CA9!14!16858-11 - 2 DMV's Corrected Brief

Case: 14-16858, 04/30/2015, ID: 9520685, DktEntry: 11-2, Page 1 of 44
14-16858
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
REHAN SHEIKH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
BRIAN KELLY, Secretary, California
State Transportation Agency; MARK
TWEETY, Manager, Department of Motor
Vehicles,
Defendants and Appellees.
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
No. 2:14-cv-751 GEB AC PS
The Honorable Garland E. Burrell, Judge
APPELLEES CORRECTED ANSWERING BRIEF
KAMALA D. HARRIS
Attorney General of California
SUSAN E. SLAGER
Acting Senior Assistant Attorney
General
DAVID J. NEILL
Supervising Deputy Attorney
General
MATTHEW T. BESMER
Deputy Attorney General
State Bar No. 269138
2550 Mariposa Mall, Room 5090
Fresno, CA 93721
Telephone: (559) 477-1680
Fax: (559) 445-5106
Email: Matthew.Besmer@doj.ca.gov
Attorneys for Appellees Brian Kelly,
Secretary, California State
Transportation Agency; and Mark
Tweety, Manager Department of Motor
Vehicles
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Introduction .................................................................................................1
Statement of Jurisdiction ..............................................................................2
Issues Presented ........................................................................................... 2
Statement of the Case................................................................................... 4
I.
Statutory Framework ...............................................................4

A.
Drivers license suspensions for failing to pay

traffic fines.....................................................................4
B.
Drivers license suspensions for failing to appear

in court........................................................................... 5
C.
Drivers license suspensions for refusing to submit

to a reexamination..........................................................5
D.
Drivers licenses cannot be renewed when a

suspension is in effect ....................................................8
E.
There is no right to a hearing when the suspension

is mandated by the vehicle code .....................................8
II.
Factual Background ................................................................. 8
III.
Procedural History ................................................................. 11
Standard of Review .................................................................................... 16

Summary of Argument .............................................................................. 16
Argument ................................................................................................... 17
I.
Legal standard on a motion to dismiss for failure to state

a claim ................................................................................... 17
II.
Sheikh lacks standing to pursue his appeal ............................. 18
III.
Sheikh failed to state a procedural due process claim ............. 20

A.
The Fourteenth Amendment does not require the

DMV to provide an administrative hearing to
review a drivers license suspension for failing to
appear in court or pay a traffic fine .............................. 21
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
(continued)
Page
B.
IV.
The Fourteenth Amendment does not require the

DMV to provide an administrative hearing before
or after suspending a drivers license for refusing
to complete a reexamination ........................................ 25
Sheikh failed to state an equal protection claim ..................... 31

A.
Sheikhs complaint did not allege an equal

protection claim ........................................................... 31
B.
Even if Sheikh had alleged an equal protection

claim in his complaint, it would have failed
because his complaint is against the Stockton
Police Department, not the DMV ................................. 32
Conclusion ................................................................................................. 34
Statement of Related Cases ........................................................................ 35
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (2009) ............................................................................... 17
Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc.
631 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) .................................................. 18
Colony Cove Props., LLC v. City of Carson
640 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 2011) .................................................................. 16
Dixon v. Love
431 U.S. 105 (1977) ............................................................................... 29
Estelle v. Gamble
429 U.S. 97 (1976)................................................................................. 18
Illinois v. Batchelder
463 U.S. 1112 (U.S. 1983) ..................................................................... 20
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America
511 U.S. 375 (1994) ............................................................................... 18
Kushner v. Shiomoto
2014 Cal. App. Unpub. .................................................................... 23, 24
Laisne v. California State Board of Optometry
19 Cal. 2d 831 (Cal. 1942) ..................................................................... 25
Litmon v. Harris
768 F.3d 1237 (9th Cir. 2014) ................................................................ 31
Mackey v. Montrym
443 U.S. 1 (1979)............................................................................passim
Mathews v. Eldridge
424 U.S. 319 (1976) ................................................................... 16, 21, 26
iii
(continued)
Page
Multistar Indus. v. United States DOT
707 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2013) ................................................................ 18
People v. Bailey
133 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 12 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1982) ................ 23
Pollack v. Dep't of Motor Vehicles
38 Cal. 3d 367 (Cal. 1985) ..................................................................... 29
Rector v. City & County of Denver
348 F.3d 935 (10th Cir. 2003) ................................................................ 19
Roelfsema v. Department of Motor Vehicles
(1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 871..................................................................... 30
Wash. Legal Found. v. Legal Found. of Wash.
271 F.3d 835 (9th Cir. 2001) .................................................................. 18
Williams v. Department of Motor Vehicles
2 Cal. App. 3d 949 (Cal. App. 1969)...................................................... 24
Wright v. Riveland
219 F.3d 905 (9th Cir. 2000) ............................................................ 20, 28
STATUTES
California Code of Regulations
Title 13, 100.01(a)(1)-(6) ................................................................ 7, 26
California Evidence Code
664 ...................................................................................................... 30
California Vehicle Code
12804.9(a)(1)(A)-(E) ............................................................................7
12807(a).......................................................................................... 8, 19
12807(c).......................................................................................... 8, 19
iv
(continued)
Page
12818 ...................................................................................... 27, 28, 33
12818(a)-(b) ..........................................................................................6
12818(b) ...............................................................................................7
12819 ...........................................................................................passim
13106 .................................................................................................. 22
13106(a)............................................................................................ 4, 5
13365(a)(2) ........................................................................... 4, 5, 16, 22
13365(b) ..................................................................................... 4, 5, 22
13801 .................................................................................................. 26
13950 .................................................................................. 7, 17, 29, 33
14101(a)................................................................................ 8, 9, 22, 26
21061(a).......................................................................................... 6, 30
21061(b) ...............................................................................................6
21062 .............................................................................................. 6, 32
40509.5(a) ....................................................................................... 5, 22
40509.5(b) ...................................................................................... 4, 22
40509.5(a)-(b) ..................................................................................... 22
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
United States Constitution
Fourteenth Amendment, 1 ............................................................passim
COURT RULES
Federal Rule of Evidence
302 ......................................................................................................... 30
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1).................................................................................................. 19
INTRODUCTION
In January 2012, the California Department of Motor Vehicles denied
Rehan Sheikhs request to renew his drivers license because he had failed to
appear in court on a traffic citation. Despite the suspension, Sheikh
continued to drive. He was stopped in February 2012, for multiple traffic
violations. He was arrested that day and issued a traffic citation, and a
notice requiring him to retake the drivers license exam to demonstrate his
fitness for diving. Sheikh, however, refused to complete the exam on March
26, 2012. Sheikh subsequently appeared in traffic court for his first citation.
On May 23, 2012, he was found guilty and ordered to pay a fine. Sheikh,
however, has refused to pay that fine, and he has refused to resolve the
outstanding failure to appear for his February 2012 traffic citation. Each of
these refusals provide separate grounds to suspend Sheikhs license. After
Sheikh clears his traffic fine and failure to appear with the San Joaquin
County Superior Court, and after he successfully completes the
reexamination of his driving privileges, the DMV will lift the suspensions.
On March 24, 2014, Sheikh filed a complaint for injunctive and
declaratory relief seeking renewal of his drivers license. He alleged that his
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights had been violated because he had
not been provided with an administrative hearing to review his license
1
suspensions. The District Court for the Eastern District of California

dismissed Sheikhs complaint without leave to amend for failing to state a
claim on September 19, 2014. The dismissal should be affirmed because the
statutes that govern Sheikhs license suspensions comply with the
Fourteenth Amendment. The statutes are sufficiently detailed to protect
against erroneous suspensions and they provide licensees with a remedial
process to remove the suspensions. Sheikhs license remains suspended, not
because of a lack of due process, but because he has refused to avail himself
of the due process provided by California law.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Except that Appellees contest Appellants standing, this Court has
subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. section 1331 because this action
involves a federal question. The order dismissing Appellants case was
entered on September 19, 2014, and is reviewable under 28 U.S.C. section
1291. The notice of appeal was filed on September 24, 2014.
ISSUES PRESENTED
1.
Does the procedural due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment require the California Department of Motor Vehicles to provide

Appellant with an administrative hearing to review his drivers license
suspensions for failing to appear in court and pay a fine, when the traffic
court provides Appellant with due process to remove the suspensions?
2.
Does the procedural due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment require the California Department of Motor Vehicles to provide

Appellant with an administrative hearing to review his drivers license
suspension for refusing to complete a priority reexamination of his driving
privileges, when Appellant may remove the suspension by successfully
completing the reexamination?
3.
Can Appellant state a viable equal protection claim on appeal
when he failed to allege an equal protection claim in his complaint, and even
if he did, the claim could not be brought against the California Department
of Motor Vehicles?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.
STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
A.
Drivers License Suspensions for Failing to Pay Traffic

Fines
Court clerks are authorized to notify the Department of Motor Vehicles

(DMV)1 when a person has willfully failed to pay a lawfully imposed
fine. Cal. Veh. Code 40509.5(b). Upon notification, the DMV is required
to suspend that persons license. Cal. Veh. Code 13365(a)(2). The
suspension is effective no sooner than 60 days after the DMV receives
notification from the court clerk. Cal. Veh. Code 13365(b). The DMV
mails notice of the suspension to the licensee, effective 30 days later,
providing the licensee with time to resolve the failure before the suspension
takes effect. See Cal. Veh. Code 13365(b), 13106(a). Once the fine is
fully paid, the magistrate or clerk of the court shall issue and file with the
department a certificate showing that the fine or bail has been paid. Cal.
Veh. Code 40509.5(b). The suspension continues until the licensees
driving record does not contain any notifications for failure to pay a fine.
Cal. Veh. Code 13365(b).
1
Appellees Brian Kelly, Secretary, California State Transportation

Agency and Mark Tweety, Manager, Department of Motor Vehicles are
collectively referred to as (DMV).
4
B.
Drivers License Suspensions for Failing to Appear in

Court
The process for suspending and removing suspensions for failing to

appear in court is similar to the process for failing to pay traffic fines. Court
clerks are authorized to notify the DMV when a person has failed to appear
in court. Cal. Veh. Code 40509.5(a). Upon notification, the DMV is
required to suspend that persons license. Cal. Veh. Code 13365(a)(2).
The suspension is effective no sooner than 60 days after the DMV receives
notification from the court clerk. Cal. Veh. Code 13365(b). The DMV
mails notice of the suspension to the licensee, effective 30 days later,
providing the licensee with time to resolve the failure before the suspension
takes effect. See Cal. Veh. Code 13365(b), 13106(a). Once the matter is
adjudicated, or the person appears in court and satisfies the courts order,
the magistrate or clerk of the court hearing the case shall sign and file with
the department a certificate to that effect. Cal. Veh. Code 40509.5(a).
The suspension continues until the driving record does not contain any
notifications for failure to appear. Cal. Veh. Code 13365(b).
C.
Drivers License Suspensions for Refusing to Submit to a

Reexamination
A traffic officer may issue a notice of reexamination to any person who

violates a traffic law, and who at the time of the violation, exhibits evidence
5
of incapacity which leads the traffic officer to reasonably believe that the
person is incapable of operating a motor vehicle in a manner so as not to
present a clear or potential danger of risk of injury to that person or others if
that person is permitted to resume operation of a motor vehicle. Cal. Veh.
Code 21061(a). Evidence of incapacity means evidence, other than
violations of this division, of serious physical injury or illness or mental
impairment or disorientation which is apparent to the traffic officer and
which presents a clear or potential danger or risk of injury to the person or
others if that person is permitted to resume operation of a motor vehicle.
Cal. Veh. Code 21061(b).
The officer who issues the notice of reexamination is required to
transmit the notice to the DMV within one working day. Cal. Veh. Code
21062. Within five days of receipt, the DMV is required to enter the
notice onto the persons driving record. Id. The person must request
reexamination during those five days, or the persons license will be
suspended. Cal. Veh. Code 12819. The suspension remains in effect until
the person has completed the reexamination, and the DMV determines
whether to take remedial action, if any, such as suspending, revoking, or
restricting the persons license. Cal. Veh. Code 12819, 12818(a)-(b).
A reexamination includes a test of the applicants knowledge and

understanding of the rules of the road, the ability to read and understand
simple English used on traffic signs, the understanding of traffic signs and
signals, an actual demonstration of the ability to operate a motor vehicle, a
hearing and eyesight test, and other matters that may be necessary to
determine the applicants mental and physical fitness to operate a motor
vehicle. Cal. Veh. Code 12804.9(a)(1)(A)-(E).
A person issued a notice of reexamination is deemed to have refused
the reexamination if he or she doe not appear as scheduled, fails to provide
information requested by the DMV, fails to complete a drive test (if
required), fails to complete a vision examination (if required), is not
responsive to questions during the reexamination, or the department does not
timely receive a medical examination (if required). Cal. Code Regs., tit. 13,
100.01(a)(1)-(6).
After a licensee completes the reexamination, the DMV will decide
whether to restrict the license, suspend the license, or revoke the license.
Cal. Veh. Code 12818(b). If the DMV proposes to take adverse action
based on the results of the examination, the licensee is entitled to notice and
an opportunity to be heard before the action takes effect. Cal. Veh. Code
13950.
7
D.
Drivers Licenses Cannot be Renewed When A

Suspension is In Effect
California law prohibits the DMV from renewing a drivers license

when the license has been suspended, unless the cause for suspension has
been removed. Cal. Veh. Code 12807(a). More specifically, when the
DMV receives notice that a person has failed to pay a fine or appear in court,
the DMV is prohibited from renewing that persons license until the court
clerk sends a certificate to the DMV clearing the failure to pay or appear.
Cal. Veh. Code 12807(c).
E.
There is no Right to a Hearing When the Suspension is

Mandated by the Vehicle Code
There is no right to a hearing for mandatory license suspensions, or the

non-renewal of a license, on grounds that a person has failed to appear in
court, pay a fine, or refused to complete a reexamination. See Cal. Veh
Code 14101(a) (a person is not entitled to a hearing when the action by
the department is mandatory by this code).
II.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On August 11, 2011, Rehan Sheikh (Sheikh) was cited for failing to
stop at a stop sign, and for not having proof of insurance. Appellants Brief
(App. Brief) 8:17-23; Appellees Excerpts of Record filed herewith (E.R.)
(Doc. 45) 00128:22-26; Request for Judicial Notice filed herewith (RJN),
8
Ex. A. Sheikh did not initially appear in court on this citation. E.R. (Doc.
45) 00125:5-12. The DMV mailed a notice to Sheikh dated December 5,
2011, advising him that his license would be suspended effective January 4,
2012, until all failures to appear and pay fines were removed from his
driving record. Id.; App. Brief, 1:10-15; 8:6-12. Around the beginning of
January 2012, Sheikh applied to renew his drivers license. E.R. (Doc. 1)
00003: 8. The DMV, however, informed Sheikh that he was ineligible to
renew his license because of the failure to appear on his driving record. Id.
at 9.
Even though his license had been suspended, Sheikh continued to
drive. On February 16, 2012, Sheikh was stopped for multiple traffic
violations. App. Brief, 8:24-28. According to Sheikh, the officers
continued to add traffic citations (6-7) until he was arrested and booked
into county jail. App. Brief, 9:3. Sheikh was cited for speeding, two red
signal violations, driving with a suspended license, failing to provide proof
of financial responsibility, failing to yield to emergency vehicles, and
following too closely. RJN, Ex. B. According to Sheikh, he was released
from jail five days later on February 17, 2012. App. Brief, 9:18.
Sheikh was issued a notice of priority reexamination in connection with
his February 12, 2012 traffic violations which he has characterized as an
9
arbitrary demand for a driving test, written test, and unspecified medical
tests. App. Brief, 21:5-8, 18-19. Sheikh admits that he refused to complete
the reexamination on March 26, 2012, and instead, demanded an
administrative hearing. App. Brief, 23:18-21. The DMV maintains that the
notice of suspension for his refusal to complete the reexamination was
timely issued, and Sheikh concedes that in the course of this litigation he has
received further notice from the DMV advising him of the need to schedule
an interview with DMVs Driver Safety Office to complete a written law
test, vision test, and a driving test. App. Brief, 12:14-20.
On or about May 23, 2012, Sheikh appeared in court on his August 11,
2011 traffic citation and he was found guilty and ordered to pay a fine. App.
Brief, 10:3-8; E.R. (Doc. 45) 00127:17-28; RJN, Ex. A. During the hearing
on Defendants motion to dismiss on August 22, 2014, Sheikh admitted that
he had not paid this fine. Motion to Dismiss Hearing Transcript (TR.)
17:1-19. As of May 21, 2014, the San Joaquin County Superior Court traffic
court records also show that Sheikh has an outstanding failure to appear for
his February 12, 2012 traffic citation, and that a bench warrant was issued
for his arrest. RJN, Exs. A and B.
10
III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Sheikh filed a complaint against the DMV for injunctive and
declaratory relief in the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of California on March 24, 2014. E.R. (Doc. 1) 00001. Sheikh asserted five
counts for alleged violations of substantive and procedural due process
under the Fourteenth Amendment. E.R. (Doc. 1) 00001-000010. Sheikh
initially alleged that the DMV failed to provide written notice of his license
suspensions (E.R. (Doc. 1) 00004: 11, 15; 00005: 21), but he has since
admitted that he did in fact receive written notice of the first suspension on
December 5, 2011. App. Brief, 1:10-13; TR. 6:14-16. Sheikh also alleged
that the DMV violated his due process rights by not providing a predeprivation or post-deprivation hearing in connection with the suspensions.
E.R. (Doc. 1) 00003:8; 00004:11, 12, 15; 00005:21, 22. Sheikh
further alleged the DMV did not provide him with a remedial procedure to
allow him to renew his drivers license. E.R. (Doc. 1) 00007:31, 36;
00009:45. Sheikh is not seeking damages. Instead, he is seeking a
declaration that the DMV violated his due process rights, an injunction
requiring the DMV to renew his license, and an injunction to bar the DMV
from enforcing unconstitutional or burdensome policies. E.R. (Doc. 1)
00010:48.
11
To moot Sheikhs claims that he was not provided with written notice
or a remedial process to remove the suspensions, Sharon Robinson of the
DMV caused a letter to be mailed to Sheikh dated May 6, 2014. E.R. (Doc.
22) 00028; E.R. (Doc. 23) 00032-00034. The letter advised Sheikh that he
needs to pay the fine for his August 11, 2011 traffic citation (San Joaquin
County Superior Court Case No. A158647), and he needs to address the
failure to appear on his February 12, 2012 traffic citation (San Joaquin
County Superior Court Case No. A156283). Id. The letter instructed Sheikh
to resolve these issues with the San Joaquin County Superior Court in
Stockton, California. E.R. 00034. The letter also informed Sheikh that he
needs to submit to a reexamination. Id. Enclosed with the letter were the
multiple notices that had been sent to Sheikh about his license suspensions
since December 5, 2011, including a notice dated October 23, 2012,
informing Sheikh of the suspension for failing to pay a fine and appear in
court. E.R. (Doc. 23) 00036-00048.
On May 7, 2014, the DMV filed a motion to dismiss for mootness,
standing, and for failure to state a claim. E.R. (Doc. 20) 00012-00013. The
motion argued that Sheikhs claims were moot because regardless of what
happened previously, the DMV provided Sheikh with written notice on May
6, 2014, of the reasons his license was suspended and outlined the remedial
12
process he needs to follow to remove the suspension to become eligible to

renew his license. E.R. (Doc. 20) 00013; E.R. (Doc. 21) 00019-00022. The
motion also argued that Sheikh lacked standing to pursue his claim because
he was not challenging the underlying reasons his license was suspended.
E.R. (Doc. 20) 00013; E.R. (Doc. 21) 00022-00024. Finally, the motion
argued that Sheikh could not state a claim because he is not entitled to the
relief he is seeking. E.R. (Doc. 20) 00013; E.R. (Doc. 21) 00024-00026.
For example, Sheikh is not entitled to an order directing the DMV to renew
his license because he did not allege facts to establish his eligibility to renew
his license. Id.
In response to a premature request for admission, DMVs trial counsel
sent Sheikh a letter dated July 14, 2014. E.R. (Doc. 39) 00074-00075,
00077-00079. The letter provided Sheikh with additional notice about his
license suspensions, and reiterated the steps he needs to take to become
eligible renew his license. The letter explained, in detail, the reasons Sheikh
must submit to a priority reexamination, and enclosed a copy of the police
report regarding his February 12, 2012 traffic citation and arrest. According
to the report, Sheikh was observed speeding, he ran a red light, and he was
following another vehicle too closely. E.R. (Doc. 39) 000089-00091. He
also failed to immediately stop in response to emergency lights and sirens.
13
E.R. (Doc. 39) 00091. The officer reported that for several blocks Sheikh
made no attempt to slow down and pull over, even though he had several
opportunities to do so. Id. When Sheikh finally stopped, the officer
discovered that he was driving with a suspended license. Id. The officer
reported that Sheikhs demeanor was initially calm, but he suddenly became
angry when asked whether he had a valid drivers license and insurance. Id.
While the first officer was speaking to a second officer who had arrived
on scene, Sheikh honked his horn, turned his brake lights on and off, and hit
his steering wheel. E.R. (Doc. 39) 00091. Then Sheikh exited his vehicle
and when asked to get back inside, he said F--k You to the officer. Id.
Sheikh was given the opportunity to either sit in his vehicle or in the patrol
vehicle, but he refused to comply and was handcuffed and placed in the
backseat of the patrol vehicle. Id. While the officer was preparing the
citation, Sheikh kicked the rear driver side door of the patrol vehicle. Id.
Sheikh refused to sign the citation and requested to be arrested. Id. At the
police station, Sheikh continued to refuse to sign the citation and was
booked into the San Joaquin County Jail. Id. Sheikhs traffic violations and
behavior on February 12, 2012, lead the officer to issue Sheikh a notice of
priority reexamination. Id. The letter dated July 14, 2014, enclosed a copy
of a notice dated March 27, 2012, which advised Sheikh that his driving
14
privileges would remain suspended until he successfully completes the

reexamination. E.R. (Doc. 39) 00098.
On August 22, 2014, United State Magistrate Judge Allison Claire
issued an Order and Findings and Recommendation to dismiss Sheikhs
complaint without leave to amend. E.R. (Doc. 44) 00111-00119. The court
found that Sheikh had been provided with written notice of his license
suspensions and that he had an adequate remedial procedure to address the
suspensions for his failure to pay and failure to appear through the traffic
court. E.R. (Doc. 44) 00117:1-3, 00117:26-00118:5. As to the
reexamination, the court found that Sheikh was not entitled a hearing before
submitting to the examination because if Sheikhs license was suspended
after he completed the reexamination, he would be entitled to a remedial
hearing. E.R. (Doc. 44) 00118:6-25. The court declined to rule on the
DMVs standing and mootness arguments. E.R. (Doc. 44) 00114:10-12,
00119:17. Sheikh filed objections to the magistrate judges findings and
recommendations on September 5, 2014. E.R. (Doc. 45) 00120-00145. The
district court judge adopted the magistrate judges ruling and entered
judgment in favor of DMV on September 19, 2014. E.R. (Docs. 46, 47)
00146-00148.
15
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews de novo a decision granting a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim. See, e.g., Colony Cove Props., LLC v. City of
Carson, 640 F.3d 948, 955 (9th Cir. 2011).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
California law requires the DMV to suspend a drivers license when it
receives notice from a court clerk that the licensee has failed to pay a fine or
appear in court. Cal. Veh. Code 13365(a)(2). The Fourteenth Amendment
does not require the DMV to provide an administrative hearing in
connection with these suspensions because the statutory framework is
sufficiently detailed to protect against erroneous suspensions, and because a
remedial process exists to allow licensees to remove the suspensions. See
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (recognizing that the process
that is due depends on the private interest involved, the risk of erroneous
deprivation, and the probative value and government burden of additional
safeguards). Licensees have the right to appear in traffic court to clear their
suspensions for failing to pay fines or appear in court. Here, Sheikh has
refused to avail himself of this due process.
California law requires the DMV to suspend a drivers license when the
licensee has failed to schedule and complete a reexamination of his driving
16
privileges within five days of receiving notice of the reexamination. Cal.

Veh. Code 12819. The Fourteenth Amendment does not require the DMV
to provide an administrative hearing before, or after, suspending a license for
refusing to complete the reexamination because sufficient due process exists
to protect against erroneous suspensions, and a remedial procedure exists to
allow Sheikh to remove the suspension by successfully completing the
reexamination. Cal. Veh. Code 12819. If the DMV takes further action
against his license after he completes the reexamination, Sheikh is entitled to
a hearing to review the DMVs decision. Cal. Veh. Code 13950. Sheikh,
so far, has refused to avail himself of this due process.
ARGUMENT
I.
LEGAL STANDARD ON A MOTION TO DISMISS FOR

FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on

its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation
marks omitted). A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id.
17
Generally speaking, pro se complaints must be liberally construed and

held to less stringent standards than pleadings prepared by lawyers. See,
e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). But a liberal
interpretation of a . . . civil rights complaint may not supply essential
elements of the claim that were not initially pled. Chapman v. Pier 1
Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 954 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (citation and
quotation marks omitted).
II.
SHEIKH LACKS STANDING TO PURSUE HIS APPEAL

Without standing, federal courts do not have jurisdiction to hear a
claim. Wash. Legal Found. v. Legal Found. of Wash., 271 F.3d 835, 847
(9th Cir. 2001). To satisfy Article III standing, a plaintiff must show (1) an
injury in fact, (2) a causal connection between the injury and the challenged
action, and (3) that it is likely and not merely speculative that the injury will
be redressed by a favorable decision. Multistar Indus. v. United States DOT,
707 F.3d 1045, 1054 (9th Cir. 2013). Plaintiff has the burden of establishing
jurisdiction. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S.
375, 377 (1994) (stating that [i]t is to be presumed that a cause lies outside
this limited [federal] jurisdiction [citation omitted] and the burden of
establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction [citation
omitted]).
18
[T]he Constitution does not protect procedure for procedures sake.

The Fourteenth Amendment, by its terms, does not guarantee due process; it
protects against deprivations of life, liberty, or property without due
process. Rector v. City & County of Denver, 348 F.3d 935, 943-44 (10th
Cir. 2003). Indeed, [u]nless a person asserts some basis for contesting a
governmental deprivation of life, liberty, or property, he is not injured by
defective procedures he has no occasion to invoke. Id.
Sheikh lacks standing because he cannot establish a causal connection
between not being provided with an administrative hearing, and the DMVs
decision not to renew his license. Sheikh admitted at the hearing on the
DMVs motion to dismiss that he has not paid his fine for his August 11,
2011 traffic citation. TR. 17:18-19. Therefore, in addition to other grounds,
Sheikh is not eligible to renew his license. The lack of an administrative
hearing has caused him no harm. Cal. Veh. Code 12807(a) and (c)
(stating that a license cannot be renewed while suspended, and cannot be
renewed until the court clerk files certificates of compliance to clear the
failure to pay and appear). Because Sheikh is not eligible to renew is
license, he is not entitled to declaratory or injunctive relief.
Based on the foregoing, Sheikhs appeal should be dismissed under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) because he lacks standing.
19
III. SHEIKH FAILED TO STATE A PROCEDURAL DUE

PROCESS CLAIM
Even if Sheikh has standing to pursue his appeal, the District Courts
dismissal should be affirmed because Sheikh has failed to state a procedural
due process claim. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits the states from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, 1. To state a
procedural due process claim, a plaintiff must allege (1) a liberty or
property interest protected by the Constitution; (2) a deprivation of the
interest by the government; [and] (3) lack of process. Wright v. Riveland,
219 F.3d 905, 913 (9th Cir. 2000).
The suspension of a drivers license for statutorily defined cause
implicates a protectible property interest. Illinois v. Batchelder, 463 U.S.
1112, 1116-117 (U.S. 1983) (quoting Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 10
(1979)). At issue is what process is due to protect against an erroneous
deprivation of that interest. Id. This issue is resolved by considering three
factors: first, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards; and third, the Government's interest, including the
20
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. Batchelder,
463 U.S. at 1117 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
Sheikhs procedural due process claims fail as a matter of law because
the statutory framework for suspending drivers licenses comports with
Mathews.
A.
The Fourteenth Amendment does not Require the DMV

to Provide an Administrative Hearing to Review a
Drivers License Suspension For Failing to Appear in
Court or Pay a Traffic Fine
Sheikh argues that the Fourteenth Amendment requires the DMV to

provide an administrative hearing to review his license suspensions for
failing to pay a fine and appear in court. Appellants Brief, 1:10-2:6. While
Sheikh is entitled to due process, the DMV is not required to provide an
administrative hearing because Californias statutory framework complies
with Mathews.
First, Sheikh has complete control over the length of his license
suspension. Sheikh may address his outstanding fine and failure to appear
with the San Joaquin County Superior Court, but so far, he has refused to do
so. Second, a detailed statutory framework governs the process for
suspending licenses to guard against errors and provides a remedial process
21
to remove the suspensions. The DMV was required to suspend Sheikhs

license when it received notice from the San Joaquin County Superior Court
that he had failed to appear in court and pay a fine. Cal. Veh. Code
13365(a)(2), 40509.5(a)-(b). Sheikh had at least 60 days after the DMV
first received notice of his delinquency, and 30 days after he received notice
of the suspension to resolve the issues before the suspensions took effect.
Cal. Veh. Code 13365(b), 13106. Because the suspensions were
mandatory, Sheikh was not entitled to an administrative hearing under
California law. See Cal. Veh Code 14101(a).
The DMV will remove the failure to pay suspension when the clerk of
the San Joaquin County Superior Court files a certificate showing that the
fine or bail has been paid. Cal. Veh. Code 40509.5(b). As of August 22,
2014, Sheikh had not paid his fine for his August 11, 2011 traffic citation.
TR. 17:18-19. When Sheikh satisfies the courts order to appear on his
February 16, 2012 traffic citation, the court clerk will file a certificate of
compliance, and the DMV will remove the failure to appear suspension.
Cal. Veh. Code 40509.5(a).
Requiring the DMV to provide Sheikh with an adjudicatory hearing
would add minimal, if any, procedural safeguards to protect against an
erroneous suspension. The hearing would do no more than confirm that the
22
DMV does not have the certificates of compliance to clear the suspensions.
Two California courts have held that the statutory framework for suspending
licenses for failing to appear and pay a fine comports with due process. The
former appellate department of the Los Angeles County Superior Court
stated that:
It would be a legal absurdity to require the Department
of Motor Vehicles to grant a hearing on the question of
whether a person did in fact violate his written promise
to appear on a traffic citation, when the court where
appearance was required has already made such a
finding. (See Veh. Code 40509, subd. (a).) n3 If the
defaulting citee has a valid excuse for his
nonappearance, the place to submit his explanation is in
the court, not before the department.
People v. Bailey, 133 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 12, 15 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct.
1982). The Bailey court concluded that the determination of license
suspension by the Department of Motor Vehicles without affording the
licensee an opportunity for a hearing beyond the court appearances directed
by the summons on the traffic citations sufficiently complies with due
process. Id. at 16 (citing Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1971)).
More recently, the California Court of Appeal held in an unpublished
opinion that due process doe not require the DMV to provide a licensee with
a hearing before suspending his license for failing to pay a fine. Kushner v.
Shiomoto, 2014 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6626 (Cal. App. 2014).
23
The statutory framework for suspending licenses for failing to appear

and pay a fine holds drivers accountable for their traffic violations and
undoubtedly furthers the states legitimate interest in public safety. Without
such a procedure, the noncomplying drivers could continue to violate
highway safety regulations without consequence.
If Sheikh contends that the traffic court records are in error (i.e., he has
paid his fine or appeared in court) and that the certificates of compliance
should have been issued, his remedy is to file a petition for writ of mandate
directly against the San Joaquin County Superior Court. Williams v.
Department of Motor Vehicles, 2 Cal. App. 3d 949, 953-54 (Cal. App. 1969)
(individual whose license was suspended by the DMV pursuant to a
mandatory provision in the Vehicle Code had to seek a writ of mandamus
directly against the criminal court to challenge the validity of one of his
convictions for driving under the influence of alcohol). The DMV does not
have authority to review the accuracy of the San Joaquin County Superior
Courts records, or to correct any alleged errors in those records. Kushner v.
Shiomoto, 2014 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6626 (Cal. App. 2014) ([t]he
independent review of traffic court proceedings sought by [the licensee] is
nowhere authorized by the Vehicle Code) (citing Williams, 2 Cal. App. 3d
at 953-54 (Cal. App. 1969) (the DMV cannot exercise judicial power
24
required to nullify a prior conviction); see generally Laisne v. California

State Board of Optometry, 19 Cal. 2d 831, 834-35 (Cal. 1942) (explaining
limits on administrative agencys ability to exercise judicial power).
Based on the foregoing, the Fourteenth Amendment does not require
the DMV to provide Sheikh with an administrative hearing to review his
license suspensions for failing to appear in court and pay a traffic fine.
Sheikh, therefore, has failed to state a claim.
B.
The Fourteenth Amendment Does Not Require the DMV

to Provide an Administrative Hearing Before or After
Suspending a Drivers License for Refusing to Complete
a Reexamination
Sheikh argues that the Fourteenth Amendment requires the DMV to

provide an administrative hearing in connection with his license suspension
for refusing to complete a priority reexamination of his driving privileges.
App. Brief, 21:17-20; 23:17-19. Sheikh is wrong. The DMVs
reexamination process satisfies the Fourteenth Amendment because the presuspension procedures adequately protect against erroneous suspensions,
and remedial procedures exist to remove the suspension.
The DMV was required to suspend Sheikhs license when he initially
failed to schedule the reexamination within five days of receiving notice,
and the DMV was required to continue the suspension when Sheikh
25
appeared for the reexamination on March 26, 2012, but refused to complete
it. App. Brief, 21:17-20; 23:17-19; Cal. Veh. Code 12819, 13801; Cal.
Code Regs., tit. 13, 100.01(a)(1)-(6) (failing to provide requested
information, to complete a drive test, a vision test, and failing to be
responsive to questions constitutes a failure to submit or complete a
reexamination). Sheikh was not entitled to a hearing under California law
because the suspension was mandated by statute. Cal. Veh. Code
14101(a). The suspension will continue until Sheikh successfully
completes the reexamination. Cal. Veh. Code 12819.
The mandatory suspension in this case is similar to the mandatory
suspension that the United States Supreme Court upheld in Mackey v.
Montrym, 443 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1979). In Mackey, Montrym was arrested for
driving under the influence of alcohol. He initially refused to take a breath
analysis test, but retracted his refusal 20 minutes later after talking with his
attorney. Id. at 5. The police officer declined to comply with Montryms
belated request, and his license was summarily suspended for 90 days
because of his initial refusal. Id. In applying the Mathews factors, the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Massachusetts implied
consent statute and found that it did not violate the Fourteenth Amendments
due process clause. Id. at 19.
26
Weighing in favor of constitutionality, the Supreme Court noted

Montryms right to an immediate post-suspension hearing. [W]hen prompt
postdeprivation review is available for correction of administrative error, we
have generally required no more than that the predeprivation procedures
used be designed to provide a reasonably reliable basis for concluding that
the facts justifying the official action are as a responsible governmental
official warrants them to be. Mackey, 443 U.S. at 13. Further, the Court
asserted that the length of the deprivation is an important factor when
assessing the impact official action has on a private interest, and in regards
to Montrym, his license was suspended for only 90 days. Id. at 12. Finally,
considering the public safety interest in removing intoxicated drivers from
the road, the Supreme Court recognized that [a] presuspension hearing
would substantially undermine the state interest in public safety by giving
drivers significant incentive to refuse the breath-analysis test and demand a
presuspension hearing as a dilatory tactic. Id. at 18.
Vehicle Code sections 12818 and 12819 provide an adequate predeprivation procedure that guards against errors, just as the pre-deprivation
procedure did in Mackey. There is no dispute that Sheikh refused to
complete the reexamination on or about March 26, 2012, and that section
27
12819 required an automatic suspension based on that refusal. 2 App. Brief,

21:17-20; 23:17-19. A pre-suspension hearing would add little, if any,
procedural safeguards. The hearing would do no more than establish that
Sheikh refused to complete the reexamination. 3
The Vehicle Code provides post-suspension due process by giving
Sheikh the right to schedule and complete a reexamination, similar to the
right Montrym had to an immediate post-suspension hearing in Mackey. See
Cal. Veh. Code 12818 (the suspension continues until the person
successfully completes the reexamination and the department takes final
action). In this regard, the reexamination is the administrative hearing. Had
Sheikh timely and successfully completed the reexamination in the first
place, his license may have never been suspended. If the DMV takes
2
Although a suspension was initially imposed for failing to timely

schedule the reexamination, this point became moot when Sheikh appeared
for the reexamination on March 26, 2012, but refused to complete it. App.
Brief, 21:17-20; 23:17-21.
3
While not clear, Sheikh seems to argue that he should have been
provided with a hearing before being required to submit to a reexamination.
This argument does not state a procedural due process claim. The desire not
to complete a reexamination is not a liberty or property interest protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment. See Wright v. Riveland, 219 F.3d 905, 913 (9th
Cir. 2000) (the Fourteenth Amendment protects liberty and property
interests). Conducting a pre-examination hearing would be redundant of the
purpose of the reexamination. It would be tantamount to holding an
administrative hearing to determine the validity of traffic citations before
they are adjudicated in traffic court.
28
adverse action after Sheikh completes the reexamination, Sheikh will have
the right to a hearing to challenge the DMVs decision. See Cal. Veh. Code
13950 (when the DMV determines upon reexamination that grounds for
suspension exist notice and an opportunity to be heard shall be given before
taking the action).
Also weighing in favor of satisfying the Fourteenth Amendment is the
length of Sheikhs suspension which is less severe than Montryms
mandatory 90 day suspension in Mackey. Vehicle Code section 12819 does
not prescribe a minimum suspension for refusing to complete a
reexamination. Sheikhs suspension could have been lifted nearly as soon as
it was imposed if only he had completed the reexamination.
Finally, the significant public safety interest weighs in favor of finding
that the suspension without an adjudicatory administrative hearing comports
with due process. The United States Supreme Court has held that due
process does not require an administrative hearing prior to revocation of
driving privileges where the threat to public safety is sufficiently obvious to
justify immediate termination. Pollack v. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 38 Cal.
3d 367 (Cal. 1985) (citing Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105 (1977). Here,
29
notices of priority reexamination are issued to protect public safety.4 See

Cal. Veh. Code 21061(a) (a traffic officer may issue a notice of priority
reexamination where there is evidence of incapacity leading to a reasonable
belief that a driver is incapable of operating a motor vehicle in a manner so
as not to present a clear or potential danger of risk of injury to that person or
others if that person is permitted to resume operation of a motor vehicle).
Requiring a pre-suspension hearing would impede public safety by
delaying the fitness-for-driving determination, and by keeping potentially
unsafe drivers on the road. See Dixon, 431 U.S. at 114 (the requirement of a
pretermination hearing in every case would impede the public interests of
administrative efficiency as well as highway safety, which is promoted by
the prompt removal of hazardous drivers). In this regard, the Supreme Court
4
The notice of priority examination is presumed to have been properly

issued to Sheikh. Fed. R. Evid. 302 (state law presumptions apply in civil
cases); Cal. Evid. Code 664 ([i]t is presumed that official duty has been
regularly performed); see e.g. Roelfsema v. Department of Motor Vehicles
(1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 871, 880 (under Evidence Code section 664, sobriety
checkpoints are presumed constitutional in administrative hearings). Further
supporting this presumption are facts indicating Sheikhs incapacity derived
from his arrest and the numerous citations he received on February 12, 2012
speeding, two red signal violations, driving with a suspended license,
failing to provide proof of financial responsibility, failing to yield to
emergency vehicles, and following too closely. App. Brief, 8:24-28; 9:3-28;
RJN, Ex. B.
30
in Mackey recognized that [a] presuspension hearing would substantially

undermine the state interest in public safety by giving drivers significant
incentive to refuse the breath-analysis test and demand a presuspension
hearing as a dilatory tactic. Id. at 18. Similarly, a pre-suspension hearing
for refusing to complete the reexamination could be used as a dilatory tactic
and jeopardize public safety.
Based on the foregoing, the Fourteenth Amendment does not require
the DMV to provide Sheikh with an administrative hearing to review the
suspension for his refusal to complete a priority reexamination. Sheikh,
therefore, has failed to state a claim.
IV. SHEIKH FAILED TO STATE AN EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAIM
A.
Sheikhs Complaint Did Not Allege an Equal Protection

Claim
Sheikh alleges that the notice of reexamination violated his equal

protection rights. App. Brief, 21:3-4. Sheikh, however, never alleged an
equal protection claim in his complaint, nor did he allege any facts that
would suggest an equal protection claim. E.R. (Doc. 1) 00001-00010.5
Therefore, he cannot raise an equal protection claim on appeal. Litmon v.
5
Sheikh improperly filed a non-operative first amended complaint

(Doc. 32), which did not allege an equal protection claim.
31
Harris, 768 F.3d 1237, 1241 (9th Cir. 2014) (a liberal interpretation of a
pro se civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim
that were not initially pled).
B.
Even if Sheikh had alleged an Equal Protection Claim in

his Complaint, It Would Have Failed Because His
Complaint is Against the Stockton Police Department,
Not the DMV
Sheikh points out that on February 12, 2012, he was issued a citation,
and a notice of reexamination. App. Brief, 21:17-21. He claims that the
[o]nly justification for reexamination is that because police said so. App.
Brief, 21:20-21. Sheikh further argues that Police does not refer all drivers
for such a reexamination when police issues traffic citations. App. Brief,
22:4-5. Sheikhs argument is about how the citing police officer allegedly
treated him unequally or in an arbitrarily or capricious manner. Sheikhs
equal protection claim, if one exists, would be against the police officer and
his law enforcement agency, not the DMV.
Once the DMV receives a notice of priority reexamination, the DMV is
required to conduct a reexamination or suspend the license for refusal to
complete the reexamination. See Cal. Veh. Code 21062, 12819. The
32
DMV has no discretion6 in responding to the notice of reexamination, and

therefore, no opportunity to treat licensees differently from one another, or
in an arbitrary or capricious manner.
Accordingly, Sheikhs equal protection claim should not be entertained
on appeal.
Discretionary decision making attaches only after a licensee

completes the reexamination and the DMV takes action on the results. See
Cal. Veh. Code 12818, 12819, 13950.
33
CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm the dismissal without leave to amend of
Sheikhs complaint because he failed to allege a Fourteenth Amendment due
process claim.
Dated: April 30, 2015
Respectfully submitted,
KAMALA D. HARRIS
SUSAN E. SLAGER
Acting Senior Assistant Attorney General
DAVID J. NEILL
Supervising Deputy Attorney General
/S/ Matthew T. Besmer
MATTHEW T. BESMER
Secretary, California State Transportation
Agency; and Mark Tweety, Manager
Department of Motor Vehicles
SA2014118327
95139235.doc
34
14-16858
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
REHAN SHEIKH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
BRIAN KELLY, Secretary, California
State Transportation Agency; MARK
TWEETY, Manager, Department of Motor
Vehicles,
Defendants and Appellees.
STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES
To the best of our knowledge, there are no related cases.
Dated: April 30, 2015
Respectfully Submitted,
KAMALA D. HARRIS
SUSAN E. SLAGER
Acting Senior Assistant Attorney General
DAVID J. NEILL
Supervising Deputy Attorney General
/s/ Matthew T. Besmer
MATTHEW T. BESMER
Secretary, California State Transportation
Agency; and Mark Tweety, Manager
Department of Motor Vehicles
35
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
PURSUANT TO FED.R.APP.P 32(a)(7)(C) AND CIRCUIT RULE 32-1
FOR 14-16858
I certify that: (check (x) appropriate option(s))
x
1. Pursuant to Fed.R.App.P. 32(a)(7)(C) and Ninth Circuit Rule 32-1, the attached
opening/corrected answering/reply/cross-appeal brief is
Proportionately spaced, has a typeface of 14 points or more and contains 7,347 words
(opening, answering and the second and third briefs filed in cross-appeals must not exceed
14,000 words; reply briefs must not exceed 7,000 words
or is
Monospaced, has 10.5 or fewer characters per inch and contains ____ words or ___ lines of
text (opening, answering, and the second and third briefs filed in cross-appeals must not exceed
14,000 words or 1,300 lines of text; reply briefs must not exceed 7,000 words or 650 lines of
text).
2. The attached brief is not subject to the type-volume limitations of Fed.R.App.P. 32(a(7)(B)
because
This brief complies with Fed.R.App.P 32(a)(1)-(7) and is a principal brief of no more than 30
pages or a reply brief of no more than 15 pages.
or
This brief complies with a page or size-volume limitation established by separate court order
dated ______________ and is
Proportionately spaced, has a typeface of 14 points or more and contains ______________
words,
or is
Monospaced, has 10.5 or fewer characters per inch and contains __ pages or __ words or __
lines of text.
3. Briefs in Capital Cases.
This brief is being filed in a capital case pursuant to the type-volume limitations set forth at Circuit
Rule 32-4 and is
Proportionately spaced, has a typeface of 14 points or more and contains ______________
words (opening, answering and the second and third briefs filed in cross-appeals must not
exceed 21,000 words; reply briefs must not exceed 9,800 words).
or is
Monospaced, has 10.5 or fewer characters per inch and contains __ words or __ lines of text
(opening, answering, and the second and third briefs filed in cross-appeals must not exceed 75
pages or 1,950 lines of text; reply briefs must not exceed 35 pages or 910 lines of text).
4. Amicus Briefs.
Pursuant to Fed.R.App.P 29(d) and 9th Cir.R. 32-1, the attached amicus brief is proportionally
spaced, has a typeface of 14 points or more and contains 7,000 words or less,
or is
Monospaced, has 10.5 or few characters per inch and contains not more than either 7,000
words or 650 lines of text,
or is
Not subject to the type-volume limitations because it is an amicus brief of no more than 15
pages and complies with Fed.R.App.P. 32 (a)(1)(5).
4/30/15
Dated
/S/ Matthew T. Besmer

Matthew T. Besmer
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Case Name:
Sheikh, Rehan v. Kelly, Brian,

et al.
No.
14-16858
I hereby certify that on April 30, 2015, I electronically filed the following documents with the
Clerk of the Court by using the CM/ECF system:
APPELLEES CORRECTED ANSWERING BRIEF
Participants in the case who are registered CM/ECF users will be served by the CM/ECF system.
I am employed in the Office of the Attorney General, which is the office of a member of the
California State Bar at which member's direction this service is made. I am 18 years of age or
older and not a party to this matter. I am familiar with the business practice at the Office of the
Attorney General for collection and processing of correspondence for mailing with the United
States Postal Service. In accordance with that practice, correspondence placed in the internal
mail collection system at the Office of the Attorney General is deposited with the United States
Postal Service with postage thereon fully prepaid that same day in the ordinary course of
business.
I further certify that some of the participants in the case are not registered CM/ECF users. On
April 30, 2015, I have caused to be mailed in the Office of the Attorney General's internal mail
system, the foregoing document(s) by First-Class Mail, postage prepaid, or have dispatched it to
a third party commercial carrier for delivery within three (3) calendar days to the following nonCM/ECF participants:
Rehan Sheikh
1219 W. El Monte Street
Stockton, CA 95207
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California the foregoing is true
and correct and that this declaration was executed on April 30, 2015, at Fresno, California.
Terri E. Broderick
Declarant
95139284.doc
/s/ Terri E. Broderick

Signature

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Statutory Framework ...............................................................4

Drivers license suspensions for failing to pay

Drivers license suspensions for failing to appear

Drivers license suspensions for refusing to submit

Drivers licenses cannot be renewed when a

There is no right to a hearing when the suspension

Factual Background ................................................................. 8

Procedural History ................................................................. 11

Standard of Review .................................................................................... 16

Legal standard on a motion to dismiss for failure to state

Sheikh lacks standing to pursue his appeal ............................. 18

Sheikh failed to state a procedural due process claim ............. 20

The Fourteenth Amendment does not require the

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The Fourteenth Amendment does not require the

Sheikh failed to state an equal protection claim ..................... 31

Sheikhs complaint did not allege an equal

Even if Sheikh had alleged an equal protection

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suspensions. The District Court for the Eastern District of California

Does the procedural due process clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment require the California Department of Motor Vehicles to provide

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Does the procedural due process clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment require the California Department of Motor Vehicles to provide

Can Appellant state a viable equal protection claim on appeal

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Drivers License Suspensions for Failing to Pay Traffic

Court clerks are authorized to notify the Department of Motor Vehicles

Appellees Brian Kelly, Secretary, California State Transportation

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Drivers License Suspensions for Failing to Appear in

The process for suspending and removing suspensions for failing to

Drivers License Suspensions for Refusing to Submit to a

A traffic officer may issue a notice of reexamination to any person who

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A reexamination includes a test of the applicants knowledge and

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Drivers Licenses Cannot be Renewed When A

California law prohibits the DMV from renewing a drivers license

There is no Right to a Hearing When the Suspension is

There is no right to a hearing for mandatory license suspensions, or the

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III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

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process he needs to follow to remove the suspension to become eligible to

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privileges would remain suspended until he successfully completes the

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privileges within five days of receiving notice of the reexamination. Cal.