occurred. Capt. Holmes, then the Commanding Officer of PSB, believed that
only after a violation had been found and documented, should an interview be conducted. As of
this writing, MCSO has received 121 CDs. These CDs contain 2146 videos and all have been
reviewed. Further lieutenant reviews were required of 30 videos, and these have been completed.
Additionally, there were 14 videos in which the only language spoken was Spanish. It is
unknown if these Spanish only videos are included in this number. MCSO has never provided
the Monitoring Team with specific information regarding any of these incidents, the deputies
involved or the types of infractions being investigated.
On July 9, 2014, Capt. Bailey, who replaced Captain Holmes as commander of PSB, requested
clarification from the Monitoring Team regarding the self-reporting memorandums on traffic
stop audio/video. His request follows:
To the kfonitor Team,
Regarding the Self-Reporting memorandums on traffic stop audio/video, we are seeking
clarification. As we read the Court Order,
(a) identify all of its officers, volunteers, and employees both current and former who used or
had access to any kind of recording device during trcif.fic stops fiom2007 forward, (b) identify
specifically what kinds of devices each officer/volunteer/employee
used (e.g. audio, video, dashcam, eyeglass cam, body mount camera, etc.), when
those devices were acquired; and whether the devices were issued by the JV!CSO,
provided by the officer/volunteer/employee him or herself, or hmv the devices
were otherwise acquired or came into use,
We believe the task at hand is to identifj;, regarding traffic stops, "kinds of devices, " when
acquired, and whether they were k!CSO issued or personally owned. We would like clarification
that this is indeed the only information we need to provide per the Court Order.
Through conversations with 1\lfajor Peters it is the understanding of my staff that the kfonitors
are requesting us to specifically identify every recording device from 2007 to current, including
make, model, serial number, and if applicable eve1y vehicle number associated to a deputy who
recorded a traffic stop. The Order does not appear to require this level of specificity.
As we have advised you, we have found that historically there was no consistency and/or record
keeping for recording devices, therefore, we are not in a position to readily identify such
specific information as what has been requested by J\!lajor Peters (make model and serial number
or vehicle information) other than what we have already provided. I believe that our spreadsheet
for the self-reporting memorandums has captured the information that was required by the JV!ay
15 Order by identifj;ing who used or had access to the recording devices, the kinds of devices
that were used and whether they were personally owned or issued by k!CSO. A majority of
memorandums list specifically what kinds of devices people had access to or whether they were
used for trcif.fic stops but not the specific make, model and serial number of each device. As
Page 6 of 40
such, these memorandums would potentially be considered "deficient" requiring fi1rther

investigative effort that is not specifically required by the Order. It seems the purpose of the
Order was to ascertain the types of devices being used (or able to be accessed) during traffic
stops from 2007 to present- the additional requirement of make, model and serial number does
not appear to be directly relevant to this purpose.
Also, with respect to the analysis of the data that was requested by the J\;fonitor team, if we were
to count eve1J1 device, as requested, we would run into an accounting issue due to specific
devices being counted multiples times if issued or used by multiple personnel from 2007 to
present. We are happy to run the analysis ~with this caveat, we just vvanted to be sure that is what
you were requesting (that we run it off ofthe total number of devices identified even if that might
mean that a device has been counted twice).
Major Peters also requested we specifically identifY each unit/work assignment where personnel
were assigned. We have included this information in the current Reformatted Self-Reporting
Survey results spreadsheet.
Please advise whether you believe that identifYing the "kind" of device (as indicated by the "(e.g.
audio, video, dashcam, eyeglass cam, bodymount camera, etc.)" of the J\;fay 15 Order) with
whatever level of specificity was used by the responding person (some indicated just the type of
device, some identified the devices by name, etc.) is insufficient for Compliance with paragraphs
(a) and (b), and state whether it is your position that failure to identifY the make, model and
serial number constitutes a deficient response requiring fitrther investigative effort. Once we
have your clarification, we will determine how to proceed.
Sincerely,
Captain Steve Bailey
J\!laricopa County Sherijfs Office
Commander, Professional Standards Bureau
Clearly MCSO continues to resist seeking specific recording device information.

Commander Girvin provided the following advice and direction:
Captain Bailey,
As I understand it, the topic of capturing make, model, and serial number for recording devices
came zp in conversation during our last site visit when your spreadsheets were being
discussed J\!lajor Peters asked if J\!JCSO was capturing this information, and when he was
informed that it was not being captured, he suggested that it should be, particularly for devices
acquired by J\!JCSO. Jllfost agencies are able to provide this type of information for property they
acquire. He also suggested that, at a minimum, J\!JCSO would need to capture this information
movingforwardfor any newly acquired devices.
Page 7 of 40
I'd like to clariJY a few issues you raise.

You "Wrote, "Through conversations with ~Major Peters it is the understanding of my staff that the
1Vlonitors are requesting us to specifically identifY eve1;1 recording device fiwn 2007 to current,
including make, model, serial number, and if applicable every vehicle number associated to a
deputy who recorded a traffic stop." (Emphasis added.) As mentioned above, 1vfajor
Peters suggested that you capture the specific device information. The vehicle information is
actually required under section (c) of the order, which states: "(c) identiJY each patrol car that
may have had such a device mounted in it and the current location of that device and/or patrol
car;" Keep in mind that the standard in the Order is "used or had access to" during a traffic
stop. A recording need not have taken place.
You wrote, "Also, with respect to the analysis of the data that was requested by the 1vfonitor
team, ifvve were to count eve1y device, as requested, we would run into an accounting issue due
to specific devices being counted multiples times if issued or used by multiple personnel fiwn
2007 to present." This statement appears to contradict itself Please consider "Whether you are
counting eve1y device, or you are counting some devices more than once. Your concern appears
to derive fiwn the flawed survey instrument used in this process. IdentifYing each device with as
much specificity as possible would eliminate this concern. This is. also why we emphasized
identifYing which organizational components had multiple agency-owned cameras assigned to
it. For example, if 20 officers working in a unit with JO agency owned cameras assigned to it
claimed access to cameras, you could reasonably conclude that these 20 officers were referring
to these same 10 cameras. You would not count the cameras 20 times.
In answer to your question, "Please advise whether you believe that identiJYing the 'kind' of
device (as indicated by the '(e.g. audio, video, dashcam, eyeglass cam, bodymount camera, etc.)'
of the }lfay 15 Order) with whatever level of specificity was used by the responding
person (some indicated just the type of device, some identified the devices by name, etc.) is
insufficient for Compliance with paragraphs (a) and (b), and state whether it is your position
that failure to identifY the make, model and serial number constitutes a deficient response
requiring fi1rther investigative effort. " (Emphasis added.) The standard cannot be "with
whatever level of specificity was used by the responding person". If an objective reviewer can
determine 'that a response is deficient, that response is not acceptable simply because it was
submitted as such.
At a minimum, the agency must capture type of device (dashcam, eyeglass cam, bodymount,
digital voice recorder, pocket cassette recorder, etc.) and its recording capability (video, audio,
or both). Any other information that is readily available (make, model, serial number) should be
noted. Please note that simply identiJYing a manufacturer is insufficient, particularly if that
manufacturer produces multiple types of devices.
Regards,
John
Commander (Ret.) John M Girvin
Page 8 of 40
Deputy jl,;Jonitor
In addition to the CDs received as a result of the self-reporting survey, the HSU also turned in 3
binders of CDs from their Unit. There are 2203 reported videos on these CDs and MCSO repmis
that all have been reviewed. Of those, 48 videos were identified for further review by a
lieutenant for potential MCSO policy violations and/or state law violations.
2. PREL!JvIINARY FINDINGS
MCSO to date has not created a plan to address individuals who have not responded to the
survey, nor to address those individuals whose surveys have been deemed insufficient. The bulk
of the missing surveys are from the volunteer Posse members. This lack of response appears to
be a result of the inadequate manner in which MCSO administers and oversees the program.
Anecdotal information leads the Monitoring Team to believe that if Posse members were to
respond to MCSO as requested, the number of surveys would dramatically increase, but not
necessarily the number of recordings. Posse members have been observed in recordings
presently.
3. RECOJVlivIENDATIONS
MCSO should be directed to continue to pursue the collection of the self-reporting surveys in
spite of the flaws with the instrument.
All recordings received with the surveys should be reviewed for policy and/or criminal
violations. At this time MCSO, claims that this has occurred. Discipline, if appropriate after the
conclusion of the reviews, should be dispensed as well. Given MCSO's video collection
methodology, the Monitoring Team questions whether anyone would have submitted a recording
of a bad citizen interaction and the validity of any outcomes reported.
During September 2014, the Monitoring Team reviewed a non-scientific sample of the HSU
videos. During these reviews, no conduct similar to that observed in the Armendariz video
reviews was noted. Persons stopped were both males and females of various races/ethnicity.
Almost without exception, the drivers were asked for their licenses and insurance and were told
the reason for the stop. In many cases, records checks were not completed on the drivers and
little if any conversation took place with any passengers.
With the number of reviews conducted, it was difficult to tell if there were any patterns, other
than a significant number of stops for minor violations with few records checks and almost no
citations. It was not possible to determine from the video segments reviewed if deputies were
focusing on some particular types of violators or violations. The Monitoring Team expects to
conduct additional reviews once specific inforn1ation is received from MCSO on those identified
as problematic in their review.
During September 2014 the Monitoring Team also reviewed a non-scientific sample of the selfreporting videos. Some of the videos were only seconds long, others clearly did not contain the
entire contact, and still others would not play at all. In the videos that could be reviewed, no
Page 9 of 40
conduct similar to that seen in the Armendariz videos was observed. The Monitoring Team
expects to conduct additional reviews once specific information is received from MCSO on those
identified as problematic in their reviews.
The Posse program should receive direct attention and modification, should Posses continue to
have access to recording equipment. Although the use of citizen volunteers is a generally
accepted and welcomed practice in community policing, there needs to be a well-defined
structure governed by policies and procedures, in order to ensure that individuals serving under
this program have a clear understanding of its purpose, and are accountable and responsive to the
agency.
The issue of management and oversight of audio video recording within the MCSO has never
received the proper level of attention it requires. Initial policies written in February 2008,
directed organizational concerns toward the protection of HSU deputies "from false and
frivolous allegations made by violators and passengers." There was only minor
acknowledgement of usage for law enforcement purposes. Internal controls for the public
purchase, identification and distribution of these devices did not exist. Personal purchase and use
of recording devices was undeterred, further hampering the gathering of specific information
regarding the types of recording devices in use. To this day, MCSO command personnel and
legal counsel continue to resist efforts to identify with specificity the types of devices that were
used by agency personnel
II.
ARMENDARIZ CASE
A. SUICIDE INVESTIGATION
On May 8, 2014 at approximately 1435 hours, MCSO Special Investigations Unit and MCSO
Tactical Operations Unit found Ramon C. "Charlie" Ramirez-Armendariz deceased at his home
located at 3214 W. Eugie Ave., Phoenix, AZ. Armendariz was found lying face down on the
floor with his head suspended 4-6 inches off the floor by a rope. The initial report as written by
Dep. R. Barraza #S1891 and approved by Sergeant G. Pepe #1319, indicates this incident
occurred on May 8, 2013.
The Monitoring Team recognizes that PSB was and is confronted with a formidable task. A
deputy sheriff committed suicide, vast amounts of evidence were discovered, and are still being
discovered, which revealed that this individual was involved in possible criminal acts and bizarre
behavior that negatively impacted the lives of many Maricopa County residents and visitors.
After the suicide and during the Monitoring Team's initial meeting with PSB, PSB members
appeared motivated and ready to meet the challenges of the Charlie Armendariz suicide
investigation. This investigation became much more involved and complex after former Deputy
Cisco Perez made disparaging comments during his unemployment hearing regarding the
conduct of Human Smuggling Unit members during law enforcement operations, prompting a
second investigation. Perez's comments regarding the inappropriate and illegal seizures of
Page 10 of 40
personal property appeared on the surface to be corroborated by the vast amounts of evidence
seized in the Armendariz residence.
On June 4, 2014, Chiefs Kiyler, Martinez and Commander Girvin attended the PSB daily
meeting regarding the ongoing Armendariz investigation. Lt. Munley led the meeting, which
was normally chaired by Captain Holmes who was unable to attend due to a personal conflict.
Throughout the meeting, specific MCSO personnel provided updates, sometimes utilizing power
point presentations, on various components of the investigation.
A chronology of events was provided by MCSO as follows:
05/01/14
05/02/14
05/05/14
05105114
05/06/14
05/08/14
05/08/14
Burglary report, Armendariz residence (Phoenix PD)

Armendariz Resignation
Armendariz Barricade Subject
Search Warrant served by MCSO on Armendariz
Armendariz Arrest Warrant on drug and other charges
Attempted Arrest Warrant on Armendariz
Armendariz Suicide
We were advised that Probation's inability to serve their warrant led to a tactical entry by MCSO
and the finding of the body of Armendariz within the residence. MCSO contends that a request
for assistance had been made to Phoenix PD by Probation, but that request had been refused. Lt.
Pierce from Phoenix PD had advised that they would respond to calls for service or 911 calls at
the residence, but would not assist with the Probation request. MCSO provided the name of Lt.
Pierce as the Watch Commander at Phoenix PD who declined assistance to Probation, and also
provided an internal email from Lt Ellis of MCSO regarding that communication. MCSb
acknowledged that once Armendariz was found deceased, no requests were made for Phoenix
PD to assume the death investigation. MCSO personnel were directed by Command Staff to
conduct the death investigation. In the meeting with the Monitoring Team on June 5th, Captain
Holmes, who was at that time the IA Commander, stated that he thought Phoenix PD should
have conducted the death investigation. Captain Bailey, during a subsequent meeting with the
Monitoring Team after he took over as the IA Commander, also stated that he thought that
Phoenix PD should have conducted the death investigation. These positions are at odds with
MCSO's failure to make such a request.
In addition to other evidence that was seized from the residence, cocaine and amphetamines were
also found by MCSO. As a result, a full toxicology review has been requested by the Medical
Examiner. (As of this writing no report has been received by MCSO nor provided to the
Monitoring Team.) At the time of the barricade incident with Phoenix PD, MCSO drug tested
Armendariz and found cocaine, Ambien and amphetamines (possibly a breakdown of diet pills)
in his system.
Armendariz, prior to death, had recorded what has been termed a "good-bye" video that was
approximately 35 minutes long. Investigative reporter Donna Rossi, from CBS 5, apparently had
contact with Armendariz and had spent time with him prior to his suicide. After becoming aware
of his suicide, it has been reported that she made contact with an MCSO employee, Yolanda
Gibb, seeking information.
Page 11of40
It was noted that as of June 4, 2014, when the suicide report was provided to the Monitoring
Team, no one from PSB had reviewed the entire suicide report, although Captain Holmes
advised that the only existing full copy had been given to the Monitoring Team.
Following the death of Armendariz, MCSO Major Crimes Division responded and investigated
the incident as a suicide. On June 11, 2014, Lt. Kim Seagraves was selected by Captain Bailey
and temporarily assigned from the Special Investigations Division to PSB to conduct additional
follow up. In the opinion of the Monitoring Team, she has competently directed the course of
the investigation, including the follow-up of leads, and conducting interviews of friends,
neighbors and associates of Armendariz.
Lt. Seagraves has provided updates to the Monitoring Team on her investigation in the weekly
reports submitted by MCSO, and in a meeting with Chief Kiyler on July 22, 2014. At that time,
Lt. Seagraves provided a lengthy briefing regarding the investigation to date. During this
meeting, Lt. Seagraves specifically referenced interviews with Wally Canales (domestic partner
of Armendariz), Jonathan Chacon Serrano (an individual who associated with Armendariz and
who was originally believed to be a member of the Police Explorers but was later determined to
be a Posse member), John Kaniscar (friend of Armendariz), Patricia Darcey (Armendariz
landlord), Larry Esau (roommate of Armendariz), Miguel Brusuelas (friend of Armendariz), and
several neighbors as having provided the most information. Chief Kiyler has also been provided
with 26 CDs of all the interviews conducted, or attempted to be conducted, by Lt. Seagraves
during her investigation.
The outcome of the civilian interviews conducted by Lt. Seagraves indicated that many of those
interviewed believed that Armendariz was working with the Department of Justice (DOJ) or .
others regarding the MCSO, and that he was being mistreated (picked on) by the MCSO. None
of those interviewed were able to provide any specificity regarding Armendariz working with the
DOI or others except that it was about traffic stops and the MCSO's treatment of "illegals". A
number of those interviewed believed Armendariz was a former marine, had multiple college
degrees, and was suffering from serious medical conditions, including cancer. According to
information from the MCSO, none of these beliefs are true. References were also made regarding
Armendariz' s excessive di:inking and use of diet pills, particularly during the last month of his
life, and that he was a "cry wolf' kind of guy who was always looking for attention.
Lt. Seagraves has completed her interviews with the exception of those .who are employees of the
MCSO. MSCO command staff directed PSB to stop employee administrative interviews until
the conclusion of the criminal interviews conducted based on the allegations of Cisco Perez.
During the meeting of July 22, 2014, with Chief Kiyler, Lt. Seagraves did not know who would
be assigned to complete the employee administrative interviews or when they would occur.
Lt. Seagraves intends to have all weapons taken from the Armendariz residence tested via the
National Integrated Ballistic Information Network. She is still awaiting the results of the forensic
examination of Armendariz' s personal computer and the final toxicology results for Armendariz.
Page 12 of 40
Lt. Seagraves has been to the Armendariz residence and has obtained additional items from
"trash" which she has impounded in the Property Room. Lt. Seagraves stated that she would be
asking that all items currently impounded for safekeeping as a result of this investigation be
moved to "evidence" holds to ensure that these are retained until the conclusion of the
investigation.
Lt. Seagraves was returned to her nonnal assignment with the Special Investigations Division on
June 30, 2014. This return to duty implies that the Armendariz suicide case has been completed
and all leads have been investigated. The Monitoring Team was not advised or consulted prior to
this action.
2. PRELiiVJINARY FINDINGS
On June 5th, after a review of the suicide report, the Monitoring Team provided a list of questions
and concerns regarding the suicide investigation, specifically as it related to actions of
Armendariz and others prior to the suicide. These questions and concerns included the need for
additional interviews and re-interviews; and the need to review the contents of Armendariz's
personal computer and cell phone.
During a meeting with Chief Kiyler on June 11, 2014, Lt. Seagraves was introduced as the
person who had been assigned to conduct the further follow up on the Armendariz suicide. At
that time Lt. Seagraves was in the process of reviewing the report to determine all of the
interviews that needed to be conducted as well as other follow up necessary.
During the site visit of June 16-20, 2014, Lt. Seagraves provided an update to the Monitoring
Team on the Armendariz Suicide investigation. Since that time, Lt. Seagraves has conducted
numerous interviews, reviewed evidence, and responded to the list of questions asked by the
Monitoring Team on June 5, 2014.
As of September 24, 2014, the Monitoring Team believes that Lt. Seagraves has thoroughly
pursued all investigative leads that were identified in the original suicide report. Twenty-six
interview CDs have been presented to the Monitoring Team as a result of her efforts. MCSO
employee interviews and interviews of other civilians identified through her investigation have
not been completed to date and no one has been assigned to complete these interviews. MCSO is
continuing with their review of both Armendariz's personal computer and cell phone, and
expected to have the data information in a spreadsheet format by September 25th. The
toxicology report regarding Armendariz has still not been received from the Medical Examiner's
Office.
3. RECOiVfJvJENDATIONS
The Monitoring Team recommends that the investigation continue to follow the direction as
provided by Lt. Seagraves, to include the forensic computer review, the NIBIN weapons testing
and the review of the toxicology report when provided. The Monitoring Team expected that,
because of Lt. Seagraves' extensive knowledge of the case, she would be assigned to conduct the
Page 13 of 40
employee interviews and the additional civilian interviews when the decision is rendered to
move forward with Administrative Interviews, but we have learned that she is no longer working
on this case.
To ensure transparency in the event of a future incident of this type, MCSO should contact the
police department with primary jurisdiction and request that they conduct the initial criminal
investigation.
B. EVIDENCE COLLECTION/ANALYSIS
MCSO investigators had originally reported that 618 items of evidence had been seized from the
Armendariz residence. This number would prove to be wholly inaccurate. The Monitoring Team
can only surmise that this inadequacy was due to a lack of policy and procedure on the part of
MCSO. Multiple items of evidence were packaged and numbered together as one, with the
assigning of a single evidentiary number as depicted in the original Excel spreadsheet "618 Items
Evidence and Supplemental Tracking Database 6 26 14".
2. PRELD\1JNARY FINDINGS
The Special Investigations Division (SID) was charged with the initial collection of evidence and
the pursuit of intelligence and research of the seized items in order to correlate these items with
individual and motor vehicle stops conducted by Armendariz. They are currently conducting
reviews of the driver licenses and personal identification cards found, and have been inputting all
the information into a spreadsheet as their research continues to unfold, which will then be
compared to the traffic stop data. Every document is intended to be identified and cataloged on
the spreadsheet. Ultimately, most if not all of the property should be returned to the rightful
owner, requiring further investigative efforts to accomplish this.
Durin~
the June 16-20, 2014 site visit, the Monitoring Team r~commended that the individual
spreadsheets listing the evidentiary items be merged so that the contents could be cross
referenced and "linked" together. This process would provide a more comprehensive overview
of this investigation.
As a result of the recommendations, SID conducted a review and spreadsheet modification which
has now increased the total number of evidentiary items to 1657. It is the opinion of the
Monitoring Team that even this number is less than accurate based upon the fact that MCSO
continues to list multiple pieces of evidence in single line item. Each additional item requires
further investigation and follow-up. No date has been provided to the Monitoring Team for
completion of this task. On September 22, 2014, Captain Bailey advised the Monitoring Team
that there has been minimal follow up on the evidentiary items that were seized. Investigators
have researched whether or not Armendariz conducted a Justice Web Interface (JWI) inquiry
Page 14 of 40
associated with the items, and have identified" 18 to 20" such instances where he did so, but they
have not yet followed up on these instances beyond the database research.
3. RECOJvfJVJENDATIONS
The Monitoring Team continues to be dissatisfied with the continuous modifications of the total
number of evidentiary documents and items, but believes the accounting has vastly improved
since the initial seizure. The Monitoring Team believes that further spreadsheet refinement will
identify an even greater number of seized items than what was initially reported. The PSB has
recently acquired an analyst, Jennifer Johnson, who has been most receptive to suggestions made
by the Monitoring Team, and has been able to create documents of substantially better quality as
a result. The Monitoring Team recommends that MCSO continue to utilize the services of Ms.
Johnson in order to resolve the immediate issues at hand, and to establish future protocols for the
seizure and documentation of seized evidentiary items.
One of the single-most important factors in any investigation is the manner in which physical
evidence is handled by the investigating agency. Personnel utilized for this purpose are tasked
with the effective collection, preservation, packaging, and transportation of all collected
evidence. Evidence is required to have specific documentation of its location at the scene, the
date of collection, and the officer who collected it. Each individual item collected is identified as
evidence and numbered as such, in order to establish the chain of custody. MCSO should have
recognized early on that the death of a Deputy would be a high profile- investigation mandating
the careful collection and cataloging of evidence.
It would appear that these simple processes have not been adopted and are not institutionalized
within MCSO by virtue of policy and training. The importance of physical evidence in a case
cannot be overstated. The credibility and integrity of the evidence is wholly contingent on its
handling from its initial observance through presentation in court. Evidence procedures should
be developed for the purpose of providing the investigator with a working knowledge of physical
evidence handling.
C. VIDEOS/REVIEWS
During the June 4, 2014 meeting, lengthy discussions took place regarding how MCSO would
determine if a reviewed stop was "problematic" and if any guidelines have been developed to
ensure consistency of reviews. Specifically, the Monitoring Team desired to see the direction
given to those MCSO employees reviewing the CDs. No such guidelines were provided.
PSB personnel indicated that the reviewers were looking for policy violations, legal issues, the
seizure of property and discretionary concerns. The reviewers were directed to identify "any"
problematic issue, no matter how small. Reviewers were also advised that MCSO personnel
were not the only ones reviewing the videos. Reviewers were shown what was perceived by
some to be a "problematic" video as an example of what reviewers should be looking for.
Page 15 of 40
The Monitoring Team noted that there were no specific guidelines or protocols established for
the review process. Recommendations were made to develop a clear, standardized and specific
methodology that could be utilized by all reviewers. This recommendation was ignored.
Technical Management Bureau Deputy Chief Shelly Bunn discussed CDs that are corrupted and
cannot currently be copied, and in some cases, cannot be viewed. At the time they advised that
they were looking at a number of solutions. (Ultimately, prior to the end of the site visit, the
Monitor was provided with a memo detailing the attempts made by MCSO to date to deal with
these videos, and their further intentions to solve the problem.)
As of the June 4, 2014 meeting, of the 510 Armendariz CDs, 265 CDs had been viewed, with a
total of 1731 videos reviewed. Traffic stop videos accounted for 1211 videos, with the
remainder being referred to as "other." These "other" videos include Armendariz being parked
at locations with the video running, and in some cases, driving with the video running.
During the meeting, Captain Holmes advised the Monitoring Team that they (MCSO) felt
pressured by the Monitoring Team to get the CD reviews completed. The Monitoring Team
continually impressed upon MCSO that the quality of these reviews are more important than the
timeliness of the reviews.
As of Monday, June 16, 2014, an additional 10 detectives from the Special Investigations Unit
were temporarily assigned to review Armendariz videos, for a period of seven days.
Sgt. Rick Morris, also later promoted to the rank of Lieutenant, was assigned to oversee SID
members who were reviewing CDs associated with the suicide investigation. Two Spanish
speaking investigators were added to the group reviewing the CDs to specifically review the
videos containing Spanish dialogue.
The Monitor required further clarification and status on the CDs/DVDs that had been deemed to
be com1pted. Chief Bunn identified internal attempts to retrieve the corrupted data. Ultimately,
a private consultant advised MCSO to acquire a software program called "Screen Capture". This
program is designed to capture data from corrupted discs.
'
MCSO installed Screen Caphire on 5 computer work stations and assigned 5 detectives to review
and monitor the 190 corrupted videos. They were averaging 5-6 CD reviews per day. Some were
as long as 7 hours, and each had to be monitored and reviewed during the entire "caphire"
process.
Captain Bailey advised that they had obtained search warrants for both the computer and cell
phone belonging to Armendariz. MCSO personnel assigned to Arizona Counter Terrorism
Information Center were to conduct a forensic analysis of the computer and MCSO SID
personnel were to perform the examination of the cell phone.
As of July 15, 2014 and until the present date, MCSO has had a total of 602 DVDs capturing the
activities of Armendariz. Taken from the Annendariz residence were a total of 560 DVDs. An
Page 16 of 40
additional 42 DVDs were located in binders held by the HSU Administrative Officer. No
additional DVDs have since been located.
2. PRELliVJINARY FINDINGS
In regard to the reviews of the DVDs, each investigator appeared to be making independent
decisions on what was problematic. PSB commanding officers felt that the investigators tasked
with reviewing videos were experienced personnel and they did not believe they needed to give
them more specific direction than that which was previously provided.
The only information captured by reviewers, according to the spreadsheet "Armendariz Linked
Spreadsheet 7 16 14 MASTER" was: Disc#, File Date, Video Length, Name Listed, Potential
Race/Ethnicity, License Plate, Other Passengers, Potential Race/Ethnicity, Other MCSO, Other
Agencies, Items Seized, Spanish Spoken, Further Review, Comments, Reviewer. There were no
specific notations of policy violations or law violations.
Of particular note were the documented dates that recordings were made. The Aimendariz DVDs
seized from his residence ranged in date from January 1, 2010 through March 14, 2014. The
additional Armendariz DVDs seized from his computer ranged in date from December 15, 2008
thiough October 8, 2013. The Armendariz DVDs maintained in the HSU ranged in date from
March 18, 2010 through April 5, 2013. DVDs attributed to other HSU members ranged in date
from January 1, 2007 through February 7, 2014. Many of the videos also have an automatically
inserted time stamp indicating the date and time of the recording, but both MCSO and the
Monitoring Team have noted obvious inaccuracies with this data. The self-survey requested a
response for traffic stops from "2007 forward".
3. REC01V!JVIENDA110NS
The review of motor vehicle stop recordings is only one piece of a larger organizational process.
This process begins with the formation of specific patrol procedures taught during the preservice phase of training and reinforced during in-service training.
On August 26, 2014, the Monitoring Team reviewed a non-scientific sample of the seized
Armendariz DVDs The intent of this review process was to observe incidents that MCSO
previously considered both problematic and non-problematic in nature. This initial review of 19
video incidents revealed a recurring pattern. Armendariz would:
begin contacts with citizens by asking them if they had any "guns, lmives, bombs, or
weapons of mass destruction"
lecture drivers about traffic infractions
use inappropriate language (fucking) often
arrest, handcuff and place persons in the backseat of his police vehicle and then cite
and release them for the traffic violation
advise drivers that their speeds were higher than he actually cited them for
Page 17 of 40
appear to make pretextual stops for motor vehicle violations, (i.e.: license plate light
out) for vehicles with Hispanic drivers and passengers, and then request ID's of the
driver and passengers
ask drivers if they would prefer to receive a "tongue lashing" in lieu of summons
tow the vehicle for an alleged violation of law and then subsequently seize and search
the passengers' pocket books without reason while requesting ID
place drivers and passengers under arrest for minor violations, handcuff them, place
them in the sheriffs vehicle, search the subject's vehicle, and when no evidence was
found, release the subject's with a motor vehicle summons
seize driver licenses and license plates without supervisory follow up to ensure same
were properly placed into evidence & property.
Additionally, the Monitoring Team noted that in many cases it is apparent that other MCSO
personnel were on scene, but they were not identified by the reviewer.
D. ARMENDARIZ PERSONNEL HISTORY

Mr. Armendariz was a poor representative of law enforcement. The fact that Mr. Armendariz
was able to pass the MCSO pre-employment background is worrisome, but even more
concerning is the fact that even after a long list of complaints and numerous red flags were raised
by supervisors, Mr. Armendariz remained in the Human Smuggling Unit.
Early in June 2014, members of the Monitoring Team reviewed the timeline of Armendariz
employment, beginning in 2005 with the hiring of Armendariz, obtaining deputy status in
October 2005, his transfer to HSU in 2007 and his "disciplinary" transfer back to patrol in 2013.
We asked MCSO to identify and document all efforts undertaken by MCSO to review his
background, criminal history, employment history and contemporary associates. The initial
personnel review process seemed to lack direction.
A review of civilian complaints against Armendariz revealed that not all complaints were
documented with PSB and that some complaints remained at the district level, never being seen
or reviewed by PSB. MCSO intended to follow up with the appropriate supervisors on this issue.
Armendariz was interviewed, both criminally and administratively. During the criminal
interview Armendariz invoked his 5th Amendment rights. Subsequently, the criminal interview
was terminated and the administrative interview began. It was during the administrative
interview that Armendariz resigned. Once he expressed an interest in resigning, securing his
resignation became the focus of the interview, and there was virtually no questioning about his
behavior and the vast amounts of property discovered at his residence. Armendariz did state
during his interview that it was common for other members of the HSU to leave items like
identifications laying around the office and that the Detention Officer would just gather them up
and take them up to his house and put them in the garage. During her interview, the Detention
'
'
Page 18 of 40
Officer named by Annendariz denied that this ever occuned. All opportumt1es for further
questioning regarding this statement or other concerns 1vere lost when Am1endariz committed
suicide. Captain Holmes advised the Monitoring Team that the administrative interviews of HSU
persom1el commenced, and as of June 18, 2014,
Captain Holmes also stated that "anecdotally" he heard that there had been approximately 14
complaints about Annendariz over a 12 month period (the inforn1ation regarding these 14
complaints was later found by the Monitoring Team while reviewing the supervisor notes of Sgt.
Trowbridge), and that MCSO "made" him wear a camera as a result. The Captain indicated that
reviews had been conducted on videos associated with complaints alleging wrongdoing by
Arn1endariz, but he did not lmow if videos recorded by Armendariz had been randomly revie1ved
by supervisors. The Captain \vas unable to provide specific documentation to support these
assertions. Additionally, on November 30, 2009, prior to the Court Order, MCSO implemented
a 9-month retention period for recordings. After 9 months, recordings were destroyed.
2. PREL!JWINARY FINDINGS
As of July 17, 2014, Sgt. Fax, assigi1ed to PSB and Annendariz case officer, began to construct a
nanative tiineline of Annendariz citizen complaints, PSB investigations and other incidents that
occuned while Annendariz was employed with the MCSO. When this timeline is completed, the
MCSO and the Monitoring Team should have a much clearer understanding of the Armendariz
employment histmy. Additional members of PSB have continued to work on the merging of the
spreadsheet data in order to link persons, incidents, evidence, DVDs and other items.
As early as 2007, Am1endariz committed what was referred to in his perforn1ance evaluation as a
"serious policy violation." This incident involved Am1endariz, vvhile off duty, using his marked
police vehicle to drive himself and his friend to a bar, where after receiving a citizen's complaint,
MCSO personnel responded and found him inside the bar drinking alcohol. While
memorandums about the event were located, there was no indication found that any discipline or
other administrative actions took place. Throughout his tenure vi'ith MCSO, supervisors
continued to reference complaints and concerns about Am1endariz, many of them related to his
interaction -with members of the public, and some associated with "internal affairs"
investigations.
In a review of perfonnance evaluations of Annendariz by the Monitoring Team, it was noted that
Arn1endariz was consistently refened to by supervisors as one of the hardest working deputies.
The performance evaluations also consistently noted a concern over the number of complaints
Arn1endariz had, stemming from his interactions with members of the public .. These comments
took several different fonns, in some cases saying that he had been talked to, and in others, that
his number of complaints seemed to have lessened. Annendariz still received a "satisfactory"
rating in personal relations, and there appeared to be no structured remedial training provided to
Annendariz to address these concerns. The complaints seemed to consistently indicate concern
from citizens regarding their treatment by Annendariz.
Page 19 of 40
On May 29, 2012, Arn1endariz was involved in a domestic violence situation with his domestic
paiiner and he contacted his sergeant for assistance. Arn1endariz was very emotional, and based
on a number of factors, Sgt. Trowbridge became concerned that Armendariz might be
considering harn1ing himself. Ultimately, An11endariz voluntarily entered a Behavioral
Treatment Center. By June 13, 2012, Armendariz had been released from the treatment center
and had a signed fit-for-duty packet releasing him for full duty.
On Febrnary 13, 2013, Sgt. Trowbridge authored a memorandum saying that between May 2011
and Feb 2013, he documented fomieen citizen complaints on An11endariz and had no less than
four sit down conversations vvith An11endariz about these complaints. He concluded his twopage memo to Lt. Jakowinicz by saying that while An11endariz was one of the hardest working
deputies he had ever been around or supervised, An11endariz seemed to have a problem
interacting with the public. In a subsequent memo to Chief Trombi on February 21, 2013, Lt.
Jakowinicz supported the concerns of Sgt. Trowbridge and requested that An11endariz be
transfened to a different assignment. In a one-paragraph memo from Chief Trombi to Lt.
Jakowinicz on 3/13/13, Chief Trombi indicated that he had met with Armendariz to discuss his
performance issues and recuning complaints and was convinced Armendariz was receptive and
would make a concerted effort to meet goals and work on his interpersonal relations skills. It
appears that no transfer of assignment or structured remedial training occurred as an immediate
result of this series of communications between supervisors, though Sgt. Trowbridge had
previously discussed interpersonal training with Armendariz.
"
~. Sgt. Madrid
became the direct supervisor for Am1endariz and would eventually write a memo requesting that
An11P.ndariz be removed from his squac
Sgt. Fax completed the timeline of An11endariz citizen complaints, PSB investigations and other
incidents that occurred while Annendariz was employed with the MCSO. The infonrntion
contained in the timeline and written summary validates the early assessment of the Monitoring
Team that Aimendariz had a long history of issues, including policy violations, citizen
complaints and personal issues that were not addressed by MCSO. That timeline is paraphrased
below:
May 31, 2005
An11endariz is hired by the MCSO as a Detention Officer.

August 1, 2005
Annendariz successfully completes the detention academy.

October 10, 2005
Page 20 of 40
"
Am1endariz is promoted to deputy trainee.
Febrnary 27, 2005

Am1endariz successfully completes deputy academy.
July 6, 2005
Internal Affairs Case number 2006-0116.

July 9, 2009
Am1endariz is transfened to the special assignment unit.
"
Dec. 3, 2007
Administrative Inquiry conducted.
January 2, 2008
..
Annendariz is transferred to general investigations division .
April 14, 2008
"
An11endariz is transfened to the court security division.
June 2008
Am1endariz is transfened to the human smuggling unit.
September 2009
Internal Affairs case number 2009-0134.

May 4, 2010
Internal Affairs case number 2010-0137.

May 2, 2011
Citizen Complaint- No Internal Affairs Number Issued.

May 12, 2011
Citizen Complaint - No Internal Affairs Number Issued.
"
May 17, 2011
"
June 25, 2011
Citizen Complaint-No Internal Affairs Number Issued.
February 17, 2012
Citizen Complaint -No Internal Affairs Number Issued.

o Actual Administrative Inquiry Completed
Unkno-vvn date believed to be between February and July of 2012
Page 21of40
Unknown date believed to be between Febrnary and July of2012

e
Citizen Complaint - no Internal Affairs Number issued.
Unknown date believed to be between February and July of 2012
e
May 27, 2012
Phoenix Police Department responds to the Armendariz residence in reference to a
domestic violence call.
May 29, 2012
Sgt. Trowbridge receives a text message from Annfndariz stating that he needs help
May 30, 2012
e
Armendariz is given a fit for duty packet by Sergeant Trowbridge while in Aurora
Behavioral Health Services.
May 31, 2012
A1111endariz requests Sgt. Trowbridge come to see him at behavioral health service.
Sgt. Trowbridge told that another deputy had advised that Annendariz had alcohol
and other issues.
June 1, 2012
Annendariz's Sheriffs Office vehicle removed from his home.

June 2, 2012
Sgt. Trowbridge advised by treating physician of concerns and that Annendariz will
remain in the facility until the following Monday.
{
June 4,2012
Sgt. Trowbridge responds to behavioral health facility and advised of ongoing
concerns regarding Annendariz after which Armendariz is released from the facility.
0
June 14, 2012

"
An11endariz turns in his fit for duty packet returning him to duty.
July 10, 2012
..
Citizen Complaint - No Internal Affairs Number Issued .
July 10, 2012
"
October 12, 2012
..
Page 22 of 40
January 23, 2013

"
Febrnary 8, 2013

Febrnmy 11, 2013

Febrnmy 13, 2013
Sgt. Trmvbridge authors memo to Lt. Jakowinicz about all the citizen complaints
against Annendariz.
Febrnary20, 2013

Febrnary 21, 2013
Lt. Jakowinicz authors a memo to Chief Trombi concurring with Sgt. Trowbridge's
concerns.
March 5, 2013
"
Chief Trombi authors a memo to Lt. Jakowinicz in reference to speaking with
Annendariz about his performance and the ways he dealt with the public.
May 20, 2013
The Phoenix Police Department 1s called to Annendariz's residence reference a
domestic violence situation.

May 27 2013
The Phoenix Police Department is called to the Annendariz residence reference a

welfare check as AIJllendariz had hinted in a text about cmnmitting suicide.
June 11, 2013
A deputy becomes concerned about some statements made by Aimendariz about

possibly harming himself. A welfare check is done on Armendariz. It appears that
the Armendariz chain of command was notified about the incident.
June 13, 2013
A Detention Officer vvrites a memo to Lt. Jakowinicz regarding the domestic violence
incident at the Arn1endariz residence.
June14,2013
~
Lt. Jakowinicz requests Kelly Grennan speak to Annendariz about their concerns
about him and ensure that the County was providing him all assistance they could.
Page 23 of 40
June24, 2013
The HSU 1s transferred from the Enforcement Support Division to the Special
Investigations Division.
August 8, 2013

August 19, 2013
"
Armendariz is transferred from the HSU to Patrol District 2.
January 25, 2014
e
Internal Affairs case Number 2014-0077.
March 14, 2014
Internal Affai;s Case Number 2014-0142.

March 26, 2014
.,
MCSO contacted regarding Armendariz possibly giving drngs to the son of a friend.
Detennined that no crime had occurred.
April 15, 2014
Claim filed against Maricopa County in reference to damages stemming from a traffic
stop by Arn1endariz.
April 30, 2014
Phoenix Police Department responds to the Armendariz residence regarding a

burglary. Armendariz acting erratic and MCSO Watch Commander notified. Upon
the arrival of MCSO persom1el, drngs and other evidentiary items were located at the
residence.
May 1, 2014
e
MCSO personnel serve a search warrant at the Armendariz residence and start an
investigatio11 in to .Armendariz in reference to the drugs a11d other criminal activity.
May 2, 2014
Arn1endariz is interviewed criminally and administratively by MCSO and resigns.
$
May 4, 2014
Phoenix Police Department responds to Arn1endariz residence reference an attempted

suicide by Annendariz. An11endariz barricades himself in the residence and makes
threats to commit suicide, at the conclusion of the barricade situation, Armendariz is
sent to the hospital for threatening suicide.
May 5, 2014
Arn1endariz 1s booked into the 4th Avenue jail in reference to drug and weapons
charges.
Page 24 of 40
May 7, 2014
Annendariz fails to shmv up for his electronic tracking device and a wanant is issued
for his arrest.
May 8, 2014
Am1endariz is found deceased in his residence from an apparent suicide.
"
June 6, 2014
A claim is filed against Maricopa County in reference to Armendariz and Sheriffs
Office persom1el taking the complainant's identification card.
..
A claim is filed against l-,1faricopa County in reference to Armendariz seizing the
complainant's vehicle.
Jtme 10, 2014
..
A claim is filed against Maricopa County, Sheriff Arpaio and Armendariz in
reference to false arrest, imprisonment, theft, negligence, negligent supervision and
excessive force based on a traffic stop Arn1endariz conducted on January 16, 2014.
3. REC01vfkfENDATIONS
MCSO lacks nationally recognized policies and procedures relative to the implementation and
use of recording devices. Although implementation of these systems cam1ot completely ensure
the appropriate behavior of law enforcement officers, implementation does provide for adequate
levels of oversight and an ability to terminate those who fail to follmv proper procedures in a
timely manner.
MCSO must fully implement the Order-required Early Identification System. Such a system, if
properly administered, vvould certainly have identified Armendariz as an extremely problematic
and troubled employee; While we will never know if an early identification system could have
prevented the ultimate tragic outcome, we do know that such intervention would have saved the
agency a great deal of time and resources resulting from the actions of Armendariz.
"
III.
HSU ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATION
From the beginning of the Monitor's review of the Am1endariz and HSU investigations, there
has been a recuning pattern of missteps and questionable decisions made by PSB investigators
and command staff. A lack of a satisfactory investigative plan provided the opportunity for these
missteps.
On approximately June 18, 2014 the administrative interviews were stopped as a result of the
statements made by Deputy Cisco Perez during his unemployment hearing alleging criminal
activities among members of the HSU. Perez claimed that HSU members were inappropriately
Page 25 of 40
, seizing personal property from locations being searched. As a result of these statements, Captain
Bailey made a decision to interview all members criminally.
This decision was not well received by the criminal investigators of the PSB.
2. PRELIA11NARY FINDINGS
Two lieutenants, two sergeants, and 4 detectives had been interviewed prior to the administrative
interviews being stopped.
-
investigation. A'
had been served with a Notice oflnvestigation in the HSU administrative

..
'
'
L. __
.J..;_
'
'
- - -
---- ' -
- - - - .I - -
- - -
During a meeting with Chiefs Martinez and Kiyler on August 27, 2014, Captain Bailey along
with Sergeant Fax advised them that since the criminal investigation was complete, they would
be moving forward with the HSU administrative investigation. After significant hesitation and
negotiation, our team was afforded the opportunity to review and comment on proposed
interview questions in the criminal investigation. Chiefs Martinez and Kiyler requested that we
once again be afforded the opportunity to review the questions for the -HSU administrative
investigation prior to the commencement of these interviews. Captain Bailey agreed to this
request.
On the afternoon of Friday, September 12, 2014 Chief Kiyler received an email from Ms.
Christine Stutz on behalf of Captain Bailey. This email provided a list of questions to be asked in
the administrative interview of Sgt. Trmvbridge. Ms. Stutz requested that these questions be
forwarded to appropriate members of the Monitoring Team for review. This email \Vas
acknowledged and responded to the same afternoon. The supervisory questions follow.
in supervisory investigation)
Although these questions may not be asked exactly as written below, the general concept of the
questions will be asked. These may not be the only questions asked, based on the ansvvers, there
will probably be spin off questions or clarifying questions. It should also be noted these
questinns are onlv for the supervis01y investigation and are not related to any other investigation
thm
may be involved in. It -'- 1 J - ~~ ''n nntpd that these questions may
not be the same questions that are asked to
~
: in this investigation;
however some of the questions could overlap and be asked
1
Page 26 of 40

(
Page 27 of 40
-- - -- l . . . - -- --
On the afternoon of Monday September 15, 2014, a message was left by Chief Kiyler for Ms.
Stutz that my team had questions about the interview process. On Wednesday, September 1i 11,
2014, Chief Kiyler spoke with Ms. Stutz about our concerns. A short time later, Captain Bailey
sent an email to Chief Kivler advising that PSB had already started the administrative interviews
and already interviewee:
. one detention officer and three deputies.
This information surprised the Monitoring team, and Captain Bailey's email to Chief Kiyler is
included below.
Chief,
As a result of a conversation you had with Christine Stutz I would like to clarify our intention on
the administrative investigations. We will independently develop questions for each interview
that will be conducted based on what information we have collected fiwn video review,
spreadsheet data, reports, etc ... that is why we suspended the interviews earlier in the process.
However, we anticipate that questions could change or new questions could be develoved_based
~
on the answers WP nro aiven. To date, we have interviewed['" . - --. - .. .
_ .
~
___ .... ,y-- As we discussed
durmg yuur w.st vt.stt, me administrative inte111iews started on September l 5 1h as planned.
I am directing Sgt. Fax to provide a further written outline that will be provided in this week's
report.
Page 28 of 40

.
Sincerely,
Captain Steve Bailey

1vfaricopa County Sheriffs Office
A follow up phone call was made to Captain Bailey by Chief Kiyler, during which Captain
Bailey indicated that they did not intend to have any scripted questions for the administrative
investigation regarding HSU's potential misappropriation of property. He said that they had
decided to just do vvhat he referred to as "thematic" interviews. He further clarified that the
questions sent to her on September 12, 2014 were specific to the "supervisory investigation".
Captain Bailey said that they began the interviews after not hearing back from Chief Kiyler. It
_
.
was determined that the interview of _
. \Vhen reminded by Chief Kiyler that the request for review of the interview questions by
the Monitoring Team had only been made on the afternoon of Friday September 12, 2014,
Captain Bailey provided no meaningful response, saying basically that they had just proceeded
after not hearing from her. Captain Bailey 1vas again asked to forward the ''supervisor" questions
to the Monitoring Team prior to proceeding any further with them and he agreed to do so.
During the on-?ite compliance meeting with PSB persmmel September 22, 2014, Captain Bailey
was again urged by my team to develop standard questions for the "property" investigation, as
this had been.the approach during the previous administrative and criminal interviews. Captain
Bailey, although clearly resistant to our request, stated that he 1vould discuss it with his team and
provide a response by close of business Tuesday, September 23, 2014. As of this writing,
Captain Bailey has not responded regarding the standardized questions for the "property"
investigation and no proposed questions for supervisor intervie1vs have been received.
On September 26, 2014, Major Peters and Chief Kiyler were advised by Lauren Sanchez,
Administrative Assistant to Captain Bailey, of the status of the administrative interviews. She
forwarded the following email as sent by Sgt. Fax, presumably to Captain Bailey.
Sir,
In reference to the interviews of Sheriff's ()ffirP nPrsnnnPl fnr all of the different IA 's that are
being conducted I have ' _
_
The rest of the interviews are still being scheduled based on the fact I am completing the
writing of questions for the supervisors so they can be submitted to the monitoring team and I
have mandat01y training on the r1 and 211 d of October. As the intenifews are scheduled I will
update you and the monitoring team. If there is any fi1rther infonnation I can help with please let
me !mow.
Sergeant Stephen Fax SJ 243
J..1aricopa County Sheriff's Office
Professional Standards Bureau
Page 29 of40
550 West Jackson Street

Phoenix, Arizona 85003
(602) 876-4972
3. REC01vflvlENDATIONS
The Monitoring Team recommends that a more detailed investigative plan be developed to
include specific background information on each subject identified for interview. Additionally,
the Monitoring Team requests that they have input into the development of the basic line of
questions to be asked of each subject, as we have done in the past.
IV.
HSU CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION
1. INITIALOBSERVATIONS
Former Deputy Perez's allegations, described above, resulted in a criminal investigation of HSU
members. Deputy Perez's firing stemmed from a prior criminal investigation involving a
wiretap, ~vhich revealed potential criminal conduct of others in MCSO, some of whom worked or
had association with members of the Human Smuggling Unit. Deputy Alfredo Navarette was
arrested on felony charges. It would be during the unemployment hearing for Cisco Perez that
other allegations of criminal wrongdoing would be made, setting the stage for the conduct of the
criminal interviews.
As a result of the wiretap investigation, an MCSO Detention Officer, Sylvia Najera was arrested
and ultimately dismissed, and other MCSO members were disciplined. PSB personnel have put
forth the theory that the state.cl com1ption and misdeeds of the HSU personnel were aberrations
that were confined to a small group of rogue employees. This opinion would permeate the
investigations and would inhibit good investigatory and interviewing practices. The Monitoring
Team reminded investigators to remain objective and to seek the trnth, no matter where it may
lead and in spite of their pre-conceived notions.
On June 16, 2014, members of the Monitoring Team met with Chief Deputy Sheridan and the
PSB chain of command. PSB was asked to provide an update on the progress of the
investigation and the status of the development of the line of questions to be asked of subjects. It
was at this time that the Monitoring Team became aware that the criminal interviews were
already underway.
This would prove to be problematic as the interview procedures lacked consistency. It was
learned that the criminal interviews, which are normally conducted in the PSB office where there
is video/audio recording capability, had been moved off-site to the same building where the
Human Smuggling Unit was located. After several interviews had been conducted, the interview
location was moved, in response to investigators' concerns that several current employees who
are related to Alfredo Navarette or Cisco Perez worked in close proximity to where the
interviews had been conducted previously. This is but another issue that may have been negated
if a complete and thorough investigative plan had been developed and adhered to.
Page 30 of 40
The interviews were then moved to a third location. However, the new location could only
provide audio recording capability in contrast to the conduct of the previous interviews and PSB
policy. Additional interviews were then conducted with the use of audio-only recordings, before
the PSB command staff stopped the interviews pursuant to a Monitoring Team recommendation.
At issue once again was the inconsistency of the interview process.
The Monitoring Team asked why the interviews were not conducted in PSB, in concert with
normal protocol, and we were advised that the interview room was in use by three deputies
reviewing the Spanish dialogue Armendariz videos. The Monitoring Team recommended
moving the three deputies into the same room where all other Armendariz DVDs were under
review. As a result of the recommendation, the PSB interview room quickly became available.
This entire incident was indicative of a pattern of poor decision making and lack of flexibility
with the interviewers and the interview process.
2. PRELiiVJJNARY FINDINGS
During the June 16-20, 2014 site visit, the Monitoring Team was advised by Captain Bailey, that
he had personally decided that the best approach to this investigation would be to interview the
subjects in a criminal interview. Captain Bailey advised the Monitoring Team that he had
personally hand-picked Sgt. Dave Tennyson as the lead investigator and interviewer for the
criminal investigation. This decision would ultimately call into question the ability of the Captain
to assess the skill levels of his investigators.
Sgt. Tennyson advised the Monitoring Team that he was not in agreement with the decision
made by Captain Bailey regarding the need to conduct criminal interviews. As a result of that
disagreement, Sgt. Tennyson did not appear to apply any effort in developing a comprehensive
investigative plan. The initial line of inquiry was composed of four questions that could be
answered with a yes or no response. The four questions were:
QI Do you recall using the vvord pocket as a slang term within the unit with a meaning
other than what most think it is.
Q2 Do you recall any of those things being taken "pocketed" during the course of an
operation?
Q3 Do you recall seeing items like these at enforcement support?
Q4 During your time with HSU do you recall anyone pocketing or taking items for
personal use instead ofproperly handling the items and entering them into property as evidence?
Upon learning the limited scope of questioning the Monitoring Team strongly suggested that a
proper set of questions be formulated and provided some examples that could be used during the
interviews. On June 23, 2014, the Monitoring Team provided the following questions and advice
to Captain Bailey and his team of investigators.
Page 31of40
The suggestions from the .l\;fonitoring Team are intended to be baseline questions only and asked
of all Subjects in a consistent manner, allowing for additional branching of questions as a result
of statements made by the Subject.
Prior to questioning the Subject, a personnel revievv should be conducted to precisely ascertain
the period of time the Subject was assigned and worked with the HSU.
Additionally, an IA review should be conducted to ascertain if any of the Subject's was a
principal in investigations of complaints that could fall within the arena of questioning.
All interviews should provide specific documentation relative to the interviewer, all observers,
the specific start time and date and the specific end time and date.
1. When were you transferred into HSU?
2. Who did you work with?
3. When did you transfer out ofHSU? If transferred out involuntarily, what do you believe
the reason was for your transfer.
4. Who was your chain of command in HSU? Who did you directly report to?
5. Was there an informal leader in the Unit, someone who seemed ve1y knowledgeable and
sought after for assistance by other HSU members? Jfyes, who?
6. Were you aware of any Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) while working in HSU?
7. It has been alleged that items not considered having evidential value have been seized by
HSU members. Can you describe the types of items that may have been seized and what
their intended pitrpose may have been?
8. Did you eve1~ see anyone take items (or cash) during a search warrant or other
operation/traffic stop that were not impounded after their seizure? If so, what, where and
vvhen? Did you report it to a supervisor?
9. Describe the locations where these items may have been seizedfrom and the type of
operation that may have been ongoing.
10. Jfyou saw any of the items mentioned (or other items), on people's desks or other places
in the office, where do you believe they came from?
11. Describe the process that an HSU deputy wouldfollow when he/she made a traffic stop of
a vehicle with an illegal or unauthorized licenseplate.
12. An individual assigned to HSU stated that license plates were sometimes talden to the
office and placed on the wall. What was the purpose?
13. Can you describe the license plates? Who had these license plates?
14. Describe the process that an HSU deputy wouldfollow when he/she came into possession
of a suspended, revoked, or otherwise invalid driver's license. Did eve1yone do it the
same way?
15. If an item was seized by an HSU member, can you describe how that would occur? F01;
example were they packaged as evidence?
16. Did the supervisors have knowledge of this practice and if so who were they?
17. Is there paperwork to document the seizure of the items mentioned?
18. ldentifa the specific training and approximate dates that you have attendee{, where HSU
seized items have been used as training aids.
Page 32 of 40
19. What agency (ies) or specific instructors delivered training to HSU members utilizing
non-evidentiary seized property as training devices?
20. Is there documentation of the training?
21. Cisco Perez references a 62 inch flat screen. Do you recall anyone taking either as
evidence or for training pwposes?
22. Was there a 62" TV in the Unit?
23. Was cash ever recovered as a result of any of the HSU operations that you know of? If
so who handled the seizure and how was the cash processed?
24. Please describe the operational protocols for initiating a search warrant operation. For
example vvho keeps logs? Is there a briefing prior to? Is there a debriefing at the
conclusion of the operation?
25. For items you have seized as evidence, describe the process you have taken to document
the seizure. For items not seized as evidence please describe the process taken to acquire
the item.
26. Describe the disposition process for seized property. Was the intake of this property
documented? How?
27. Was there ever a ti'me when cori/iscated property that was not of evidentiary value was
used in the HSU office? For what purpose? How was this property documented? How
was it disposed of when it was no longer usefitl?
28. During the execution of a search warrant or any other activity where evidence will be
seized, how many people are designated to receive the seized property?
29. Is there always a supervisor on scene?
30. Do you believe supervisors were aware that items not considered by HSU members to be
evidence were seized by those officers for other reasons?
31. Do the squads work independently or is ever, an operation (not) planned and approved by
a supervisor?
32. While an employee of MCSO, have you ever seized any item from an individual or
operation that has not been properly logged into evidence?
33. While an employee of JVJCSO, have you ever observed any other JVJCSO employee seize
any item from an individual or operation that to your lmowledge was not properly logged
into evidence?
Upon receipt of the advice of the Monitoring Team, Captain Bailey responded, indicating his
agreement and advising the Monitoring Team that the provided questions and suggestions will be
seriously considered. He further indicated that the questions were fair and important to ask, and
would provide a pathway for the administrative ihterviews as well. The Captain was requested to
provide the final list of questions to the Monitoring Team.
Captain Bailey never responded to the Monitoring Team. Instead, on June 24, 2014 the following
response was received by Major Peters directly from Sgt. Tennyson.
}.;fr. Peters
I intend to continue interviewing HSU members beginning tomorrow June 25th 2014. I have
recieved (sic) what I believe is an accurate roster of all past and present members. According to
Page 33 of 40
' my roster there are 24 individuals remaining. I vvill schedule no more than four individuals per
day in an attempt to thoroughly cover the topics of interest and properly document my findings.
The interviews will be conducted at the Criminal Internal Affairs Offices and will be both audio
and video taped Upon completion of each inten1ieiw (sic) two copies will be made, as one will
be sent out for transcription. Intervievvs will be scheduled based on availabilty (sic) however it is
my goal to complete the remaining interviews by Thursday July 3rd 2014. The remainder of this
day will be spent organizing the questions to be asked and contacting HSU Detectives in al1
attempt to begin scheduling. A completed question list will be sent to you as soon as possible,
thank you.
David Tennyson
Sgt. Criminal Internal Affairs Division
~Maricopa County Sheriffa Office
602-876-4975
Preparation of a distinct and comprehensive line of questioning did not appear to be the Sgt.'s
priority. When the interviews resumed, questions 31, 32, and 33 and been removed.
A review of the initial audio/video taped interviews raised serious questions regarding the
commitment and capability of Sgt. Tennyson and the investigative team. On many occasions,
the Sergeant would ask leading questions, thereby narrowing the responses of the individuals
being interviewed. At times, when subjects appeared to want to offer additional statements, the
Sergeant would cut off their responses as if to limit where the conversation or statement may
lead. In one particular interview, a Sergeant began to vent about HSU being improperly used for
political purposes by the Sheriff. Upon hearing these statements the interview was immediately
stopped by Sgt. Tennyson, apparently on the directive of outside commanding officers who were
observing the interview remotely. These actions created the impression that investigators are or
could be intimidated, and they were doing just enough to make the interviews appear credible.
The Monitoring Team noted on several occasions the failure of Sgt. Tennyson to act on leads
provided through interviews. For example, during one interview, a supervisor stated that a
deputy that worked in HSU was responsible for the inventory and assignment of video cameras.
This statement was not given proper follow-up, as PSB had no knowledge if the inventory list
even existed. During the same interview, the same supervisor identified two hard drives where
video recordings from HSU cameras were downloaded. These two hard drives were left in HSU
for several weeks after their existence became known, instead of having them removed and taken
to PSB for safekeeping,' and to ensure the integrity of any evidence which may be contained
therein. The Monitoring Team noted that several of the interviews conducted appeared to
corroborate the claims by Cisco Perez that items including religious statues, license plates, ID's
'
and personal effects had been seized during HSU operations. These items were retained and
displayed in HSU in lieu of impounding.
During another interview, a supervisor complained that he saw Armendariz wearing a ski mask
while in full police uniform, conducting traffic stops during saturation patrols. This supervisor
worked in HSU, but in a different squad. He was incredulous that Armendariz was allowed to do
Page 34 of 40
that. The Monitoring Team mentioned this to Captain Bailey and asked if there had been a
follow-up. Capt. Bailey indicated he would follow up on this issue and subsequently advised the
Monitoring Team that he was unable to find any additional information supporting this
allegation. There seems to have been a lack of interest in this behavior or in corroborating or
disproving the action.
Sgt. Tennyson failed to consistently and properly provide Miranda warnings to MCSO members
being interviewed. While in most cases, he would read Miranda from a card, other times he just
stated that Miranda applied and that the person being interviewed had the right to an attorney.
The Monitoring Team considered the interview techniques of Sgt. Tennyson to be poor, failing
to convey the seriousness of the allegations, and his approach to the interviews was very
apologetic in nature. In one interview, a deputy stated that sometimes there were large amounts
of cash confiscated from load vehicles. The Sergeant failed to follow up or inquire further about
how large amounts of currency were normally handled. The Sergeant's general interview
demeanor presented an air of informality, friendliness and lacked rigor.
The Monitoring Team has continually requested to be provided with a list of every employee
who has worked in the Human Smuggling Unit, and a complete and comprehensive list of those
deputies who have been interviewed. To date, we have been provided with four different lists.
The Monitoring Team is not confident of the accuracy of any of these documents since record
keeping is haphazard. According to PSB, there is no system that tracks employee transfers.
Compiling a list of personnel 'who have worked in HSU has been laborious for the PSB
investigators.
Continued interactions between the Monitoring Team, Professional Standards Bureau
investigators, and their command staff solidified the opinion of the Monitoring Team that the
Professional Standards Bureau investigators required closer scmtiny and guidance than they
were being provided. It is unclear whether their individual actions were intentional, or
committed as a result of a lack of expertise and training. However, it is clear to the Monitoring
Team that the Professional Standards Bureau investigators committed a series of missteps that
would not have been committed if Professional Standards Bureau investigators followed a
professional and comprehensive investigatory process.
On August 27, 2014 the MCSO presented the Monitoring Team with a document entitled "HSU
Criminal Inquiry: Summary" and advised that "an Agency" decision had been reached that no
referral would be made to the Maricopa County Attorney's Office seeking a prosecutorial
decision. This decision was made despite the recommendation of the Monitor to MCSO to
develop a policy for referral to MCAO for prosecutorial declinations.
The document was submitted directly from Sgt. Tennyson to Chief Kiyler and raised serious
questions by the Monitoring Team. The document was printed on white bond paper, but
contained no addressee and no signatures. The document was not printed on official MCSO
letterhead.
The document appears to have been written by Sgt. Tennyson, and as a result of the delivery
process, the Monitoring Team believed this document to have been intended for their records,
Page 35 of 40
although it abounds with inaccuracies and personal opinions of Sgt. Tennyson. Sgt. Tem1yson
alleges that:
Major Peters and Chief Rojas prompted detectives to "expedite this investigation
in order to protect the citizens of Maricopa County."
The "absence of the two questions delayed the investigation approximately one
week potentially allowing time for communication between alleged suspects
possibly affecting the integrity and outcome of the case."
The "demand" by Monitoring Team members Peters, Rojas, and Kiyler that
interviews continue to be audio and video recorded to avoid inconsistency. (The
Monitoring Team has consistently made recommendations - not "demands".)
There was a "tremendous push made by the court appointed monitors to schedule,
complete and notify, not the findings of the interviews instead the dates times and
number of individuals who had completed the process."
The document itself bears no resemblance to a criminal investigation report.
In light of the manner in which a subordinate of the MCSO delivered this document to the
Monitoring Team bypassing his chain of command, several questions arose and were addressed
by Deputy Monitor Raul Martinez in an email to Captain Bailey.
Good afternoon Captain Bailey. I have been given a copy of a report that was handed to Chief
Kiyler by Sergeant Tennyson before I was able to join your meeting this morning. This internal
document is titled ''HSU Criminal Inquiry" and it is not signed by anyone.
Some questions we have are:
- Is this the format ofyour investigative close out reports?
-Ifso, is this the close out of the criminal investigation efforts on all these matters?
- Do the comments by the Sergeant within this report reflect the views of the Nfaricopa County
Sheriffs Office?
- Since we do inot see any signatures in this document, are you in concurrence with all the
comments made by the Sergeant in this report?
Thanking you in advance.
Raul Martinez
Chief (Retired)
Deputy 1Vfonitor
Captain Bailey provided the following response to Chief Martinez on August 28, 2014.
ChiefMartinez,
Page 36 of 40
Early in the meeting we discussed that Sgt. Tennyson had completed his investigation, because
he had just interviewed Deputy Quintero. Last week Sgt. Tennyson discussed with me that he felt
strongly about a number of things that happened during the investigation. I could tell he was
fhtstrated so I told him to write what he felt was necessmy so I could review it. That is the
document you are in possession of
The opinions of Sgt. Tennyson are going to be placed in memo format addressed to me. The
findings of his criminal inquiry/investigation are going in a more formal document. However, I
do agree that what Sgt. Tennyson wrote in this document is an accurate description of what
happened. When Sgt. Tennyson finishes his final report on the criminal inquiry/investigation and
I sign it an electronic copy vvil! be forwarded to you.
Thank you,
Captain Steve Ba;!ey
Maricopa County Sheriffs Office
On August 29, 2014 an additional document was provided to the Monitoring Team. This
document was written on MCSO memo form from Sgt. Tennyson to Captain Bailey. The report
had been amended as described by the Captain, and obviously missing were the personal
opinions and inaccuracies of Sgt. Tennyson.
On September 4, 2014, Captain Bailey and Counsel Christine Stutz were questioned about this
report by Major Peters. The inquiry focused on the format of the report and whether or not the
submitted report was considered by the Captain to be the final criminal investigation report. The
Captain indicated that he had discussed the format of the report with Sgt. Tennyson and both had
agreed that documenting the interviews and the procedures on an investigation report was
unnecessary and that this decision had been approved by the MCAO. Major Peters further
queried the Captain on this development, but the Captain was unable to provide further specifics.
The Captain stated that this was an "odd ball criminal investigation" and that Sgt. Tennyson
came to the Captain and asked him if it would be ok to put the summary on a memo in lieu of an
investigation report. Based on the Sergeant's comments, ,captain Bailey approved the action.
Major Peters specifically asked him if this investigation were to receive a prosecutorial referral
would this be the report that would be provided to them. The Captain responded historically no,
further reinforcing the Major's opinion that no official review had been conducted by MCAO.
The Captain stated that he believed Sgt. Tennyson had conferred with and briefed the county
attorneys on this case but was unsure. The Captain was sure that the attorneys had not seen any
reports or transcripts of the interviews. The Captain possessed no knowledge of who the
Sergeant may have spoken with, if anyone, and was unable to identify who in the MCAO had
provided this advice.
It is the understanding of Major Peters that the interaction between any representative of MCAO
and Sgt. Tennyson was not a formal review of any type relative to the investigation and no
specific advice or direction was requested or received from them.
Page 37
of 40
The Captain was emphatic that based upon the way the complaint was received and his personal
assessment of Perez's credibility, it was a coin toss as to whether they even should have done a
criminal investigation. In the interest of thoroughness, the Captain decided that this should be a
criminal investigation.
The Captain asked Major Peters as to whether or not he agreed with this position.
Major Peters advised the Captain of his opinion that once he had reached the decision to conduct
criminal interviews, all subsequent documentation should be on a criminal investigation report.
MCSO's ultimate purpose of this report and subsequent transcripts of the interviews should be to
pursue a referral to the prosecuting authority, in this case MCAO. In the opinion of Major Peters,
MCAO should determine their own prosecutorial position. If decided that no further criminal
actions would be undertaken, then a prosecutorial declination letter should be received by the
MCSO, allowing for any possible administrative follow up or interviews to occur. The decision
whether or not to pursue prosecution does not lie within the MCSO or its counsel. The fact that
this entire report was not captured in an investigat01y format appears to display the original
opinion of Sgt. Tennyson and the investigators that no criminal acts occurred.
On September 5, 2014, in a memo from Lt. Dave Munley to Captain Bailey which was provided
to the Monitoring Team in the September 5, 2014 weekly submission, the Lieutenant advises the
Captain that " ... this matter has been informally staffed with Maricopa Deputy County Attorney
Ed Leiter. Based on the case information relayed Mr. Leiter is of the opinion the actions of the
HSU Detectives in their totality do not rise to a criminal level. However due to the high profile
nature of this investigation Mr. Leiter will staff the case summary with supervisory staff."
The issue of Prosecutorial Review was revisited during our on-site compliance visit on
September 22, 2014. At this time, Captain Bailey once again advised my team that he did not
believe that it was appropriate to submit the criminal investigation to the County Attorney's
Office for review as he did not believe there was any basis to do so. He told our team they had
"informally" staffed this case with a Deputy County Attorney, who said he would staff the case
summary with supervisory staff. This would not constitute a formal submittal and would not
result in any formal response from the County Attorney's Office.
My team again reiterated to Captain Bailey, as well as to Attorney Christine Stutz, the
importance of having a prosecutorial review of this investigation and a written determination
from MCAO in writing that no criminal conduct existed. The following issues, although not
necessarily conclusive of theft or misappropriation of property, warranted further scrntiny by
MCAO:
1. Personal items found in Armendariz garage that were apparently seized from
enforcement actions.
2. Armendariz stating during an interview that it was common practice for HSU members to
leave seized items such as IDs around the office, and a Detention Officer would gather
them and take them to his garage.
3. Cisco Perez statements that HSU members would "pocket" items.
4. HSU members' criminal interviews in which some acknowledged that they had kept
items for training purposes.
Page 38 of 40
5. A lack of requests to convert confiscated evidence into Office property to be used for
training purposes.
On July 16, 2014 during an on-site visit, Chief Warshaw, Major Peters, Chief Rojas and Chief
Kiyler met with MCAO Attorney Christine Stutz and Capt. Bailey. At this meeting the
Monitoring Team requested that MCSO provide a comprehensive listing of all deputies assigned
to HSU, who had submitted evidence to Property & Evidence in accordance with MCSO policy.
This list should also indicate all deputies who had subsequently removed that evidence for the
sole intended purpose of training.
On July 31, 2014, Sgt. Stephen Fax of the PSB submitted a memo to Captain Bailey. Sgt. Fax
sought the assistance of John Shamley (property custodian). Mr. Shamley had provided
documents that identified each of the HSU deputies' property and evidence history and whether
or not items had been released to the deputies. If an item had been released to the deputy, a
further search would be required to ascertain the reason for the release. Items also received
designations of RICO or diversion program. When an item was released to the diversion
program, the considered property value of the item was less than or equal to $25 and the released
item was intended for office use only. The diversion program utilizes a document entitled
"Property & Evidence Diversion List". Items on these lists are considered to be "nonaccountable" and less than $25 in value. The value is determined by the potential auction sale .
pnce.
Approximately 1000 pages of information were provided to Sgt. Fax, but only 15 deputies were
identified as having removed evidentiary items designated as Officer, diversion, or RICO. The
identified deputies were: Dep. Ortega-Rodriguez S1717, Dep. Lopez S1853, Dep. Locksa Sl312,
Dep. Ross S1654, Dep. Martinez Sl593, Dep. Garcia S1244, Dep. Frei Sl570, Dep. Sedlacek
S1413, Dep. Almanza S1329, Dep. Monroe SI 713, Dep. Joya Sl 739, Dep. Ochoa Sl802, Dep.
Hechavarria S1851, Dep. Gandara S1906, and Dep. Voeltz S1658.
The 20 provided Diversion Lists were handwritten documents in which items were described,
dated, signed with badge number and assignment of the deputy. Each sheet may have several
days' worth of infornrntion. Many of the documents were incomplete and required information
.,
had been omitted.

Two deputies, Dep. Hechavarria and Rangel (former HSU members) removed two computers via
the use of a request for diverted property document. Both computers were designated for training
purposes on these document requests, and both were dated March 25, 2014.
Although several other items had also been removed by current or former HSU members via the
use of the 20 pages of diversion logs provided, none were identified for use in training.
If left uncorrected, it is the opinion of the Monitoring Team that these management and
investigatory errors will adversely impact the resolution of not only these cases, but future cases
as well. Several interviews observed by the Monitoring Team appeared to corroborate the
statements of Cisco Perez and the response or failure to respond by the investigators appeared to
reflect a nonchalance regarding the proper procedures for seizures of personal property.
Page 39 of 40
Monitoring Team investigative suggestions and guidance designed to minimize negative impact
have not been instituted in a timely and comprehensive fashion. The ultimate effect of MCSO 's
actions and missteps remains to be seen.
3.
RECONhMENDATIONS
The MCSO should be required to provide the Professional Standards Bureau with a statement of
purpose, which should be to protect the professional integrity of the MCSO and to fully, fairly,
and expeditiously investigate and resolve citizen complaints and employee misconduct
investigations. The Professional Standards Bureau should be provided with sufficient staff,
funds, and resources to perform these functions independently. Only highly qualified candidates
should become Professional Standards Bureau investigators.
Formal criteria should be established for selection of the commanding officer of the Professional
Standards Bureau and for staff who supervise or conduct internal investigations. Established
criteria should apply to the incumbent Professional Standards Bureau commanding officer and
the investigative staff, and all candidates for these positions, and also should be used to evaluate
the performance of persons serving in these positions.
Maricopa County should be required to ensure that the Professional Standards Bureau
commanding officer and staff who supervise or conduct internal investigations receive adequate
training to enable them to carry out their duties. This training should at minimum include
misconduct investigation techniques; interviewing skills; observation skills; report writing;
criminal law and procedure; court procedures; rnles of evidence; and disciplinary and
administrative procedures.
In light of the extensive list of personal items seized from the Armendariz residence, and the
corroborating statements of several HSU members, MCSO should be required to develop policy
and procedure specifically prohibiting the improper seizure of property. This policy should
directly prohibit deputies from keeping any items seized from a scene, or the seizure of
abandoned property, without the explicit request and approval for internal use by the MCSO.
Page 40 of 40

Melendres # 795 - D.ariz. 2-07-Cv-02513 795 ORDER W Report Attached

Hochgeladen von

Dokumentinformationen

Originaltitel

Copyright

Verfügbare Formate

Dieses Dokument teilen

Dokument teilen oder einbetten

Freigabeoptionen

Stufen Sie dieses Dokument als nützlich ein?

Sind diese Inhalte unangemessen?

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

Melendres # 795 - D.ariz. 2-07-Cv-02513 795 ORDER W Report Attached

Hochgeladen von

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

Case 2:07-cv-02513-GMS Document 795 Filed 11/20/14 Page 1 of 21

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Manuel de Melendres, et al.,

Maricopa, County of, et al.,

therefore determines as follows.

investigation of Deputy Charley Armendariz from the Phoenix Police Department.

personally implicated by some of the specific allegations made by two representatives of

Case 2:07-cv-02513-GMS Document 795 Filed 11/20/14 Page 2 of 21

the Plaintiff class.

After MCSOs criminal investigation into Deputy Armendariz began, MCSO

MCSO discovered significant quantities of illegal drugs as well as hundreds of personal

items belonging to unknown individualsincluding credit cards, drivers licenses,

potentially belonged to members of the Plaintiff class.

home after an apparent suicide.

Officers also discovered

Armendariz engaged in what MCSO classified as problematic behaviore.g. behavior

Upon questioning by the Court at the hearing, Chief Deputy Sheridan

Case 2:07-cv-02513-GMS Document 795 Filed 11/20/14 Page 3 of 21

asked for such materials prior to trial.

suggestions regarding the inadequacy of MCSOs existing internal investigative practices

due to the lack of evidence presented at trial on that issue).)

The matters raised by the Armendariz materials implicated a number of different

In light of the property found in the possession of Deputy Armendariz,

previously identified by the Court.

The failure of MCSO to produce the materials properly requested by

Plaintiffs the opportunity to present such evidence at the original trial.

Because of MCSOs apparent failure to proffer such materials at an earlier

Case 2:07-cv-02513-GMS Document 795 Filed 11/20/14 Page 4 of 21

to the Plaintiffs rights to relief may have since been destroyed.

related to deficiencies in MCSOs investigation of complaints against deputies, the

Armendariz materials and their sequelae.

Evidence kept from Plaintiffs may have hampered Plaintiffs ability to

This evidence and impeachable testimony, if admitted at the trial of this

were being gathered in light of the Armendariz videotapes.

Case 2:07-cv-02513-GMS Document 795 Filed 11/20/14 Page 5 of 21

department-wide retrieval of all outstanding, relevant recordings made by officers that

employees to collect any outstanding recordings.

Case 2:07-cv-02513-GMS Document 795 Filed 11/20/14 Page 6 of 21

provided to Plaintiffs prior to trial.

MCSO began an internal criminal and administrative investigation into HSU,

proceeded. Experienced members of the Monitor team observed the internal

administrative investigation when it recommenced, and offered suggestions as to various

praiseworthy. Lieutenant Seagraves was assigned to investigate the cause of Deputy

issues surrounding Deputy Armendarizs service within the MCSO.

In addition to the satisfactory work of Lieutenant Seagraves and Sergeant Fax in

investigation of alleged misconduct of HSU deputies generally. These investigations

irregularities in departmental processes as it related to persons under investigations, and

the two investigations.

Case 2:07-cv-02513-GMS Document 795 Filed 11/20/14 Page 7 of 21

investigation conducted by MCSOs Professional Standards Bureau (PSB) was

light further demonstrating the inadequacy of that investigation.

In addition, the Court questioned the Defendants assertion of privilege to attempt

inconsistent with protections offered to MCSO employees by Title 38 of the Arizona

Rev. Stat. 38-1101.

After the October 28 hearing, significant additional materials responsive to both

Plaintiffs pretrial discovery requests, and apparently relevant to the criminal

investigation closed by Defendants was discovered and subsequently revealed to this

processes to conceal widespread departmental misconduct, as alleged at least in part by

Case 2:07-cv-02513-GMS Document 795 Filed 11/20/14 Page 8 of 21

following clarification of the Monitors independent authority to investigate under its

As this Court has previously articulated, MCSOs assertions of statutory and

without colorable merit.