Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 91332 July 16, 1993

PHILIP MORRIS, INC., BENSON & HEDGES (CANADA), INC., AND FABRIQUES OF
TABAC REUNIES, S.A., petitioners
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION, respondents.
Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Pea & Nolasco Law Office for petitioners.
Teresita Gandionco-Oledan for private respondent.

MELO, J.:
In the petition before us, petitioners Philip Morris, Inc., Benson and Hedges (Canada), Inc.,
and Fabriques of Tabac Reunies, S.A., are ascribing whimsical exercise of the faculty
conferred upon magistrates by Section 6, Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of Court when
respondent Court of Appeals lifted the writ of preliminary injunction it earlier had issued
against Fortune Tobacco Corporation, herein private respondent, from manufacturing and
selling "MARK" cigarettes in the local market.
Banking on the thesis that petitioners' respective symbols "MARK VII", "MARK TEN", and
"LARK", also for cigarettes, must be protected against unauthorized appropriation,
petitioners twice solicited the ancillary writ in the course the main suit for infringement but
the court of origin was unpersuaded.
Before we proceed to the generative facts of the case at bar, it must be emphasized that
resolution of the issue on the propriety of lifting the writ of preliminary injunction should not
be construed as a prejudgment of the suit below. Aware of the fact that the discussion we
are about to enter into involves a mere interlocutory order, a discourse on the aspect
infringement must thus be avoided. With these caveat, we shall now shift our attention to
the events which spawned the controversy.
As averred in the initial pleading, Philip Morris, Incorporated is a corporation organized under
the laws of the State of Virginia, United States of America, and does business at 100 Park
Avenue, New York, New York, United States of America. The two other plaintiff foreign
corporations, which are wholly-owned subsidiaries of Philip Morris, Inc., are similarly not
doing business in the Philippines but are suing on an isolated transaction. As registered
owners "MARK VII", "MARK TEN", and "LARK" per certificates of registration issued by the
Philippine Patent Office on April 26, 1973, May 28, 1964, and March 25, 1964, plaintiffspetitioners asserted that defendant Fortune Tobacco Corporation has no right to
manufacture and sell cigarettes bearing the allegedly identical or confusingly similar
trademark "MARK" in contravention of Section 22 of the Trademark Law, and should,

therefore, be precluded during the pendency of the case from performing the acts
complained of via a preliminary injunction (p. 75, Court of Appeals Rollo in AC-G.R. SP No.
13132).
For its part, Fortune Tobacco Corporation admitted petitioners' certificates of registration
with the Philippine Patent Office subject to the affirmative and special defense on misjoinder
of party plaintiffs. Private respondent alleged further that it has been authorized by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue to manufacture and sell cigarettes bearing the trademark
"MARK", and that "MARK" is a common word which cannot be exclusively appropriated
(p.158, Court of Appeals Rollo in A.C.-G.R. SP No. 13132). On March 28, 1983, petitioners'
prayer for preliminary injunction was denied by the Presiding Judge of Branch 166 of the
Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region stationed at Pasig, premised upon
the following propositions:
Plaintiffs admit in paragraph 2 of the complaint that ". . . they are
not doing business in the Philippines and are suing on an isolated transaction .
. .". This simply means that they are not engaged in the sale, manufacture,
importation, expor[t]ation and advertisement of their cigarette products in the
Philippines. With this admission, defendant asks: ". . . how could defendant's
"MARK" cigarettes cause the former "irreparable damage" within the territorial
limits of the Philippines?" Plaintiffs maintain that since their trademarks are
entitled to protection by treaty obligation under Article 2 of the Paris
Convention of which the Philippines is a member and ratified by Resolution
No. 69 of the Senate of the Philippines and as such, have the force and effect
of law under Section 12, Article XVII of our Constitution and since this is an
action for a violation or infringement of a trademark or trade name by
defendant, such mere allegation is sufficient even in the absence of proof to
support it. To the mind of the Court, precisely, this is the issue in the main
case to determine whether or not there has been an invasion of plaintiffs' right
of property to such trademark or trade name. This claim of plaintiffs is
disputed by defendant in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Answer; hence, this
cannot be made a basis for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
There is no dispute that the First Plaintiff is the registered owner of
trademar[k] "MARK VII" with Certificate of Registration No. 18723, dated April
26,1973 while the Second Plaintiff is likewise the registered owner of
trademark "MARK TEN" under Certificate of Registration No. 11147, dated May
28, 1963 and the Third Plaintiff is a registrant of trademark "LARK" as shown
by Certificate of Registration No. 10953 dated March 23, 1964, in addition to a
pending application for registration of trademark "MARK VII" filed on
November 21, 1980 under Application Serial No. 43243, all in the Philippine
Patent Office. In same the manner, defendant has a pending application for
registration of the trademark "LARK" cigarettes with the Philippine Patent
Office under Application Serial No. 44008. Defendant contends that since
plaintiffs are "not doing business in the Philippines" coupled the fact that the
Director of Patents has not denied their pending application for registration of
its trademark "MARK", the grant of a writ of preliminary injunction is
premature. Plaintiffs contend that this act(s) of defendant is but a subterfuge
to give semblance of good faith intended to deceive the public and patronizers
into buying the products and create the impression that defendant's goods are
identical with or come from the same source as plaintiffs' products or that the
defendant is a licensee of plaintiffs when in truth and in fact the former is not.
But the fact remains that with its pending application, defendant has
embarked in the manufacturing, selling, distributing and advertising of
"MARK" cigarettes. The question of good faith or bad faith on the part of

defendant are matters which are evidentiary in character which have to be

proven during the hearing on the merits; hence, until and unless the Director
of Patents has denied defendant's application, the Court is of the opinion and
so holds that issuance a writ of preliminary injunction would not lie.
There is no question that defendant has been authorized by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue to manufacture cigarettes bearing the trademark "MARK"
(Letter of Ruben B. Ancheta, Acting Commissioner addressed to Fortune
Tobacco Corporation dated April 3, 1981, marked as Annex "A", defendant's
"OPPOSITION, etc." dated September 24, 1982). However, this authority is
qualified . . . that the said brands have been accepted and registered by the
Patent Office not later than six (6) months after you have been manufacturing
the cigarettes and placed the same in the market." However, this grant ". . .
does not give you protection against any person or entity whose rights may be
prejudiced by infringement or unfair competition in relation to your indicated
trademarks/brands". As aforestated, the registration of defendant's
application is still pending in the Philippine Patent Office.
It has been repeatedly held in this jurisdiction as well as in the United States
that the right or title of the applicant for injunction remedy must be clear and
free from doubt. Because of the disastrous and painful effects of an injunction,
Courts should be extremely careful, cautious and conscionable in the exercise
of its discretion consistent with justice, equity and fair play.
There is no power the exercise of which is more delicate which
requires greater caution, deliberation, and sound discretion, or
(which is) more dangerous in a doubtful case than the issuing of
an injunction; it is the strong arm of equity that never ought to
be extended unless to cases of great injury, where courts of law
cannot afford an adequate or commensurate remedy in
damages. The right must be clear, the injury impending or
threatened, so as to be averted only by the protecting
preventive process of injunction. (Bonaparte v. Camden, etc. N.
Co., 3 F. Cas. No. 1, 617, Baldw. 205, 217.)
Courts of equity constantly decline to lay down any rule which
injunction shall be granted or withheld. There is wisdom in this
course, for it is impossible to foresee all exigencies of society
which may require their aid to protect rights and restrain
wrongs. (Merced M. Go v. Freemont, 7 Gal. 317, 321; 68 Am.
Dec. 262.)
It is the strong arm of the court; and to render its operation
begin and useful, it must be exercised with great discretion, and
when necessary requires it. (Attorney-General v. Utica Inc. Co.,
P. John Ch. (N.Y.) 371.)
Having taken a panoramic view of the position[s] of both parties as viewed
from their pleadings, the picture reduced to its minimum size would be this: At
the crossroads are the two (2) contending parties, plaintiffs vigorously
asserting the rights granted by law, treaty and jurisprudence to restrain
defendant in its activities of manufacturing, selling, distributing and
advertising its "MARK" cigarettes and now comes defendant who countered
and refused to be restrained claiming that it has been authorized temporarily

by the Bureau of Internal Revenue under certain conditions to do so as

aforestated coupled by its pending application for registration of trademark
"MARK" in the Philippine Patent Office. This circumstance in itself has created
a dispute between the parties which to the mind of the Court does not warrant
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
It is well-settled principle that courts of equity will refuse an
application for the injunctive remedy where the principle of law
on which the right to preliminary injunction rests is disputed
and will admit of doubt, without a decision of the court of law
establishing such principle although satisfied as to what is a
correct conclusion of law upon the facts. The fact, however, that
there is no such dispute or conflict does not in itself constitute a
justifiable ground for the court to refuse an application for the
injunctive relief. (Hackensack Impr. Commn. v. New Jersey
Midland P. Co., 22 N.J. Eg. 94.)
Hence, the status quo existing between the parties prior to the filing of this
case should be maintained. For after all, an injunction, without reference to
the parties, should be violent, vicious nor even vindictive. (pp. 338-341, Rollo
in G.R. No. 91332.)
In the process of denying petitioners' subsequent motion for reconsideration of the order
denying issuance of the requested writ, the court of origin took cognizance of the
certification executed on January 30, 1984 by the Philippine Patent office
(p. 348, Rollo.)
It appears from the testimony of Atty. Enrique Madarang, Chief of the Trademark Division of
the then Philippine Patent Office that Fortune's application for its trademark is still pending
before said office (p. 311, Rollo).
Petitioners thereafter cited supervening events which supposedly transpired since March 28,
1983, when the trial court first declined issuing a writ of preliminary injunction, that could
alter the results of the case in that Fortune's application had been rejected, nay, barred by
the Philippine Patent Office, and that the application had been forfeited by abandonment,
but the trial court nonetheless denied the second motion for issuance of the injunctive writ
on April 22, 1987, thus:
For all the prolixity of their pleadings and testimonial evidence, the plaintiffsmovants have fallen far short of the legal requisites that would justify the
grant of the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for. For one, they did not
even bother to establish by competent evidence that the products supposedly
affected adversely by defendant's trademark now subject of an application for
registration with the Philippine Patents Office, are in actual use in the
Philippines. For another, they concentrated their fire on the alleged
abandonment and forfeiture by defendant of said application for registration.
The Court cannot help but take note of the fact that in their complaint
plaintiffs included a prayer for issuance preliminary injunction. The petition
was duly heard, and thereafter matter was assiduously discussed lengthily
and resolved against plaintiffs in a 15-page Order issued by the undersigned's
predecessor on March 28, 1983. Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration was

denied in another well-argued 8 page Order issued on April 5, 1984,, and the
matter was made to rest.
However, on the strength of supposed changes in the material facts of this
case, plaintiffs came up with the present motion citing therein the said
changes which are: that defendant's application had been rejected and barred
by the Philippine Patents Office, and that said application has been deemed
abandoned and forfeited. But defendant has refiled the same.
Plaintiffs' arguments in support of the present motion appear to be a mere
rehash of their stand in the first above-mentioned petition which has already
been ruled upon adversely against them. Granting that the alleged changes in
the material facts are sufficient grounds for a motion seeking a favorable
grant of what has already been denied, this motion just the same cannot
prosper.
In the first place there is no proof whatsoever that any of plaintiffs' products
which they seek to protect from any adverse effect of the trademark applied
for by defendant, is in actual use and available for commercial purposes
anywhere in the Philippines. Secondly as shown by plaintiffs' own evidence
furnished by no less than the chief of Trademarks Division of the Philippine
Patent Office, Atty. Enrique Madarang, the abandonment of an application is of
no moment, for the same can always be refiled. He said there is no specific
provision in the rules prohibiting such refiling (TSN, November 21, 1986, pp.
60 & 64, Raviera). In fact, according to Madarang, the refiled application of
defendant is now pending before the Patents Office. Hence, it appears that the
motion has no leg to stand on. (pp. 350-351, Rollo in G. R. No. 91332.)
Confronted with this rebuff, petitioners filed a previous petition for certiorari before the
Court, docketed as G.R. No. 78141, but the petition was referred to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals initially issued a resolution which set aside the court of origin's order
dated April 22, 1987, and granted the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining
Fortune, its agents, employees, and representatives, from manufacturing, selling, and
advertising "MARK" cigarettes. The late Justice Cacdac, speaking for the First Division of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 13132, remarked:
There is no dispute that petitioners are the registered owners of the
trademarks for cigarettes "MARK VII", "MARK TEN", and "LARK".(Annexes B, C
and D, petition). As found and reiterated by the Philippine Patent Office in two
(2) official communications dated April 6, 1983 and January 24, 1984, the
trademark "MARK" is "confusingly similar" to the trademarks of petitioners,
hence registration was barred under Sec. 4 (d) of Rep. Act. No. 166, as
amended (pp. 106, 139, SCA rollo). In a third official communication dated
April 8, 1986, the trademark application of private respondent for the "MARK"
under Serial No. 44008 filed on February 13, 1981 which was declared
abandoned as of February 16, 1986, is now deemed forfeited, there being no
revival made pursuant to Rule 98 of the Revised Rules of Practitioners in
Trademark Cases." (p. 107, CA rollo). The foregoing documents or
communications mentioned by petitioners as "the changes in material facts
which occurred after March 28, 1983", are not also questioned by
respondents.

Pitted against the petitioners' documentary evidence, respondents pointed to

(1) the letter dated January 30, 1979 (p. 137, CA rollo) of Conrado P. Diaz, then
Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue, temporarily granting the request of
private respondent for a permit to manufacture two (2) new brands of
cigarettes one of which is brand "MARK" filter-type blend, and (2) the
certification dated September 26, 1986 of Cesar G. Sandico, Director of
Patents (p. 138, CA rollo) issued upon the written request of private
respondents' counsel dated September 17, 1986 attesting that the records of
his office would show that the "trademark MARK" for cigarettes is now the
subject of a pending application under Serial No. 59872 filed on September
16, 1986.
Private respondent's documentary evidence provides the reasons neutralizing
or weakening their probative values. The penultimate paragraph of
Commissioner Diaz' letter of authority reads:
Please be informed further that the authority herein granted
does not give you protection against any person or entity whose
rights may be prejudiced by infringement or unfair competition
in relation to your above-named brands/trademark.
while Director Sandico's certification contained similar conditions as follows:
This Certification, however, does not give protection as against
any person or entity whose right may be prejudiced by
infringement or unfair competition in relation to the aforesaid
trademark nor the right to register if contrary to the provisions
of the Trademark Law, Rep. Act No. 166 as amended and the
Revised Rules of Practice in Trademark Cases.
The temporary permit to manufacture under the trademark "MARK" for
cigarettes and the acceptance of the second application filed by private
respondent in the height of their dispute in the main case were evidently
made subject to the outcome of the said main case or Civil Case No. 47374 of
the respondent Court. Thus, the Court has not missed to note the absence of a
mention in the Sandico letter of September 26, 1986 of any reference to the
pendency of the instant action filed on August 18, 1982. We believe and hold
that petitioners have shown a prima facie case for the issuance of the writ of
prohibitory injunction for the purposes stated in their complaint and
subsequent motions for the issuance of the prohibitory writ. (Buayan Cattle
Co. vs. Quintillan, 125 SCRA 276)
The requisites for the granting of preliminary injunction are the existence of
the right protected and the facts against which the injunction is to be directed
as violative of said right. (Buayan Cattle Co. vs. Quintillan, supra; Ortigas &
Co. vs. Ruiz, 148 SCRA 326). It is a writ framed according to the circumstances
of the case commanding an act which the Court regards as essential to justice
and restraining an act it deems contrary to equity and good conscience
(Rosauro vs. Cuneta, 151 SCRA 570). If it is not issued, the defendant may,
before final judgment, do or continue the doing of the act which the plaintiff
asks the court to restrain, and thus make ineffectual the final judgment
rendered afterwards granting the relief sought by the plaintiff (Calo vs.
Roldan, 76 Phil. 445). Generally, its grant or denial rests upon the sound
discretion of the Court except on a clear case of abuse (Belish Investment &

Finance Co. vs. State House, 151 SCRA 636). Petitioners' right of exclusivity to
their registered trademarks being clear and beyond question, the respondent
court's denial of the prohibitive writ constituted excess of jurisdiction and
grave abuse discretion. If the lower court does not grant preliminary
injunction, the appellate court may grant the same. (Service Specialists, Inc.
vs. Sheriff of Manila, 145 SCRA 139). (pp. 165-167, Rollo in G.R. No. 91332.)
After private respondent Fortune's motion for reconsideration was rejected, a motion to
dissolve the disputed writ of preliminary injunction with offer to post a counterbond was
submitted which was favorably acted upon by the Court of Appeals, premised on the filing of
a sufficient counterbond to answer for whatever perjuicio petitioners may suffer as a result
thereof, to wit:
The private respondent seeks to dissolve the preliminary injunction previously
granted by this Court with an offer to file a counterbond. It was pointed out in
its supplemental motion that lots of workers employed will be laid off as a
consequence of the injunction and that the government will stand to lose the
amount of specific taxes being paid by the
private respondent. The specific taxes being paid is the sum total of P120,120,
295.98 from January to July 1989.
The petitioners argued in their comment that the damages caused by the
infringement of their trademark as well as the goodwill it generates are
incapable of pecuniary estimation and monetary evaluation and not even the
counterbond could adequately compensate for the damages it will incur as a
result of the dissolution of the bond. In addition, the petitioner further argued
that doing business in the Philippines is not relevant as the injunction pertains
to an infringement of a trademark right.
After a thorough re-examination of the issues involved and the arguments
advanced by both parties in the offer to file a counterbond and the opposition
thereto, WE believe that there are sound and cogent reasons for US to grant
the dissolution of the writ of preliminary injunction by the offer of the private
respondent to put up a counterbond to answer for whatever damages the
petitioner may suffer as a consequence of the dissolution of the preliminary
injunction.
The petitioner will not be prejudiced nor stand to suffer irreparably as a
consequence of the lifting of the preliminary injunction considering that they
are not actually engaged in the manufacture of the cigarettes with the
trademark in question and the filing of the counterbond will amply answer for
such damages.
While the rule is that an offer of a counterbond does not operate to dissolve
an injunction previously granted, nevertheless, it is equally true that an
injunction could be dissolved only upon good and valid grounds subject to the
sound discretion of the court. As WE have maintained the view that there are
sound and good reasons to lift the preliminary injunction, the motion to file a
counterbond is granted. (pp. 53-54, Rollo in G.R. No. 91332.)
Petitioners, in turn, filed their own motion for re-examination geared towards reimposition of
the writ of preliminary injunction but to no avail (p. 55, Rollo in G.R. No. 91332).

Hence, the instant petition casting three aspersions that respondent court gravely abused its
discretion tantamount to excess of jurisdiction when:
I. . . . it required, contrary to law and jurisprudence, that in order that
petitioners may suffer irreparable injury due to the lifting of the injunction,
petitioners should be using actually their registered trademarks in commerce
in the Philippines;
II. . . . it lifted the injunction in violation of section 6 of Rule 58 of the Rules of
Court; and
III. . . . after having found that the trial court had committed grave abuse of
discretion and exceeded its jurisdiction for having refused to issue the writ of
injunction to restrain private respondent's acts that are contrary to equity and
good conscience, it made a complete about face for legally insufficient
grounds and authorized the private respondent to continue performing the
very same acts that it had considered contrary to equity and good conscience,
thereby ignoring not only the mandates of the Trademark Law, the
international commitments of the Philippines, the judicial admission of private
respondent that it will have no more right to use the trademark "MARK" after
the Director of Patents shall have rejected the application to register it, and
the admonitions of the Supreme Court. (pp. 24-25, Petition; pp. 25-26, Rollo.)
To sustain a successful prosecution of their suit for infringement, petitioners, as foreign
corporations not engaged in local commerce, rely on section 21-A of the Trademark Law
reading as follows:
Sec. 21-A. Any foreign corporation or juristic person to which a mark or tradename has been registered or assigned under this act may bring an action
hereunder for infringement, for unfair competition, or false designation of
origin and false description, whether or not it has been licensed to do business
in the Philippines under Act Numbered Fourteen hundred and fifty-nine, as
amended, otherwise known as the Corporation Law, at the time it brings
complaint: Provided, That the country of which the said foreign corporation or
juristic person is a citizen or in which it is domiciled, by treaty, convention or
law, grants a similar privilege to corporate or juristic persons of the
Philippines. (As inserted by Sec. 7 of Republic Act No. 638.)
to drive home the point that they are not precluded from initiating a cause of
action in the Philippines on account of the principal perception that another
entity is pirating their symbol without any lawful authority to do so. Judging
from a perusal of the aforequoted Section 21-A, the conclusion reached by
petitioners is certainly correct for the proposition in support thereof is
embedded in the Philippine legal jurisprudence.
Indeed, it was stressed in General Garments Corporation vs. Director of Patents (41 SCRA 50
[1971]) by then Justice (later Chief Justice) Makalintal that:
Parenthetically, it may be stated that the ruling in the Mentholatum case was
subsequently derogated when Congress, purposely to "counteract the effects"
of said case, enacted Republic Act No. 638, inserting Section 21-A in the
Trademark Law, which allows a foreign corporation or juristic person to bring
an action in Philippine courts for infringement of a mark or tradename, for
unfair competition, or false designation of origin and false description,

"whether or not it has been licensed to do business in the Philippines under

Act Numbered Fourteen hundred and fifty-nine, as amended, otherwise known
as the Corporation Law, at the time it brings complaint."
Petitioner argues that Section 21-A militates against respondent's capacity to
maintain a suit for cancellation, since it requires, before a foreign corporation
may bring an action, that its trademark or tradename has been registered
under the Trademark Law. The argument misses the essential point in the said
provision, which is that the foreign corporation is allowed thereunder to sue
"whether or not it has been licensed to do business in the Philippines"
pursuant to the Corporation Law (precisely to counteract the effects of the
decision in the Mentholatum case). (at p. 57.)
However, on May, 21, 1984, Section 21-A, the provision under consideration, was qualified
by this Court in La Chemise Lacoste S.A. vs. Fernandez (129 SCRA 373 [1984]), to the effect
that a foreign corporation not doing business in the Philippines may have the right to sue
before Philippine Courts, but existing adjective axioms require that qualifying circumstances
necessary for the assertion of such right should first be affirmatively pleaded (2 Agbayani
Commercial Laws of the Philippines, 1991 Ed., p. 598; 4 Martin, Philippine Commercial Laws,
Rev. Ed., 1986, p. 381). Indeed, it is not sufficient for a foreign corporation suing under
Section 21-A to simply allege its alien origin. Rather, it must additionally allege its
personality to sue. Relative to this condition precedent, it may be observed that petitioners
were not remiss in averring their personality to lodge a complaint for infringement (p. 75,
Rollo in AC-G.R. SP No. 13132) especially so when they asserted that the main action for
infringement is anchored on an isolated transaction (p. 75, Rollo in AC-G.R. SP No. 13132;
Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co. vs. Cebu Stevedoring Co., Inc., 17 SCRA 1037 (1966), 1 Regalado,
Remedial Law Compendium, Fifth Rev. Ed., 1988, p. 103).
Another point which petitioners considered to be of significant interest, and which they
desire to impress upon us is the protection they enjoy under the Paris Convention of 1965 to
which the Philippines is a signatory. Yet, insofar as this discourse is concerned, there is no
necessity to treat the matter with an extensive response because adherence of the
Philippines to the 1965 international covenant due to pact sunt servanda had been
acknowledged in La Chemise (supra at page 390).
Given these confluence of existing laws amidst the cases involving trademarks, there can be
no disagreement to the guiding principle in commercial law that foreign corporations not
engaged in business in the Philippines may maintain a cause of action for infringement
primarily because of Section 21-A of the Trademark Law when the legal standing to sue is
alleged, which petitioners have done in the case at hand.
In assailing the justification arrived at by respondent court when it recalled the writ of
preliminary injunction, petitioners are of the impression that actual use of their trademarks
in Philippine commercial dealings is not an indispensable element under Article 2 of the Paris
Convention in that:
(2) . . . . no condition as to the possession of a domicile or establishment in
the country where protection is claimed may be required of persons entitled to
the benefits of the Union for the enjoyment of any industrial property of any
industrial property rights. (p. 28, Petition; p. 29, Rollo in G.R. No. 91332.)
Yet petitioners' perception along this line is nonetheless resolved by Sections 2 and 2-A of
the Trademark Law which speak loudly, about necessity of actual commercial use of the
trademark in the local forum:

Sec. 2. What are registrable. Trademarks, tradenames and service marks

owned by persons, corporations, partnerships or associations domiciled in the
Philippines and by persons, corporations, partnerships or associations
domiciled in any foreign country may be registered in accordance with the
provisions of this Act; Provided, That said trademarks, tradenames, or service
marks are actually in use in commerce and services not less than two months
in the Philippines before the time the applications for registration are filed;
And provided, further, That the country of which the applicant for registration
is a citizen grants by law substantially similar privileges to citizens of the
Philippines, and such fact is officially certified, with a certified true copy of the
foreign law translated into the English language, by the government of the
foreign country to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. (As
amended by R.A. No. 865).
Sec. 2-A. Ownership of trademarks, tradenames and service marks; how
acquired. Anyone who lawfully produces or deals in merchandise of any
kind or who engages in any lawful business, or who renders any lawful service
in commerce, by actual use thereof in manufacture or trade, in business, and
in the service rendered, may appropriate to his exclusive use a trademark, a
tradename, or a service mark not so appropriated by another, to distinguish
his merchandise, business or service from the merchandise, business or
service of others. The ownership or possession of a trademark, tradename,
service mark, heretofore or hereafter appropriated, as in this section provided,
shall be recognized and protected in the same manner and to the same extent
as are other property rights known to the law. (As amended by R.A. No. 638).
(Kabushi Kaisha Isetan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 203 SCRA 583
[1991], at pp. 589-590; emphasis supplied.)
Following universal acquiescence and comity, our municipal law on trademarks regarding
the requirement of actual use in the Philippines must subordinate an international
agreement inasmuch as the apparent clash is being decided by a municipal tribunal
(Mortensen vs. Peters, Great Britain, High Court of Judiciary of Scotland, 1906, 8 Sessions 93;
Paras, International Law and World Organization, 1971 Ed., p. 20). Withal, the fact that
international law has been made part of the law of the land does not by any means imply
the primacy of international law over national law in the municipal sphere. Under the
doctrine of incorporation as applied in most countries, rules of international law are given a
standing equal, not superior, to national legislative enactments (Salonga and Yap, Public
International Law, Fourth ed., 1974, p. 16).
The aforequoted basic provisions of our Trademark Law, according to Justice Gutierrez, Jr., in
Kabushi Kaisha Isetan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (203 SCRA 583 [1991]), have been
construed in this manner:
A fundamental principle of Philippine Trademark Law is that actual use in
commerce in the Philippines is a pre-requisite to the acquisition of ownership
over a trademark or a tradename.
xxx xxx xxx
These provisions have been interpreted in Sterling Products International, Inc.
v. Farbenfabriken Bayer Actiengesellschaft (27 SCRA 1214 [1969]) in this way:
A rule widely accepted and firmly entrenched because it has
come down through the years is that actual use in commerce or

business is a prerequisite to the acquisition of the right of

ownership over a trademark.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Adoption alone of a trademark would not give exclusive
right thereto. Such right grows out of their actual use. Adoption
is not use. One may make advertisements, issue circulars, give
out price lists on certain goods; but these alone would not give
exclusive right of use. For trademark is a creation of use. The
underlying reason for all these is that purchasers have come to
understand the mark as indicating the origin of the wares.
Flowing from this is the trader's right to protection in the trade
he has built up and the goodwill he has accumulated from use
of the trademark. . . .
In fact, a prior registrant cannot claim exclusive use of the trademark unless it
uses it in commerce.
We rule[d] in Pagasa Industrial Corporation v. Court of Appeals (118 SCRA 526
[1982]):
3. The Trademark law is very clear. It requires actual commercial use of the
mark prior to its registration. There is no dispute that respondent corporation
was the first registrant, yet it failed to fully substantiate its claim that it used
in trade or business in the Philippines the subject mark; it did not present
proof to invest it with exclusive, continuous adoption of the trademark which
should consist among others, of considerable sales since its first use. The
invoices (Exhibits 7, 7-a, and 8-b) submitted by respondent which were dated
way back in 1957 show that the zippers sent to the Philippines were to be
used as "samples" and "of no commercial value". The evidence for respondent
must be clear, definite and free from inconsistencies. (Sy Ching v. Gaw Lui, 44
SCRA 148-149) "Samples" are not for sale and therefore, the fact of exporting
them to the Philippines cannot be considered to be equivalent to the "use"
contemplated by the law. Respondent did not expect income from such
"samples". There were no receipts to establish sale, and no proof were
presented to show that they were subsequently sold in the Philippines.
(Pagasa Industrial Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 118 SCRA 526 [1982]; Emphasis
Supplied)
The records show that the petitioner has never conducted any business in the
Philippines. It has never promoted its tradename or trademark in the
Philippines. It is unknown to Filipino except the very few who may have
noticed it while travelling abroad. It has never paid a single centavo of tax to
the Philippine government. Under the law, it has no right to the remedy it
seeks. (at pp. 589-591.)
In other words, petitioners may have the capacity to sue for infringement irrespective of lack
of business activity in the Philippines on account of Section 21-A of the Trademark Law but
the question whether they have an exclusive right over their symbol as to justify issuance of
the controversial writ will depend on actual use of their trademarks in the Philippines in line
with Sections 2 and 2-A of the same law. It is thus incongruous for petitioners to claim that
when a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in Philippines files a complaint for
infringement, the entity need not be actually using its trademark in commerce in the

Philippines. Such a foreign corporation may have the personality to file a suit for
infringement but it may not necessarily be entitled to protection due to absence of actual
use of the emblem in the local market.
Going back to the first assigned error, we can not help but notice the manner the ascription
was framed which carries with it the implied but unwarranted assumption of the existence of
petitioners' right to relief. It must be emphasized that this aspect of exclusive dominion to
the trademarks, together with the corollary allegation of irreparable injury, has yet to be
established by petitioners by the requisite quantum of evidence in civil cases. It cannot be
denied that our reluctance to issue a writ of preliminary injunction is due to judicial
deference to the lower courts, involved as there is mere interlocutory order (Villarosa vs.
Teodoro, Sr., 100 Phil. 25 [1956]). In point of adjective law, the petition has its roots on a
remedial measure which is but ancillary to the main action for infringement still pending
factual determination before the court of origin. It is virtually needless to stress the obvious
reality that critical facts in an infringement case are not before us more so when even Justice
Feliciano's opinion observes that "the evidence is scanty" and that petitioners "have yet to
submit copies or photographs of their registered marks as used in cigarettes" while private
respondent has not, for its part, "submitted the actual labels or packaging materials used in
selling its "Mark" cigarettes." Petitioners therefore, may not be permitted to presume a given
state of facts on their so called right to the trademarks which could be subjected to
irreparable injury and in the process, suggest the fact of infringement. Such a ploy would
practically place the cart ahead of the horse. To our mind, what appears to be the
insurmountable barrier to petitioners' portrayal of whimsical exercise of discretion by the
Court of Appeals is the well-taken remark of said court that:
The petitioner[s] will not be prejudiced nor stand to suffer irreparably as a
consequence of the lifting of the preliminary injunction considering that they
are not actually engaged in the manufacture of the cigarettes with the
trademark in question and the filing of the counterbond will amply answer for
such damages. (p. 54. Rollo in G.R. No. 91332.)
More telling are the allegations of petitioners in their complaint (p. 319, Rollo G.R. No.
91332) as well as in the very petition filed with this Court (p. 2, Rollo in G.R. No. 91332)
indicating that they are not doing business in the Philippines, for these frank representations
are inconsistent and incongruent with any pretense of a right which can breached (Article
1431, New Civil Code; Section 4, Rule 129; Section 3, Rule 58, Revised Rules of Court).
Indeed, to be entitled to an injunctive writ, petitioner must show that there exists a right to
be protected and that the facts against which injunction is directed are violative of said right
(Searth Commodities Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 207 SCRA 622 [1992]). It may be
added in this connection that albeit petitioners are holders of certificate of registration in the
Philippines of their symbols as admitted by private respondent, the fact of exclusive
ownership cannot be made to rest solely on these documents since dominion over
trademarks is not acquired by the mere fact of registration alone and does not perfect a
trademark right (Unno Commercial Enterprises, Inc. vs. General Milling Corporation, 120
SCRA 804 [1983]).
Even if we disregard the candid statements of petitioners anent the absence of business
activity here and rely on the remaining statements of the complaint below, still, when these
averments are juxtaposed with the denials and propositions of the answer submitted by
private respondent, the supposed right of petitioners to the symbol have thereby been
controverted. This is not to say, however, that the manner the complaint was traversed by
the answer is sufficient to tilt the scales of justice in favor of private respondent. Far from it.
What we are simply conveying is another basic tenet in remedial law that before injunctive
relief may properly issue, complainant's right or title must be undisputed and demonstrated

on the strength of one's own title to such a degree as to unquestionably exclude dark clouds
of doubt, rather than on the weakness of the adversary's evidence, inasmuch as the
possibility of irreparable damage, without prior proof of transgression of an actual existing
right, is no ground for injunction being mere damnum absque injuria (Talisay-Silay Milling
Co., Inc. vs. CFI of Negros Occidental, 42 SCRA 577 [1971]; Francisco, Rules of Court, Second
ed., 1985, p. 225; 3 Martin, Rules of Court, 1986 ed., p. 82).
On the economic repercussion of this case, we are extremely bothered by the thought of
having to participate in throwing into the streets Filipino workers engaged in the
manufacture and sale of private respondent's "MARK" cigarettes who might be retrenched
and forced to join the ranks of the many unemployed and unproductive as a result of the
issuance of a simple writ of preliminary injunction and this, during the pendency of the case
before the trial court, not to mention the diminution of tax revenues represented to be close
to a quarter million pesos annually. On the other hand, if the status quo is maintained, there
will be no damage that would be suffered by petitioners inasmuch as they are not doing
business in the Philippines.
With reference to the second and third issues raised by petitioners on the lifting of the writ
of preliminary injunction, it cannot be gainsaid that respondent court acted well within its
prerogatives under Section 6, Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of Court:
Sec. 6. Grounds for objection to, or for motion of dissolution of injunction.
The injunction may be refused or, if granted ex parte, may be dissolved, upon
the insufficiency of the complaint as shown by the complaint itself, with or
without notice to the adverse party. It may also be refused or dissolved on
other grounds upon affidavits on the part of the defendants which may be
opposed by the plaintiff also by affidavits. It may further be refused or, if
granted, may be dissolved, if it appears after hearing that although the
plaintiff is entitled to the injunction, the issuance or continuance thereof, as
the case may be, would cause great damage to the defendant while the
plaintiff can be fully compensated for such damages as he may suffer, and the
defendant files a bond in an amount fixed by the judge conditioned that he
will pay all damages which the plaintiff may suffer by the refusal or the
dissolution of the injunction. If it appears that the extent of the preliminary
injunction granted is too great, it must be modified.
Under the foregoing rule, injunction may be refused, or, if granted, may be dissolved, on the
following instances:
(1) If there is insufficiency of the complaint as shown by the allegations
therein. Refusal or dissolution may be granted in this case with or without
notice to the adverse party.
(2) If it appears after hearing that although the plaintiff is entitled to the
injunction, the issuance or continuance thereof would cause great damage to
the defendant, while the plaintiff can be fully compensated for such damages
as he may suffer. The defendant, in this case, must file a bond in an amount
fixed by the judge conditioned that he will pay all damages which plaintiff may
suffer by the refusal or the dissolution of the injunction.
(3) On the other grounds upon affidavits on the part of the defendant which
may be opposed by the plaintiff also affidavits.

Modification of the injunction may also be ordered by the court if it appears

that the extent of the preliminary injunction granted is too great. (3 Martin,
Rules of Court, 1986 ed., p. 99; Francisco, supra, at p. 268.)
In view of the explicit representation of petitioners in the complaint that they are not
engaged in business in the Philippines, it inevitably follows that no conceivable damage can
be suffered by them not to mention the foremost consideration heretofore discussed on the
absence of their "right" to be protected. At any rate, and assuming in gratia argumenti that
respondent court erroneously lifted the writ it previously issued, the same may be cured by
appeal and not in the form of a petition for certiorari (Clark vs. Philippine Ready Mix
Concrete Co., 88 Phil. 460 [1951]). Verily, and mindful of the rule that a writ of preliminary
injunction is an interlocutory order which is always under the control of the court before final
judgment, petitioners' criticism must fall flat on the ground, so to speak, more so when
extinction of the previously issued writ can even be made without previous notice to the
adverse party and without a hearing (Caluya vs. Ramos, 79 Phil. 640 [1974]; 3 Moran, Rules
of Court, 1970 ed., p. 81).
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals
dated September 14, 1989 and November 29, 1989 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 113213 August 15, 1994

PAUL JOSEPH WRIGHT, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE JOSE DE LA RAMA, RTC, BRANCH 139, MAKATI, M.M. and HON.
FRANK DRILON, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, respondents.
Rodrigo E. Mallari for petitioner.
Aurora Salva Bautista collaborating for petitioner.

KAPUNAN, J.:
A paramount principle of the law of extradition provides that a State may not surrender any individual for any offense
not included in a treaty of extradition. This principle arises from the reality of extradition as a derogation of
sovereignty. Extradition is an intrusion into the territorial integrity of the host State and a delimitation of the sovereign
power of the State within its own territory. 1 The act of extraditing amounts to a "delivery by the State of a person
accused or convicted of a crime, to another State within whose territorial jurisdiction, actual or constructive, it was
committed and which asks for his surrender with a view to execute justice." 2 As it is an act of "surrender" of an
individual found in a sovereign State to another State which demands his surrender 3, an act of extradition, even with
a treaty rendered executory upon ratification by appropriate authorities, does not imposed an obligation to extradite
on the requested State until the latter has made its own determination of the validity of the requesting State's
demand, in accordance with the requested State's own interests.
The principles of international law recognize no right of extradition apart from that arising from treaty. 4 Pursuant to
these principles, States enter into treaties of extradition principally for the purpose of bringing fugitives of justice
within the ambit of their laws, under conventions recognizing the right of nations to mutually agree to surrender
individuals within their jurisdiction and control, and for the purpose of enforcing their respective municipal laws. Since
punishment of fugitive criminals is dependent mainly on the willingness of host State to apprehend them and revert
them to the State where their offenses were committed, 5 jurisdiction over such fugitives and subsequent enforcement
of penal laws can be effectively accomplished only by agreement between States through treaties of extradition.
Desiring to make more effective cooperation between Australia and the Government of the Philippines in the
suppression of crime, 6 the two countries entered into a Treaty of Extradition on the 7th of March 1988. The said
treaty was ratified in accordance with the provisions of Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution in a Resolution
adopted by the Senate on September 10, 1990 and became effective thirty (30) days after both States notified each
other in writing that the respective requirements for the entry into force of the Treaty have been complied with. 7

The Treaty adopts a "non-list, double criminality approach" which provides for broader coverage of extraditable
offenses between the two countries and (which) embraces crimes punishable by imprisonment for at least one (1)
year. Additionally, the Treaty allows extradition for crimes committed prior to the treaty's date of effectivity, provided
that these crimes were in the statute books of the requesting State at the time of their commission.
Under the Treaty, each contracting State agrees to extradite. . . "persons
. . . wanted for prosecution of the imposition or enforcement of a sentence in the Requesting State for an extraditable
offense." 8 A request for extradition requires, if the person is accused of an offense, the furnishing by the requesting
State of either a warrant for the arrest or a copy of the warrant of arrest of the person, or, where appropriate, a copy
of the relevant charge against the person sought to be extradited. 9
In defining the extraditable offenses, the Treaty includes all offenses "punishable under the Laws of both Contracting
States by imprisonment for a period of at least one (1) year, or by a more severe penalty." 10 For the purpose of the
definition, the Treaty states that:
(a) an offense shall be an extraditable offense whether or not the laws of the Contracting States
place the offense within the same category or denominate the offense by the same terminology;
(b) the totality of the acts or omissions alleged against the person whose extradition is requested
shall be taken into account in determining the constituent elements of the offense. 11
Petitioner, an Australian Citizen, was sought by Australian authorities for indictable crimes in his country. Extradition
proceedings were filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, which rendered a decision ordering the deportation
of petitioner. Said decision was sustained by the Court of Appeals; hence, petitioner came to this Court by way of
review on certiorari, to set aside the order of deportation. Petitioner contends that the provision of the Treaty giving
retroactive effect to the extradition treaty amounts to an ex post facto law which violates Section 21 of Article VI of the
Constitution. He assails the trial court's decision ordering his extradition, arguing that the evidence adduced in the
court below failed to show that he is wanted for prosecution in his country. Capsulized, all the principal issues raised
by the petitioner before this Court strike at the validity of the extradition proceedings instituted by the government
against him.
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, 12 are undisputed:
On March 17, 1993, Assistant Secretary Sime D. Hidalgo of the Department of Foreign Affairs
indorsed to the Department of Justice Diplomatic Note No. 080/93 dated February 19, 1993 from
the Government of Australia to the Department of Justice through Attorney General Michael Duffy.
Said Diplomatic Note was a formal request for the extradition of Petitioner Paul Joseph Wright who
is wanted for the following indictable crimes:
1. Wright/Orr Matter one count of Obtaining Property by Deception contrary to Section 81(1) of
the Victorian Crimes Act of 1958; and
2. Wright/Cracker Matter Thirteen (13) counts of Obtaining Properties by Deception contrary to
Section 81(1) of the Victorian Crimes Act of 1958; one count of attempting to Obtain Property by
Deception contrary to Section 321(m) of Victorian Crimes Act of 1958; and one count of Perjury
contrary to Section 314 of Victorian Crimes Act of 1958, which crimes were allegedly committed in
the following manner:
The one (1) count of Obtaining Property by Deception contrary to Section 81 (1)
of the Victorian Crimes Act of 1958 constitutes in Mr. Wright's and co-offender,
Herbert Lance Orr's, dishonesty in obtaining $315,250 from Mulcahy, Mendelson
and Round Solicitors (MM7R), secured by a mortgage on the property in

Bangholme, Victoria owned by Ruven Nominees Pty. Ltd., a company controlled

by a Rodney and a Mitchell, by falsely representing that all the relevant legal
documents relating to the mortgage had been signed by Rodney and Janine
Mitchell.
The thirteen (13) counts of Obtaining Property by Deception contrary to Section
81(1) of the Victorian Crimes Act of 1958 constitutes in Mr. Wright's and cooffender Mr. John Carson Craker's receiving a total of approximately 11.2 in
commission (including $367,044 in bonus commission) via Amazon Bond Pty.
Ltd., depending on the volume of business written, by submitting two hundred
fifteen (215) life insurance proposals, and paying premiums thereon (to the
acceptance of the policies and payment of commissions) to the Australian Mutual
Provident (AMP) Society through the Office of Melbourne Mutual Insurance, of
which respondent is an insurance agent, out of which life proposals none are in
existence and approximately 200 of which are alleged to have been false, in one
or more of the following ways:
( i ) some policy-holders signed up only because they were told the policies were
free (usually for 2 years) and no payments were required.
(ii) some policy-holders were offered cash inducements ($50 or $100) to sign and
had to supply a bank account no longer used (at which a direct debit request for
payment of premiums would apply). These policy-holders were also told no
payments by them were required.
(iii) some policy-holders were introduced through the "Daily Personnel Agency",
and again were told the policies were free for 2 years as long as an unused bank
account was applied.
(iv) some policy-holders were found not to exist.
The one count of Attempting to Obtain Property by Deception contrary to Section
321(m) of the Victorian Crimes Act of 1958 constitutes in Mr. Wright's and Mr.
Craker's attempting to cause the payment of $2,870.68 commission to a bank
account in the name of Amazon Bond Pty. Ltd. by submitting one proposal for
Life Insurance to the AMP Society, the policy-holder of which does not exist with
the end in view of paying the premiums thereon to insure acceptance of the
policy and commission payments.
The one count of Perjury contrary to Section 314 of Victorian Crimes Act of 1958
constitutes in Mr. Wright's and Mr. Craker's signing and swearing before a
Solicitor holding a current practicing certificate pursuant to the Legal Profession
Practice Act (1958), a Statutory Declaration attesting to the validity of 29 of the
most recent Life Insurance proposals of AMP Society and containing three (3)
false statements.
Pursuant to Section 5 of PD No. 1069, in relation to the Extradition Treaty concluded between the
Republic of the Philippines and Australia on September 10, 1990, extradition proceedings were
initiated on April 6, 1993 by the State Counsels of the Department of Justice before the respondent
court.

In its Order dated April 13, 1993, the respondent court directed the petitioner to appear before it on
April 30, 1993 and to file his answer within ten days. In the same order, the respondent Judge
ordered the NBI to serve summons and cause the arrest of the petitioner.
The respondent court received return of the warrant of arrest and summons signed by NBI Senior
Agent Manuel Almendras with the information that the petitioner was arrested on April 26, 1993 at
Taguig, Metro Manila and was subsequently detained at the NBI detention cell where petitioner, to
date, continue to be held.
Thereafter, the petitioner filed his answer.
In the course of the trial, the petitioner testified that he was jobless, married to a Filipina, Judith
David, with whom he begot a child; that he has no case in Australia; that he is not a fugitive from
justice and is not aware of the offenses charged against him; that he arrived in the Philippines on
February 25, 1990 returned to Australia on March 1, 1990, then back to the Philippines on April 11,
1990, left the Philippines again on April 24, 1990 for Australia and returned to the Philippines on
May 24, 1990, again left for Australia on May 29, 1990 passing by Singapore and then returned to
the Philippines on June 25, 1990 and from that time on, has not left the Philippines; and that his
tourist visa has been extended but he could not produce the same in court as it was misplaced, has
neither produced any certification thereof, nor any temporary working visa.
The trial court, in its decision dated 14 June 1993, granting the petition for extradition requested by the Government
of Australia, concluding that the documents submitted by the Australian Government meet the requirements of Article
7 of the Treaty of Extradition and that the offenses for which the petitioner were sought in his country are extraditable
offenses under Article 2 of the said Treaty. The trial court, moreover, held that under the provisions of the same
Article, extradition could be granted irrespective of when the offense in relation to the extradition was
committed, provided that the offense happened to be an offense in the requesting State at the time the acts or
omissions constituting the same were committed. 13
Petitioner challenged the decision of the Regional Trial Court before the Court of Appeals assigning the following
errors:
I. THAT THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING
RETROACTIVE FORCE AND EFFECT TO THE EXTRADITION TREATY DESPITE THE FACT
THAT THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE RESPONDENT SHOW THAT THE ALLEGED
OFFENSES FOR WHICH PETITIONER IS SOUGHT TO BE EXTRADITED TOOK PLACE IN
1988-1989 AT THE TIME THERE WAS NO EXTRADITION TREATY BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES AND AUSTRALIA.
II. THAT THE ACT OF THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE IN GIVING RETROACTIVE
FORCE AND EFFECT TO THE EXTRADITION TREATY BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND AUSTRALIA AMOUNTS TO AN "EX POST FACTO LAW" AND VIOLATES
SECTION 21, ARTICLE VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.
III. THAT THE HON. RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED IN ORDERING THE
EXTRADITION OF PETITIONER DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED DO
NOT SHOW THAT PETITIONER IS WANTED FOR PROSECUTION IN AUSTRALIA.
IV. THAT THE HON. RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION, AMOUNTING
TO LACK OF JURISDICTION, IN MISINTERPRETING THE EXTENDED STAY OF PETITIONER
AS EVIDENCE OF PETITIONER'S DESIGN TO HIDE AND EVADE PROSECUTION IN
AUSTRALIA.

V. THAT THE HON. RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED IN ORDERING THE

EXTRADITION OF PETITIONER WITHOUT SPECIFYING IN HIS ORDER OR DECISION THE
SPECIFIC CHARGES FOR WHICH PETITIONER IS TO STAND TRIAL IN AUSTRALIA.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision on September 14, 1993 and denied petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration on December 16, 1993. 14 Reiterating substantially the same assignments of error which he
interposed in the Court of Appeals, petitioner challenges in this petition the validity of the extradition order issued by
the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals under the Treaty. Petitioner vigorously argues that the trial court
order violates the Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. He avers that for the extradition order to be
valid, the Australian government should show that he "has a criminal case pending before a competent court" in that
country "which can legally pass judgement or acquittal or conviction upon him."
Clearly, a close reading of the provisions of the Treaty previously cited, which are relevant to our determination of the
validity of the extradition order, reveals that the trial court committed no error in ordering the petitioner's extradition.
Conformably with Article 2, Section 2 of the said Treaty, the crimes for which the petitioner was charged and for which
warrants for his arrest were issued in Australia were undeniably offenses in the Requesting State at the time they
were alleged to have been committed. From its examination of the charges against the petitioner, the trial court
correctly determined that the corresponding offenses under our penal laws are Articles 315(2) and 183 of the Revised
Penal Code on swindling/estafa and false testimony/perjury, respectively. 15
The provisions of Article 6 of the said Treaty pertaining to the documents required for extradition are sufficiently clear
and require no interpretation. The warrant for the arrest of an individual or a copy thereof, a statement of each and
every offense and a statement of the acts and omissions which were alleged against the person in respect of each
offense are sufficient to show that a person is wanted for prosecution under the said article. All of these documentary
requirements were dully submitted to the trial court in its proceedings a quo. For purposes of the compliance with the
provisions of the Treaty, the signature and official seal of the Attorney-General of Australia were sufficient to
authenticate all the documents annexed to the Statement of the Acts and Omissions, including the statement
itself. 16 In conformity with the provisions of Article 7 of the Treaty, the appropriate documents and annexes were
signed by "an officer in or of the Requesting State" 17 "sealed with . . . (a) public seal of the Requesting State or of a
Minister of State, or of a Department or officer of the Government of the Requesting State," 18 and "certified by a
diplomatic or consular officer of the Requesting State accredited to the Requested State." 19 The last requirement was
accomplished by the certification made by the Philippine Consular Officer in Canberra, Australia.
The petitioner's contention that a person sought to be extradited should have a "criminal case pending before a
competent court in the Requesting State which can legally pass judgement of acquittal or conviction" 20 stretches the
meaning of the phrase "wanted for prosecution" beyond the intended by the treaty provisions because the relevant
provisions merely require "a warrant for the arrest or a copy of the warrant for the arrest of the person sought to be
extradited." 21 Furthermore, the 'Charge and Warrant of Arrest Sheets' attest to the fact that petitioner is not only
wanted for prosecution but has, in fact, absconded to evade arrest and criminal prosecution. Since a charge or
information under the Treaty is required only when appropriate, i.e., in cases where an individual charged before a
competent court in the Requesting State thereafter absconds to the Requested State, a charge or a copy thereof is
not required if the offender has in fact already absconded before a criminal complaint could be filed. As the Court of
Appeals correctly noted, limiting the phrase "wanted for prosecution" to person charged with an information or a
criminal complaint renders the Treaty ineffective over individuals who abscond for the purpose of evading arrest and
prosecution. 22
This brings us to another point raised by the petitioner both in the trial court and in the Court of Appeals. May the
extradition of the petitioner who is wanted for prosecution by the government of Australia be granted in spite of the
fact that the offenses for which the petitioner is sought in his country were allegedly committed prior to the date of
effectivity of the Treaty.
Petitioner takes the position that under Article 18 of the Treaty its enforcement cannot be given retroactive effect.
Article 18 states:

ENTRY INTO FORCE AND TERMINATION

This Treaty shall enter into force thirty (30) days after the date on which the Contracting States
have notified each other in writing that their respective requirements for the entry into force of this
Treaty have been complied with.
Either contracting State may terminate this Treaty by notice in writing at any time and it shall cease
to be in force on the one hundred and eightieth day after the day on which notice is given.
We fail to see how the petitioner can infer a prohibition against retroactive enforcement from this provision. The first
paragraph of Article 18 refers to the Treaty's date of effectivity; the second paragraph pertains to its termination.
Absolutely nothing in the said provision relates to, much less, prohibits retroactive enforcement of the Treaty.
On the other hand, Article 2(4) of the Treaty unequivocally provides that:
4. Extradition may be granted pursuant to provisions of this Treaty irrespective of when the offense
in relation to which extradition is requested was committed, provided that:
(a) it was an offense in the Requesting State at the time of the acts or omissions constituting the
offense; and
(b) the acts or omissions alleged would, if they had taken place in the Territory of the Requested
State at the time of the making of the request for extradition, have constituted an offense against
the laws in force in that state.
Thus, the offenses for which petitioner is sought by his government are clearly extraditable under Article 2 of the
Treaty. They were offenses in the Requesting State at the time they were committed, and, irrespective of the time
they were committed, they fall under the panoply of the Extradition Treaty's provisions, specifically, Article 2
paragraph 4, quoted above.
Does the Treaty's retroactive application violate the Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws? Early
commentators understood ex post facto laws to include all laws of retrospective application, whether civil or
criminal. 23 However, Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase, citing Blackstone, The Federalist and other early U.S. state
constitutions in Calder vs. Bull 24 concluded that the concept was limited only to penal and criminal statutes. As
conceived under our Constitution, ex post facto laws are 1) statutes that make an act punishable as a crime when
such act was not an offense when committed; 2) laws which, while not creating new offenses, aggravate the
seriousness of a crime; 3) statutes which prescribes greater punishment for a crime already committed; or, 4) laws
which alter the rules of evidence so as to make it substantially easier to convict a defendant. 25 "Applying the
constitutional principle, the (Court) has held that the prohibition applies only to criminal legislation which affects the
substantial rights of the accused." 26 This being so, there is no absolutely no merit in petitioner's contention that the
ruling of the lower court sustaining the Treaty's retroactive application with respect to offenses committed prior to the
Treaty's coming into force and effect, violates the Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. As the Court of
Appeals correctly concluded, the Treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal procedural statute. "It
merely provides for the extradition of persons wanted for prosecution of an offense or a crime which offense or crime
was already committed or consummated at the time the treaty was ratified." 27
In signing the Treaty, the government of the Philippines has determined that it is within its interests to enter into
agreement with the government of Australia regarding the repatriation of persons wanted for criminal offenses in
either country. The said Treaty was concurred and ratified by the Senate in a Resolution dated September 10, 1990.
Having been ratified in accordance with the provision of the 1987 Constitution, the Treaty took effect thirty days after
the requirements for entry into force were complied with by both governments.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision of respondent Court of Appeals, we hereby AFFIRM the
same and DENY the instant petition for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 148571

September 24, 2002

GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, petitioner,
vs.
HON. GUILLERMO PURGANAN, Presiding Judge Regional Trial Court of Manila and
MARC JIMENEZ a.k.a. MARCIO BATACAN CRESPO, respondent
Davide Jr., CJ, Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Morales and Callejo, Sr.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In extradition proceedings, are prospective extraditees entitled to notice and hearing before warrants for their
arrest can be issued? Equally important, are they entitled to the right to bail and provisional liberty while the
extradition proceedings are pending? In general, the answer to these two novel questions is "No." The explanation of
and the reasons for, as well as the exceptions to, this rule are laid out in this Decision.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to void and set aside the
Orders dated May 23, 2001 1 and July 3, 2001 2 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 42. 3The
first assailed Order set for hearing petitioners application for the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of Respondent
Mark B. Jimenez.
The second challenged Order, on the other hand, directed the issuance of a warrant, but at the same time
granted bail to Jimenez. The dispositive portion of the Order reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the [Court] finds probable cause against respondent Mark
Jimenez. Accordingly let a Warrant for the arrest of the respondent be issued. Consequently and taking into
consideration Section 9, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, this Court fixes the
reasonable amount of bail for respondents temporary liberty at ONE MILLION PESOS (Php 1,000,000.00),
the same to be paid in cash.
Furthermore respondent is directed to immediately surrender to this Court his passport and the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation is likewise directed to include the name of the respondent in its Hold
Departure List." 4
Essentially, the Petition prays for the lifting of the bail Order, the cancellation of the bond, and the taking of
Jimenez into legal custody.
The Facts
This Petition is really a sequel to GR No. 139465 entitled Secretary of Justice v. Ralph C. Lantion. 5
Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, 6 the United States Government, through diplomatic
channels, sent to the Philippine Government Note Verbale No. 0522 dated June 16, 1999, supplemented by Note
Nos. 0597, 0720 and 0809 and accompanied by duly authenticated documents requesting the extradition of Mark B.
Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan Crespo. Upon receipt of the Notes and documents, the secretary of foreign
affairs (SFA) transmitted them to the secretary of justice (SOJ) for appropriate action, pursuant to Section 5 of
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1069, also known as the Extradition Law.
Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and was granted a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) by the RTC of Manila, Branch 25. 7 The TRO prohibited the Department of Justice (DOJ) from filing with
the RTC a petition for his extradition. The validity of the TRO was, however, assailed by the SOJ in a Petition before
this Court in the said GR No. 139465. Initially, the Court -- by a vote of 9-6 -- dismissed the Petition. The SOJ was
ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the
latter a reasonable period within which to file a comment and supporting evidence. 8
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the SOJ, this Court issued its October 17, 2000
Resolution. 9 By an identical vote of 9-6 -- after three justices changed their votes -- it reconsidered and reversed its
earlier Decision. It held that private respondent was bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation
stage of the extradition process. This Resolution has become final and executory.
Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the United States of America, represented by the Philippine
DOJ, filed with the RTC on May 18, 2001, the appropriate Petition for Extradition which was docketed as Extradition
Case No. 01192061. The Petition alleged, inter alia, that Jimenez was the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida on April 15, 1999. The warrant had been issued in
connection with the following charges in Indictment No. 99-00281 CR-SEITZ: (1) conspiracy to defraud the United
States and to commit certain offenses in violation of Title 18 US Code Section 371; (2) tax evasion, in violation of Title
26 US Code Section 7201; (3) wire fraud, in violation of Title 18 US Code Sections 1343 and 2; (4) false statements,
in violation of Title 18 US Code Sections 1001 and 2; and (5) illegal campaign contributions, in violation of Title 2 US
Code Sections 441b, 441f and 437g(d) and Title 18 US Code Section 2. In order to prevent the flight of Jimenez, the
Petition prayed for the issuance of an order for his "immediate arrest" pursuant to Section 6 of PD No. 1069.
Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent Jimenez filed before it an "Urgent Manifestation/ExParte Motion," 10 which prayed that petitioners application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing.

In its assailed May 23, 2001 Order, the RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez and set the case for hearing on
June 5, 2001. In that hearing, petitioner manifested its reservations on the procedure adopted by the trial court
allowing the accused in an extradition case to be heard prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
After the hearing, the court a quo required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. In his
Memorandum, Jimenez sought an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in
the amount of P100,000.
The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for hearing on June 15, 2001. Thereafter, the court below
issued its questioned July 3, 2001 Order, directing the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his
temporary liberty at one million pesos in cash. 11 After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required cash
bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty via the challenged Order dated July 4, 2001. 12
Hence, this Petition. 13
Issues
Petitioner presents the following issues for the consideration of this Court:
I.
The public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in adopting a procedure of first hearing a potential extraditee
before issuing an arrest warrant under Section 6 of PD No. 1069.
II.
The public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the prayer for bail and in allowing Jimenez to go on
provisional liberty because:
1. An extradition court has no power to authorize bail, in the absence of any law that
provides for such power.
2. Section 13, Article III (right to bail clause) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution and Section
4, Rule 114 (Bail) of the Rules of Court, as amended, which [were] relied upon, cannot be used as
bases for allowing bail in extradition proceedings.
3. The presumption is against bail in extradition proceedings or proceedings leading to
extradition.
4. On the assumption that bail is available in extradition proceedings or proceedings leading
to extradition, bail is not a matter of right but only of discretion upon clear showing by the applicant
of the existence of special circumstances.
5. Assuming that bail is a matter of discretion in extradition proceedings, the public
respondent received no evidence of special circumstances which may justify release on bail.
6. The risk that Jimenez will flee is high, and no special circumstance exists that will
engender a well-founded belief that he will not flee.
7. The conditions attached to the grant of bail are ineffectual and do not ensure compliance
by the Philippines with its obligations under the RP-US Extradition Treaty.
8. The Court of Appeals Resolution promulgated on May 10, 2001 in the case entitled
Eduardo T. Rodriguez et al. vs. The Hon. Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 17, Manila, CA-G.R. SP

No. 64589, relied upon by the public respondent in granting bail, had been recalled before the
issuance of the subject bail orders." 14
In sum, the substantive questions that this Court will address are: (1) whether Jimenez is entitled to notice and
hearing before a warrant for his arrest can be issued, and (2) whether he is entitled to bail and to provisional liberty
while the extradition proceedings are pending. Preliminarily, we shall take up the alleged prematurity of the Petition
for Certiorari arising from petitioners failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration in the RTC and to seek relief in the
Court of Appeals (CA), instead of in this Court. 15 We shall also preliminarily discuss five extradition postulates that will
guide us in disposing of the substantive issues.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
Preliminary Matters
Alleged Prematurity of Present Petition
Petitioner submits the following justifications for not filing a Motion for Reconsideration in the Extradition Court:
"(1) the issues were fully considered by such court after requiring the parties to submit their respective memoranda
and position papers on the matter and thus, the filing of a reconsideration motion would serve no useful purpose; (2)
the assailed orders are a patent nullity, absent factual and legal basis therefor; and (3) the need for relief is extremely
urgent, as the passage of sufficient time would give Jimenez ample opportunity to escape and avoid extradition; and
(4) the issues raised are purely of law." 16
For resorting directly to this Court instead of the CA, petitioner submits the following reasons: "(1) even if the
petition is lodged with the Court of Appeals and such appellate court takes cognizance of the issues and decides
them, the parties would still bring the matter to this Honorable Court to have the issues resolved once and for all [and]
to have a binding precedent that all lower courts ought to follow; (2) the Honorable Court of Appeals had in one
case 17 ruled on the issue by disallowing bail but the court below refused to recognize the decision as a judicial guide
and all other courts might likewise adopt the same attitude of refusal; and (3) there are pending issues on bail both in
the extradition courts and the Court of Appeals, which, unless guided by the decision that this Honorable Court will
render in this case, would resolve to grant bail in favor of the potential extraditees and would give them opportunity to
flee and thus, cause adverse effect on the ability of the Philippines to comply with its obligations under existing
extradition treaties." 18
As a general rule, a petition for certiorari before a higher court will not prosper unless the inferior court has
been given, through a motion for reconsideration, a chance to correct the errors imputed to it. This rule, though, has
certain exceptions: (1) when the issue raised is purely of law, (2) when public interest is involved, or (3) in case of
urgency. 19 As a fourth exception, the Court has also ruled that the filing of a motion for reconsideration before
availment of the remedy of certiorari is not a sine qua non, when the questions raised are the same as those that
have already been squarely argued and exhaustively passed upon by the lower court. 20 Aside from being of this
nature, the issues in the present case also involve pure questions of law that are of public interest. Hence, a motion
for reconsideration may be dispensed with.
Likewise, this Court has allowed a direct invocation of its original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari when
there are special and important reasons therefor. 21 In Fortich v. Corona 22 we stated:
[T]he Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition filed directly
[before] it if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, warrant. This has been
the judicial policy to be observed and which has been reiterated in subsequent cases, namely: Uy vs.
Contreras, et. al., Torres vs. Arranz, Bercero vs. De Guzman, and, Advincula vs. Legaspi, et. al. As we have
further stated in Cuaresma:
x x x. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be
allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out
in the petition. This is established policy. x x x.

Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take primary jurisdiction over the present petition in the
interest of speedy justice and to avoid future litigations so as to promptly put an end to the present
controversy which, as correctly observed by petitioners, has sparked national interest because of the
magnitude of the problem created by the issuance of the assailed resolution. Moreover, x x x requiring the
petitioners to file their petition first with the Court of Appeals would only result in a waste of time and money.
That the Court has the power to set aside its own rules in the higher interests of justice is well-entrenched in
our jurisprudence. We reiterate what we said in Piczon vs. Court of Appeals: 23
Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than
promote substantial justice, must always be avoided. Time and again, this Court has suspended its own
rules and excepted a particular case from their operation whenever the higher interests of justice so require.
In the instant petition, we forego a lengthy disquisition of the proper procedure that should have been taken
by the parties involved and proceed directly to the merits of the case.
In a number of other exceptional cases, 24 we held as follows:
This Court has original jurisdiction, concurrent with that of Regional Trial Courts and the Court of
Appeals, over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus, and we
entertain direct resort to us in cases where special and important reasons or exceptional and compelling
circumstances justify the same."
In the interest of justice and to settle once and for all the important issue of bail in extradition proceedings, we
deem it best to take cognizance of the present case. Such proceedings constitute a matter of first impression over
which there is, as yet, no local jurisprudence to guide lower courts.
Five Postulates of Extradition
The substantive issues raised in this case require an interpretation or construction of the treaty and the law on
extradition. A cardinal rule in the interpretation of a treaty or a law is to ascertain and give effect to its intent. 25Since
PD 1069 is intended as a guide for the implementation of extradition treaties to which the Philippines is a
signatory, 26 understanding certain postulates of extradition will aid us in properly deciding the issues raised here.
1. Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of Crime.
First, extradition treaties are entered into for the purpose of suppressing crime 27 by facilitating the
arrest and the custodial transfer 28 of a fugitive 29 from one state to the other.
With the advent of easier and faster means of international travel, the flight of affluent criminals from
one country to another for the purpose of committing crime and evading prosecution has become more
frequent. Accordingly, governments are adjusting their methods of dealing with criminals and crimes that
transcend international boundaries.
Today, "a majority of nations in the world community have come to look upon extradition as the major
effective instrument of international co-operation in the suppression of crime." 30 It is the only regular system
that has been devised to return fugitives to the jurisdiction of a court competent to try them in accordance
with municipal and international law. 31
An important practical effect x x x of the recognition of the principle that criminals should be
restored to a jurisdiction competent to try and punish them is that the number of criminals seeking
refuge abroad will be reduced. For to the extent that efficient means of detection and the threat of
punishment play a significant role in the deterrence of crime within the territorial limits of a State, so
the existence of effective extradition arrangements and the consequent certainty of return to the
locus delicti commissi play a corresponding role in the deterrence of flight abroad in order to
escape the consequence of crime. x x x. From an absence of extradition arrangements flight
abroad by the ingenious criminal receives direct encouragement and thus indirectly does the
commission of crime itself." 32

In Secretary v. Lantion 33 we explained:

The Philippines also has a national interest to help in suppressing crimes and one way to do it is to
facilitate the extradition of persons covered by treaties duly entered [into] by our government. More and
more, crimes are becoming the concern of one world. Laws involving crimes and crime prevention are
undergoing universalization. One manifest purpose of this trend towards globalization is to deny easy refuge
to a criminal whose activities threaten the peace and progress of civilized countries. It is to the great interest
of the Philippines to be part of this irreversible movement in light of its vulnerability to crimes, especially
transnational crimes."
Indeed, in this era of globalization, easier and faster international travel, and an expanding ring of international
crimes and criminals, we cannot afford to be an isolationist state. We need to cooperate with other states in order to
improve our chances of suppressing crime in our own country.
2. The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the Accused
Second, an extradition treaty presupposes that both parties thereto have examined, and that both accept and
trust, each others legal system and judicial process. 34 More pointedly, our duly authorized representatives signature
on an extradition treaty signifies our confidence in the capacity and the willingness of the other state to protect the
basic rights of the person sought to be extradited. 35 That signature signifies our full faith that the accused will be
given, upon extradition to the requesting state, all relevant and basic rights in the criminal proceedings that will take
place therein; otherwise, the treaty would not have been signed, or would have been directly attacked for its
unconstitutionality.
3. The Proceedings Are Sui Generis
Third, as pointed out in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, 36 extradition proceedings are not criminal in nature. In
criminal proceedings, the constitutional rights of the accused are at fore; in extradition which is sui generis -- in a
class by itself -- they are not.
An extradition [proceeding] is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation
all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. To begin with, the process of extradition does
not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged
in the court of the state where he will be extradited. Hence, as a rule, constitutional rights that are only
relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by an extraditee x x x.
xxxxxxxxx
There are other differences between an extradition proceeding and a criminal proceeding. An
extradition proceeding is summary in nature while criminal proceedings involve a full-blown trial. In
contradistinction to a criminal proceeding, the rules of evidence in an extradition proceeding allow admission
of evidence under less stringent standards. In terms of the quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a criminal
case requires proof beyond reasonable doubt for conviction while a fugitive may be ordered extradited upon
showing of the existence of a prima facie case. Finally, unlike in a criminal case where judgment becomes
executory upon being rendered final, in an extradition proceeding, our courts may adjudge an individual
extraditable but the President has the final discretion to extradite him. The United States adheres to a similar
practice whereby the Secretary of State exercises wide discretion in balancing the equities of the case and
the demands of the nations foreign relations before making the ultimate decision to extradite."
Given the foregoing, it is evident that the extradition court is not called upon to ascertain the guilt or the
innocence of the person sought to be extradited. 37 Such determination during the extradition proceedings will only
result in needless duplication and delay. Extradition is merely a measure of international judicial assistance through
which a person charged with or convicted of a crime is restored to a jurisdiction with the best claim to try that person.
It is not part of the function of the assisting authorities to enter into questions that are the prerogative of that
jurisdiction. 38 The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings in court is only to determine whether the extradition
request complies with the Extradition Treaty, and whether the person sought is extraditable. 39
4. Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.

Fourth, our executive branch of government voluntarily entered into the Extradition Treaty, and our legislative
branch ratified it. Hence, the Treaty carries the presumption that its implementation will serve the national interest.
Fulfilling our obligations under the Extradition Treaty promotes comity 40 with the requesting state. On the other
hand, failure to fulfill our obligations thereunder paints a bad image of our country before the world community. Such
failure would discourage other states from entering into treaties with us, particularly an extradition treaty that hinges
on reciprocity. 41
Verily, we are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply in good faith with our obligations under the Treaty.42 This
principle requires that we deliver the accused to the requesting country if the conditions precedent to extradition, as
set forth in the Treaty, are satisfied. In other words, "[t]he demanding government, when it has done all that the treaty
and the law require it to do, is entitled to the delivery of the accused on the issue of the proper warrant, and the other
government is under obligation to make the surrender." 43 Accordingly, the Philippines must be ready and in a position
to deliver the accused, should it be found proper.
5. There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight
Fifth, persons to be extradited are presumed to be flight risks. This prima facie presumption finds reinforcement
in the experience 44 of the executive branch: nothing short of confinement can ensure that the accused will not flee the
jurisdiction of the requested state in order to thwart their extradition to the requesting state.
The present extradition case further validates the premise that persons sought to be extradited have a
propensity to flee. Indeed,
extradition hearings would not even begin, if only the accused were willing to submit to trial in the requesting
country. 45 Prior acts of herein respondent -- (1) leaving the requesting state right before the conclusion of his
indictment proceedings there; and (2) remaining in the requested state despite learning that the requesting state is
seeking his return and that the crimes he is charged with are bailable -- eloquently speak of his aversion to the
processes in the requesting state, as well as his predisposition to avoid them at all cost. These circumstances point to
an ever-present, underlying high risk of flight. He has demonstrated that he has the capacity and the will to flee.
Having fled once, what is there to stop him, given sufficient opportunity, from fleeing a second time?
First Substantive Issue:
Is Respondent Entitled to Notice and Hearing
Before the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest?
Petitioner contends that the procedure adopted by the RTC --informing the accused, a fugitive from justice, that
an Extradition Petition has been filed against him, and that petitioner is seeking his arrest -- gives him notice to
escape and to avoid extradition. Moreover, petitioner pleads that such procedure may set a dangerous precedent, in
that those sought to be extradited -- including terrorists, mass murderers and war criminals -- may invoke it in future
extradition cases.
On the other hand, Respondent Jimenez argues that he should not be hurriedly and arbitrarily deprived of his
constitutional right to liberty without due process. He further asserts that there is as yet no specific law or rule setting
forth the procedure prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest, after the petition for extradition has been filed in court;
ergo, the formulation of that procedure is within the discretion of the presiding judge.
Both parties cite Section 6 of PD 1069 in support of their arguments. It states:
SEC. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest; Hearing, Service of Notices.- (1) Immediately upon
receipt of the petition, the presiding judge of the court shall, as soon as practicable, summon the accused to
appear and to answer the petition on the day and hour fixed in the order. [H]e may issue a warrant for the
immediate arrest of the accused which may be served any where within the Philippines if it appears to the
presiding judge that the immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused will best serve the ends of
justice. Upon receipt of the answer, or should the accused after having received the summons fail to answer
within the time fixed, the presiding judge shall hear the case or set another date for the hearing thereof.

(2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the warrant of arrest, if issued, shall be promptly served
each upon the accused and the attorney having charge of the case." (Emphasis ours)
Does this provision sanction RTC Judge Purganans act of immediately setting for hearing the issuance of a
warrant of arrest? We rule in the negative.
1. On the Basis of the Extradition Law
It is significant to note that Section 6 of PD 1069, our Extradition Law, uses the word "immediate" to qualify the
arrest of the accused. This qualification would be rendered nugatory by setting for hearing the issuance of the arrest
warrant. Hearing entails sending notices to the opposing parties, 46 receiving facts and arguments 47 from them, 48 and
giving them time to prepare and present such facts and arguments. Arrest subsequent to a hearing can no longer be
considered "immediate." The law could not have intended the word as a mere superfluity but, on the whole, as a
means of imparting a sense of urgency and swiftness in the determination of whether a warrant of arrest should be
issued.
By using the phrase "if it appears," the law further conveys that accuracy is not as important as speed at such
early stage. The trial court is not expected to make an exhaustive determination to ferret out the true and actual
situation, immediately upon the filing of the petition. From the knowledge and the material then available to it, the
court is expected merely to get a good first impression -- a prima facie finding -- sufficient to make a speedy initial
determination as regards the arrest and detention of the accused.
Attached to the Petition for Extradition, with a Certificate of Authentication among others, were the following: (1)
Annex H, the Affidavit executed on May 26, 1999 by Mr. Michael E. Savage -- trial attorney in the Campaign
Financing Task Force of the Criminal Division of the US Department of Justice; (2) Annexes H to G, evidentiary
Appendices of various exhibits that constituted evidence of the crimes charged in the Indictment, with Exhibits 1 to
120 (duly authenticated exhibits that constituted evidence of the crimes charged in the Indictment); (3) Annex BB, the
Exhibit I "Appendix of Witness [excerpts] Statements Referenced in the Affidavit of Angela Byers" and enclosed
Statements in two volumes; (4) Annex GG, the Exhibit J "Table of Contents for Supplemental Evidentiary Appendix"
with enclosed Exhibits 121 to 132; and (5) Annex MM, the Exhibit L "Appendix of Witness [excerpts] Statements
Referenced in the Affidavit of Betty Steward" and enclosed Statements in two volumes. 49
It is evident that respondent judge could have already gotten an impression from these records adequate for
him to make an initial determination of whether the accused was someone who should immediately be arrested in
order to "best serve the ends of justice." He could have determined whether such facts and circumstances existed as
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that the extradition request was prima facie
meritorious. In point of fact, he actually concluded from these supporting documents that "probable cause" did exist.
In the second questioned Order, he stated:
In the instant petition, the documents sent by the US Government in support of [its] request for
extradition of herein respondent are enough to convince the Court of the existence of probable cause to
proceed with the hearing against the extraditee." 50

We stress that the prima facie existence of probable cause for hearing the petition and, a priori, for issuing an
arrest warrant was already evident from the Petition itself and its supporting documents. Hence, after having already
determined therefrom that a prima facie finding did exist, respondent judge gravely abused his discretion when he set
the matter for hearing upon motion of Jimenez. 51
Moreover, the law specifies that the court sets a hearing upon receipt of the answer or upon failure of the
accused to answer after receiving the summons. In connection with the matter of immediate arrest, however, the
word "hearing" is notably absent from the provision. Evidently, had the holding of a hearing at that stage been
intended, the law could have easily so provided. It also bears emphasizing at this point that extradition proceedings
are summary 52 in nature. Hence, the silence of the Law and the Treaty leans to the more reasonable interpretation
that there is no intention to punctuate with a hearing every little step in the entire proceedings.

It is taken for granted that the contracting parties intend something reasonable and something not
inconsistent with generally recognized principles of International Law, nor with previous treaty obligations
towards third States. If, therefore, the meaning of a treaty is ambiguous, the reasonable meaning is to be
preferred to the unreasonable, the more reasonable to the less reasonable x x x ." 53
Verily, as argued by petitioner, sending to persons sought to be extradited a notice of the request for their arrest
and setting it for hearing at some future date would give them ample opportunity to prepare and execute an escape.
Neither the Treaty nor the Law could have
intended that consequence, for the very purpose of both would have been defeated by the escape of the
accused from the requested state.
2. On the Basis of the Constitution
Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is invoked by Jimenez, does not require a notice or a
hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. It provides:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized."
To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the Constitution itself requires only the
examination -- under oath or affirmation -- of complainants and the witnesses they may produce. There is no
requirement to notify and hear the accused before the issuance of warrants of arrest.
In Ho v. People 54 and in all the cases cited therein, never was a judge required to go to the extent of conducting
a hearing just for the purpose of personally determining probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. All we
required was that the "judge must have sufficient supporting documents upon which to make his independent
judgment, or at the very least, upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable
cause." 55
In Webb v. De Leon, 56 the Court categorically stated that a judge was not supposed to conduct a hearing
before issuing a warrant of arrest:
Again, we stress that before issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely determine personally the
probability, not the certainty of guilt of an accused. In doing so, judges do not conduct a de novo hearing to
determine the existence of probable cause. They just personally review the initial determination of the
prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial evidence."
At most, in cases of clear insufficiency of evidence on record, judges merely further examine complainants and
their witnesses. 57 In the present case, validating the act of respondent judge and instituting the practice of hearing the
accused and his witnesses at this early stage would be discordant with the rationale for the entire system. If the
accused were allowed to be heard and necessarily to present evidence during the prima facie determination for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest,
what would stop him from presenting his entire plethora of defenses at this stage -- if he so desires -- in his
effort to negate a prima facie finding? Such a procedure could convert the determination of a prima facie case into a
full-blown trial of the entire proceedings and possibly make trial of the main case superfluous. This scenario is also
anathema to the summary nature of extraditions.
That the case under consideration is an extradition and not a criminal action is not sufficient to justify the
adoption of a set of procedures more protective of the accused. If a different procedure were called for at all, a more
restrictive one -- not the opposite -- would be justified in view of respondents demonstrated predisposition to flee.
Since this is a matter of first impression, we deem it wise to restate the proper procedure:

Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge must study them and make,
as soon as possible, a prima facie finding whether (a) they are sufficient in form and substance, (b) they show
compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law, and (c) the person sought is extraditable. At his discretion, the judge
may
require the submission of further documentation or may personally examine the affiants and witnesses of the
petitioner. If, in spite of this study and examination, no prima facie finding 58 is possible, the petition may be dismissed
at the discretion of the judge.
On the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie case is determined, then the magistrate must immediately
issue a warrant for the arrest of the extraditee, who is at the same time summoned to answer the petition and to
appear at scheduled summary hearings. Prior to the issuance of the warrant, the judge must not inform or notify the
potential extraditee of the pendency of the petition, lest the latter be given the opportunity to escape and frustrate the
proceedings. In our opinion, the foregoing procedure will "best serve the ends of justice" in extradition cases.
Second Substantive Issue:

Is Respondent Entitled to Bail?

Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, is worded as follows:
Art. III, Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required."
Respondent Mark B. Jimenez maintains that this constitutional provision secures the right to bail of all persons,
including those sought to be extradited. Supposedly, the only exceptions are the ones charged with offenses
punishable with reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong. He also alleges the relevance to the present
case of Section 4 59 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court which, insofar as practicable and consistent with the summary
nature of extradition proceedings, shall also apply according to Section 9 of PD 1069.
On the other hand, petitioner claims that there is no provision in the Philippine Constitution granting the right to
bail to a person who is the subject of an extradition request and arrest warrant.
Extradition Different from Ordinary Criminal Proceedings
We agree with petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the constitutional provision on bail
quoted above, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested
and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition
courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused
who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be
proved beyond reasonable doubt." 60 It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like
extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.
The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus is suspended" does not detract from the rule that the constitutional right to bail is available
only in criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds
application "only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with
invasion." 61 Hence, the second sentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in
criminal proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to mean that the right is available even in
extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature.

That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the United States is not an
argument to grant him one in the present case. To stress, extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from the
trial for the offenses for which he is charged. He should apply for bail before the courts trying the criminal cases
against him, not before the extradition court.
No Violation of Due Process
Respondent Jimenez cites the foreign case Paretti 62 in arguing that, constitutionally, "[n]o one shall be deprived
of x x x liberty x x x without due process of law."
Contrary to his contention, his detention prior to the conclusion of the extradition proceedings does not amount
to a violation of his right to due process. We iterate the familiar doctrine that the essence of due process is the
opportunity to be heard 63 but, at the same time, point out that the doctrine does not always call for a prior opportunity
to be heard. 64 Where the circumstances -- such as those present in an extradition case -- call for it, a subsequent
opportunity to be heard is enough. 65 In the present case, respondent will be given full opportunity to be heard
subsequently, when the extradition court hears the Petition for Extradition. Hence, there is no violation of his right to
due process and fundamental fairness.
Contrary to the contention of Jimenez, we find no arbitrariness, either, in the immediate deprivation of his liberty
prior to his being heard. That his arrest and detention will not be arbitrary is sufficiently ensured by (1) the DOJs filing
in court the Petition with its supporting documents after a determination that the extradition request meets the
requirements of the law and the relevant treaty; (2) the extradition judges independent prima facie determination that
his arrest will best serve the ends of justice before the issuance of a warrant for his arrest; and (3) his opportunity,
once he is under the courts custody, to apply for bail as an exception to the no-initial-bail rule.
It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the extradition of respondent, proceedings had
already been conducted in that country. But because he left the jurisdiction of the requesting state before those
proceedings could be completed, it was hindered from continuing with the due processes prescribed under its laws.
His invocation of due process now has thus become hollow. He already had that opportunity in the requesting state;
yet, instead of taking it, he ran away.
In this light, would it be proper and just for the government to increase the risk of violating its treaty obligations
in order to accord Respondent Jimenez his personal liberty in the span of time that it takes to resolve the Petition for
Extradition? His supposed immediate deprivation of liberty without the due process that he had previously shunned
pales against the governments interest in fulfilling its Extradition Treaty obligations and in cooperating with the world
community in the suppression of crime. Indeed, "[c]onstitutional liberties do not exist in a vacuum; the due process
rights accorded to individuals must be carefully balanced against exigent and palpable government interests." 66
Too, we cannot allow our country to be a haven for fugitives, cowards and weaklings who, instead of facing the
consequences of their actions, choose to run and hide. Hence, it would not be good policy to increase the risk of
violating our treaty obligations if, through overprotection or excessively liberal treatment, persons sought to be
extradited are able to evade arrest or escape from our custody. In the absence of any provision -- in the Constitution,
the law or the treaty -- expressly guaranteeing the right to bail in extradition proceedings, adopting the practice of not
granting them bail, as a general rule, would be a step towards deterring fugitives from coming to the Philippines to
hide from or evade their prosecutors.1wphi1.nt
The denial of bail as a matter of course in extradition cases falls into place with and gives life to Article 14 67of
the Treaty, since this practice would encourage the accused to voluntarily surrender to the requesting state to cut
short their detention here. Likewise, their detention pending the resolution of extradition proceedings would fall into
place with the emphasis of the Extradition Law on the summary nature of extradition cases and the need for their
speedy disposition.
Exceptions to the No Bail Rule
The rule, we repeat, is that bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. However, the judiciary has the
constitutional duty to curb grave abuse of discretion 68 and tyranny, as well as the power to promulgate rules to protect
and enforce constitutional rights. 69 Furthermore, we believe that the right to due process is broad enough to include
the grant of basic fairness to extraditees. Indeed, the right to due process extends to the "life, liberty or property" of
every person. It is "dynamic and resilient, adaptable to every situation calling for its application." 70

Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice, we believe and so hold that, after a potential extraditee has
been arrested or placed under the custody of the law, bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon
a clear and convincing showing (1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the
community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances 71 including, as a matter of
reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in extradition
cases therein.
Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and since it is derived essentially from general
principles of justice and fairness, the applicant bears the burden of proving the above two-tiered requirement with
clarity, precision and emphatic forcefulness. The Court realizes that extradition is basically an executive, not a
judicial, responsibility arising from the presidential power to conduct foreign relations. In its barest concept, it partakes
of the nature of police assistance amongst states, which is not normally a judicial prerogative. Hence, any intrusion by
the courts into the exercise of this power should be characterized by caution, so that the vital international and
bilateral interests of our country will not be unreasonably impeded or compromised. In short, while this Court is ever
protective of "the sporting idea of fair play," it also recognizes the limits of its own prerogatives and the need to fulfill
international obligations.
Along this line, Jimenez contends that there are special circumstances that are compelling enough for the
Court to grant his request for provisional release on bail. We have carefully examined these circumstances and shall
now discuss them.
1. Alleged Disenfranchisement
While his extradition was pending, Respondent Jimenez was elected as a member of the House of
Representatives. On that basis, he claims that his detention will disenfranchise his Manila district of 600,000
residents. We are not persuaded. In People v. Jalosjos, 72 the Court has already debunked the disenfranchisement
argument when it ruled thus:
When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did so with full
awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge that he could achieve
only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of prison. To give a more drastic
illustration, if voters elect a person with full knowledge that he is suffering from a terminal illness, they do so
knowing that at any time, he may no longer serve his full term in office.
In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question of constitutional equal protection.
The Constitution guarantees: x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws. This
simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and
responsibilities imposed. The organs of government may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to any
person. Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be displayed.
Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows different treatment? Is
being a Congressman a substantial differentiation which removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner from
the same class as all persons validly confined under law?
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse
to free a person validly [from] prison. The duties imposed by the mandate of the people are multifarious.
The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The
accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24
members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the
physical absence of one or a few of its members. Depending on the exigency of Government that has to be
addressed, the President or the Supreme Court can also be deemed the highest for that particular duty. The
importance of a function depends on the need for its exercise. The duty of a mother to nurse her infant is
most compelling under the law of nature. A doctor with unique skills has the duty to save the lives of those
with a particular affliction. An elective governor has to serve provincial constituents. A police officer must
maintain peace and order. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different
classification from those others who are validly restrained by law.

A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest[,] wittingly or otherwise, insidious discriminations are
made in favor of or against groups or types of individuals.
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare may justify
exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their
interests are disregarded.
We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in
criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him
from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest
and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same
class." 73
It must be noted that even before private respondent ran for and won a congressional seat in Manila, it was
already of public knowledge that the United States was requesting his extradition. Hence, his constituents were or
should have been prepared for the consequences of the extradition case against their representative, including his
detention pending the final resolution of the case. Premises considered and in line with Jalosjos, we are constrained
to rule against his claim that his election to public office is by itself a compelling reason to grant him bail.
2. Anticipated Delay
Respondent Jimenez further contends that because the extradition proceedings are lengthy, it would be unfair
to confine him during the pendency of the case. Again we are not convinced. We must emphasize that extradition
cases are summary in nature. They are resorted to merely to determine whether the extradition petition and its
annexes conform to the Extradition Treaty, not to determine guilt or innocence. Neither is it, as a rule, intended to
address issues relevant to the constitutional rights available to the accused in a criminal action.
We are not overruling the possibility that petitioner may, in bad faith, unduly delay the proceedings. This is quite
another matter that is not at issue here. Thus, any further discussion of this point would be merely anticipatory and
academic.
However, if the delay is due to maneuverings of respondent, with all the more reason would the grant of bail not
be justified. Giving premium to delay by considering it as a special circumstance for the grant of bail would be
tantamount to giving him the power to grant bail to himself. It would also encourage him to stretch out and
unreasonably delay the extradition proceedings even more. This we cannot allow.
3. Not a Flight Risk?
Jimenez further claims that he is not a flight risk. To support this claim, he stresses that he learned of the
extradition request in June 1999; yet, he has not fled the country. True, he has not actually fled during the preliminary
stages of the request for his extradition. Yet, this fact cannot be taken to mean that he will not flee as the process
moves forward to its conclusion, as he hears the footsteps of the requesting government inching closer and closer.
That he has not yet fled from the Philippines cannot be taken to mean that he will stand his ground and still be within
reach of our government if and when it matters; that is, upon the resolution of the Petition for Extradition.
In any event, it is settled that bail may be applied for and granted by the trial court at anytime after the applicant
has been taken into custody and prior to judgment, even after bail has been previously denied. In the present case,
the extradition court may continue hearing evidence on the application for bail, which may be granted in accordance
with the guidelines in this Decision.
Brief Refutation of Dissents
The proposal to remand this case to the extradition court, we believe, is totally unnecessary; in fact, it is a copout. The parties -- in particular, Respondent Jimenez -- have been given more than sufficient opportunity both by the
trial court and this Court to discuss fully and exhaustively private respondents claim to bail. As already stated, the
RTC set for hearing not only petitioners application for an arrest warrant, but also private respondents prayer for
temporary liberty. Thereafter required by the RTC were memoranda on the arrest, then position papers on the
application for bail, both of which were separately filed by the parties.

This Court has meticulously pored over the Petition, the Comment, the Reply, the lengthy Memoranda and the
Position Papers of both parties. Additionally, it has patiently heard them in Oral Arguments, a procedure not normally
observed in the great majority of cases in this Tribunal. Moreover, after the Memos had been submitted, the parties -particularly the potential extraditee -- have bombarded this Court with additional pleadings -- entitled "Manifestations"
by both parties and "Counter-Manifestation" by private respondent -- in which the main topic was Mr. Jimenezs plea
for bail.
A remand would mean that this long, tedious process would be repeated in its entirety. The trial court would
again hear factual and evidentiary matters. Be it noted, however, that, in all his voluminous pleadings and verbal
propositions, private respondent has not asked for a remand. Evidently, even he realizes that there is absolutely no
need to rehear factual matters. Indeed, the inadequacy lies not in the factual presentation of Mr. Jimenez. Rather, it
lies in his legal arguments. Remanding the case will not solve this utter lack of persuasion and strength in his legal
reasoning.
In short, this Court -- as shown by this Decision and the spirited Concurring, Separate and Dissenting Opinions
written by the learned justices themselves -- has exhaustively deliberated and carefully passed upon all relevant
questions in this case. Thus, a remand will not serve any useful purpose; it will only further delay these already very
delayed proceedings, 74 which our Extradition Law requires to be summary in character. What we need now is prudent
and deliberate speed, not unnecessary and convoluted delay. What is needed is a firm decision on the merits, not a
circuitous cop-out.
Then, there is also the suggestion that this Court is allegedly "disregarding basic freedoms when a case is one
of extradition." We believe that this charge is not only baseless, but also unfair. Suffice it to say that, in its length and
breath, this Decision has taken special cognizance of the rights to due process and fundamental fairness of potential
extraditees.
Summation
As we draw to a close, it is now time to summarize and stress these ten points:
1. The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings is to determine whether the request expressed in
the petition, supported by its annexes and the evidence that may be adduced during the hearing of the
petition, complies with the Extradition Treaty and Law; and whether the person sought is extraditable. The
proceedings are intended merely to assist the requesting state in bringing the accused -- or the fugitive who
has illegally escaped -- back to its territory, so that the criminal process may proceed therein.
2. By entering into an extradition treaty, the Philippines is deemed to have reposed its trust in the
reliability or soundness of the legal and judicial system of its treaty partner, as well as in the ability and the
willingness of the latter to grant basic rights to the accused in the pending criminal case therein.
3. By nature then, extradition proceedings are not equivalent to a criminal case in which guilt or
innocence is determined. Consequently, an extradition case is not one in which the constitutional rights of
the accused are necessarily available. It is more akin, if at all, to a courts request to police authorities for the
arrest of the accused who is at large or has escaped detention or jumped bail. Having once escaped the
jurisdiction of the requesting state, the reasonable prima facie presumption is that the person would escape
again if given the opportunity.
4. Immediately upon receipt of the petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge
shall make a prima facie finding whether the petition is sufficient in form and substance, whether it complies
with the Extradition Treaty and Law, and whether the person sought is extraditable. The magistrate has
discretion to require the petitioner to submit further documentation, or to personally examine the affiants or
witnesses. If convinced that a prima facie case exists, the judge immediately issues a warrant for the arrest
of the potential extraditee and summons him or her to answer and to appear at scheduled hearings on the
petition.
5. After being taken into custody, potential extraditees may apply for bail. Since the applicants have a
history of absconding, they have the burden of showing that (a) there is no flight risk and no danger to the
community; and (b) there exist special, humanitarian or compelling circumstances. The grounds used by the
highest court in the requesting state for the grant of bail therein may be considered, under the principle of

reciprocity as a special circumstance. In extradition cases, bail is not a matter of right; it is subject to judicial
discretion in the context of the peculiar facts of each case.
6. Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due process and to fundamental fairness. Due
process does not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. A subsequent opportunity is sufficient due to
the flight risk involved. Indeed, available during the hearings on the petition and the answer is the full chance
to be heard and to enjoy fundamental fairness that is compatible with the summary nature of extradition.
7. This Court will always remain a protector of human rights, a bastion of liberty, a bulwark of
democracy and the conscience of society. But it is also well aware of the limitations of its authority and of the
need for respect for the prerogatives of the other co-equal and co-independent organs of government.
8. We realize that extradition is essentially an executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising out of the
presidential power to conduct foreign relations and to implement treaties. Thus, the Executive Department of
government has broad discretion in its duty and power of implementation.
9. On the other hand, courts merely perform oversight functions and exercise review authority to
prevent or excise grave abuse and tyranny. They should not allow contortions, delays and "over-due
process" every little step of the way, lest these summary extradition proceedings become not only inutile but
also sources of international embarrassment due to our inability to comply in good faith with a treaty
partners simple request to return a fugitive. Worse, our country should not be converted into a dubious
haven where fugitives and escapees can unreasonably delay, mummify, mock, frustrate, checkmate and
defeat the quest for bilateral justice and international cooperation.
10. At bottom, extradition proceedings should be conducted with all deliberate speed to determine
compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law; and, while safeguarding basic individual rights, to avoid the
legalistic contortions, delays and technicalities that may negate that purpose.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed RTC Order dated May 23, 2001 is hereby declared
NULL and VOID, while the challenged Order dated July 3, 2001 is SET ASIDE insofar as it granted bail to
Respondent Mark Jimenez. The bail bond posted by private respondent is CANCELLED. The Regional Trial Court of
Manila is directed to conduct the extradition proceedings before it, with all deliberate speed pursuant to the spirit and
the letter of our Extradition Treaty with the United States as well as our Extradition Law. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 153675

April 19, 2007

GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, represented by the Philippine

Department of Justice, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO MUOZ, Respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, seeking to nullify the two Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8, Manila (presided by
respondent Judge Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr.) issued in Civil Case No. 99-95773. These are: (1) the Order dated
December 20, 2001 allowing Juan Antonio Muoz, private respondent, to post bail; and (2) the Order dated April 10,
2002 denying the motion to vacate the said Order of December 20, 2001 filed by the Government of Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice (DOJ), petitioner. The petition
alleges that both Orders were issued by respondent judge with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction as there is no provision in the Constitution granting bail to a potential extraditee.
The facts are:
On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of Hong Kong signed an
"Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons." It took effect on June 20, 1997.
On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong reverted back to the Peoples Republic of China and became the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region.
Private respondent Muoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of the offense of
"accepting an advantage as agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201
of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law
of Hong Kong. On August 23, 1997 and October 25, 1999, warrants of arrest were issued against him. If convicted,
he faces a jail term of seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge.
On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for the provisional
arrest of private respondent. The DOJ then forwarded the request to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which,
in turn, filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 19 an application for the provisional arrest of private respondent.
On September 23, 1999, the RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an Order of Arrest against private respondent. That
same day, the NBI agents arrested and detained him.

On October 14, 1999, private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition
andmandamus with application for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ of habeas corpus questioning the
validity of the Order of Arrest.
On November 9, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision declaring the Order of Arrest void.
On November 12, 1999, the DOJ filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 140520,
praying that the Decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed.
On December 18, 2000, this Court rendered a Decision granting the petition of the DOJ and sustaining the validity of
the Order of Arrest against private respondent. The Decision became final and executory on April 10, 2001.
Meanwhile, as early as November 22, 1999, petitioner Hong Kong Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC of
Manila a petition for the extradition of private respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-95733, raffled off to Branch
10, presided by Judge Ricardo Bernardo, Jr. For his part, private respondent filed, in the same case,- a petition for
bail which was opposed by petitioner.
After hearing, or on October 8, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition for bail, holding that
there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a high "flight risk."
On October 22, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing Civil Case No. 99-95733. It was then
raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge.
On October 30, 2001, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his application for
bail. This was granted by respondent judge in an Order dated December 20, 2001 allowing private respondent to post
bail, thus:
In conclusion, this Court will not contribute to accuseds further erosion of civil liberties. The petition for bail is granted
subject to the following conditions:
1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby undertakes that he will appear
and answer the issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times hold himself amenable to orders and
processes of this Court, will further appear for judgment. If accused fails in this undertaking, the cash bond
will be forfeited in favor of the government;
2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;
3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own motion for hold
departure order before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and
4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or if they so desire to the
nearest office, at any time and day of the week; and if they further desire, manifest before this Court to
require that all the assets of accused, real and personal, be filed with this Court soonest, with the condition
that if the accused flees from his undertaking, said assets be forfeited in favor of the government and that
the corresponding lien/annotation be noted therein accordingly.
SO ORDERED.
On December 21, 2001, petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was denied by respondent
judge in his Order dated April 10, 2002.

Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the Constitution or
statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal
proceedings.
In his comment on the petition, private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights
extends to a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged deprivation of
ones liberty.
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that the right to bail shall not be impaired, thus:
Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided
by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.
Excessive bail shall not be required.
Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in this jurisdiction. Nonetheless, this is not the first time that this
Court has an occasion to resolve the question of whether a prospective extraditee may be granted bail.
In Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch
42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo,1 this Court, speaking through then Associate Justice Artemio
V. Panganiban, later Chief Justice, held that the constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition
proceedings. It is "available only in criminal proceedings," thus:
x x x. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as
Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of
Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings because extradition courts do not render
judgments of conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who
should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be
proved beyond reasonable doubt" (De la Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1, 6, September 17, 1971, per Fernando, J.,
later CJ). It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the
presumption of innocence is not at issue.
The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is suspended" does not detract from the rule that the constitutional right to bail is available only in
criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpusfinds
application "only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion"
(Sec. 18, Art. VIII, Constitution). Hence, the second sentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely
emphasizes the right to bail in criminal proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to mean that
the right is available even in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature.
At first glance, the above ruling applies squarely to private respondents case. However, this Court cannot ignore the
following trends in international law: (1) the growing importance of the individual person in public international law
who, in the 20th century, has gradually attained global recognition; (2) the higher value now being given to human
rights in the international sphere; (3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in
fulfilling their treaty obligations; and (4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our
fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other.
The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth of the individual person and
the sanctity of human rights. Slowly, the recognition that the individual person may properly be a subject of

international law is now taking root. The vulnerable doctrine that the subjects of international law are limited only to
states was dramatically eroded towards the second half of the past century. For one, the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials
after World War II resulted in the unprecedented spectacle of individual defendants for acts characterized as
violations of the laws of war, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity. Recently, under the Nuremberg
principle, Serbian leaders have been persecuted for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the former
Yugoslavia. These significant events show that the individual person is now a valid subject of international law.
On a more positive note, also after World War II, both international organizations and states gave recognition and
importance to human rights. Thus, on December 10, 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in which the right to life, liberty and all the other fundamental rights of every
person were proclaimed. While not a treaty, the principles contained in the said Declaration are now recognized
as customarily binding upon the members of the international community. Thus, in Mejoff v. Director of
Prisons,2 this Court, in granting bail to a prospective deportee, held that under the Constitution, 3 the principles
set forth in that Declaration are part of the law of the land. In 1966, the UN General Assembly also adopted the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which the Philippines signed and ratified. Fundamental among the
rights enshrined therein are the rights of every person to life, liberty, and due process.
The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, committed to uphold the fundamental human
rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of
our Constitution which provides: "The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for
human rights." The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person
to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court,
to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other words,
the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under detention such remedies
which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail. While this
Court in Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings, however, in light of the various
international treaties giving recognition and protection to human rights, particularly the right to life and liberty, a
reexamination of this Courts ruling in Purganan is in order.
First, we note that the exercise of the States power to deprive an individual of his liberty is not necessarily
limited to criminal proceedings. Respondents in administrative proceedings, such as deportation and
quarantine,4 have likewise been detained.
Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our eyes to our jurisprudential history.
Philippine jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings only. This
Court has admitted to bail persons who are not involved in criminal proceedings. In fact, bail has been
allowed in this jurisdiction to persons in detention during the pendency of administrative proceedings, taking
into cognizance the obligation of the Philippines under international conventions to uphold human rights.
The 1909 case of US v. Go-Sioco5 is illustrative. In this case, a Chinese facing deportation for failure to secure the
necessary certificate of registration was granted bail pending his appeal. After noting that the prospective deportee
had committed no crime, the Court opined that "To refuse him bail is to treat him as a person who has committed the
most serious crime known to law;" and that while deportation is not a criminal proceeding, some of the machinery
used "is the machinery of criminal law." Thus, the provisions relating to bail was applied to deportation proceedings.
In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons6 and Chirskoff v. Commission of Immigration,7 this Court ruled that foreign nationals
against whom no formal criminal charges have been filed may be released on bail pending the finality of an order of
deportation. As previously stated, the Court in Mejoff relied upon the Universal declaration of Human Rights in
sustaining the detainees right to bail.
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition
cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no

reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings where the
innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue.
Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the
various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights.
Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the
right to liberty of every individual is not impaired.
Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) defines "extradition" as "the
removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to
enable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against
him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or
government."
Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power, created by treaty, to demand the surrender of
one accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the correlative duty of the other state to
surrender him to the demanding state.8 It is not a criminal proceeding.9 Even if the potential extraditee is a criminal,
an extradition proceeding is not by its nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime, even though such
punishment may follow extradition.10 It is sui generis, tracing its existence wholly to treaty obligations between
different nations.11 It is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee. 12 Nor is it a fullblown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in character.13 Its object is to prevent the escape of a person
accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or
punishment.14
But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the following: (a) it entails a deprivation of
liberty on the part of the potential extraditee and (b) the means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is
also "the machinery of criminal law." This is shown by Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law)
which mandates the "immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused" if such "will best serve the
interest of justice." We further note that Section 20 allows the requesting state "in case of urgency" to ask for the
"provisional arrest of the accused, pending receipt of the request for extradition;" and that release from
provisional arrest "shall not prejudice re-arrest and extradition of the accused if a request for extradition is received
subsequently."
Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal process. A
potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to
the demanding state following the proceedings. "Temporary detention" may be a necessary step in the process of
extradition, but the length of time of the detention should be reasonable.
Records show that private respondent was arrested on September 23, 1999, and remained incarcerated until
December 20, 2001, when the trial court ordered his admission to bail. In other words, he had been detained for
over two (2) years without having been convicted of any crime. By any standard, such an extended period of
detention is a serious deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged deprivation of liberty
which prompted the extradition court to grant him bail.
While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no provision
prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution.
The applicable standard of due process, however, should not be the same as that in criminal proceedings. In the
latter, the standard of due process is premised on the presumption of innocence of the accused.
As Purganancorrectly points out, it is from this major premise that the ancillary presumption in favor of admitting to
bail arises. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the arrest
warrant and the "temporary detention" is the possibility of flight of the potential extraditee. This is based on the

assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive from justice.15 Given the foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears
the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted bail.
The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its obligations under the
Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Failure to comply with these
obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats the purpose of extradition. However, it does not
necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditees
rights to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but
also by international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee
of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.
An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying bail can neither be
the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil
cases. While administrative in character, the standard of substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot
likewise apply given the object of extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our
jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno,
proposed that a new standard which he termed "clear and convincing evidence" should be used in granting bail
in extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher
than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is
not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.
In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not a flight risk.
Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether private respondent may be
granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence."
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to the trial court to determine whether private
respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence." If not, the trial court should order the
cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate detention; and thereafter, conduct the extradition proceedings with
dispatch.
SO ORDERED.