China Grapples With the Realities of Global Power

Analysis
Forecast

As outlined in China's latest defense white paper, the Chinese

military will focus more on the growing internationalization of its
role and "active defense."
China's expanding economic and military activities in developing
countries will make it increasingly difficult for Beijing to
counter accusations of imperialism and convince other countries
that it remains both politically neutral and capable of protecting
its interests.
As China becomes more involved in global defense, it will struggle
to maintain its professed policies of noninterference while
protecting its expanding national interests and will be forced to
choose sides in political and security issues.
Weaker states or groups within states will attempt to leverage
Chinese power for their own interests.

China's defense white papers are less revelations of new direction than
partial reflections of current trends, carefully crafted for foreign and
domestic consumption. No secrets are revealed, and little new ground
is broken, but a comprehensive view emerges of just how China would
like the world to interpret the evolution of its defense capabilities and
actions. In China's latest such paper, released May 26, China is sending
a message that it is a big power with international interests and will
shoulder international responsibilities, but that unlike other major
powers before it (alluding in particular to the United States), China has
no hegemonic designs.
The centerpiece of China's strategy is "active defense," which Chinese
defense officials contrast with the "proactive" defense policies of other
nations (a clear nod to the emerging Japanese defense doctrine, as well
as to existing U.S. strategy). In short, China wants and needs to

take a stronger and more active role in international security. But it also
wants to prevent any of its actions from being interpreted as aggressive
or imperialistic to avoid the political and security consequences of being
seen as an interventionist power.
Among the shifts in China's overall defense strategy, as laid out in the
white paper but already clearly underway, are modifications of the
primary roles of the various branches of the People's Liberation Army
(PLA). In Section IV of the white paper, China elucidates these changing
roles:

The PLA Army "will continue to reorient from theater defense to

trans-theater mobility."
The PLA Navy "will gradually shift its focus from 'offshore waters
defense' to the combination of 'offshore waters defense' and 'open
seas protection.'"
The PLA Air Force "will endeavor to shift its focus from territorial
air defense to both defense and offense."

These evolutions match China's expanding strategic interests and

reflect the ongoing refocusing of its defense strategy and capability from
internal security and territorial integrity to assuring stability in its near
abroad and addressing national interests far from China's borders or
shores. This international component is summed up in Section I of the
white paper:
With the growth of China's national interests, its national security is
more vulnerable to international and regional turmoil, terrorism,
piracy, serious natural disasters and epidemics, and the security of
overseas interests concerning energy and resources, strategic sea lines
of communication (SLOCs), as well as institutions, personnel and
assets abroad, has become an imminent issue.
The latter half of this quote may highlight the biggest challenge to
China's overall foreign policy. Just the assertion of the importance of
Chinese interests abroad shaped by natural resources, transport
corridors, personnel and business operations in other countries
places China on a path of likely intervention that follows the United

States and other imperial powers (whether intentionally imperial or

otherwise) before it. If China is going to protect its physical interests
and assets abroad, including its supplies of raw materials and its
manufacturing and market bases, it will be forced to choose sides in
political and security issues.

The Necessity of Choosing Sides

A shift in internal political alignment, a rising labor movement, the
expansion of a militant organization or a change in international
relations can all affect the stability and security of Chinese investments,
access to raw materials, and the safety and security of Chinese
personnel and assets abroad. In recent years, China has experienced
these vulnerabilities firsthand, sometimes because of general trends
(needing to pull its citizens out of Yemen, for example). At other times,
it has been more directly related to Chinese activities (for instance,
protests and actions against Chinese business operations in East
Africa). China has already begun to face a stream of local accusations of
economic imperialism in Africa, for example, and concerns are being
raised about China's expanding economic activities in Latin America.
Add in a more active military role, and Beijing will find it increasingly
hard to convince other countries or populations that it remains both
politically neutral and capable of protecting its interests.
An article written by the chief editor of the Sudanese newspaper AlAyyam on May 25, timed to nearly coincide with the release of the
Chinese defense white paper, highlights this growing challenge for
Beijing. Discussing the situation in South Sudan and China's supply of
arms to the South Sudanese government, the commentary notes that
the situation on the ground is forcing China to take sides and ease away
from its noninterference policies, if it truly does want to ensure its own
interests. The author then asserts, "China is now speaking the same
language as the United States and the West on the South Sudan
conflict." This is exactly the image China is trying so hard to deflect, but
the reality is that protecting national interests requires choosing sides.
And Beijing is finding it increasingly hard to follow its professed
noninterference policy or even its less overt tactic of funding and

maintaining political ties with both sides of internal conflicts to ensure

it has friends no matter which side wins.
In Africa, Southeast Asia (particularly Myanmar), Central Asia and
beyond, Chinese officials face difficult decisions that test the
noninterference policies every day. Adhering to noninterference could
mean a loss of national interests, of access to strategic commodities, or
of ease of passage for goods and services. Violating noninterference
presents its own risks, as countries and populations see Chinese actions
as more and more selfish and less and less about simply sharing with all
in the great rise of the developing nations and the global south. China's
clear shift to a more active international defense role shows just how
much its thinking and recognition of this change in international
relations is a reality. Why develop the ability to intervene to protect
Chinese interests abroad if these interests are not threatened and if
their status can be resolved through noninterfering political dialogue?
This is not to say that China is about to become the next global
policeman, or that Chinese forces will begin deploying around the world
on unilateral missions to protect Chinese factories. But the change in
defense strategy is tied closely to evolutions in political strategy, and
"active defense" to protect "the security of overseas interests" will
frequently require choosing a side in internal and regional competitions
and conflicts. One of the requirements of a major world power is that it
must deal with these sorts of complications and contradictions; it is the
cost of an expanded global reach and growing global dependencies.

The Risks of Empire

There is the additional risk that, as China's capabilities increase,
countries will attempt to pull China into local or regional conflicts or
confrontations to support their own positions. The United States finds
itself regularly at the receiving end of requests for military assistance or
intervention. And to maintain economic or diplomatic relations, the
United States at times finds itself involved in conflicts that are of only
tangential interest. For countries with the capability and the need to
maintain certain levels of political relations to ensure their economic
interests, it can be difficult to avoid being drawn in by third-party

interests. Countries and interest groups may seek to exploit China's

national interests to compel direct Chinese involvement in issues and
cases where Beijing would prefer to remain somewhat distant. The
more capability China develops and demonstrates, the more likely it is
that weaker states or groups within states will attempt to leverage
Chinese power for their own interests.
The United States, which China is always alluding to when it mentions
hegemonic powers,did not seek to become a global empire and did not
intend to be an interventionist power. U.S. policy was frequently
espoused as noninterventionist, particularly in the 1800s as the United
States emerged from a backwater nation in virgin lands to a globally
active economic and military power at the end of the century. Yet as U.S.
business interests expanded abroad, the U.S. Navy became a default
tool of forcing changes in local behavior to ensure American economic
access and security. The United States' claims of anti-imperialism
during the same period stemmed from both a political will to avoid
following the United Kingdom's path and a recognition of the weakness
of the U.S. position abroad compared with the existing imperial
European powers. Anti-imperialism was a tool to allow the United
States to gain economic and security benefits at minimal cost and lower
risk. As China continues its emergence from a regional to a global
power, it is encountering similar compulsions and constraints and the
contradictions that power and expanding global interests bring to
professed ideological and anti-imperial non-hegemonic regimes.
Lead Analyst: Rodger Baker
Source: https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/china-grapples-realitiesglobal-power