Draft Resolution 1.

0
Proposer: Georgia
The United Nations General Assembly,
Reaffirming that the United Nations is committed to maintaining international peace and security,
and to achieving international co-operation in solving international problems of humanitarian
character, as per Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations,
Emphasising that Member States must not use force to undermine the territorial integrity or political
independence of another Member State, as per Article 2 of the United Nations Charter,
Noting that Armenia forcibly occupied territory legally belonging to Azerbaijan, notably including the
Nagorno-Karabakh region that voted to secede to Armenia but also including Azerbaijani territory
with purely strategic value to Armenia,
Recognising the immense desire of Armenian citizens residing in the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic
(NKR) to possess a high degree of autonomy from Azerbaijan, either by joining Armenia or by
establishing the NKR as an internationally recognised state,
Recognising the legitimate concerns of Azerbaijan that its sovereignty has been violated by military
force, without prior failure to protect citizens that would justify Responsibility to Protect or other
interventions,
Noting that any agreement at this stage would set a precedent for implicitly supporting military
interventions justified, truthfully or not, by the appearance of popular support, which could
negatively affect ongoing or future border disputes elsewhere in the world,
Recognising the resulting difficulty of attaining international consensus on the NKR, especially
between Armenia and Azerbaijan who would have to implement and maintain the agreement, and
that a controversial recognition of the NKR could spark further ethnic conflict,
Recognising the continued displacement of more than a million people after the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict, including refugees who fled country and internally displaced Azerbaijani citizens wishing to
return to territory currently controlled by Armenia,
Noting the significant harms this displacement causes to these people, including lack of sufficient
shelter, economic hardship, cultural alienation, psychological distress, fear of further ethnic conflict
or oppression, and limited opportunities for further self-actualisation or improvement of quality of
life,
Noting with pleasure previous initiatives to mitigate these harms, including material aid from Turkey,
power and electricity donations from Iran, and 33,000 tons of grain and 150 tons of infant formula
sent by the United States through Georgian ports,
Noting the continued fragility of the ceasefire agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, due to
severe political tension between the two countries, occasional breaches of the ceasefire, and the
rapid growth of the Azerbaijani military,
Emphasising the need for peacekeeping forces to maintain peace in the Nagorno-Karabakh region,
especially while refugees and internally displaced persons return home,

Noting that Russian peacekeeping forces may not be perceived as legitimate, given Russias
dominant military alliance with Armenia, the Black January Soviet peacekeeping forces killing of
133 Azerbaijani civilians, and recent Russian military invasions of Georgia and Crimea,
Recalling that settling a border dispute too rapidly can lead to disastrous consequences, such as the
ethnic cleansing of up to half a million citizens during the partition of India, or the ongoing tensions
between North and South Korea,
Recognising that both Armenia and Azerbaijan have significant ties to the disputed land, and any
sanctions attempting to influence their position on the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute would need to be
severe,
Noting that Armenia and Azerbaijan are still developing economies, and severe economic sanctions
would either significantly hurt their citizens, or force Armenia and Azerbaijan to make their
economies totally dependent on countries not prepared to sanction them,
Noting that economic sanctions would only influence government positions on the NagornoKarabakh region, and would not solve ethnic and cultural tensions responsible for past human rights
abuses and persistent cross-border conflict,
Recognising that failure to protect citizens or obey international law can already be directly
addressed through other methods, such as existing Responsibility to Protect doctrine,
Recognising that the Lachin corridor is legally the territory of Azerbaijan,
Noting that as the Lachin corridor currently falls under the control and domain of the NKR, the
eventual legal status of the Lachin corridor will depend on future agreements on the legal status of
the NKR,
Noting that the mountainous region surrounding the Lachin corridor makes travel between Armenia,
Azerbaijan, and the NKR prohibitive if the Lachin corridor cannot be used,
Emphasising the importance of accessible travel between these regions while they recover from the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, particularly for displaced refugees seeking to return home, transfer of
aid and humanitarian supplies, and access for any deployed peacekeeping forces,
Suggesting that the Lachin corridor therefore be treated as a special case of Azerbaijani territory
until substantial progress has been made on these humanitarian issues,
Suggesting that Azerbaijan has an incentive to allow free travel along the Lachin corridor, both to
allow its own citizens to return home, and also to allow any citizens not wishing to remain in
Azerbaijan to leave so they do not contribute further to cultural and ethnic tensions,
Recognising that previous attempts to resolve the legal status of the Lachin corridor while retaining
accessible travel have been made by the OSCE Minsk Group, but as part of package deals that were
rejected primarily for the presence of other clauses,
1. Urges Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the NKR to strive to reduce conflict in the region, including
breaches of the ceasefire by their own military forces, and consistent cross-border conflict
by citizens and militias such as raids and sniper fire,
2. Recommends that the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) approve the use of UN
peacekeepers to maintain order in the Nagorno-Karabakh region,

3. Calls upon Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the NKR to fully accept any deployed UN peacekeepers,
by granting them full access to disputed regions, providing them with any relevant
information deemed necessary to perform their peacekeeping duties, and urging citizens to
cooperate,
4. Supports further expansion of the OSCE Monitoring Missions to observe the disputed
regions and report on breaches of the ceasefire agreement,
5. Demands that Armenian forces withdraw immediately from all Azerbaijani territory outside
the NKR, given the lack of any possible non-military justification for their occupation,
6. Recommends that Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the NKR be given further time to reach a
satisfactory resolution to the legal status of the NKR, contingent on their continued efforts
to negotiate in good will and use of military forces solely for peacekeeping while the legal
status of the NKR is determined,
7. Recommends that no threat of economic sanctions be imposed on Armenia or Azerbaijan for
failures to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict,
8. Declines to recognise the NKR as a legitimate state at this stage,
9. Recommends that the NKR take further steps to provide an acceptable justification for
statehood, including but not limited to the following possibilities:
a. Hosting further referendums or polls to determine the wishes of citizens living in the
NKR, with demonstrable representation of all citizens including the Azerbaijani
minority and any citizens temporarily displaced from the NKR but intending to
return,
b. Demonstrating a willingness and ability to maintain regional peace, potentially by
acting to stop cross-border conflict, de-mining dangerous areas for civilians,
protecting or destroying currently insecure ex-Soviet weapon and ammunition
stockpiles, or contributing peacekeeping forces,
c. Assisting recovery efforts from the war, such as resettling displaced refugees and
persons to their homes, giving aid to other states or organisations pursuing similar
humanitarian aims where appropriate, facilitating reparations to victims of human
rights abuses or conflict in general, rebuilding destroyed infrastructure and
resources, or focusing economic development efforts in affected areas,
d. Initiating trust building initiatives to restore good faith between Armenian and
Azerbaijani citizens, such as the open markets proposal in the Minsk Package Deal of
1997, economic initiatives partially funded by both Armenia and Azerbaijan with
profits flowing back to both countries, or allowing free use of infrastructure like
railways to both nationalities,

10. Urges Armenia and Azerbaijan to allow the NKR to pursue these activities while negotiations
and debate continue over the legal status of NKR, and to participate where appropriate,
11. Urges the international community, particularly regional actors including Armenia,
Azerbaijan, and the NKR, to continue to help resettle these displaced people, through means
including but not limited to:
a. Allowing and assisting displaced persons to return to their homes, potentially by
providing free transport or bolstering police presences in areas where continued
potential for ethnic violence is a deterrent to return home,
b. Providing aid specifically for refugees and displaced people, including food, water,
shelter, clothing, furniture, medical support, and other basic humanitarian
necessities,
c. Providing other aid assisting the regions in which these displaced people currently
live or would resettle to, including electricity and gasoline,
12. Recommends aid be distributed to both Armenian and Azerbaijani citizens on a nondiscriminatory basis, to avoid fostering further tensions,
13. Recommends cross-border donation of aid to rebuild trust between Armenia and Azerbaijan,
including aid workers if requested by the other country or the NKR,
14. Suggests that Azerbaijan temporarily lease the Lachin corridor to the OSCE, with the
following conditions:
a. Exclusive use of the corridor will be granted to NKR authorities, with the exception
of civilian transit along the corridor,
b. The OSCE will monitor security conditions along the Lachin corridor as an extension
of the current monitor missions,
c. Permanent settlement or armed forces are barred from the corridor,
d. The contract must be renewed every year, or another suitable timeframe
determined between Azerbaijan and the OSCE,
e. The contract terminates without penalty if an agreement determining the legal
status of the NKR as a whole is reached, whereby the Lachin corridor assumes the
same legal status as the rest of the NKR as currently defined,