Thursday, October 31, 2013

PHILCONSA vs. HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, G.R. No. 113105 August 19, 1994
Facts:
House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB
of 1994), was passed and approved by both houses of Congress on December
17, 1993. As passed, it imposed conditions and limitations on certain items of
appropriations in the proposed budget previously submitted by the President.
It also authorized members of Congress to propose and identify projects in
the pork barrels allotted to them and to realign their respective operating
budgets.
Pursuant to the procedure on the passage and enactment of bills as
prescribed by the Constitution, Congress presented the said bill to the
President for consideration and approval.
On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law, and declared
the same to have become Republic Act NO. 7663, entitled AN ACT
APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN
HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES (GAA of 1994). On
the same day, the President delivered his Presidential Veto Message,
specifying the provisions of the bill he vetoed and on which he imposed
certain conditions, as follows:
1.
Provision on Debt Ceiling, on the ground that this debt reduction
scheme cannot be validly done through the 1994 GAA. And that
appropriations for payment of public debt, whether foreign or domestic, are
automatically appropriated pursuant to the Foreign Borrowing Act and Section
31 of P.D. No. 1177 as reiterated under Section 26, Chapter 4, Book VI of E.O.
No. 292, the Administrative Code of 1987.
2.
Special provisions which authorize the use of income and the creation,
operation and maintenance of revolving funds in the appropriation for State
Universities and Colleges (SUCs),
3.
Provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road
maintenance.
4.
Special provision on the purchase by the AFP of medicines in
compliance with the Generics Drugs Law (R.A. No. 6675).
5.
The President vetoed the underlined proviso in the appropriation for
the modernization of the AFP of the Special Provision No. 2 on the Use of
Fund, which requires the prior approval of the Congress for the release of the

corresponding modernization funds, as well as the entire Special Provision No.

3 on the Specific Prohibition which states that the said Modernization Fund
shall not be used for payment of six (6) additional S-211 Trainer planes, 18
SF-260 Trainer planes and 150 armored personnel carriers
6.
New provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to use savings in the AFP to
augment pension and gratuity funds.
7.
Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, Ombudsman,
COA, and CHR, the Congress.
Issue:
whether or not the conditions imposed by the President in the
items of the GAA of 1994: (a) for the Supreme Court, (b) Commission on Audit
(COA), (c) Ombudsman, (d) Commission on Human Rights, (CHR), (e) Citizen
Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUS) and (f) State Universities and
Colleges (SUCs) are constitutional; whether or not the veto of the special
provision in the appropriation for debt service and the automatic
appropriation of funds therefore is constitutional
Held:
The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a
part of the legislative process. There is, therefore, sound basis to indulge in
the presumption of validity of a veto. The burden shifts on those questioning
the validity thereof to show that its use is a violation of the Constitution.
The vetoed provision on the debt servicing is clearly an attempt to repeal
Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 (Foreign Borrowing Act) and E.O. No. 292, and to
reverse the debt payment policy. As held by the court in Gonzales, the repeal
of these laws should be done in a separate law, not in the appropriations law.
In the veto of the provision relating to SUCs, there was no undue
discrimination when the President vetoed said special provisions while
allowing similar provisions in other government agencies. If some
government agencies were allowed to use their income and maintain a
revolving fund for that purpose, it is because these agencies have been
enjoying such privilege before by virtue of the special laws authorizing such
practices as exceptions to the one-fund policy (e.g., R.A. No. 4618 for the
National Stud Farm, P.D. No. 902-A for the Securities and Exchange
Commission; E.O. No. 359 for the Department of Budget and Managements
Procurement Service).
The veto of the second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the item for
the DPWH is unconstitutional. The Special Provision in question is not an
inappropriate provision which can be the subject of a veto. It is not alien to

the appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other hand, it specifies
how the said item shall be expended 70% by administrative and 30% by
contract.
The Special Provision which requires that all purchases of medicines by the
AFP should strictly comply with the formulary embodied in the National Drug
Policy of the Department of Health is an appropriate provision. Being
directly related to and inseparable from the appropriation item on purchases
of medicines by the AFP, the special provision cannot be vetoed by the
President without also vetoing the said item.
The requirement in Special Provision No. 2 on the use of Fund for the AFP
modernization program that the President must submit all purchases of
military equipment to Congress for its approval, is an exercise of the
congressional or legislative veto. However the case at bench is not the
proper occasion to resolve the issues of the validity of the legislative veto as
provided in Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 because the issues at hand can be
disposed of on other grounds. Therefore, being inappropriate provisions,
Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 were properly vetoed.
Furthermore, Special Provision No. 3, prohibiting the use of the Modernization
fund for payment of the trainer planes and armored personnel carriers, which
have been contracted for by the AFP, is violative of the Constitutional
prohibition on the passage of laws that impair the obligation of contracts (Art.
III, Sec. 10), more so, contracts entered into by the Government itself. The
veto of said special provision is therefore valid.
The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff to use savings to
augment the pension fund for the AFP being managed by the AFP Retirement
and Separation Benefits System is violative of Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of the
Article VI of the Constitution.
Regarding the deactivation of CAFGUS, we do not find anything in the
language used in the challenged Special Provision that would imply that
Congress intended to deny to the President the right to defer or reduce the
spending, much less to deactivate 11,000 CAFGU members all at once in
1994. But even if such is the intention, the appropriation law is not the proper
vehicle for such purpose. Such intention must be embodied and manifested
in another law considering that it abrades the powers of the Commander-inChief and there are existing laws on the creation of the CAFGUs to be
amended.
On the conditions imposed by the President on certain provisions relating to
appropriations to the Supreme Court, constitutional commissions, the NHA
and the DPWH, there is less basis to complain when the President said that
the expenditures shall be subject to guidelines he will issue. Until the

guidelines are issued, it cannot be determined whether they are proper or

inappropriate. Under the Faithful Execution Clause, the President has the
power to take necessary and proper steps to carry into execution the law.
These steps are the ones to be embodied in the guidelines.
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PHILCONSA v. PEDRO M. GIMENEZ G.R. No. L-23326 December 18, 1965
NAVARRO vs. PINEDA G. R, No. L-18456 November 30 1963
DAVAO SAW MILL CO. VS. CASTILLO G.R. No. L-40411 August 7, 1935
MANARANG V. OFILADA, G.R. No. L-8133, May 18, 1956
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PHILCONSA v. PEDRO M. GIMENEZ G.R. No. L-23326 December 18, 1965
Facts:
Philippine Constitution Association, Inc (PHILCONSA) assails the
validity of RA 3836 insofar as the same allows retirement gratuity and
commutation of vacation and sick leave to Senators and Representatives, and
to the elective officials of both Houses (of Congress). The provision on
retirement gratuity is an attempt to circumvent the Constitutional ban on
increase of salaries of the members of Congress during their term of office,
contrary to the provisions of Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution. The
same provision constitutes selfish class legislation because it allows
members and officers of Congress to retire after twelve (12) years of service
and gives them a gratuity equivalent to one year salary for every four years
of service, which is not refundable in case of reinstatement or re election of
the retiree, while all other officers and employees of the government can
retire only after at least twenty (20) years of service and are given a gratuity
which is only equivalent to one month salary for every year of service, which,

in any case, cannot exceed 24 months. The provision on vacation and sick
leave, commutable at the highest rate received, insofar as members of
Congress are concerned, is another attempt of the legislator to further
increase their compensation in violation of the Constitution.
The Solicitor General counter-argued alleging that the grant of retirement or
pension benefits under Republic Act No. 3836 to the officers objected to by
the petitioner does not constitute forbidden compensation within the
meaning of Section 14 of Article VI of the Philippine Constitution. The law in
question does not constitute class legislation. The payment of commutable
vacation and sick leave benefits under the said Act is merely in the nature of
a basis for computing the gratuity due each retiring member and, therefore,
is not an indirect scheme to increase their salary.
Issue:
whether Republic Act 3836 violates Section 14, Article VI, of the
Constitution which reads as follows:
The senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall, unless
otherwise provided by law, receive an annual compensation of seven
thousand two hundred pesos each, including per diems and other
emoluments or allowances, and exclusive only of travelling expenses to and
from their respective districts in the case of Members of the House of
Representative and to and from their places of residence in the case of
Senators, when attending sessions of the Congress. No increase in said
compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all
the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving
such increase. Until otherwise provided by law, the President of the Senate
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall each receive an annual
compensation of sixteen thousand pesos.
Held:
Yes. When the Constitutional Convention first determined the
compensation for the Members of Congress, the amount fixed by it was only
P5,000.00 per annum but it embodies a special proviso which reads as
follows: No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the
expiration of the full term of all the members of the National Assembly
elected subsequent to approval of such increase. In other words, under the
original constitutional provision regarding the power of the National Assembly
to increase the salaries of its members, no increase would take effect until
after the expiration of the full term of the members of the Assembly elected
subsequent to the approval of such increase.
The Constitutional provision in the aforementioned Section 14, Article VI,

includes in the term compensation other emoluments. This is the pivotal

point on this fundamental question as to whether the retirement benefit as
provided for in Republic Act 3836 fall within the purview of the term other
emoluments.
Emolument is defined as the profit arising from office or employment; that
which is received as compensation for services or which is annexed to the
possession of an office, as salary, fees and perquisites.
It is evident that retirement benefit is a form or another species of
emolument, because it is a part of compensation for services of one
possessing any office.
Republic Act 3836 provides for an increase in the emoluments of Senators
and Members of the House of Representatives, to take effect upon the
approval of said Act, which was on June 22, 1963. Retirement benefits were
immediately available thereunder, without awaiting the expiration of the full
term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives
approving such increase. Such provision clearly runs counter to the
prohibition in Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution. RA 3836 is therefore
unconstitutional.
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PHILCONSA vs. HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, G.R. No. 113105 August 19, 1994
NAVARRO vs. PINEDA G. R, No. L-18456 November 30 1963
RODOLFO FARINAS VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY [G.R. No. 147387. December
10, 2003]
DAVAO SAW MILL CO. VS. CASTILLO G.R. No. L-40411 August 7, 1935
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GAUDENCIO RAYO vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BULACAN G.R. No. L55273-83 December 19, 1981
FACTS: At the height of the infamous typhoon "Kading", the respondent
opened simultaneously all the three floodgates of the Angat Dam which
resulted in a sudden, precipitate and simultaneous opening of said floodgates
several towns in Bulacan were inundated. The petitioners filed for damages
against the respondent corporation.

Petitioners opposed the prayer of the respondents forn dismissal of the case
and contended that the respondent corporation is merely performing a
propriety functions and that under its own organic act, it can sue and be sued
in court.

ISSUE: W/N the respondent performs governmental functions with respect to

the management and operation of the Angat Dam.

W/N the power of the respondent to sue and be sued under its organic
charter includes the power to be sued for tort.

HELD: The government has organized a private corporation, put money in it

and has allowed it to sue and be sued in any court under its charter.

As a government owned and controlled corporation, it has a personality of its

own, distinct and separate from that of the government. Moreover, the
charter provision that it can sue and be sued in any court.
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Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance, G.R. No. L-31635, August 31, 1971
RODOLFO FARINAS VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY [G.R. No. 147387. December
10, 2003]
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES GR No.
174689 October 22, 2007
PEOPLE'S BANK AND TRUST CO. vs. DAHICAN LUMBER COMPANY G.R. No. L17500 May 16, 1967

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REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA vs. JAMES VINZON [G.R. No. 154705. June 26, 2003]
FACTS: Petitioner Vinzon entered into a Maintenance Agreement with
respondent. The maintenance agreement includes the following specific
equipments: air conditioning units, generator sets, electrical facilities, water
heaters and water motor pumps. The agreement shall be effective for 4
years.

The new Minister Counsellor allegedly found respondent's work and services
unsatisfactory and not in compliance with the standards set in the
Agreement. The respondent terminated the agreement with the respondent.
The latter claim that it was unlawful and arbitrary. Respondent filed a Motion
to Dismiss alleging that the Republic of Indonesia, as a foreign state, has
sovereign immunity from suit and cannot be sued as party-defendant in the
Philippines.

ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in sustaining the trial court's decision that
petitioners have waived their immunity from suit by using as its basis the
provision in the Maintenance Agreement.

HELD: The mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private
party cannot be construed as the ultimate test of whether or not it is an act
juri imperii or juri gestionis. Such act is only the start of the inquiry. There is
no dispute that the establishment of a diplomatic mission is an act juri
imperii. The state may enter into contracts with private entities to maintain
the premises, furnishings and equipment of the embassy. The Republic of
Indonesia is acting in pursuit of a sovereign activity when it entered into a

contract with the respondent. The maintenance agreement was entered into
by the Republic of Indonesia in the discharge of its governmental functions. It
cannot be deemed to have waived its immunity from suit.
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SPOUSES MAKADAYA SADIK and USODAN SADIK vs. JUDGE ABDALLAH CASAR,
G.R. No. MTJ-95-1053, January 2, 1997
RODOLFO FARINAS VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY [G.R. No. 147387. December
10, 2003]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, G. R. No. 154380
October 5, 2005
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES GR No.
174689 October 22, 2007
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Tuesday, October 29, 2013
VICTORIA AMIGABLE vs. NICOLAS CUENCA G.R. No. L-26400 February 29,
1972
FACTS: Victoria Amigable is the is the registered owner of a lot which, without
prior expropriation proceedings or negotiated sale, was used by the
government. Amigable's counsel wrote the President of the Philippines
requesting payment of the portion of her lot which had been expropriated by
the government.

Amigable later filed a case against Cuenca, the Commissioner of Public

Highways, for recovery of ownership and possession of the said lot. She also

sought payment for comlensatory damages, moral damages and attorney's

fees.

The defendant said that the case was premature, barred by prescription, and
the government did not give its consent to be sued.

ISSUE: W/N the appellant may properly sue the government.

HELD: Where the government takes away property from a private landowner
for public use without going through the legal process of expropriation or
negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the
government without violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from
suit.

The doctrine of immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for

perpetrating an injustice to a citizen. The only relief available is for the
government to make due compensation which it could and should have done
years ago. To determine just compensation of the land, the basis should be
the price or value at the time of the taking.
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RODOLFO FARINAS VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY [G.R. No. 147387. December
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Banco Espanol-Filipino vs. Palanca G.R. No. L-11390, March 26, 1918
FRANCISCO M. ALONSO vs. CEBU COUNTRY CLUB, INC. G.R. No. 130876
January 31, 2002
Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance, G.R. No. L-31635, August 31, 1971
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Tuesday, April 10, 2012
RODOLFO FARINAS VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY [G.R. No. 147387. December
10, 2003]

NATURE OF THE CASE:

Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, seeking to declare

as unconstitutional Section 14 of Republic Act No. 9006 (The Fair Election
Act), insofar as it expressly repeals Section 67 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881
(The Omnibus Election Code) which provides:

SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. Any elective official, whether
national or local, running for any office other than the one which he is holding
in a permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-President, shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate
of candidacy.

FACTS:

The petitioners now come to the Court alleging in the main that Section 14 of
Rep. Act No. 9006, insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code, is unconstitutional for being in violation of Section 26(1), Article VI of
the Constitution, requiring every law to have only one subject which should
be expressed in its title.

According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14 repealing Section 67

of the Omnibus Election Code in Rep. Act No. 9006 constitutes a proscribed
rider.

They point out the dissimilarity in the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006, on
the one hand, and Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the other.
Rep. Act No. 9006 primarily deals with the lifting of the ban on the use of
media for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair election
practices, while Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code imposes a limitation
on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding
in a permanent capacity by considering them as ipso facto resigned
therefrom upon filing of the certificate of candidacy. The repeal of Section 67
of the Omnibus Election Code is thus not embraced in the title, nor germane
to the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006.

The petitioners also assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the
equal protection clause of the Constitution because it repeals Section 67 only
of the Omnibus Election Code, leaving intact Section 66 thereof which
imposes a similar limitation to appointive officials, thus:

SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. Any person

holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in governmentowned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned
from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 discriminates against
appointive officials. By the repeal of Section 67, an elective official who runs
for office other than the one which he is holding is no longer considered ipso
facto resigned therefrom upon filing his certificate of candidacy. Elective
officials continue in public office even as they campaign for reelection or
election for another elective position. On the other hand, Section 66 has been
retained; thus, the limitation on appointive officials remains - they are still
considered ipso facto resigned from their offices upon the filing of their
certificates of candidacy.

The petitioners assert that Rep. Act No. 9006 is null and void in its entirety as
irregularities attended its enactment into law. The law, not only Section 14

thereof, should be declared null and void. Even Section 16 of the law which
provides that [t]his Act shall take effect upon its approval is a violation of
the due process clause of the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which
require publication of the law before it becomes effective.

Finally, the petitioners maintain that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code
is a good law; hence, should not have been repealed. The petitioners cited
the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr.,[13] that Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code is based on the constitutional mandate on the
Accountability of Public Officers:

Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at
all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead
modest lives.

Consequently, the respondents Speaker and Secretary General of the House

of Representatives acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess
or lack of jurisdiction for not considering those members of the House who
ran for a seat in the Senate during the May 14, 2001 elections as ipso facto
resigned therefrom, upon the filing of their respective certificates of
candidacy.

ISSUES:

W/N Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is a Rider.

W/N Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is Violative of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Constitution.

W/N Section 16 of the law which provides that [t]his Act shall take effect
upon its approval is a violation of the due process clause of the Constitution,
as well as jurisprudence, which require publication of the law before it

becomes effective.

HELD:

To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional

requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title, the Court
laid down the rule that
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes
should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of
legislation. The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in
its title should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction. It is
sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the
general object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and
every end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that
object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title need not be an abstract or
index of the Act.
The title of Rep. Act No. 9006 reads: An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free,
Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Election
Practices.

The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of Rep. Act No. 9006
are comprehensive enough to include the repeal of Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code within its contemplation. To require that the said
repeal of Section 67 of the Code be expressed in the title is to insist that the
title be a complete index of its content.

The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which

imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the
one they are holding, to the other provisions of Rep. Act No. 9006, which deal
with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda, does
not violate the one subject-one title rule. This Court has held that an act
having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any
number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they
are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be

considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and

means of carrying out the general subject.

The legislators considered Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as a form

of harassment or discrimination that had to be done away with and repealed.
The executive department found cause with Congress when the President of
the Philippines signed the measure into law. For sure, some sectors of society
and in government may believe that the repeal of Section 67 is bad policy as
it would encourage political adventurism. But policy matters are not the
concern of the Court. Government policy is within the exclusive dominion of
the political branches of the government. It is not for this Court to look into
the wisdom or propriety of legislative determination. Indeed, whether an
enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is based on sound economic theory,
whether it is the best means to achieve the desired results, whether, in short,
the legislative discretion within its prescribed limits should be exercised in a
particular manner are matters for the judgment of the legislature, and the
serious conflict of opinions does not suffice to bring them within the range of
judicial cognizance. Congress is not precluded from repealing Section 67 by
the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra upholding the validity of the
provision and by its pronouncement in the same case that the provision has a
laudable purpose. Over time, Congress may find it imperative to repeal the
law on its belief that the election process is thereby enhanced and the
paramount objective of election laws the fair, honest and orderly election of
truly deserving members of Congress is achieved.

Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive

officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the
electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be
removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand,
appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by
an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a
permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve
at the pleasure of the appointing authority.

Finally, the Effectivity clause (Section 16) of Rep. Act No. 9006 which
provides that it shall take effect immediately upon its approval, is defective.
However, the same does not render the entire law invalid. In Taada v.
Tuvera, this Court laid down the rule:

... the clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity
and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be
omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislator may make the law
effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date without its
previous publication.

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its

discretion provide that the usual fifteen-period shall be shortened or
extended.

Following Article 2 of the Civil Code and the doctrine enunciated in Taada,
Rep. Act No. 9006, notwithstanding its express statement, took effect fifteen
days after its publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general
circulation.

In conclusion, it bears reiterating that one of the firmly entrenched principles

in constitutional law is that the courts do not involve themselves with nor
delve into the policy or wisdom of a statute. That is the exclusive concern of
the legislative branch of the government. When the validity of a statute is
challenged on constitutional grounds, the sole function of the court is to
determine whether it transcends constitutional limitations or the limits of
legislative power. No such transgression has been shown in this case.

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ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES GR No.
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January 31, 2002
ISIDRO CARIO vs. COMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS G.R. No. 96681, December
2, 1991
PEOPLE vs. GENOSA, G.R. No. 135981, January 15 2004.
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Monday, March 5, 2012
PESIGAN vs. ANGELES, G.R. No. L-64279, April 30, 1984

FACTS:

Petitioners Anselmo and Marcelino Pesigan, carabao dealers, transported in a

10-wheeler truck in April 1982, 26 carabaos and a calf, from Camarines Sur to
Batangas. Despite the health certificate, permit to transport, and certificate
of inspection issued to them by the provincial veterinarian, provincial
commander and constabulary command, respectively, while petitioners were
negotiating the town of Basud, Camarines Norte, the carabaos were
confiscated by private respondents, Police Station Commander Lt. Zanarosa,
and provincial veterinarian Dr. Miranda. The confiscation was based on
Executive Order 626-A which prohibited the transport of carabaos from one
province to another. Pursuant to EO 626-A, Dr Miranda distributed the
carabaos to 25 farmers of Basud. Petitioners filed for recovery of the
carabaos and damages, against private respondent Judge Angeles who heard
the case in Daet and later transferred to Caloocan City, and dismissed the
case for lack of cause of action.

ISSUE:
Whether or not EO 626-A be enforced before its publication in the
Official Gazette.

HELD:

Said executive order should not be enforced against the Pesigans on April 2,
1982 because, as already noted, it is a penal regulation published more than
two months later in the Official Gazette dated June 14, 1982. It became
effective only fifteen days thereafter as provided in article 2 of the Civil Code
and section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code.

The word "laws" in article 2 (article 1 of the old Civil Code) includes circulars
and regulations which prescribe penalties. Publication is necessary to apprise
the public of the contents of the regulations and make the said penalties
binding on the persons affected thereby.
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NAVARRO vs. PINEDA G. R, No. L-18456 November 30 1963
PHILCONSA vs. HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, G.R. No. 113105 August 19, 1994
DAVAO SAW MILL CO. VS. CASTILLO G.R. No. L-40411 August 7, 1935
MANARANG V. OFILADA, G.R. No. L-8133, May 18, 1956
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Labels: Civil Code Case Digest, Civl Law
Tuesday, January 10, 2012
SPOUSES MAKADAYA SADIK and USODAN SADIK vs. JUDGE ABDALLAH CASAR,
G.R. No. MTJ-95-1053, January 2, 1997

SADIK vs. CASAR

G.R. No. MTJ-95-1053, January 2, 1997

FACTS:
On February 14, 1985, one Lekiya Paito filed an application for life insurance
with the Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation (Grepalife) in Cotabato City.
The application was approved and Policy No. 0503033 was issued in her
name for the amount of P30,000.00 with an accidental death benefit rider.
Named as beneficiaries were her daughters, Linang Minalang and Makadaya
Sadik. She paid the initial premium of P410.00.

On October 12, 1985, Lekiya Paito died. The beneficiaries and/or through
their representatives sought for and obtained the assistance of respondent,
who was then a trial attorney of the Bureau of Forest Development, Cotabato
City, to pursue the approval of their claim for payment of the insurance
benefits with Grepalife.

On November 17, 1989, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision in favor
of plaintiffs and against the defendant ordering the latter to pay to the former
the sum of P30,000.00 as benefit due them under Insurance Policy No.
503033. The court denied plaintiffs claim for double indemnity of
P60,000.00 under the accidental death rider. At this time, respondent was
already the presiding Judge of the 5th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Kolambugan-Maigo.

Upon receipt of the decision, respondent as counsel for plaintiffs filed a notice
of appeal to the Court of Appeals even as defendant likewise filed an appeal.
Respondent represented the plaintiffs in the appeal. After the dismissal of its
petition by the Supreme Court, Grepalife filed a Manifestation dated 6 July
1993 with the Regional Trial Court, Br. 13, Cotabato City declaring its
willingness to pay the judgment award and depositing with said court RCBC
check No. 62837 in the amount of P30,000.00 payable to the plaintiffs.

Respondent collected the check from the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial
Court, Br, 13, Cotabato City and thereafter cashed it. Respondent did not
deliver the said money judgment to the plaintiffs. On January 26, 1995,

complainants filed their administrative complaint.

ISSUE: W/N Respondent Judge is guilty and must be dismissed from service
HELD:
Respondents act of collecting the judgment award of P30,000.00 from the
Clerk of Court of RTC, Cotabato City and his refusal to turn over the amount to
his client, complainant Makadaya Sadik and her sister, is an act of
misappropriation amounting to gross misconduct and/or dishonesty. His
defense that he has the right to retain the entire P30,000.00 as attorneys
lien in unacceptable. For he has no right to retain the judgment award
allegedly to secure payment of litigation expenses and attorneys fees. He
had no authority to practice law while in government service. In continuing to
handle the case of herein complainants against Grepalife after he joined the
government and without first securing proper authority is no less constitutive
of abuse of authority. Furthermore, he violated Rule 5.06 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct which prohibits a judge to engage in the private practice of
law.

He likewise violated the Attorneys Oath in agreeing to file Civil Case No.
2747 for the purpose of claiming the insurance proceeds from Grepalife
despite his having been informed that the insurance policy of Lekiya Paito
was fraudulently applied for. Agreeing to handle the claim said to have arisen
from a fraudulent act against the insurer certainly speaks of a moral flaw in
his character. xxx But scam or not we are convinced that the complainant
Makadaya Sadik is not an impostor. She denied that she is the step-daughter
of Lekiya Paito. She insisted she is the youngest daughter and she named all
her brothers and sisters. And it was respondent who presented her in Civil
Case No. 2747 as Makadaya Sadik daughter of Lekiya Sadik and one of the
beneficiaries of the latters insurance policy.

Indeed, to be effective in his role, a judge must be a man of exceptional

integrity and honesty. The special urgency for requiring these qualities in a
judge is not hard to understand for the judge acts directly upon the property,
liberty, even life, of his countrymen. Hence, being in a position of such grave
responsibility in the administration of justice, a judge must conduct himself in
a manner befitting the dignity of such exalted office.
Respondent judge, however, not only failed in this respect but proved himself
repeatedly unworthy of his post.

This Court notes that respondent had been previously fined P5,000.00 and
sternly warned for knowingly issuing an order without jurisdiction and with
grave abuse of discretion. Moreover, he has four other administrative cases
docketed against him involving various charges such as gross ignorance of
the law, gross incompetence, illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions
and falsification of public documents.
Respondent judges seeming propensity to transgress the very law he is
sworn to uphold makes him unfit to discharge the functions of a judge.
Judicial office demands the best possible men and this Court will not hesitate
to rid its ranks of undesirables who undermine its efforts towards effective
and efficient administration of justice, thus tainting its image in the eyes of
the public.

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