Lexoterica - SC Rulings On Political Law

ATTY.
RESCI ANGELLI RIZADA

Lexoterica: Compilation of SC Rulings
SC RULINGS ON POLITICAL LAW
January 2014 Philippine Supreme

Court Rulings on Political Law
Posted on February 14, 2014 by Philbert E. Varona Posted in Constitutional Law,
Philippines - Cases, Philippines - Law
Here are select January 2014 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines
on political law:
Absence of motion of reconsideration; effect of. The omission of the filing
of a motion for reconsideration poses no obstacle for the Courts review of
its ruling on the whole case since a serious constitutional question has been
raised and is one of the underlying bases for the validity or invalidity of the
presidential action. If the President does not have any constitutional
authority to discipline a Deputy Ombudsman and/or a Special Prosecutor in
the first place, then any ruling on the legal correctness of the OPs decision
on the merits will be an empty one. In other words, since the validity of the
OPs decision on the merits of the dismissal is inextricably anchored on the
final and correct ruling on the constitutional issue, the whole case
including the constitutional issue remains alive for the Courts
consideration on motion for reconsideration. Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office
of the President, etc., et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa,
Jr., et al., G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232, January 28, 2014.
Congress; power to determine modes of removal from office of public
officers; must be consistent with the core constitutional principle of
independence of the Office of the Ombudsman. The intent of the framers of
the Constitution in providing that all other public officers and employees
may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment
in the second sentence of Section 2, Article XI is to prevent Congress from
extending the more stringent rule of removal only by impeachment to
favoured public officers. Contrary to the implied view of the minority, in no
way can this provision be regarded as blanket authority for Congress to
provide for any ground of removal it deems fit. While the manner and cause
of removal are left to congressional determination, this must still be
consistent with constitutional guarantees and principles, namely: the right to
ATTY. RESCI ANGELLI RIZADA

procedural and substantive due process; the constitutional guarantee of

security of tenure; the principle of separation of powers; and the principle of
checks and balances. The authority granted by the Constitution to Congress
to provide for the manner and cause of removal of all other public officers
and employees does not mean that Congress can ignore the basic principles
and precepts established by the
Constitution. Emilio A. Gonzales III v.
Office of the President, etc., et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito N.
Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232, January 28, 2014.
Constitutional bodies; concept of independence. The independence enjoyed

by the Office of the Ombudsman and by the Constitutional Commissions
shares certain characteristics they do not owe their existence to any act of
Congress, but are created by the Constitution itself; additionally, they all
enjoy fiscal autonomy. In general terms, the framers of the Constitution
intended that these independent bodies be insulated from political pressure
to the extent that the absence of independence would result in the
impairment of their core functions. The deliberative considerations
abundantly show that the independent constitutional commissions have been
consistently intended by the framers to be independent from executive
control or supervision or any form of political influence. At least insofar as
these bodies are concerned, jurisprudence is not scarce on how the
independence granted to these bodies prevents presidential interference.
Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of the President, etc., et al./Wendell
Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 196231/G.R.
No. 196232, January 28, 2014.
Gross negligence; concept of; not present when Deputy Ombudsman
reviews a case for nine days. Gross negligence refers to negligence
characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting to act
in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but wilfully and
intentionally, with a conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other
persons may be affected. In case of public officials, there is gross negligence
when a breach of duty is flagrant and palpable. The Deputy Ombudsman
cannot be guilty of gross neglect of duty and/or inefficiency since he acted
on the case forwarded to him within nine days. The OPs ruling that
Gonzales had been grossly negligent for taking nine days, instead of five
days as required for Hearing Officers, is totally baseless.Emilio A. Gonzales

III v. Office of the President, etc., et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty.

Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232, January
28, 2014.
Impeachment; concept of. Impeachment is the most difficult and
cumbersome mode of removing a public officer from office. It is, by nature,
a sui generis politico-legal process that signals the need for a judicious and
careful handling as shown by the process required to initiate the proceeding;
the one-year limitation or bar for its initiation; the limited grounds for
impeachment; the defined instrumentality given the power to try
impeachment cases; and the number of votes required for a finding of guilt.
Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of the President, etc., et al./Wendell
No. 196232, January 28, 2014.
Judicial power; issuance of protection orders is in pursuance of the Courts
authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights that
are enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of
wrongs for violations of such rights. The provision in R.A. 9262 allowing
the issuance of protection orders is not an invalid delegation of legislative
power to the court and to barangay officials to issue protection orders.
Section 2 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that the
Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the
jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of
its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof. Hence, the
primary judge of the necessity, adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness and
expediency of any law is primarily the function of the legislature. The act of
Congress entrusting us with the issuance of protection orders is in pursuance
of our authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights
that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or the
redress of wrongs for violations of such rights. Ralph P. Tua v. Hon. Cesar
A. Mangrobang, Presiding Judge, Branch 22, RTC, Imus, Cavite; and
Rossan Honrado-Tua, G.R. No. 170701. January 22, 2014.
Just compensation; determination of just compensation is fundamentally a
judicial function. In the exercise of the Courts essentially judicial function
of determining just compensation, the RTC-SACs are not granted unlimited
discretion and must consider and apply the enumerated factors in R.A. No.
6657 and the DAR formula (in AO 5-98) that reflect these factors. These

factors and formula provide the uniform framework or structure for the
computation of the just compensation for a property subject to agrarian
reform. When acting within the parameters set by the law itself, the RTCSACs, however, are not strictly bound to apply the DAR formula to its
minute detail, particularly when faced with situations that do not warrant the
formulas strict application; they may, in the exercise of their discretion,
relax the formulas application to fit the factual situations before them. They
must, however, clearly explain the reason for any deviation from the factors
and formula that the law and the rules have provided.Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Yatco Agricultural Enterprises, G.R. No. 172551, January 15,
2014.
Just compensation; fair market value of the expropriated property is
determined as of the time of taking. The time of taking refers to that time
when the State deprived the landowner of the use and benefit of his property,
as when the State acquires title to the property or as of the filing of the
complaint, per Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Yatco Agricultural Enterprises, G.R. No. 172551, January 15,
2014.
Justiciable question; definition of. A justiciable question is one which is
inherently susceptible of being decided on grounds recognized by law, as
where the court finds that there are constitutionally-imposed limits on the
exercise of the powers conferred on a political branch of the government.
Our inquiry is limited to whether such statutory grant of disciplinary
authority to the President violates the Constitution, particularly the core
constitutional principle of the independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman. Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of the President, etc., et
al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No.
196231/G.R. No. 196232, January 28, 2014.
Ombudsman; investigative and disciplinary powers; scope. The
Ombudsmans broad investigative and disciplinary powers include all acts of
malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance of all public officials, including
Members of the Cabinet and key Executive officers, during their tenure. To
support these broad powers, the Constitution saw it fit to insulate the Office
of the Ombudsman from the pressures and influences of officialdom and
partisan politics and from fear of external reprisal by making it an
independent office. Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of the President, etc.,

et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No.

196231/G.R. No. 196232, January 28, 2014.
Ombudsman; powers and functions. Under Section 12, Article XI of the
1987 Constitution, the Office of the Ombudsman is envisioned to be the
protector of the people against the inept, abusive, and corrupt in the
Government, to function essentially as a complaints and action bureau. This
constitutional vision of a Philippine Ombudsman practically intends to make
the Ombudsman an authority to directly check and guard against the ills,
abuses, and excesses of the bureaucracy. As the Ombudsman is expected to
be an activist watchman, the Court has upheld its actions, although not
squarely falling under the broad powers granted it by the Constitution and by
R.A. No. 6770, if these actions are reasonably in line with its official
function and consistent with the law and the Constitution. Emilio A.
Gonzales III v. Office of the President, etc., et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v.
Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232,
January 28, 2014.
Private lands acquired for agrarian reform; primary jurisdiction. The Land
Bank of the Philippines is primarily charged with determining land valuation
and compensation for all private lands acquired for agrarian reform
purposes. But this determination is only preliminary. The landowner may
still take the matter of just compensation to the court for final adjudication.
Thus, we clarify and reiterate: the original and exclusive jurisdiction over all
petitions for the determination of just compensation under R.A. No. 6657
rests with the RTC-SAC. But, in its determination, the RTC-SAC must take
into consideration the factors laid down by law and the pertinent DAR
regulations. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Yatco Agricultural Enterprises,
G.R. No. 172551, January 15, 2014.
Public officer; discourtesy in the performance of official duties. As a public
officer and trustee for the public, it is the ever existing responsibility of
respondent sheriff to demonstrate courtesy and civility in his official
actuations with the public. Based on the transcript of the altercation, it is
readily apparent that respondent has indeed been remiss in the duty of
observing courtesy in serving the public. He should have exercised restraint
in dealing with the complainant, instead of allowing the quarrel to escalate
into a hostile encounter. The balm of a clean conscience should have been
sufficient to relieve any hurt or harm respondent felt from complainants

criticisms in the performance of his duties. On the contrary, respondents

demeanor tarnished the image not only of his office but that of the judiciary
as a whole, exposing him to disciplinary measure. Atty. Virgillo P. Alconera
v. Alfredo T. Pallanan, A.M. No. P-12-3069, January 20, 2014.
Public officer; making untruthful statements. The charge of making
untruthful statements must fail. While the statements mentioned in
respondents complaint-affidavit were not reflected in the transcript
submitted by the complainant, this actuality is not conclusive evidence that
such event did not take place. As claimed by respondent, complainants
clerk was only able to record a part of the argument. We cannot then
discount the probability that there is more to the argument than what was
caught on video and there remains the possibility that what respondent
narrated and what complainant recorded both actually transpired. Atty.
Virgillo P. Alconera v. Alfredo T. Pallanan, A.M. No. P-12-3069, January
20, 2014.
Section 8(2) of RA 6770; constitutional; the Office of the Special
Prosecutor is not constitutionally within the Office of the Ombudsman; not
entitled to the independence the Office of the Ombudsman enjoys under the
Constitution. The Court resolved to maintain the validity of Section 8(2) of
R.A. No. 6770 insofar as the Special Prosecutor is concerned. The Court
does not consider the Office of the Special Prosecutor to be constitutionally
within the Office of the Ombudsman and is, hence, not entitled to the
independence the latter enjoys under the Constitution. Emilio A. Gonzales III
v. Office of the President, etc., et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito
N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232, January 28, 2014.
Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770; unconstitutional; vesting of disciplinary
authority in the President over the Deputy Ombudsman; violation of the
independence of the Ombudsman. In more concrete terms, we rule that
subjecting the Deputy Ombudsman to discipline and removal by the
President, whose own alter egos and officials in the Executive department
are subject to the Ombudsmans disciplinary authority, cannot but seriously
place at risk the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman itself.
Section 8(2) of R.A. No. 6770 intruded upon the constitutionally-granted
independence of the Office of the Ombudsman. By so doing, the law directly
collided not only with the independence that the Constitution guarantees to
the Office of the Ombudsman, but inevitably with the principle of checks

and balances that the creation of an Ombudsman office seeks to revitalize.

What is true for the Ombudsman must equally and necessarily be true for her
Deputies who act as agents of the Ombudsman in the performance of their
duties. The Ombudsman can hardly be expected to place her complete trust
in her subordinate officials who are not as independent as she is, if only
because they are subject to pressures and controls external to her Office.
This need for complete trust is true in an ideal setting and truer still in a
young democracy like the Philippines where graft and corruption is still a
major problem for the government. For these reasons, Section 8(2) of R.A.
No. 6770, providing that the President may remove a Deputy Ombudsman,
should be declared void. Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of the President,
etc., et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R.
No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232, January 28, 2014.
Special Prosecutor; structural relationship with the Ombudsman; the Special
Prosecutor is by no means an ordinary subordinate but one who effectively
and directly aids the Ombudsman in the exercise of his/her duties, which
include investigation and prosecution of officials in the Executive
Department. Congress recognized the importance of the Special Prosecutor
as a necessary adjunct of the Ombudsman, aside from his or her deputies, by
making the Office of the Special Prosecutor and organic component of the
Office of the Ombudsman and by granting the Ombudsman control and
supervision over that office. This power of control and supervision includes
vesting the Office of the Ombudsman with the power to assign duties to the
Special Prosecutor as he or she may deem fit. Even if the Office of the
Special Prosecutor is not expressly made part of the composition of the
Office of the Ombudsman, the role it performs as an organic component of
that Office militates against a differential treatment between the
Ombudsmans Deputies, on one hand, and the Special Prosecutor himself,
on the other. What is true for the Ombudsman must be equally true, not only
for her Deputies but, also for other lesser officials of that Office who act
directly as agents of the Ombudsman herself in the performance of her
duties. Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of the President, etc., et al./Wendell
No. 196232, January 28, 2014.
Dissension in the Court: July 2013

Posted on August 16, 2013 by Rafael L. Encarnacion Posted in Constitutional Law
In a decision penned by Justice Peralta and promulgated last July 1, 2013,

the Third Division of the Supreme Court ruled that just compensation for
property taken by the government in 1940 should be Php0.70/sqm, its fair
market value (FMV) at the time of taking, and not Php10,000/sqm, its FMV
at the time of filing of the claim for just compensation by the landowners in
1995, nor Php1,500/sqm, its reasonable value as determined by the
Provincial Appraisal Committee (PAC) appointed by the lower court in 1999
to determine just compensation.
Private respondents owned land in Bulacan that was taken by the DPWH in
1940 and used for the construction of the MacArthur Highway, without the
owners consent and without the necessary expropriation proceedings. In
1994, respondents demanded payment of the FMV of the land but petitioner
DPWH District Engineer Contreras offered to pay Php0.70/sqm per
resolution of the PAC of Bulacan. Unsatisfied with the offer, respondents
demanded the return of their property or the payment of compensation at
current FMV. As their demand remained unheeded, respondents filed a
Complaint on March 1995 for recovery of possession with damages against
petitioners DPWH Secretary and DPWH District Engineer.
Acting on petitioners motion, the RTC dismissed the complaint based on

the doctrine of state immunity from suit. On appeal, however, the CA
finding instead that the doctrine of state immunity is not applicable because
the recovery of compensation is the only relief available to the landowner
and to deny such relief would cause injustice to the landowner reversed the
RTC and remanded the case to the RTC for the purpose of determining just
compensation. The RTC then referred the case to the PAC which
recommended Php1,500/sqm as the just and reasonable compensation even
as it noted that its current FMV was Php10,000/sqm. The RTC adopted this
recommendation and rendered a decision directing the petitioners to pay
respondents that amount.
On appeal, the CA affirmed that decision with the modification that the
Php1,500/sqm amount should earn interest of 6% per annum computed from
the filing of the action on March 1995 until full payment. Aggrieved,
petitioners filed this petition for review on certiorari assailing the CA

decision.
The majority of the Third Division justices found the petition partly
meritorious and, citing several precedents with common factual
circumstances as this case, ruled that just compensation is the value of the
property at the time of taking (which is Php0.70/sqm), and not its value at
the time of payment. The reason for this rule, as explained in Republic v.
Lara, et. al. and in a number of recent cases, is that (i) the value of the
property may be enhanced by the public purpose for which it is taken or
there may have been a natural increase in the value due to general economic
conditions from the time it is taken to the time the complaint is filed, and (ii)
the owner must be compensated only for what he actually loses since
compensation must be just not only to the property owner, but also to the
public which ultimately bears the cost of expropriation. However, noting
that petitioners clearly disregarded respondents proprietary rights in taking
their property without the benefit of expropriation proceedings, the SC
ordered the petitioners to pay interest at 6% per annum from the date of
taking in 1940 instead of March 1995, until full payment.
In his dissenting opinion, J. Velasco submits that, while this Court has
consistently ruled that the reckoning point for the determination of just
compensation is the time of taking, an exception must be made in cases
where no condemnation proceedings were instituted after a substantial
period from the time of illegal taking, since to apply the general rule in those
cases would result in inequity and prejudice.
He notes that government violated respondents constitutional right to
procedural due process when it deprived them of their property without their
consent and the requisite expropriation proceedings, and unless the
mandatory requirement of due process is followed, the exercise of
government powers can become repressive. DPWHs action in this case,
done without observing procedural due process, is illegal and invalid. As
such, the condemnation of the subject property ought to be reversed. But
since that would no longer be possible as it has already been put to public
use, the only remedy available to respondents is the recovery of just
compensation which, in this case, should not be Php0.70/sqm as that measly
amount would be highly unjust and inequitable to respondents who had
already been deprived of their right to due process for 55 years. This
dissenter believes that both the RTC and CA were correct in granting

respondents just compensation of Php1,500/sqm as recommended by the

PAC which is just and proper considering that it falls between
Php0.70/sqm and Php10,000/sqm, the valuation at the time of filing of the
claim for just compensation, which is already enhanced by the public
purpose and the natural appreciation in value of the property so
government would think twice next time before taking any unwarranted
short cuts in condemning private property.
In his separate opinion, J. Leonen proposes using the economic concept of
present value for determining just compensation, as a happy middle ground
that meets the need for doctrinal precision urged by J. Peralta and the thirst
for substantial justice in J. Velascos dissenting opinion. Under this concept,
money received today is more valuable than the same amount of money
received tomorrow; that is, your Php0.70 in 1940 can buy more in 1940 than
your Php0.70 in 1995. And so taking into consideration the potential of
money to increase (or decrease) in value across time, a proper rate of return
is applied to determine, say, how much Php0.70 in 1940 if put in the bank
in 1940 and allowed to earn interest on a compounded basis until 1995
would be worth in 1995. The value in 1995 of that Php0.70 1940 money
would then be paid out in 1995.
Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways and District
Engineer Celesinto R. Contreras vs Spouses Heracleo and Ramona Tecson
(G.R. No. 179334); dissenting and concurring opinion: Velasco, Jr., J.;
separate opinion: Leonen, J.
Dissension in the Court: June 2013

Posted on July 17, 2013 by Rafael L. Encarnacion Posted in Constitutional Law,
By a vote of seven justices, with three inhibiting, one absent, and four
dissenting, the Supreme Court in a decision penned by J. Perez and
promulgated last June 25, 2013 dismissed this petition for certiorari
assailing the earlier Resolutions of public respondent COMELEC which
ordered the cancellation of petitioners Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for
the position of Representative of the lone district of Marinduque.
This case stemmed from a petition to deny due course or to cancel petitioner

Reyess CoC filed on October 2012 by private respondent Tan with the
COMELEC alleging that Reyes misrepresented in her CoC that (a) she is
single and a resident of Marinduque, when she is married to Rep. Mandanas
of Bauan, Batangas and a resident of that town (and also of Quezon City as
admitted in the Directory of Congressional Spouses of the House of
Representatives), and (b) she is a Filipino citizen and not a permanent
resident of another country, when she is an American citizen and a
permanent resident of the United States.
In her answer, Reyes averred that (a) she is not legally married to Rep.
Mandanas, thus his residence cannot be attributed to her, and (b) the
evidence presented by Tan does not support the allegation that she is a
permanent resident or citizen of the United States.
On February 8, 2013, Tan filed a Manifestation with Motion to Admit

Newly Discovered Evidence consisting of, among others, (a) a copy of a
January 2013 internet article of a Mr. Eli Obligacion which provided a
database record from the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID)
indicating that Reyes is an American citizen and a holder of a US passport,
and (b) a photocopy of a Certification of Travel Records from the BID
which showed that Reyes used her US passport in her various travels abroad.
On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution
granting Tans petition and cancelling Reyess CoC. It found that Reyes is
not a Filipino citizen because she failed to qualify for repatriation under RA
9225 by taking the required Oath of Allegiance and executing an Affidavit
of Renunciation of her American citizenship. In addition, it ruled that Reyes
did not comply with the one-year residency requirement under the 1987
Constitution.
On April 8, 2013, Reyes filed her motion for reconsideration claiming that
she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and that she has not lost such status by
simply obtaining and using a US passport. Additionally, she averred that
while she was married to an American citizen in 1997, this only resulted in
her acquiring dual citizenship and not in her becoming a naturalized
American citizen, thus, there is no need for her to fulfill the twin

requirements under RA 9225. She also attached to her motion an Affidavit

of Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship dated September 21, 2012 and a
Voter Certification in Boac, Marinduque dated April 17, 2012.
On May 14, 2013, the COMELEC en banc promulgated its Resolution
denying Reyess motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. Chairman
Brillantes, however, dissented from the majority and held that Tan failed to
offer substantial evidence to prove that Reyes lost her Filipino citizenship,
noting that the internet article by Mr. Obligacion is hearsay, while the
purported copy of the BID certification is merely a photocopy and not even a
certified true copy of the original, thus similarly inadmissible as
evidence. Chairman Brillantes also opined that (a) a petition to deny due
course tackles exclusively the issue of deliberate misrepresentation over a
qualification, and not the lack of qualification per se which is the proper
subject of a quo warranto proceeding, and (b) the issues pertaining to
Reyess residence and citizenship require exhaustive presentation and
examination of evidence that are best addressed in a full blown quo
warranto proceeding rather than the summary proceedings in the present
case.
On May 18, 2013, Reyes was proclaimed winner of the May 13, 2013
elections by the Marinduque Provincial Board of Canvassers.
On June 5, 2013, the COMELEC en banc issued a Certificate of Finality
declaring its May 14, 2013 Resolution final and executory, pursuant to the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure which provide that said resolutions shall
become final and executory after the lapse of five days from promulgation,
unless restrained by the Supreme Court.
On June 7, 2013, Reyes took her oath of office before Speaker Belmonte of
the House of Representatives. On that same day, Reyes filed this Petition for
Certiorari assailing the COMELEC Resolutions and claiming that (a) the
COMELEC was ousted of its jurisdiction when she was duly proclaimed
winner, and (b) the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion (i)
when it took cognizance of Tans newly discovered evidence without the
same have been testified and offered and admitted in evidence and without
giving Reyes the opportunity to question and present controverting evidence,
in violation of Reyess right to due process, (ii) when it declared that Reyes

is not a Filipino citizen and did not meet the residency requirement, and (iii)
when by, enforcing RA 9225, it imposed additional qualifications to those
enumerated in the Constitution for a Member of the House of
Representatives.
Without further proceedings, the majority of the SC justices dismissed the
petition and held that:
A. The COMELEC retained jurisdiction to the exclusion of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) because (a) Reyes has not filed a
petition with the HRET, and (b) the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only
after the candidate is considered a Member of the House of Representatives
which, based on jurisprudence, happens only after a winning candidate has
been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office at noon of the thirtieth
day of June next following his election. The majority also believed that the
COMELEC en banc had already disposed of the issue of petitioners lack of
Filipino citizenship and residency last May 14, 2013 and so the Board of
Canvassers which proclaimed petitioner as winner on May 18, 2013 cannot,
by such act, be allowed to render nugatory the COMELEC en banc decision,
which per COMELEC Rules of Procedure became final and executory on
May 19, 2013. To prevent the assailed Resolution from becoming final,
petitioner should have filed a petition before the SC within the 5-day period
as provided in said Rules, but she failed to do so.
B. The COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion when it took
cognizance of the newly discovered evidence because it is not bound to
strictly adhere to the technical rules of procedure in the presentation of
evidence, and since the proceedings in a petition to deny due course or to
cancel a CoC are summary in nature. There was no denial of due process
because petitioner had five months from the filing of Tans petition to the
issuance of the COMELEC First Divisions Resolution to adduce evidence,
but she did not avail herself of the opportunity given her.
C. A doubt was clearly cast on petitioners citizenship which petitioner
failed to clear. Early on, Reyes contended that it was Tans burden to prove
that Reyes is not a Filipino citizen. Tan was able to substantiate his
allegation by evidence establishing that Reyes is a holder of an American
passport. The burden now shifted to Reyes to present evidence either that

she is a natural-born citizen and has not lost the same or that she has availed
of the privileges under RA 9225 but she failed to do that, and so the
conclusion is that she remains to be an American citizen. Notably, in her
motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc, Reyes admitted
that she is a holder of a US passport, but she averred that she is only a dual
Filipino-American citizen, thus RA 9225 does not apply to her. Still,
attached to the said motion is an Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign
Citizenship which she explained was attached if only to comply with the
rules, even as a superfluity. Given that the Affidavit was executed in
September 2012 or even before the COMELEC issued the assailed
Resolutions raising RA 9225 compliance as an issue, this must be taken as
an admission by petitioner that RA 9225 applies to her.
D. As to the issue of residency, the majority agrees with the ruling of the
COMELEC First Division that petitioner cannot be considered a resident of
Marinduque because she did not show that she had re-acquired her Filipino
citizenship pursuant to RA 9225, and so it follows that she has not
abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA. The only proof presented by
petitioner to show that she has met the one-year residency requirement is her
claim that she served as Provincial Administrator of the province from
January 18, 2011 to July 13, 2011, but no amount of her stay in the said
locality can substitute the fact that she has not abandoned her domicile of
choice in the USA.
E. The COMELEC did not impose additional qualifications on candidates
for the House of Representatives who have acquired foreign citizenship. It
merely applied the qualifications prescribed in the Constitution that the
candidate must be a natural-born citizen and must have one-year residency
prior to the date of elections. Thus, it was proper for the COMELEC to
inquire into Reyess compliance with RA 9225 to determine if she reacquired her status as a natural-born citizen.
All in all, the majority believed, considering that the petition for denial and
cancellation of the CoC is summary in nature, that the COMELEC is given
much discretion in the evaluation and admission of evidence. They also
cited an earlier case where the SC held that the rule that factual findings of
administrative bodies will not be disturbed by the courts except when there
is absolutely no evidence or no substantial evidence in support of such
findings should be applied with greater force when it concerns the

COMELEC, as the latter was created and explicitly made independent by the
Constitution itself and intended by its framers to be placed on a level higher
than statutory administrative organs. Citing another case, they noted that for
an act to be struck down as having been done with grave abuse of discretion,
the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross and, in this case, petitioner
failed to adequately and substantially show that grave abuse of discretion
exists.
In his dissenting opinion, J. Brion, joined by J. Carpio, J. Villarama, and J.
Leonen, expressed his strong reservations to the majoritys outright
dismissal of this petition after an initial review, based solely on the petition
and its annexes and its finding that there was no grave abuse of discretion on
the part of COMELEC. The dissenters believed that the majority ought to
have at least required public respondent COMELEC to comment on the
petition in light of the gravity of the issues raised, the potential effect on
jurisprudence, and the affected personal relationships within and outside
the Court, before any further action can be made. That this case at least
deserves further proceedings from the SC is supported by the following
considerations:
First, the issues raised by petitioner on the jurisdiction of the COMELEC, on
her right to due process and the COMELECs failure to properly appreciate
and evaluate the evidence against her, and on the alleged imposition by the
COMELEC of a qualification for the position of congressman other than
those mentioned in the Constitution, among others, are all substantial issues
deserving more than the hasty dismissive action the majority made. For
example, comments should have been solicited at least on how petitioners
admitted marriage affected her citizenship and on how the COMELEC
arrived at the conclusion that petitioner was a naturalized American citizen
based on submitted evidence that could only show that petitioner was the
holder of a US passport.
Second, unless the case is clearly and patently shown to be without basis, the
SC should, out of delicadeza, at least hear and consider both sides before
making a ruling that would favor the son of a member of the SC (bloggers
note: petitioners rival candidate was the son of J. Velasco).
Third, the majoritys holding that the jurisdiction of the HRET only begins

after the candidate has assumed office on June 30 is contrary to prevailing

jurisprudence and the HRET Rules (which both hold the proclamation of the
winner as the reckoning point and trigger that brings election contests within
the HRETs exclusive jurisdiction) and is, in fact, a major retrogressive
jurisprudential development that can emasculate the HRET. In this
particular case, any election protest or petition for quo warranto filed after
June 30 or more than fifteen (15) days from Reyess proclamation on May
18, 2013 shall be dismissed outright by the HRET for having been filed out
of time under the HRET Rules. In making this kind of ruling, the SC should
have at least undertaken a full-blown proceeding.
All told, the dissenters believe that the COMELEC does not have an airtight
case based on substantial evidence on the citizenship and residency issues,
and much less a similar case on the jurisdictional issue, to justify a very
prompt outright dismissal action from the SC. They also believe that
petitioner Reyes is not lacking in arguably meritorious positions to support
her cause, even if only to the extent of being fully heard by the SC. If the
SC is really serious in administering justice in this case, the proper course of
action is to require the COMELEC to comment on the petition and to decide
matters from that point.
Regina Ongsiako Reyes vs Commission on Elections and Joseph Socorro B.
Tan (G.R. No. 207264); dissenting opinion: Brion, J., Carpio, J., Villarama,
J., Leonen, J.
SEC Guidelines on Compliance with

Filipino-Foreign
Ownership Requirements
Posted on June 3, 2013 by Imelda A. Manguiat Posted in Constitutional Law
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued Memorandum

Circular No. 8-2013 on May 20, 2013. The Circular sets out the guidelines
to determine compliance with the required percentage of Filipino-foreign
ownership in corporations engaged in nationalized and partly-nationalized
activities.

Nationalized activities refer to those areas of investments which are

completely or partly reserved to Philippine nationals pursuant to the 1987
Constitution, the Foreign Investments Act, as amended (FIA), and other
existing laws such as the Retail Trade Liberalization Act.
The Circular was issued pursuant to the Supreme Courts directive in the
case of Gamboa v. Teves, where the Court interpreted the term capital in
Article XII, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution to refer only to shares of
stock entitled to vote in the election of directors. Under the Circular, for
purposes of determining compliance with the nationality restrictions, the
required percentage of Filipino ownership shall be applied to both (a) the
total number of outstanding shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of
directors, and (b) the total number of outstanding shares of stock, whether or
not entitled to vote in the election of directors. On the other hand,
corporations covered by special laws providing for specific citizenship
requirements shall continue to be guided by the provisions of those special
laws. The corporate secretaries of covered corporations are directed to
monitor compliance with the provisions of the Circular.
The SEC provided for a one-year grace period to enable all corporations to
comply with its new Circular, failing which, the corporation shall be
subjected to administrative sanctions under the FIA, as amended.
SEC Memorandum Circular No. 8-2013 took effect immediately after its
publication last May 22.
(Imee Manguiat and Grace Lazaro co-authored this post.)
Dissension in the Court: April 2013

Posted on May 6, 2013 by Rafael L. Encarnacion Posted in Commercial Law,
Constitutional Law, Philippines - Cases
The 1987 Constitution allows only one (1) member of a bicameral Congress
to sit in the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC). This, according to the Supreme
Court in a majority decision penned by J. Mendoza and promulgated last
April 16, 2013, was the intention of the framers of the Constitution who
conceived of the JBC as an independent body representative of all the

stakeholders in the judicial appointment process to recommend nominees to

the President in order to rid such process of partisan political activities, and
carefully worded Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution in this
wise:
Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the
supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex
officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the
Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a
professor of law, retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative
of the private sector.
The majority cannot accede to the argument of respondents that allowing

only one representative from Congress in the JBC would lead to absurdity
considering its bicameral nature, and that the failure of the framers to make
the proper textual adjustment where there was a shift from unilateralism to
bicameralism was a plain oversight. According to the majority, every
language in the Constitution must be taken to have been deliberately chosen
and that in opting to use the singular letter a to describe representative of
Congress, the Filipino people through the framers intended that Congress
be entitled to only one (1) seat in the JBC. There could not have been any
plain oversight in the wordings of the provision since the other provisions of
the 1987 Constitution were amended accordingly with the shift to a
bicameral legislative body (e.g., Sections 4, 8 and 18 of Article VII where
corresponding adjustments were made as to how a matter would be handled
and voted upon by the two Houses of Congress), and this Court has no
power to add another member by judicial construction.
According to the majority, it is clear that the framers were not keen on
adjusting the provision on congressional representation in the JBC because
(i) it was not in the exercise of its primary function to legislate, considering
that the JBC was created to support the executive power to appoint and
Congress, as one whole body, was merely assigned a contributory nonlegislative function, and (ii) there was no need to recognize the dichotomy of
each House and to consider the interplay between the two Houses in their
participation in the JBC because there is no interaction required between

these two Houses in the screening and nomination of judicial officers. Thus,
in providing for the membership of the JBC, the framers simply gave
recognition to the Legislature, not because it was in the interest of a certain
constituency, but in reverence to it as a major branch of government. And
the argument that a senator cannot represent a member of the House of
Representatives in the JBC and vice versa is misplaced because any member
of Congress is constitutionally empowered to represent the entire Congress.
The majority went on to cite various authorities who, having perused the
records of the Constitutional Commission, are of the view that to allow
Congress to have two representatives with one vote each is to negate the
principle of equality among the three branches of government, the
interpretation of two votes for Congress would give Congress more
influence in the appointment of judges and would also increase the number
of JBC members to eight, which could lead to a voting deadlock and is a
clear violation of the seven enumerated members in the Constitution, and
no parallelism can be drawn between the representative of Congress in the
JBC and the exercise by Congress of its legislative and constituent powers
under the Constitution while the latter justifies the separateness of the two
Houses as they relate inter se, no such dichotomy need be made when
Congress interacts with the other two co-equal branches of government.
In his dissenting opinion, J. Abad, joined by J. del Castillo, voted to grant
respondents motion for reconsideration on the basis that the framers of the
1987 Constitution did not intend to limit representation of a bicameral
Congress to only one member since the two Houses are still separate and
distinct from each other and that neither House can by itself claim to
represent the Congress. While Section 8(1), Article VIII provides for just a
representative of the Congress, it also provides that such representation is
ex officio or by virtue of ones office and there are actually two persons
in Congress the Chairperson of the Senate Justice Committee and the
Chairperson of the House of Representatives Justice Committee who hold
separate offices with the attached function of sitting in the JBC. Adhering to
the majoritys literal translation of Section 8(1) would mean no
representative from Congress will qualify as ex officio member of the JBC
and would deny Congress the representation the framers intended it to
have. According to this dissenter, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, a member of the
Constitutional Commission, himself admitted that the committee charged
with making adjustments in the previously passed provisions covering the

JBC, failed to consider the impact of a changed character of the Legislature

on the inclusion of a representative of the Congress in the membership of
the JBC.
In his separate dissenting opinion, J. Leonen agrees with J. Abad that
limiting our interpretation only from the preposition a undermines the
concept of a bicameral congress implied in all other 114 places in the
Constitution that uses the word Congress. On the other hand, there is no
compelling reason why we should blind ourselves to the meaning of
representative of Congress and ex officio and to limit representation of a
bicameral Congress to only one.
First, the provision did not provide for a number of members to the JBC,
unlike the provisions creating many other bodies in the Constitution, and
there does not have to be an odd number of members in the JBC since the
decision made there is not a dichotomous one, i.e., a yes or a no, where a tiebreaker will be necessary, but rather one where the shortlisted nominees are
decided by a plurality of votes. Second, Congress discharges its function to
check and balance the power of both the Judiciary and the Executive in the
JBC; thus, its representative has to consult with Congress as a whole. Since
neither a Senator or a Member of the House of Representatives may
represent Congress as a whole, and since Congress does not exist separate
from the Senate and the House of Representatives, each chamber must be
represented in the JBC and must be able to instruct their respective
representatives who do not sit there just to represent themselves again,
they are representatives of Congress ex officio. Third, the belief that one
co-equal branch should be represented by only one representative, while true
for the Executive who has a political alter ego in the Secretary of Justice and
may be represented by that single individual, cannot apply to Congress
which may not be represented by only one individual since it operates
through the Senate and the House of Representatives. Lastly, it is apparent
from the chronology of events relating to the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission that the discussions perused by the authorities
cited in the main ponencia took place when the commissioners were still
contemplating a unicameral legislature and therefore any mention of the
composition of the JBC having seven members during the dates cited was
within the context that the Commission had not yet voted and agreed upon a
bicameral legislature. It is apparent that the Constitutional Commission was
not able to amend the provisions concerning the JBC after it had decided to

propose a bicameral Congress.

This dissenter believes that discerning that there should be a Senator and a
Member of the House of Representatives sitting in the JBC so that Congress
can be fully represented ex officio is not judicial activism, but is rather in
keeping with the constitutional project of a bicameral Congress that is
effective wherever it is represented and in tune with how our people
understand Congress as described in the Constitution beyond a single
isolated text. Thus, nothing less than having two representatives from
Congress with one full vote each would carry out this understanding since
previous mechanisms used to carry out the consequence of the majoritys
opinion such as allowing two representatives but with half a vote each or
alternating the seat between a Senator and a Member of the House of
Representatives are constitutionally abominable since in the former, either
chamber of Congress is deemed only worth fifty percent of the wisdom of
each other JBC member, while in the latter, alternating the seat would mean
not giving a seat to the Congress at all since neither the Senator nor Member
of the House of Representatives can represent Congress as a whole.
Francisco I. Chavez vs Judicial and Bar Council, Sen. Francis Joseph G.
Escudero and Rep. Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (G.R. No. 202242); dissenting
opinion: Abad, J., Leonen, J.
Changing Rules
List System
on
the
Party
Posted on May 1, 2013 by Vicente D. Gerochi IV Posted in Constitutional Law,

Much like a swinging pendulum, the decision of the Supreme Court on

which parties compose the party list system swings from one side to the
other. Previously, the Supreme Court limited the party list system to
representatives of marginalized and underprivileged sectors. In Atong
Paglaum v. COMELEC (G.R. Nos. 203766, et al., April 2, 2013), the latest
in the series of party list cases, the pendulum now points to the opposite
side.

The New Ruling

Atong Paglaum involved 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for
Certiorari and Prohibition filed by 52 party-list groups against COMELEC
for disqualifying them from participating in the May 13, 2013 party-list
elections. One of the main reasons for the disqualification was their failure
to represent the marginalized and underrepresented.
Two issues were presented:
(1)
Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
disqualifying the petitioners from participating in the May 2013 elections;
and
(2)
Whether the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid
down in Ang Bagong Bayani v. COMELEC (ABB) and BANAT v.
COMELEC (BANAT) should be applied by the COMELEC in the coming
May 2013 elections.
The Supreme Court ruled that COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion because it merely followed the rulings laid down in ABB and
BANAT. However, the Court decided to abandon these rulings and adopted
new parameters for the upcoming elections; thus, it remanded the case to
COMELEC so the latter can determine the status of the petitioners based on
the following new guidelines:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1)
national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and
(3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do
not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any
marginalized and underrepresented sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they
register under the party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative

district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields

candidates in legislative district elections can participate in partylist
elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the
party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral
party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be marginalized and
underrepresented or lacking in well-defined political constituencies. It is
enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and
concerns of their sector. The sectors that are marginalized and
underrepresented include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The
sectors that lack well-defined political constituencies include
professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that
represent the marginalized and underrepresented must belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented sector they represent. Similarly, a
majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack welldefined political constituencies must belong to the sector they represent.
The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
marginalized and underrepresented, or that represent those who lack
well-defined political constituencies, either must belong to their respective
sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors.
The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be
bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be
disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they
have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
It is clear from the foregoing that a new rule has been set: not all parties in
the party-list system have to represent a sector that is marginalized and
underrepresented.
According to the Supreme Court, the framers of the Constitution never
intended the party-list system to be reserved for sectoral parties. The latter
were only part of the party-list system not the entirety of it. There were two

more groups composing the system national and regional parties. This is
evident from the phrasing of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, which
states that:
The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be
elected from legislative districtsand those who, as provided by law, shall
be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations. (emphasis supplied)
National and regional parties are different from sectoral parties such that the
former need not organize along sectoral lines and represent a particular
sector. Hence, it is not necessary for these parties to be representative of the
marginalized and underrepresented. In fact, Republic Act No. 7941, the
enabling law of the party-list elections under the Constitution, does not
require these parties to fall under this criterion. The Supreme Court
emphasized that the phrase marginalized and underrepresented appeared
only once in R.A. No. 7941, particularly in the Declaration of Policy. The
section provides:
The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system
of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties,
and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could
contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that
will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a
full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in
the legislature, and shall provided the simplest scheme possible.
The oft-quoted phrase neither appeared in the specific implementing
provisions of R.A. No. 7941 nor did it require sectors, organizations, or
parties to fall under the criterion as well. In this regard, how then should the
broad policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941 be harmonized with

its specific implementing provisions, bearing in mind the applicable

provisions of the 1987 Constitution on the matter?
The Supreme Court answered in this wise:
The phrase marginalized and underrepresented should refer only to
the sectors in Section 5 that are, by their nature, economically
marginalized and underrepresented. These sectors are: labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped,
veterans, overseas workers, and other similar sectors. For these sectors, a
majority of the members of the sectoral party must belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented. The nominees of the sectoral
party either must belong to the sector, or must have a track record of
advocacy for the sector represented
The recognition that national and regional parties, as well as sectoral parties
of professionals, the elderly, women and the youth, need not be
marginalized and underrepresented will allow small ideology-based and
cause-oriented parties who lack well-defined political constituencies a
chance to win seats in the House of Representatives. On the other hand,
limiting to the marginalized and underrepresented the sectoral parties for
labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by their
nature are economically at the margins of society, will give the
marginalized and underrepresented an opportunity to likewise win seats in
the House of Representatives.
This interpretation will harmonize the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941
and will give rise to a multi-party system where those marginalized and
underrepresented, both in economic and ideological status, will have the
opportunity to send their own members to the House of Representatives.
This interpretation will also make the party-list system honest and
transparent, eliminating the need for relatively well-off party-list
representatives to masquerade as wallowing in poverty, destitution and
infirmity, even as they attend sessions in Congress riding in SUVs.
Based on the Courts ratiocination, only sectoral parties for labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped,

veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature are
economically at the margins of society must comply with the criterion of
representing the marginalized and underrepresented. For national, regional,
and sectoral parties of professionals, the elderly, women and the youth, it is
sufficient that they consist of citizens who advocate the same ideology or
platform, or the same governance principles and policies, regardless of their
economic status as citizens.
Consequently, since political parties are essentially national and regional
parties, the Supreme Court categorically stated that they may participate in
the party-list elections. The rules for their participation are found under
guideline number three.
Evolution of Party-List Cases
ABB and BANAT were the prevailing jurisprudence prior to Atong
Paglaum.
In ABB, the Supreme Court recognized that even major political parties may
join the party list elections. However, the Supreme Court went on saying
that although they may participate, it does not mean that any political party
or group for that matter may do so. It is essential for these parties to be
consistent with the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the
Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.
According to the Supreme Court, the purpose of the party-list system is
clear: to give genuine power to the people, not only by giving more law to
those who have less in life, but more so by enabling them to become
veritable lawmakers themselves. Essentially, the goal is to give voice to the
voiceless to enable Filipino citizens belonging to the marginalized and
underrepresented to become members of Congress.
Hence, only parties representing the marginalized and underrepresented may
join the party-list elections. The Supreme Court stressed that the party-list
system cannot be exclusive to marginalized and underrepresented because if
the rich and overrepresented can participate, it would desecrate the spirit of
the party-list system.

In BANAT where the Supreme Court again had the opportunity to deal with
the matter, it categorically declared, by a vote of 8-7, that major political
parties are barred from participating either directly or indirectly from the
party-list elections.
Clearly, the doctrine in Atong Paglaum is in stark contrast with the former
interpretation of the party-list system. The Supreme Courts reasoning in
both decisions also sits at opposite sides of the scale. In ABB and BANAT,
the Supreme Court concentrated on the spirit and purpose of the party-list
system while in Atong Paglaum, it focused on the letter of the law and the
intent of the Constitutions framers and Congress.
No wonder this decision has sparked intense debate and passionate reaction
from the stakeholders. These party-list cases constitute three decisions with
two exceptionally different doctrines. Which then is correct? Should the
spirit of the law prevail over the letter? Should the party-list system be really
open to all? Should the court engage in socio-political engineering as it did
in the first two cases or should it remain as neutral magistrates of the law,
blindfolded like lady justice, interpreting the letter of the law strictly
according to its words?
The decision in Atong Paglaum is not yet final and executory. The case is
still, if not already, subject to a motion for reconsideration. It is still possible
for the pendulum to swing back to its former side or it may remain
suspended where it is now.
Dissension in the Court: March 2013

Posted on April 3, 2013 by Rafael L. Encarnacion Posted in Constitutional Law,
In a majority decision penned by J. Perlas-Bernabe and promulgated last

March 19, 2013, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) which declared the validity of
private respondent Lucy Torres-Gomezs substitution of Richard Gomez as
the Liberal Partys replacement candidate for the position of Leyte
Representative.

The records clearly show that (i) Richard filed his certificate of candidacy
(CoC) misrepresenting in his CoC that he resided in Ormoc City (in light of
the Constitutional requirement that members of the House of
Representatives be residents of their respective districts at least one year
immediately preceding the day of the election) when he in fact resided in
Greenhills, Mandaluyong City, (ii) an opposing candidate, Juntilla, filed a
petition asking the COMELEC to disqualify Richard and to deny due course
to or cancel his CoC for material misrepresentation regarding his residence,
(iii) the COMELEC First Division granted Juntillas petition without any
qualification although its resolution only spoke of disqualifying Richard
without denying due course to or canceling his CoC, (iv) only Richard
moved for reconsideration of the above resolution; Juntilla did not, (v) the
COMELEC En Banc issued a resolution denying Richards motion for
reconsideration and after the latter filed a Manifestation accepting the
decision to enable a substitute to take his place, the COMELEC En Banc
issued an Order declaring its resolution final and executory, (vi) Lucy
promptly filed her CoC together with the Liberal Party endorsement as the
partys official substitute candidate vice Richard, (vii) over Juntillas
opposing claim that there should be no substitution because there is no
candidate to substitute for, the COMELEC En Banc issued a resolution
allowing the substitution on the basis that the COMELEC First Division
resolution only spoke of disqualifying Richard without denying due course
to or canceling his CoC, (viii) Juntilla filed a motion for reconsideration of
this En Banc order but, pending resolution of his motion, local elections
were conducted and Lucy was proclaimed winner, (ix) 12 days after Lucys
proclamation, one of her losing opponents, petitioner Tagolina, filed a
petition for quo warranto before the HRET to oust Lucy from her
congressional seat claiming, among others, that she did not validly substitute
Richard since the latters CoC was void ab initio, (x) the HRET dismissed
the quo warranto petition and held that the substitution was valid noting that
the COMELEC First Division resolution only spoke of disqualifying
Richard without denying due course to or canceling his CoC.
In reversing the HRET ruling, the Supreme Court distinguished between a

disqualification case under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC),
and a petition to deny due course to and/or cancel a CoC under Section
78. A disqualification case is hinged on either (i) a candidates possession

of a permanent resident status in a foreign country or (ii) his commission of

an election offense under the OEC, and results in the candidate still
technically considered to have been a candidate but is ordered to discontinue
such candidacy (or is disallowed from holding public office if he has already
been elected) as a sanction for committing the election offense.
On the other hand, a denial of due course to and/or cancellation of a CoC
proceeding is premised on a persons misrepresentation of any of the
material qualifications required for the elective office aspired for. Citing
Miranda v Abaya (370 Phil 642), the majority noted that the deliberateness
of the misrepresentation or ones intent to defraud is of little consequence in
the determination of whether ones CoC should be deemed cancelled or not,
as it is enough that the persons declaration of a material qualification in the
CoC be false. Pertinently, while a disqualified candidate under Section 68 is
still considered to have been a candidate for all intents and purposes, a
person whose CoC had been denied due course to and/or cancelled under
Section 78 is deemed not to have been a candidate at all, as his cancelled
CoC is considered void ab initio. And considering that Section 77 of the
OEC requires that there be a candidate in order for substitution to take place,
as well as the precept that a person without a valid CoC is not considered as
a candidate at all, it necessarily follows that a person whose CoC has been
denied due course to and/or cancelled cannot be validly substituted. It is
equally revelatory that Section 77 enumerates the instances where
substitution is permissible and noticeably, while death, withdrawal or
disqualification for any cause of an official candidate of a registered political
party are included as valid basis for substitution, material misrepresentation
cases are not included.
In this case, it is undisputed that Richard was disqualified to run due to his
failure to comply with the residency requirement. The confusion, however,
stemmed from the use of the word disqualified in the Resolution of the
COMELEC First Division, which was adopted by the COMELEC En Banc
in granting the substitution of Lucy, and even further perpetuated by the
HRET in denying the quo warranto petition. Yet, the fact that the
COMELEC First Divisions Resolution did not explicitly decree denial of
due course to and/or cancellation of Richards CoC should not have
prevented the COMELEC En Banc from declaring the invalidity of Lucys
substitution since the clear basis for Richards disqualification is his failure
to comply with the residency requirement under the Constitution which is a

ground for the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of a CoC under
Section 78 of the OEC, not for disqualification. There is therefore no legal
basis to support a finding of disqualification under the OEC, and it cannot be
mistaken that the COMELEC First Divisions unqualified grant of Juntillas
petition necessarily carried with it the denial of due course to and/or
cancellation of Richards CoC pursuant to Section 78, notwithstanding the
use of the term disqualified in its Resolution. Hence, the COMELEC En
Banc misconstrued the COMELEC First Divisions Resolution when it
noted that Richard was only disqualified and that his CoC was not denied
due course to and/or cancelled, paving the way for the approval of Lucys
substitution. And the HRET, in perpetuating the COMELEC En Bancs error
although not bound by previous COMELEC pronouncements being the
sole judge of all contests relating the election, returns and qualifications of
the members of the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of
discretion.
In his dissenting opinion, J. Leonardo-de Castro voted to deny the quo
warranto petition of Tagolino on the ground that it was filed beyond the
prescribed period of 10 days after the proclamation of the winner under Rule
17 of the HRET Rules, having been filed 12 days after the proclamation of
Lucy Torres-Gomez. Hence, the petition should have been dismissed
outright pursuant to Rule 21 of the said Rules.
Furthermore, the petition for quo warranto lacked factual basis since, under
Rule 17 of the HRET Rules, the grounds for such petition are ineligibility to
run for a public office or disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. The
ponencia did not find any of the qualifications of a member of the House of
Representatives absent in the case of Lucy; rather it attributed her
ineligibility to its erroneous assumption that the CoC of Richard, whom she
substituted, should have been cancelled.
Moreover, this dissenter believes that the substantive issue extensively
discussed in the ponencia, particularly as to the divergent effects of
disqualification and denial of due course to and/or cancellation of CoC cases
vis--vis candidate substitution, is inappropriate, firstly because the CoC of
Richard Gomez was not cancelled by the COMELEC, and secondly because
the decision by the COMELEC not to cancel said CoC was proper as the
COMELEC did not reach any finding that Richard deliberately committed a
misrepresentation, which deliberate misrepresentation is a requisite for the

cancellation of a CoC under Section 78 of the OEC, citing Mitra v.

Commission on Elections (622 SCRA 744), contrary to the majority view
that deliberateness of the misrepresentation is of little consequence in the
determination of whether the CoC should be cancelled. Since the
COMELEC did not cancel the CoC of Richard but only disqualified him
from running in the elections, the substitution by Lucy of Richard squarely
falls within Section 77 of the OEC, which uses the broad language
disqualification for any cause.
In his separate dissenting opinion, J. Abad, joined by J. Mendoza and J. Del
Castillo, posits that the real issue in this case is whether or not the HRET can
review and reverse a COMELEC decision involving a member of the House
of Representatives that had become final and executory. This dissenter
believes that neither the HRET nor this Court can review or set aside final
and executory resolutions of the COMELEC that it rendered pursuant to its
powers under the Constitution, even if such resolutions are erroneous.
It is clear from the facts that the COMELEC First Divisions Resolution,
which merely disqualified Richard but did not cancel or deny due course to
his CoC, although it may be in error, became final and executory for the
following reasons: first, Juntilla never filed a motion for reconsideration of
that Resolution; second, only Richard moved to reconsider and when the
COMELEC En Banc resolved to dismiss his motion, Richard filed a
manifestation accepting its dismissal, whereupon the COMELEC En Banc
declared its resolution final and executory and consequently closed down the
last window of opportunity to review and possible reverse the COMELEC
First Divisions Resolution; third, over Juntillas claim that the COMELEC
First Division Resolution resulted in the COMELEC denying due course to
Richards CoC with the effect that, without a valid CoC, he could not be
substituted, the COMELEC En Banc issued a resolution allowing the
substitution on the basis that the COMELEC First Division resolution
merely ordered Richards disqualification and such resolution had become
final and executory; fourth, while Juntilla filed a motion for reconsideration
of this En Banc order, the motion remained unacted upon due to the
supervening local elections and thereafter he never insisted that it be
resolved and never elevated the matter before the Supreme Court or the
HRET and may thus be deemed to have abandoned that motion for
reconsideration.

This dissenter notes that the Supreme Court may have earlier ruled in
Guerrero v. Commission on Elections (391 Phil 344) that, since the
Constitution makes the HRET the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of
Representatives, it has the jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of
substitution involving such members. However, this dissenter believes
that Taganito cannot invoke that ruling for three reasons:
First, the Courts thesis in that case is that the HRET can take over a pending
matter before the COMELEC since the latter may be considered ousted of its
jurisdiction over the same upon the winners assumption of office. Here,
however, the key issue of whether or not the COMELEC First Divisions
Resolution, which merely disqualified Richard but did not cancel his CoC, is
no longer a pending matter but has become final and executory.
Second, the petitioner Guerrero in that case had the right to raise the issue of
disqualification before the HRET since he intervened in the earlier action
before the COMELEC. Here, Tagolino never intervened in Juntillas actions
before the COMELEC; consequently, he has no right to ask the HRET to
resolve Juntillas motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC En Bancs
order.
Third, Tagolino made a binding admission before the HRET that the
COMELEC did not in fact order the cancellation of Richards CoC and is
thus barred from claiming that, in disqualifying Richard, the COMELECs
First Division in effect caused the cancellation of his CoC.
Silverio R. Tagolino vs House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and
Lucy Marie Torres-Gomez (G.R. No. 202202); dissenting opinions:
Leonardo-de Castro, J., Abad, J.
Making GOCCs relevant

Posted on September 14, 2012 by Ricardo Ma. P.G. Ongkiko Posted in Constitutional
Law, Philippines - Law
After more than a year of absence, we are back with a blog on new laws

passed by Congress. With the impeachment proceedings of the old Chief

Justice over and done with, it is time for Congress to focus on making new
laws. But, before we write on new laws passed by Congress, it may be
worthwhile looking back at one important legislation last year Republic
Act No. 10149 or the GOCC Governance Act of 2011 enacted by
Congress on June 6, 2011
In recent years, there have been various reports about high-ranking officers
of government owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs) being charged
with graft for misappropriation of government resources, dispensation of
bloated salaries, unauthorized purchase of assets, and abuse of power.
In a move to try to address these ills, the GOCC Governance Act of 2011
was passed to provide greater transparency, periodic disclosure and
evaluation of operations and finances, creation of appropriate remuneration
schemes, and clear separation between the regulatory and proprietary
activities of GOCCs.
The Act actually also applies to Government Instrumentalities with
Corporate
Powers/Government
Corporate
Entities,
which
are
instrumentalities or agencies of the government that are neither corporations
nor agencies integrated within the departmental framework but are vested by
law with special functions or jurisdiction, and government financial
institutions and their subsidiaries. The Act however does not cover the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, state universities and colleges, cooperatives,
local water districts, economic zone authorities and research institutions
(Sec. 4).
A. Creation of the GCG

The Act creates the Governance Commission for GOCCs (GCG) within the
Office of the President. The GCG, which is composed of five membersa
Chairman with the rank of Cabinet Secretary, two members with the rank of
Undersecretary (to be appointed by the President), and the Secretaries of the
Department of Budget and Management and the Department of Finance (as
ex officio members) (Sec. 6), is tasked with the following duties:

1. GOCC Evaluation creating performance evaluation systems, conducting

periodic examination, and identifying GOCCs for reorganization, merger,
abolition or privatization (in consultation with the department or agency to
which the GOCC is attached), and preparing a semi-annual progress report
for submission to the President and Congress (Sec. 5 (a));
2. GOCC Streamlining implementing the reorganization, merger, abolition
or privatization of the GOCCs (Sec. 5 (a));
3. GOCC Classification classifying GOCCs into the following categories:
(a) Developmental/Social Corporations; (b) Proprietary Commercial
Corporations; (c) Government Financial, Investment and Trust Institutions;
(d) Corporations with Regulatory Functions; and (e) Others (Sec. 5 (b));
4. GOCC Manual creating an ownership and operations manual and
government corporate standards governing GOCCs, which shall be no less
rigorous than those required by the Philippine Stock Exchange, the
Securities and Exchange Commission, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, as the
case may be, and consistent with the Medium-Term Philippine Development
Plan issued by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA)
(Sec. 5(c));
5. GOCC Accountability recommending to the Board of Directors or
Trustees of the GOCCs the suspension of their member/s who participated
(by commission or omission) in the approval of an act giving rise to a
violation or non-compliance with the GOCC manual (Sec. 5(d));
6. GOCC Nomination identifying necessary skills and qualifications
required for Appointive Directors and recommending to the President a
shortlist of suitable and qualified candidates for Appointive Directors
(Sec.5(e));
7. GOCC Compensation conducting studies, developing and
recommending to the President a competitive compensation and
remuneration system (i.e. the Compensation and Position Classification
System), that would attract and retain talent, and at the same time allow the
GOCCs to be financially sound and sustainable (e.g. disallowance of
retirement benefits to directors and trustees of GOCCs) (Sec. 5(h) and 8);

and
8. GOCC Adviser and Coordinator providing technical advice and
assistance to the government agencies to which the GOCCs are attached in
setting performance objectives and targets, monitoring GOCCs performance
vis-a-vis established objectives and targets, and ensuring GOCCs operation
are aligned and consistent with the national development policies and
programs (Sec. 5 (i)).
B. Board of Directors, CEO and Officers of GOCC
To try to weed out inept political appointees, the GCG shall now apply its
Fit and Proper Rule in determining who are qualified to become members of
the Board, CEO and officers of GOCCs, review the qualifications and
disqualifications of individuals appointed as officers, directors or elected
CEO of the GOCC and shall disqualify those found unfit (Sec. 15).
In determining whether an individual is fit and proper to hold the position of
an officer, director or CEO of the GOCCs, due regard shall be given to ones
integrity, experience, education, training and competence (Sec. 16).
The Act also prescribes that term of office of all Appointive Directors shall
be limited to one year, unless sooner removed for cause. An Appointive
Director may be nominated by the GCG for reappointment by the President
only if he/she obtains a performance score of above average or higher in the
immediately preceding year of tenure based on the performance criteria for
Appointive Directors (Sec. 17).
As fiduciaries of the State, members of the Board of Directors/Trustees and
the officers of GOCCs have been given by the Act the legal obligation and
duty to always act in the best interest of the GOCC, with utmost good faith
and exercise extraordinary diligence in all its dealings with the property and
monies of the GOCC (e.g. avoid conflicts of interest and declare an interest
they may have in any particular matter before the Board) (Sec. 19 and 21).
Moreover, except for the per diem received for the actual attendance in
board meetings and the reimbursement for actual and reasonable expenses,
all profits and/or benefits including, but not limited to, the share in the

profits, incentives of members of the Board or officers in excess of what is

authorized by the GCG, stock options, dividends and other similar offers or
grants from corporations where the GOCC is a stockholder or investor, and
any benefit from the performance of members of the Board or officers of
their duties, are to be held in trust by such member of the Board or officer
for the exclusive benefit of the GOCC (Sec. 20).
Upon the determination of the Commission on Audit that properties or
monies belonging to a GOCC are in the possession of a member of the
Board or officer without authority, or that profits are earned by the member
of the Board or officer in violation of the fiduciary duty, or the aggregate per
diems, allowances and incentives received are in excess of the limits
provided under the Act, the member of the Board or officer shall return the
same to the GOCC. Failure to make the restitution within 30 days after
written demand is punishable with an imprisonment of one year and a fine
equivalent to twice the amount to be restituted, and in the discretion of the
court, disqualification to hold public office (Sec. 24).
C. Full Disclosure
In the spirit of public accountability and right of the public to receive public
information, the Act likewise promotes complete disclosure through the
medium of GOCCs websites that are now required to show the following
information:
(a) latest annual audited financial and performance report within 30 days
from receipt of such report;
(b) audited financial statements in the immediate past five years;
(c) quarterly, annual reports and trial balance;
(d) current corporate operating budget;
(e) complete compensation package of all the board members and officers,
including travel, representation, transportation and any other form of
expenses or allowances;

(f) local and foreign borrowings;

(g) performance scorecards and strategy maps;
(h) government subsidies and net lending;
(i) all borrowings guaranteed by the government; and
(j) such other information or report the GCG may require (Sec. 25).
D. Creation and Acquisition of a GOCC
Maybe learning from the past misdeed of a former GOCC officer who is
reported to have acquired a thrift bank in excess of his authority, the Act
now also makes stringent requirements for government agencies seeking to
establish a GOCC, a subsidiary or affiliate corporation, or purchase or
acquire controlling interests in another corporation. Accordingly, they are
now required to submit their proposal to the GCG for its review and
recommendation to the President (for his/her approval). The SEC shall not
register the articles of incorporation and by-laws of a proposed GOCC or
subsidiary of affiliate, unless the application for registration is accompanied
by an endorsement from the GCG stating that the President has approved the
same (Sec. 27 and 28.).
Conclusion
The Act was well drafted and easily understandable. It seems to cover
opportunities for the abuse of GOCCs by unscrupulous government officials.
Nonetheless, the best way to implement the thrust of the Act is to constantly
remind our President to remain steadfast in not bestowing Appointive
Director positions in GOCCs as gifts to supporters or allies of his/her
government, and for us to remain vigilant by taking advantage of the
information now readily available to us that would indicate abuse or
impropriety by those tasked with running GOCCs.
August 2012 Philippine Supreme

Court Decisions on Political Law

Posted on September 5, 2012 by Philbert E. Varona Posted in Constitutional Law,
Philippines - Cases, Philippines - Law, Philippines - Regulation
Here are select August 2012 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines
on political law:
Constitutional law
Bill of rights; due process. Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not
always and in all situations require a trial-type proceeding. It is satisfied
when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity
to explain or defend himself. In administrative proceedings, the filing of
charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to
answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of
due process. More often, this opportunity is conferred through written
pleadings that the parties submit to present their charges and defenses. But
as long as a party is given the opportunity to defend his or her interests in
due course, said party is not denied due process. Since petitioner was
given the opportunity to defend himself from the charges against him, as in
fact he submitted a Counter-Affidavit with the PAGC, though he failed to
comply with the order for the submission of position paper, he cannot
complain of denial of due process. Dr. Fernando A. Melendres M.D.,
Executive Director of the Lung Center of the Philippines [LCP] vs.
President Anti-Graft Commission, et al., G.R. No. 163859, August 15, 2012.
Bill of rights; unreasonable searches; exclusionary rule. Section 2, Article III
of the Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried out
through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence
of probable cause, absent which such search and seizure becomes
unreasonable
within
the
meaning
of
said
constitutional
provision. Evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such an
unreasonable search and seizure is tainted and should be excluded for being
the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In the language of the fundamental
law, it shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any
proceeding. Margarita Ambre Y Cayuni v. People of the Philippines, G.R.
No. 191532, August 15, 2012.

Bill of rights; warrantless arrests; flagrante delicto. Section 5[ of Rule 113

of the Rules of Criminal Procedure] provides three (3) instances when
warrantless arrest may be lawfully effected: (a) arrest of a suspect in
flagrante delicto; (b) arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge
of the arresting officer, there is probable cause that said suspect was the
perpetrator of a crime which had just been committed; (c) arrest of a prisoner
who has escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily
confined during the pendency of his case or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
In arrest in flagrante delicto, the accused is apprehended at the very moment
he is committing or attempting to commit or has just committed an offense
in the presence of the arresting officer. Clearly, to constitute a valid in
flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be
arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt
act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
In the case at bench, there is no gainsaying that Ambre was caught by the
police officers in the act of using shabu and, thus, can be lawfully arrested
without a warrant. PO1 Mateo positively identified Ambre sniffing
suspected shabu from an aluminum foil being held by Castro. Ambre,
however, made much of the fact that there was no prior valid intrusion in the
residence of Sultan. The argument is specious.
Suffice it to state that prior justification for intrusion or prior lawful
intrusion is not an element of an arrest in flagrante delicto. Thus, even
granting arguendo that the apprehending officers had no legal right to be
present in the dwelling of Sultan, it would not render unlawful the arrest of
Ambre, who was seen sniffing shabu with Castro and Mendoza in a pot
session by the police officers. Accordingly, PO2 Masi and PO1 Mateo were
not only authorized but were also duty-bound to arrest Ambre together with
Castro and Mendoza for illegal use of methamphetamine hydrochloride in
violation of Section 15, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
Considering that the warrantless arrest of Ambre was valid, the subsequent

search and seizure done on her person was likewise lawful. After all, a
legitimate warrantless arrest necessarily cloaks the arresting police officer
with authority to validly search and seize from the offender (1) dangerous
weapons, and (2) those that may be used as proof of the commission of an
offense. Margarita Ambre Y Cayuni v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
191532, August 15, 2012.
Public officers
Public officers; three-fold responsibility. We have ruled that dismissal of a
criminal action does not foreclose institution of an administrative proceeding
against the same respondent, nor carry with it the relief from administrative
liability. It is a basic rule in administrative law that public officials are
under a three-fold responsibility for a violation of their duty or for a
wrongful act or omission, such that they may be held civilly, criminally and
administratively liable for the same act. Administrative liability is thus
separate and distinct from penal and civil liability.
Moreover, the fact that the administrative case and the case filed before the
Ombudsman are based on the same subject matter is of no moment. It is a
fundamental principle of administrative law that the administrative case may
generally proceed against a respondent independently of a criminal action
for the same act or omission and requires only a preponderance of evidence
to establish administrative guilt as against proof beyond reasonable doubt of
the criminal charge. Accordingly, the dismissal of two criminal cases by the
Sandiganbayan and of several criminal complaints by the Ombudsman did
not result in the absolution of petitioner from the administrative
charges. Dr. Fernando A. Melendres M.D., Executive Director of the Lung
Center of the Philippines [LCP] vs. President Anti-Graft Commission, et al.,
G.R. No. 163859, August 15, 2012.
Public officers; three-fold responsibility. Under the threefold liability
rule, any act or omission of any public official or employee can result in
criminal, civil, or administrative liability, each of which is independent of
the other. Ernesto A. Fajardo vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al., G.R. No.
173268, August 23, 2012.
Ombudsman; power to dismiss erring public officials. As a last ditch effort

to save himself, petitioner now puts in issue the power of the Ombudsman to
order his dismissal from service. Petitioner contends that the Ombudsman in
dismissing him from service disregarded Section 13, subparagraph 3, Article
XI of the Constitution as well as Section 15(3) of RA No. 6770, which only
vests in the Ombudsman the power to recommend the removal of a public
official or employee.
It is already well-settled that the power of the Ombudsman to determine
and impose administrative liability is not merely recommendatory but
actually mandatory. As we have explained in Atty. Ledesma v. Court of
Appeals [503 Phil. 396 (2003)], the fact [t]hat the refusal, without just
cause, of any officer to comply with [the] order of the Ombudsman to
penalize an erring officer or employee is a ground for disciplinary action
[under Section 15(3) of RA No. 6770]; is a strong indication that the
Ombudsmans recommendation is not merely advisory in nature but is
actually mandatory within the bounds of law. Ernesto A. Fajardo vs. Office
of the Ombudsman, et al., G.R. No. 173268, August 23, 2012.
July 2012 Philippine Supreme Court

Decisions on Political Law
Posted on August 10, 2012 by Philbert E. Varona Posted in Constitutional Law,
Philippines - Cases, Philippines - Law Tagged Bill of Rights, eminent domain, impea,
President
Here are select July 2012 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on
political law:
Constitutional Law
Bill of rights; right of confrontation. The examination of witnesses must be
done orally before a judge in open court. This is true especially in criminal
cases where the Constitution secures to the accused his right to a public trial
and to meet the witnesses against him face to face. The requirement is the
safest and most satisfactory method of investigating facts as it enables the
judge to test the witness credibility through his manner and deportment

while testifying. It is not without exceptions, however, as the Rules of Court

recognizes the conditional examination of witnesses and the use of their
depositions as testimonial evidence in lieu of direct court testimony. Go, et
al. v. The People of the Philippines and Highdone Company, Ltd., et
al., G.R. No. 185527, July 18, 2012.
Bill of rights; right of confrontation; conditional examination of
witnesses. But for purposes of taking the deposition in criminal cases, more
particularly of a prosecution witness who would foreseeably be unavailable
for trial, the testimonial examination should be made before the court, or at
least before the judge, where the case is pending as required by the clear
mandate of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure
Certainly, to take the deposition of the prosecution witness elsewhere and
not before the very same court where the case is pending would not only
deprive a detained accused of his right to attend the proceedings but also
deprive the trial judge of the opportunity to observe the prosecution witness
deportment and properly assess his credibility, which is especially
intolerable when the witness testimony is crucial to the prosecutions case
against the accused
The right of confrontation, on the other hand, is held to apply specifically to

criminal proceedings and to have a twofold purpose: (1) to afford the
accused an opportunity to test the testimony of witnesses by crossexamination, and (2) to allow the judge to observe the deportment of
witnesses. The Court explained in People v. Seneris [G.R. No. L- 48883,
August 6, 1980] that the constitutional requirement insures that the witness
will give his testimony under oath, thus deterring lying by the threat of
perjury charge; it forces the witness to submit to cross-examination, a
valuable instrument in exposing falsehood and bringing out the truth; and it
enables the court to observe the demeanor of the witness and assess his
credibility. Go, et al. v. The People of the Philippines and Highdone
Company, Ltd., et al., G.R. No. 185527, July 18, 2012.
Bill of rights; right to privacy. Clearly [citing Morfe v. Mutuc (130 Phil. 415

[1968]) and Ople v. Torres (354 Phil. 948 [1998]), the right to privacy is
considered a fundamental right that must be protected from intrusion or
constraint. However, in Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on
Banks [G.R. No. 167173, December 27, 2007], this Court underscored that
the right to privacy is not absolute
Therefore, when the right to privacy finds tension with a competing state
objective, the courts are required to weigh both notions. In these cases,
although considered a fundamental right, the right to privacy may
nevertheless succumb to an opposing or overriding state interest deemed
legitimate and compelling. Gamboa v. P/Ssupt. Marlou C. Chan, et al., G.R.
No. 193636, July 24, 2012.
Bill of rights; writ of habeas data. The writ of habeas data is an independent
and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor,
information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a
forum to enforce ones right to the truth and to informational privacy. It
seeks to protect a persons right to control information regarding oneself,
particularly in instances in which such information is being collected
through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. It must be
emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ to be granted, there
must exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the
right to life, liberty or security on the other. Gamboa v. P/Ssupt. Marlou C.
Chan, et al., G.R. No. 193636, July 24, 2012.
Bill of rights; writ of habeas data. The notion of informational privacy is
still developing in Philippine law and jurisprudence. Considering that even
the Latin American habeas data, on which our own Rule on the Writ of
Habeas Data is rooted, finds its origins from the European tradition of data
protection, this Court can be guided by cases on the protection of personal
data decided by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). Of
particular note is Leander v. Sweden [26 March 1987, 9 EHRR 433], in
which the ECHR balanced the right of citizens to be free from interference
in their private affairs with the right of the state to protect its national
security
Leander illustrates how the right to informational privacy, as a specific
component of the right to privacy, may yield to an overriding legitimate state

interest. In similar fashion, the determination of whether the privilege of the

writ of habeas data, being an extraordinary remedy, may be granted in this
case entails a delicate balancing of the alleged intrusion upon the private life
of Gamboa and the relevant state interest involved. Gamboa v. P/Ssupt.
Marlou C. Chan, et al., G.R. No. 193636, July 24, 2012.
Constitutional construction; verba legis non est recedendum. One of the
primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a
statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled
principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in the
Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical
terms are employed. As much as possible, the words of the Constitution
should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says
according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance
and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the
framers and the people mean what they say. Verba legis non est
recedendum from the words of a statute there should be no departure.
The raison d tre for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because it is
assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched
express the objective sought to be attained; and second, because the
Constitution is not primarily a lawyers document but essentially that of the
people, in whose consciousness it should ever be present as an important
condition for the rule of law to prevail. Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council,
et al., G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012.
Eminent domain; determination of just compensation. We also declared in
National Power Corporation v. Purefoods Corporation [G.R. No. 160725,
September 12, 2008] that Section 3A of Republic Act No. 6395, as amended
(which provides a fixed formula in the computation of just compensation in
cases of acquisition of easements of right of way) is not binding upon this
Court. This is in keeping with the established rule that the determination of
just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial
function. National Power Corporation vs. Sps. Florimon V. Lleto, et al.,
G.R. Nos. 169957 & 171558, July 11, 2012.
Executive power; emergency or calling-out powers of President. [I]t has

already been established that there is one repository of executive powers,

and that is the President of the Republic. This means that when Section 1,
Article VII of the Constitution speaks of executive power, it is granted to the
President and no one else. As emphasized by Justice Jose P. Laurel, in his
ponencia in [Villena v. Secretary of the Interior, 67 Phil. 541
(1939)]: With reference to the Executive Department of the government,
there is one purpose which is crystal-clear and is readily visible without the
projection of judicial searchlight, and that is the establishment of a single,
not plural, Executive. The first section of Article VII of the Constitution,
dealing with the Executive Department, begins with the enunciation of the
principle that The executive power shall be vested in a President of the
Philippines. This means that the President of the Philippines is the
Executive of the Government of the Philippines, and no other. Corollarily,
it is only the President, as Executive, who is authorized to exercise
emergency powers as provided under Section 23, Article VI, of the
Constitution, as well as what became known as the calling-out powers under
Section 7, Article VII thereof. Jamar M. Kulayan, et al. vs. Gov. Abdusakur
M. Tan etc., et al., G.R. No. 187298, July 3, 2012.
Executive power; civilian police force; authority of local executives over
police. Regarding the countrys police force, Section 6, Article XVI of the
Constitution states that: The State shall establish and maintain one police
force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in character, to be
administered and controlled by a national police commission. The authority
of local executives over the police units in their jurisdiction shall be
provided by law. A local chief executive, such as the provincial governor,
exercises operational supervision over the police, and may exercise control
only in day-to-day operations In the discussions of the Constitutional
Commission regarding the above provision it is clear that the framers never
intended for local chief executives to exercise unbridled control over the
police in emergency situations. This is without prejudice to their authority
over police units in their jurisdiction as provided by law, and their
prerogative to seek assistance from the police in day to day situations, as
contemplated by the Constitutional Commission. But as a civilian agency of
the government, the police, through the NAPOLCOM, properly comes
within, and is subject to, the exercise by the President of the power of
executive control. Jamar M. Kulayan, et al. vs. Gov. Abdusakur M. Tan etc.,
et al., G.R. No. 187298, July 3, 2012.

Executive power; emergency or calling-out powers of local

executives. Respondents cannot rely on paragraph 1, subparagraph (vii) of
Article 465 [of the Local Government Code], as the said provision expressly
refers to calamities and disasters, whether man-made or natural. The
governor, as local chief executive of the province, is certainly empowered to
enact and implement emergency measures during these occurrences. But the
kidnapping incident in the case at bar cannot be considered as a calamity or
a disaster. Respondents cannot find any legal mooring under this provision
to justify their actions. Paragraph 2, subparagraph (vi) of the same provision
is equally inapplicable for two reasons. First, the Armed Forces of the
Philippines does not fall under the category of a national law enforcement
agency, to which the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) and its
departments belong. Its mandate is to uphold the sovereignty of the
Philippines, support the Constitution, and defend the Republic against all
enemies, foreign and domestic. Its aim is also to secure the integrity of the
national territory. Second, there was no evidence or even an allegation on
record that the local police forces were inadequate to cope with the situation
or apprehend the violators. If they were inadequate, the recourse of the
provincial governor was to ask the assistance of the Secretary of Interior and
Local Government, or such other authorized officials, for the assistance of
national law enforcement agencies. Jamar M. Kulayan, et al. vs. Gov.
Abdusakur M. Tan etc., et al., G.R. No. 187298, July 3, 2012.
Executive power; power of reorganization. Section 31 of Executive Order
No. 292 (E.O. 292), otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987,
vests in the President the continuing authority to reorganize the offices under
him in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency
In the case of Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora [G.R. Nos. 142801-802,
July 10, 2001], the Court affirmed that the Presidents authority to carry out
a reorganization in any branch or agency of the executive department is an
express grant by the legislature by virtue of E.O. 292, thus: But of course,
the list of legal basis authorizing the President to reorganize any department
or agency in the executive branch does not have to end here. We must not
lose sight of the very source of the power that which constitutes an express
grant of power. Under Section 31, Book III of Executive Order No. 292
(otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987), the President,
subject to the policy of the Executive Office and in order to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have the continuing authority to

reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President. For

this purpose, he may transfer the functions of other Departments or Agencies
to the Office of the President. Pichay, Jr. v. Office of the Deputy Executive
Secretary for Legal Affairs-Investigative and Adjudicatory Division, et al.,
G.R. No. 196425, July 24, 2012.
Executive power; power of reorganization; rationale. And in Domingo v.
Zamora [G.R. No. 142283, February 6, 2003], the Court gave the rationale
behind the Presidents continuing authority in this wise: The law grants the
President this power in recognition of the recurring need of every President
to reorganize his office to achieve simplicity, economy and
efficiency. The Office of the President is the nerve center of the Executive
Branch. To remain effective and efficient, the Office of the President must
be capable of being shaped and reshaped by the President in the manner he
deems fit to carry out his directives and policies. After all, the Office of the
President is the command post of the President. Pichay, Jr. v. Office of the
Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs-Investigative and Adjudicatory
Division, et al., G.R. No. 196425. July 24, 2012.
Executive power; power of reorganization; nature. Generally, this authority
to implement organizational changes is limited to transferring either an
office or a function from the Office of the President to another Department
or Agency, and the other way around. Only Section 31(1) [of the
Administrative Code] gives the President a virtual freehand in dealing with
the internal structure of the Office of the President Proper by allowing him
to take actions as extreme as abolition, consolidation or merger of units,
apart from the less drastic move of transferring functions and offices from
one unit to another. Again, in Domingo v. Zamora, the Court
noted: However, the Presidents power to reorganize the Office of the
President under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292 should be distinguished
from his power to reorganize the Office of the President Proper. Under
Section 31 (1) of EO 292, the President can reorganize the Office of the
President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units, or by
transferring functions from one unit to another. In contrast, under Section
31 (2) and (3) of EO 292, the Presidents power to reorganize offices outside
the Office of the President Proper but still within the Office of the President
is limited to merely transferring functions or agencies from the Office of the
President to Departments or Agencies, and vice versa.

The distinction between the allowable organizational actions under Section

31(1) on the one hand and Section 31 (2) and (3) on the other is crucial not
only as it affects employees tenurial security but also insofar as it touches
upon the validity of the reorganization, that is, whether the executive actions
undertaken fall within the limitations prescribed under E.O. 292. When the
PAGC was created under E.O. 12, it was composed of a Chairman and two
(2) Commissioners who held the ranks of Presidential Assistant II and I,
respectively, and was placed directly under the Office of the
President. On the other hand, the ODESLA, to which the functions of the
PAGC have now been transferred, is an office within the Office of the
President Proper. Since both of these offices belong to the Office of the
President Proper, the reorganization by way of abolishing the PAGC and
transferring its functions to the ODESLA is allowable under Section 31 (1)
of E.O. 292. Pichay, Jr. v. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for
Legal Affairs-Investigative and Adjudicatory Division, et al., G.R. No.
196425, July 24, 2012.
Eminent domain; what constitutes taking. The NPC, relying on [Section
3A of Republic Act No. 6395], argues that the CA erred when it ordered the
payment of just compensation for the properties in question, given that most
of the properties were subject only to an aerial easement of right of way,
with the NPC requiring the use of the area above the subject lands for its
transmission lines. We have already established in a number of cases the
flaw behind the NPCs argument. At the heart of this argument is the
mistaken assumption that what are involved are mere liens on the property in
the form of aerial easements. While it may be true that the transmission
lines merely pass over the affected properties, the easement imposes the
additional limitation that the landowners are prohibited from constructing
any improvements or planting any trees that exceed three (3) meters within
the aerial right of way area. This prohibition clearly interferes with the
landowners right to possess and enjoy their properties
Apart from interfering with the attributes of ownership, we have articulated
in our observation in National Power Corp. v. Sps. Gutierrez [271 Phil. 1
(1991)]that these transmission lines, because of the high-tension current that
passes through them, pose a danger to the lives and limbs of those in the
surrounding areas, and, thus, serve to limit the activities that can be done on
these lands. National Power Corporation vs. Sps. Florimon V. Lleto, et al.,
G.R. Nos. 169957 & 171558, July 11, 2012.

Impeachment; nature of. Impeachment, described as the most formidable

weapon in the arsenal of democracy, was foreseen as creating divisions,
partialities and enmities, or highlighting pre-existing factions with the
greatest danger that the decision will be regulated more by the comparative
strength of parties, than by the real demonstrations of innocence or
guilt. Given their concededly political character, the precise role of the
judiciary in impeachment cases is a matter of utmost importance to ensure
the effective functioning of the separate branches while preserving the
structure of checks and balance in our government. Moreover, in this
jurisdiction, the acts of any branch or instrumentality of the government,
including those traditionally entrusted to the political departments, are
proper subjects of judicial review if tainted with grave abuse or arbitrariness.
Impeachment refers to the power of Congress to remove a public official for
serious crimes or misconduct as provided in the Constitution. A mechanism
designed to check abuse of power, impeachment has its roots in Athens and
was adopted in the United States (US) through the influence of English
common law on the Framers of the US Constitution.
Our own Constitutions provisions on impeachment were adopted from the
US Constitution Corona v. Senate of the Philippines sitting as an
Impeachment Court, et al., G.R. No. 200242, July 17, 2012.
Impeachment; power of judicial review. In the first impeachment case
decided by this Court, Francisco, Jr. v. Nagmamalasakit na mga
Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. [G.R. No. 160261,
November 10, 2003], we ruled that the power of judicial review in this
jurisdiction includes the power of review over justiciable issues in
impeachment proceedings. Subsequently, in Gutierrez v. House of
Representatives Committee on Justice [G.R. No. 193459, February 15,
2011], the Court resolved the question of the validity of the simultaneous
referral of two impeachment complaints against petitioner Ombudsman
which was allegedly a violation of the due process clause and of the one year
bar provision
In the meantime, the impeachment trial had been concluded with the
conviction of petitioner by more than the required majority vote of the
Senator-Judges. Petitioner immediately accepted the verdict and without

any protest vacated his office. In fact, the Judicial and Bar Council is
already in the process of screening applicants and nominees, and the
President of the Philippines is expected to appoint a new Chief Justice
within the prescribed 90-day period from among those candidates shortlisted
by the JBC. Unarguably, the constitutional issue raised by petitioner had
been mooted by supervening events and his own acts. Corona v. Senate of
the Philippines sitting as an Impeachment Court, et al., G.R. No. 200242,
July 17, 2012.
Judicial and Bar Council; composition. As petitioner correctly posits, the
use of the singular letter a preceding representative of Congress is
unequivocal and leaves no room for any other construction. It is indicative
of what the members of the Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is,
Congress may designate only one (1) representative to the JBC. Had it been
the intention that more than one (1) representative from the legislature would
sit in the JBC, the Framers could have, in no uncertain terms, so
provided. Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, et al., G.R. No. 202242, July
17, 2012.
Judicial and Bar Council; composition. Applying the foregoing principle to
this case, it becomes apparent that the word Congress used in Article
VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No
particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House
of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a
singular representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC. The foregoing
declaration is but sensible, since, as pointed out by an esteemed former
member of the Court and consultant of the JBC in his memorandum, from
the enumeration of the membership of the JBC, it is patent that each
category of members pertained to a single individual only. Chavez v.
Judicial and Bar Council, et al., G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012.
Judicial and Bar Council; composition. More than the reasoning provided in
the above discussed rules of constitutional construction, the Court finds the
above thesis as the paramount justification of the Courts conclusion that
Congress, in the context of JBC representation, should be considered as
one body. It is evident that the definition of Congress as a bicameral body
refers to its primary function in government to legislate. In the passage of
laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role of each house
in the process. The same holds true in Congress non-legislative powers

such as, inter alia, the power of appropriation, the declaration of an

existence of a state of war, canvassing of electoral returns for the President
and Vice-President, and impeachment. In the exercise of these powers, the
Constitution employs precise language in laying down the roles which a
particular house plays, regardless of whether the two houses consummate an
official act by voting jointly or separately. An inter-play between the two
houses is necessary in the realization of these powers causing a vivid
dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. Verily, each house is
constitutionally granted with powers and functions peculiar to its nature and
with keen consideration to 1) its relationship with the other chamber; and 2)
in consonance with the principle of checks and balances, to the other
branches of government.
This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation because no
liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. No
mechanism is required between the Senate and the House of Representatives
in the screening and nomination of judicial officers. Hence, the term
Congress must be taken to mean the entire legislative department. A
fortiori, a pretext of oversight cannot prevail over the more pragmatic
scheme which the Constitution laid with firmness, that is, that the JBC has a
seat for a single representative of Congress, as one of the co-equal branches
of government. Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, et al., G.R. No.
202242, July 17, 2012.
Public officers
Public officers; authority of city vice-mayor to enter into contracts. Under
[Section 456 of the Local Government Code], there is no inherent authority
on the part of the city vice-mayor to enter into contracts on behalf of the
local government unit, unlike that provided for the city mayor. Thus, the
authority of the vice-mayor to enter into contracts on behalf of the city was
strictly circumscribed by the ordinance granting it. Ordinance No. 15-2003
specifically authorized Vice-Mayor Yambao to enter into contracts for
consultancy services. As this is not a power or duty given under the law to
the Office of the Vice-Mayor, Ordinance No. 15-2003 cannot be construed
as a continuing authority for any person who enters the Office of the ViceMayor to enter into subsequent, albeit similar, contracts. Arnold D. Vicencio
v. Hon. Reynaldo A. Villar, et al., G.R. No. 182069, July 3, 2012.

Public officers; compensation and allowances. The issuance of Resolution

No. 464 by the NHA was without legal basis. At the time of its issuance in
1982, Section 3 of P.D. 1597 had already expressly repealed all decrees,
executive orders, and issuances that authorized the grant of allowances to
groups of officials or employees despite the inconsistency of those
allowances with the position classification or rates indicated in the National
Compensation and Position Classification Plan.
Petitioners contention that P.D. 1597 only repealed Section 4 of P.D. 985,
but not Section 2 thereof, is without basis. While Section 2 of P.D. 1597
only mentions Section 4 of P.D. 985, Section 3 of P.D. 1597 specifically
refers to all inconsistent laws or issuances.
Thereafter, or in 1989, R.A. 6758 further reinforced this policy by expressly
decreeing that all allowances not specifically mentioned therein, or as may
be determined by the DBM, shall be deemed included in the standardized
salary rates prescribed.
Under Section 12 of R.A. 6758, all kinds of allowances are integrated in the
standardized salary rates. Below are the exceptions: 1. Representation and
transportation allowance (RATA); 2. Clothing and laundry allowance; 3.
Subsistence allowance of marine officers and crew on board government
vessels; 4. Subsistence allowance of hospital personnel; 5. Hazard pay; 6.
Allowances of foreign service personnel stationed abroad; and 7. Such other
additional compensation not otherwise specified herein as may be
determined by the DBM.
Only those additional compensation benefits being received by incumbents
as of 1 July 1989, which were not integrated into the standardized salary
rates, shall continue to be authorized.
In this case, the incentive allowances granted under Resolution No.464 are
clearly not among those enumerated under R.A. 6758. Neither has there
been any allegation that the allowances were specifically determined by the
DBM to be an exception to the standardized salary rates. Hence, such
allowances can no longer be granted after the effectivity of R.A.
6758. Abellanosa, et al. v. Commission on Audit and National Housing
Authority, G.R. No. 185806, July 24, 2012.

Public officers; validity of per diems paid to ex-officio members of

PEZA. PEZAs insistence that there is legal basis in its grant of per diems to
the ex officio members of its Board does not hold water. The constitutional
prohibition explained in [Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, G.R.
Nos. 83896 & 83815, February 22, 1991] still stands and this Court finds no
reason to revisit the doctrine laid down therein as said interpretation, to this
Courts mind, is in consonance with what our Constitution provides In
Civil Liberties Union, this Court clarified the prohibition under Section 13,
Article VII of the Constitution and emphasized that a public official holding
an ex officio position as provided by law has no right to receive additional
compensation for the ex officio position. This Court ruled: It bears
repeating though that in order that such additional duties or functions may
not transgress the prohibition embodied in Section 13, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution, such additional duties or functions must be required by
the primary functions of the official concerned, who is to perform the same
in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law, without receiving any
additional compensation therefor. The ex-officio position being actually and
in legal contemplation part of the principal office, it follows that the official
concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his services in
the said position. The reason is that these services are already paid for and
covered by the compensation attached to his principal office. It should be
obvious that if, say, the Secretary of Finance attends a meeting of the
Monetary Board as an ex-officio member thereof, he is actually and in legal
contemplation performing the primary function of his principal office in
defining policy in monetary and banking matters, which come under the
jurisdiction of his department. For such attendance, therefore, he is not
entitled to collect any extra compensation, whether it be in the form of a per
diem or an honorarium or an allowance, or some other such euphemism. By
whatever name it is designated, such additional compensation is prohibited
by the Constitution. Philippine Economic Zone Authority v. Commission
on Audit and Reynaldo A. Villar, Chairman, Commission on Audit, G.R. No.
189767, July 3, 2012.
Public officers; liability of public officer executing contract without
authority. Section 103 of P.D. 1445 declares that expenditures of
government funds or uses of government property in violation of law or
regulations shall be a personal liability of the official or employee found to
be directly responsible therefor. The public officials personal liability
arises only if the expenditure of government funds was made in violation of

law. In this case, petitioners act of entering into a contract on behalf of the
local government unit without the requisite authority therefor was in
violation of the Local Government Code. While petitioner may have relied
on the opinion of the City Legal Officer, such reliance only serves to
buttress his good faith. It does not, however, exculpate him from his
personal liability under P.D. 1445. Arnold D. Vicencio v. Hon. Reynaldo A.
Villar, et al., G.R. No. 182069, July 3, 2012.
Public officers; suspension order. While the suspension of a public officer
under [Section 13 or Republic Act No. 3019] is mandatory, the suspension
requires a prior hearing to determine the validity of the information filed
against him, taking into account the serious and far reaching consequences
of a suspension of an elective public official even before his
conviction. The accused public officials right to challenge the validity of
the information before a suspension order may be issued includes the right to
challenge the (i) validity of the criminal proceeding leading to the filing of
an information against him, and (ii) propriety of his prosecution on the
ground that the acts charged do not constitute a violation of R.A. No. 3019
or of the provisions on bribery of the Revised Penal Code. Miguel v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 172035, July 4, 2012.
Public officers; suspension order. The purpose of the law in requiring a presuspension hearing is to determine the validity of the information so that the
trial court can have a basis to either suspend the accused and proceed with
the trial on the merits of the case, withhold the suspension and dismiss the
case, or correct any part of the proceedings that impairs its validity. That
hearing is similar to a challenge to the validity of the information by way of
a motion to quash.
While a pre-suspension hearing is aimed at securing for the accused fair and
adequate opportunity to challenge the validity of the information or the
regularity of the proceedings against him, [Luciano v. Mariano (148-B Phil.
178 [1971])]likewise emphasizes that no hard and fast rule exists in
regulating its conduct. With the purpose of a pre-suspension hearing in
mind, the absence of an actual hearing alone cannot be determinative of the
validity of a suspension order. Miguel v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 172035,
July 4, 2012.

No estoppel against Government. In Baybay Water District v. Commission

on Audit [425 Phil. 326 [2002]), this Court stated that public officers
erroneous application and enforcement of the law do not estop the
government from making a subsequent correction of those errors. Where
there is an express provision of law prohibiting the grant of certain benefits,
the law must be enforced even if it prejudices certain parties on account of
an error committed by public officials in granting the benefit. Practice,
without more no matter how long continued cannot give rise to any
vested right if it is contrary to law. Abellanosa, et al. v. Commission on
Audit and National Housing Authority, G.R. No. 185806, July 24, 2012.
Local government
Local autonomy; devolution; reservation in favor of national
government. While [Section 17 of the Local Government Code] charges the
LGUs to take on the functions and responsibilities that have already been
devolved upon them from the national agencies on the aspect of providing
for basic services and facilities in their respective jurisdictions, paragraph (c)
of the same provision provides a categorical exception of cases involving
nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs and services, thus: (c)
Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, public works and
infrastructure projects and other facilities, programs and services funded by
the National Government under the annual General Appropriations Act,
other special laws, pertinent executive orders, and those wholly or partially
funded from foreign sources, are not covered under this Section, except in
those cases where the local government unit concerned is duly designated as
the implementing agency for such projects, facilities, programs and
services.
The essence of this express reservation of power by the national government
is that, unless an LGU is particularly designated as the implementing
agency, it has no power over a program for which funding has been provided
by the national government under the annual general appropriations act,
even if the program involves the delivery of basic services within the
jurisdiction of the LGU
Indeed, a complete relinquishment of central government powers on the
matter of providing basic facilities and services cannot be implied as the

Local Government Code itself weighs against it. The national government
is, thus, not precluded from taking a direct hand in the formulation and
implementation of national development programs especially where it is
implemented locally in coordination with the LGUs concerned. Pimentel, et
al. v. Executive Secretary, et al., G.R. No. 195770, July 17, 2012.
Other laws
Agrarian reform; procedure for acquisition. The procedure for acquisition of
private lands under Section 16 (e) of the CARL is that upon receipt by the
landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no
response from the landowner, upon deposit with an accessible bank
designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds, the
DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and request the proper
Register of Deeds to issue a TCT in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines. Thereafter, the DAR shall proceed with the redistribution of the
land to the qualified beneficiaries Diamond Farms, Inc. v. Diamond
Farm Workers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, et al., G.R. No. 192999, July 18,
2012.
Agrarian reform; control and possession of agricultural land. We, however,
agree that petitioner must now turn over possession of the 109-hectare
land. The matter has already been settled in Hacienda Luisita, Incorporated,
etc. v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, et al. [G.R. No. 171101,
April 24, 2012], when we ruled that the Constitution and the CARL
intended the farmers, individually or collectively, to have control over
agricultural lands, otherwise all rhetoric about agrarian reform will be for
naught. We stressed that under Section 4, Article XIII of the 1987
Constitution and Section 2 of the CARL, the agrarian reform program is
founded on the right of farmers and regular farm workers who are landless to
own directly or collectively the lands they till. The policy on agrarian
reform is that control over the agricultural land must always be in the hands
of the farmers. Diamond Farms, Inc. v. Diamond Farm Workers MultiPurpose Cooperative, et al., G.R. No. 192999, July 18, 2012.
Government-owned and -controlled corporations; definition. From
[Sections 2(10) and 2(13) of the Introductory Provisions of the
Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292)], it is clear that a

GOCC must be organized as a stock or non-stock corporation while an

instrumentality is vested by law with corporate powers. Likewise, when the
law makes a government instrumentality operationally autonomous, the
instrumentality remains part of the National Government machinery
although not integrated with the department framework.
When the law vests in a government instrumentality corporate powers, the
instrumentality does not necessarily become a corporation. Unless the
government instrumentality is organized as a stock or non-stock corporation,
it remains a government instrumentality exercising not only governmental
but also corporate powers.
Many government instrumentalities are vested with corporate powers but
they do not become stock or non-stock corporations, which is a necessary
condition before an agency or instrumentality is deemed a
GOCC. Examples are the Mactan International Airport Authority, the
Philippine Ports Authority, the University of the Philippines, and Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas. All these government instrumentalities exercise
corporate powers but they are not organized as stock or non-stock
corporations as required by Section 2(13) of the Introductory Provisions of
the Administrative Code. These government instrumentalities are
sometimes loosely called government corporate entities. They are not,
however, GOCCs in the strict sense as understood under the Administrative
Code, which is the governing law defining the legal relationship and status
of government entities. Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Philippine Reclamation Authority (PRA) vs. City of Paraaque, G.R. No.
191109, July 18, 2012.
Government-owned and -controlled corporations; definition. In the case at
bench, PRA is not a GOCC because it is neither a stock nor a non-stock
corporation. It cannot be considered as a stock corporation because although
it has a capital stock divided into no par value shares as provided in Section
74 of P.D. No. 1084, it is not authorized to distribute dividends, surplus
allotments or profits to stockholders. There is no provision whatsoever in
P.D. No. 1084 or in any of the subsequent executive issuances pertaining to
PRA, particularly, E.O. No. 525, E.O. No. 6546 and EO No. 7987 that
authorizes PRA to distribute dividends, surplus allotments or profits to its
stockholders.

PRA cannot be considered a non-stock corporation either because it does not

have members. A non-stock corporation must have members. Moreover, it
was not organized for any of the purposes mentioned in Section 88 of the
Corporation Code. Specifically, it was created to manage all government
reclamation projects. Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
191109, July 18, 2012.
Government-owned
and
-controlled
corporations;
Constitutional
requirements. Furthermore, there is another reason why the PRA cannot be
classified as a GOCC. Section 16, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
provides as follows: Section 16. The Congress shall not, except by general
law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of private
corporations. Government-owned or controlled corporations may be created
or established by special charters in the interest of the common good and
subject to the test of economic viability.
The fundamental provision above authorizes Congress to create GOCCs
through special charters on two conditions: 1) the GOCC must be
established for the common good; and 2) the GOCC must meet the test of
economic viability. In this case, PRA may have passed the first condition of
common good but failed the second one economic viability. Undoubtedly,
the purpose behind the creation of PRA was not for economic or commercial
activities. Neither was it created to compete in the market place considering
that there were no other competing reclamation companies being operated
by the private sector. As mentioned earlier, PRA was created essentially to
perform a public service considering that it was primarily responsible for a
coordinated, economical and efficient reclamation, administration and
operation of lands belonging to the government with the object of
maximizing their utilization and hastening their development consistent with
the public interest. Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
191109, July 18, 2012.
Government-owned and -controlled corporations; definition. This Court is
convinced that PRA is not a GOCC either under Section 2(3) of the
Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code or under Section 16,

Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. The facts, the evidence on record and
jurisprudence on the issue support the position that PRA was not organized
either as a stock or a non-stock corporation. Neither was it created by
Congress to operate commercially and compete in the private
market. Instead, PRA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate
powers and performing an essential public service pursuant to Section 2(10)
of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code. Being an
incorporated government instrumentality, it is exempt from payment of real
property tax. Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Philippine
Reclamation Authority (PRA) vs. City of Paraaque, G.R. No. 191109, July
18, 2012.
Government contracts; public bidding requirement. Public bidding, as a
method of government procurement, is governed by the principles of
transparency, competitiveness, simplicity, and accountability. By its very
nature and characteristic, a competitive public bidding aims to protect the
public interest by giving the public the best possible advantages thru open
competition and in order to avoid or preclude suspicion of favoritism and
anomalies in the execution of public contracts. Except only in cases in
which alternative methods of procurement are allowed, all government
procurement shall be done by competitive bidding. In the case of Agan, Jr.
v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co, Inc. [G.R. Nos. 155001,
155547 & 155661, May 5, 2003], the Court held: Competition must be
legitimate, fair and honest. In the field of government contract law,
competition requires, not only bidding upon a common standard, a common
basis, upon the same thing, the same subject matter, the same undertaking,
but also that it be legitimate, fair and honest; and not designed to injure of
defraud the government. It has been held that the three principles in
bidding are the offer to the public, opportunity for competition, and a basis
for the exact comparison of bids. A regulation of the matter which excludes
any of these factors destroys the distinctive character of the system and
thwarts the purpose of its adoption. Philippine Sports Commission, et al. v.
Dear John Services, Inc., G.R. No. 183260, July 4, 2012.
Government contracts; public bidding requirement; approved budget of
contract must be disclosed. Under the law, the PSC-BAC is mandated to
disclose not only the description of the items to be procured, and the
eligibility requirements, among others, but also the approved budget of the
project. Competitive bidding is an essential element of a public

bidding. Thus, it should be conducted fairly and openly with full and free
opportunity for competition among bidders. It has been held in a long line
of cases that a contract granted without the competitive bidding required by
law is void and the party to whom it is awarded cannot benefit from it
Consequently, the provision in the Instruction to Bidders stating that no
award of the contract shall be made to a bidder whose bid price is lower than
the allowable government estimate (AGE) or AAE is not valid. The rule on
the matter is clear. The PSC-BAC is obliged to observe and enforce the
same in the procurement of goods and services for the project. The law on
public bidding is not an empty formality. A strict adherence to the
principles, rules and regulations on public bidding must be sustained if only
to preserve the integrity and the faith of the general public on the
procedure. Philippine Sports Commission, et al. v. Dear John Services, Inc.,
G.R. No. 183260, July 4, 2012.

Posted on February 20, 2012 by Vicente D. Gerochi IV Posted in Constitutional Law,
Philippines - Cases
Here are selected January 2012 rulings of the Supreme Court of the
Philippines on political law.
Constitutional Law
Bill of Rights; right to speedy trial versus right to speedy disposition of
cases. The right to a speedy trial is available only to an accused and is a
peculiarly criminal law concept, while the broader right to a speedy
disposition of cases may be tapped in any proceedings conducted by state
agencies. In this case, the appropriate right involved is the right to a speedy
disposition of cases, the recovery of ill-gotten wealth being a civil suit. An
examination of the petitioners arguments and the cited indicia of delay
would reveal the absence of any allegation that petitioners moved before the
Sandiganbayan for the dismissal of the case on account of vexatious,
capricious and oppressive delays that attended the proceedings. Petitioners

are deemed to have waived their right to a speedy disposition of the case.
Moreover, delays, if any, prejudiced the Republic as well. What is more, the
alleged breach of the right in question was not raised below. As a matter of
settled jurisprudence, but subject to equally settled exception, an issue not
raised before the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED), et al. vs.
Republic of the Philippines; Wigberto E. Tanada, et al., intervenors; Danilo
S. Ursua vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 177857-58 & G.R. No.
178193, January 24, 2012.
Constitutionality of PD 755, 961, 1468. This case cannot be resolved
without going into the constitutionality of P.D. Nos. 755, 961 and 1468 in
particular. For petitioners predicate their claim over the sequestered shares
and necessarily their cause on laws and martial law issuances assailed by the
respondent on constitutional grounds. This case is for the recovery of shares
grounded on the invalidity of certain enactments, which in turn is rooted in
the shares being public in character, purchased as they were by funds raised
by the taxing and/or a mix of taxing and police powers of the state. As may
be recalled, P.D. No. 755, under the policy-declaring provision, authorized
the distribution of UCPB shares of stock free to coconut farmers. On the
other hand, Section 2 of P.D. No. 755 authorized the PCA to utilize portions
of the CCSF to pay the financial commitment of the farmers to acquire
UCPB and to deposit portions of the CCSF levies with UCPB interest free.
The CCSF, CIDF and like levies that Philippine Coconut Authority is
authorized to collect shall be considered as non-special or fiduciary funds to
be transferred to the general fund of the Government, meaning they shall be
deemed private funds.
In other words, the relevant provisions of P.D. Nos. 755, as well as those of
P.D. Nos. 961 and 1468, could have been the only plausible means by which
close to a purported million and a half coconut farmers could have acquired
the said shares of stock. It has, therefore, become necessary to determine the
validity of the authorizing law, which made the stock transfer and
acquisitions possible.
It is of crucial importance to determine the validity of P.D. Nos. 755, 961

and 1468 in light of the constitutional proscription against the use of special
funds save for the purpose it was established. Otherwise, petitioners claim
of legitimate private ownership over UCPB shares and indirectly over SMC
shares held by UCPBs subsidiaries will have no leg to stand on, P.D. No.
755 being the only law authorizing the distribution of the SMC and UCPB
shares of stock to coconut farmers, and with the aforementioned provisions
actually stating and holding that the coco levy fund shall not be considered
as a special not even general fund, but shall be owned by the farmers in
their private capacities.
A. The coconut levy funds are in the nature of taxes and can only be used for
public purpose. Consequently, they cannot be used to purchase shares of
stocks to be given for free to private individuals.
Taxes are imposed only for a public purpose. They cannot be used for purely
private purposes or for the exclusive benefit of private persons. When a law
imposes taxes or levies from the public, with the intent to give undue benefit
or advantage to private persons, or the promotion of private enterprises, that
law cannot be said to satisfy the requirement of public purpose. In this case,
the coconut levy funds were sourced from forced exactions decreed under
P.D. Nos. 232, 276 and 582, among others, with the end-goal of developing
the entire coconut industry. To hold therefore, even by law, that the revenues
received from the imposition of the coconut levies be used purely for private
purposes to be owned by private individuals in their private capacity and for
their benefit, would contravene the rationale behind the imposition of taxes
or levies.
The Court rejected the idea of what appears to be an indirect if not exactly
direct conversion of special funds into private funds, i.e., by using special
funds to purchase shares of stocks, which in turn would be distributed for
free to private individuals. Even if these private individuals belong to, or are
a part of the coconut industry, the free distribution of shares of stocks
purchased with special public funds to them, nevertheless cannot be
justified. The fact that the coconut levy funds were collected from persons or
entities in the coconut industry, among others, does not and cannot entitle
them to be beneficial owners of the subject funds or more bluntly, owners
thereof in their private capacity. The said private individuals cannot own the
UCPB shares of stocks so purchased using the said special funds of the
government.

B. The coconut levy funds can only be used for the special purpose and the
balance thereof should revert to the general fund. Consequently, their
subsequent reclassification as a private fund to be owned by private
individuals in their private capacities under P.D. Nos. 755, 961 and 1468 are
unconstitutional.
Article VI, Section 29 (3) of the 1987 Constitution, restating a general
principle on taxation, enjoins the disbursement of a special fund in
accordance with the special purpose for which it was collected, the balance,
if there be any, after the purpose has been fulfilled or is no longer
forthcoming, to be transferred to the general funds of the government,
As couched, P.D. No. 276 created and exacted the CCSF to advance the
governments avowed policy of protecting the coconut industry. The CCSF
was originally set up as a special fund to support consumer purchases of
coconut products. The protection of the entire coconut industry and the
consuming public provides the rationale for the creation of the coconut levy
fund. P.D. No. 276 intended the fund created and set up therein not
especially for the coconut farmers but for the entire coconut industry, albeit
the improvement of the industry would doubtless redound to the benefit of
the farmers. Upon the foregoing perspective, the following provisions of
P.D. Nos. 755, 961 and 1468 insofar as they declared, as the case may be,
that: [the coconut levy] fund and the disbursements thereof [shall be]
authorized for the benefit of the coconut farmers and shall be owned by them
in their private capacities; or the coconut levy fund shall not be construed
by any law to be a special and/or fiduciary fund, and do not therefore form
part of the general fund of the national government later on; or the UCPB
shares acquired using the coconut levy fund shall be distributed to the
coconut farmers for free, violated the special public purpose for which the
CCSF was established.
Not only were the challenged presidential issuances unconstitutional for
decreeing the distribution of the shares of stock for free to the coconut
farmers and, therefore, negating the public purpose declared by P.D. No.
276, i.e., to stabilize the price of edible oil and to protect the coconut
industry. They likewise reclassified, nay treated, the coconut levy fund as
private fund to be disbursed and/or invested for the benefit of private
individuals in their private capacities, contrary to the original purpose for
which the fund was created. To compound the situation, the offending

provisions effectively removed the coconut levy fund away from the cavil of
public funds which normally can be paid out only pursuant to an
appropriation made by law. The conversion of public funds into private
assets was illegally allowed, in fact mandated, by these provisions. Clearly
therefore, the pertinent provisions of P.D. Nos. 755, 961 and 1468 are
unconstitutional for violating Article VI, Section 29 (3) of the Constitution.
In this context, the distribution by PCA of the UCPB shares purchased by
means of the coconut levy fund a special fund of the government to the
coconut farmers, is therefore void.
C. Section 1 of P.D. No. 755 is an invalid delegation of legislative power.
Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative power: (1) the
completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard test. A law is complete
when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate. It lays down a sufficient standard when it
provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the
boundaries of the delegates authority and prevent the delegation from
running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the
delegates authority, announce the legislative policy and identify the
conditions under which it is to be implemented.
In this case, the requisite standards or criteria are absent in P.D. No. 755.
This decree authorizes PCA to distribute to coconut farmers, for free, the
shares of stocks of UCPB and to pay from the CCSF levy the financial
commitments of the coconut farmers under the Agreement for the
acquisition of such bank. Yet, the decree does not even state who are to be
considered as coconut farmers. Would, say, one who plants a single coconut
tree be already considered a coconut farmer and, therefore, entitled to own
UCPB shares? If so, how many shares shall be given to him? The definition
of a coconut farmer and the basis as to the number of shares a farmer is
entitled to receive for free are important variables to be determined by law
and cannot be left to the discretion of the implementing agency.
Moreover, P.D. No. 755 did not identify or delineate any clear condition as
to how the disposition of the UCPB shares or their conversion into private
ownership will redound to the advancement of the national policy declared
under it. P.D. No. 755 seeks to accelerate the growth and development of

the coconut industry and achieve a vertical integration thereof so that

coconut farmers will become participants in, and beneficiaries of, such
growth and development. The said law gratuitously gave away public funds
to private individuals, and converted them exclusively into private property
without any restriction as to its use that would reflect the avowed national
policy or public purpose. Conversely, the private individuals to whom the
UCPB shares were transferred are free to dispose of them by sale or any
other mode from the moment of their acquisition. P.D. No. 755 did not
provide for any guideline, standard, condition or restriction by which the
said shares shall be distributed to the coconut farmers that would ensure that
the same will be undertaken to accelerate the growth and development of the
coconut industry pursuant to its national policy. Thus, P.D. No. 755, insofar
as it grants PCA a veritable carte blanche to distribute to coconut farmers
UCPB shares at the level it may determine, as well as the full disposition of
such shares to private individuals in their private capacity without any
conditions or restrictions that would advance the laws national policy or
public purpose, present a case of undue delegation of legislative power.
D. Article III, Section 5 of P.D. No. 961 and Article III, Section 5 of P.D.
No. 1468 violate Article IX (D) (2) of the 1987 Constitution.
Article III, Section 5 of P.D. No. 961 takes away the coconut levy funds
from the coffer of the public funds. It privatized revenues derived from the
coco levy. The same provision is carried over in Article III, Section 5 of
P.D. No. 1468. These provisions violate Article IX (D), Section 2(1) of the
Constitution, which states in pertinent part that the Commission on Audit
shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all
accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses
of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the
Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities.
The Constitution, by express provision, vests the COA with the
responsibility for state audit. As an independent supreme state auditor, its
audit jurisdiction cannot be undermined by any law. Indeed, under Article
IX (D), Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution, [n]o law shall be passed
exempting any entity of the Government or its subsidiary in any guise
whatever, or any investment of public funds, from the jurisdiction of the
Commission on Audit. Following the mandate of the COA and the
parameters set forth by the foregoing provisions, it is clear that it has

jurisdiction over the coconut levy funds, being special public funds.
Conversely, the COA has the power, authority and duty to examine, audit
and settle all accounts pertaining to the coconut levy funds and,
consequently, to the UCPB shares purchased using the said funds. However,
declaring the said funds as partaking the nature of private funds, ergo subject
to private appropriation, removes them from the coffer of the public funds of
the government, and consequently renders them impervious to the COA
audit jurisdiction. Clearly, the pertinent provisions of P.D. Nos. 961 and
1468 divest the COA of its constitutionally-mandated function and
undermine its constitutional independence.
The assailed purchase of UCPB shares of stocks using the coconut levy
funds is an example of an investment of public funds. The conversion of
these special public funds into private funds by allowing private individuals
to own them in their private capacities is something else. It effectively
deprives the COA of its constitutionally-invested power to audit and settle
such accounts. The conversion of the said shares purchased using special
public funds into pure and exclusive private ownership has taken, or will
completely take away the said funds from the boundaries with which the
COA has jurisdiction. Obviously, the COA is without audit jurisdiction over
the receipt or disbursement of private property. Accordingly, Article III,
Section 5 of both P.D. Nos. 961 and 1468 must be struck down for being
unconstitutional. Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc.
(COCOFED), et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines; Wigberto E. Tanada, et
al., intervenors; Danilo S. Ursua vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. Nos.
177857-58 & G.R. No. 178193, January 24, 2012.
Decisions; statement of fact and law. Complainant alleges that respondent
members of the CAs Sixth Division violated Section 14, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution by not specifically stating the facts and the law on which
the denial of the petition for review was based. He insists that the decision
promulgated by the CAs Sixth Division had no legal foundation and did not
even address the five issues presented in the petition for review. Section 14
provides that [n]o decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based. No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of
the court shall be refused due course or denied without starting the legal
basis therefor. The Court held that the complaint was unfounded. The
essential purpose of the constitutional provision is to require that a judicial

decision be clear on why a party has prevailed under the law as applied to
the facts as proved; the provision nowhere demands that a point-by-point
consideration and resolution of the issues raised by the parties are necessary.
Re: Verified complaint of Engr. Oscar L. Ongjoco, Chairman of the
Board/CEO etc. against Hon. Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., et al., A.M. No. 11-184CA-J, January 31, 2012.
Due process; right to be heard. Petitioner COCOFEDs right to be heard had
not been violated by the mere issuance of partial summary judgments before
they can adduce their evidence. As it were, petitioners COCOFED et al.
were able to present documentary evidence in conjunction with its Class
Action Omnibus Motion dated February 23, 2001 where they appended
around 400 documents including affidavits of alleged farmers. These
petitioners manifested that said documents comprise their evidence to prove
the farmers ownership of the UCPB shares, which were distributed in
accordance with valid and existing laws. COCOFED et al. even filed their
own Motion for Separate Summary Judgment, an event reflective of their
admission that there are no more factual issues left to be determined at the
level of the Sandiganbayan. This act of filing a motion for summary
judgment is a judicial admission against COCOFED under Section 26, Rule
130 which declares that the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a
relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. Viewed in this light,
the Court rejected petitioners allegations about being deprived the right to
adduce evidence. Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc.
(COCOFED), et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines; Wigberto E. Tanada, et
al., intervenors; Danilo S. Ursua vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. Nos.
177857-58 & G.R. No. 178193, January 24, 2012.
Eminent domain; just compensation. In expropriation proceedings, just
compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken
from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the takers gain, but
the owners loss. The word just is used to intensify the meaning of the
word compensation and to convey thereby the idea that the equivalent to
be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and
ample. The constitutional limitation of just compensation is considered to
be a sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly defined as
the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course
of legal action and competition; or the fair value of the property; as between
one who receives and one who desires to sell it, fixed at the time of the

actual taking by the government. In this case, the Court affirmed the
appellate courts ruling that the commissioners properly determined the just
compensation to be awarded to the landowners whose properties were
expropriated by petitioner. The records show that the trial court dutifully
followed the procedure under Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
when it formed a committee that was tasked to determine the just
compensation for the expropriated properties. The first set of committee
members made an ocular inspection of the properties, subject of the
expropriation. They also determined the exact areas affected, as well as the
kinds and the number of improvements on the properties. When the
members were unable to agree on the valuation of the land and the
improvements thereon, the trial court selected another batch of disinterested
members to carry out the task of determining the value of the land and the
improvements. The members of the new committee even made a second
ocular inspection of the expropriated areas. They also obtained data from the
BIR to determine the zonal valuation of the expropriated properties,
interviewed the adjacent property owners, and considered other factors such
as distance from the highway and the nearby town center. Further, the
committee members also considered Provincial Ordinance No. 173, which
was promulgated by the Province of Cotabato on 15 June 1999, and which
provides the value of the properties and the improvements for taxation
purposes. The committee members based their recommendations on reliable
data and considered various factors that affected the value of the land and
the improvements.
The Court also upheld the CA ruling, which deleted the inclusion of the
value of the excavated soil in the payment for just compensation. There is no
legal basis to separate the value of the excavated soil from that of the
expropriated properties. In the context of expropriation proceedings, the soil
has no value separate from that of the expropriated land. Just compensation
ordinarily refers to the value of the land to compensate for what the owner
actually loses. Such value could only be that which prevailed at the time of
the taking. Republic of the Philippines, rep. by the National Irrigation
Administration (NIA) vs.Rural Bank of Kabacan, Inc., et al., G.R. No.
185124, January 25, 2012.
Ombudsman; due process. Petitioners were not denied due process of law
when the investigating lawyer proceeded to resolve the case based on the
affidavits and other evidence on record. Section 5(b)(1), Rule 3 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by A.O. No. 17,

provides that the hearing officer may issue an order directing the parties to
file, within ten days from receipt of the order, their respective verified
position papers on the basis of which, along with the attachments thereto, the
hearing officer may consider the case submitted for decision. It is only when
the hearing officer determines that, based on the evidence, there is a need to
conduct clarificatory hearings or formal investigations under Section 5(b)(2)
and Section 5(b)(3) that such further proceedings will be conducted. But the
determination of the necessity for further proceedings rests on the sound
discretion of the hearing officer. As the petitioners have failed to show any
cogent reason why the hearing officers determination should be overturned,
the determination will not be disturbed by this Court. The Court likewise
find no merit in petitioners contention that the new procedures under A.O.
No. 17, which took effect while the case was already undergoing trial before
the hearing officer, should not have been applied. The rule in this
jurisdiction is that one does not have a vested right in procedural rules.
While the rule admits of certain exceptions, such as when the statute itself
expressly or by necessary implication provides that pending actions are not
subject to its operation, or where to apply it would impair vested rights,
petitioners failed to show that application of A.O. No. 17 to their case would
cause injustice to them. Here, the Office of the Ombudsman afforded
petitioners every opportunity to defend themselves by allowing them to
submit counter-affidavits, position papers, memoranda and other evidence in
their defense. Since petitioners have been afforded the right to be heard and
to defend themselves, they cannot rightfully complain that they were denied
due process of law. Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always
and in all situations require a trial-type proceeding. It is satisfied when a
person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to
explain or defend himself. In administrative proceedings, the filing of
charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to
answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of
due process. More often, this opportunity is conferred through written
pleadings that the parties submit to present their charges and defenses. But
as long as a party is given the opportunity to defend his or her interests in
due course, said party is not denied due process. Gemma P. Cabalit vs.
COA-Region VII/Filadelfo S. Apit vs. COA, Legal and adjuciation, Region
VII/Leonardo G. Olaivar, etc. vs. Hon. Primo C. Miro, etc., et al., G.R. Nos.
180326/180341/180342, January 17, 2012.

Ombudsman; power to impose penalties. In the exercise of his duties, the

Ombudsman is given full administrative disciplinary authority. His power is
not limited merely to receiving, processing complaints, or recommending
penalties. He is to conduct investigations, hold hearings, summon witnesses
and require production of evidence and place respondents under preventive
suspension. This includes the power to impose the penalty of removal,
suspension, demotion, fine, or censure of a public officer or employee. The
provisions of R.A. No. 6770 taken together reveal the manifest intent of the
lawmakers to bestow on the Office of the Ombudsman full administrative
disciplinary authority. These provisions cover the entire gamut of
administrative adjudication which entails the authority to, inter alia, receive
complaints, conduct investigations, hold hearings in accordance with its
rules of procedure, summon witnesses and require the production of
documents, place under preventive suspension public officers and employees
pending an investigation, determine the appropriate penalty imposable on
erring public officers or employees as warranted by the evidence, and,
necessarily, impose the said penalty. Thus, it is settled that the Office of the
Ombudsman can directly impose administrative sanctions. Gemma P.
Cabalit vs. COA-Region VII/Filadelfo S. Apit vs. COA, Legal and
adjuciation, Region VII/Leonardo G. Olaivar, etc. vs. Hon. Primo C. Miro,
etc., et al., G.R. Nos. 180326/180341/180342, January 17, 2012.
Public funds/assets. The coconut levy funds are special public funds.
Consequently, any property purchased by means of the coconut levy funds
should likewise be treated as public funds or public property, subject to
burdens and restrictions attached by law to such property. In this case, the 6
CIIF Oil Mills were acquired by UCPB using coconut levy funds. On the
other hand, the 14 CIIF holding companies are wholly owned subsidiaries of
the CIIF Oil Mills. These companies were acquired using or whose
capitalization comes from the coconut levy funds. However, as in the case of
UCPB, UCPB itself distributed a part of its investments in the CIIF Oil Mills
to coconut farmers, and retained a part thereof as administrator. The portions
distributed to the supposed coconut farmers followed the procedure outlined
in PCA Resolution No. 033-78. And as the administrator of the CIIF holding
companies, UCPB authorized the acquisition of the SMC shares. In fact,
these companies were formed or organized solely for the purpose of holding
the SMC shares. As found by the Sandiganbayan, the 14 CIIF holding
companies used borrowed funds from UCPB to acquire the SMC shares in
the aggregate amount of P1.656 Billion. Since the CIIF companies and the

CIIF block of SMC shares were acquired using coconut levy funds funds
that have been established to be public in character it goes without saying
that these acquired corporations and assets ought to be regarded and treated
as government assets. Being government properties, they are accordingly
owned by the Government, for the coconut industry pursuant to currently
existing laws. Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED),
et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines; Wigberto E. Tanada, et al.,
intervenors; Danilo S. Ursua vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. Nos.
177857-58 & G.R. No. 178193, January 24, 2012.
Election Law
Supreme Court; review of decision of a COMELEC division. Although
Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution confers on the Court the
power to review any decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC, it limits
such power to a final decision or resolution of the COMELEC en banc, and
does not extend to an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the
COMELEC. Otherwise stated, the Court has no power to review on
certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final resolution issued by a
Division of the COMELEC. Thus, the Court has no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the petition for certiorari assailing the denial by the
COMELEC First Division of the special affirmative defenses of the
petitioner. The proper remedy is for the petitioner to wait for the COMELEC
First Division to first decide the protest on its merits, and if the result should
aggrieve him, to appeal the denial of his special affirmative defenses to the
COMELEC en banc along with the other errors committed by the Division
upon the merits.
One exception to the above rule is that the Court may take cognizance of a
petition for certiorari under Rule 64 to review an interlocutory order issued
by a Division of the COMELEC on the ground of the issuance being made
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it does not
appear to be specifically provided under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
that the matter is one that the COMELEC en banc may sit and consider, or a
Division is not authorized to act, or the members of the Division
unanimously vote to refer to the COMELEC en banc. Of necessity, the
aggrieved party can directly resort to the Court because the COMELEC en
banc is not the proper forum in which the matter concerning the assailed

interlocutory order can be reviewed. Douglas R. Cagas vs. the Commission

on Elections & Claude P. Bautista, G.R. No. 194139. January 24, 2012.
Public Officers
Public employee; grave misconduct. Grave misconduct consists in a
government officials deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of
behavior. It is regarded as grave when the elements of corruption, clear
intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rules are
present. In particular, corruption as an element of grave misconduct consists
in the officials unlawful and wrongful use of his station or reputation to
procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and
the rights of others. Rigging by a public official of bidding in the
organization where he belongs is a form of corruption. As a public officer,
private respondent had the duty to protect the process of public bidding in
his organization. A ruling that would absolve private respondent of any
liability for rigging the bids in the government office where he works on the
pretext that he was not a member of the bids and awards committee would
encourage public officers who are not members of bids committees to make
an industry of rigging bids, using their offices and official reputations.
National Power Corporation vs. Civil Service Commission & Rodrigo A.
Tanfelix, G.R. No. 152093. January 24, 2012.
Public officers; reassignment; detail versus reassignment. The issue here is
whether or not respondents reassignment constitutes constructive dismissal
entitling her to reinstatement and back wages. The Court ruled in the
affirmative. While a temporary transfer or assignment of personnel is
permissible even without the employees prior consent, it cannot be done
when the transfer is a preliminary step toward his removal, or a scheme to
lure him away from his permanent position, or when it is designed to
indirectly terminate his service, or force his resignation. Such a transfer
would in effect circumvent the provision which safeguards the tenure of
office of those who are in the Civil Service. Section 6, Rule III of CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 40, series of 1998, defines constructive dismissal
as a situation when an employee quits his work because of the agency heads
unreasonable, humiliating, or demeaning actuations which render continued
work impossible. Hence, the employee is deemed to have been illegally
dismissed. This may occur although there is no diminution or reduction of
salary of the employee. It may be a transfer from one position of dignity to a

more servile or menial job. Reassignments involving a reduction in rank,

status or salary violate an employees security of tenure, which is assured by
the Constitution, the Administrative Code of 1987, and the Omnibus Civil
Service Rules and Regulations. Security of tenure covers not only employees
removed without cause, but also cases of unconsented transfers and
reassignments, which are tantamount to illegal/constructive removal.
The Court distinguished between a detail and reassignment. A detail, as
defined and governed by Executive Order 292, Book V, Title 1, Subtitle A,
Chapter 5, Section 26 (6), is the movement of an employee from one agency
to another without the issuance of an appointment and shall be allowed only
for a limited period in the case of employees occupying professional,
technical and scientific positions. If the employee believes that there is no
justification for the detail, he may appeal his case to the Civil Service
Commission. Pending appeal, the decision to detail the employee shall be
executory unless otherwise ordered by the Commission. On the other hand, a
reassignment, as defined and governed by E.O. 292, Book V, Title 1,
Subtitle A, Chapter 5, Section 26 (7), means that an employee is reassigned
from one organizational unit to another in the same agency, provided that
such reassignment shall not involve a reduction in rank, status or salaries.
The principal distinctions between a detail and reassignment lie in the place
where the employee is to be moved and in its effectiveness pending appeal
with the CSC. A detail requires a movement from one agency to another
while a reassignment requires a movement within the same agency.
Moreover, pending appeal with the CSC, an order to detail is immediately
executory, whereas a reassignment order does not become immediately
effective.
Having ruled that respondent was constructively dismissed, the next
question is whether she is entitled to reinstatement and back wages. The
Court held that she is entitled to reinstatement but not to full back wages and
benefits. An illegally dismissed civil service employee is entitled to back
salaries but limited only to a maximum period of five years, and not full
back salaries from his illegal dismissal up to his reinstatement. Republic of
the Philippines, represented by the Civil Service Commission vs. Minerva
M.P. Pacheco, G.R. No. 178021, January 31, 2012.
Public officers; reorganization; termination of employment. The issue here is
whether the NEA Board had the power to terminate all of NEAs employees

in connection with a reorganization of the agency. Under Rule 33, Section

3(b)(ii) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the EPIRA Law, all
NEA employees shall be considered legally terminated with the
implementation of a reorganization program pursuant to a law enacted by
Congress or pursuant to Sec. 5(a)(5) of PD 269 through which the
reorganization was carried out. Petitioners argue that the power granted unto
the NEA Board to organize or reorganize does not include the power to
terminate employees but only to reduce NEAs manpower complement. The
Court disagreed and affirmed the termination of the employees.
Reorganization involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices,
or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. It
could result in the loss of ones position through removal or abolition of an
office. However, for a reorganization for the purpose of economy or to make
the bureaucracy more efficient to be valid, it must pass the test of good faith;
otherwise, it is void ab initio. Evidently, the termination of all the employees
of NEA was within the NEA Boards powers and may not successfully be
impugned absent proof of bad faith. United Claimant Association of NEA
(Unican) etc., et al. vs. National Electrification Administration (NEA), et al.,
G.R. No. 187107, January 31, 2012.
Public officers; temporary and coterminous employees. No officer or
employee in the Civil Service can be removed or suspended except for cause
provided by law. However, this admits of exceptions, as it is likewise settled
that the right to security of tenure is not available to those employees whose
appointments are temporary and coterminous in nature. Here, petitioners
appointment was temporary as he did not have the required career executive
service eligibility. An appointee without such eligibility cannot hold the
position in a permanent capacity. A temporary appointee can be removed
even without cause and at a moments notice. As to those with eligibilities,
their right to security of tenure pertain to their rank but not to the position to
which they were appointed. Petitioner never alleged that, at any time during
which he held the position in question, he had acquired the requisite
eligibility. Petitioners temporary appointment was also coterminous, or one
that is co-existent with the tenure of the appointing authority or at the latters
pleasure. As such, his replacement was not a removal but rather an
expiration of term and no prior notice, due hearing or cause were necessary
to effect the same. The acceptance of a temporary appointment divests an
appointee of the right to security of tenure against removal without cause.
One who holds a temporary appointment has no fixed tenure of office; his

employment can be terminated at the pleasure of the appointing authority,

there being no need to show that the termination is for cause. Samuel B. Ong
vs. Office of the President, et al., G.R. No. 184219. January 30, 2012.
Dissension
in
December 2011
the
Court:
Posted on January 16, 2012 by Jose Ma. G. Hofilea Posted in Constitutional Law,
Criminal Law, Philippines - Cases Tagged probation, writ of amparo
The following relates to select decisions promulgated by the High Court in

December 2011 where at least one Justice felt compelled to express his or
her dissent from the decision penned by the ponente.
1.
Probation or Not?(Abad vs. Peralta and Villarama)
In the case of Arnel Colinares vs. People of the Philippines, Arnel Colinares
was found guilty by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of frustrated homicide
and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment from two years and four months
of prisioncorreccional, as minimum, to six years and one day of
prisionmayor, as maximum. Since the maximum probationable
imprisonment under the law was only up to six years, Arnel did not qualify
for probation.
Colinares appealed to the Court of Appeals invoking self-defense and,
alternatively, seeking conviction for the lesser crime of attempted homicide
with the consequent reduction of the penalty imposed on him. However, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Acting on his Petition for Review, the Supreme Court, through Justice
Roberto A. Abad, found Colinares guilty of committing only the lesser crime
of attempted homicide with its imposable penalty of imprisonment of four
months of arrestomayor, as minimum, to two years and four months of
prisioncorreccional, as maximum. As a result, the Supreme Court held that
since the maximum imposable penalty was now less than six years,
Colinares may apply for probation upon remand of the case to the trial court.

Justice Diosadado M. Peralta took exception to this ruling of the majority,

emphasizing that probation is not a right but a privilege.
According to this dissenter, the Probation Law is clear that no application

for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected
an appeal from the judgment of conviction. And since Colinares did
exactly thati.e., he appealed from a judgment of conviction and not merely
appealed the imposition of wrong penaltythen he is not entitled to apply
for probation.
Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. joined Justice Peralta in dissenting on the
point relating to the granting to Colenares of a right to apply for
probation. This dissenter cited the precedent of Francisco vs, Court of
Appeals particular;y the pronouncement therein that [p]robation is not a
right of an accused, but rather an act of grace of clemency or immunity
conferredconferred by the court to a seemingly deserving defendant who
thereby escapes the extreme rigors of the penalty imposed by law for the
offense of which he stands convicted.
For Justice Villarama, the majority decision carves out an exception not
found in and contrary to the purpose of the probation law. He adds that the
the policy of liberality of probation statutes cannot prevail against the
categorical provisions of the law.
Justice Abad defends the majority ruling on this point by (i) clarifying that
the High Court is not saying that Colinares has a right to be granted
probation, only that in view of the reduced maximum sentence, he has a
right to apply for probation, with the trial judge still having the discretion to
decide whether or not to grant him the privilege of probation, taking into
account the full circumstances of his case, and (ii) explaining that even if it
may be the case that under the probation law the accused who appeals from
the judgment of conviction is disqualified from availing himself of the
benefits of probation, in this case, the RTCs judgment has been annulled
and this, to say that Colinares is not now entitled to apply for probation will
be to apply the probation law based on the trial courts erroneous, and
thereafter annulled, judgment.

From a zoological perspective, Justice Abad concludes:

And, worse, Arnel will now also be made to pay for the trial courts
erroneous judgment with the forfeiture of his right to apply for probation.
Ang kabayo ang nagkasala, ang hagupit ay sa kalabaw (the horse errs, the
carabao gets the whip). Where is justice there?
Specifically addressing the views expressed by the dissenters, the majority
ruled that the case of Colinares differs from the Francisco case in that in the
Francisco case, the accused was convicted and meted out a probationary
penalty. But instead of applying for probation, the convicted party chose to
appeal his conviction, thereby forfeiting the opportunity to apply for
probation.
In this case, Colinares did not have a choice on whether to apply for
probation or to appeal since the sentence handed down by the RTC (which
was later annulled by the Court) did not grant to him a right to apply for
probation.
In addition, on the dissenting view that allowing Arnel to apply for probation
after he appealed from the trial courts judgment of conviction would not be
consistent with the provision of Section 2 that the Probation Law should be
interpreted to provide an opportunity for the reformation of a penitent
offender (because an accused like Arnel who appeals from a judgment
convicting him shows no penitence), Justice Abad notes that there would be
no issue on this point if the trial court meted out on Colinares a correct
judgment of conviction. For [h]ow can the Court expect him to feel
penitent over a crime, which as the Court now finds, he did not commit?
queries the ponente.
(Arnel Colinares vs. People of the Philippines, December 13, 2011, G.R. No.
182748. See dissenting opinions: J. Peralta, J. Villarama
(authors note: To this author, there is wisdom and therefore merit to the
distinction made by the majority. Applying for probation essentially means
that a convicted person accepts his conviction but asks for a degree of
clemency. But horses and carabaos aside, even based only on human gut
feel, it seems that there is something just not right in depriving a person of a

right to at least ask for probation if the original conviction that caused his
non-entitlement was found to have been wrong.)
2.
Writ of Amparo (Villarama vs. Sereno)
The main issues in the consolidated cases of Arthur Balao, et al. vs. Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, et al. and President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al.
vs. Arthur Balao, et al. have to do with the standards for the issuance of a
writ of Amparo as well as Presidential immunity.
Sometime in September of 2008, James M. Balao, a Psychology and
Economics graduate of the University of the Philippines-Baguio and among
other things, a founder of the Cordillera Peoples Alliance (CPA), a coalition
of non-government organizations working for the cause of indigenous
peoples in the Cordillera Region, was abducted by unidentified men in la
Trinidad, Benguet.
Inquiries and investigations followed the disappearance of James Balao but
even so, on October 8, 2008, Jamess siblings filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of
Amparo in favor of James Balao with an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the
immediate issuance of the writ of Amparo. Officials of the Military, the
Defense Department, the Executive Secretary and the President of the
Philippines were included as respondents.
The following day, October 9, 2008, the Writ of Amparowas issued directing
respondents to file their verified return together with their supporting
affidavit within five days from receipt of the writ.
In their return, the respondents contended that the petition failed to meet the
requirement in the Rules on the Writ of Amparo that claims must be
established by substantial evidence. They also moved to have President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo dropped as a party on account of Presidential
immunity.
In its decision, the RTC ordered the issuance of a Writ of Amparo ordering
the respondents to (a) disclose where James Balao is detained or confined,
(b) to release James Balao considering his unlawful detention since his

abduction and (c) to cease and desist from further inflicting harm upon his
person.
The RTC believed that more likely than not, the motive for Jamess
disappearance is his activist/political leanings and that Jamess case is one of
an enforced disappearance as defined under the Rules on the Writ of Amparo
considering the several incidents of harassment mentioned in testimonies
and in the petition; and the references in the petition to the CPA as a front
for the CPP-NPA.
The RTC likewise ruled that the government violated Jamess right to
security of person as the investigation conducted by respondents was very
limited, superficial and one-sided.
It also denied the prayer to drop the President as a party. However, certain
interim reliefs sought by the petitioners (inspection, production and witness
protection orders) were denied by the RTC due to the failure of the
petitioners to comply with the stringent provisions on the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo and substantiate the same.
Both parties appealed to this Court.
In disposing of the consolidated cases, Justice Martic S. Villarama, Jr., as
ponente, zeroed in on Section 18 of the Amparo Rule which states:
SEC. 18. Judgment. The court shall render judgment within ten (10) days
from the time the petition is submitted for decision. If the allegations in the
petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the
privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate;
otherwise, the privilege shall be denied. (Emphasis supplied.)
Therefore, according the Justice Villarama, the threshold issue is whether
the totality of evidence satisfied the degree of proof required by the Amparo
Rule to establish an enforced disappearance.
The majority observed that the trial court gave considerable weight to
briefing papers supposedly obtained from the AFP indicating that the antiinsurgency campaign of the military under the administration of President

Arroyo included targeting of identified legal organizations under the NDF,

which included the CPA, and their members, as enemies of the state and
that this campaign resulted in the prevalence of extrajudicial killings. Based
on such, the petitioners postulated that the surveillance on James and his
subsequent abduction are interconnected with the harassments, surveillance,
threats and political assassination of other members and officers of CPA
which is his organization.
The majority decision held that such documented practice of targeting
activists in the militarys counter-insurgency program by itself does not
fulfill the evidentiary standard provided in the Amparo Rule to establish an
enforced disappearance.
Justice Villarama wrote that the similarity between the circumstances
attending a particular case of abduction with those surrounding previous
instances of enforced disappearances does not, necessarily, carry sufficient
weight to prove that the government orchestrated such abduction.
Accordingly, the trial court in this case cannot simply infer government
involvement in the abduction of James from past similar incidents in which
the victims also worked or affiliated with the CPA and other left-leaning
groups.
Moreover, the Court held that the participation in any manner of military and
police authorities, who had been impleaded on the basis of a command
responsibility assertion, in the abduction of James has not been adequately
proven.
On the matter of President Arroyos inclusion as party-respondent, the
ponente stated that the RTC clearly erred in holding that presidential
immunity cannot be properly invoked in an Amparo proceeding. As
president, then President Arroyo enjoyed immunity from suit at the time the
petition for a writ of Amparo was filed and moreover, the petition did not
allege what specific presidential act or omission violated or threatened to
violate petitioners protected rights.
The sole dissenter, Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno, took the view that
[w]hile the substantial evidence rule remains the standard in Amparo
proceedings, flexibility should be observed. Courts must consider evidence

adduced in its totality, including that which would otherwise be deemed

inadmissible if consistent with the admissible evidence adduced.
Justice Sereno took issue with the majority decisions thesis that the
similarity between past abductions and the present case of enforced
disappearance is not sufficient basis for the issuance of a writ of
Amparo. Citing international jurisprudence, specifically the ruling of the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights in Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras,
the dissenting opinion noted that inn that case, the tribunal found that once a
pattern or practice of enforced disappearances supported or tolerated by the
government is established, a present case of disappearance may be linked to
that practice and proven through circumstantial evidence or logical
inference.
On the issue of Presidential immunity, the dissenter opined that [t] he
majority Decision states that former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
(former President Arroyo) should have been accorded presidential immunity,
as she was the incumbent President when the present Petitions were filed.
This position is not in accord with the ruling of this Court in Estrada v.
Desierto, in which it was explicitly held that a non-sitting President does not
enjoy immunity from suit even for acts committed during the latters
tenure.
Instead of dropping president Arroyo as a party on the basis of Presidential
immunity, Justice Sereno argued that the dismissal should have been on a
finding that petitioners failed to make allegations or adduce evidence to
show her responsibility or accountability for violation of or threat to James
Balaos right to life, liberty and security.
(Arthur Balao, et al. vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al. / President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, et al. , December 13, 2011, G.R. Nos.
186050/186059. See dissenting opinion here.)
October 2011 Supreme

Court
Posted on November 14, 2011 by Vicente D. Gerochi IV Posted in Constitutional Law,

Philippines - Cases
Here are selected October 2011 rulings of the Supreme Court of the
Philippines on political law:
Constitutional Law
Constitutionality of RA 10153. Republic Act 10153 reset the ARMM elections
from August 8, 2011, to the second Monday of May 2013 and every three years
thereafter, to coincide with the countrys regular national and local elections. The law
also granted the President the power to appoint officers in charge for the Office of
the ARMM Regional Governor, the Regional Vice-Governor, and the Members of the
Regional Legislative Assembly, who will hold said offices until the officials duly
elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office. In
addressing the constitutionality of this law, the Court discussed the following issues:
Does the Constitution mandate the synchronization of elections? Yes. While the
Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and
local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the
Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which show the extent to
which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the
terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization of elections. The
objective behind setting a common termination date for all elective officials, done
among others through the shortening the terms of the twelve winning senators with
the least number of votes, is to synchronize the holding of all future elections
whether national or local to once every three years. This intention finds full support
in the discussions during the Constitutional Commission deliberations. These
Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the provisions of the Transitory
Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the constitutional
mandate to hold synchronized national and local elections, starting the second
Monday of May, 1992 and for all the following elections. Although called regional
elections, the ARMM elections should be included among the elections to be
synchronized as it is a local election based on the wording and structure of the
Constitution.
Does the passage of RA 10153 violate Section 26(2), Article VI of the

Constitution? No. That section provides that before a bill passed by either the House
or the Senate can become law, it must pass through three readings on separate
days. The exception is when the President certifies to the necessity of the bills
immediate enactment. In this case, the records show that the President wrote to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate
enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local
elections. Following Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, the Presidents certification
exempted both the House and the Senate from having to comply with the three
separate readings requirement.
Does the requirement of a supermajority vote for amendments or revisions to RA

9054 violate Section 1 and Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution and the
corollary doctrine on irrepealable laws? Yes. Even assuming that RA 9333 and RA
10153 did in fact amend RA 9054 (the Court ruled in this case that those two laws
did not amend RA 9054), the supermajority (2/3) voting requirement required under
Section 1, Article XVII of RA 9054 has to be struck down for giving that law the
character of an irrepealable law by requiring more than what the Constitution
demands. RA 9054 is the Second Organic Act of the ARMM, which provided that the
first ARMM elections would be held on the second Monday of September 2001. RA
9333 is one of several laws prior to RA 10153 that reset the date of the ARMM
regional elections. Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution provides that a
majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business. As long as
majority of the members of the House of Representatives or the Senate are present,
these bodies have the quorum needed to conduct business and hold session. Within
a quorum, a vote of majority is generally sufficient to enact laws or approve acts. In
contrast, Section 1, Article XVII of RA 9054 requires a vote of no less than 2/3 of the
Members of the House of Representatives and of the Senate, voting separately, in
order to amend that law. Clearly, this 2/3 voting requirement is higher than what
the Constitution requires for the passage of bills, and served to restrain the plenary
powers of Congress to amend, revise or repeal the laws it had passed. While a
supermajority is not a total ban against a repeal, it is a limitation in excess of what
the Constitution requires on the passage of bills and is constitutionally obnoxious
because it significantly constricts the future legislators room for action and
flexibility.
Does the requirement of a plebiscite apply only to the creation of autonomous
regions under paragraph 2, Section 18, Article X of the Constitution? Yes. RA 9054
enlarged the plebiscite requirement in the Constitution with respect to the
ARMM. This enlargement violates Section 18, Article X of the Constitution. Section
18 states that a plebiscite is required only for the creation of autonomous regions
and for determining which provinces, cities and geographic areas will be included in
the autonomous regions. This means that only amendments to, or revisions of, the
Organic Act constitutionally-essential to the creation ofautonomous regions i.e.,
those aspects specifically mentioned in the Constitution which Congress must provide
for in the Organic Act require ratification through a plebiscite. These amendments
to the Organic Act are those that relate to: (a) the basic structure of the regional
government;
(b)
the
regions
judicial
system,
i.e.,
the special courts with personal, family, and property law jurisdiction; and, (c) the
grant and extent of the legislative powers constitutionally conceded to the regional
government under Section 20, Article X of the Constitution. The date of the ARMM
elections does not fall under any of the matters that the Constitution specifically
mandated Congress to provide for in the Organic Act. Therefore, any change in the
date of elections cannot be construed as a substantial amendment of the Organic Act
that would require compliance with the plebiscite requirement.
Does RA 10153 violate the autonomy granted to the ARMM? No. Petitioners argued
that while synchronization may be constitutionally mandated, it cannot be used to
defeat or to impede the autonomy that the Constitution granted to the ARMM.
Phrased in this manner, one would presume that there exists a conflict between two
recognized Constitutional mandates synchronization and regional autonomy such
that it is necessary to choose one over the other. The Court found this to be an
erroneous approach that violates a basic principle in constitutional construction that

the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole, and one mandate should not be
given importance over the other except where the primacy of one over the other is
clear. Synchronization is an interest that is as constitutionally entrenched as
regional autonomy. They are interests that the Court should reconcile and give effect
to, in the way that Congress did in RA 10153, which provides the measure to transit
to synchronized regional elections with the least disturbance on the interests that
must be respected. Particularly, regional autonomy will be respected instead of
being sidelined, as the law does not in any way alter, change or modify its governing
features, except in a very temporary manner and only as necessitated by the
attendant circumstances. Further, while autonomous regions are granted political
autonomy, the framers of the Constitution never equated autonomy with
independence. The ARMM as a regional entity thus continues to operate within the
larger framework of the State and is still subject to the national policies set by the
national government, save only for those specific areas reserved by the Constitution
for regional autonomous determination. The autonomy granted to the ARMM cannot
be invoked to defeat national policies and concerns. Since the synchronization of
elections is not just a regional concern but a national one, the ARMM is subject to it;
the regional autonomy granted to the ARMM cannot be used to exempt the region
from having to act in accordance with a national policy mandated by no less than the
Constitution.
Given the constitutional objective of synchronization, did Congress gravely abuse its
discretion or violate the Constitution when it addressed through RA 10153 the
concomitant problems that the adjustment of elections necessarily brought with
it? No. The Court here identified the following options open to Congress in order to
resolve the problems: (1) allow the elective officials in the ARMM to remain in office
in a hold over capacity until those elected in the synchronized elections assume
office; (2) hold special elections in the ARMM, with the terms of those elected to
expire when those elected in the synchronized elections assume office; or (3)
authorize the President to appoint officers in charge, pursuant to Section 3 of RA
10153, until those elected in the synchronized elections assume office. The Court
held that in choosing to grant the President the power to appoint OICs, Congress
chose the correct option and passed RA 10153 as a valid law.
Holdover option is unconstitutional. This option violates Section 8, Article X of
the Constitution, which states that the term of office of elective local officials, except
barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no
such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Since elective ARMM
officials are local officials, they are covered and bound by the three-year term limit
prescribed by the Constitution; Congress cannot extend their term through a law
allowing officials to serve in a holdover capacity. If it will be claimed that the
holdover period is effectively another term mandated by Congress, the net result is
for Congress to create a new term and to appoint the occupant for the new term.
This view like the extension of the elective term is constitutionally infirm
because Congress cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way
that would effectively extend the term of the incumbents. Congress cannot also
create a new term and effectively appoint the occupant of the position for the new
term. This is effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional
intrusion into the constitutional appointment power of the President.

COMELEC has no authority to order special elections. Another option proposed
by the petitioner is for this Court to compel COMELEC to immediately conduct special
elections pursuant to Section 5 and 6 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 881. The power to
fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature. Congress has acted on
the ARMM elections by postponing the scheduled August 2011 elections and setting
another date May 13, 2011 for regional elections synchronized with the
presidential, congressional and other local elections. By so doing, Congress itself has
madea policy decision in the exercise of its legislative wisdom that it shall not call
special elections as an adjustment measure in synchronizing the ARMM elections with
the other elections. After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the
Judiciary can act to the contrary by ordering special elections instead at the call of
the COMELEC. The Court, particularly, cannot make this call without thereby
supplanting the legislative decision and effectively legislating. Further, the
constitutional power of COMELEC, in contrast with the power of Congress to call for
and to set the date of elections, is limited to enforcing and administering all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election. COMELEC has no power to call for
the holding of special elections unless pursuant to a specific statutory grant.
The Court has no power to shorten the terms of elective officials. Even
assuming that it is legally permissible for the Court to compel the COMELEC to hold
special elections, no legal basis exists to rule that the newly elected ARMM officials
shall hold office only until the ARMM officials elected in the synchronized elections
shall have assumed office. The Court is not empowered to adjust the terms of
elective officials. Based on the Constitution, the power to fix the term of office of
elective officials, which can be exercised only in the case of barangay officials, is
specifically given to Congress. Even Congress itself may be denied such power, as
shown when the Constitution shortened the terms of twelve Senators obtaining the
least votes in the 1992 congressional elections, and extended the terms of the
President and the Vice-President in order to synchronize elections; Congress was not
granted this same power. The settled rule is that terms fixed by the Constitution
cannot be changed by mere statute. More particularly, not even Congress and
certainly not the Court, has the authority to fix the terms of elective local officials in
the ARMM forless, or more, than the constitutionally mandated three years, as this
tinkering would directly contravene Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. In the
same way that the term of elective ARMM officials cannot be extended through a
holdover, the term cannot be shortened by putting an expiration date earlier than
the three years that the Constitution itself commands. This is what will happen a
term of less than two years if a call for special elections shall prevail.
Does the grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs violate the
Constitution? No. The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the
limitations on or qualifications to the exercise of this power should be strictly
construed; these limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be
recognized. The appointing power is embodied in Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution, which pertinently states that the President shall appoint all other
officers of the government whose whom the President may be authorized by law to
appoint. Since the Presidents authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA 10153, it
falls under this group of officials that the President can appoint pursuant to Section
16, Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, the assailed law rests on clear constitutional
basis.

If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority to appoint OICs
under Section 3 of RA 10153 is the assertion that the Constitution requires that the
ARMM executive and legislative officials be elective and representative of the
constituent political units. This requirement indeed is an express limitation whose
non-observance in the assailed law leaves the appointment of OICs constitutionally
defective. But the Court said this alleged constitutional problem is more apparent
than real and becomes very real only if RA 10153 were to be mistakenly read as a
law that changes the elective and representative character of ARMM positions. RA
10153, however, does not in any way amend what the organic law of the ARMM sets
outs in terms of structure of governance. What RA 10153 in fact only does is to
appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice
Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the
functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013
elections shall have qualified and assumed office. This power is far different from
appointing elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated term ending on the
assumption to office of the officials elected in the May 2013 elections.
Given the plain unconstitutionality of providing for a holdover and the unavailability
of constitutional possibilities for lengthening or shortening the term of the elected
ARMM officials, is the choice of the Presidents power to appoint for a fixed and
specific period as an interim measure, and as allowed under Section 16, Article VII of
the Constitution an unconstitutional or unreasonable choice for Congress to
make? Admittedly, the grant of the power to the President under other situations or
where the power of appointment would extend beyond the adjustment period for
synchronization would be to foster a government that is not democratic and
republican. For then, the peoples right to choose the leaders to govern them may
be said to be systemically withdrawn to the point of fostering an undemocratic
regime. This is the grant that would frontally breach the elective and
representative governance requirement of Section 18, Article X of the
Constitution. But this conclusion would not be true under the very limited
circumstances contemplated in RA 10153 where the period is fixed and, more
important, the terms of governance both under Section 18, Article X of the
Constitution and RA 9054 will not systemically be touched nor affected at all. RA
9054 will govern unchanged and continuously, with full effect in accordance with the
Constitution, save only for the interim and temporary measures that synchronization
of elections requires.
Viewed from another perspective, synchronization will temporarily disrupt the
election process in a local community, the ARMM, as well as the communitys choice
of leaders, but this will take place under a situation of necessity and as an interim
measure in the manner that interim measures have been adopted and used in the
creation of local government units and the adjustments of sub-provinces to the
status of provinces. These measures, too, are used in light of the wider national
demand for the synchronization of elections (considered vis--vis the regional
interests involved). The adoption of these measures, in other words, is no different
from the exercise by Congress of the inherent police power of the State, where one
of the essential tests is the reasonableness of the interim measure taken in light of
the given circumstances.
Furthermore, the representative character of the chosen leaders need not

necessarily be affected by the appointment of OICs as this requirement is really a
function of the appointment process; only the elective aspect shall be supplanted
by the appointment of OICs. In this regard, RA 10153 significantly seeks to address
concerns arising from the appointments by providing, under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of
the assailed law, concrete terms in the Appointment of OIC, the Manner and
Procedure of Appointing OICs, and their Qualifications. Datu Michael Abas Kida, etc.,
et al. vs. Senate of the Philippines, etc., et al./Basari D. Mapupuno vs. Sixto
Brillantes, etc., et al./Rep. Edcel C. Lagman vs. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., etc., et
al./Almarin Centi Tillah, et al. vs. The Commission on Elections, etc., et al./Atty.
Romulo B. Macalintal vs. Commission on Elections, et al./Luis Barok Biraogo vs.
The Commission on Elections, et al./Jacinto V. Paras vs. Executive Secretary, et al.,
G.R. No. 196271/G.R. No. 196305/G.R. No. 197221/G.R. No. 197280/G.R. No.
197282/G.R. No. 197392/G.R. No. 197454. October 18, 2011.
Ombudsman; power to grant immunity. In this case, petitioner argues that by
excluding the respondents in the information, the Ombudsman is engaged in
selective prosecution which is a clear case of grave abuse of discretion. He claims
that before the Ombudsman may avail of the respondents as state witnesses, they
must be included first in the information filed with the court. Thereafter, the
Ombudsman can ask the court for their discharge so that they can be used as state
witnesses under the conditions laid down in Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of
Court. The Supreme Court held petitioners claim to be erroneous. The Ombudsman
has the power to grant immunity by itself and even prior to the filing of information
in court. RA No. 6770 fully recognizes this prosecutory prerogative by empowering
the Ombudsman to grant immunity, subject to such terms and conditions as he
may determine. The only textual limitation imposed by law on this authority is the
need to take into account the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court, i.e.,
Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. The rule under RA No. 6770 clarifies that
in cases already filed with the courts, the prosecution merely makes a proposal and
initiates the process of granting immunity to an accused-witness in order to use him
as a witness against his co-accused. If there is any distinction at all between the
public prosecutor and the Ombudsman in this endeavor, it is in the specificity of and
the higher priority given by law to the Ombudsmans purpose and objective. This
accounts for the Ombudsmans unique power to grant immunity by itself and even
prior to the filing of information in court, a power that the public prosecutor himself
generally does not enjoy. Thus, there was no grave abuse of discretion in this
case. Erdito Quarto vs. The Hon. Ombudsman Simeon Marcelo, et al., G.R. No.
169042. October 5, 2011.
Police power; zoning. Congress expressly granted the city government, through the
city council, police power by virtue of Section 12(oo) of Republic Act No. 537, or the
Revised Charter of Quezon City. With regard to the power of local government units
to issue zoning ordinances, jurisprudence has recognized that the government may
enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses
and occupations to promote the general welfare. However, the interference must be
reasonable and not arbitrary. Based on the foregoing, the power to establish zones
for industrial, commercial and residential uses is derived from the police power itself
and is exercised for the protection and benefit of the residents of a locality. In this
case, it is clear that the primary objectives of the city council of Quezon City when it
issued the questioned ordinance ordering the construction of arcades were the health
and safety of the city and its inhabitants; the promotion of their prosperity; and the

improvement of their morals, peace, good order, comfort, and the convenience.
These arcades provide safe and convenient passage along the sidewalk for
commuters and pedestrians, not just the residents of Quezon City. More especially
so because the contested portion of the building is located on a busy segment of the
city, in a business zone along EDSA. Consequently, the enactment of the ordinance
in this case is within the power of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Quezon City and
any resulting burden on those affected cannot be said to be unjust. Emilio Gancayco
vs. Cito Government of Quezon City and Metro Manila Development Authority/Metro
Manila Development Authority vs. Justice Emilio A. Gancayco (Retired), G.R. No.
177807/G.R. No. 177933. October 11, 2011.
Right to privacy; unreasonable search and seizure. This case involves a search of
office computer assigned to a government employee who was charged
administratively and eventually dismissed from the service. The employees personal
files stored in the computer were used by the government employer as evidence of
misconduct. Petitioner questions the legality of the search conducted on his office
computer and the copying of his personal files without his knowledge and
consent. He said this search violated his constitutional right to privacy. The right to
privacy is a facet of the right protected by the guarantee against unreasonable
search and seizure under Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
Relying on US jurisprudence, the Court noted that the existence of privacy right
involves a two-fold requirement: first, that a person has exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy; and second, that the expectation be one that
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable (objective). Once the right is
established, the next inquiry is whether the search alleged to have violated such
right was reasonable. This proceeds from the principle that the constitutional
guarantee under Section 2, Article III, is not a prohibition of all searches and
seizures but only of unreasonable searches and seizures.
In the case of searches conducted by a public employer, the court needs to balance
the invasion of the employees legitimate expectations of privacy against the
governments need for supervision, control, and the efficient operation of the
workplace. A public employers intrusions on the constitutionally protected privacy
interests of government employees for non-investigatory, work-related purposes, as
well as for investigations of work-related misconduct, should be judged by the
standard of reasonableness under all the circumstances. Under this reasonableness
standard, both the inception and the scope of the intrusion must be
reasonable. Ordinarily, a search of an employees office by a supervisor will be
justified at its inception when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the
search will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct,
or that the search is necessary for a non-investigatory work-related purpose. The
search will be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably
related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the
nature of the misconduct.
Applying the above standards and principles, the Court then addressed the following
issues: (1) Did petitioner have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office and
computer files?; and (2) Was the search authorized by the respondent Civil Service
Commission Chair, the copying of the contents of the hard drive on petitioners

computer, reasonable in its inception and scope? Here, the relevant surrounding
circumstances to consider include: (1) the employees relationship to the item
seized; (2) whether the item was in the immediate control of the employee when it
was seized; and (3) whether the employee took actions to maintain his privacy in the
item.
The Court answered the first issue in the negative. Petitioner failed to prove that he
had an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy either in his office or governmentissued computer which contained his personal files. Petitioner did not allege that he
had a separate enclosed office which he did not share with anyone, or that his office
was always locked and not open to other employees or visitors. Neither did he
allege that he used passwords or adopted any means to prevent other employees
from accessing his computer files. On the contrary, he submits that being in the
public assistance office of the CSC, he normally would have visitors in his
office. Even assuming that petitioner had at least a subjective expectation of privacy
in his computer as he claims, the same is negated by the presence of policy
regulating the use of office computers. The CSC had implemented a policy that puts
its employees on notice that they have no expectation of privacy in anything they
create, store, send or receive on the office computers. Under this policy, the CSC
may monitor the use of the computer resources using both automated or human
means. This implies that on-the-spot inspections may be done to ensure that
computer resources were used only for legitimate business purposes.
On the second issue, the Court answered in the affirmative. The search of
petitioners computer files was conducted in connection with an investigation of
work-related misconduct. Under the facts obtaining, the Court held that the search
conducted on petitioners computer was justified at its inception and in
scope. Briccio Ricky A. Pollo vs. Chairperson Karina Constantino-David, et al., G.R.
No. 181881. October 18, 2011.
Administrative Law
Administrative agencies; due process. Procedural due process is the constitutional
standard demanding that notice and an opportunity to be heard be given before
judgment is rendered. As long as a party is given the opportunity to defend his
interests in due course, he would have no reason to complain; the essence of due
process is in the opportunity to be heard. A formal or trial-type hearing is not
always necessary. In this case, while the petitioner did not participate in the August
17, 2006 pre-hearing conference (despite receipt on August 14, 2006 of a fax copy
of the August 11, 2006 order) conducted by the GSIS, GSIS President and General
Manager Winston Garcias decision of February 21, 2007 duly considered and
discussed the defenses raised in the pleadings filed by petitioners
counsel. Furthermore, what negates any due process infirmity is the petitioners
subsequent motion for reconsideration which cured whatever defect the Hearing
Officer might have committed in the course of hearing the petitioners case. Again,
Garcia duly considered the arguments presented in the petitioners motion for
reconsideration when he rendered the June 6, 2007 resolution. Thus, the petitioner
was actually heard through his pleadings. Monico K. Imperial, Jr. vs. Government
Service Insurance System, G.R. No. 191224. October 4, 2011.

Administrative agencies; findings of facts. In this case, petitioner was found to have
committed the acts complained of, i.e., he approved the requests for salary loans of
eight GSIS Naga Field Office employees who lacked the necessary contribution
requirements under PPG No. 153-99. However, the Supreme Court disagreed with
the findings of the GSIS, the CSC and the CA that the petitioners acts constituted
grave misconduct. While great respect is accorded to the factual findings of
administrative agencies, the Supreme Court did not characterize the offense
committed as grave. No substantial evidence was adduced to support the elements
of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established
rule that must be present to characterize the misconduct as grave. Under the
circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court did not see the type of open defiance
and disregard of GSIS rules that the CSC observed. In fact, the CSCs findings on
the petitioners actions prior to the approval of the loans negate the presence of any
intent on the petitioners part to deliberately defy the policy of the GSIS. First, GSIS
branch managers have been granted in the past the authority to approve loan
applications beyond the prescribed requirements of GSIS; second, there was a
customary lenient practice in the approval of loans exercised by some branch
managers notwithstanding the existing GSIS policy; and third, the petitioner first
sought the approval of his immediate supervisor before acting on the loan
applications. These circumstances run counter to the characteristic flagrant disregard
of the rules that grave misconduct requires. Thus, the his liability under the given
facts was found to constitute as simple misconduct only. Monico K. Imperial, Jr. vs.
Government Service Insurance System, G.R. No. 191224. October 4, 2011.
Administrative proceedings; due process. Due process in administrative proceedings
requires compliance with the following cardinal principles: (1) the respondents right
to a hearing, which includes the right to present ones case and submit supporting
evidence, must be observed; (2) the tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) the decision must have some basis to support itself; (4) there must be
substantial evidence; (5) the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented
at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties
affected; (6) in arriving at a decision, the tribunal must have acted on its own
consideration of the law and the facts of the controversy and must not have simply
accepted the views of a subordinate; and (7) the decision must be rendered in such
manner that respondents would know the reasons for it and the various issues
involved. In the present case, the fifth requirement was not complied with. Reyes
was not properly apprised of the evidence offered against him, which were
eventually made the bases of petitioners decision that found him guilty of grave
misconduct. The fact that Reyes was able to assail the adverse decision of the
petitioner via a Motion for Reconsideration Cum Motion to Set the Case for
Preliminary Conference did not cure the violation of his right to due process in this
case. Reyes filed the said motion precisely to raise the issue of the violation of his
right to due process. As it were, petitioner rendered its Decision dated September
24, 2001 on the basis of evidence that were not disclosed to Reyes. Thus, it cannot
be said that Reyes had a fair opportunity to squarely and intelligently answer the
accusations therein or to offer any rebuttal evidence thereto. Office of the
Ombudsman vs. Antonio T. Reyes, G.R. No. 170512. October 5, 2011.
Government contract; lack of appropriation. Petitioner DPWH argues that the
contracts with respondents were void for not complying with Sections 85 and 86
of Presidential Decree 1445, or the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines, as

amended by Executive Order No. 292. These sections require an appropriation for
the contracts and a certification by the chief accountant of the agency or by the head
of its accounting unit as to the availability of funds. In this case, there was an
appropriation amounting to Php400 million, which was increased to Php700
million. The funding was for the rehabilitation of the areas devastated and affected
by the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo, which included the Sacobia-Bamban-Parua River for
which some of the channeling, desilting and diking works were rendered by
respondents construction companies. It was, however, undisputed that there was
no certification from the chief accountant of DPWH regarding the availability of funds
for the disputed expenditure. In spite of the lack of certification, however, the
Supreme Court held that jurisprudence has consistently recognized the rule that
payment for services done on account of the government, but based on a void
contract, cannot be avoided. The contract in this case was not illegal per se.
Department of Public Works and Highways vs. Ronald E. Quiwa, doing under the
name R.E.Q. Construction, et al., G.R. No. 183444. October 12, 2011.
Government construction contracts; price escalation. The issue here is whether
Presidential Decree 1594 requires the contractor to prove that the price increase of
construction materials was due to the direct acts of the government before a price
escalation is granted in a construction contract. Petitioner argues that Section 8 of
PD 1594 requires the following conditions before an adjustment of the contract price
may be made: (i) there was an increase or a decrease in the cost of labor,
equipment, materials and supplies for construction; and (ii) the increase or decrease
is due to the direct acts of the government. Petitioner stresses that respondent
failed to show the existence of these conditions. The Court disagreed. The
contractor does not need to prove that the increase in construction cost was due to
the direct acts of the government. PD 454, which was enacted prior to PD 1594,
provides (in relation to adjustment of contract price for public works projects) that
increase of prices of gasoline and other fuel oils and of cement shall be considered
direct acts of the Government. Consequently, when PD 1594 reproduced the phrase
direct acts of the government without supplying a contrary or different definition,
the definition and coverage provided by the earlier enacted PD 454 were deemed
adopted by the later decree. Thus, proof of increase in fuel or cement price during
the contract period is enough to justify a claim for price escalation based on such
increase. Philippine Economic zone Authority vs. Green Asia Construction &
Development Corporation, etc., G.R. No. 188866. October 19, 2011.
MMDA; power to demolish. MMDA alleges that by virtue of MMDA Resolution No. 0228, Series of 2002, it is empowered to demolish Justice Gancaycos property. It
further alleges that it demolished the property pursuant to the Building Code in
relation to Ordinance No. 2904, as amended. However, the Supreme Court held that
the power to enforce the provisions of the Building Code was lodged in the
Department of Public Works and Highways, not in MMDA. Since there was no
evidence that the MMDA had been delegated by the DPWH to implement the Building
Code, it necessarily had no authority to carry out the demolition. Additionally, the
penalty prescribed by Ordinance No. 2904 itself does not include the demolition of
illegally constructed buildings in case of violations. Instead, it merely prescribes a
punishment of a fine or by imprisonment, or both, at the discretion of the court. The
ordinance itself clearly states that it is the regular courts that will determine whether
there was a violation of the ordinance. Emilio Gancayco vs. Cito Government of

Quezon City and Metro Manila Development Authority/Metro Manila Development
Authority vs. Justice Emilio A. Gancayco (Retired), G.R. No. 177807/G.R. No.
177933. October 11, 2011.
Election Law
Election protest; failure to file preliminary conference brief. In exercising its powers
and jurisdiction, as defined by its mandate to protect the integrity of elections, the
COMELEC must not be straitjacketed by procedural rules in resolving election
disputes. Here, notwithstanding the fact that petitioners motion for reconsideration
was not verified, the COMELEC should have considered the merits of the said motion
in light of petitioners meritorious claim that he was not given timely notice of the
date set for the preliminary conference. The essence of due process is to be afforded
a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence in support of ones
claim or defense. It is the denial of this opportunity that constitutes violation of due
process of law. Procedural due process demands prior notice and hearing. The fact
that petitioner somehow acquired knowledge or information of the date set for the
preliminary conference by means other than the official notice sent by the COMELEC
is not an excuse to dismiss his protest, because it cannot be denied that he was not
afforded reasonable notice and time to adequately prepare for and submit his
brief. This is precisely the reason why petitioner was only able to file his Preliminary
Conference Brief on the day of the conference itself. Hence, by denying petitioners
motion for reconsideration, without taking into consideration the violation of his right
to procedural due process, the COMELEC also guilty of grave abuse of
discretion. Salvador D. Violago, Sr. vs. Commission on Elections and Joan V. Alarilla,
G.R. No. 194143. October 4, 2011.
Public Officers
Public officers; dishonesty. Good faith is ordinarily used to describe that state of
mind denoting honesty of intention and freedom from knowledge of circumstances
which ought to put the holder upon inquiry. In other words, good faith is actually a
question of intention. Although this is something internal, one can ascertain a
persons intention not from his own protestation of good faith, which is self-serving,
but from evidence of his conduct and outward acts. In this case, the facts and
circumstances surrounding petitioners acquisition of the Certificate of Eligibility cast
serious doubts on his good faith. He made a deal with a retired CSC official and
accepted the Certificate of Eligibility from the latters representative. These
circumstances reveal petitioners knowledge that the CSC official could have pulled
strings in order to obtain his Certificate of Eligibility and have it delivered to his
residence. Besides, whether some CSC personnel should be held administratively
liable for falsifying petitioners Certificate of Eligibility is beside the point. The fact
that someone else falsified the certificate will not excuse him for knowingly using the
same for his career advancement. Thus, the Supreme Court held that that the CA
did not err in affirming the penalty of dismissal and all its accessory penalties
imposed by the CSC. Cesar S. Dumduma vs. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No.
182606. October 4, 2011.

September 2011 Philippine Supreme

Posted on October 21, 2011 by Vicente D. Gerochi IV Posted in Constitutional Law,
Here are selected September 2011 rulings of the Supreme Court of the
Constitutional Law
COA; Powers and function. Under the 1987 Constitution, the Commission
on Audit is vested with authority to determine whether government entities,
including LGUs, comply with laws and regulations in disbursing
government funds, and to disallow illegal or irregular disbursements of these
funds. Pursuant to its mandate as the guardian of public funds, the COA is
vested with broad powers over all accounts pertaining to government
revenue and expenditures and the uses of public funds and property. This
includes the exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and
examination, establish the techniques and methods for such review, and
promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations. The COA is
endowed with enough latitude to determine, prevent and disallow irregular,
unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of
government funds. LGUs, though granted local fiscal autonomy, are still
within the audit jurisdiction of the COA. Luciano Veloso, Abraham
Cabochan, Jocelyn Dawis-Asuncion and Marlon M. Lacson vs. Commission
on Audit, G.R. No. 193677. September 6, 2011.
Local government units; grant of award to employees. In the exercise of its
power to determine the positions and salaries, wages, allowances and other
emoluments and benefits of officials and employees paid wholly or mainly
from city funds and provide for expenditures necessary for the proper
conduct of programs, projects, services, and activities of the city
government, the City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8040,
which authorized the conferment of the EPSA (Exemplary Public Service
Award) to the former three-term councilors and, as part of the award, the
qualified city officials were to be given retirement and gratuity pay
remuneration. The Supreme Court, however, noted that the above power is

not without limitations, such as the rule against double compensation. The
recomputation of the award disclosed that it is equivalent to the total
compensation received by each awardee for nine years that includes basic
salary, additional compensation, Personnel Economic Relief Allowance,
representation and transportation allowance, rice allowance, financial
assistance, clothing allowance, 13th month pay and cash gift. Undoubtedly,
the awardees reward is excessive and tantamount to double and additional
compensation. The remuneration is equivalent to everything that the
awardees received during the entire period that he served as such
official. Indirectly, their salaries and benefits are doubled, only that they
receive half of them at the end of their last term. Luciano Veloso, Abraham
Cabochan, Jocelyn Dawis-Asuncion and Marlon M. Lacson vs. Commission
on Audit, G.R. No. 193677. September 6, 2011.
Constitutionality; Tariff and Customs Code. In this case, the issue was the
validity of Customs Administrative Order No. 7-92 and Section 3506 of the
Tariff and Customs Code (on the assignment of customs employees to
overtime work). Section 3506 provides: Customs employees may be
assigned by a Collector to do overtime work at rates fixed by the
Commissioner of Customs when the service rendered is to be paid by the
importers, shippers or other persons served. The rates to be fixed shall not
be less than that prescribed by law to be paid to employees of private
enterprise. The Supreme Court disagreed with the CA in excluding airline
companies, aircraft owners, and operators from the coverage of Section 3506
of the TCCP. The term other persons served refers to all other persons
served by the BOC employees. Airline companies, aircraft owners, and
operators are among other persons served by the BOC employees. The
processing of embarking and disembarking from aircrafts of passengers, as
well as their baggage and cargoes, forms part of the BOC functions. BOC
employees who serve beyond the regular office hours are entitled to
overtime pay for the services they render. The SC also noted that the BOC
created a committee to re-evaluate the proposed increase in the rate of
overtime pay and for two years, several meetings were conducted with the
agencies concerned to discuss the proposal. BAR and the Airline Operators
Council participated in these meetings and discussions. Hence, BAR cannot
claim that it was denied due process in the imposition of the increase of the
overtime rate. Sergio I. Carbonilla, et al. vs. Borad of Airlines, et al., G.R.

No. 193247/G.R. No. 194276. September 14, 2011.

Undue Delegation; Tariff and Customs Code. The SC did not agree with the
Court of Appeals that Section 3506 of the TCCP failed the completeness and
sufficient standard tests. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all
its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it
reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. The
second test requires adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to
determine the boundaries of the delegates authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot. Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals,
Section 3506 of the TCCP complied with these requirements. The law is
complete in itself that it leaves nothing more for the BOC to do: it gives
authority to the Collector to assign customs employees to do overtime work;
the Commissioner of Customs fixes the rates; and it provides that the
payments shall be made by the importers, shippers or other persons
served. Section 3506 also fixed the standard to be followed by the
Commissioner of Customs when it provides that the rates shall not be less
than that prescribed by law to be paid to employees of private
enterprise. Sergio I. Carbonilla, et al. vs. Borad of Airlines, et al., G.R. No.
193247/G.R. No. 194276. September 14, 2011.
Sequestration and Freeze Orders; nature and purpose. Without making a
definitive conclusion as to the validity of the Sequestration and Freeze
Orders being the main issue in Civil Case No. 0142 which is yet to be
decided by the Sandiganbayan, the SC concluded that the pieces of evidence
enumerated by Tourist Duty Free Shops, Inc. (TDFSI) do not show that it
has a right to be protected and that the implementation of the Sequestration
and Freeze Orders violates its rights. The power of the PCGG to sequester
property claimed to be ill-gotten means to place or cause to be placed
under its possession or control said property, or any building or office
wherein any such property and any records pertaining thereto may be found,
including business enterprises and entities for the purpose of preventing
the destruction, concealment or dissipation of, and otherwise conserving and
preserving, the same until it can be determined, through appropriate
judicial proceedings, whether the property was in truth ill-gotten. On the
other hand, a freeze order prohibits the person having possession or control
of property alleged to constitute ill-gotten wealth from transferring,
conveying, encumbering or otherwise depleting or concealing such property,
or from assisting or taking part in its transfer, encumbrance, concealment, or

dissipation. In other words, it commands the possessor to hold the property

and conserve it subject to the orders and disposition of the authority
decreeing such freezing. Presidential Commission on Good Government vs.
Sandiganbayan (Second Division), et al., G.R. No. 152500. September 14,
2011.
Administrative Law
Public officers; administrative vs. criminal liability. It is a basic rule in
administrative law that public officials are under a three-fold responsibility
for a violation of their duty or for a wrongful act or omission, such that they
may be held civilly, criminally and administratively liable for the same
act. Administrative liability is separate and distinct from penal and civil
liability. First, there is a difference in the quantum of evidence required and,
correlatively, the procedure observed and sanctions imposed. Second, there
is the principle that a single act may offend against two or more distinct and
related provisions of law, or that the same act may give rise to criminal as
well as administrative liability. Accordingly, the dismissal of the criminal
case for violation of R.A. No. 3019 by the Ombudsman does not foreclose
administrative action against Cataquiz, as the general manager of Laguna
Lake Development Authority. Office of the President and Presidential AntiGraft Commission vs. Calixto R. Cataquiz, G.R. No. 183445, September 14,
2011.
Public officers; effect of removal or resignation from office on
administrative liability. Removal or resignation from office is not a bar to a
finding of administrative liability. Despite his removal from his position,
Cataquiz can still be held administratively liable for acts committed during
his service as General Manager of the Laguna Lake Development Authority
and he can be made to suffer the corresponding penalties. Office of the
President and Presidential Anti-Graft Commission vs. Calixto R. Cataquiz,
G.R. No. 183445, September 14, 2011.


Posted on September 22, 2011 by Vicente D. Gerochi IV Posted in Constitutional Law,
Here are selected August 2011 rulings of the Supreme Court of the
Constitutional Law
Citizenship; collateral attack prohibited. Vilando seeks to disqualify
Limkaichong on the ground that she is a Chinese citizen. To prove his point,
he refers to the alleged nullity of the grant of naturalization of
Limkaichongs father which, however, is not allowed as it would constitute a
collateral attack on the citizenship of the father. Under Philippine law, an
attack on a persons citizenship may only be done through a direct action for
its nullity. Renald F. Vilando vs. House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal, Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong and Hon. Speaker Prospero Nograles,
G.R. Nos. 192147 & 192149. August 23, 2011.
Citizenship; forfeiture; application for an alien certificate of
registration. Vilandos assertion that Limkaichong cannot derive Philippine
citizenship from her mother because the latter became a Chinese citizen
when she married Julio Sy, as provided for under Section 1 (7) of
Commonwealth Act No. 63 in relation to Article 2 (1) Chapter II of the
Chinese Revised Nationality Law of February 5, 1959, likewise
failed. Vilando was not able to offer in evidence a duly certified true copy
of the alleged Chinese Revised Law of Nationality to prove that
Limkaichongs mother indeed lost her Philippine citizenship. He failed to
establish his case through competent and admissible evidence to warrant a
reversal of the HRET ruling. Also, an application for an alien certificate of
registration (ACR) is not an indubitable proof of forfeiture of Philippine
citizenship. Obtaining an ACR by Limkaichongs mother was not
tantamount to a repudiation of her original citizenship. Neither did it result
in an acquisition of alien citizenship. The Supreme Court has consistently
held that an application for, and the holding of, an alien certificate of
registration is not an act constituting renunciation of Philippine
citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in loss of citizenship, the
same must be express. Such express renunciation is lacking in this

case. Accordingly, Limkaichongs mother, being a Filipino citizen, can

transmit her citizenship to her daughter. Renald F. Vilando vs. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong and Hon.
Speaker Prospero Nograles, G.R. Nos. 192147 & 192149. August 23, 2011.
Citizenship; natural-born citizen. With Limkaichongs father having been

conferred the status as a naturalized Filipino, it follows that she is a Filipino
citizen born to a Filipino father. Even on the assumption that the
naturalization proceedings and the subsequent issuance of a certificate of
naturalization were invalid, Limkaichong can still be considered a naturalborn Filipino citizen having been born to a Filipino mother and having
impliedly elected Filipino citizenship when she reached majority age. The
HRET was, thus, found to have ruled correctly in declaring that
Limkaichong is a natural-born Filipino citizen. Renald F. Vilando vs. House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong and Hon.
Speaker Prospero Nograles, G.R. Nos. 192147 & 192149. August 23, 2011.
Constitutionality of statutes; writ of certiorari and prohibition. Writs of
certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies to test the constitutionality of
statutes and the acts of the other branches of government. Prof. Merlin M.
Magallona, et al. vs. Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 187167, August 16,
2011.
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal; jurisdiction. The HRET has
jurisdiction over quo warranto petitions, specifically over cases challenging
ineligibility on the ground of lack of citizenship. The 1987 Constitution
vests the HRET with the authority to be the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of Members of the House of
Representatives. This constitutional power is likewise echoed in the 2004
Rules of the HRET. However, such power of the HRET, no matter how
complete and exclusive, does not carry with it the authority to delve into the
legality of the judgment of naturalization in the pursuit of disqualifying
Limkaichong. To rule otherwise would operate as a collateral attack on the
citizenship of the father which is not permissible. Renald F. Vilando vs.
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong and
Hon. Speaker Prospero Nograles, G.R. Nos. 192147 & 192149. August 23,

2011.
International law; UNCLOS III; RA 9522. The Supreme Court rejected
petitioners contention that RA 9522 dismembers a large portion of the
national territory because it discards the pre-UNCLOS III demarcation of
Philippine territory under the Treaty of Paris and related treaties,
successively encoded in the definition of national territory under the 1935,
1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Petitioners argue that from the Treaty of
Paris technical description, Philippine sovereignty over territorial waters
extends hundreds of nautical miles around the Philippine archipelago,
embracing the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of Paris. The Court
said that UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of
territory. It is a multilateral treaty regulating, among others, sea-use rights
over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the
baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the baselines], and
exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and
continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits. On the other hand, baselines
laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States to mark-out
specific basepoints along their coasts from which baselines are drawn, either
straight or contoured, to serve as geographic starting points to measure the
breadth of the maritime zones and continental shelf. In other words,
baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States
to delimit with precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental
shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest of the international community
of the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within which States
exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the exercise of sovereignty over
territorial waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal,
immigration, and sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33), and the
right to exploit the living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic
zone (Article 56) and continental shelf (Article 77). In sum, UNCLOS III
and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition, enlargement
or, as petitioners claim, diminution of territory. Under traditional
international law typology, States acquire (or conversely, lose) territory
through occupation, accretion, cession and prescription, not by executing
multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes
to comply with the treatys terms to delimit maritime zones and continental
shelves. Territorial claims to land features are outside UNCLOS III, and are
instead governed by the rules on general international law. Prof. Merlin M.
Magallona, et al. vs. Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 187167, August 16,

2011.
International law; archipelagic waters. Petitioners contend that RA 9522
unconstitutionally converts internal waters into archipelagic waters, hence
subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes passage under
UNCLOS III, including overflight. Petitioners extrapolate that these passage
rights indubitably expose Philippine internal waters to nuclear and maritime
pollution hazards, in violation of the Constitution. To this the Supreme
Court held: Whether referred to as Philippine internal waters under Article
I of the Constitution or as archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III (Article
49 [1]), the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying
landward of the baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine
areas underneath. The fact of sovereignty, however, does not preclude the
operation of municipal and international law norms subjecting the territorial
sea or archipelagic waters to necessary, if not marginal, burdens in the
interest of maintaining unimpeded, expeditious international navigation,
consistent with the international law principle of freedom of navigation.
Thus, domestically, the political branches of the Philippine government, in
the competent discharge of their constitutional powers, may pass legislation
designating routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and
sea lanes passage. Prof. Merlin M. Magallona, et al. vs. Eduardo Ermita, et
al., G.R. No. 187167, August 16, 2011.
International law; rights of innocent passage. In the absence of municipal
legislation, international law norms, now codified in UNCLOS III, operate
to grant innocent passage rights over the territorial sea or archipelagic
waters, subject to the treatys limitations and conditions for their exercise.
Significantly, the right of innocent passage is a customary international law,
thus automatically incorporated in the corpus of Philippine law. No modern
State can validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent
passage that is exercised in accordance with customary international law
without risking retaliatory measures from the international community. The
fact that, for archipelagic States, their archipelagic waters are subject to both
the right of innocent passage and sea lanes passage does not place them in
lesser footing vis--vis continental coastal States which are subject, in their
territorial sea, to the right of innocent passage and the right of transit passage
through international straits. The imposition of these passage rights through
archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III was a concession by archipelagic
States, in exchange for their right to claim all the waters landward of their

baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast, as

archipelagic waters subject to their territorial sovereignty. More important,
the recognition of archipelagic States archipelago and the waters enclosed
by their baselines as one cohesive entity prevents the treatment of their
islands as separate islands under UNCLOS III. Separate islands generate
their own maritime zones, placing the waters between islands separated by
more than 24 nautical miles beyond the States territorial sovereignty,
subjecting these waters to the rights of other States under UNCLOS III.
Prof. Merlin M. Magallona, et al. vs. Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No.
187167, August 16, 2011.
Judgment; law of the case. The doctrine of the law of the case means that
whatever is irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule between the
same parties in the same case, whether correct on general principles or not,
continues to be the law of the case for as long as the facts on which the legal
rule was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court. In
G.R. No. 137285 (which was the predecessor of this case), the Supreme
Court upheld the annulment of the Compromise Agreement and recognized
that the agreed upon mode of payment of the just compensation for Lot
1406-B with Lot 434 was cancelled. The SC ratiocinated that it is notable
that it mentioned nothing in the said case about the invalidation of the
amount of just compensation corresponding to the mode of payment, which
was the value of Lot 434 at the time, which silence was the Courts
acknowledgment that the parties understood and accepted, by entering into
the Compromise Agreement in 1993, that the just compensation for Lot
1406-B was Lot 434 (or the value of Lot 434, which at the time of the swap
in 1993 was definitely much higher than Lot 434s value in 1981). Export
Processing Zone Authority (now Philippine Economic Zone Authority) vs.
Estate of Salud Jimenez, G.R. No. 188995. August 24, 2011.
Moot and academic principle; exception. A moot and academic case is one
that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening
events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical value. As a
rule, courts decline jurisdiction over such case, or dismiss it on ground of
mootness. Limkaichongs term of office as Representative of the First
District of Negros Oriental from June 30, 2007 to June 30, 2010 already
expired. Moreover, there was the conduct of the 2010 elections, which has
also rendered this case moot and academic. However, citizenship, being a
continuing requirement for Members of the House of Representatives, may

be questioned at anytime. For this reason, the Court deemed it appropriate

to resolve the petition on the merits based on the rule that courts will decide
a question, otherwise moot and academic, if it is capable of repetition, yet
evading review. The question on Limkaichongs citizenship is likely to
recur if she would run again, as she did, for public office, hence, capable of
repetition. Renald F. Vilando vs. House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal, Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong and Hon. Speaker Prospero Nograles,
G.R. Nos. 192147 & 192149. August 23, 2011.
NPC Charter; prescription. The SC ruled that the prescriptive period
provided under Section 3(i) of Republic Act No. 6395 (the NPC Charter) is
applicable only to an action for damages, and does not extend to an action to
recover just compensation like this case. Consequently, NPC cannot thereby
bar the right of the Heirs of Macabangkit to recover just compensation for
their land. The action to recover just compensation from the State or its
expropriating agency differs from the action for damages. It would very
well be contrary to the clear language of the Constitution to bar the recovery
of just compensation for private property taken for a public use solely on the
basis of statutory prescription. National Power Corporation vs. Heirs of
Macabangkit Sangkay, namely: Cebu, Batowa-an, et al., all surnamed
Macabangkit, G.R. No. 165828. August 24, 2011.
Power of Eminent Domain; action to recover just compensation from the
state and action for damages; distinction. An action to recover just
compensation from the State or its expropriating agency differs from an
action for damages. The former, also known as inverse condemnation, is
intended to recover the value of property taken in fact by the government
defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain
has been attempted by the taking agency. On the other hand, the latter
action seeks to vindicate a legal wrong through damages. When a right is
exercised in a manner not conformable with the norms enshrined in Article
19 and like provisions on human relations in the Civil Code, and the exercise
results in damage to another, a legal wrong is committed and the wrongdoer
is held responsible. The two actions are different in nature and purpose. The
action to recover just compensation is based on the Constitution while the
action for damages is predicated on statutory enactments. Indeed, the former
arises from the exercise by the State of its power of eminent domain against
private property for public use, but the latter emanates from the
transgression of a right. The fact that the owner rather than the expropriator

brings the former does not change the essential nature of the suit as an
inverse condemnation, for the suit is not based on tort, but on the
constitutional prohibition against the taking of property without just
compensation. National Power Corporation vs. Heirs of Macabangkit
Sangkay, namely: Cebu, Batowa-an, et al., all surnamed Macabangkit, G.R.
No. 165828. August 24, 2011.
Power of Eminent Domain; just compensation; reckoning value. The RTC
based its fixing of just compensation ostensibly on the prevailing market
value at the time of the filing of the complaint, instead of reckoning it from
the time of the taking pursuant to Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 6395.
The SC affirmed this and ruled that the reckoning value is the value at the
time of the filing of the complaint. Compensation that is reckoned on the
market value prevailing at the time either when NPC entered or when it
completed the tunnel, as NPC submits, would not be just, for it would
compound the gross unfairness already caused to the owners by NPCs
entering without the intention of formally expropriating the land, and
without the prior knowledge and consent of the Heirs of
Macabangkit. NPCs entry denied elementary due process of law to the
owners since then until the owners commenced the inverse condemnation
proceedings. Reckoning just compensation on the value at the time the
owners commenced these inverse condemnation proceedings is
warranted. National Power Corporation vs. Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay,
namely: Cebu, Batowa-an, et al., all surnamed Macabangkit, G.R. No.
165828. August 24, 2011.
Power of Eminent Domain; just compensation; rentals. In this case, the CA
upheld the RTCs granting to the Heirs of Macabangkit of rentals of
Php30,000.00/month from 1979 up to July 1999 with 12% interest per
annum by finding NPC guilty of bad faith in taking possession of the land
to construct the tunnel without their knowledge and consent. However, the
SC found that the granting rentals is legally and factually bereft of
justification, in light of the taking of the land being already justly
compensated. Accordingly, the SC deleted the award of back rentals and in
its place prescribed interest of 12% interest per annum from November 21,
1997, the date of the filing of the complaint, until the full liability is paid by
NPC. National Power Corporation vs. Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay,
165828. August 24, 2011.

Power of Eminent Domain; limitations. The power of eminent domain is not

an unlimited power. Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution sets
down the essential limitations: (a) the taking must be for a public purpose;
and (b) just compensation must be paid to the owner. In addition, the owner
is entitled to legal interest from the time of taking until the actual payment in
order to place the owner in a position as good as, but not better than, the
position he was in before the taking occurred. In this case, it is undeniable
that just compensation was not promptly made to the Estate of Salud
Jimenez for the taking of Lot 1406-B by the petitioner. In view of this, the
SC found the CAs fixing of legal interest at only 6% per annum as
insufficientfor that rate would not ensure that compensation was just in the
face of the long delay in payment. Accordingly, it imposed a 12% per
annum legal interest, from August 23, 1993, the date of the approval of the
failed Compromise Agreement, until the full amount of the just
compensation is paid, instead. Export Processing Zone Authority (now
Philippine Economic Zone Authority) vs. Estate of Salud Jimenez, G.R. No.
188995. August 24, 2011.
Power of Eminent Domain; meaning of taking. There was a full taking on
the part of NPC, notwithstanding that the owners were not completely and
actually dispossessed. It is settled that the taking of private property for
public use, to be compensable, need not be an actual physical taking or
appropriation. Indeed, the expropriators action may be short of acquisition
of title, physical possession, or occupancy but may still amount to a
taking. Compensable taking includes destruction, restriction, diminution, or
interruption of the rights of ownership or of the common and necessary use
and enjoyment of the property in a lawful manner, lessening or destroying its
value. It is neither necessary that the owner be wholly deprived of the use of
his property, nor material whether the property is removed from the
possession of the owner, or in any respect changes hands. In this case, NPC
constructed a tunnel underneath the land of the Heirs of Macabangkit
without going through formal expropriation proceedings and without
procuring their consent or at least informing them beforehand of the
construction. NPCs construction adversely affected the owners rights and
interests because the subterranean intervention prevented them from
introducing any developments on the surface, and from disposing of the land
or any portion of it, either by sale or mortgage. This was considered by the
SC as compensable taking. NPC should pay just compensation for the entire
land. National Power Corporation vs. Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay,


165828. August 24, 2011.
Administrative Law
Administrative offense; exoneration. The mere reduction of the penalty on
appeal does not entitle a government employee to back salaries if he was not
exonerated of the charge against him. If the exoneration of the employee is
relative (as distinguished from complete exoneration), an inquiry into the
factual premise of the offense charged and of the offense committed must be
made. If the administrative offense found to have been actually committed
is of lesser gravity than the offense charged, the employee cannot be
considered exonerated if the factual premise for the imposition of the lesser
penalty remains the same. The Civil Service Commission vs. Richard G.
Cruz, G.R. No. 187858, August 9, 2011.
Administrative proceedings; substantial evidence. Self-serving and
unsubstantiated declarations are insufficient to establish a case before quasijudicial bodies where the quantum of evidence required establishing a fact is
substantial evidence. Often described as more than a mere scintilla,
substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other equally reasonable
minds might conceivably opine otherwise. In this case, there is no dispute
regarding the fact that Esguerra had altogether failed to comply with the
mandatory reporting requirement under the POEA-SEC. Beyond his bare
assertion that CSMSI (employer) never gave him referrals to continue his
medications as recommended by the foreign doctor despite his call on 8
July 2003 to inform them that he will report the next day in order to submit
his medical evaluation abroad, Esguerra did not present any evidence to
prove justification for his inability to submit himself to a post-employment
medical examination by a company-designated physician. Thus, he was not
awarded disability benefits and sickness allowance. Coastal Safeway
Marine Services vs. Esguerra, G.R. No. 185352, August 10, 2011.
Public officers; No work-no pay principle; Exception. The general rule is
that public officials are only entitled to compensation if they render
service. This is otherwise known as the no work-no pay
principle. However, back salaries may be awarded even for unworked days

to illegally dismissed or unjustly suspended employees based on the

constitutional provision that no officer or employee in the civil service shall
be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law. In order,
however, to fall under this exception, two conditions must be complied with:
(a) the employee must be found innocent of the charges; and (b) his
suspension must be unjustified. In this case, the two conditions were
present. The first condition was met since the offense which the respondent
was found guilty of (violation of reasonable rules and regulations) stemmed
from an act (failure to log in and log out) different from the act of dishonesty
(claimingovertime pay despite his failure to render overtime work) that he
was charged with. The second condition was met as the respondents
committed offense merits neither dismissal from the service nor suspension
(for more than one month), but only reprimand. In sum, the respondent is
entitled to back salaries from the time he was dismissed until his
reinstatement to his former position i.e., for the period of his preventive
suspension pending appeal. For the period of his preventive suspension
pending investigation, the respondent is not entitled to any back salaries. The
Civil Service Commission vs. Richard G. Cruz, G.R. No. 187858, August 9,
2011.
Public officers; kinds of preventive suspension. There are two kinds of
preventive suspension of civil service employees who are charged with
offenses punishable by removal or suspension: (i) preventive suspension
pending investigation and (ii) preventive suspension pending
appeal. Compensation is due only for the period of preventive
suspensionpending appeal should the employee be ultimately
exonerated. The Civil Service Commission vs. Richard G. Cruz, G.R. No.
187858, August 9, 2011.
Election Law
Election contest; preliminary conference. The questioned notice of
preliminary conference issued in the instant election protest was defective in
that (1) the notice issued by the MCTC clerk of court was a generic notice of
hearing without any mention that it was for preliminary conference, and (2)
it was served on the party himself despite being represented by counsel in

contravention of Rule 9, Section 21 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC. For this

reason the Supreme Court disagreed with the RTCs finding that impliedly
ascribed all fault to petitioner in failing to timely file his preliminary
conference brief. Ceriaco Bulilis vs. Victorino Nuez, Hon. Pres. Judge, 6th
MCTC, Ubay, Bohol, et al., G.R. No. 195953, August 9, 2011.
Election contest; COMELECs jurisdiction. The Supreme Court found no
merit in petitioners argument that Rule 28, Section 1 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure limits the COMELECs jurisdiction over petitions for
certiorariin election cases to issues related to elections, returns and
qualifications of elective municipal and barangay officials. According to the
Supreme Court, said provision, taken together with the succeeding section,
undeniably shows that an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari
with the COMELEC whenever a judge hearing an election case has acted
without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and
there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. A petition for certiorari questioning an interlocutory
order of a trial court in an electoral protest is within the appellate jurisdiction
of the COMELEC. Ceriaco Bulilis vs. Victorino Nuez, Hon. Pres. Judge,
6th MCTC, Ubay, Bohol, et al., G.R. No. 195953, August 9, 2011.

Posted on August 19, 2011 by Vicente D. Gerochi IV Posted in Constitutional Law,
Philippines - Cases, Philippines - Law Tagged agrarian reform, due process, public
officers
Here are selected July 2011 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines
on political law.
Constitutional Law
Court proceedings; denial of due process. The SC here ruled that the Energy
Regulatory Commission did not deprive petitioners of their right to be
heard. Where opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or

through pleadings is granted, there is no denial of due process. In this case,

prior to the issuance of the assailed ERC Decision approving Meralcos
application for rate increase, petitioners were given several opportunities to
attend the hearings and to present all their pleadings and
evidence. Petitioners voluntarily failed to appear in most of those
hearings. Although the ERC erred in prematurely issuing its Decision (as
the same was issued prior to the lapse of the period for petitioners to file
their comment on the application), its subsequent act of ordering petitioners
to file their comments on another partys motion for reconsideration cured
this defect. Even though petitioners never filed their own motion for
reconsideration, the fact that they were still given notice of the other motion
and the opportunity to file their comments renders immaterial ERCs failure
to admit their comment on the rate application. National Association of
Electricity Consumers of reforms, Inc. [Nasecore], et al. vs. Energy
Regulator Commission (ERC), et al., G.R. No. 190795. July 6, 2011.
Value added tax on toll fees; non-impairment clause. Petitioners argue that
since VAT was never factored into the formula for computing toll fees under
the Toll Operation Agreements, its imposition would violate the nonimpairment of contract clause of the constitution. The SC held that
Petitioner Timbol has no personality to invoke the non-impairment clause on
behalf of private investors in the tollway projects. She will neither be
prejudiced nor affected by the alleged diminution in return of investments
that may result from the VAT imposition. She has no interest in the profits
to be earned under the TOAs. The interest in and right to recover
investments belongs solely to the private tollway investors. Renato V. Diaz
and Aurora Ma. F. Timbol vs. The Secretary of Finance and the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 193007. July 19, 2011.
Administrative Law
Public official; effect of resignation on filing of administrative
complaint. The Ombudsman can no longer institute an administrative case
against Andutan because the latter was not a public servant at the time the
case was filed. It is irrelevant, according to the Ombudsman, that Andutan
had already resigned prior to the filing of the administrative case since the

operative fact that determines its jurisdiction is the commission of an offense

while in the public service. The SC observed that indeed it has held in the
past that a public officials resignation does not render moot an
administrative case that was filed prior to the officials
resignation. However, the facts of those cases are not entirely applicable to
the present case. In the past cases, the Court found that the public officials
subject of the administrative cases resigned, either to prevent the
continuation of a case already filed or to pre-empt the imminent filing of
one. Here, neither situation obtains. First, Andutans resignation was neither
his choice nor of his own doing; he was forced to resign. Second, Andutan
resigned from his DOF post on July 1, 1998, while the administrative case
was filed on September 1, 1999, exactly one year and two months after his
resignation. What is clear from the records is that Andutan was forced to
resign more than a year before the Ombudsman filed the administrative case
against him. If the SC agreed with the interpretation of the Ombudsman, any
official even if he has been separated from the service for a long time
may still be subject to the disciplinary authority of his superiors, ad
infinitum. Likewise, if the act committed by the public official is indeed
inimical to the interests of the State, other legal mechanisms are available to
redress the same. Office of the Ombudsman vs. Uldarico P. Andutan, Jr.,
G.R. No. 164679. July 27, 2011.
Public officials; prohibited positions. Respondent in this case was charged
with violation of Section 7(d) of Republic Act 6713 for solicitation or
acceptance of gifts by reason of public office. The CA found that RA 6713
was repealed by RA 6938; thus, respondent was not liable. The SC found
the contrary. There was no repeal. The ban on Cooperative Development
Authority (CDA) officials holding a position in a cooperative provided in
RA 6938 should be taken as a prohibition in addition to those provided in
RA 6713 and specifically applicable to CDA officials and employees. True,
RA 6938 allows CDA officials and employees to become members of
cooperatives and enjoy the privileges and benefits attendant to
membership. However, RA 6938 should not be taken as creating in favor of
CDA officials and employees an exemption from the coverage of Section
7(d), RA 6713 considering that the benefits and privileges attendant to
membership in a cooperative are not confined solely to availing of loans and
not all cooperatives are established for the sole purpose of providing credit
facilities to their members. Petra C. Martinez, In her capacity as General
Manager of Claveria Agri-based Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. vs.

Filomena L. villanueva/Office of the Ombudsman vs. Filomena L.

Villanueva, G.R. No. 169196/G.R. No. 169198, July 6, 2011.
Public officials; misconduct. The prohibition in Section 7(d) of RA 6713 is
malum prohibitum. It is the commission of that act as defined by the law,
and not the character or effect thereof, that determines whether or not the
provision has been violated. Therefore, it is immaterial whether respondent
has fully paid her loans since the law prohibits the mere act of soliciting a
loan under the circumstances provided in Section 7(d) of RA 6713. Neither
is undue influence on respondents part required to be proven as held by the
CA. Whether respondent used her position or authority as a CDA official is
of no consequence in the determination of her administrative liability. And
considering that respondent admitted having taken two loans from
CABMPCI, which is a cooperative whose operations are directly regulated
by respondents office, respondent was correctly meted the penalty of
suspension by the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon for violation of Section
7(d). Petra C. Martinez, In her capacity as General Manager of Claveria
Agri-based Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. vs. Filomena L.
villanueva/Office of the Ombudsman vs. Filomena L. Villanueva, G.R. No.
169196/G.R. No. 169198, July 6, 2011.
Agrarian Reform
Agrarian reform; distribution of shares to farmers. In this case,
Farmworkers Agrarian Reform Movement, Inc. (FARM) argues that Sec. 31
of RA 6657 is unconstitutional as it permits stock transfer in lieu of outright
agricultural land transfer; in fine, there is stock certificate ownership of the
farmers or farmworkers instead of them owning the land, as envisaged in the
Constitution. For FARM, this modality of distribution is an anomaly to be
annulled for being inconsistent with the basic concept of agrarian reform
ingrained in Sec. 4, Art. XIII of the Constitution. The Supreme Court denied
FARMs contention of unconstitutionality. First, there was a failure on the
part of FARM and its members to raise the question of constitutionality at
the first opportunity. It took them 27 years before they raised the same
before the SC and after they have already received some benefits from its
implementation. Second, the issue of constitutionality is not the lis mota of
this case, the lis mota being the alleged non-compliance by Hacienda
Luisita, Inc. with the conditions of the Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) to
support a plea for its revocation. And before the Supreme Court, the lis

mota is whether or not the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council acted in

grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the recall of the SDP for such noncompliance and the fact that the SDP, as couched and implemented, offends
certain constitutional and statutory provisions. The SC held that any of these
key issues may be resolved without going into the constitutionality of Sec.
31 of RA 6657. Finally, there appears to be no breach of the fundamental
law. The wording of the Section 4 of Article XIII of the Constitution is
unequivocalthe farmers and regular farmworkers have a right to own
directly or collectively the lands they till. Accordingly, the basic law allows
two modes of land distributiondirect and indirect ownership. Direct
transfer to individual farmers is the most commonly used method by DAR
and widely accepted. Indirect transfer through collective ownership of the
agricultural land is the alternative to direct ownership of agricultural land by
individual farmers. Therefore, Section 4 expressly authorizes collective
ownership by farmers. No language can be found in the 1987 Constitution
that disqualifies or prohibits corporations or cooperatives of farmers from
being the legal entity through which collective ownership can be
exercised. Hacienda Luisita, Inc., et al. vs. Presidential Agrarian Reform
Council, G.R. No. 171101, July 5, 2011.

Posted on July 14, 2011 by Jose Ma. G. Hofilea Posted in Civil Law, Constitutional
Law, Philippines - Cases

June 2011 where at least one Justice felt compelled to express his dissent
from the decision penned by the ponente.
1.
Informed Consent(Villarama vs. Carpio)
In essential issue in the case of Dr. Rubi Li vs. the Spouses Reynaldo and
Lina Soliman was whether or not Dr. Li, a medical oncologist, should be
held liable for damages on account of medical malpractice. According to the
majority decision penned by Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr., the answer is
no. According to the dissenter, Justice Antonio T. Carpio, the answer is yes.

Sometime in July 1993, Angelica Soliman, the 11-year old daughter of

Reynaldo and Lina Soliman, was diagnosed with a highly malignant form of
bone cancer that usually afflicts teenage children. This condition required
Angelicas leg to be amputated. To eliminate any remaining cancer cells,
minimize the chances of recurrence and prevent the disease from spreading
to other parts of Angelicas body, chemotherapy was suggested and
eventually, Angelica was referred Dr. Li.
In August of 1993, Angelica was administered the first cycle of the
chemotherapy regimen. However, 11 days later, Angelica passed away.
The Soliman spouses filed an action for damages against Dr. Li, claiming,
among other things, that Dr. Li had assured them that Angelica would
recover in view of 95% chance of healing with chemotherapy. And that
wwhen they had inquired about side effect, they claim that Dr. Li mentioned
only slight vomiting, hair loss and weakness. Angelica had, however,
suffered far greater side effects from the chemotherapy and accordingly, the
Solimans claimed that they would not have given their consent to
chemotherapy had petitioner not falsely assured them of its side effects.
Dr. Li, on the other hand, asserted that she did not give Angelicas parents
any assurance that chemotherapy will cure Angelicas cancer. During their
several consultation sessions, Dr. Li stated that she explained the following
side effects of chemotherapy treatment to respondents: (1) falling hair; (2)
nausea and vomiting; (3) loss of appetite; (4) low count of white blood cells
[WBC], red blood cells [RBC] and platelets; (5) possible sterility due to the
effects on Angelicas ovary; (6) damage to the heart and kidneys; and (7)
darkening of the skin especially when exposed to sunlight.
In his reasoning, Justice Villarama traced back the English common law
origins of the doctrine of informed consent in medical malpractice or
medical negligence cases and concluded that [t]here are four essential
elements a plaintiff must prove in a malpractice action based upon the
doctrine of informed consent: (1) the physician had a duty to disclose
material risks; (2) he failed to disclose or inadequately disclosed those risks;
(3) as a direct and proximate result of the failure to disclose, the patient

consented to treatment she otherwise would not have consented to; and (4)
plaintiff was injured by the proposed treatment.
Based on the evidence on record, the ponente held that there was adequate
disclosure of material risks inherent in the chemotherapy procedure
performed with the consent of Angelicas parents. Surely, Justice VIllarama
wrote, the Soliman spouses could not have been unaware in the course of
initial treatment and amputation of Angelicas lower extremity, that her
immune system was already weak on account of the malignant tumor in her
knee.
He added, that [w]hen petitioner informed the respondents beforehand of
the side effects of chemotherapy which includes lowered counts of white and
red blood cells, decrease in blood platelets, possible kidney or heart damage
and skin darkening, there is reasonable expectation on the part of the doctor
that the respondents understood very well that the severity of these side
effects will not be the same for all patients undergoing the procedure. In
other words, by the nature of the disease itself, each patients reaction to the
chemical agents even with pre-treatment laboratory tests cannot be precisely
determined by the physician. That death can possibly result from
complications of the treatment or the underlying cancer itself, immediately
or sometime after the administration of chemotherapy drugs, is a risk that
cannot be ruled out, as with most other major medical procedures, but such
conclusion can be reasonably drawn from the general side effects of
chemotherapy already disclosed.
On the other hand, form Justice Carpios dissenting point of view, analogous
cases in the United States essentially reiterate the four requisites cited by
Justice Villarama that must be proven in cases involving the doctrine of
informed consent.
Moreover, the dissenter averred, that under a patient standard of
materiality, a doctor is obligated to disclose that information which a
reasonable patient would deem material in deciding whether to proceed with
a proposed treatment. Stated differently, what should be disclosed depends
on what a reasonable person, in the same or similar situation as the patient,
would deem material in deciding whether to proceed with the proposed
treatment.

Justice Carpio held significant the testimony of Dr. Li that while she
disclosed some material risks, she has impliedly admitted that she failed to
disclose many of the other associated risks and side effects of chemotherapy,
including the most material infection, sepsis and death.
Clearly, infection, sepsis and death are material risks and side effects of
chemotherapy. To any reasonable person, the risk of death is one of the most
important, if not the most important, consideration in deciding whether to
undergo a proposed treatment. Thus, Dr. Li should have disclosed to
Reynaldo and Lina that there was a chance that their 11-year old daughter
could die as a result of chemotherapy as, in fact, she did after only 13 days
of treatment.
Accordingly, Justice Carpio held the view that Dr. Li should be liable for
medical negligence.
(Dr. Rubi Li vs. Spouses Reynaldo and Lina Soliman as parents/heirs of
deceased Angelica Soliman, June 7, 2011, G.R. No. 165279. See dissenting
opinion here.)
(authors note: While this author appreciates, as an academic matter, the
historical developments of, and continued discussions on, the doctrine of
informed consent in medical malpractice cases, he wonders whether all the
nice theories actually do work in such a tragic moment as deciding whether
or not to permit a specific form of treatment in the face of the malignantly
deteriorating physical condition of a loved one? Despite the legal niceties
about what a physician should or need not disclose and explain, this author
can foresee that his own mental state in such a situation would likely be in
such a state of disquiet as to almost certainly taint any decision he may
make, informed or not.)
2.
When Own Means Control (Carpio vs. Velasco)
In Wilson P. Gamboa v. Finance Secretary Margarito B. Teves et al,

petitioners questioned the sale by the Republic of the Philippines to Metro
Pacific Assets Holdings, Inc. of roughly forty-six percent (46%) of the
shares of Philippine Telecommunication Investment Corporation (PTIC), on
the ground that such sale caused the foreign ownership in Philippine Long

Distance Telephone Co. Inc. (PLDT), engaged in the business of

telecommunications as a public utility, to exceed the constitutionallyallowed limits for foreign ownership in a public utility, as set out in Section
11, Article XII of the Constitution:
SECTION 11. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization
for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the
Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of
the Philippines at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such
citizens, nor shall such franchise, certificate, or authorization be exclusive in
character or for a longer period than fifty years. Neither shall any such
franchise or right be granted except under the condition that it shall be
subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the
common good so requires. The State shall encourage equity participation in
public utilities by the general public. The participation of foreign investors
in the governing body of any public utility enterprise shall be limited to their
proportionate share in its capital, and all the executive and managing
officers of such corporation or association must be citizens of the
Philippines.
The petitioners posited that capital under the foregoing constitutional
provision refers only to the public utilitys common shares because such
shares are entitled to vote and it is through voting that control over a
corporation is exercised. Petitioners pointed out that, considering that
PLDTs preferred shares have no voting rights, only the common shares
can vote and elect members of the board of directors.
Citing the intent of the framers of the Constitution, as well as the Foreign
Investments Act, the Supreme Court en banc, speaking through Justice
Antonio T. Carpio, ruled that [t]he term capital in Section 11, Article XII
of the Constitution refers only to shares of stock entitled to vote in the
election of directors, which, in PLDTs case, is limited to common shares.
The Courts test does not lie in the classification of shares per se but the
right to vote in the election of directors which should, therefore, include
preferred shares if such shares are also entitled to vote in the election of
directors.
With the concurrence of ten of the justices, the Court en banc partly granted

the petition and in its dispositive portion, directed the Securities and
Exchange Commission to apply their definition of the term capital in
determining the extent of allowable foreign ownership in respondent PLDT,
and if there is a violation of Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, to
impose the appropriate sanctions under the law.
In the dissent penned by Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., he countered by
stating that the intent of the framers of the Constitution was not to limit the
application of the word capital to voting or common shares alone. In
support thereof, the dissenter noted that the Records of the Constitutional
Commission reveal that even though the UP Law Center proposed the phrase
voting stock or controlling interest, the framers of the Constitution did not
adopt this but instead used the word capital,
To the eyes of Justice Velasco, the intent of the Constitution is very clear
under the doctrine of Cassus Omissus Pro Omisso Habendus Esta person,
object or thing omitted must have been omitted intentionally. Contrary to
the majority, Justice Velasco maintained that the framers of the Constitution
decided to use the word capital in all provisions that talk about foreign
participation and intentionally left out the phrase voting stocks or
controlling interest.
Moreover, Justice Velasco noted that stockholders, whether holding voting
or non-voting stocks, have all the rights, powers and privileges of ownership
over their stocks and that this necessarily includes the right to vote because
such is inherent in and incidental to the ownership of corporate stocks, and
as such is a property right. In fact, the dissenting opinion pointed out that
even non-voting stocks are entitled to be voted on for fundamental and
major corporate changes as set out in Section 6 of the Corporation
Code. Thus, the fact that only holders of common shares can elect a
corporations board of directors does not mean that only such holders
exercise control over the corporation.
As far as Justice Velasco sees it, applying the ponencias definition of the
word capital will give rise to a greater anomaly because it will result in the
foreigners obtaining beneficial ownership over the corporation, which is
contrary to the provisions of the Constitution. On the other hand,
interpreting capital to include both voting and non-voting shares will

result in giving both legal and beneficial ownership of the corporation to the
Filipinos.
(Wilson P. Gamboa vs. Finance Secretary Margarito B. Teves, et al.;
Pablito V. Sanidad, et al., Petitioners-in-intervention, June 28, 2011, G.R.
No. 176579. See dissenting opinion here.)
June 2011 Philippine Supreme Court

Posted on July 8, 2011 by Vicente D. Gerochi IV Posted in Constitutional Law
Tagged Commission on Audit, due process, freedom of the press, local government,
Ombudsman
Here are selected June 2011 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines
on political law.
Constitutional Law
Commission on Audit; jurisdiction over Boy Scouts. The issue was whether
or not the Boy Scouts of the Philippines (BSP) fall under the jurisdiction
of the Commission on Audit. The BSP contends that it is not a governmentowned or controlled corporation; neither is it an instrumentality, agency, or
subdivision of the government. The Supreme Court, however, held that not
all corporations, which are not government owned or controlled, are ipso
facto to be considered private corporations as there exists another distinct
class of corporations or chartered institutions which are otherwise known as
public corporations. These corporations are treated by law as agencies or
instrumentalities of the government which are not subject to the tests of
ownership or control and economic viability but to a different criteria
relating to their public purposes/interests or constitutional policies and
objectives and their administrative relationship to the government or any of
its departments or offices. As presently constituted, the BSP is a public
corporation created by law for a public purpose, attached to the Department
of Education Culture and Sports pursuant to its Charter and the
Administrative Code of 1987. It is not a private corporation which is
required to be owned or controlled by the government and be economically
viable to justify its existence under a special law. The economic viability

test would only apply if the corporation is engaged in some economic

activity or business function for the government, which is not the case for
BSP. Therefore, being a public corporation, the funds of the BSP fall under
the jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. Boy Scouts of the Philippines
vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 177131. June 7, 2011.
Local governments; principle of local autonomy. The claim of petitioners in
this case that the subject proclamation and administrative orders violate the
principle of local autonomy is anchored on the allegation that, through them,
the President authorized the DILG Secretary to take over the operations of
the ARMM and assume direct governmental powers over the region. The
Supreme Court held that in the first place, the DILG Secretary did not take
over control of the powers of the ARMM. The SC observed that after law
enforcement agents took respondent Governor of ARMM into custody for
alleged complicity in the Maguindanao massacre, the ARMM ViceGovernor, petitioner Ansaruddin Adiong, assumed the vacated post on
December 10, 2009 pursuant to the rule on succession found in Article VII,
Section 12, of RA 9054. In turn, Acting Governor Adiong named the then
Speaker of the ARMM Regional Assembly, petitioner Sahali-Generale,
Acting ARMM Vice-Governor. In short, the DILG Secretary did not take
over the administration or operations of the ARMM. Datu Zaldy Uy
Ampatuan, et al. v. Hon. Ronaldo Puno, et al., G.R. No. 190259. June 7,
2011.
This case involved a

Presidential Electoral Tribunal; constitutionality.
motion for reconsideration, reiterating the contention that the constitution of
the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court
denied the motion and explained that judicial power granted to the Supreme
Court by the Constitution is plenary. And under the doctrine of necessary
implication, the additional jurisdiction bestowed by the last paragraph of
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to decide presidential and vicepresidential elections contests includes the means necessary to carry it into
effect. As to the claim of petitioner that the PET exercises quasi-judicial
power and, thus, its members violate the proscription in Section 12, Article
VIII of the Constitution, the Supreme Court held that, contrary to
petitioners claim, the resolution of electoral contests are judicial in
nature. Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal vs. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, G.R.

No. 191618. June 7, 2011.

Presidential powers; declaration of a state of emergency. Petitioners contend
that the President unlawfully exercised her powers when she declared a state
of emergency in the provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the
City of Cotabato. The Presidents call on the armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence springs from the power vested in her under
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. While it is true that the Court
may inquire into the factual bases for the Presidents exercise of the above
power, it would generally defer to her judgment on the matter. It is clearly
to the President that the Constitution entrusts the determination of the need
for calling out the armed forces to prevent and suppress lawless
violence. Unless it is shown that such determination was attended by grave
abuse of discretion, the Court will accord respect to the Presidents
judgment. Here, petitioners failed to show that the declaration of a state of
emergency as well as the Presidents exercise of the calling out power had
no factual basis. They simply alleged that, since not all areas under the
ARMM were placed under a state of emergency, it follows that the take over
of the entire ARMM by the DILG Secretary had no basis too. Datu Zaldy
Uy Ampatuan, et al. v. Hon. Ronaldo Puno, et al., G.R. No. 190259. June 7,
2011.
Presidential powers; calling-out power. Petitioners contend that the
President unlawfully exercised emergency powers when she ordered the
deployment of AFP and PNP personnel in the Provinces of Maguindanao
and Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato. The Supreme Court held that
such deployment is not by itself an exercise of emergency powers as
understood under Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution. The
President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency
in the three places mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to any law
enacted by Congress that authorized her to exercise extraordinary
powers. The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence in such places is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the
President. She did not need a congressional authority to exercise the
same. But, apart from the fact that there was no such take over to begin
with, the SC held the imminence of violence and anarchy at the time the
President issued Proclamation 1946 was too grave to ignore and as a result,
the President had to act to prevent further bloodshed and hostilities in the
places mentioned. Progress reports also indicated that there was movement

in these places of both high-powered firearms and armed men sympathetic to

the two clans. Thus, to pacify the peoples fears and stabilize the situation,
the President had to take preventive action. She called out the armed forces
to control the proliferation of loose firearms and dismantle the armed groups
that continuously threatened the peace and security in the affected places.
Datu Zaldy Uy Ampatuan, et al. v. Hon. Ronaldo Puno, et al., G.R. No.
190259. June 7, 2011.
Right to fair trial v. freedom of the press. On the possible influence of
media coverage on the impartiality of trial court judges, the Court found that
prejudicial publicity insofar as it undermines the right to a fair trial must
pass the totality of circumstances test, applied in People v. Teehankee, Jr.
and Estrada v. Desierto, that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not
incompatible to a free press, that pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial
to the right of an accused to a fair trial, and that there must be allegation and
proof of the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free
decision. Mere fear of possible undue influence is not tantamount to actual
prejudice resulting in the deprivation of the right to a fair trial. Re: Petition
for radio and television coverage of the multiple murder cases against
Maguindanao Governor Zaldy Ampatuan, et al., A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC/A.M.
No. 10-11-6-SC/A.M. No. 10-11-7-SC. June 14, 2011.
Local Government Code
Local government; power to classify lands. Petitioners in this case contend
that the subject property is outside the coverage of the agrarian reform
program in view of the enactment of City Ordinance No. 1313 by the City of
Iligan
reclassifying
the
area
into
a
residential/commercial
land. Unconvinced, the DARAB, in its Decision, noted that the record is
bereft of any evidence that the city ordinance has been approved by the
HLURB, thereby allegedly casting doubt on the validity of the
reclassification over the subject property. The Supreme Court agreed with
petitioners that the property is outside the coverage of the agrarian reform
program. Ordinance No. 1313 was enacted in 1975. Significantly, there was
still no HLURB to speak of during that time. It was the Task Force on
Human Settlements, the earliest predecessor of HLURB, which was in
existence at that time. The Task Force was not empowered to review and
approve zoning ordinances and regulations. As a matter of fact, it was only
on August 9, 1978, with the issuance of Letter of Instructions No. 729, that

local governments were required to submit their existing land use plans,
zoning ordinances, enforcement systems and procedures to the Ministry of
Human Settlements for review and ratification. Heirs of Dr. Jose Deleste v.
Land Bank of the Philippines, et al., G.R. No. 169913. June 8, 2011.
Administrative Law
Administrative cases; due process. Petitioners contend that DAR failed to
notify them that it is putting the subject property under the coverage of the
agrarian reform program; hence, their right to due process of law was
violated. The SC agreed. The importance of an actual notice in subjecting a
property under the agrarian reform program cannot be underrated, as noncompliance with it violates the essential requirements of administrative due
process of law. If the illegality in the issuance of the CLTs is patent, the
Court must immediately take action and declare the issuance as null and
void. Accordingly, there being no question that the CLTs in the instant case
were improperly issued, for which reason, their cancellation is
warranted. The same holds true with respect to the EPs and certificates of
title issued by virtue of the void CLTs, as there can be no valid transfer of
title should the CLTs on which they were grounded are void. Heirs of Dr.
Jose Deleste v. Land Bank of the Philippines, et al., G.R. No. 169913. June
8, 2011.
Administrative cases; execution of Ombudsman decisions. Petitioners in
this case raise the issue of whether administrative decisions of the Office of
the Ombudsman imposing the penalties of dismissal and one-year
suspension from office are immediately executory pending appeal. The
Supreme Court held that it is immediately executory pending appeal. This is
the rule provided for under Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of
the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by Administrative Order No. 17,
dated September 15, 2003, which provides among others: An appeal shall
not stop the decision from being executory. In case the penalty is suspension
or removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as
having been under preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and
such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or
removal. A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases
shall be executed as a matter of course Under this provision, a
respondent who is found administratively liable by the Office of the
Ombudsman and is slapped with a penalty of suspension of more than one

month from service has the right to file an appeal with the CA under Rule 43
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. But although a
respondent is given the right to appeal, the act of filing an appeal does not
stay the execution of the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman. Marcelo
G. Ganaden, et al. v. The Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos. 170500 &
170510-11. June 1, 2011.
May 2011 Philippine Supreme Court

Posted on June 23, 2011 by Vicente D. Gerochi IV Posted in Constitutional Law
Tagged agrarian reform, appeal, Civil Service Commission, due process, exhaustion of
administrative remedies, judicial review, security of tenure
Here are selected May 2011 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines
on political law.
Constitutional Law
Declaration of unconstitutionality; doctrine of operative fact. An
unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it
affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not
been passed at all. The doctrine of operative fact is an exception this rule. It
applies as a matter of equity and fair play, and nullifies the effects of an
unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a
determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have
consequences that cannot always be ignored. It applies when a declaration of
unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have relied on
the invalid law. The doctrine cannot be applied to this case, as to hold
otherwise would be iniquitous to petitioner who was illegally dismissed
from employment and would allow his employer to profit from a violation of
an unconstitutional provision of law. Claudio S. Yap v. Thenamaris Ships
Management and Intermare Maritime Agencies, Inc., G.R. No. 179532. May
30, 2011.
Judicial review; review of executive policy. Petitioner here seeks judicial

review of a question of Executive policy, which the Court ruled is outside its
jurisdiction. Despite the definition of judicial power under Section 1, Article
VIII of the Constitution, the determination of where, as between two
possible routes, to construct a road extension is not within the province of
courts. Such determination belongs exclusively to the Executive
branch. Barangay Captain Beda Torrecampo v. Metropolitan Waterworks
and Sewerage System, et al., G.R. No. 188296. May 30, 2011.
Administrative Law; Public Officers
Administrative cases; due process. Petitioners argue that they were denied
due process because their order of dismissal was not accompanied by any
justification from the Board of Directors of Philippine Estates Authority,
which merely relied on the findings of the Presidential Anti-Graft
Commission. The Court dismissed this argument on the basis that
petitioners were given the opportunity to be heard in the course of PAGCs
investigation. The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is
the opportunity to explain ones side or seek a reconsideration of the action
or ruling complained of, and to submit any evidence a party may have in
support of his defense. The demands of due process are sufficiently met
when the parties are given the opportunity to be heard before judgment is
rendered. Petitioners here actively participated in the proceedings before
PAGC where they were afforded the opportunity to explain their actions
through their memoranda. The essence of due process is the right to be
heard and this evidently was afforded to them. Theron V. Lacson v. The
Hon. Executive Secretary, et al./Jaime R. Millan and Bernardo T. Viray v.
The Hon. Executive Secretary, et al., G.R. No. 165399 & 165475/G.R. No.
165404 & 165489. May 30, 2011.
Administrative proceedings; due process. The essence of due process is

simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. In the application of
the principle of due process, what is sought to be safeguarded is not lack of
previous notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard. As long as a
party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he was

not denied due process. Petitioner here was adequately apprised of the
charges filed against him and he submitted his answer to the complaint while
the case was still under a pre-charge investigation. When the Office of the
Legal Service conducted a summary hearing on the complaint, petitioner
was again duly notified of the proceedings and was given an opportunity to
explain his side. He was not denied due process. Rimando A. Gannapao v.
Civil Service Commission, et al., G.R. No. 180141. May 31, 2011.
Administrative proceedings; length of service as an alternative
circumstance. Length of service as a factor in determining the imposable
penalty in administrative cases is not always a mitigating circumstance. It is
an alternative circumstance, which can mitigate or possibly even aggravate
the penalty, depending on the circumstances of the case. Where the
government employee concerned took advantage of his long years of service
and position in public office, length of service may not be considered in
lowering the penalty. The Court will take this circumstance against the
public officer or employee in administrative cases involving serious
offenses, even if it was the first time said public officer or employee was
administratively charged. Rimando A. Gannapao v. Civil Service
Commission, et al., G.R. No. 180141. May 31, 2011.
Appeal; doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. The Supreme
Court denied this petition for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies. Petitioner here went to the Court of Appeals to appeal the orders
of Laguna Lake Development Authority. Petitioner cites deprivation of due
process and lack of any plain, speedy or adequate remedy as grounds which
exempted it from complying with the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies. The Supreme Court agreed with the CA that such appeal was
premature since the law provides for an appeal from decisions or orders of
the LLDA to the DENR Secretary or the Office of the President, a remedy
which should have first been exhausted before invoking judicial
intervention. Petitioners contrary arguments to show that an appeal to the
DENR Secretary would be an exercise in futility as the latter merely adopts
the LLDAs findings is at best speculative and presumptuous. Universal
Robina Corp. v. Laguna Lake Development Authority, G.R. No.
191427. May 30, 2011.
Civil service; security of tenure. Career service officers enjoy security of
tenure as guaranteed under the 1987 Constitution and the Civil Service

Decree of the Philippines, which provides that no officer or employee in the

Civil Service shall be suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided
by law and after due process. The tenurial protection accorded to a civil
servant is a guaranty of both procedural and substantive due
process. Procedural due process requires that the dismissal, when warranted,
be effected only after notice and hearing. Substantive due process requires,
among others, that the dismissal be for legal cause, which must relate to and
effect the administration of the office of which the concerned employee is a
member and must be restricted to something of a substantial nature directly
affecting the rights and interests of the public. Nevertheless, the right to
security of tenure is not tantamount to immunity from dismissal. Petitioners
cannot seek absolute protection from this constitutional provision. As long
as their dismissal was for a legal cause and the requirements of due process
were met, the law will not prevent their removal from office. Theron V.
Lacson v. The Hon. Executive Secretary, et al./Jaime R. Millan and
Bernardo T. Viray v. The Hon. Executive Secretary, et al., G.R. No. 165399
& 165475/G.R. No. 165404 & 165489. May 30, 2011.
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service; requirements;
examples. The acts of respondent constitute the administrative offense of
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, which need not be
related to, or connected with, the public officers official functions. As long
as the questioned conduct tarnishes the image and integrity of his public
office, the corresponding penalty may be meted on the erring public officer
or employee. Under the Civil Service law and rules, there is no concrete
description of what specific acts constitute the grave offense of Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. However, the Court has
considered the following acts or omissions, inter alia, as Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service: misappropriation of public
funds; abandonment of office; failure to report back to work without prior
notice; failure to safe keep public records and property; making false entries
in public documents; falsification of court orders; a judges act of
brandishing a gun and threatening the complainants during a traffic
altercation; and a court interpreters participation in the execution of a
document conveying complainants property which resulted in a quarrel in
the latters family. Rimando A. Gannapao v. Civil Service Commission, et
al., G.R. No. 180141. May 31, 2011.
Government owned and controlled corporation; requisites. The Court here

ruled that Philippine Centennial Expo 98 Corporation is a private

corporation. It was not created by a special law but was incorporated under
the Corporation Code and was registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission. It is not a government-owned or controlled corporation.
Although the Bases Conversion Development Authority owned almost all of
the shares of Expocorp at the time of the latters incorporation, the Board of
Directors of Expocorp allowed a private corporation to buy its shares
constituting 55.16% of its outstanding capital stock two months after
incorporation. With the BCDA as a minority stockholder, Expocorp cannot
be characterized as a government-owned or controlled corporation. A
government-owned or controlled corporation must be owned by the
government, and in the case of a stock corporation, at least a majority of its
capital stock must be owned by the government. Since Expocorp is not a
GOCC, its officers and employees are private individuals who are outside
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. People of the Philippines v. Luis J.
Morales, G.R. No. 166355. May 30, 2011.
Misconduct; relation to the official performance of duties. To constitute
misconduct, the act or acts must have a direct relation to, and must be
connected with, the performance of official duties. The duties of respondent
here as a member of the GSIS Fund Management Accounting
Department do not involve the modification of IP addresses, the offense he
committed. The act was considered unauthorized, precisely because dealing
with the GSIS networks IP addresses is strictly reserved for personnel of the
Information Technology Services Group, who are expectedly knowledgeable
in this field. Government Service Insurance System, et al. v. Arwin T.
Mayordomo, G.R. No. 191218. May 31, 2011.
Procedural due process; right to cross-examine. While the right to crossexamine is a vital element of procedural due process, the right does not
require an actual cross examination but merely an opportunity to exercise
this right if desired by the party entitled to it. In this case, while National
Police Commission Memorandum Circular No. 96-010 provides that the
sworn statements of witnesses shall take the place of oral testimony but shall
be subject to cross-examination, petitioner missed this opportunity precisely
because he did not appear at the deadline for the filing of his supplemental
answer or counter-affidavit, and accordingly the hearing officer considered
the case submitted for decision. And even with the grant of his subsequent
motion to be furnished with a copy of the complaint and its annexes, he still

failed to file a supplemental answer or counter-affidavit and instead filed a

motion to dismiss. Rimando A. Gannapao v. Civil Service Commission, et
al., G.R. No. 180141. May 31, 2011.
Agrarian Law
Tenancy relation; elements. RA 1199, the Agricultural Tenancy Act of the
Philippines, defines a tenant as a person who, himself and with the aid
available from within his immediate farm household, cultivates the land
belonging to, or possessed by, another, with the latters consent for purposes
of production, sharing the produce with the landholder under the share
tenancy system, or paying the landholder a price certain or ascertainable in
produce or in money or both, under a leasehold tenancy system. For a
tenancy relationship to exist, the following essential elements must be
shown: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject
matter is agricultural land; (3) there is consent between the parties; (4) the
purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation by the
tenant; and (6) there is sharing of the harvests between the parties. The
presence of all of these elements must be proved by substantial
evidence. Estate of Pasto Samson v. Mercedes & Ruberto Susano/Julian
Chan v. Mercedes and Ruberto Susano, G.R. No. 179024/G.R. No.
179086. May 30, 2011.
April 2011 Philippine Supreme Court

Posted on May 18, 2011 by Vicente D. Gerochi IV Posted in Constitutional Law,
Here are selected April 2011 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines
on political law.
Constitutional Law
Cityhood Laws; Equal protection. The petitioners in this case reiterate their
position that the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6 and Section 10 of Article

X of the Constitution, the Equal Protection Clause, and the right of local
governments to a just share in the national taxes. This was denied by the
Supreme Court. Congress clearly intended that the local government units
covered by the Cityhood Laws be exempted from the coverage of R.A. No.
9009 (the Cityhood Law). The House of Representatives adopted Joint
Resolution No. 29, entitled Joint Resolution to Exempt Certain
Municipalities Embodied in Bills Filed in Congress before June 30, 2001
from the coverage of Republic Act No. 9009. However, the Senate failed to
act on Joint Resolution No. 29. Even so, the House of Representatives
readopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 during the
12th Congress, and forwarded Joint Resolution No. 1 to the Senate for
approval. Again, the Senate failed to approve Joint Resolution No.
1. Thereafter, the conversion bills of the respondents were individually filed
in the House of Representatives, and were all unanimously and favorably
voted upon by the Members of the House of Representatives. The bills,
when forwarded to the Senate, were likewise unanimously approved by the
Senate. The acts of both Chambers of Congress show that the exemption
clauses ultimately incorporated in the Cityhood Laws are but the express
articulations of the clear legislative intent to exempt the respondents, without
exception, from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009. Thereby, R.A. No. 9009,
and, by necessity, the LGC, were amended, not by repeal but by way of the
express exemptions being embodied in the exemption clauses. League of
Cities of the Philippines etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al./League of Cities of
the Philippines etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al./League of Cities of the
Philippines etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 176951/G.R. No.
177499/G.R. No. 178056. April 12, 2011.
Cityhood Laws; Just share in national taxes. The share of local government
units is a matter of percentage under Section 285 of the Local Government
Code (LGC), not a specific amount. Specifically, the share of the cities is
23%, determined on the basis of population (50%), land area (25%), and
equal sharing (25%). This share is also dependent on the number of existing
cities, such that when the number of cities increases, then more will divide
and share the allocation for cities. However, the Supreme Court noted that
the allocation by the National Government is not a constant, and can either
increase or decrease. With every newly converted city becoming entitled to
share the allocation for cities, the percentage of internal revenue allotment
(IRA) entitlement of each city will decrease, although the actual amount
received may be more than that received in the preceding year. That is a

necessary consequence of Section 285 and Section 286 of the LGC. In this
case, since the conversion by the Cityhood Laws is not violative of the
Constitution and the LGC, the respondents are thus also entitled to their just
share in the IRA allocation for cities. League of Cities of the Philippines etc.,
et al. v. COMELEC, et al./League of Cities of the Philippines etc., et al. v.
COMELEC, et al./League of Cities of the Philippines etc., et al. v.
COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 176951/G.R. No. 177499/G.R. No.
178056. April 12, 2011.
Expenditure of Public Funds; Requirements. The Administrative Code of

1987 expressly prohibits the entering into contracts involving the
expenditure of public funds unless two prior requirements are satisfied. First,
there must be an appropriation law authorizing the expenditure required in
the contract. Second, there must be attached to the contract a certification by
the proper accounting official and auditor that funds have been appropriated
by law and such funds are available. Failure to comply with any of these two
requirements renders the contract void. The clear purpose of these
requirements is to insure that government contracts are never signed unless
supported by the corresponding appropriation law and fund availability. The
Supreme Court found that the three contracts between Philippine National
Railways (PNR) and Kanlaon do not comply with the requirement of a
certification of appropriation and fund availability. Even if a certification of
appropriation is not applicable to PNR if the funds used are internally
generated, still a certificate of fund availability is required. Thus, the three
contracts between PNR and Kanlaon were found to be void for violation of
Sections 46, 47, and 48, Chapter 8, Subtitle B, Title I, Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987, as well as Sections 85, 86, and 87 of the
Government Auditing Code of the Philippines. Philippine National
Railways v. Kanlaon Construction Enterprises, Co., Inc., G.R. No.
182967. April 6, 2011.
Locus Standi. For a party to have locus standi, one must allege such a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions. Because constitutional cases are often public actions in which
the relief sought is likely to affect other persons, a preliminary question

frequently arises as to this interest in the constitutional question raised. It

cannot be denied that movants-intervenors will suffer direct injury in the
event their Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment is denied and their
Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors Motion
for Reconsideration of the Resolution is denied with finality. Indeed,
according to the Supreme Court, they have sufficiently shown that they have
a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that if the Resolution
ordering finality be not reconsidered, their election to their respective
positions during the May 10, 2010 polls and its concomitant effects would
all be nullified and be put to naught. Rodolfo G. Navarro, et al. Vs.
Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 180050. April 12,
2011.
Moot and academic Principle; Exception. The moot and academic
principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts
from resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and
academic, if: (1) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) there is an
exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is
involved; (3) the constitutional issue raised requires formation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (4) the case is
capable of repetition yet evading review. Rodolfo G. Navarro, et al. Vs.
2011.
Administrative Law
Government Employee; Dishonesty; Misconduct. Dishonesty is defined as
the concealment or distortion of truth in a matter of fact relevant to ones
office or connected with the performance of his duty. On the other hand,
misconduct is a transgression of some established or definite rule of action,
is a forbidden act, is a dereliction of duty, is willful in character, and implies
wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment. More particularly, it is an
unlawful behavior by the public officer. The term, however, does not
necessarily imply corruption or criminal intent. In this case, petitioners acts
were found by the Supreme Court as clearly reflecting his dishonesty and
grave misconduct. He allowed the Spouses Abuan to use his position as SSS
Senior Member Services Representative to make their clients believe that
he could give them undue advantage over others without the same
connection by processing their SSS claims faster. Likewise, his acts,

according to the SC, imply malevolent intent, and not merely error in
judgment. He was aware of what the Spouses Abuan were doing and was
complicit in the same. At the very least, according to the Supreme Court, he
failed to stop the illegal trade, and that constitutes willful disregard of the
laws and rules. Jerome Japson v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No.
189479. April 12, 2011.
Agrarian Law
Agrarian Reform; Right to just compensation. Apart from the requirement
that compensation for expropriated land must be fair and reasonable,
compensation, to be just, must also be made without delay. In simpler
terms, for the governments payment to be considered just compensation, the
landowner must receive it in full without delay. In the present case, it is
undisputed that the government took the petitioners lands on December 9,
1996; the petitioners only received full payment of the just compensation
due on May 9, 2008. This circumstance, by itself, was found by the Supreme
Court as already confirming the unconscionable delay in the payment of just
compensation. APO Fruits Corporation and Hijo Plantation, Inc. v. Land
Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 164195. April 5, 2011.
Local Government; Requisites for creation of province. The central policy
considerations in the creation of local government units are economic
viability, efficient administration, and capability to deliver basic services to
their constituents. The criteria prescribed by the Local Government Code,
i.e., income, population and land area, are all designed to accomplish these
results. Without doubt, the primordial criterion in the creation of local
government units, particularly of a province, is economic viability. This is
the clear intent of the framers of the LGC. However, there is an exemption
provided in the Local Government Code in terms of the land area
requirement. When the local government unit to be created consists of one
(1) or more islands, it is exempt from the land area requirement as expressly
provided in Section 442 and Section 450 of the LGC, if the local
government unit to be created is a municipality or a component city,
respectively. This exemption is absent in the enumeration of the requisites
for the creation of a province under Section 461 of the LGC, although it is

expressly stated under Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR. The Supreme Court
found no reason why this exemption should not apply also to provinces. In
fact, the Supreme Court observed that considering the physical configuration
of the Philippine archipelago, there is a greater likelihood that islands or
group of islands would form part of the land area of a newly-created
province than in most cities or municipalities. It is, therefore, logical to infer
that the genuine legislative policy decision was expressed in Section 442 (for
municipalities) and Section 450 (for component cities) of the LGC, but was
inadvertently omitted in Section 461 (for provinces). Thus, when the
exemption was expressly provided in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR, the
inclusion was intended to correct the congressional oversight in Section 461
of the LGC and to reflect the true legislative intent. The Court thus upheld
the validity of Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR. Rodolfo G. Navarro, et al. Vs.
2011.
March 2011 Philippine Supreme

Posted on April 26, 2011 by Vicente D. Gerochi IV Posted in Constitutional Law,
Here are selected March 2011 rulings of the Supreme Court of the
Constitutional Law
COMELEC; House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal; Jurisdiction. The
Supreme Court held in this case that despite recourse to it, it cannot rule on
the issue of citizenship of petitioner Gonzalez. Subsequent events showed
that Gonzalez had not only been duly proclaimed, he had also taken his oath
of office and assumed office as Member of the House of Representatives.
Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed
office as a member of the House of Representatives, COMELECs
jurisdiction over election contests relating to the candidates election and
qualifications ends, and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins. Fernando V.

Gonzalez v. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 192856, March 8,

2011.
Equal Protection. The main issue in this case is whether or not PAGCOR is
still exempt from corporate income tax and VAT with the enactment of R.A.
No. 9337. The Supreme Court held that under Section 1 of R.A. No. 9337,
amending Section 27 (c) of the National Internal Revenue Code of
1977, petitioner is no longer exempt from corporate income tax as it has
been effectively omitted from the list of GOCCs that are exempt from it. The
burden of proof rests upon the party claiming exemption to prove that it is,
in fact, covered by the exemption so claimed. In this case, PAGCOR failed
to prove that it is still exempt from the payment of corporate income tax,
considering that Section 1 of R.A. No. 9337 amended Section 27 (c) of the
National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 by omitting PAGCOR from the
exemption. PAGCOR cannot find support in the equal protection clause of
the Constitution, as the legislative records of the Bicameral Conference
Meeting dated October 27, 1997, of the Committee on Ways and Means,
show that PAGCORs exemption from payment of corporate income tax, as
provided in Section 27 (c) of R.A. No. 8424, or the National Internal
Revenue Code of 1997, was not made pursuant to a valid classification
based on substantial distinctions and the other requirements of a reasonable
classification by legislative bodies, so that the law may operate only on
some, and not all, without violating the equal protection clause. The
legislative records show that the basis of the grant of exemption to
PAGCOR from corporate income tax was PAGCORs own request to be
exempted. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation v. Bureau of
Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 172087, March 15, 2011.
Impeachment; Initiation. The Supreme Court reiterated its previous ruling

that the term initiate as used in Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution
refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress
taking initial action on said complaint. The initial action of the House of
Representatives on the complaint is the referral of the same to the
Committee on Justice. Ma. Merceditas C. Gutierrez v. The House of
Representatives Committee on Justice, et al., G.R. No. 193459, March 8,
2011.

Impeachment; Promulgation of Rules. When the Constitution uses the word

promulgate, it does not necessarily mean to publish in the Official Gazette
or in a newspaper of general circulation. Promulgation, as used in Section
3(8), Article XI of the Constitution, suitably takes the meaning of to make
known as it should be generally understood. Ma. Merceditas C. Gutierrez v.
The House of Representatives Committee on Justice, et al., G.R. No.
193459, March 8, 2011.
Non-impairment Clause. Petitioner PAGCOR, in this case, states that the
private parties/investors transacting with it considered the tax exemptions,
which inure to their benefit, as the main consideration and inducement for
their decision to transact/invest with it. Petitioner argues that the withdrawal
of its exemption from corporate income tax by R.A. No. 9337 has the effect
of changing the main consideration and inducement for the transactions of
private parties with it; thus, the amendatory provision is violative of the nonimpairment clause of the Constitution. The SC held that a franchise partakes
of the nature of a grant which is beyond the purview of the non-impairment
clause of the Constitution. Under Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution,
PAGCORs franchise is subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by
Congress such as the amendment under Section 1 of R.A. No. 9377. Hence,
the provision in Section 1 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Section 27 (c) of
R.A. No. 8424 by withdrawing the exemption of PAGCOR from corporate
income tax, which may affect any benefits to PAGCORs transactions with
private parties, is not violative of the non-impairment clause of the
Constitution. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation v. Bureau of
Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 172087, March 15, 2011.
Senate Ethics Committee; Due Process. This case refers to the ethics
complaint filed against Sen. Manny Villar on the alleged double insertion of
Php200 million for the C-5 Road Extension Project in the 2008 General
Appropriations Act. Petitioners allege that the adoption of the Rules of the
Ethics Committee by the Senate Committee of the Whole is violative of
Senator Villars right to due process. The SC did not agree. The
Constitutional right of the Senate to promulgate its own rules of proceedings
has been recognized and affirmed by this Court. The only limitation to the
power of Congress to promulgate its own rules is the observance of quorum,
voting, and publication when required. As long as these requirements are
complied with, according to the SC, the Court will not interfere with the
right of Congress to amend its own rules. Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., et al. v.

Senate Committee of the Whole represented by Senate President Juan Ponce

Enrile, G.R. No. 187714, March 8, 2011.
Senate Ethics Committee; Equal Protection. Petitioners allege that the
Senate Committee of the Whole was constituted solely for the purpose of
assuming jurisdiction over the complaint against Senator Villar. Petitioners
further allege that the act was discriminatory and removed Senator Villars
recourse against any adverse report of the Ethics Committee to the Senate as
a body. The SC did not agree with this. The Rules of the Ethics Committee
provide that all matters relating to the conduct, rights, privileges, safety,
dignity, integrity and reputation of the Senate and its Members shall be
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Senate Committee on Ethics and
Privileges. However, in this case, the refusal of the Minority to name its
members to the Ethics Committee stalled the investigation. In short, while
ordinarily an investigation about one of its members alleged irregular or
unethical conduct is within the jurisdiction of the Ethics Committee, the
Minority effectively prevented it from pursuing the investigation when they
refused to nominate their members to the Ethics Committee. Even Senator
Villar called the Ethics Committee a kangaroo court and declared that he
would answer the accusations against him on the floor and not before the
Ethics Committee. Given the circumstances, the referral of the investigation
to the Committee of the Whole was an extraordinary remedy undertaken by
the Ethics Committee and approved by a majority of the members of the
Senate. Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., et al. v. Senate Committee of the Whole
represented by Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile, G.R. No.
187714, March 8, 2011.
Senate; Publication of Rules. Petitioners assail the non-publication of the
Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole. Respondent counters that
publication is not necessary because the Senate Committee of the Whole
merely adopted the Rules of the Ethics Committee which had been published
in the Official Gazette on 23 March 2009. Respondent alleges that there is
only one set of Rules that governs both the Ethics Committee and the Senate
Committee of the Whole. The SC held that the Constitution does not require
publication of the internal rules of the House or Senate. Since rules of the
House or the Senate that affect only their members are internal to the House
or Senate, such rules need not be published, unless such rules expressly
provide for their publication before the rules can take effect. In this
particular case, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole itself

provide that the Rules must be published before the Rules can take effect.
Thus, even if publication is not required under the Constitution, publication
of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is required because the
Rules expressly mandate their publication. To comply with due process
requirements, the Senate must follow its own internal rules if the rights of its
own members are affected. Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., et al. v. Senate
Committee of the Whole represented by Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile,
G.R. No. 187714, March 8, 2011.
Senate; Quorum and Voting. If the Senate is constituted as a Committee of
the Whole, a majority of the Senate is required to constitute a quorum to do
business pursuant to Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution.
Otherwise, there will be a circumvention of this express provision of the
Constitution on quorum requirement. Obviously, the Rules of the Senate
Committee of the Whole require modification to comply with requirements
of quorum and voting which the Senate must have overlooked in this case.
In any event, in case of conflict between the Rules of the Senate Committee
of the Whole and the Constitution, the latter will of course prevail. . Aquilino
Q. Pimentel, Jr., et al. v. Senate Committee of the Whole represented by
Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile, G.R. No. 187714, March 8, 2011.
Unlawful Expenditure for being Excessive; Factors. Price is considered
excessive if it is more than the 10% allowable price variance between the
price paid for the item bought and the price of the same item per canvass of
the auditor. In determining whether or not the price is excessive, the
following factors may be considered: (a) supply and demand forces in the
market; (b) government price quotations; (c) warranty of products or special
features; (d) brand of products. In this case, the issue was whether the
computer units bought by Cooperative Development Authority (CDA) from
Tetra were overpriced. The records showed that while the respondents found
nothing wrong per se with the criteria adopted by the CDA in the overall
evaluation of the bids, the technical aspect was seriously questioned. The
final technical evaluation report was apparently manipulated to favor Tetra,
which offered a Korean-made brand as against Microcircuits which offered a
US-made brand said to be more durable, at a lower price. The SC concluded
that the price per item of the PC units, laptop and UPS were overpriced by
almost 50%. This comparison was based on the initial purchase of 23 PC
units with the bid price by Tetra of Php1,269,630.00 (23 PC units, 1 unit 386
Tower and 1 unit 386 Notebook) under Disbursement Voucher No. 01-92-

12-2399. There was an additional (repeat) purchase of 21 PC units for

Php929,649.00 (same price per item of Php44,269.00) and one unit UPS for
Php86,000.00. The total contract price obtained by Tetra was
Php2,285,279.00, of which COA disallowed the amount of Php881,819.00
representing the overprice per the auditors findings. Candelario L. Verzosa,
Jr. v. Guillermo N. Carague, et al., G.R. No. 157838, March 8, 2011.
Unlawful Expenditure; Liability of Public Officers. The SC held the
petitioner liable personally and solidarily for the disallowed amount of
Php881,819.00. The doctrine of separate personality of a corporation finds
no application because the Cooperative Development Authority is not a
private entity but a government agency created by virtue of Republic Act
No. 6939 in compliance with the provisions of Section 15, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution. Moreover, respondents satisfactorily established that
petitioner acted in bad faith when he prevailed upon the Development
Academy of the Philippines-Technical Evaluation Committee (DAP-TEC) to
modify the initial result of the technical evaluation of the computers by
imposing an irrelevant grading system that was intended to favor one of the
bidders, after the bids had been opened. Candelario L. Verzosa, Jr. v.
Guillermo N. Carague, et al., G.R. No. 157838, March 8, 2011.
Administrative Law
Administrative Proceeding; Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction. This case
refers to the ethics complaint filed against Sen. Manny Villar on the alleged
double insertion of Php200 million for the C-5 Road Extension Project in the
2008 General Appropriations Act. Respondent avers that primary recourse
of petitioners should have been to the Senate and that the Supreme Court
must uphold the separation of powers between the legislative and judicial
branches of the government. The SC held that the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction does not apply to this case. The issues presented here do not
require the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of respondent for
their resolution. On the contrary, the issues here are purely legal questions
which are within the competence and jurisdiction of the Court, and not for
an administrative agency or the Senate to resolve. Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr.,
et al. v. Senate Committee of the Whole represented by Senate President
Juan Ponce Enrile, G.R. No. 187714, March 8, 2011.

Agrarian Law
Agrarian Reform; Qualifications of Beneficiary. DAR Administrative Order
No. 3, series of 1990, enumerated the qualifications of a beneficiary: (1)
Landless; (2) Filipino citizen; (3) Actual occupant/tiller who is at least 15
years of age or head of the family at the time of filing application; and (4)
Has the willingness, ability and aptitude to cultivate and make the land
productive. The SC found that petitioner Lebrudo does not qualify as a
beneficiary because of (1) and (3). First, Lebrudo is not landless. According
to the records, Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer Amelia Sangalang issued
a certification dated 28 February 1996 attesting that Lebrudo was awarded
by the DAR with a home lot consisting of an area of 236 square meters
situated at Japtinchay Estate, Bo. Milagrosa, Carmona, Cavite. Next,
Lebrudo is not the actual occupant or tiller of the lot at the time of the filing
of the application. Loyola and her family were the actual occupants of the lot
at the time Loyola applied to be a beneficiary under the CARP. Julian S.
Lebrudo and Reynaldo L. Lebrudo v. Remedios Loyola, G.R. No.
181370, March 9, 2011.
Agrarian Reform; Role of Land Bank of the Philippines. In this case, the
issue was whether the Land Bank of the Philippines has the personality to
file a petition for determination of just compensation before the Special
Agrarian Court. The SC held that LBP did. The LBP is an agency created
primarily to provide financial support in all phases of agrarian reform
pursuant to Section 74 of RA 3844 or the Agricultural Reform Code and
Section 64 of RA 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1988. In the previous case of Heirs of Lorenzo and Carmen Vidad v. Land
Bank of the Philippines, the SC held that LBP is not merely a nominal party
in the determination of just compensation, but an indispensable participant in
such proceedings. It is primarily responsible for the valuation and
determination of compensation for all private lands. It has the discretion to
approve or reject the land valuation and just compensation for a private
agricultural land placed under the CARP. In case the LBP disagrees with the
valuation of land and determination of just compensation by a party, the
DAR, or even the courts, the LBP not only has the right, but the duty, to
challenge the same, by appeal to the Court of Appeals or to this Court, if
appropriate. Davao Fruits Corporation v. Land Bank of the Philippines,
G.R. Nos. 181566 & 181570. March 9, 2011.

Agrarian Reform; Sale or Conveyance of Land. It is clear from Section 27 of

RA 6657 that lands awarded to beneficiaries under the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) may not be sold, transferred or conveyed
for a period of 10 years. The law enumerated four exceptions: (1) through
hereditary succession; (2) to the government; (3) to the Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP); or (4) to other qualified beneficiaries. In short, during the
prohibitory 10-year period, any sale, transfer or conveyance of land reform
rights is void, except as allowed by law, in order to prevent a circumvention
of agrarian reform laws. In this case, petitioner Lebrudo insists that he is
entitled to one-half portion of the lot awarded to Loyola under the CARP as
payment for shouldering all the expenses for the transfer of the title of the lot
from respondent Loyolas mother, Cristina Hugo, to Loyolas name.
Lebrudo used the two Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by Loyola alloting to
him the one-half portion of the lot as basis for his claim. In other words,
waiver of rights and interests over landholdings awarded by the government
is invalid for being violative of agrarian reform laws. Julian S. Lebrudo and
Reynaldo L. Lebrudo v. Remedios Loyola, G.R. No. 181370, March 9, 2011.
Election Law
Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy; Disqualification of Candidate;
Period for Filing Petition. Petitioner Fernando V. Gonzalez and private
respondent Reno G. Lim both filed certificates of candidacy for the position
of Representative of the 3rd congressional district of the Province of Albay
in the May 10, 2010 elections. On March 30, 2010, a Petition for
Disqualification and Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy (COC) was
filed by Stephen Bichara [SPA No. 10-074 (DC)] on the ground that
Gonzalez is a Spanish national, being the legitimate child of a Spanish father
and a Filipino mother, and that he failed to elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority in accordance with the provisions of
Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 625. The SC explained the difference
between Cancellation under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code and
Disqualification under Section 68 of the OEC. A petition to cancel a
candidates COC may be filed under Section 78 of the OEC exclusively on
the ground that any material representation contained therein as required by
law is false. On the other hand, a petition for disqualification of a candidate
may also be filed pursuant to Section 68 for committing prohibited acts
referred to in said section. As to the ground of false representation in the
COC under Section 78, the Court in a previous case elaborated that the

misrepresentation must be material, i.e. misrepresentation regarding age,

residence and citizenship or non-possession of natural-born Filipino status.
In this case, the petition in SPA No. 10-074 (DC) based on the allegation
that Gonzalez was not a natural-born Filipino which was filed before the
elections is in the nature of a petition filed under Section 78. The recitals in
the petition in said case, however, state that it was filed pursuant to Section 4
(b) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8696 and Section 68 of the OEC to
disqualify a candidate for lack of qualifications or possessing some grounds
for disqualification. The COMELEC treated the petition as one filed both
for disqualification and cancellation of COC, with the effect that Section 68,
in relation to Section 3, Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, is
applicable insofar as determining the period for filing the petition. This Rule
provides the prescriptive period of filing to be not later than the date of
proclamation. On the other hand, the procedure for filing a petition for
cancellation of COC is covered by Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, which provides as the prescriptive period to be within five (5)
days following the last day for the filing of certificate of candidacy. Section
4(B) of Resolution No. 8696 represents another attempt to modify by a
mere procedural rule the statutory period for filing a petition to cancel COC
on the ground of false representation therein regarding a candidates
qualifications. Section 4(B) of Resolution No. 8696 would supplant the
prescribed period of filing of petition under Section 78 with that provided in
Section 68 even if the latter provision does not at all cover the false
representation regarding age, residence and citizenship which may be raised
in a petition under Section 78. If the purpose behind this rule promulgated
by the COMELEC allowing a petition to cancel COC based on the
candidates non-compliance with constitutional and statutory requirements
for elective office, such as citizenship, to be filed even beyond the period
provided in Section 78 was simply to remedy a perceived procedural gap
though not expressly stated in Resolution No. 8696, the Court, in a previous
case, had already rejected such justification. Fernando V. Gonzalez v.
Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 192856, March 8, 2011.

Posted on April 12, 2011 by Jose Ma. G. Hofilea Posted in Constitutional Law,

The following is a summary of a recent decision promulgated by the High

Court in March 2011 where one Justice felt compelled to express her dissent
1. An Uncooperative Audit (Villarama vs. Sereno)
The case of Verzosa vs. Carague involves the Cooperative Development
Authority (CDA) and an uncooperative Commission of Audit (COA).
Sometime almost twenty years ago, the CDA conducted a public bidding for
the supply to the CDA of computer equipment and peripherals. The three
entities that took part were Tetra Corporation-Trigem Computers (Tetra),
Microcircuits Co. (Microcircuits), and Columbia Computers (Columbia).
Following the bidding, the evaluation (which also included a technical
evaluation made by the Development Academy of the Philippines (DAP) at
the request of the CDA) and the ensuing approval given by Candelario L.
Versoza, Jr. as the CDAs Executive Director, in December 1992, Tetra was
awarded the supply contract for the total amount of P2,285,279.00, which
was eventually paid by the CDA to Tetra.
Months after the purchase, the COA Resident Auditor assigned to the CDA
sought the assistance of the Technical Services Office (TSO) of the COA to
determine the reasonableness of the prices of the purchased computers. The
TSO found that the purchased computers were overpriced/excessive by a
total of P881,819.00. Among other things, the TSO noted that: (1) no
volume discount was given by the supplier, considering the number of units
sold; (2) as early as 1992, there were so much supply of computers in the
market so that the prices of computers were relatively low already; and (3)
when the CDA first offered to buy computers, of the three qualified bidders,
Microcircuits offered the lowest bid price while Tetra offered the highest
bid. The Resident Auditor thus issued a Notice of Disallowance in
November 1993, for the amount of P881,819.
The CDA sought a reconsideration and provided its basis as to why, on the

whole, the purchase from Tetra was justified.

Unconvinced, the COA issued its decision affirming the disallowance
thereby upholding the comparison process undertaken by the Resident
Auditor and the TSO. The CoA held that CDA should not have awarded the
contract to Tetra but to the other competing bidder, whose bid is more
advantageous to the government. In addition, the COA held Verzosa
personally and solidarily liable for the disallowed amount of P881,819 on
account of his having acted in bad faith.
The CDA therefore petitioned the High Court to reverse the COAs rulings.
The Supreme Court, in the main decision penned by Justice Martin S.
VIllarama, Jr., ruled in favor of the COA.
The ponente noted at the outset that acting on its constitutional mandate to
promulgate accounting and auditing rules, and regulations including those
for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds
and properties, the COA promulgated certain amended rules which
included provisions relating to excessive expenditures which shall be
determined by place and origin of goods, volume or quantity of purchase,
service warranties, quality, special features of units purchased and the
like. Under those rules, price is considered excessive if it is more than the
10% allowable price variance between the price paid for the item bought and
the price of the same item per canvass of the auditor. And in determining
whether or not the price is excessive, several stated factors may be
considered by the COA.
Accordingly, in this case, the issue that had to be resolved was whether the
computer units bought by the CDA from Tetra were overpriced.
The majority observed that the records showed that while the COA found
nothing wrong per se with the criteria adopted by the CDA in the overall
evaluation of the bids, the conduct of the technical aspect was seriously
doubtful. In particular, the final technical evaluation report was apparently
manipulated to favor Tetra, which offered a Korean-made brand as against
Microcircuits which offered a US-made brand said to be more durable, at a

lower price.
Although the DAP, in a letter, confirmed to the CDA that based on their
evaluation in compliance with the grading system specified by CDA, the
units of Tetra were best suited to the needs of CDA. However, Justice
Villarama took note that upon investigation, it was discovered that there was
an earlier report from the DAP which actually stated a contrary finding but
that a representative from CDA gave further instructions to the DAP
regarding penalty points that should be applied for deviation in hardware
specifications, thus resulting in the affirmative letter mentioned earlier that
gave Tetra the highest ranking.
The main decision therefore held that it was clear that the conduct of public
bidding in this case was not made objectively with the end in view of
purchasing quality equipment at the least cost to the government. The price
difference far exceeded the 10% allowable variance in the unit bought and
the same items price.
The Court affirmed that the findings of quasi-judicial agencies, such as the
COA, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to
specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but at times even
finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence. It is only
upon a clear showing that the COA acted without or in excess of jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
that this Court will set aside its decisions or final orders. We find no such
arbitrariness or grave abuse on the part of the COA when it disallowed in
audit the amount representing the overprice in the payment by CDA for the
purchased computer units and peripherals, its findings are well-supported by
the evidence on record.
As for Verzosas personal liability, Justice Villarama affirmed that the COA
had sufficiently established his bad faith when he prevailed upon the DAP to
modify the initial results of their technical evaluation and accordingly,
Section 103 of Presidential Decree No. 1445 (Government Auditing Code of
the Philippines) which states:
SECTION 103. General liability for unlawful expenditures. Expenditures
of government funds or uses of government property in violation of law or

regulations shall be a personal liability of the official or employee found to

be directly responsible therefor.
should apply.
The sole dissent was supplied by the newest associate justice of the Supreme
Court, Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno.
Justice Sereno raised five reasons why the COAs ruling against the CDA
should be overturned.
First, the Commission on Audit (COA) cannot violate the same rules it
imposes on all public offices regarding the manner of conducting
canvasses.
The dissenter observed that the COA had taken issues with the manner by
which the DAP conducted its technical evaluation, finding deficiencies in
the manner by which the competing bidders and their respective products
were compared. However, Justice Sereno cites the COA for having itself
conducted a questionable methodology in comparing products and prices,
including among others, that the COAs own evaluation was based only on
alleged undocumented telephone price canvass by a COA auditor.
Second, the COA auditor, who admitted that she is not a computer
technology expert, cannot substitute her own discretion for that of the CDA
by denying the CDAs right to prefer the the required specifications for
the computers CDA intended to purchase for its own use
Third, the amount of disallowance has no basis in fact, is grossly
disproportionate to the total purchase price, and is in the nature of punitive
damages.
Fourth, this Court relies on the allegation that there were instances of
manipulation during the bidding process. However, the records show that
this allegation was belatedly raised by respondents.
Justice Sereno pointed out that this issue was not raised before the COA and
therefore, the petitioner was not afforded due process to rebut these

allegations while the case was still pending with the COA.
Fifth, there is no legal basis to make the CDA Executive Director
personally liable for the return of the disallowance.
The dissenter took the view that Verzosas act of signing the purchase
documents was only ministerial, as the Pre-qualification Bids and Awards
Committee (PBAC) and the Board of Administrators (BOA) acted on them.
According to Justice Sereno, [t]here is a clear, bright line that the [COA]
must not cross. The powers that the 1987 Constitution granted it are only to
define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and
methods required therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules
and regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance or
irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable
expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties. This does not
include the substitution of preference of government agencies. Nor does this
allow COA to trample on the due process rights of government auditees.
She added that the decision to hold Versoza personally liable engendered the
following detrimental consequences:
(i) the bidding process is rendered inutile if we hold that government
agencies should always award purchase contracts in favor of the lowest
bidder; or even worse, that they should simply purchase equipment from the
suppliers offering the lowest prices, regardless of brand or quality.
(ii) the discretionary power of government agencies to determine criteria and
the features of equipment or supplies becomes irrelevant; because the
COAs preference in determining the criteria and the features or
characteristics of the equipment or supplies is held as superior to that of any
other government agency.
(Candelario L. Verzosa, Jr. vs. Guillermo N. Caraque, et al. March 8, 2011,
G.R. No. 157838. See dissenting opinion here.)

February 2011 Philippine Supreme

Posted on March 22, 2011 by Vicente D. Gerochi IV Posted in Constitutional Law,
Philippines - Cases, Philippines - Law Tagged agrarian reform, Civil Service
Commission, due process, eminent domain, equal protection, judicial review, local
government
Here are selected February 2011 rulings of the Supreme Court of the
Constitutional Law
Administrative cases; right to be presumed innocent. The trial court was

correct in declaring that respondents had the right to be presumed innocent
until proven guilty. This means that an employee who has a pending
administrative case filed against him is given the benefit of the doubt and is
considered innocent until the contrary is proven. In this case, respondents
were placed under preventive suspension for 90 days from 23 May 2002 to
21 August 2002. After serving the period of their preventive suspension and
without the administrative case being finally resolved, respondents should
have been reinstated and entitled to the grant of step increment. The Board
of Trustees of the Government Service Insurance System, et al. v. Albert M.
Velasco, et al. G.R. No. 170463, February 2, 2011.
Equal Protection; valid classification. Petitioners argue that there is no

substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in
the 11th Congress and municipalities that did not have pending bills, such
that the mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not a
material difference to distinguish one municipality from another for the
purpose of the income requirement. The SC held that the purpose of the
enactment of R.A. No 9009 was merely to stop the mad rush of

municipalities wanting to be converted into cities and the apprehension that

before long the country will be a country of cities and without
municipalities. It found that the imposition of the P100 million average
annual income requirement for the creation of component cities was
arbitrarily made as there was no evidence or empirical data, such as inflation
rates, to support the choice of this amount. The imposition of a very high
income requirement of P100 million, increased from P20 million, was
simply to make it extremely difficult for municipalities to become
component cities. The SC also found that substantial distinction lies in the
capacity and viability of respondent municipalities to become component
cities of their respective provinces. Congress, by enacting the Cityhood
Laws, recognized this capacity and viability of respondent municipalities to
become the States partners in accelerating economic growth and
development in the provincial regions, which is the very thrust of the LGC,
manifested by the pendency of their cityhood bills during the 11th Congress
and their relentless pursuit for cityhood up to the present. League of Cities of
the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al./League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et
al. v. COMELEC, et al./League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v.
COMELEC, et al. G.R. No. 176951/G.R. No. 177499/G.R. No.
178056, February 15, 2011.
Expropriation; abandonment of public purpose. In this case, the Mactan

Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) and/or its predecessor
agency had not actually used the lots subject of the final decree of
expropriation in Civil Case No. R-1881 for the purpose they were originally
taken by the government, i.e., for the expansion and development of Lahug
Airport. In fact, the Lahug Airport had been closed and abandoned. Also, in
this case, it was preponderantly established by evidence that the National
Airport Corporation, MCIAAs predecessor, through its team of negotiators,
had given assurance to the affected landowners that they would be entitled to
repurchase their respective lots in the event they are no longer used for
airport purposes. The SC held that the government acquires only such rights
in expropriated parcels of land as may be allowed by the character of its title
over the properties. This means that in the event the particular public use for
which a parcel of land is expropriated is abandoned, the owner shall not be
entitled to recover or repurchase it as a matter of right, unless such recovery
or repurchase is expressed in or irresistibly deducible from the

condemnation judgment. The SC held that the decision in Civil Case No. R1881 enjoined MCIAA, as a condition of approving expropriation, to allow
recovery or repurchase upon abandonment of the Lahug airport project. In
effect, the government merely held the properties condemned in trust until
the proposed public use or purpose for which the lots were condemned was
actually consummated by the government. Since the government failed to
perform the obligation that is the basis of the transfer of the property, then
the lot owners can demand the reconveyance of their old properties after the
payment of the condemnation price. A condemnor should commit to use the
property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation,
failing which it should file another petition for the new purpose. If not, then
it behooves the condemnor to return the said property to its private owner, if
the latter so desires. The government cannot plausibly keep the property it
expropriated in any manner it pleases and, in the process, dishonor the
judgment of expropriation. Anunciacion Vda. De Ouano, et al. v. Republic of
the Philippines, et al./Mactan-Cebu International Airport [MCIAA] v.
Ricardo L. Inocian, in his personal capacity and as Attorney-in-Fact of
Olympia E. Esteves, et al. and Aletha Suico Magat in her personal capacity
and as Attorney-in-Fact of Philip M. Suico, et al. G.R. Nos. 168770 &
168812, February 9, 2011.
Expropriation; reconveyance of expropriated property. In accordance with

Art. 1187 of the Civil Code on mutual compensation, MCIAA may keep
whatever income or fruits it may have obtained from the parcels of land
expropriated. In turn, the landowners need not require the accounting of
interests earned by the amounts they received as just compensation.
Following Art. 1189 of the Civil Code providing that if the thing is
improved by its nature, or by time, the improvement shall inure to the
benefit of the creditor, the landowners do not have to settle the appreciation
of the values of their respective lots as part of the reconveyance process,
since the value increase is merely the natural effect of nature and time.
Anunciacion Vda. De Ouano, et al. v. Republic of the Philippines, et
al./Mactan-Cebu International Airport [MCIAA] v. Ricardo L. Inocian, in
his personal capacity and as Attorney-in-Fact of Olympia E. Esteves, et al.
and Aletha Suico Magat in her personal capacity and as Attorney-in-Fact of
Philip M. Suico, et al. G.R. Nos. 168770 & 168812, February 9, 2011.

Impeachment; narration of facts. Petitioner urged the Court to look into the
narration of facts constituting the offenses vis--vis her submissions
disclaiming the allegations in the complaints. The SC denied this as that
would require the Court to make a determination of what constitutes an
impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question,
which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislature. Ma.
Merceditas N. Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives Committee on
Justice, et al. G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011.
Impeachment; publication requirement. Petitioner contended that she was

deprived of due process since the Impeachment Rules was published only on
September 2, 2010 a day after public respondent ruled on the sufficiency of
form of the complaints. She likewise tacked her contention on Section 3(8),
Article XI of the Constitution which directs that Congress shall promulgate
its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.
While promulgation would seem synonymous to publication, there is a
statutory difference in their usage. Promulgation must thus be used in the
context in which it is generally understood, that is, to make known.What is
generally spoken shall be generally understood. Between the restricted
sense and the general meaning of a word, the general must prevail unless it
was clearly intended that the restricted sense was to be used. Since the
Constitutional Commission did not restrict promulgation to publication,
the former should be understood to have been used in its general sense. It is
within the discretion of Congress to determine on how to promulgate its
Impeachment Rules, in much the same way that the Judiciary is permitted to
determine that to promulgate a decision means to deliver the decision to the
clerk of court for filing and publication. It is not for the Supreme Court to
tell a co-equal branch of government how to promulgate when the
Constitution itself has not prescribed a specific method of
promulgation. The SC observed that it is in no position to dictate a mode of
promulgation beyond the dictates of the Constitution. Had the Constitution
intended to have the Impeachment Rules published, it could have stated so
as categorically as it did in the case of the rules of procedure in legislative
inquiries. Even assuming that publication is required, lack of it does not
nullify the proceedings taken prior to the effectiveness of the Impeachment

Rules, which faithfully comply with the relevant self-executing provisions of

the Constitution. Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez v. The House of
Representatives Committee on Justice, et al. G.R. No. 193459, February 15,
2011.
Impeachment; One-Year Bar Rule. Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of

the Constitution reads: No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated
against the same official more than once within a period of one year.
Petitioner reckoned the start of the one-year bar from the filing of the first
impeachment complaint against her on July 22, 2010 or four days before the
opening on July 26, 2010 of the 15th Congress. She posited that within one
year from July 22, 2010, no second impeachment complaint may be
accepted and referred to public respondent. Contrary to petitioners claim,
the SC found that the previous case of Francisco v. House of
Representatives was applicable to this case. There the SC held that the term
initiate means to file the complaint and take initial action on it. It refers to
the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress taking
initial action of said complaint. The initial action taken by the House on the
complaint is the referral of the complaint to the Committee on Justice. With
a simultaneous referral of multiple complaints filed, more than one lighted
matchstick light the candle at the same time. According to the SC, what is
important is that there should only be one candle that is kindled in a year,
such that once the candle starts burning, subsequent matchsticks can no
longer rekindle the candle. Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez v. The House of
2011.
Impeachment; sufficiency of form and substance. Petitioner claimed that

Congress failed to ascertain the sufficiency of form and substance of the
complaints on the basis of the standards set by the Constitution and its own
Impeachment Rules. The SC found this claim to be untenable. The
determination of sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment
complaint is an exponent of the express constitutional grant of rule-making
powers of the House of Representatives which committed such

determinative function to public respondent. Contrary to petitioners position

that the Impeachment Rules do not provide for comprehensible standards in
determining the sufficiency of form and substance, the Impeachment Rules
are clear in echoing the constitutional requirements and providing that there
must be a verified complaint or resolution, and that the substance
requirement is met if there is a recital of facts constituting the offense
charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the committee. Notatu
dignum is the fact that it is only in the Impeachment Rules where a
determination of sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment
complaint is made necessary. This requirement is not explicitly found in the
organic law, as Section 3(2), Article XI of the Constitution basically merely
requires a hearing. Prudential considerations behooved the Supreme
Court to respect the compliance by the House of its duty to effectively carry
out the constitutional purpose, absent any contravention of the minimum
constitutional guidelines. Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez v. The House of
2011.
Internal Revenue Allotment; just share. Congress, who holds the power of
the purse, in enacting the Cityhood Laws, only sought the well-being of
respondent municipalities, having seen their respective capacities to become
component cities of their provinces, temporarily stunted by the enactment of
R.A. No. 9009. By allowing respondent municipalities to convert into
component cities, Congress desired only to uphold the very purpose of the
LGC, i.e., to make the local government units enjoy genuine and
meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest
development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective
partners in the attainment of national goals, which is the very mandate of
the Constitution. League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et
al./League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al./League of
Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al. G.R. No. 176951/G.R. No.
177499/G.R. No. 178056, February 15, 2011.
International Agreements; limitations on sovereignty. The RP, by entering

into the Agreement, does thereby abdicate its sovereignty, abdication being
done by its waiving or abandoning its right to seek recourse through the
Rome Statute of the ICC for erring Americans committing international

crimes in the country. As it were, the Agreement is but a form of affirmance

and confirmation of the Philippines national criminal jurisdiction. National
criminal jurisdiction being primary, it is always the responsibility and within
the prerogative of the RP either to prosecute criminal offenses equally
covered by the Rome Statute or to accede to the jurisdiction of the
ICC. Thus, the Philippines may decide to try persons of the US, as the
term is understood in the Agreement, under our national criminal justice
system; or it may opt not to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over its erring
citizens or over US persons committing high crimes in the country and
defer to the secondary criminal jurisdiction of the ICC over them. In the
same breath, the US must extend the same privilege to the Philippines with
respect to persons of the RP committing high crimes within US territorial
jurisdiction. By their nature, treaties and international agreements actually
have a limiting effect on the otherwise encompassing and absolute nature of
sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations may decide to surrender or
waive some aspects of their state power or agree to limit the exercise of their
otherwise exclusive and absolute jurisdiction. The usual underlying
consideration in this partial surrender may be the greater benefits derived
from a pact or a reciprocal undertaking of one contracting party to grant the
same privileges or immunities to the other. Bayan Muna, as represented by
Rep. Satur Ocampo, et al. v. Alberto Romulo, in his capacity as Executive
Secretary, et al. G.R. No. 159618, February 1, 2011.
International Agreements; treaties and executive agreements. Under
international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive
agreements in terms of their binding effects on the contracting states
concerned, as long as the negotiating functionaries have remained within
their powers. However, a treaty has greater dignity than an executive
agreement, because its constitutional efficacy is beyond doubt, a treaty
having behind it the authority of the President, the Senate, and the people; a
ratified treaty, unlike an executive agreement, takes precedence over any
prior statutory enactment. Petitioner, in this case, argues that the NonSurrender Agreement between the Philippines and the US is of dubious
validity, partaking as it does of the nature of a treaty; hence, it must be duly
concurred in by the Senate. Petitioner relies on the case, Commissioner of
Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading, in which the Court stated: international
agreements involving political issues or changes of national policy and those
involving international arrangements of a permanent character usually take
the form of treaties; while those embodying adjustments of detail carrying

out well established national policies and traditions and those involving
arrangements of a more or less temporary nature take the form of executive
agreements. According to petitioner, the subject of the Agreement does not
fall under any of the subject-categories that are enumerated in the Eastern
Sea Trading case that may be covered by an executive agreement, such as
commercial/consular relations, most-favored nation rights, patent rights,
trademark and copyright protection, postal and navigation arrangements and
settlement of claims. The Supreme Court held, however, that the
categorization of subject matters that may be covered by international
agreements mentioned in Eastern Sea Trading is not cast in stone. There are
no hard and fast rules on the propriety of entering, on a given subject, into a
treaty or an executive agreement as an instrument of international
relations. The primary consideration in the choice of the form of agreement
is the parties intent and desire to craft an international agreement in the
form they so wish to further their respective interests. The matter of form
takes a back seat when it comes to effectiveness and binding effect of the
enforcement of a treaty or an executive agreement, as the parties in either
international agreement each labor under the pacta sunt servanda principle.
Bayan Muna, as represented by Rep. Satur Ocampo, et al. v. Alberto
Romulo, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, et al. G.R. No.
159618, February 1, 2011.
Judicial Review; expanded certiorari jurisdiction. Respondents raised the
impropriety of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition. They argued that
public respondent (the Congress) was not exercising any judicial, quasijudicial or ministerial function in taking cognizance of the two impeachment
complaints as it was exercising a political act that is discretionary in nature,
and that its function is inquisitorial that is akin to a preliminary
investigation. The case of Franciscov. House of Representatives
characterizes the power of judicial review as a duty which, as the expanded
certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court reflects, includes the power to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. The SC found it well-within its power
to determine whether Congress committed a violation of the Constitution or
gravely abused its discretion in the exercise of its functions and prerogatives
that could translate as lack or excess of jurisdiction, which would require
corrective measures from the Court. Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez v. The
House of Representatives Committee on Justice, et al. G.R. No.

193459, February 15, 2011.

Judicial Review; ripeness. An aspect of the case-or-controversy
requirement is the requisite of ripeness. The question of ripeness is
especially relevant in light of the direct, adverse effect on an individual by
the challenged conduct. In the present petition, the SC found no doubt that
questions on, inter alia, the validity of the simultaneous referral of the two
complaints and on the need to publish as a mode of promulgating the Rules
of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the House (Impeachment
Rules) present constitutional vagaries which call for immediate
interpretation. The unusual act of simultaneously referring to public
respondent two impeachment complaints presents a novel situation to invoke
judicial power. Petitioner was, therefore, found not to have acted
prematurely when she took the cue from the constitutional limitation that
only one impeachment proceeding should be initiated against an
impeachable officer within a period of one year. Ma. Merceditas N.
Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives Committee on Justice, et al. G.R.
No. 193459, February 15, 2011.
Legal Standing; requirements. When suing as a citizen, the interest of the
petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and
personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or any government
act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely
that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. In fine, when the proceeding
involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact that he is a citizen
satisfies the requirement of personal interest. In this case, as citizens,
petitioners interest in the subject matter of the petition is direct and
personal. At the very least, their assertions questioning the Non-Surrender
Agreement between the Philippines and the US are made of a public right,
i.e., to ascertain that the Agreement did not go against established national
policies, practices, and obligations bearing on the States obligation to the
community of nations. Bayan Muna, as represented by Rep. Satur Ocampo,
et al. v. Alberto Romulo, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, et al. G.R.
No. 159618, February 1, 2011.

Stare Decisis; nature. The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by

lower courts to doctrinal rules established by the Supreme Court in its final
decisions. It is based on the principle that once a question of law has been
examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further
argument. Basically, it is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issues,
necessary for two simple reasons: economy and stability. In our jurisdiction,
the principle is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code. The previous case
of Lubrica and the present case involve two different issues. The relief
prayed for in the previous case of Lubrica is that the amount for deposit in
favor of the landowner be determined on the basis of the time of payment
and not of the time of taking. But in the present case, the prayer of the LBP
is for the deposit of the valuation of the Land Bank of the Philippines and
Department of Agrarian Reform and not that of the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator. The principle of stare decisis, therefore, does not apply.
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Hon. Ernesto P. Pagayatan, Presiding
Judge of RTC, Branch 46, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro; and Josefina S.
Lubrica, in her capacity as Assignee of Federico Suntay, et al., G.R. No.
177190, February 23, 2011.
Sovereign Immunity; expropriation. The doctrine of sovereign immunity

cannot be successfully invoked to defeat a valid claim for compensation
arising from the taking without just compensation and without the proper
expropriation proceedings being first resorted to of the plaintiffs property.
The SC cited the previous case of De los Santos v. Intermediate Appellate
Court where it ruled that the doctrine of sovereign immunity was not an
instrument for perpetrating any injustice on a citizen. In exercising the right
of eminent domain, the State exercised its jus imperii, as distinguished from
its proprietary rights, or jus gestionis; yet, even in that area, where private
property had been taken in expropriation without just compensation being
paid, the defense of immunity from suit could not be set up by the State
against an action for payment by the owners. Air Transportation Office v.
Spouses David and Elisea Ramos, G.R. No. 159402, February 23, 2011.
Sovereign Immunity; sovereign function and proprietary function. The
immunity from suit is based on the political truism that the State, as a
sovereign, can do no wrong. Practical considerations dictate the
establishment of immunity from suit in favor of the State. Otherwise, and the

State is suable at the instance of every other individual, government service

may be severely obstructed and public safety endangered because of the
number of suits that the State has to defend against. An unincorporated
government agency without any separate juridical personality of its own
enjoys immunity from suit because it is invested with an inherent power of
sovereignty. Accordingly, a claim for damages against the agency cannot
prosper; otherwise, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is violated. However,
the need to distinguish between an unincorporated government agency
performing governmental function and one performing proprietary functions
has arisen. The immunity has been upheld in favor of the former because its
function is governmental or incidental to such function; it has not been
upheld in favor of the latter whose function was not in pursuit of a necessary
function of government but was essentially a business. In this case, the
juridical character of the Air Transportation Office (ATO) as an agency of
the Government was not performing a purely governmental or sovereign
function, but was instead involved in the management and maintenance of
the Loakan Airport, an activity that was not the exclusive prerogative of the
State in its sovereign capacity. Hence, the ATO had no claim to the States
immunity from suit. Air Transportation Office v. Spouses David and Elisea
Ramos, G.R. No. 159402, February 23, 2011.
Supreme Court; modification of doctrines and principles. The doctrine of

immutability of decisions applies only to final and executory decisions. Since
the present cases may involve a modification or reversal of a Court-ordained
doctrine or principle, the judgment rendered by the Special Third Division
may be considered unconstitutional, hence, it can never become final. A
decision rendered by a Division of the SC in violation of the constitutional
provision, that only the SC En Banc may modify or reverse a SC doctrine
and principle, would be in excess of jurisdiction and, therefore, invalid. Any
entry of judgment may thus be said to be inefficacious since the decision
is void for being unconstitutional. That a judgment must become final at
some definite point at the risk of occasional error cannot be appreciated in a
case that embroils not only a general allegation of occasional error but
also a serious accusation of a violation of the Constitution, viz., that
doctrines or principles of law were modified or reversed by the Courts
Special Third Division August 4, 2009 Resolution. David Lu v. Paterno Lu
Ym, Sr., et al./Paterno Lu Ym, Sr., et al. v. David Lu/John Lu Ym, et al. v.

The Hon. Court of Appeals of Ceby City, et al. G.R. No. 153690/G.R. No.
157381/G.R. No. 170889. February 15, 2011.
Administrative Law
Administrative Proceedings; findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies.

Petitioners argue that the Commission on Audit (COA) committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in declaring the
prepayment stipulation in the contract between Land Bank and Remad
Livestock Corporation (REMAD) proscribed by the State Audit Code of the
Philippines. The Supreme Court did not give merit to petitioners argument.
It emphasized that the COA Auditor noted that nowhere in the documents
reviewed disclosed about prepayment scheme with REMAD.It is well
settled that findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies, such as the COA, are
generally accorded respect and even finality by this Court, if supported by
substantial evidence, in recognition of their expertise on the specific matters
under their jurisdiction. If the prepayment scheme was in fact authorized,
petitioners should have produced the document to prove such fact as alleged
by them in the present petition. However, the Supreme Court was at a loss
as to whether the prepayment scheme was authorized as its review of
Annex I, the document to which petitioners base their authority to make
advance payments, does not contain such a stipulation or provision. In
addition, the Supreme Court noted that much reliance was made by
petitioners on their allegation that the terms of the Credit Facility Proposal
allowed for prepayments or advancement of the payments prior to the
delivery of the cattle by the supplier REMAD. It appears, however, that a
CFP, even if admittedly a pro forma contract and emanating from the Land
Bank main office, is merely a facility proposal and not the contract of loan
between Land Bank and the cooperatives. It is in the loan contract that the
parties embody the terms and conditions of a transaction. If there is any
agreement to release the loan in advance to REMAD as a form of
prepayment scheme, such a stipulation should exist in the loan
contract. There is, nevertheless, no proof of such stipulation as petitioners
had failed to attach the CFPs or the loan contracts relating to the present
petition. Based on the foregoing, the COA was not faulted for finding that
petitioners facilitated the commission of the irregular transaction. Ruben
Reyna, et al. v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 167219, February 8, 2011.

Agrarian Law
Agrarian Reform; exclusion and exemption from coverage. Thedeliberations
of the 1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclude, inter
alia, all lands exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and poultry-raising
from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.
Petitioners admission that, since 2001, it leased another ranch for its own
livestock is fatal to its cause. The SC, in this case, accorded respect to the
CAs observation that the assailed MARO reports and the Investigating
Teams Report do not actually contradict one another, finding that the 43
cows, while owned by petitioner, were actually pastured outside the subject
property. Milestone Farms, Inc. v. Office of the President, G.R. No.
182332, February 23, 2011.
Agrarian Reform; just compensation. The issue in this case is whether or not
the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that RA 6657, rather than P.D. No.
27/E.O. No. 228, is the law that should apply in the determination of just
compensation for the subject agricultural land. The LBP and the DAR argue
that P.D. No. 27, as reaffirmed by E.O. No. 228, should be applied in
determining the just compensation for the subject property of the case. They
contend that P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228 prescribe the formula in
determining the just compensation of rice and corn lands tenanted as of
October 21, 1972. As the subject property was tenanted and devoted to rice
production in 1972, the just value should be fixed at the prevailing rate at
that time, when the emancipation of the tenant-farmers from the bondage of
the soil was declared in P.D. No. 27. As to R.A. No. 6657, both the LBP and
the DAR insist that it applies only to ricelands and cornlands not tenanted as
of October 21, 1972. According to them, the governments OLT program on
tenanted privately-owned rice and corn lands pursuant to P.D. No. 27
continues separately and distinctly from the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP) acquisition and distribution program under R.A.
No. 6657. The SC held that RA 6657 is the applicable law, with PD 27 and
EO 228 having only suppletory effect. This is so since the provisions of R.A.
No. 6657 are also applicable to the agrarian reform process of lands placed

under the coverage of P.D. No. 27/E.O. No. 228, which has not been
completed upon the effectivity of R.A. No. 6657. It would certainly be
inequitable to determine just compensation based on the guideline provided
by PD 27 and EO 228 considering the DARs failure to determine the just
compensation for a considerable length of time. Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Magin V. Ferrer, et al./Department of Agrarian Reform,
represented by Secretary Nasser C. Pangandaman v. Antonio V. Ferrer and
Ramon V. Ferrer. G.R. No. 172230, February 2, 2011.
Agrarian Reform; initial valuation and just compensation. It is the initial
valuation made by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and the Land
Bank of the Philippines that must be released to the landowner in order for
DAR to take possession of the property. Otherwise stated, Sec. 16 of RA
6657 does not authorize the release of the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicators determination of just compensation for the land which has not
yet become final and executory. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Hon.
Ernesto P. Pagayatan, Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 46, San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro; and Josefina S. Lubrica, in her capacity as Assignee of
Federico Suntay, et al., G.R. No. 177190, February 23, 2011.
Civil Service Law
Regulations; Civil Service. Not all rules and regulations adopted by every
government agency are to be filed with the UP Law Center. Only those of
general or of permanent character are to be filed. Resolution No. 372 was
about the new GSIS salary structure, Resolution No. 306 was about the
authority to pay the 2002 Christmas Package, and Resolution No. 197 was
about the GSIS merit selection and promotion plan. Clearly, the assailed
resolutions pertained only to internal rules meant to regulate the personnel of
the GSIS. There was no need for the publication or filing of these resolutions
with the UP Law Center. The Board of Trustees of the Government Service
Insurance System, et al. v. Albert M. Velasco, et al. G.R. No.
170463, February 2, 2011.

Cityhood; criteria for conversion. The cases involved here were initiated by
the consolidated petitions for prohibition filed by the League of Cities of the
Philippines (LCP), City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treas,
assailing the constitutionality of the sixteen (16) laws, each converting the
municipality covered thereby into a component city (Cityhood Laws), and
seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from
conducting plebiscites pursuant to the subject laws. In the Decision dated
November 18, 2008, the SC En Banc, by a 6-5 vote, granted the petitions
and struck down the Cityhood Laws as unconstitutional for violating
Sections 10 and 6, Article X, and the equal protection clause. Then, in
another Decision dated December 21, 2009, the SC En Banc, by a vote of 64, declared the Cityhood Laws as constitutional. Thereafter, on August 24,
2010, the Court En Banc, through a Resolution, by a vote of 7-6, reinstated
the November 18, 2008 Decision. The SC held that the Cityhood laws were
constitutional. Based on the deliberations by Congress on R.A. No. 9009,
Congress intended that those with pending cityhood bills during the 11th
Congress would not be covered by the new and higher income requirement
of P100 million imposed by R.A. No. 9009. Notwithstanding that both the
11th and 12th Congress failed to act upon the pending cityhood bills, both
the letter and intent of Section 450 of the LGC, as amended by R.A. No.
9009, were carried on until the 13th Congress, when the Cityhood Laws
were enacted. The exemption clauses found in the individual Cityhood Laws
are the express articulation of that intent to exempt respondent
municipalities from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009. League of Cities of the
Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al./League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al.
v. COMELEC, et al./League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et
al. G.R. No. 176951/G.R. No. 177499/G.R. No. 178056, February 15, 2011.
Legislative power; amendment. R.A. No. 9009 amended the LGC. But the
SC also held that, in effect, the Cityhood Laws amended R.A. No. 9009
through the exemption clauses found therein. Since the Cityhood Laws
explicitly exempted the concerned municipalities from the amendatory R.A.
No. 9009, such Cityhood Laws are, therefore, also amendments to the LGC
itself. League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al./League of
Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al./League of Cities of the

Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al. G.R. No. 176951/G.R. No. 177499/G.R.
No. 178056, February 15, 2011.
Dissension
in
February 2011
the
Court:
Posted on March 9, 2011 by Jose Ma. G. Hofilea Posted in Constitutional Law

Tagged local government

February 2011 where at least one Justice felt compelled to express his or her
dissent from the decision penned by the ponente.
1.
No Retreat, No Surrender(Velasco vs. Carpio)
The Rome Statute

In December of 2000, the Philippines became a signatory to the Rome
Statute, an international treaty which created the International Criminal
Court (ICC), through which the International Criminal Court (ICC) was
established with the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the
most serious crimes of international concern x x x and shall be
complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions. The serious crimes
covered by the Rome Statute pertain to those considered grave under
international law, such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes,
and crimes of aggression. To date, however, the ratification by the Senate of
the Rome Statute is still pending.
Included among the provisions of the Rome Statute are certain obligations
imposed on parties to the treaty to surrender persons charged with covered
crimes upon the request of the ICC.
The Non-Surrender Agreement

In May of 2003, through an Exchange of Notes, the Philippine government

agreed to, and accepted the terms of, the United States proposed nonsurrender bilateral agreement (NSA). The NSA in pertinent part, provides
that current or former Government officials, employees (including
contractors), or military personnel or nationals of one Party that are present
in the territory of the other Party shall not, absent the express consent of the
first Party, be surrendered by the second Party to any international tribunal
or to a third country for purposes of being surrendered to an international
tribunal, unless it is to a UN Security Council tribunal.
The Act on Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and

Other Crimes Against Humanity
In December 2009, Republic Act No. 9851, otherwise known as the

Philippine Act on Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law,
Genocide, and Other Crimes Against Humanity (RA 9851) was
enacted. Section 17 of RA 9851, provides:
Section 17. Jurisdiction. x x x x
In the interest of justice, the relevant Philippine authorities may dispense

with the investigation or prosecution of a crime punishable under this Act if
another court or international tribunal is already conducting the
investigation or undertaking the prosecution of such crime. Instead, the
authorities may surrender or extradite suspected or accused persons in the
Philippines to the appropriate international court, if any, or to another State
pursuant to the applicable extradition laws and treaties.
Bayan Muna, a duly registered party-list group, filed a petition seeking the
nullity of the NSA on several grounds among which is that the NSA
contravenes the obligations of the Philippines under the Rome Statute and
likewise contravenes the provisions on RA 9851.

In the majority decision, Justice Presbitero J. Velasco disposed of the

arguments put forth by Bayan Muna and upheld the validity of the NSA.
The NSA, which is an executive agreement which, as opposed to a treaty,
does not require Senate ratification, complements, rather than contradicts,
the Rome Statute (even as the ponente points out that the binding effect of
the Rome Statute on a party such as the Philippines that has signed, but not
completed ratification, is less than on those countries that have both signed
and ratified the same). Extensive discussion was had to show how the Rome
Statute, by its very terms, upholds the primary jurisdiction over so-called
international crimes rests, at the first instance, with the state where the crime
was committed and only secondarily, with the ICC. On this basis, Justice
Velasco holds that:
The foregoing provisions of the Rome Statute, taken collectively, argue
against the idea of jurisdictional conflict between the Philippines, as party
to the [NSA], and the ICC; or the idea of the Agreement substantially
impairing the value of the [the Philippines] undertaking under the Rome
Statute. Ignoring for a while the fact that the [the Philippines] signed the
Rome Statute ahead of the Agreement, it is abundantly clear to us that the
Rome Statute expressly recognizes the primary jurisdiction of states, like the
[the Philippines], over serious crimes committed within their respective
borders, the complementary jurisdiction of the ICC coming into play only
when the signatory states are unwilling or unable to prosecute.
For nothing in the provisions of the [NSA], in relation to the Rome

Statute, tends to diminish the efficacy of the [Rome] Statute, let alone defeats
the purpose of the ICC. Lest it be overlooked, the Rome Statute contains a
proviso that enjoins the ICC from seeking the surrender of an erring person,
should the process require the requested state to perform an act that would
violate some international agreement it has entered into.

Moreover, the majority observes that Article 90 of the Rome Statute

recognizes the primacy of international agreements, such as the NSA,
entered into between States, even when one of the States, such as the United
States, is not a State-Party to the Rome Statute.
With respect to the assertion that the NSA contravenes RA 9851, Bayan
Muna had argued that under Section 17 of RA 9851, if the Philippines does
not prosecute a foreign national for violations of RA 9851, it is left with only
two options: (1) surrender the accused to the proper international tribunal; or
(2) surrender the accused to another State if such surrender is pursuant to
the applicable extradition laws and treaties. Justice Velasco writes that the
view espoused by Bayan Muna asserts that these options of the Philippines
under Sec. 17 of RA 9851 is not subject to the consent of the United States,
and any derogation of Sec. 17 of RA 9851, such as requiring the consent of
the US before the Philippines can exercise such option, requires an
amendatory law. In line with this scenario, the view strongly argues that the
Agreement prevents the Philippineswithout the consent of the USfrom
surrendering to any international tribunal US nationals accused of crimes
covered by RA 9851, and, thus, in effect amends Sec. 17 of RA
9851. Consequently, the view is strongly impressed that the Agreement
cannot be embodied in a simple executive agreement in the form of an
exchange of notes but must be implemented through an extradition law or a
treaty with the corresponding formalities.
The majority believes, however, that there is nothing in the NSA that runs
counter to RA 9851.
Rather than reading the above quoted second paragraph of Section 17 of RA
9851 as requiring the Philippines to surrender to the proper international
tribunal those persons accused of crimes sanctioned under said law if it does
not exercise its primary jurisdiction to prosecute such persons, the main
decision views the options of the Philippines thereunder to be discretionary
on account of the use of the word may in the statute and therefore, should
be interpreted as being merely permissive.
The sole dissent was provided by Justice Antonio P. Carpio. He took the
view that the NSA, as an executive agreement, should be declared
ineffective and unenforceable unless and until ratified by the Senate of the

Philippines.
The dissenter stresses that an executive agreement, such as the NSA,
cannot amend or repeal a prior law, but must comply with State policy
embodied in an existing municipal law. This also means that an executive
agreement, which at the time of its execution complies with then existing
law, is deemed amended or repealed by a subsequent law inconsistent with
such executive agreement. Under no circumstance can a mere executive
agreement prevail over a prior or subsequent law inconsistent with such
executive agreement.
Justice Carpio believes that the NSA impermissibly contravenes RA 9851
which limits the options of the Philippines, in cases where a crime is under
investigation by an international tribunal, only to surrendering the relevant
persons to the international tribunal (which obligation is not subject to a
consent requirement) or to the State of such person but only pursuant to an
extradition law or a treaty.
As for the Rome Statute, he notes that even if the Senate has not yet ratified
the Rome Statute, the same embodies generally accepted principles of
international law enforceable in the Philippines under the Philippine
Constitution pursuant to Section 2, Article II of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution.
According to the dissenting opinion, [i]t is a principle of international law
that a person accused of genocide, war crimes and other crimes against
humanity shall be prosecuted by the international community. A State where
such a person may be found has the primary jurisdiction to prosecute such
person, regardless of nationality and where the crime was committed.
However, if a State does not exercise such primary jurisdiction, then such
State has the obligation to turn over the accused to the international tribunal
vested with jurisdiction to try such person. The NSA, per Justice Carpio,
violates this surrender obligation.
(Bayan Muna, as represented by Rep. Satur Ocampo, et al. vs. Alberto
Romulo, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, et al., February 1,
2011, G.R. No. 159618. See dissenting opinion here.)

(authors note: It seems to this author that the point where the majority and
dissenting opinions clash is essentially on a matter of statutory construction,
with both sides reading the Rome Statute and RA 9851 is opposing
manners. This authors has long observed that there is probably a statutory
construction rule that will support any view you wish to take so at the end of
the day, it is actually a difficult to reconcile opposing interpretations. That
the United States wants to impose its own rules through a NSA rather than
accede to the Rome Statute as did the 139 signatory countries (it surely must
not be whimsical if 139 nations saw wisdom in the treaty) is, however, a
different, albeit not any less difficult, matter.)
2.
Unconstitutional,
Constitutional,
Constitutional (Bersamin v. Carpio)
Unconstitutional,
In the judicial version of the She Loves Me, She Loves Me Not game, The
Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, ruled as
constitutional the 16 Cityhood Laws that the court earlier ruled to be
unconstitutional prior to which it had upheld the same as constitutional after
it had first invalidated these laws as being unconstitutional.
To recall, at issue in these cases was whether or not the 16 Cityhood Laws
which declared certain municipalities as cities even as each such
municipality did not achieve the P10,000,000 income standard set out in the
Local Government Code violated Section 10, Article X of the Constitution
which states that:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided,

merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered, except in
accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and
subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected.

and the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

In this latest decision, the majority noted that the bills that eventually
became the 16 Cityhood Laws were pending before Republic Act No. 9009,
which introduced amendments to the Local Government Code including the
raising of the income requirement for cities from P20,000,000 to
P100,000,000, was enacted into law. The ponente pointed out that in the
legislative debates relating to Republic Act No. 9009, it was emphasized by
that laws sponsor that the pending bills for cityhood should not be affected
by the proposed change in the income standard. In light of this, the majority
took the position that the clear legislative intent was that the 16 Cityhood
Laws were from the beginning intended to constitute exemptions to the
higher income requirement that was enshrined in Republic Act No. 9009 and
that the exemption clauses found in the individual Cityhood Laws are the
express articulation of that intent.
That Congress is empowered to amend the Local Government Code is
undisputable.
Undeniably, R.A. No. 9009 amended the [Local Government Code]. But it is
also true that, in effect, the Cityhood Laws amended R.A. No. 9009 through
the exemption clauses found therein. Since the Cityhood Laws explicitly
exempted the concerned municipalities from the amendatory R.A. No. 9009,
such Cityhood Laws are, therefore, also amendments to the [Local
Government Code] itself. For this reason, we reverse the November 18,
2008 Decision and the August 24, 2010 Resolution on their strained and
stringent view that the Cityhood Laws, particularly their exemption clauses,
are not found in the [Local Government Code].
Thus, according to the majority, the Cityhood Laws are compliant with the
criteria established in the Local Government Code as required by Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution.
With respect to the assertion that the Cityhood Laws violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution given that there is no substantial
distinction between the fact that the bills relating to the Cityhood Laws were
pending during the enactment of Republic Act No, 9009 and other bills that
were not so pending at that time, Justice Bersamin concluded that [u]pon

more profound reflection and deliberation, we declare that there was valid
classification, and the Cityhood Laws do not violate the equal protection
clause.
Justice Bersamin chides the above view that there is no substantial
distinction because the substantial distinction should not be gauged merely
on the whether or not a bill was pending but rather on the capacity and
viability of respondent municipalities to become component cities of their
respective provinces. Said the ponente: Congress, by enacting the
Cityhood Laws, recognized this capacity and viability of respondent
municipalities to become the States partners in accelerating economic
growth and development in the provincial regions, which is the very thrust of
the [Local Government Code], manifested by the pendency of their cityhood
bills during the 11th Congress and their relentless pursuit for cityhood up to
the present. Truly, the urgent need to become a component city arose way
back in the 11th Congress, and such condition continues to exist.
Justice Antonio P. Carpio, who penned the decision that this new ruling
overturned, issued the sole dissenting opinion. In his dissent, he reiterated
that the Cityhood Laws violated Section 10, Article X of the Constitution
because those statutes effectively created cities not in accordance with the
criteria set out in the Local Government Code.
The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow
the criteria established in the Local Government Code and not in any other
law. There is only one Local Government Code. The Constitution requires
Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the criteria
necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion of a
municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other
law, like the Cityhood Laws.
Justice Carpio thereafter reiterated his position that there is no substantial
distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills during the
11th Congress and municipalities that did not have pending bills and that the
mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not a substantial
distinction that would satisfy the equal protection clause. Such pendency
is not rationally related to the purpose of the law which is to prevent fiscally
non-viable municipalities from converting into cities.

In addition, the dissenter expressed that limiting the exemption only to the
16 municipalities violates the requirement that the classification must apply
to all similarly situated. Municipalities with the same income as the 16
respondent municipalities cannot convert into cities, while the 16 respondent
municipalities can. Clearly, as worded, the exemption provision found in the
Cityhood Laws, even if it were written in Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal
protection clause.
(League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. vs. COMELEC, et al./League of
Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. vs. COMELEC, et al./League of Cities of the
Phil. etc., et al. vs. COMELEC, et al. February 15, 2011, G.R. No.
176951/G.R. No. 177499/G.R. No. 178056. See dissenting opinion here.)

Posted on February 26, 2011 by Vicente D. Gerochi IV Posted in Constitutional Law,
Philippines - Cases, Philippines - Law Tagged agrarian reform, Bill of Rights, Civil
Service Commission, Congress, corporation, double jeopardy, eminent domain,
exhaustion of administrative remedies, immunity from suit, just compensation, search,
suspension
Constitutional Law
Bill of Rights; Rights under custodial investigation. As found by the Court

of Appeals, (1) there is no evidence of compulsion or duress or violence on
the person of Nagares; (2) Nagares did not complain to the officers
administering the oath during the taking of his sworn statement; (3) he did
not file any criminal or administrative complaint against his alleged
malefactors for maltreatment; (4) no marks of violence were observed on his

body; and (5) he did not have himself examined by a physician to support
his claim. Moreover, appellants confession is replete with details, which,
according to the SC, made it highly improbable that it was not voluntarily
given. Further, the records show that Nagares was duly assisted by an
effective and independent counsel during the custodial investigation in the
NBI. As found by the Court of Appeals, after Nagares was informed of his
constitutional rights, he was asked by Atty. Esmeralda E. Galang whether he
accepts her as counsel. During the trial, Atty. Galang testified on the extent
of her assistance. According to her, she thoroughly explained to Nagares his
constitutional rights, advised him not to answer matters he did not know, and
if he did not want to answer any question, he may inform Atty. Galang who
would be the one to relay his refusal to the NBI agents. She was also present
during the entire investigation. Thus, the SC held that there was no duress or
violence imposed on the person of Nagares during the custodial
investigation and that Nagares was duly assisted by an independent counsel
during such investigation in the NBI. People of the Philippines vs. Rodolfo
Capitle and Arutor Nagares, G.R. No. 175330, January 12, 2010.
Bill of Rights; Double jeopardy. As a rule, a judgment of acquittal cannot be

reconsidered because it places the accused under double jeopardy. On
occasions, however, a motion for reconsideration after an acquittal is
possible. But the grounds are exceptional and narrow as when the court that
absolved the accused gravely abused its discretion, resulting in loss of
jurisdiction, or when a mistrial has occurred. In any of such cases, the State
may assail the decision by special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65.
Here, although complainant Vizconde invoked the exceptions, he was not
able to bring his pleas for reconsideration under such exceptions.
Complainant Vizconde cited the decision in Galman v. Sandiganbayan as
authority that the Court can set aside the acquittal of the accused in the
present case. But the Court observed that the government proved in Galman
that the prosecution was deprived of due process since the judgment of
acquittal in that case was dictated, coerced and scripted. It was a sham
trial. In this case, however, Vizconde does not allege that the Court held a
sham review of the decision of the CA. He has made out no case that the
Court held a phony deliberation such that the seven Justices who voted to
acquit the accused, the four who dissented, and the four who inhibited
themselves did not really go through the process. Antonio Lejano vs. People

of the Philippines / People of the Philippines vs. Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, et

al., G.R. No. 176389/G.R. No. 176864. January 18, 2011.
Bill of Rights; Unreasonable searches and seizures. Under the plain view
doctrine, objects falling in the plain view of an officer, who has a right to
be in the position to have that view, are subject to seizure and may be
presented as evidence. In this case, the SC found that the seizure of the two
receivers of the .45 caliber pistol outside petitioners house falls within the
purview of the plain view doctrine. First, the presence of SPO2 Nava at the
back of the house and of the other law enforcers around the premises was
justified by the fact that petitioner and Valerio were earlier seen respectively
holding .45 caliber pistols before they ran inside the structure and sought
refuge. The attendant circumstances and the evasive actions of petitioner and
Valerio when the law enforcers arrived engendered a reasonable ground for
the latter to believe that a crime was being committed. Secondly, from where
he was situated, SPO2 Nava clearly saw, on two different instances, Valerio
emerge on top of the subject dwelling and throw suspicious objects. Lastly,
considering the earlier sighting of Valerio holding a pistol, SPO2 Nava had
reasonable ground to believe that the things thrown might be contraband
items, or evidence of the offense they were then suspected of committing.
The ensuing recovery of the receivers may have been deliberate;
nonetheless, their initial discovery was indubitably inadvertent. It is not
crucial that at initial sighting the seized contraband be identified and known
to be so. The law merely requires that the law enforcer observes that the
seized item may be evidenceof a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to
seizure. Hence, the two receivers were admissible as evidence. Elenita C.
Fajardo vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 190889, January 10, 2010.
Bill of rights; Unreasonable searches and seizures. In this case, there was a
valid warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto. The following are the
circumstances immediately prior to and surrounding the arrest of accusedappellants: (1) the police officers received information from an operative
about an ongoing shipment of contraband; (2) the police officers, with the
operative, proceeded to Villa Vicenta Resort in Barangay Bignay II, Sariaya,
Quezon; (3) they observed the goings-on at the resort from a distance of
around 50 meters; and (4) they spotted the six accused-appellants loading
transparent bags containing a white substance into a white L-300 van. The

crime was committed in the presence of the police officers with the
contraband, inside transparent plastic containers, in plain view and duly
observed by the arresting officers. Furthermore, accused-appellants are
deemed to have waived their objections to their arrest for not raising the
issue before entering their plea. People of the Philippines vs. Ng Yik bun, et
al., G.R. No. 180452. January 10, 2010.
Constitutionality; Lis mota. The SC observed that the issue of

constitutionality of R.A. No. 95 (Philippine National Red Cross charter) was
not raised by the parties, and was not among the issues defined in the body
of the previous decision of the SC; thus, it was not the very lis mota of the
case.The SC reminded that it will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality
unless it is the very lis mota. A court should not pass upon a constitutional
question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such
question is raised by the parties. Under this rule, the SC held that it should
not have declared void certain sections of R.A. No. 95, as amended by
Presidential Decree (P.D.) Nos. 1264 and 1643, the PNRC Charter. Instead,
the Court should have exercised judicial restraint on the matter, especially
since there was some other ground upon which the Court could have based
its judgment. Dante V. Liban, et al. vs. Richard J. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352,
January 18, 2011.
Congress; Creation of private corporations. The SC observed that thepurpose

of the constitutional provision prohibiting Congress from creating private
corporations was to prevent the granting of special privileges to certain
individuals, families, or groups, which were denied to other groups. The SC
found the Philippine National Red Cross Charter is not covered by the
constitutional provision, as it does not grant special privileges to a particular
individual, family, or group, but creates an entity that strives to serve the
common good. Dante V. Liban, et al. vs. Richard J. Gordon, G.R. No.
175352, January 18, 2011.

Eminent domain; Just compensation. It is the nature and character of the

land at the time of its taking that is the principal criterion for determining
how much just compensation should be given to the landowner. Prior to the
NPCs introduction of improvements in the area where the subject parcel of
land is located, the properties therein, including the disputed lot, remained
agricultural and residential. The SC found that it was only upon entry of the
NPC in Barangay San Roque, and after constructing buildings and other
facilities and bringing in various equipment for its multi-purpose project,
that the lands in the said locality were later classified as commercial or
industrial. Moises Tinio, Jr. and Francis Tinio vs. National Power
Corporation/National Power Corporation vs. Moises Tinio, Jr. and Francis
Tinio, G.R. No. 160923/G.R. No. 161093, January 24, 2011.
Government contracts; Payment based on quantum meruit for illegal
contracts. The government project involved in this case, the construction of a
dike, was completed way back on 9 July 1992. For almost two decades, the
public and the government benefitted from the work done by respondent.
According to the SC, public interest and equity dictate that the contractor
should be compensated for services rendered and work done. To deny the
payment to the contractor would be to allow the government to unjustly
enrich itself at the expense of another. Justice and equity demand
compensation on the basis of quantummeruit. Gregorio R. Vigilar, et al. vs.
Arnulfo D. Aquino, G.R. No. 180388, January 18, 2011.
Philippine National Red Cross; Status. The SC found merit in Philippine

National Red Crosss contention that its structure is sui generis. National
Societies such as the PNRC act as auxiliaries to the public authorities of
their own countries in the humanitarian field and provide a range of services
including disaster relief and health and social programmes. National
societies were held to be organizations that are directly regulated by
international humanitarian law, in contrast to other ordinary private entities,
including NGOs. The auxiliary status of a Red Cross Society means that it is
at one and the same time a private institution and a public service
organization because the very nature of its work implies cooperation with

the authorities, a link with the State. The SC further noted that the creation
of the PNRC was a result of the countrys adherence to the Geneva
Convention which has the force and effect of law. Under the Constitution,
the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law
as part of the law of the land. The PNRC, as a National Society of the
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, can neither be
classified as an instrumentality of the State, so as not to lose its character of
neutrality as well as its independence, nor strictly as a private corporation
since it is regulated by international humanitarian law and is treated as an
auxiliary of the State. Dante V. Liban, et al. vs. Richard J. Gordon, G.R. No.
175352, January 18, 2011.
State; Immunity from suit. The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit
cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice to a citizen. It
would be the apex of injustice and highly inequitable to defeat respondents
right to be duly compensated for actual work performed and services
rendered, where both the government and the public have for years received
and accepted benefits from the project and reaped the fruits of respondents
honest toil and labor. The rule, in any case, is not absolute for it does not say
that the state may not be sued under any circumstance. Gregorio R. Vigilar,
et al. vs. Arnulfo D. Aquino, G.R. No. 180388, January 18, 2011.
Agrarian Law
Agrarian reform; Coverage. The main issue for resolution by the Court is
whether the Lopez and Limot lands of SNLABC can be considered grazing
lands for its livestock business and are thus exempted from the coverage of
the CARL. In Luz Farms v. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian
Reform, the Court declared unconstitutional the CARL provisions that
included lands devoted to livestock under the coverage of the CARP. The
transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on
the meaning of the word agricultural showed that it was never the
intention of the framers of the Constitution to include the livestock and
poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally mandated agrarian
reform program of the government. Thus, lands devoted to the raising of
livestock, poultry and swine have been classified as industrial, not

agricultural, and thus exempt from agrarian reform. In the instant case, the
MARO in its ocular inspection found on the Lopez lands several heads of
cattle, carabaos, horses, goats and pigs. There were likewise structures on
the Lopez lands used for its livestock business. Hence, the Court found that
the Lopez lands were in fact actually, directly and exclusively being used as
industrial lands for livestock-raising. The Court affirmed the findings of the
DAR Regional Director and the Court of Appeals that the Lopez lands were
actually, directly and exclusively being used for SNLABCs livestock
business and, thus, are exempt from CARP coverage. In contrast, however,
the Limot lands were found to be agricultural lands devoted to coconut trees
and rubber and as such, are thus not subject to exemption from CARP
coverage. Republic of the Philippines, rep. by Dept. Agrarian Reform vs.
Salvador N. Lopez Agri-Business Corp./Agri-Business Corp. vs. Dept.
Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 178895, January 10, 2011.
Administrative Law
Administrative remedies; Exhaustion. Respondent in this case filed a

complaint for collection of sum of money against petitioners since,
according to him, a large amount of money was still due him under the
Contract of Agreement involving the construction of a dike, executed
between him and petitioners. On the other hand, petitioners aver that
respondent should have first filed a claim before the Commission on Audit
(COA) before going to the courts. The SC held that there was no need to
exhaust administrative remedies. The doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction are not
ironclad rules. The exceptions to these rules are the following: (a) where
there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the
challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that
will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount involved
is relatively so small as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e)
where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be
decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g)

where the application of the doctrine may cause great and irreparable
damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due process; (i) where the
issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot;
(j) where there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) where
strong public interest is involved; and (l) in quo warranto proceedings. In
the present case, the SC found conditions (c) and (e) as present. The
government project contracted out to respondent was completed almost two
decades ago. To delay the proceedings by remanding the case to the relevant
government office or agency will definitely prejudice respondent. More
importantly, the issues in the present case involved the validity and the
enforceability of the Contract of Agreement entered into by the parties.
These, according to the SC, are questions purely of law and clearly beyond
the expertise of the Commission on Audit or the DPWH. Gregorio R.
Vigilar, et al. vs. Arnulfo D. Aquino, G.R. No. 180388, January 18, 2011.
Career Executive Service; Coverage. The Career Executive Service covers
presidential appointees only. Corollarily, as the position of Department
Manager II of the PEZA does not require appointment by the President of
the Philippines, it does not fall under the CES. The Third Level of Career
Service covers only the positions in the CES as enumerated in the
Administrative Code of 1987 and those identified by the Career Executive
Service Board as of equivalent rank, all of whom are appointed by the
President of the Philippines. Modesto Agyao, Jr. vs. Civil Service
Commission, G.R. No. 182591. January 18, 2011.
Election Law
Candidate; Disqualification. A petition for disqualification, on the one hand,
can be premised on Section 12 or 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, or
Section 40 of the Local Government Code. On the other hand, a petition to
deny due course to or cancel a Certificate of Candidacy can only be
grounded on a statement of a material representation in the said certificate
that is false. The petitions also have different effects. While a person who is
disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a
candidate, the person whose certificate is cancelled or denied due course
under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a

CoC. Thus, a candidate who is disqualified under Section 68 can validly be

substituted under Section 77 of the OEC because he/she remains a candidate
until disqualified; but a person whose CoC has been denied due course or
cancelled under Section 78 cannot be substituted because he/she is never
considered a candidate. Apart from the qualifications provided for in the
Constitution, the power to prescribe additional qualifications for elective
office and grounds for disqualification therefrom, consistent with the
constitutional provisions, is vested in Congress. However, laws prescribing
qualifications for and disqualifications from office are liberally construed in
favor of eligibility since the privilege of holding an office is a valuable one.
Sergio G. Amora, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections and Arnielo S. Olandria,
G.R. No. 192280, January 25, 2011.
Certificate of Candidacy; Requirement of being sworn. According to the SC,
it was grave abuse of discretion to uphold Olandrias claim that an
improperly sworn COC is equivalent to possession of a ground for
disqualification. This was held not to be a ground for disqualification under
Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 40 of the Local
Government Code. Nowhere therein does it specify that a defective
notarization is a ground for the disqualification of a candidate. Sergio G.
Amora, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections and Arnielo S. Olandria, G.R. No.
192280, January 25, 2011.
Local government officials; Suspension pending appeal. Respondent Barriga

was held administratively liable by the Office of the Ombudsman as a result
of anomalous transactions pertaining to the handling of the trust fund of the
Municipality of Carmen, Cebu in the Central Visayas Water and Sanitation
Project. This decision was appealed to the CA but was not implemented
immediately. According to the SC, it is clear from Section 7, Rule III of
Administrative Order No. 7, as amended by Administrative Order No. 17,

that when a public official has been found guilty of an administrative charge
by the Office of the Ombudsman and the penalty imposed is suspension for
more than a month, just like in the present case, an appeal may be made to
the CA. However, such appeal shall not stop the decision from being
executory and the implementation of the decision follows as a matter of
course. The provision in the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman is clear that an appeal by a public official from a decision
meted out by the Ombudsman shall not stop the decision from being
executory. Office of the Ombudsman vs. Court of Appeals and Dinah C.
Barriga, G.R. No. 172224, January 26, 2011.
Dissension in the Court: January 2011

Posted on February 8, 2011 by Jose Ma. G. Hofilea Posted in Constitutional Law,
The following is a decision promulgated by the High Court in January 2011

where at least one Justice felt compelled to express his or her dissent from
the decision penned by the ponente.
1.
Sui Generis(Leonardo-de Castro vs. Carpio)
The case of Dante V. Liban, et al vs. Richard J. Gordon originated from a

petition filed by petitioners to declare Gordon as having forfeited his seat in
the Senate when he accepted the chairmanship of the Board of Governors of
the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC). According to the petitioners,
Gordon had violated Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which
reads:
SEC. 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold

any other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without
forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may
have been created or the emoluments thereof increased during the term for
which he was elected.

In its original decision, the Supreme Court ruled that Senator Gordon did not
commit such a violation because the PNRC, having been established in
March 22, 1947 through Republic Act No. 95, was not a government-owned
or controlled corporation, but a private corporation or organization albeit
performing public functions.
That ruling, however, engendered a resultant query as to whether or not then,
the PNRC was unconstitutionally established by the legislature given that
under Section 7, Article XIV of the then effective 1935 Constitution, it was
provided that:
SEC. 7. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the
formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations, unless such
corporations are owned and controlled by the Government or any
subdivision or instrumentality thereof.
Similar prohibitions are found in Article XIV, Section 4 of the 1973
Constitution and Article XII, Section 16 of the 1987 Constitution. The latter
reads:
SECTION 16. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the
formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations. Governmentowned or controlled corporations may be created or established by special
charters in the interest of the common good and subject to the test of
economic viability.
As a result, while exonerating the Senator, the Supreme Court was
compelled to declare most of the first thirteen provisions of the PNRC
charter as void to the extent that they created the PNRC as a private
corporation.
It was this latter portion of the decision which Gordon and the PNRC as
intervenor, asked the High Court to reconsider.
In speaking for the majority, Justice Teresita Leonardo-de Castro, as ponente
of the decision on the motions for reconsideration filed by Gordon and
PNRC, first conceded that the constitutionality of the PNRC was never
brought up as an issue by the petitioners. Accordingly, on the basis of

existing jurisprudence which asserts that the issue of unconstitutionality

should not be touched upon unless it is the very lis mota or unless such
question is raised by the parties, the Supreme Court should not have
declared void certain sections of R.A. No. 95, as amended by Presidential
Decree (P.D.) Nos. 1264 and 1643, the PNRC Charter. Instead, the Court
should have exercised judicial restraint on this matter, especially since there
was some other ground upon which the Court could have based its
judgment. Furthermore, the PNRC, the entity most adversely affected by
this declaration of unconstitutionality, which was not even originally a party
to this case, was being compelled, as a consequence of the Decision, to
suddenly reorganize and incorporate under the Corporation Code, after
more than sixty (60) years of existence in this country.
Justice Leonardo-de Castro specifically pointed out that the constitutionality
of the PNRC charter had never been challenged and had in fact been
amended several times by Congress. These actions by the legislature,
relating as they do to the PNRCs very corporate existence notwithstanding
the constitutional proscription on the creation of private corporations by law,
constitutes a recognition that the PNRC is not strictly in the nature of a
private corporation contemplated by the aforesaid constitutional ban.
As the ponente states:
A closer look at the nature of the PNRC would show that there is none like
it not just in terms of structure, but also in terms of history, public service
and official status accorded to it by the State and the international
community. There is merit in PNRCs contention that its structure is sui
generis.
Citing a 2004 ruling in Feliciano v. Commission on Audit, the majority
decision noted that the purpose of the constitutional provision prohibiting
Congress from creating private corporations was to prevent the granting of
special privileges to certain individuals, families, or groups, which were
denied to other groups. This, according to the High Court, is not the case
with the PNRC Charter as it does not grant special privileges to a particular
individual, family, or group, but creates an entity that strives to serve the
common good. A strict and mechanical interpretation of Article XII, Section
16 of the 1987 Constitution will, wrote Justice Leonardo-de Castro, hinder

the State in adopting measures that will serve the public good or national
interest.
Accordingly, as a sui generis entity, the PNRC is neither a subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality of the government, nor a government-owned or controlled corporation or a subsidiary thereof (and therefore Senator Gordon
is not in breach of the Constitution for having accepted the chairmanship of
the PNRC). That it is not such a government entity does not ipso facto
imply that the PNRC is a private corporation within the contemplation of
the provision of the Constitution, that must be organized under the
Corporation Code.
The sole dissenter, Antonio T. Carpio first took exception to the adherence
by the majority to the view that the Supreme Court should refrain from
ruling on matters of constitutionality where the parties did not raise the same
as an issue. On this point, Justice Caprio posited that the constitutional issue
was inevitable because of the Courts decision that the PNRC was a private
corporation established through a special law. The Court could not declare
the PNRC a private corporation created by the special law without running
afoul of Section 16, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. To declare the
PNRC a private corporation necessarily meant declaring RA 95
unconstitutional. To declare the PNRC, a creation of RA 95, a private
corporation without declaring RA 95 unconstitutional would mean that
Congress can create a private corporation through a special law. This the
Court could not do.
Besides, according to the dissent, the Supreme Court allowed the PNRC to
intervene to argue on the validity of its charter. Accordingly, the PNRC had
actually become a party to the case, raising the specific issue of the
constitutionality of the PNRC charter. Although the original parties did not
raise as an issue the constitutionality of Republic Act 95, they were still
afforded the opportunity to be heard on this constitutional issue when they
filed their respective motions for reconsideration.
Justice Carpio then took the contrary view that the PNRC charter suffered
constitutional infirmities, despite the arguments raised by the PNRC as to its
nature as an entity. On this issue, the dissent said:

All private charitable organizations are doing public service or activities

that also constitute governmental functions. Hence, the PNRC cannot claim
that it is sui generis just because it is a private organization performing
certain public or governmental functions. That the PNRC is rendering
public service does not exempt it from the constitutional prohibition against
the creation of a private corporation through a special law since the PNRC
is, admittedly, still a private organization. The express prohibition against
the creation of private corporations by special charter under Section 16,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disregarded just because a
private corporation claims to be sui generis. The constitutional prohibition
admits of no exception.
Nevertheless, according to the dissenter, because of the treaty obligations of
the Philippines under the Geneva Conventions, only those provisions of the
PNRC charter which create PNRC as a private corporation or grant it
corporate powers should be declared void. The other provisions respecting
the governments treaty obligations remain valid.
(Dante V. Liban, et al. vs. Richard J. Gordon, respondent, Philippine
National Red Cross, intervenor; G.R. No. 175352, January 18, 2011. See
dissenting opinion here.)
December 2010 Philippine Supreme

Posted on January 19, 2011 by Vicente D. Gerochi IV Posted in Constitutional Law,
Philippines - Cases, Philippines - Law Tagged agrarian reform, equal protection,
judicial review, warrantless arrest
Here are selected December 2010 rulings of the Supreme Court of the
Emancipation patent; issuance. Following are the steps in transferring land
to a tenant-tiller under Presidential Decree No. 27: (a) identification of
tenant, landowner, and the land covered; (b) land survey and sketching of
portion actually cultivated by the tenant to determine parcel size, boundaries,

and possible land use; (c) issuance of Certificate of Land Transfer; (d)
valuation of the land for purposes of computing the amortization; (e)
amortization payments of the tenant-tiller over a 15-year period; and (f)
issuance of Emancipation Patent. In this case, there is no evidence that these
steps were followed. There are several supporting documents that the tenantfarmer must submit before he can receive the Emancipation Patent. The
Supreme Court found that majority of these supporting documents is
lacking. Hence, it was improper for the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board to order the issuance of the Emancipation Patent in
favor of respondent. There was also no sufficient evidence to prove that
respondent has fully paid the value of the land. Full payment of just
compensation is required prior to issuance of Emancipation Patents. Renato
Reyes, represented by Ramon Reyes vs Leopoldo Barrios, G.R. No. 172841,
December 15, 2010.
Equal protection clause; concept. The Court here struck down Executive
Order No. 1 (which created the Truth Commission) for violating the equal
protection clause. The clear mandate of the Truth Commission is to
investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and
corruption during the previous administration only. The intent to single out
the previous administration was plain, patent and manifest. According to the
Court, the Arroyo administration is a member of a class, that is, the class of
past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include in the
Commissions mandate past administrations similarly situated constitutes
arbitrariness, which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Although
Section 17 gives the President discretion to expand the scope of
investigations of the Commission so as to include acts of graft and
corruption committed in other past administrations, it does not guarantee that
they would be covered in the future. This expanded mandate of the
Commission will still depend on the discretion of the President. If he
decides not to include them, the provision would be meaningless. Louis
Barok C. Biraogo vs. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 / Rep.
Edcel C. Lagman, et al. vs. Exec. Sec. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No.
192935 & G.R. No. 19303, December 7, 2010.
Judicial review; requisites. Judicial review requires the following: (1) an
actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the
person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of
the act or issuance; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the

earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very
subject matter of the case.As to standing, the Court here held that petitioners,
who are legislators, met the requirement as they are questioning the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 creating the Truth Commission on
the basis that the latters mandate constitutes usurpation of the power of the
Congress. However, with regard to the petitioner who is questioning EO
No. 1 as a taxpayer, the Court held that he had no standing since he has not
shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal and
direct injury attributable to the implementation of that EO. The Court took
cognizance of the case as the matter involved was of transcendental
importance. Louis Barok C. Biraogo vs. The Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010 / Rep. Edcel C. Lagman, et al. vs. Exec. Sec. Paquito N.
Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 192935 & G.R. No. 19303, December 7, 2010.
President; creation of Truth Commission; power to reorganize. The creation

of the Truth Commission does not fall within the Presidents power to
reorganize.Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code contemplates
reorganization as limited by the following functional and structural lines:
(1) restructuring the internal organization of the Office of the President by
abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions
from one unit to another; (2) transferring any function under the Office of
the President to any other department or agency or vice versa; or (3)
transferring any agency under the Office of the President to any other
department or agency or vice versa. This provision, according to the Court,
refers to reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof
by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. These refer to situations
where a body or an office is already existent but a modification or alteration
thereof has to be effected. Louis Barok C. Biraogo vs. The Philippine
Truth Commission of 2010 / Rep. Edcel C. Lagman, et al. vs. Exec. Sec.
Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 192935 & G.R. No. 19303, December
7, 2010.
President; creation of Truth Commission; power of control. The creation of
the Commission is not justified by the Presidents power of control. Control
is essentially the power to alter, modify, nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter. Clearly, the

power of control is entirely different from the power to create public offices.
The former is inherent in the Executive, while the latter finds basis from
either a valid delegation from Congress, or the Executives inherent duty to
faithfully execute the laws. Louis Barok C. Biraogo vs. The Philippine
Truth Commission of 2010 / Rep. Edcel C. Lagman, et al. vs. Exec. Sec.
Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 192935 & G.R. No. 19303, December
7, 2010.
President; creation of Truth Commission; power to conduct
investigations. The Presidents power to conduct investigations to aid him
in ensuring the faithful execution of laws in this case, fundamental laws on
public accountability and transparency is inherent in the Presidents
powers as the Chief Executive. It flows from the faithful-execution clause
of the Constitution under Article VII, Section 17 thereof. One of the
recognized powers of the President is the power to create ad hoc
committees. This flows from the need to ascertain facts and determine if
laws have been faithfully executed or guide the President in performing his
duties relative to the execution and enforcement of laws. Contrary to
petitioners apprehension, the Truth Commission will not supplant the
Ombudsman or the Department of Justice or erode their respective
powers. The investigative function of the Commission will complement
those of the two offices. The recommendation to prosecute is but a
consequence of the overall task of the Commission to conduct a fact-finding
investigation. The actual prosecution of suspected offenders, much less
adjudication on the merits of the charges against them, is certainly not a
function given to the Commission. Louis Barok C. Biraogo vs. The
Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 / Rep. Edcel C. Lagman, et al. vs.
Exec. Sec. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 192935 & G.R. No. 19303,
December 7, 2010.
Tenancy relationship; elements. For purposes of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law, there is tenancy relationship between parties if the
following elements concur: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant
or agricultural lessee; (2) the subject matter of the relationship is an
agricultural land; (3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship;
(4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production;
(5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural
lessee; and (6) the harvest is shared between landowner and tenant or
agricultural lessee. All the foregoing requisites must be proved by

substantial evidence. In this case, the continued stay of the purported tenant
in the premises of the company was the result of an amicable settlement in a
labor dispute and not because there was a landlord-tenant relationship. The
fact that the stay was free of charge only proves the absence of such a
relationship. Even assuming that the employer was receiving a share of the
produce, the fact of receipt, without an agreed system of sharing, does not
ipso facto create a tenancy. There was no evidence to indicate that the
parties agreed to any system of sharing. The employees activities in the
property cannot be classified as one for agricultural production. There was
no record showed that he was engaged in any planting or other agricultural
activity. Heirs of Jose Barredo, namely, Lolita Barredo, et al. vs. Lavoiser
Besaes, G.R. No. 164695, December 13, 2010.
Warrantless arrest. The Supreme Court here found that the prosecution
failed to prove the guilt of the accused, as (a) the evidence against them is
inadmissible and (b) granting the same to be admissible, the chain of custody
has not been duly established.The police went to the house of one of the
accused based solely on the report of a concerned citizen that a pot session
was going on. Sole reliance on such a tip does not constitute probable
cause. The apprehending officers should have first conducted a surveillance
considering that the identity and address of one of the accused had earlier
been ascertained. After conducting the surveillance and determining the
existence of probable cause, a search warrant should have been secured prior
to effecting the arrest and seizure. The arrest being illegal, the ensuing
search is likewise illegal. The items seized during the illegal arrest are thus
inadmissible. People of the Philippines vs. Arnold Martinez y Angeles, et al.,
G.R. No. 191366, December 13, 2010.
Dissension
in
December 2010
the
Court:
Posted on January 11, 2011 by Jose Ma. G. Hofilea Posted in Constitutional Law,
Criminal Law, Philippines - Cases, Remedial Law
The following are decisions promulgated by the High Court in December

2010 where at least one Justice felt compelled to express his or her dissent


In this episode, the search for truth takes center stage. What is the truth? Is
truth unchanging law? We both have truths? Are mine the same as yours?
(from Tim Rice and Andrew Lloyd Webbers Jesus Christ Superstar).
1.
You Cant Handle the Truth(Mendoza, Corona, Brion,
Bersamin, Perez, Leonardo-de Castro and Peralta vs. Carpio, CarpioMorales, Nachura, Abad and Sereno)
Acting on a campaign promise which was ultimately incorporated into his
inaugural speech, President Benigno Aquino issued his first Executive Order
creating the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 tasked, among
principally, to seek and find the truth on, and toward this end, investigate
reports of graft and corruption of such scale and magnitude that shock and
offend the moral and ethical sensibilities of the people, committed by public
officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories
from the private sector, if any, during the previous administration; and
thereafter recommend the appropriate action or measure to be taken thereon
to ensure that the full measure of justice shall be served without fear or
favor.
Not long after the issuance of Executive Order No. 1, two petitions were
filed with the Supreme Court, one by a taxpayer and another by legislators,
questioning the legality of the creation of the Truth Commission. In
December 7, 2010, the Supreme Court promulgated its decision in Louis
Barok C. Biraogo vs. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 / Rep.
Edcel C. Lagman, et al. vs. Exec. Sec. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al.
The Honorable Justice Jose C. Mendoza began by disposing of the legal
standing issue, confirming that the petitioner-legislators had the requisite
standing to challenge Executive Order No. 1 as they are allowed to question
the validity of any official action which, to their mind, infringes on their
prerogatives as legislators. As for Barok Biraogo, although the Court
conceded that he is a nontraditional plaintiff, he does possess the requisite
legal standing given the transcendental importance of the case.
The Court discussed the possible legal bases that could support the creation

by the President of the Truth Commission and resolved each of these as

follows:
The creation of the Truth Commission cannot be supported by Section 31
of the Revised Administrative Code which grants the President the
power to restructure the internal organization of the Office of the
President. Restructuring implies the reorganization of already
existence bodies or offices. As the Truth Commission is a new office,
that provision of the Revised Administrative Code is unavailing.
The creation of the Truth Commission cannot be justified by the
Presidents power of control. Control is essentially the power to alter
or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done
in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the
former with that of the latter. This power is different from the power
to create public offices.
The creation of the Truth Commission cannot find statutory basis in
Presidential Decree No. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772, which
granted the President the continuing authority to reorganize the
national government, including the power to group, consolidate
bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to
create and classify functions, services and activities, transfer
appropriations, and to standardize salaries and materials, since this
law was issued only in relation to providing for a transition towards a
parliamentary form of government. That statute therefore, is functus
oficio.
The creation of the Truth Commission, however, can be justified under the
Constitutional authority of the President to ensure that all laws be
faithfully executed, which includes therefore the power to create ad
hoc committees to conduct investigations and other fact finding
activities.
However, according to Justice Mendoza, even as the President may have the
power to create a Truth Commission, Executive Order No. 1 is
unconstitutional for having transgressed the equal protection clause of the
Constitution which clause, says the majority, is aimed at all official state
actions and not just the legislature.
The majority decision reiterated the equality principles underpinning the

equal protection clause and outlined the essential elements for permissible
classifications based on the standard of reasonableness: (1) The
classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the
purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It
applies equally to all members of the same class.
Applying these tests to Executive Order No. 1, Justice Mendoza ruled to
strike the order down as unconstitutional for being violative of the equal
protection clause given that the clear mandate of the envisioned Truth
Commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported
cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration only. This
intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest
in the very language of Executive Order No. 1.
For the majority, the Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class,
that is, a class of past administrations and it is not a class of its own. Said the
ponente, [n]ot to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes
arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such
discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as
a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution.
Before rendering the dispositive portion of the decision, Justice Mendoza
however advised that [l]est it be misunderstood, this is not the death knell
for a truth commission as nobly envisioned by the present
administration. Perhaps a revision of the executive issuance so as to include
the earlier past administrations would allow it to pass the test of
reasonableness and not be an affront to the Constitution. Of all the branches
of the government, it is the judiciary which is the most interested in knowing
the truth and so it will not allow itself to be a hindrance or obstacle to its
attainment. It must, however, be emphasized that the search for the truth
must be within constitutional bounds for ours is still a government of laws
and not of men.
The majority decision spawned five dissenting opinions in addition to six
separate opinions that supported the conclusions of the majority. A virtual
judicial brawl.
The dissenting opinions that were handed down all took exception to the

ruling that Executive Order No. 1 violated the equal protection clause.
One of the more significant common themes that thread through the
colorfully-worded dissenting opinions by pointing to the previous
administration of President Arroyo, Executive Order No. 1 does not violate
the standard of reasonable classification. Contrary to the reading of the
majority, the dissenters believe that by the language Executive Order No. 1,
its investigative functions are not limited to the immediate past
administration although it is being prioritized. And such prioritization,
which can be supported by important considerations, does not contradict the
equal protection clause. By its nature, investigations, like prosecutions,
must be focused on specific persons or incidents and it is not
unconstitutional for the President to do so through the Truth Commission.
(Louis Barok C. Biraogo vs. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 /
Rep. Edcel C. Lagman, et al. vs. Exec. Sec. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al.;
G.R. No. 192935 & G.R. No. 19303, December 7, 2010.
(authors note: this author is still grappling with the concept espoused by
the majority that the previous administration cannot be made a class of its
own in the context in which Executive Order No. 1
implies. Classificationseven by the Supreme Courtfor way smaller
things have been done in the past. Moreover, this author subscribes to the
view that fact-finding and investigations are necessarily focused and specific
and it would seem to this author to be overreaching to strike down an act of
the President that seeks to conduct an investigation or fact-finding into a
specific matter just because he is not including all that may possibly
constitute the rest in that activity.
On a separate matter, this author feels that it would have spared the
President a lot of anguish if he proceeded with his objectives to investigate
graft and corrupt acts conducted during the Arroyo administration with the
use of existing, available tools such as the Department of Justice. Instead,
he opted to grandstand a little bit by creating a special Truth Commission,

thereby inviting political opponents to craft innovative, if curious, legal

theories).
2.
A Tangled Webb(Abad vs. Villarama)
Though the gruesome 1991 murders of Estrelita Vizconde and her daughters
Carmela and Jennifer was most unspeakable, it was then the only talk of the
town. Almost two decades later, when the decision of the Supreme Court in
Lejano vs. People of the Philippines and People of the Philippines vs. Webb,
et al was handed down, it once again became the topic of every conversation
in the country.
Hubert Webb, Antonio Lejano, Michael Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez,
Peter Estrada and Gerardo Biong were accused of committing the hideous
crime, detained and in January 2000, after four years of hearings, were later
found guilty by the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque. A plethora of
evidence was presented and adduced during the trial, including evidence
intended to support Webbs alibi that he was in the United States on the day
the crime took place as well as the testimony of Jessica Alfaro, who claimed
to have been with the group of the accused (save for Biong) when the
murders were committed.
In January 2000, the trial court rendered a guilty verdict on the accused,
imposing a penalty of reclusion perpetua on all except Biong, who was
given indeterminate prison term of eleven years.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the guilty verdict sometime in 2007 and the
case made its way to the Supreme Court. During the course of the Supreme
Courts deliberations on the case, the Court issued a Resolution granting the
request of Webb to submit for DNA analysis the semen specimen taken from
Carmela Vizcondes cadaver, which was then believed to be with the
NBI. However, the NBI responded by informing the Supreme Court that it
no longer had the specimens and that these had been turned over to the trial
court. However, the trial record showed that such specimen was not among
the evidence offered by the prosecution during the case.
This development prompted Web to file a motion for his acquittal on the
ground that the government failed to preserve vital evidence in violation of

his due process rights.

In the combined cases of Lejano vs. People of the Philippines and People of
the Philippines vs. Webb, et al, therefore, the principal issues addressed by
the Supreme Court were: (a) whether or not Webb should outright be
acquitted for the governments failure to produce the semen specimen, (b)
whether or not Alfaros testimony is entitled to belief, and (c) whether or not
Webb had presented sufficient proof to support his alibi.
Writing for the majority, Justice Roberto Abad ruled on the first point that
the government cannot be faulted for not presenting the semen specimen.
According to Justice Abad, citing U.S. jurisprudence, due process does not
require the State to preserve the semen specimen although it might be useful
to the accused unless the latter is able to show bad faith on the part of the
prosecution or the police. In addition, the ponente points out that the rules
on DNA evidence did not yet exist, the country did not yet have the
technology for conducting the test, and no Philippine precedent had as yet
recognized its admissibility as evidence, at the time the DNA issue was
raised.
With respect to the credibility of Alfaro as the principal witness of the
prosecution, the majority took note of seeming inconsistencies in her
testimony as well as factual accounts given by her that appeared to the High
Court to be implausible if absurd. As a result, the Court concluded that
Alfaros testimony should not have been accorded the weight it was given
by the lower courts. The same conclusion was reached by the Court with
respect of other prosecution witnesses presented to corroborate the testimony
of Alfaro.
Finally, on Webbs alibi that he was in the United States at that time, Justice
Abad took issue with the trial courts decision that Webbs alibi cannot stand
against Alfaros positive identification. He admonished the trial court,
insinuating that it arrived hastily into that conclusion. Said Justice Abad,
[a] positive declaration from a witness that he saw the accused commit the
crime should not automatically cancel out the accuseds claim that he did not
do it. A lying witness can make as positive an identification as a truthful
witness can.

For a positive identification to be acceptable, it must satisfy the following:

the positive identification of the offender must come from a credible
witness.
the witness story of what she personally saw must be believable, not
inherently contrived.
Alfaro and her testimony fail to meet the above criteria.
The Court notes that Webb produced various travel documents including his
passport and certifications issued by U.S. immigration officials.
On the lower courts assertion that the passport cannot be given evidentiary
weight because the original was not left with the court, Justice Abad noted
that it is not necessary to do so where the parties stipulate that the copy left
with the court is a faithful reproduction of the original. And as Webbs not
having been able to present the actual immigration official who prepared
certifications on Webbs United States arrival and departure that validated
the stamps of Webbs passport, the majority held that this was unnecessary
as Webbs passport is a document issued by the Philippine government,
which under international practice, is the official record of travels of the
citizen to whom it is issued. The entries in that passport are presumed
true. x x x The officers who issued these certifications need not be
presented in court to testify on them. Their trustworthiness arises from the
sense of official duty and the penalty attached to a breached duty, in the
routine and disinterested origin of such statement and in the publicity of the
record.
Although official records that carry the presumption of truth are not immune
from challenge, the Court observed that the prosecution in this case did not
present any impeaching evidence.
The majority of the Court concluded that Webbs documented alibi
altogether impeaches Alfaros testimony, not only with respect to him, but
also with respect to rest of the accused. For, if the Court accepts the
proposition that Webb was in the U.S. when the crime took place, Alfaros
testimony will not hold together. Webbs participation is the anchor of
Alfaros story. Without it, the evidence against the others must necessarily
fall.

Justice Martin S. Villarama penned the dissenting opinion to which Justices

Brion, Leonardo-De Castro and Chief Justice Corona acceded.
In the dissenting opinion, Justice Villarama meticulously sifted through the
prosecutions evidence that supported the conviction and also evaluated the
evidence given by each of the accused in their defense. Unlike the majority,
the dissenters believed that the prosecutions evidence, particularly the
testimony of the eyewitness Alfaro, constituted credible evidence.
Justice Villarama notes that the determination of the competence and

credibility of a witness rests primarily with the trial court, because it has the
unique position of observing the witness deportment on the stand while
testifying. Further, he adds, that it is a fundamental rule that findings of the
trial courts which are factual in nature and which involve credibility are
accorded respect when no glaring errors, gross misapprehensions of facts
and speculative, arbitrary and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from
such findings. When the trial courts findings have been affirmed by the
appellate court, said findings are generally conclusive and binding upon the
Supreme Court.
In sustaining a judgment of conviction, the dissenting opinion explains that

two crucial points must be considered: first, the identification of the accused
as perpetrator of the crime, taking into account the credibility of the
prosecution witness who made the identification as well as the prosecutions
compliance with legal and constitutional standards; and second, whether or
not all the elements constituting the crime were duly proven by the
prosecution to be present. In this case, the prosecution complied with these
requirements. No one has doubted the commission of the crime. As for the
identification of the accused, Justice Villarama states:
Eyewitness identification constitutes vital evidence and, in most cases,
decisive of the success or failure of the prosecution. Both the RTC and CA
found the eyewitness testimony of Alfaro credible and competent proof that
appellants Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Rodriguez and Estrada

were at the scene of the crime and that Webb raped Carmela as the bloodied
bodies of her mother and sister lay on top of the bed inside the masters
bedroom, and right beside it stood Lejano while Ventura was preparing for
their escape. At another house in BF Executive Village where the group
retreated after leaving the Vizconde house, Alfaro witnessed the blaming
session, particularly between Ventura and Webb, and thereupon learned
from their conversation that Carmelas mother and sister were stabbed to
death before she herself was killed. Alfaro likewise positively identified
appellant Biong, whom somebody from the group described as the driver
and bodyguard of the Webb family, as the person ordered by Webb to clean
the Vizconde house.
The testimony of Alfaro on its material points was corroborated by Birrer,

Dr. Cabanayan, White, Jr., Cabanacan and Gaviola. Appellants presence
at the scene of the crime before, during and after its commission was duly
established. Their respective participation, acts and declarations were
likewise detailed by Alfaro who was shown to be a credible witness. It is
axiomatic that a witness who testifies in a categorical, straightforward,
spontaneous and frank manner and remains consistent on cross-examination
is a credible witness.
On Webbs alibi defense, the dissent reminded that alibi is an inherently

weak and unreliable defense, it being easy to fabricate and difficult to
disprove. Thus, the accused asserting alibi must prove (a) that he was
present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b)
that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the
crime. Alibi must be supported by clear and convincing proof.
On this point, the dissenters observed that Webbs claim that he left for the
United States on March 9, 1991 and returned to the Philippines only on
October 26, 1992 was correctly rejected by the lower courts. Said Villarama,
Given the financial resources and political influence of his family, it was

not unlikely that Webb could have traveled back to the Philippines before
June 29-30, 1991 (when the crime was committed) and then departed for the
US again, and returning to the Philippines in October 1992. x x x There
clearly exists, therefore, such possibility of Webbs presence at the scene of
the crime at the time of its commission.
The dissenting opinion then opted to affirm the findings of the lower courts
that the various documentary evidence submitted by Webb to support his
defense were either inadmissible, incompetent or irrelevant.
Accordingly, in Justice Villaramas opinion, Webbs defense of alibicannot
be sustained where it is not only without credible corroboration, but also
where it does not, on its face, demonstrate the physical impossibility of the
accuseds presence at the place and time of the commission of the
crime. Against positive evidence, alibi becomes most unsatisfactory. It is
only when the identification of the accused is inconclusive or unreliable that
alibi assumes importance. As far as the dissenters are concerned, such was
not the situation in the case where the identification of the perpetrators by a
lone eyewitness satisfied the moral certainty standard.
The dissenting opinion thereafter dissected the defenses put up by the rest of
the accused but arrived at the same conclusion that the findings of the lower
court, including that there was conspiracy amongst the accused, were
supported by adequate evidence and hence their conviction should be
upheld.
(Antonio Lejano vs. People of the Philippines / People of the Philippines vs.
Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, et al.; G.R. No. 176389 / G.R. No. 176864.
December 14, 2010. See dissenting opinion here.)
(authors note: This case was ultimately resolved not so much on the basis
of interpreting the applicable law, but on how credible each individual
Justice perceived the witnesses and evidence to be. Thus, it is not
implausible, as can be seen throughout the history of this case, that different
individuals will have disparate views in their appreciation of
evidence. Thats just the way we humans are made. The decision in a case

like this could therefore go either way depending on how credulous or

doubting the Court is on balance [which may explain why many people
become hugely interested in the composition of the High Court].
The other interesting thing here, at least to this author, is that the
conviction twice givenat the trial court and at the Court of Appealswas
overturned by the vote of 7 out of a 15-man Court, or less than a majority of
the Court, but a clear preponderance of the 11 participated. Not taking
part in a decision is often resorted to in order to avoid the appearance of
partiality. But not taking part in a decision, especially where one is
convinced of his own impartiality or more so, the truth, can have a profound
impact in the dispensation of justice. Appearance of partiality or the
dispensation of justicewhich should we value more?
As a final note, this author just wants to note that no matter which side you
are on, there should be something to be said about the fact that a crime
committed in 1991 is finally resolved only in 2010.)
November 2010 Philippine Supreme

Posted on December 15, 2010 by Vicente D. Gerochi IV Posted in Constitutional Law
Tagged Bill of Rights, due process, eminent domain, speedy trial
Here are selected November 2010 rulings of the Supreme Court

of the Philippines on political law:
Constitutional Law

Bill of Rights; Right to Speedy Trial. The right to speedy trial is

considered violated only when the proceeding is attended by
vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. In this case, far
from being vexatious, capricious and oppressive, the delays
entailed by the postponements of the hearings were, to a great
extent, attributable to petitioner Franciscos extraordinary
remedies against the interlocutory orders issued by the lower
court and the assignment of at least three public prosecutors to
the case. Although the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
mandate commencement of trial within 30 days from receipt of
the pre-trial order, and the continuous conduct thereof for a
period not exceeding 180 days, Section 3(a)(1) of Rule 119
provides that delays resulting from extraordinary remedies
against interlocutory orders shall be excluded in computing the
time within which trial must commence. In determining the right
of an accused to speedy trial, courts are required to do more
than a mathematical computation of the number of
postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case and to give
particular regard to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each
case. Based on the foregoing, the Court rejected petitioner
Franciscos claim that the postponements of the pre-trial
conferences before the lower court violated his right to a speedy
trial. Nelson Imperial, et al. vs. Maricel M. Joson, et al./Santos O.
Francisco vs. Spouses Gerard and Maricel Joson Nelson/Imperial,
et al. vs.. Hilarion C. Felix, et al., G.R. No. 160067/G.R. Mo.
170410/G.R. No. 171622, November 17, 2010.
Bill of Rights; Right to Speedy Trial. In determining whether the

right of the accused to a speedy trial was violated, any delay
should be considered in relation to the entirety of the
proceedings. Here, there had been an undue and inordinate delay
in the reinvestigation of the cases by the Office of the
Ombudsman, which failed to submit its reinvestigation report
despite the lapse of the 60-day period set by the Sandiganbayan,
and did so only after more than a year thereafter. However,

while such reinvestigation delayed the proceedings, the Court

held that said process could not have been dispensed with as it
was undertaken for the protection of the rights of petitioners and
their co-accused. These rights should not be compromised at the
expense of expediency. Thus, even though the Court
acknowledged the delay in the criminal proceedings, as well as
the prejudice suffered by petitioners and their co-accused by
reason thereof, the Court held that petitioners right to speedy
trial and disposition of the cases involving them do not justify the
dismissal of the criminal cases. The Court further held that the
State should not be prejudiced and deprived of its right to
prosecute the criminal cases simply because of the ineptitude or
nonchalance of the Office of the Ombudsman. Monico V. Jacob,
et al. vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No. 162206, November 17,
2010.
Constitutionality; Legal Standing. Petitioner questioned the

constitutionality of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET). The
Court held that he has no legal standing. The issue of legal
standing is derived from the following requisites of a judicial
inquiry: (1) There must be an actual case or controversy; (2)
The question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper
party; (3) The constitutional question must be raised at the
earliest possible opportunity; and (4) The decision of the
constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of
the case itself. The Court said that even if the petitioners claim
that he is a proper party on the basis that the creation and
operation of the PET involves the use of public funds and the
issue he raised is of transcendental importance, his standing was
still imperiled by his appearance as counsel to then presidential
candidate Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in the 2004 election protest
filed by her opponent before the PET. A constitutional question
must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity. That
appearance would have been the first opportunity to challenge
the constitutionality of the PETs constitution. Instead, petitioner
ubiquitously entered his appearance before the PET and
acknowledged its jurisdiction. His failure to raise a seasonable

constitutional challenge at that time, coupled with his

unconditional acceptance of the PETs authority, meant that he
did not meet the third condition and therefore has no standing to
file the petition. Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal vs. Presidential
Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 191618, November 23, 2010.
Constitutionality; Presidential Electoral Tribunal; Creation.

Petitioner here claimed that the creation of the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal (PET) is unconstitutional as it violates Section 4
of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that The
Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the
purpose. He contends that the provision, as worded, does not
authorize the constitution of the PET. The Court said that, while
the above provision does not specify the establishment of the
PET, neither does it preclude, much less prohibit, the same. The
Court further said that its constitutional mandate to act as sole
judge of election contests involving the President or VicePresident, and its rule-making authority in connection therewith
(granted by the provision of Section 4 that the Court may
promulgate its rules for the purpose), are not restricted but
include all necessary powers implicit in the exercise of such
mandate and authority. These powers are plenary and the
authority of the Court to decide presidential and vice-presidential
election contests through the PET are derived from the
unequivocal grant of jurisdiction under Section 4 of Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution. Accordingly, the creation of the PET
implements Section 4 and faithfully complies with the
constitutional directive. The discussions of the Constitutional
Commission clearly support the foregoing conclusion. Atty.
Romulo B. Macalintal vs. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No.
191618, November 23, 2010.
Constitutionality; Presidential Electoral Tribunal; Exercise of

Quasi-Judicial Function. The Court here rejected petitioners

claim that the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) exercises
quasi-judicial functions contrary to Section 12, Article VIII of the
Constitution, which states that The Members of the Supreme
Court and of other courts established by law shall not be
designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or
administrative functions. The traditional grant of judicial power
is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, which
provides that the power shall be vested in one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be established by
law. Consistent with the presidential system of government, the
function of dealing with the settlement of disputes,
controversies or conflicts involving rights, duties or prerogatives
that are legally demandable and enforceableis apportioned to
courts of justice. With the advent of the 1987 Constitution,
judicial power was expanded to include the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. Judicial power was thus
expanded, but it remained absolute.
The Court held that set up embodied in the 1987 Constitution

characterizes the resolution of electoral contests as essentially an
exercise of judicial power. When the Supreme Court, as the PET,
resolves a presidential or vice-presidential election contest, it
performs what is essentially a judicial power. The present
Constitution has allocated to the Supreme Court, in conjunction
with latters exercise of judicial power inherent in all courts, the
task of deciding presidential and vice-presidential election
contests, with full authority in the exercise thereof. The power
wielded by PET is a derivative of the plenary judicial
power allocated to courts of law, expressly provided in the
Constitution. Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal vs. Presidential Electoral
Tribunal, G.R. No. 191618, November 23, 2010.

Eminent Domain; Interest. If property is taken for public use

before compensation is paid or deposited with the court having
jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must include
interest on its just value to be computed from the time the
property was taken to the time when compensation is actually
paid or deposited with the court. In fine, between the taking of
the property and the actual payment, legal interest accrue in
order to place the owner in a position as good as (but not better
than) that he was in before the taking occurred. As in previous
cases, the Supreme Court affirmed the award of 12% interest on
just compensation payable to the landowner. Land Bank of the
Philippines vs. Esther Anson Rivera, et al., G.R. No. 182431,
November 17, 2010.
Administrative Law
Due Process; Administrative Due Process. Petitioners here
assailed the credibility of a witnesss statement because it was
not made under oath and he was not presented as witness during
the hearing. The Court rejected this claim. In administrative
proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not
strictly applied. Administrative due process cannot be fully
equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. In
administrative proceedings, due process is satisfied when the
parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain
their side of the controversy or given opportunity to move for a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. The
measure of due process to be observed by administrative
tribunals allows a certain degree of latitude as long as fairness is
not compromised. Irene K. Nacu, etc. vs. Civil Service
Commission, et al., G.R. No. 187752, November 23, 2010.
Other Laws

Land Bank of the Philippines; Costs of Suit. Since Land Bank of

the Philippines is performing a governmental function in agrarian
reform proceedings, it is exempt from the payment of costs of
suit under Rule 142, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, which
provides that No costs shall be allowed against the Republic of
the Philippines, unless otherwise provided by law. Land Bank of
the Philippines vs. Esther Anson Rivera, et al., G.R. No. 182431,
November 17, 2010.
October 2010 Philippine Supreme

Posted on November 30, 2010 by Vicente D. Gerochi IV Posted in Constitutional Law
Tagged bidding, Bill of Rights, eminent domain, just compensation, Ombudsman,
probable cause
Here are selected October 2010 rulings of the Supreme Court of the
Constitutional Law
Bill of Rights; Presumption of Innocence. In this case, the so-called frameup was virtually pure allegation bereft of credible proof. The narration of the
police officer who implemented the search warrant was found, after trial and
appellate review, as the true story. It is on firmer ground than the selfserving statement of the accused-appellant of frame-up. The defense
cannot solely rely upon the constitutional presumption of innocence for,
while it is constitutional, the presumption is not conclusive. Notably, the
accused-appellant herself stated in her brief that no proof was proffered by
the accused-appellant of the police officers alleged ill motive. Stated
otherwise, the narration of the incident by law enforcers, buttressed by the
presumption that they have regularly performed their duties in the absence of
convincing proof to the contrary, must be given weight. People of the
Philippines vs. Olive Rubio Mamaril. G.R. No. 171980, October 6, 2010.

Bill of Rights; Probable Cause. There is no general formula or fixed rule for
the determination of probable cause since the same must be decided in light
of the conditions obtaining in given situations and its existence depends to a
large degree upon the findings or opinion of the judge conducting the
examination. It is presumed that a judicial function has been regularly
performed, absent a showing to the contrary. The defenses reliance of the
quoted testimony of the police officer alone, without any other evidence to
show that there was indeed lack of personal knowledge, is insufficient to
overturn the finding of the trial court. The accused-appellant, having failed
to present substantial rebuttal evidence to defeat the presumption of
regularity of duty of the issuing judge, cannot not be sustained by the
Court. People of the Philippines vs. Olive Rubio Mamaril. G.R. No. 171980,
October 6, 2010.
Constitutionality; Actual Controversy; Standing to Sue. The power of
judicial review can only be exercised in connection with a bona
fide controversy involving a statute, its implementation or a government
action. Without such controversy, courts will decline to pass upon
constitutional issues through advisory opinions, bereft as they are of
authority to resolve hypothetical or moot questions.
The limitation on the
power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies defines the role
assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power, to assure that the
courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of
government. But even with the presence of an actual case or controversy,
the Court may refuse judicial review unless the constitutional question or the
assailed illegal government act is brought before it by a party who
possesses locus standi or the standing to challenge it.
To have standing,
one must establish that he has a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement.
Particularly, he must show that (1) he has suffered some
actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and
(3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.
Petitions for certiorari and prohibition are, as here, appropriate remedies to

raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify, when
proper, acts of legislative and executive officials.
The present petitions

allege that then President Ramos had exercised vis--vis an assignment of

franchise, a function legislative in character. As alleged, too, the
Toll Regulatory Board (TRB), in the guise of entering into contracts
or agreements
with the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC) and
other
juridical entities, virtually enlarged, modified and/or extended the statutory
franchise of PNCC, thereby usurping a legislative prerogative. The
usurpation came in the form of executing the assailed
Supplemental Toll Operation Agreements
and
the
issuance
of
Toll Operation Certificates. Grave abuse of discretion is also laid on the
doorstep of the TRB for its act of entering into these same contracts or
agreements without the required public bidding mandated by law. In fine,
the certiorari petitions impute on then President Ramos and the TRB, the
commission of acts that translate inter alia into usurpation of the
congressional authority to grant franchises and violation of extant
statutes.
The petitions make a prima facie case for certiorari and
prohibition; an actual case or controversy ripe for judicial review
exists.
Verily, when an act of a branch of government is seriously alleged
to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact
the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute.
In doing so, the judiciary
merely defends the sanctity of its duties and powers under the Constitution.
In any case, the rule on standing is a matter of procedural technicality, which
may be relaxed when the subject in issue or the legal question to be resolved
is of transcendental importance to the public.
Hence, even absent any
direct injury to the suitor, the Court can relax the application of legal
standing or altogether set it aside for non-traditional plaintiffs, like ordinary
citizens, when the public interest so requires.
There is no doubt that
individual petitioners, Marcos, et al., in G.R. No. 169917, as then members
of the House of Representatives, possess the requisite legal standing since
they assail acts of the executive they perceive to injure the institution of
Congress.
On the other hand, petitioners Francisco, Hizon, and the other
petitioning associations, as taxpayers and/or users of the tollways or
representatives of such users, would ordinarily not be clothed with the
requisite standing.
While this is so, the Court is wont to presently relax
the rule on locus standi owing primarily to the transcendental importance
and the paramount public interest involved in the implementation of the laws
on the Luzon tollways, a roadway complex used daily by hundreds of
thousands of motorists. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., et al. vs. Toll Regulatory

Board, et al./Hon. Imee R. Marcos, et al. vs. The Republic of the Philippines,
et al./Gising Kabataan Movement, Inc., et al. vs. The Republic of the
Philippines, et al./The Republic of the Philippines vs. Young Professionals
and Entrepreneurs of San Pedro, Laguna. G.R. No. 166910, 169917,
173630, 183599, October 19, 2010.
Constitutionality; Locus Standi. A party who assails the constitutionality of
a statute must have a direct and personal interest. It must show not only that
the law or any governmental act is invalid, but also that it sustained or is in
immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its
enforcement, and not merely that it suffers thereby in some indefinite way.
Petitioners have not presented any personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy. None of them faces any charge under RA 9372. Petitioners
in G.R. No. 178890, allege that they have been subjected to close security
surveillance by state security forces, their members followed by
suspicious persons and vehicles with dark windshields, and their offices
monitored by men with military build. They likewise claim that they
have been branded as enemies of the State. Even conceding such
allegations, petitioners have yet to show any connection between the
purported surveillance and the implementation of RA 9372. On the other
hand, petitioner-organizations in G.R. No. 178581 would like the Court to
take judicial notice of respondents alleged action of tagging them as
militant organizations fronting for the Communist Party of the Philippines
(CPP) and its armed wing, the National Peoples Army (NPA). The tagging,
according to petitioners, is tantamount to the effects of proscription without
following the procedure under the law. Petitioners apprehension is
insufficient to substantiate their plea. That no specific charge or
proscription under RA 9372 has been filed against them, three years after its
effectiveness, belies any claim of imminence of their perceived threat
emanating from the so-called tagging. The same is true with petitioners
in G.R. No. 178554, who merely harp as well on their supposed link to the
CPP and NPA. They fail to particularize how the implementation of
specific provisions of RA 9372 would result in direct injury to their
organization and members. RA 9372 has been in effect for three years
now. From July 2007 up to the present, petitioner-organizations have
conducted their activities fully and freely without any threat of, much less an
actual,
prosecution
or
proscription
under
RA
9372.
Petitioners IBP and CODAL in G.R. No. 179157, on the other
hand, base their claim of locus standi on their sworn duty to uphold the

Constitution. The IBP zeroes in on Section 21 of RA 9372 directing it to

render assistance to those arrested or detained under the law. The mere
invocation of the duty to preserve the rule of law, however, does not suffice
to clothe the IBP or any of its members with standing. The IBP failed to
sufficiently demonstrate how its mandate under the assailed statute revolts
against its constitutional rights and duties. Moreover, both the IBP and
CODAL have not pointed to even a single arrest or detention effected under
RA 9372. Former Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo Madrigal, who claims to have
been
the
subject
of
political
surveillance,
also
lacks locus standi.
Prescinding from the veracity, let alone legal basis, of
the claim of political surveillance, the Court finds that she has not shown
even the slightest threat of being charged under RA 9372. Similarly
lacking in locus standi are former Senator Wigberto Taada and Senator
Sergio Osmea III, who cite their being respectively a human rights
advocate and an oppositor to the passage of RA 9372. Outside these
statements,
no
concrete
injury
to
them
has
been
pinpointed. Petitioners Southern
Hemisphere
Engagement
Network and Atty. Soliman Santos Jr. in G.R. No. 178552 also conveniently
state that the issues they raise are of transcendental importance, which must
be settled early and are of far-reaching implications, without mention of
any specific provision of RA 9372 under which they have been charged, or
may be charged. Mere invocation of human rights advocacy has nowhere
been held sufficient to clothe litigants with locus standi. Petitioners must
show an actual, or immediate danger of sustaining, direct injury as a result of
the laws enforcement. To rule otherwise would be to corrupt the settled
doctrine of locus standi, as every worthy cause is an interest shared by the
general public. Neither can locus standi be conferred upon individual
petitioners as taxpayers and citizens. A taxpayer suit is proper only when
there is an exercise of the spending or taxing power of Congress, whereas
citizen standing must rest on direct and personal interest in the proceeding.
In sum, it bears to stress that generalized interests, albeit accompanied by the
assertion of a public right, do not establish locus standi. Evidence of a direct
and personal interest is key. Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network,
Inc., et al. vs. Anti-Terrorism Council, et al./Kilusang Mayo Uno, et al. Vs.
Hon. Eduardo Ermita., et al./Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (Bayan), et al.
vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al./Karapatan, et al. vs.
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al./The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, et
al.
vs.
Executive
Secretary
Eduardo Ermita,
et
al./Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-Southern
Tagalog,
et
al.
vs.

Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al. G.R. No. 178552, 178554, 178581,

178890, 179157, 179461, October 5, 2010.
Constitutionality; Judicial Review; Actual Case or Controversy. The Court is
not unaware that a reasonable certainty of the occurrence of a perceived
threat to any constitutional interest suffices to provide a basis for mounting a
constitutional challenge. This, however, is qualified by the requirement that
there must be sufficient facts to enable the Court to intelligently adjudicate
the issues. Prevailing American jurisprudence allows adjudication on the
merits when an anticipatory petition clearly shows that the challenged
prohibition forbids the conduct or activity that a petitioner seeks to do, as
there would then be a justiciable controversy. Unlike the plaintiffs in Holder,
however, herein petitioners have failed to show that the challenged
provisions
of
RA
9372
forbid constitutionally
protected conduct or activity that they seek to do. No demonstrable threat
has been established, much less a real and existing one. Petitioners
obscure allegations of sporadic surveillance and supposedly being tagged
as communist fronts in no way approximate a credible threat of
prosecution. From these allegations, the Court is being lured to render
an advisory opinion, which is not its function. Without any justiciable
controversy, the petitions have become pleas for declaratory relief, over
which the Court has no original jurisdiction. Then again, declaratory
actions characterized by double contingency, where both the activity the
petitioners intend to undertake and the anticipated reaction to it of a public
official are merely theorized, lie beyond judicial review for lack of
ripeness. Allegations of abuse must be anchored on real events before courts
may step in to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable. Southern Hemisphere Engagement
Network, Inc, et al. vs. Anti-Terrorism Council, et al./Kilusang Mayo Uno
etc.,
et
al.
Vs.
Hon.
Eduardo Ermita.,
et
al./Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (Bayan), et al. vs. Gloria MacapagalArroyo, et al./Karapatan, et al. vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al./The
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, et al. vs. Executive Secretary
Eduardo Ermita, et al./Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-Southern Tagalog, et
al. vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al. G.R. Nos. 178552, 178554, 178581,
178890, 179157, 179461, October 5, 2010.
Constitutionality; Void for Vagueness and Overbreadth Doctrine. A facial
invalidation of a statute is allowed only in free speech cases, wherein certain

rules of constitutional litigation are rightly excepted. To be sure, the doctrine

of vagueness and the doctrine of overbreadth do not operate on the same
plane. A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.
The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a governmental purpose
to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations
may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and
thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. As distinguished from the
vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine assumes that individuals will
understand what a statute prohibits and will accordingly refrain from that
behavior, even though some of it is protected. A facial challenge is
likewise different from an as-applied challenge. Distinguished from an asapplied challenge which considers only extant facts affecting real litigants,
a facial invalidation is an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws
and defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but
also on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others
not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or
activities. The vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, as grounds for a facial
challenge, are not applicable to penal laws. On the other hand, the
allowance of a facial challenge in free speech cases is justified by the aim
to avert the chilling effect on protected speech, the exercise of which
should not at all times be abridged.
This rationale is inapplicable to plain
penal statutes that generally bear an in terrorem effect in deterring socially
harmful conduct. In fact, the legislature may even forbid and penalize acts
formerly considered innocent and lawful, so long as it refrains from
diminishing or dissuading the exercise of constitutionally protected
rights. Under no case, therefore, may ordinary penal statutes be subjected to
a facial challenge. The rationale is obvious. If a facial challenge to a penal
statute is permitted, the prosecution of crimes may be hampered. No
prosecution would be possible. It is settled, furthermore, that the application
of the overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial kind of challenge and,
owing to the given rationale of a facial challenge, applicable only to free
speech cases. By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply
a facial type of invalidation in order to plot areas of protected speech,
inevitably almost always under situations not before the court, that are
impermissibly swept by the substantially overbroad regulation. Otherwise
stated, a statute cannot be properly analyzed for being substantially
overbroad if the court confines itself only to facts as applied to the litigants.

In this case, since a penal statute may only be assailed for being vague as
applied to petitioners, a limited vagueness analysis of the definition of
terrorism in RA 9372 is legally impermissible absent an actual or
imminent
charge
against
them. In
fine,
petitioners
have
established neither an actual charge nor a credible threat of
prosecution under RA 9372. Even a limited vagueness analysis of
the assailed definition of terrorism is thus legally impermissible. Southern
Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc., et al. vs. Anti-Terrorism Council, et
al./Kilusang Mayo Uno, et al. Vs. Hon. Eduardo Ermita., et
al./Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (Bayan), et al. vs. Gloria MacapagalArroyo, et al./Karapatan, et al. vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al./The
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, et al. vs. Executive Secretary
Eduardo Ermita, et al./Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-Southern Tagalog, et
al. vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al. G.R. Nos. 178552, 178554, 178581,
178890, 179157, 179461, October 5, 2010.
Eminent Domain; Just Compensation. Section 9, Article III of the 1987
Constitution requires that in the exercise of the power of eminent domain,
compensation should be just. The public, through the State, must balance the
injury that the taking of property causes through compensation for what is
taken, value for value. The owners loss is not only his property but also
its income-generating potential. While the LBP immediately paid the
remaining balance on the just compensation due to the petitioners after the
Supreme Court had fixed the value of the expropriated properties, it
overlooks one essential fact from the time that the State took the
petitioners properties until the time that the petitioners were fully paid,
almost 12 long years passed. This is the rationale for imposing the 12%
interest in order to compensate the petitioners for the income they would
have made had they been properly compensated for their properties at the
time of the taking. Furthermore, while the SC has equitably reduced the
amount of interest awarded in numerous cases in the past, those cases
involved interest that was essentially consensual in nature, i.e., interest
stipulated in signed agreements between the contracting parties. In contrast,
the interest involved in the present case runs as a matter of law and follows
as a matter of course from the right of the landowner to be placed in as good
a position as money can accomplish, as of the date of taking. Thus, the
interest due in the present case cannot be reduced. Apo Fruits Corporation,
et al. vs. Land Bank of the Philippines. G.R. No. 164195, October 12, 2010.

Fiscal Autonomy of the Judiciary; GSIS; Exemption from Legal Fees. In In

Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the Government Service
Insurance System from Payment of Legal Fees, the Court ruled that the
provision in the Charter of the GSIS, i.e., Section 39 of Republic Act No.
8291, which exempts it from all taxes, assessments, fees, charges or duties
of all kinds, cannot operate to exempt it from the payment of legal fees.
This was because, unlike the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, which
empowered Congress to repeal, alter or supplement the rules of the Supreme
Court concerning pleading, practice and procedure, the 1987 Constitution
removed this power from Congress. Hence, the Supreme Court now has
the sole authority to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts. Any exemption from the payment of legal fees
granted by Congress to government-owned or controlled corporations and
local government units will necessarily reduce the JDF and the SAJF.
Undoubtedly, such situation is constitutionally infirm for it impairs the
Courts guaranteed fiscal autonomy and erodes its independence. In the
instant case, therefore, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction to try and
decide the permissive counterclaim considering that petitioner is not
exempted from the payment of legal fees. Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) vs. Heirs of Fernando P. Caballero, et al. G.R. No. 158090,
October 4, 2010.
Ombudsman; Disciplinary Authority over Public School Teachers. The
administrative disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman over a public school
teacher is not an exclusive power but is concurrent with the proper
committee of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS).
However, while petitioner has such concurrent authority, Section 23 of the
Ombudsman Act of 1989 provides that the Ombudsman may refer a
complaint to the proper disciplinary authority. Under the circumstances
obtaining in the case, it would have been more prudent for petitioner to have
referred the complaint to the DECS given that it would have been in a better
position to serve the interest of justice considering the nature of the
controversy. Respondent is a public school teacher and is covered by
RA 4670, therefore, the proceedings before the DECS would have been the
more appropriate venue to resolve the dispute. In any case, the foregoing
pronouncement does not automatically mean that the Supreme Court is
nullifying the proceedings before the Ombudsman as estoppel has already
set in. Respondent actively participated in the proceedings before the
Ombudsman. He submitted his counter-affidavit, an affidavit of his witness,

and attached annexes. Respondent even filed a Motion for Reconsideration

asking for affirmative relief from the Ombudsman. Finally, as to the power
to impose administrative liability, the Office of the Ombudsman has the
authority to determine the administrative liability of an erring public official
or employee, and to direct and compel the head of the concerned officer or
agency to implement the penalty imposed. This power to impose
administrative liability is not merely recommendatory but actually
mandatory. Office of the Ombudsman vs. Pedro Delijero, Jr. G.R. No.
172635, October 20, 2010.
Office of the Ombudsman; Powers. The Ombudsmans decision imposing
the penalty of suspension for one year is immediately executory pending
appeal. It cannot be stayed by the mere filing of an appeal to the Court of
Appeals (CA). Clearly, Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the
Office of the Ombudsman supersedes the discretion given to the CA in
Section 12, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court when a decision of the
Ombudsman in an administrative case is appealed to the CA. The provision
in the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman that a decision is
immediately executory is a special rule that prevails over the provisions of
the Rules of Court. Moreover, Section 13 (8), Article XI of the Constitution
authorizes the Office of the Ombudsman to promulgate its own rules of
procedure. In this connection, Sections 18 and 27 of the Ombudsman Act of
1989 also provide that the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to
promulgate its rules of procedure for the effective exercise or performance
of its powers, functions and duties and to amend or modify its rules as the
interest of justice may require. For the CA to issue a preliminary injunction
that will stay the penalty imposed by the Ombudsman in an administrative
case would be to encroach on the rule-making powers of the Office of the
Ombudsman under the Constitution and RA 6770 as the injunctive writ will
render nugatory the provisions of Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman. Office of the Ombudsman vs.
Joel S. Samaniego. G.R. No. 175573, October 5, 2010.
Preliminary Investigation; Decision; Applicability of Constitutional
Requirements to DOJ. A preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial
proceeding since the prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not
determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. Preliminary investigation
is merely inquisitorial. While the prosecutor makes that determination, he
cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately,

that pass judgment on the accused, not the prosecutor. A preliminary

investigation thus partakes of an investigative or inquisitorial power for the
sole purpose of obtaining information on what future action of a judicial
nature may be taken. Balangauan v. Court of Appeals in fact iterates that
even the action of the Secretary of Justice in reviewing a prosecutors order
or resolution via appeal or petition for review cannot be considered a quasijudicial proceeding since the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body. Section
14, Article VIII of the Constitution does not thus extend to resolutions
issued by the DOJ Secretary. Atty. Alice Odchique-Bondoc vs.
Tan Tiong Bio a.k.a. Henry Tan. G.R. No. 186652, October 6, 2010.
Validity of Supplemental Toll Operation Agreements.
(a) Public Utility Franchise; Substitution of Grantee. The Court rejected
petitioners contention that contractual provisions on substitution of the
franchise holder violated the Constitution. Relying on Clause 17.4.1 of the
Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement (STOA) for the North Luzon
Expressway that the lenders have the unrestricted right to appoint a
substitute entity in case of default of Manila North Tollways Corporation
(MNTC) or the occurrence of an event of default in respect
of MNTCs loans, petitioners argue that since MNTC is the assignee or
transferee of the franchise of Philippine National Construction Corporation
(PNCC), then it steps into the shoes of PNCC.
They contend that the act
of replacing MNTC as grantee is tantamount to an amendment or alteration
of PNCCs original franchise and hence unconstitutional, considering that
the constitutional power to appoint a new franchise holder is reserved to
Congress. The Court disagreed. Petitioners presupposition that only
Congress has the power to directly grant franchises is
misplaced.
The Court has held that administrative agencies may be
empowered by the Legislature by means of a law to grant franchises or
similar authorizations. In this case, the Court ruled that the Toll Regulatory
Board (TRB) is empowered to grant a franchise for toll road projects.
Petitioners also contend that substituting MNTC as the grantee in case of
default with respect to its loans is tantamount to an amendment of PNCCs
original franchise and is therefore unconstitutional.
The Court also
found this assertion to be without merit. Besides holding that the
Legislature may properly empower administrative agencies to grant
franchises pursuant to a law, the Court explained in this case that

Presidential Decree No. 1113 and the amendatory Presidential Decree No.
1894 both vested the TRB with the power to impose conditions on PNCCs
franchise in an appropriate contract and may therefore amend or alter the
same when public interest so requires, save for the conditions stated in
Sections 1 and 2 of PD 1894, which relate to the coverage area of
the tollways and
the
expiration
of
PNCCs
original
franchise.
Presidential Decree No. 1112 provided further that the TRB
has the power to amend or modify a Toll Operation Certificate that it issued
when public interest so requires.
Accordingly, there is nothing infirm
much less questionable about the provision in the MNTC STOA allowing
the substitution of MNTC in case it defaults in its loans.
Furthermore, the unrestricted right of the lender in Clause 17.4.1 of the
MNTC STOA to appoint a substituted entity is never intended to afford such
lender the plenary power to do so. It is clear that the lenders do not actually
have an absolute or unrestricted right to appoint the substituted entity in
view of TRBs right to accept or reject the substitution within one month
from notice, and such right to appoint comes into force only if and when the
TRB decides to effectuate the substitution of MNTC as allowed in Clause
17.2 of the MNTC STOA.
Court
agreed
with
(b) Public
Utility Franchise; Extension. The
petitioners contention that the option in the MNTC STOA to extend the
concession for the stated period is unconstitutional. Clause 17.5 of
the MNTC STOA grants MNTCs lenders the power to extend the
concession in case the Grantor (Republic of the Philippines) takes over the
same, for a period not exceeding 50 years, until full payment of the
loans. At the outset, Clause 17.5 does not grant the lenders the power to
unilaterally extend the concession for a period not exceeding 50 years. The
afore-quoted provision should be read in conjunction with Clause 20.12,
which expressly provides that the MNTC STOA is made under and shall be
governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the Philippines,
and particularly, by the provisions of PD 1112, PD 1113
and PD 1894.
Under the applicable laws, the TRB may amend, modify,
alter or revoke the authority/franchise whenever the public interest so
requires.
In a word, the power to determine whether or not to continue
or extend the authority granted to a concessionaire to operate and maintain
a tollway is vested in the TRB by the applicable laws.
The necessity of
whether or not to extend the concession or the authority to construct, operate

and maintain a tollway rests, by operation of law, with the TRB.

As such,
the lenders cannot unilaterally extend the concession period, or, with like
effect, demand that the TRB agree to extend the concession.
It must be noted, however, that while the TRB is vested by law with the
power to extend the administrative franchise or authority that it granted, it
cannot do so for an accumulated period exceeding 50 years. Otherwise, it
would violate
the proscription under Article XII, Section 11 of the 1987
Constitution, which provides that no public utility franchise shall be for a
longer period than 50 years.
In this case, the MNTC STOA has an original stipulated period
of 30 years.
Clause 17.5 allows the extension of this period if necessary
to fully repay the loans of MNTC. If the maximum extension as provided in
Clause 17.5, i.e., 50 years, is used, the accumulated concession period
granted in this case would effectively be 80 years.
This is a clear
violation of the 50-year franchise threshold set by the Constitution.
It
is on this basis that the Court struck down the provision in Clause 17.5
allowing extension of the concession for up to 50 years. However, the
nullity is only with respect to any extension beyond the 50-year
constitutional limit.
(c) Government Guarantee. The Court declared as unconstitutional and
grossly disadvantageous to the Government Clause 11.7 of the MNTC
STOA (and a similar provision in the STOA for the South Luzon
Expressway rehabilitation and extension project), which guarantees
the financial viability of tollway project. Under Clause 11.7 of the MNTC
STOA, the TRB agreed to pay monthly the difference in the toll fees
actually collected by MNTC and that which it could have realized under the
STOA. Article VI, Section 29(1) of the Constitution mandates that [n]o
money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation
made
by
law. In
this case,
the
TRB,
by
warranting to compensate MNTC for loss of revenue resulting from the nonimplementation of the periodic and interim toll fee adjustments, violates the
constitutionally guaranteed and exclusive power of the Legislature
to appropriate money for public purpose from the General Funds of the
Government.

Further, Section 3(e)(5) of PD 1112 explicitly states that no guarantee,

Certificate of Indebtedness, collateral securities, or bonds shall be issued by
any government agency or government-owned or controlled corporation on
any financing program of the toll operator in connection with his
undertaking under the Toll Operation Certificate. What the law here seeks
to prevent is the eventuality that the Government, through any of its
agencies, could be obligated to pay or secure, whether directly or indirectly,
the financing by the private investor of the project.
In this case, under
Clause 11.7 of the MNTC STOA, the Republic of the Philippines (through
the TRB) guaranteed the security of the project against revenue losses that
could result in case the TRB, based on its determination of a just and
reasonable toll fee, decides not to effect a toll fee adjustment under the
STOAs periodic/interim adjustment formula.
(d) Toll Rate Adjustments. The Court rejected petitioners contention that
the toll rate adjustment mechanisms in the STOAs violated the
Constitution. Petitioners argue that the STOAs for the North Luzon
Expressway, South Luzon Expressway and South Metro Manila Skyway
(SMMS) projects tie the hands of the TRB, as it is bound by the stipulated
periodic and interim toll rate adjustments provided therein.
Petitioners
contend that the provisions on initial toll rates and periodic/interim toll
rate adjustments, by using a built-in automatic toll rate adjustment
formula, guaranteed fixed returns for the investors and negated the public
hearing requirement. The Court held that the requisite public hearings under
Section 3(d) of PD 1112 and Section 8(b) of PD 1894 are not negated by the
fixing of the initial toll rates and the periodic adjustments under the STOAs.
A clear distinction must be made between the statutory prescription on the
fixing
of initial toll
rates,
on
the
one
hand,
and
of periodic/interim or subsequent toll rates, on the other.
First, the
hearing required under the said provisos refers to notice and hearing for the
approval or denial of petitions for toll rate adjustments or the subsequent
toll rates, not to the fixing of initial toll rates.
By express legal provision,
the TRB is authorized to approve the initial toll rates without the necessity of
a hearing.
It is only when a challenge on the initial toll rates fixed ensues
that public hearings are required.
In determining the reasonableness of subsequent toll rate increases, the
TRB must seek out the Commission on Audit for assistance in examining

and auditing the financial books of the public utilities

concerned. Furthermore, while the periodic, interim and other toll rate
adjustment formulas are indicated in the STOAs, it does not mean that the
TRB should accept a rate adjustment predicated on the economic data,
references or assumptions adopted by the toll operator.
The final figures
should be determined by the TRB based on its appreciation of the relevant
rate-influencing data.
The TRB should exercise its rate-fixing powers
within the context of the agreed formula, but always having in mind that the
rates should be just and reasonable.
Conversely, it is very well within the
power of the TRB under the law to approve a change in the current toll
fees.
Section 3(d) of PD 1112 grants the TRB the power to issue,
modify and promulgate from time to time the rates of toll that will be
charged the direct users of toll facilities.
But the reasonableness of a
possible increase in the fees must first be clearly and convincingly
established by the petitioning entities, i.e., the toll operators. Ernesto B.
Francisco, Jr., et al. vs. Toll Regulatory Board, et al./Hon. Imee R. Marcos,
et al. vs. The Republic of the Philippines, et al./Gising Kabataan Movement,
Inc., et al. vs. The Republic of the Philippines, et al./The Republic of the
Philippines vs. Young Professionals and Entrepreneurs of San Pedro,
Laguna. G.R. No. 166910, 169917, 173630, 183599, October 19, 2010.
Administrative Law
Administrative Agencies; Doctrine of Primary Administrative
Jurisdiction. Under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction,
courts will not determine a controversy where the issues for resolution
demand the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special
knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to
determine technical and intricate matters of fact. The objective of the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide the court in determining whether
it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative
agency has determined some question or some aspect of some question
arising in the proceeding before the court. Undeniably, supervening events
have substantially changed the factual backdrop of the case while it was
pending before the Court. The Supreme Court thus deferred to the
competence and expertise of the Securities and Exchange Commission to
determine whether, given the supervening events, the Second Amendment to
the Rehabilitation Plan is no longer capable of implementation and whether
the rehabilitation case should be terminated as a consequence. Nestle

Philippines, Inc. et al. vs. Uniwide Sales, Inc., et al. G.R. No. 174674,
October 20, 2010.
Government Contracts; Public Bidding. The Court held that public bidding
is not required with respect to the procurement of the South Metro Manila
Skyway, North Luzon Expressway and South Luzon Expressway
projects. Private petitioners maintain that public bidding is required for
these projects on the basis that they are in the nature of a build-operatetransfer infrastructure undertaking under the BOT Law. The Court said that
the
BOT
Law
does
not
squarely
apply
to
Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), which exercised its
prerogatives and obligations under its franchise to pursue the construction,
rehabilitation and expansion of the above toll roads with chosen partners.
These tollway projects may very well qualify as a build-operate-transfer
undertaking.
However, given that the projects have been undertaken by
PNCC in the exercise of its franchise under Presidential Decree No. 1113
and Presidential Decree No. 1894, in joint venture with its chosen partners at
the time when it was held valid to do so by the Office of
the Government Corporate Counsel and the Department of Justice, the
public bidding provisions under the BOT Law do not strictly apply.
The above projects are not ordinary contracts for the construction of
government infrastructure projects, which require, under the Government
Procurement Reform Act or the now-repealed Presidential Decree
No. 1594, public bidding as the preferred mode of contract
award.
Neither are these contracts where financing or financial
guarantees for the project are obtained from the government. Rather, the
Supplemental Toll Operating Agreements (pursuant to which PNCC is
undertaking the projects together with its chosen partners) actually constitute
a statutorily-authorized transfer or assignment of usufruct of PNCCs
existing franchise to construct, maintain and operate expressways.
The conclusion would perhaps be different if the tollway projects were to be
prosecuted by an outfit completely different from, and not related to, PNCC.
In such a scenario, the entity awarded the winning bid in a BOT-scheme
infrastructure project will have to construct, operate and maintain
the tollways through an automatic grant of a franchise or TOC, in which
case, public bidding is required under the law. Where, as here, a
franchisee (PNCC) undertakes the construction, rehabilitation and expansion

of the tollways under its franchise, there is no need for a public

bidding.
In pursuing the projects with the vast resource requirements, the
franchisee can partner with other investors, which it may choose in the
exercise of its management prerogatives.
In this case, no public bidding
is required upon the franchisee in choosing its partners, as such process was
done in the exercise of management prerogatives and in pursuit of its right
of delectus personae. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., et al. vs. Toll Regulatory
Board, et al./Hon. Imee R. Marcos, et al. vs. The Republic of the Philippines,
et al./Gising Kabataan Movement, Inc., et al. vs. The Republic of the
173630, 183599, October 19, 2010.
Election Laws
it
is
undisputed
Candidate;
Residency
Requirement. While
that Mitras domicile of origin is Puerto Princesa City, Mitra adequately
proved by substantial evidence that he transferred by incremental process
to Aborlan beginning 2008, and concluded his transfer in early
2009. Given this proof, the burden of evidence lies with the private
respondents to establish the contrary, which the latter failed to do. On the
other hand, the COMELEC based its ruling that Mitra did not take up
residence
in Aborlan largely
on
the
photographs
of Mitras Aborlan premises; it concluded that the photographed premises
could not have been a residence because of its assessment of the interior
design and furnishings of the room. Thus, the COMELEC Second
Divisions Resolution (which the COMELEC en banc fully supported) did
not merely conclude that Mitra does not live in the photographed premises;
more than this, it ruled that these premises cannot be considered a home or a
residence, for lack of the qualities of a home that the Second Division
wanted to see. The COMELEC not only grossly misread the evidence but
even used personal and subjective standards in its assessment
of Mitras dwelling when, in fact, the law is replete with standards, i.e., the
dwelling must be where a person permanently intends to return and to
remain. Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra vs. Commission on Elections, Antonio V.
Gonzales and Orlando R. Balbon, Jr. G.R. No. 191938, October 19, 2010.
Special Laws

Agrarian Reform; Just Compensation. Although the Department of Agrarian

Reform (DAR) is vested with primary jurisdiction under the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988 to determine in a preliminary
manner the reasonable compensation for lands taken under the CARP, such
determination is subject to challenge in the courts. The CARL vests in the
RTCs, sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, original and exclusive jurisdiction
over
all
petitions
for
the
determination
of
just
compensation. The jurisdiction of the RTCs is not any less original and
exclusive because the question is first passed upon by the DAR. The
proceedings before the RTC are not a continuation of the administrative
determination. Additionally, the administrative orders providing for the
guidelines in determining just compensation are mandatory and not mere
guides that the RTC may disregard. Finally, although in some expropriation
cases, the Court allowed the imposition of said interest, the same was in the
nature of damages for delay in payment which in effect makes the obligation
on the part of the government one of forbearance. In this case, respondents
are not entitled to interest on the final compensation considering that
petitioner promptly deposited the compensation for their lands after they
rejected petitioners initial valuation. Land Bank of the Philippines vs.
Glenn Y. Escandor, et al. G.R. No. 171685, October 11, 2010.
Energy Regulatory Commission; Implementation of RA 7832. SURNECO
cannot insist on using the multiplier scheme even after the imposition of the
system loss caps under Section 10 of R.A. No. 7832. Indeed, under
National Electrification Administration Memorandum No. 1-A, the use of
the multiplier scheme allows the recovery of system losses even beyond the
caps mandated in R.A. No. 7832, which is intended to gradually phase out
pilferage losses as a component of the recoverable system losses by the
distributing utilities such as SURNECO. However, it is totally repugnant
to and incompatible with the system loss caps established in R.A. No. 7832,
and is repealed by Section 16 of the law. As between NEA Memorandum
No. 1-A, a mere administrative issuance, and R.A. No. 7832, a legislative
enactment, the latter must prevail. Additionally, the PPA formula provided
in the IRR of R.A. No. 7832 was only a model to be used as a guide by the
electric cooperatives in proposing their own PPA formula for approval by
the then Energy Regulatory Board (ERB). Sections 4 and 5, Rule IX of the
IRR directed the electric cooperatives to apply for approval of such formula
with the ERB so that the system loss caps under the law would be
incorporated in their computation of power cost adjustments. The IRR did

not provide for a specific formula; therefore, there was nothing in the IRR
that was amended or could have been amended relative to the PPA
formula.
The IRR left to the ERB, now the Energy Regulatory
Commission, the authority to approve and oversee the implementation of the
electric cooperatives PPA formula in the exercise of its rate-making power
over them. Surigao del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. (SURNECO) vs.
Energy Regulatory Commission. G.R. No. 183626, October 4, 2010.
PNCC; Authority After Expiration of Franchise. In this case, petitioners
assume and harp on the lack of authority of the Philippine National
Construction Corporation (PNCC) to continue, in joint venture with private
investors, with its North Luzon Expressway (NLEX), South Luzon
Expressway (SLEX) and Metro Manila Expressway (MMEX) operations
after the lapse of its franchise (granted under Presidential Decree No. 1113)
on May 1, 2007. However, this expiration did not carry with it the
cancellation of PNCCs authority and that of its joint venture partners
granted under Presidential Decree No. 1112 in relation to Section 1 of
Presidential Decree No. 1894 to construct, operate and maintain any and
all such extensions, linkages or stretches, together with the toll facilities
appurtenant thereto, from any part of [NLEX], [SLEX] and/or [MMEX]
and/or to divert the original route and change the original end-points of the
[NLEX] and/or [SLEX] as may be approved by the [TRB]. To highlight
the point, Section 2 of PD 1894 specifically provides that the franchise for
the extension and toll road projects constructed after the approval of PD
1894 shall be 30 years, counted from project completion. Indeed, prior to the
expiration of PNCCs original franchise in May 2007, the
Toll Regulatory Board (TRB), in the exercise of its special powers under PD
1112, signed Supplemental Toll Operation Agreements (STOAs) with
PNCC and its private joint venture partners. These STOAs covered the
expansion and rehabilitation of NLEX and SLEX, as the case may be,
and/or the construction, operation and maintenance of toll road projects
contemplated in PD 1894. Further, corresponding Toll Operation
Certificates (TOCs) have been issued for the toll road projects. The
STOAs TRB entered into with PNCC and its joint venture partners had the
effect of granting authorities to construct, operate and maintain toll facilities,
but with the injection of additional private sector investments consistent with
the intent of PD 1112, PD 1113 and PD 1894.
The execution of these
STOAs came in 1995, 1998 and 2006, or before the expiration of PNCCs
original franchise on May 1, 2007. Upon the expiration of PNCCs

legislative franchise on May 1, 2007, the new authorities to construct,

maintain and operate the subject tollways and toll facilities granted by the
TRB pursuant to the validly executed STOAs and TOCs, shall begin to
operate and be treated as administrative franchises or authorities. After May
1, 2007, the operation and maintenance of the NLEX and the other
subject tollways are no longer be founded on PNCCs original franchise but
on entirely new authorizations, i.e. the TOCs, granted by the TRB
pursuant to its statutory franchising authority under Sections 3(a) and (e) of
PD 1112. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., et al. vs. Toll Regulatory Board, et
al./Hon. Imee R. Marcos, et al. vs. The Republic of the Philippines, et
al./Gising Kabataan Movement, Inc., et al. vs. The Republic of the
173630, 183599, October 19, 2010.
Presidents Power to Approve TRB Contracts. Petitioners here assert that the
grant to the President of the power to peremptorily authorize the assignment
by Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), as franchise
holder, of its franchise or the usufruct in its franchise is unconstitutional for
being an encroachment of legislative power. The Court rejected this
claim. Section 3(a) of Presidential Decree No. 1112 requires approval by
the President of any contract the Toll Regulatory Board may have entered
into or effected for the construction and operation of toll
facilities.
Complementing Section 3(a) is 3(e)(3) of PD 1112 enjoining
the transfer of the usufruct of PNCCs franchise without the Presidents prior
approval. The Presidents approving authority is therefore of statutory
origin.
There is nothing illegal, let alone unconstitutional, with the
delegation to the President of the authority to approve the assignment by
PNCC of its rights and interest in its franchise, the assignment and
delegation being circumscribed by restrictions in the delegating law
itself. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., et al. vs. Toll Regulatory Board, et
and Entrepreneurs of San Pedro, Laguna. G.R. No. 166910, 169917, 173630,
183599, October 19, 2010.
Public Land; Alienability. Unless a public land is shown to have been
reclassified as alienable or actually alienated by the State to a private person,

that piece of land remains part of the public domain, and its occupation in
the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot confer ownership or
possessory rights. It is only after the property has been declared alienable
and disposable that private persons can legally claim possessory rights over
it. This does not mean, however, that neither of the parties has the right to
possess the property. While the Modestos claim to have been in possession
of Lot 356 for almost 33 years, this occupation could not give rise to
possessory rights while the property being occupied remain government land
that had not yet been declared alienable and disposable. It was the Modestos,
however, who were the actual possessors of the property when it was
declared alienable and disposable on October 16, 1987, and continued to
possess the property until the present time. Pio Modesto and Cirila RiveraModesto vs. Carlos Urbina, substituted by the heirs of Olympia
Miguel Vda. de Urbina, et al. G.R. No. 189859, October 18, 2010.
Public land; Foreshore. To qualify as foreshore land, it must be shown that
the land lies between the high and low water marks and is alternately wet
and dry according to the flow of the tide. The lands proximity to the waters
alone does not automatically make it a foreshore land. Thus, in Republic of
the Philippines v. Lensico, the Court held that although the two corners of
the subject lot adjoins the sea, the lot cannot be considered as foreshore land
since it has not been proven that the lot was covered by water during high
tide. Similarly in this case, it was clearly proven that the disputed land
remained dry even during high tide. Indeed, all the evidence supports the
conclusion that the disputed portion of Lot No. 6278-M is not foreshore land
but remains private land owned by respondents. Manuel Almagro, joined
by his spouse, Elizabeth Almagro vs. Salvacion C. Kwan, et al. /
Margarita Pachoro, et al. vs. William C. Kwan, et al. G.R. Nos. 175806,
175810 and G.R. No. 175849. October 20, 2010.
Toll Regulatory Board; Franchising Powers. The Court dismissed
petitioners argument that only Congress has, under the 1987 Constitution,
the exclusive prerogative to grant franchise to operate public utilities. With
respect to the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB), Sections 3(a) and (e) of
Presidential Decree No. 1112 in relation to Section 4 of Presidential Decree
No. 1894 have invested the TRB with sufficient power to grant a qualified
person or entity with authority to construct, maintain, and operate a toll
facility and to issue the corresponding toll operating permit or
Toll Operation Certificate. By explicit provision of law, therefore, the

TRB was given the power to grant administrative franchise for toll facility
projects.
The power to authorize and control a public utility is admittedly a
prerogative that stems from the Legislature.
Any suggestion, however,
that only Congress has the authority to grant a public utility franchise is less
than accurate.
As
stressed in Albano v. Reyes a case decided
under the 1987 Constitution there is nothing in the Constitution remotely
indicating the necessity of a congressional franchise before each and every
public utility may operate. A special franchise directly emanating from
Congress is not necessary if the law already specifically authorizes an
administrative body to grant a franchise or to award a contract. Under the
1987 Constitution, Congress has an explicit authority to grant a public utility
franchise.
However, it may validly delegate its legislative authority,
under the power of subordinate legislation, to issue franchises of certain
public utilities to some administrative agencies. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr.,
et al. vs. Toll Regulatory Board, et al./Hon. Imee R. Marcos, et al. vs. The
Republic of the Philippines, et al./Gising Kabataan Movement, Inc., et al. vs.
The Republic of the Philippines, et al./The Republic of the Philippines vs.
Young Professionals and Entrepreneurs of San Pedro, Laguna. G.R. No.
166910, 169917, 173630, 183599, October 19, 2010.
Toll
Regulatory
Board; Quasi-Legislative
and
Quasi-Judicial
Functions. Petitioners in the special civil actions cases would have the Court
declare as invalid (i) Sections 3(a) and (d) of Presidential Decree No. 1112
(which accord the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) the power to enter into
contracts for the construction and operation of toll facilities, and, at the same
time, grant it the power to issue and promulgate toll rates) and (ii) Section
8(b) of Presidential Decree No. 1894 (which grant the TRB adjudicatory
jurisdiction over matters involving toll rate movements). As submitted by
petitioners, granting the TRB the power to award toll contracts is
inconsistent with its quasi-judicial function of adjudicating petitions for
initial toll and periodic toll rate adjustments. There cannot, so petitioners
would postulate, be impartiality in such a situation. The Court rejected these
arguments. It does not perceive an irreconcilable clash in the enumerated
statutory powers of the TRB, such that the exercise of one negates the other.
The ascription of impartiality on the part of the TRB cannot, under the
premises, be accorded cogency. Petitioners have not shown that the TRB
lacks the expertise, competence and capacity to implement its mandate of

balancing the interests of the toll-paying motoring public and the imperative
of allowing the concessionaires to recoup their investment with reasonable
profits. The fact that an administrative agency is exercising its
administrative or executive functions (such as the granting of franchises or
awarding of contracts) and at the same time exercising its quasi-legislative
(e.g., rule-making) and/or quasi-judicial functions (e.g., rate-fixing), does
not support a finding of a violation of due process or the Constitution.
Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., et al. vs. Toll Regulatory Board, et
173630, 183599, October 19, 2010.
Dissension in the Court: October 2010

Posted on November 10, 2010 by Jose Ma. G. Hofilea Posted in Commercial Law,
Constitutional Law, Remedial Law Tagged COMELEC, election contest, interest,
judgment
The following are decisions promulgated by the High Court in October 2010
where at least one Justice felt compelled to express his or her dissent from
the decision penned by the ponente.
When is a case really final? When can the High Court review a lower
tribunals findings of fact? To some extent, each of the cases cited below
deal with a long-standing rule and its exceptions that are, at the end of the
day, really very broad. The wide expanse of these exceptions is a fertile
ground upon which Justices may disagree. So with this background, and in
the wake of the forthcoming Pacquiao-Margarito bout, it is timely to once
again declare, Lets get ready to rumble!
1.
Interest and Immutability (Brion v. Bersamin)
The decision and dissent in the case of Apo Fruits Corporation and Hijo
Plantation, Inc. vs. Land Bank of the Philippines promulgated on October
12, 2010 essentially involved a divergence of positions on: (a) the conditions

in which a 12% legal interest may be imposed in the payment of just

compensation, and (b) the principle of immutability of judgments.
A. Legal Interest
In the main decision, Justice Arturo D. Brion ruled that the obligation of the
State to make just compensation payments effectively constitutes a
forbearance on the part of Government upon which interest should become
due.
According to the ponente, [a]part from the requirement that compensation
for expropriated land must be fair and reasonable, compensation, to be just,
must also be made without delay.Without prompt payment, compensation
cannot be considered just if the property is immediately taken as the
property owner suffers the immediate deprivation of both his land and its
fruits or income.
Justice Brion added: [t]his is the principle at the core of the present case
where the petitioners were made to wait for more than a decade after the
taking of their property before they actually received the full amount of the
principal of the just compensation due them. What they have not received to
date is the income of their landholdings corresponding to what they would
have received had no uncompensated taking of these lands been immediately
made. This income, in terms of the interest on the unpaid principal, is the
subject of the current litigation.
Accordingly, Justice Brion finds that in the instant case, when the Land
Bank of the Philippines (LBP) took the petitioners lands without the
corresponding full payment, LBP became liable for the income the
landholdings would have earned had they not immediately been taken from
Apo Fruits Corporation and Hijo Plantation, Inc. (the Petitioners).
For the majority then, in just compensation cases, the unpaid amount of just
compensation should earn interest at the legal rate of 12% per annum from
the date the properties are taken up to the time of full payment.

In turn, the sole dissenter, Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, asserts that the legal
interest of 12% per annum should be deemed as a form of damages which,
according to the Civil Code and certain existing jurisprudence, should be
imposable only where there is delay in the payment of just
compensation. Citing an earlier case of Land Bank of the Philippines v.
Wycoco, Justice Bersamin pointed out that the Supreme Court has held that
the interest of 12% per annum on the just compensation is due the
landowner in case of delay in payment, which will in effect make the
obligation on the part of the government one of forbearance. On the other
hand, interest in the form of damages cannot be applied, where there was
prompt and valid payment of just compensation. In these cases, the delay
should be sufficiently established.
Since, according to the dissenter, LBP had paid a portion of the just
compensation promptly after the valuation had been handed down by the
Department of Agrarian Reform (which amounts the Petitioners also
promptly withdrew), LBP could not be said to have been in delay. Any
subsequent recourse by LBP to the courts on the issue of just compensation
cannot be construed as unjustified delay on its part considering that assailing
an erroneous order before a higher court is a remedy afforded by law to
every losing party.
B. Immutability of Judgments
The October 12, 2010 decision of the Supreme Court en banc stemmed from
a motion filed by the Petitioners for the High Court to entertain a second
motion for reconsideration (with a motion to refer the same to the Court en
banc) which motion was filed slightly less than 2 weeks after an Entry of
Judgment had already been given on the case. Expectedly, LBP protested
that the decision in the case had already attained finality and that the
principles of immutability of judgments should restrict the Court from
entertaining the second motion for reconsideration.
Justice Bersamin justified the en bancs giving of due course to the second
motion for reconsideration on the grounds that there are recognized
exceptions to the immutability of judgments principle, which principle states
that a final judgment may no longer be altered, amended or modified, even
if the alteration, amendment or modification is meant to correct what is

perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law and regardless of

what court, be it the highest Court of the land, rendered it.
The majority decision quoted from the 2004 case of Barnes v. Padilla (482
Phil. 903), which enumerated exceptions to the application of the rule on
immutability of judgments:
However, this Court has relaxed this rule in order to serve substantial
justice considering (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property, (b) the
existence of special or compelling circumstances, (c) the merits of the case,
(d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party
favored by the suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of any showing that the
review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the other party will
not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.
Contrary to the position of LBP that the instant case involved merely matter
of private interest, Justice Bersamin believed that it actually posed issues of
transcendental importance involving as it does, constitutional limitations on
eminent domain and because the subject matter involvedagrarian reform
covers a societal objective that the government has unceasingly sought to
achieve in the past half century. Thus, the interests of substantial justice
should prevail over a procedural rule concerning the finality of judgments.
On the issue of immutability, the dissent of Justice Brion concedes that there
are indeed exceptions such as: (a) the correction of clerical errors; (b) the
nunc pro tunc entries that cause no prejudice to any party; (c) void
judgments; and (d) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the
decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable. However, Justice
Brion does not believe that the case provides any basis to apply any of the
exceptions.
As the dissenter concludes, he cannot bring [himself] to agree that this case
is impressed at all with public interest, involving as it does only a private
claim for interest and attorneys fees which cannot even be classified as
unprecedented, which does not qualify either as a substantial or
transcendental matter, or as an issue of paramount public interest for no
special or compelling circumstance was present to warrant the relaxation of
the doctrine of immutability in favor of the petitioners.

(Apo Fruits Corporation, et al. vs. Land Bank of the Philippines; G.R. No.
164195, October 12, 2010. See dissenting opinion here.)
(authors note: On the matter of legal interest, the author agrees in the
principle espoused by the majority that the concept of just compensation
should involve not just the amount of the payment but the timeliness in the
payment of the full amount. Otherwise, it would indeed be less than
just. On the immutability issue, this is again, to the author, one of those
rules which allows of an exceedingly broad set of exceptions which can be
applied anytime, anywhere (and thus the real exception would once again
be, whenever the Supreme Court wants to). Consider the following
exceptions cited by the Supreme Court from the Barnes decision: (a) matters
of life, liberty, honor or property, (b) the existence of special or compelling
circumstances, (c) the merits of the case, (d) a cause not entirely attributable
to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules,
(e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and
dilatory, and (f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced
thereby. Doesnt this cover virtually every case brought before the Supreme
Court?)
2.
An Arbitrary, Despotic and Hostile ComelecA Rematch (Brion
v. Velasco)
In Dissension in the Court: August 2010 posted in Lexoterica on September

6, 2010, the case of Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra vs. Commission on Elections,
Antonio V. Gonzales and Orlando R. Balbon, Jr. in which Justice Arturo D.
Brion was discussed. In that decision, the majority held that the
Commission on Elections (Comelec) gravely abused its discretion in its
evaluation and appreciation of factual evidence. On this basis, the Court
ruled that the evidence on hand supported the fact that Abraham Mitra had
sufficiently transferred his residence in Palawan from Puerto Princesa to
Aborlan.
Justice Presbitero J. Velasco penned a dissenting opinion and noted that

there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Comelec that would
justify the High Courts substituting the Comelecs factual findings with the
Courts own.
The Comelec, Antonio Gonzales and Orlando Balbon each asked the
Supreme Court to reconsider that decision.
In the view expressed by the ponente, the motions for reconsideration
consisted of mere rehashes of their previous submissions and raised the same
arguments already resolved by the Court earlier. Given that no new
substantial points were raised, Justice Brion, for the majority, decided to
deny such motions for reconsideration. Even so, the majority proceeded to
address the points raised if only to put an end to lingering doubts on the
correctness of [their] July 2, 2010 Decision.
The succeeding discourse in the main decision then consisted essentially of
pointing out why the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in the
appreciation of the evidence presented to it.
Similarly, Justice Velasco reiterated the basis for his earlier dissent arguing
that the Comelec did not gravely abuse its discretion in appreciating the
factual evidence and asserted anew that the Court could not under those
circumstances, supplant the Comelecs factual findings with its own.
(Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra vs. Commission on Elections, Antonio vs.
Gonzales and Orlando R. Balbon Jr.; G.R. No. 191938, October 19,
2010. See dissenting opinion here.)

Posted on October 15, 2010 by Vicente D. Gerochi IV Posted in Constitutional Law
Tagged agrarian reform, constitutional rights, exhaustion of administrative remedies,
immunity from suit, judiciary, land registration, police power, right to counsel, tax
Here are selected September 2010 rulings of the Supreme Court of the


Constitutional Law
Constitutionality; Presidential Proclamation 310; inalienable lands. The
Court declared as unconstitutional Presidential Proclamation 310, which
took 670 hectares from petitioners registered lands for distribution to
indigenous peoples and cultural communities, on the basis that such lands
are inalienable, being part of the functions of an educational institution. It
did not matter that it was President Arroyo who, in this case, attempted by
proclamation to appropriate the lands for distribution to indigenous peoples
and cultural communities. The lands by their character have become
inalienable from the moment President Garcia dedicated them for
petitioners use in scientific and technological research in the field of
agriculture. They have ceased to be alienable public lands. Central
Mindanao University, etc. vs. The Hon. Executive Secretary, et al. G.R. No.
184869, September 21, 2010.
Constitutionality; Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000. The Court
dismissed petitioners argument that Republic Act No. 8762, known as the
Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 200, violates the mandate of the 1987
Constitution for the State to develop a self-reliant and independent national
economy effectively controlled by Filipinos. The provisions of Article II of
the 1987 Constitution, the declarations of principles and state policies, are
not self-executing. Legislative failure to pursue such policies cannot give
rise to a cause of action in the courts. Further, while Section 19, Article II of
the 1987 Constitution requires the development of a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipino
entrepreneurs, it does not impose a policy of Filipino monopoly of the
economic environment. The objective is simply to prohibit foreign powers
or interests from maneuvering our economic policies and ensure that
Filipinos are given preference in all areas of development. The 1987
Constitution takes into account the realities of the outside world as it
requires the pursuit of a trade policy that serves the general welfare and
utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and
reciprocity; and speaks of industries which are competitive in both domestic
and foreign markets as well as of the protection of Filipino enterprises
against unfair foreign competition and trade practices. Thus, while the
Constitution mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and

enterprises, it also recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of
the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of
Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that
are unfair. In other words, the 1987 Constitution does not rule out the entry
of foreign investments, goods, and services. While it does not encourage
their unlimited entry into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In
fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning
only on foreign competition that is unfair. The key, as in all economies in
the world, is to strike a balance between protecting local businesses and
allowing the entry of foreign investments and services. More important,
Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution gives Congress the
discretion to reserve to Filipinos certain areas of investments upon the
recommendation of the National Economic and Development Authority and
when the national interest requires. Thus, Congress can determine what
policy to pass and when to pass it depending on the economic exigencies. It
can enact laws allowing the entry of foreigners into certain industries not
reserved by the Constitution to Filipino citizens. In this case, Congress has
decided to open certain areas of the retail trade business to foreign
investments instead of reserving them exclusively to Filipino citizens.
The control and regulation of trade in the interest of the public welfare is of
course an exercise of the police power of the State. A persons right to
property, whether he is a Filipino citizen or foreign national, cannot be taken
from him without due process of law. In 1954, Congress enacted the Retail
Trade Nationalization Act (RA 1180) that restricts the retail business to
Filipino citizens. In denying the petition assailing the validity of such Act
for violation of the foreigners right to substantive due process of law, the
Supreme Court held that the law constituted a valid exercise of police power.
The State had an interest in preventing alien control of the retail trade and
R.A. 1180 was reasonably related to that purpose. That law is not
arbitrary. Here, to the extent that RA 8762 lessens the restraint on the
foreigners right to property or to engage in an ordinarily lawful business, it
cannot be said that the law amounts to a denial of the Filipinos right to
property and to due process of law. Filipinos continue to have the right to
engage in the kinds of retail business to which the law in question has
permitted the entry of foreign investors. Certainly, it is not within the
province of the Court to inquire into the wisdom of RA 8762 save when it

blatantly violates the Constitution. But as the Court has said, there is no
showing that the law has contravened any constitutional mandate. The Court
is not convinced that the implementation of RA 8762 would eventually lead
to alien control of the retail trade business. Petitioners have not mustered
any concrete and strong argument to support its thesis. The law itself has
provided strict safeguards on foreign participation in that
business. Representatives Gerardo S. Espina, et al. vs. Hon. Ronaldo
Zamora, Jr., et al. G.R. No. 143855, September 21, 2010.
Constitutionality; standing to sue. The long settled rule is that he who
challenges the validity of a law must have a standing to do so. Legal
standing or locus standi refers to the right of a party to come to a court of
justice and make such a challenge. More particularly, standing refers to his
personal and substantial interest in that he has suffered or will suffer direct
injury as a result of the passage of that law. The party must show that he has
been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully
entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by
reason of the law he complains of. In this case, there is no clear showing
that the implementation of the Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000
prejudices petitioners or inflicts damages on them, either as taxpayers or as
legislators. Still the Court will resolve the question they raise since the rule
on standing can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens,
taxpayers, and legislators when, as here, the public interest so requires or the
matter is of transcendental importance, of overarching significance to
society, or of paramount public interest. Representatives Gerardo S. Espina,
et al. vs. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, Jr., et al. G.R. No. 143855, September 21,
2010.
Court decisions; statement of fact and law. The Constitution commands that
[n]o decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. Judges are
expected to make complete findings of fact in their decisions and scrutinize
closely the legal aspects of the case in the light of the evidence
presented. They should avoid the tendency to generalize and form
conclusions without detailing the facts from which such conclusions are
deduced. The Court has sustained decisions of lower courts as having
substantially or sufficiently complied with the constitutional injunction,
notwithstanding the laconic and terse manner in which they were written;
and even if there (was left) much to be desired in terms of (their) clarity,

coherence and comprehensibility, provided that they eventually set out the
facts and the law on which they were based, as when they stated the legal
qualifications of the offense constituted by the facts proved, the modifying
circumstances, the participation of the accused, the penalty imposed and the
civil liability; or discussed the facts comprising the elements of the offense
that was charged in the information, and accordingly rendered a verdict and
imposed the corresponding penalty; or quoted the facts narrated in the
prosecutions memorandum, but made their own findings and assessment of
evidence, before finally agreeing with the prosecutions evaluation of the
case. On the other hand, the Court has expressed concern over the possible
denial of due process when an appellate court failed to provide the appeal
the attention it rightfully deserved, thus depriving the appellant of a fair
opportunity to be heard by a fair and responsible magistrate. The parties to a
litigation should be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of
the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the trial
court. The losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to
the higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the decision should be
reversed. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and
the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was
reached and is precisely prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to
pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal.
The Court of Appeals (CA) decision in this case cannot be deemed
constitutionally infirm, as it clearly stated the facts and law on which the
ruling was based, and while it did not specifically address each and every
assigned error raised by appellants, it cannot be said that the appellants were
left in the dark as to how the CA reached its ruling affirming the trial courts
judgment of conviction. The principal arguments raised in their
Memorandum submitted before the Supreme Court actually referred to the
main points of the CA rulings, such as the alleged sufficiency of prosecution
evidence, their common defense of alibi, allegations of torture, probative
value of ballistic and fingerprint test results, circumstances qualifying the
offense and modification of penalty imposed by the trial court. Lenido
Lumanog, et al. vs. People of the Philippines/Cesar Fortuna vs. People of
the Philippines/People of the Philippines vs. SPO2 Cesar Fortuna y Abudo,
et al. G.R. Nos. 182555/G.R. No. 185123/G.R. No. 187745, September 7,
2010.
Custodial investigation; right to counsel. Custodial investigation refers to the

critical pre-trial stage when the investigation is no longer a general inquiry

into an unsolved crime, but has begun to focus on a particular person as a
suspect. The police officers here claimed that upon arresting one of the
accused and before questioning him, they informed him of his constitutional
rights to remain silent, that any information he would give could be used
against him, and that he had the right to a competent and independent
counsel, preferably of his own choice, and if he cannot afford the services of
counsel he will be provided with one. However, since these rights can only
be waived in writing and with the assistance of counsel, there could not have
been such a valid waiver by the accused, who was presented by the police
investigators to the lawyer of the IBP Office, Quezon City Hall, for the
taking of his formal statement only the following day and stayed overnight
at the police station before he was brought to said counsel. Thus, the
constitutional requirement had not been observed. Settled is the rule that the
moment a police officer tries to elicit admissions or confessions or even
plain information from a suspect, the latter should, at that juncture, be
assisted by counsel, unless he waives this right in writing and in the presence
of counsel.
However, the Court rejected the appellants contention that the accused was
not given a counsel of his own choice, as he never objected to the IBP
lawyer when the latter was presented to him to be his counsel for the taking
down of his statement. The phrase preferably of his own choice does not
convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under
investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and
independent attorneys from handling the defense; otherwise the tempo of
custodial investigation would be solely in the hands of the accused who can
impede or obstruct the progress of the interrogation by simply selecting a
lawyer who, for one reason or another, is not available to protect his
interest. Thus, while the choice of a lawyer in cases where the person under
custodial interrogation cannot afford the services of counsel or where the
preferred lawyer is not available is naturally lodged in the police
investigators, the suspect has the final choice, as he may reject the counsel
chosen for him and ask for another one. A lawyer provided by the
investigators is deemed engaged by the accused when he does not raise any
objection against the counsels appointment during the course of the
investigation, and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of the
statement before the swearing officer.

The Constitution gives the person under custodial investigation the right to a
competent and independent counsel. The modifier competent and
independent is not an empty rhetoric. It stresses the need to accord the
accused, under the uniquely stressful conditions of a custodial investigation,
an informed judgment on the choices explained to him by a diligent and
capable lawyer. An effective and vigilant counsel necessarily and logically
requires that the lawyer be present and able to advise and assist his client
from the time the confessant answers the first question asked by the
investigating officer until the signing of the extrajudicial
confession. Moreover, the lawyer should ascertain that the confession is
made voluntarily and that the person under investigation fully understands
the nature and the consequence of his extrajudicial confession in relation to
his constitutional rights. A contrary rule would undoubtedly be antagonistic
to the constitutional rights to remain silent, to counsel and to be presumed
innocent. The right to counsel has been written into the Constitution in order
to prevent the use of duress and other undue influence in extracting
confessions from a suspect in a crime. The lawyers role cannot be reduced
to being that of a mere witness to the signing of a pre-prepared confession,
even if it indicated compliance with the constitutional rights of the accused.
The accused is entitled to effective, vigilant and independent
counsel. Where the prosecution failed to discharge the States burden of
proving with clear and convincing evidence that the accused had enjoyed
effective and vigilant counsel before he extrajudicially admitted his guilt, the
extrajudicial confession cannot be given any probative value. Lenido
Lumanog, et al. vs. People of the Philippines/Cesar Fortuna vs. People of
the Philippines/People of the Philippines vs. SPO2 Cesar Fortuna y Abudo,
et al., G.R. Nos. 182555/G.R. No. 185123/G.R. No. 187745, September 7,
2010.
Immunity from suit. Petitioner here claimed that it could not be sued
pursuant to the doctrine of state immunity without the consent of the
Republic of the Philippines, on the basis that under Service Contract 38, it
served merely as an agent of the Philippine government in the development
of the Malampaya gas reserves. The Court ruled that petitioner cannot claim
immunity from suit because it is not an agent of the Republic of
the Philippines, but the latters service contractor for the exploration and
development of one of the countrys natural gas reserves. While the
Republic of the Philippines appointed petitioner as the exclusive party to
conduct petroleum operations in the Camago-Malampayo area under the

States full control and supervision, it does not follow that petitioner has
become the States agent within the meaning of the law. An agent is a
person who binds himself to render some service or to do something in
representation or on behalf of another, with the consent or authority of the
latter. The essence of an agency is the agents ability to represent his
principal and bring about business relations between the latter and third
persons. An agents ultimate undertaking is to execute juridical acts that
would create, modify or extinguish relations between his principal and third
persons. It is this power to affect the principals contractual relations with
third persons that differentiates the agent from a service contractor.
Petitioners main undertaking under Service Contract 38 is to [p]erform all
petroleum operations and provide all necessary technology and finance as
well as other connected services to the Philippine government. As defined
under the contract, petroleum operation means the searching for and
obtaining Petroleum within the Philippines, including the transportation,
storage, handling and sale of petroleum whether for export or domestic
consumption. Petitioners primary obligation under the contract is not to
represent the Philippine government for the purpose of transacting business
with third persons. Rather, its contractual commitment is to develop and
manage petroleum operations on behalf of the State. Consequently, it is not
an agent of the Philippine government, but a provider of services,
technology and financing for the Malampaya Natural Gas Project. Notably,
the Philippine government itself recognized that petitioner could be sued in
relation to the project. This is evident in the stipulations agreed upon by the
parties under Service Contract 38. Shell Philippines Exploration B. V. vs.
Efren Jalos, et al., G.R. No. 179918, September 8, 2010.
Judiciary; seniority in appointment of Court of Appeals justices. An
appointment to a public office is the unequivocal act, of one who has the
authority, of designating or selecting an individual to discharge and perform
the duties and functions of an office or trust. Where the power of
appointment is absolute and the appointee has been determined upon, no
further consent or approval is necessary and the formal evidence of the
appointment, the commission, may issue at once. The appointment is
deemed complete once the last act required of the appointing authority has
been complied with. A written memorial that can render title to public
office indubitable is required. This written memorial is known as the
commission. For purposes of completion of the appointment process, the

appointment is complete when the commission is signed by the executive,

and sealed if necessary, and is ready to be delivered or transmitted to the
appointee. Thus, transmittal of the commission is an act which is done after
the appointment has already been completed. It is not required to complete
the appointment but only to facilitate the effectiveness of the appointment by
the appointees receipt and acceptance thereof.
For purposes of appointments to the judiciary, therefore, the date the
commission has been signed by the President (which is the date appearing
on the face of such document) is the date of the appointment. Such date will
determine the seniority of the members of the Court of Appeals in
connection with Section 3, Chapter I of BP 129, as amended by RA
8246. In other words, the earlier the date of the commission of an appointee,
the more senior he is over the other subsequent appointees. It is only when
the appointments of two or more appointees bear the same date that the order
of issuance of the appointments by the President becomes material. This
provision of statutory law (Section 3, Chapter I of BP 129, as amended by
RA 8246) controls over the provisions of the 2009 Internal Rules of the
Court of Appeals, which gives premium to the order of appointments as
transmitted to this Court. Rules implementing a particular law cannot
override but must give way to the law they seek to implement. Re: Seniority
among the four most recent appointments to the position of Associate
Justices of the Court of Appeals. A.M. No. 10-4-22-SC, September 28, 2010.
Police power; taxation versus regulation. In distinguishing tax and
regulation as a form of police power, the determining factor is the purpose of
the implemented measure. If the purpose is primarily to raise revenue, then
it will be deemed a tax even though the measure results in some form of
regulation. On the other hand, if the purpose is primarily to regulate, then it
is deemed a regulation and an exercise of the police power of the state, even
though incidentally, revenue is generated. In this case, the royalty fees were
imposed by the Clark Development Corporation (CDC) primarily for
regulatory purposes, and not for the generation of income or profits as
petitioner claims. These fees form part of the regulatory mandate of CDC to
ensure free flow or movement of petroleum fuel to and from the Clark
Special Economic Zone (CSEZ). Being the administrator of CSEZ, CDC is
responsible for ensuring the safe, efficient and orderly distribution of fuel
products within the CSEZ. Addressing specific concerns demanded by the
nature of goods or products involved is encompassed in the range of services

which respondent CDC is expected to provide under the law, pursuant to its
general power of supervision and control over the movement of all supplies
and equipment into the CSEZ. Chevron Philippines, Inc. vs. Bases
conversion
Development
Authority
and
Clark
Development
Corporation. G.R. No. 173863, September 15, 2010.
Right to speedy disposition of cases. Section 16, Article III of
the Constitution provides that all persons shall have the right to a speedy
disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative
bodies. This protection extends to all citizens and covers the periods
before, during and after trial, affording broader protection than Section
14(2), which guarantees merely the right to a speedy trial. However, just
like the constitutional guarantee of speedy trial, speedy disposition of
cases is a flexible concept. It is consistent with delays and depends upon
the circumstances. What the Constitution prohibits are unreasonable,
arbitrary and oppressive delays, which render rights nugatory. The
determination of whether the right to speedy disposition of cases has been
violated, particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances
peculiar to each case. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved
would not be sufficient. Under the circumstances of this case, the Court held
that the delay of four years during which the case remained pending with the
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court was not unreasonable, arbitrary or
oppressive. Lenido Lumanog, et al. vs. People of the Philippines/Cesar
Fortuna vs. People of the Philippines/People of the Philippines vs. SPO2
Cesar Fortuna y Abudo, et al. G.R. Nos. 182555/G.R. No. 185123/G.R. No.
187745, September 7, 2010.
Administrative Law
Administrative agencies; findings of fact. Findings of facts and conclusions
of law of the Securities and Exchange Commission are controlling on the
reviewing authority. The rule is that findings of fact of administrative
bodies, if based on substantial evidence, are controlling on the reviewing
authority. It is not for the appellate court to substitute its own judgment for
that of the administrative agency on the sufficiency of the evidence and the
credibility of the witnesses. It is not the function of this Court to analyze or
weigh all over again the evidence and the credibility of witnesses presented
before the lower court, tribunal, or office, as we are not a trier of facts. Our
jurisdiction is limited to reviewing and revising errors of law imputed to the

lower court, the latters findings of fact being conclusive and not reviewable
by this Court. The SEC Hearing Officer had the optimum opportunity to
review the pieces of evidence presented before him and to observe the
demeanor of the witnesses. Administrative decisions on matters within his
jurisdiction are entitled to respect and can only be set aside on proof of grave
abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law, which has not been shown by
petitioner in this case. Queensland-Tokyo Commodities, Inc., et al. vs.
Thomas George. G.R. No. 172727, September 8, 2010.
Administrative investigation; right to counsel; admission. The right to
counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is meant to protect a suspect
during custodial investigation. The exclusionary rule under paragraph 2,
Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions made in a
criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative
investigation. While investigations conducted by an administrative body
may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding, the rule under existing laws is
that a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by
counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of petitioners capacity
to represent herself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person
being investigated with counsel. The right to counsel is not always
imperative in administrative investigations because such inquiries are
conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit the
imposition of disciplinary measures against erring public officers and
employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government
service. As such, the admissions made by petitioner during the investigation
may be used as evidence to justify her dismissal. Clarita J. Carbonel vs.
Civil Service Commission. G.R. No. 187689, September 7, 2010.
Administrative remedies; exhaustion. The doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies requires that when an administrative remedy is
provided by law, relief must be sought by exhausting this remedy before
judicial intervention may be availed of. No recourse can be had until all
such remedies have been exhausted, and the special civil actions against
administrative officers should not be entertained if there are superior
administrative officers who could grant relief. This doctrine is a judicial
recognition of certain matters that are peculiarly within the competence of
the administrative agency to address. It operates as a shield that prevents the
overarching use of judicial power and thus hinders courts from intervening
in matters of policy infused with administrative character. Dimson (Manila),

Inc. and Phesco, Inc. vs. Local Water Utilities Administration. G.R. No.
168656, September 22, 2010.
Administrative remedies; exhaustion. Under the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of
the court, he or she should have availed himself or herself of all the means of
administrative processes afforded him or her. Hence, if resort to a remedy
within the administrative machinery can still be made by giving the
administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that
comes within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted
first before the courts judicial power can be sought. The premature
invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to ones cause of
action. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on
practical and legal reasons. Resort to administrative remedy entails lesser
expenses
and
provides
for
a
speedier
disposition
of
controversies. Furthermore, courts of justice, for reasons of comity and
convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative
redress has been completed and complied with, so as to give the
administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and
dispose of the case. While the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies is subject to several exceptions, the Court finds that the instant case
does not fall under any of them. Public Hearing Committee of the Laguna
Lake Development Authority, et al. vs. SM Prime Holdings, Inc. G.R. No.
170599, September 22, 2010.
Laguna Lake Development Authority; powers. The Laguna Lake
Development Authority (LLDA) has power to impose fines in the exercise
of its function as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to
pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region. Adjudication of pollution cases
generally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB), except where
a special law, such as the LLDA Charter, provides for another
forum. Although the PAB assumed the powers and functions of the National
Pollution Control Commission with respect to adjudication of pollution
cases, this does not preclude the LLDA from assuming jurisdiction of
pollution cases within its area of responsibility and to impose fines as
penalty. Public Hearing Committee of the Laguna Lake Development
Authority, et al. vs. SM Prime Holdings, Inc. G.R. No. 170599, September
22, 2010.

Election Law
Automated election system; source code. The pertinent portion of Section 12
of Republic Act No. 9369 is clear in that once an [automated election
system] technology is selected for implementation, the [COMELEC] shall
promptly make the source code of that technology available and open to any
interested political party or groups which may conduct their own review
thereof. The COMELEC has offered no reason not to comply with this
requirement of the law. Indeed, its only excuse for not disclosing the source
code was that it was not yet available when petitioner asked for it and,
subsequently, that the review had to be done, apparently for security reason,
under a controlled environment. The elections had passed and that reason is
already stale. The Court here ruled on the petition notwithstanding the fact
that the elections for which the subject source code was to be used had
already been held. It accepted petitioners claim that the source code
remained important and relevant not only for compliance with the law, and
the purpose thereof, but especially in the backdrop of numerous admissions
of errors and claims of fraud in the May 2010 elections. Center for People
Empowerment in Governance vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
189546, September 21, 2010.
Local Government
Salary standardization; Presidents power over local governments. The Court
here reversed the ruling of the Commission on Audit (COA), which
disallowed the premium payment for hospitalization and health care
insurance benefits granted by petitioner to its officials and employees. COA
held that such benefits disregarded Section 2 of Administrative Order No.
103, series of 1994 (AO 103), which prohibits all heads of government
offices and agencies from granting productivity incentive benefits or any and
all similar forms of allowances and benefits without the Presidents prior
approval. The Court ruled that petitioner did not violate the rule of prior
Presidential approval since Section 2 of AO 103 states that the prohibition
applies only to government offices/agencies, including government-owned
and/or controlled corporations, as well as their respective governing
boards. Nowhere is it indicated in Section 2 that the prohibition also
applies to local government units. The approval requirement must be
observed by government offices under the Presidents control, i.e.,
departments, bureaus, offices and government-owned and controlled

corporations under the Executive branch. Being an LGU, petitioner is

merely under the Presidents general supervision pursuant to Section 4,
Article X of the Constitution.
The Presidents power of general supervision means the power of a superior
officer to see to it that subordinates perform their functions according to
law. This is distinguished from the Presidents power of control which is the
power to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in
the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the President
over that of the subordinate officer. The power of control gives the
President the power to revise or reverse the acts or decisions of a subordinate
officer involving the exercise of discretion. Since LGUs are subject only to
the power of general supervision of the President, the Presidents authority is
limited to seeing to it that rules are followed and laws are faithfully
executed. The President may only point out that rules have not been
followed but the President cannot lay down the rules, neither does he have
the discretion to modify or replace the rules. Thus, the grant of additional
compensation like hospitalization and health care insurance benefits in this
case does not need the approval of the President to be valid. The Province of
Negros Occidental vs. The Commissioners, Commission on Audit, et al. G.R.
No. 182574, September 28, 2010.
Special Laws
Agrarian reform; just compensation. The Supreme Court here reiterated its
previous rulings that the factors for determining just compensation under
Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law), which have been translated into a formula through DAR
Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1992, as amended by DAR
Administrative Order No. 11, series of 1994, are mandatory and should be
strictly complied with. In this case, Land Banks valuation correctly
reflected the actual use and produce of the subject properties and did not
factor in potential use as what respondents appraiser did. (Note that DAR
AO No. 6, as amended by DAR A.O. No. 11, has been superseded by DAR
Administrative Order No. 5, series of 1998.) Land Bank of the Philippines
vs. Conrado O. Colarina, G.R. No. 176410, September 1, 2010.
Agrarian reform; just compensation. For purposes of just compensation, the

fair market value of an expropriated property is determined by its character

and its price at the time of taking. There are three important concepts in this
definition the character of the property, its price, and the time of actual
taking. The time of taking is the time when the landowner was deprived of
the use and benefit of his property, such as when title is transferred to the
Republic.
The propertys character refers to its actual use at the time of taking, not its
potential uses. Where, as here, it has been conclusively decided by final
judgment in the earlier cases filed by respondent that his property was
validly acquired under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (RA 6657)
and validly distributed to agrarian reform beneficiaries, the property should
be conclusively treated as an agricultural land and valued as such. The lower
courts erred in ruling that the character or use of the property has changed
from agricultural to residential, because there is no allegation or proof that
the property was approved for conversion to other uses by the Department of
Agrarian Reform. In the absence of such approval, it cannot be said that the
character or use of the property has changed from agricultural to
residential. Respondents property remains agricultural and should be
valued as such. Respondents evidence of the value of his land
as residential property (which the lower courts found to be preponderant)
could, at most, refer to the potential use of the property. While the potential
use of an expropriated property is sometimes considered in cases where
there is a great improvement in the general vicinity of the expropriated
property, it should never control the determination of just
compensation. The potential use of a property should not be the principal
criterion for determining just compensation for this will be contrary to the
well-settled doctrine that the fair market value of an expropriated property is
determined by its character and its price at the time of taking, not its
potential uses. The proper approach should have been to value respondents
property as an agricultural land, which value may be adjusted in light of the
improvements in the locality where it is situated.
As to the price, the factors and requirements set out in Section 17 of RA
6657 must be applied. Here, the Land Banks authority to value the land is
only preliminary and the landowner who disagrees with petitioners
valuation may bring the matter to court for a judicial determination of just
compensation. The Regional Trial Courts, organized as special agrarian
courts, are the final adjudicators on the issue of just compensation. Land

Bank must substantiate its valuation. It is not enough that the landowner fails
to prove a higher valuation for the property; Land Bank must still prove the
correctness of its claims. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Enrique Livioco,
G.R. No. 170685, September 22, 2010.
Agrarian reform; retention rights. The right of retention, as protected and
enshrined in the Constitution, balances the effect of compulsory land
acquisition by granting the landowner the right to choose the area to be
retained subject to legislative standards. Thus, landowners who have not yet
exercised their retention rights under Presidential Decree No. 27 are entitled
to new retention rights provided for by Republic Act No. 6657. However,
the limitations under Letter of Instruction No. 474 still apply to a landowner
who filed an application for retention under RA 6657. LOI 474 amended
PD 27 by removing any right of retention from persons who own other
agricultural lands of more than 7 hectares, or lands used for residential,
commercial, industrial or other purpose from which they derive adequate
income to support themselves and their families. Section 9 (d) of DAR
Administrative Order No. 05 is inconsistent with PD No. 27, as amended by
LOI 474, insofar as it removed the limitations to a landowners retention
rights. It is well-settled that administrative officials are empowered to
promulgate rules and regulations in order to implement a statute. The
power, however, is restricted such that an administrative regulation cannot
go beyond what is provided in the legislative enactment. It must always be
in harmony with the provisions of the law; hence, any resulting discrepancy
between the two will always be resolved in favor of the statute. Celestio
Santiago substituted by Lauro Santiago and Isidro Gutierrez substituted by
Rogelio Gutierez vs. Amada R. Ortiz-Luis substituted by Juan Ortiz-Luiz, Jr.
G.R. No. 186184 & G.R. No. 186988, September 20, 2010.
Government Procurement Reform Act; jurisdiction; appeal from decisions of
bids and awards committee. Under Republic Act No. 9184, or the
Government Procurement Reform Act (GPRA), the proper recourse to a
court action from decisions of the Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) is to
file a certiorari not before the Supreme Court but before the regional trial
court, which is vested by the GPRA with jurisdiction to entertain the
same. Compliance with the mandatory protest mechanisms of the GPRA is
jurisdictional in character. Section 58 of that law requires that there be
exhaustion of the statutorily available remedies at the administrative level as
a precondition to the filing of a certiorari petition. This requirement points

to the mechanisms for protest against decisions of the BAC in all stages of
the procurement process that are outlined in both the provisions of Section
55 of the GPRA as well in Section 55 of the implementing rules. Under
these relevant sections of the law and the rules, resort to the judicial remedy
of certiorari must be made only after the filing of a motion for
reconsideration of the BACs decision before the said body. Subsequently,
from the final denial of the motion for reconsideration, the aggrieved party
must then lodge a protest before the head of the procuring entity through a
verified position paper that formally complies with requirements in Section
55.2 of the GPRAs Implementing Rules and Regulations Part A. Only
upon the final resolution of the protest can the aggrieved party be said to
have exhausted the available remedies at the administrative level. In other
words, only then can he viably avail of the remedy of certiorari before the
proper courts. Non-compliance with this statutory requirement, under
Section 58 of the GPRA, constitutes a ground for the dismissal of the action
for lack of jurisdiction. Dimson (Manila), Inc. and Phesco, Inc. vs. Local
Water Utilities Administration. G.R. No. 168656, September 22, 2010.
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act; vested property rights. When Congress
enacted the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) or Republic Act 8371 in
1997, it provided in Section 56 that property rights within the ancestral
domains already existing and/or vested upon its effectiveness shall be
recognized and respected. In this case, ownership over the subject lands
had been vested in petitioner as early as 1958. Consequently, a Presidential
proclamation transferring the lands in 2003 to the indigenous peoples around
the area is not in accord with the IPRA. Central Mindanao University, etc.
vs. The Hon. Executive Secretary, et al. G.R. No. 184869, September 21,
2010.
Republic Act No. 8975; government ICT projects. This is the first time that
the Court is confronted with the question of whether a government
information and communication technology project is covered by Republic
Act No. 8975, which prohibits trial courts from issuing a temporary
restraining order, preliminary injunction or mandatory injunction against the
bidding or awarding of a contract or project of the national government. The
term national government projects means (i) national government
infrastructure projects, engineering works and service contracts, (ii) all
projects covered by the Build-Operate-and-Transfer (BOT) Law, and (iii)
other related and necessary activities, such as site acquisition, supply and/or

installation of equipment and materials, implementation, construction,

completion,
operation,
maintenance,
improvement
repair
and
rehabilitation. The purpose of RA 8975 is to ensure the expeditious
implementation and completion of government infrastructure projects.
Undeniably, under the BOT Law, the entire information technology project,
including the civil works component and the technological aspect thereof, is
considered an infrastructure or development project and treated similarly as
traditional infrastructure projects. Such information technology project is
therefore covered by RA 8975.
On the other hand, under Republic Act No. 9184 or the Government
Procurement Reform Act (GPRA), which contemplates projects to be funded
by public funds, the term infrastructure project is limited to the civil
works component of information technology projects. The non-civil works
component of information technology projects is treated as an acquisition of
goods or consulting services. Thus, the civil works component of
information technology projects are subject to the provisions of the GPRA
and its implementing regulations on infrastructure projects, while the
technological and other components would be covered by the provisions on
procurement of goods or consulting services as the circumstances may
warrant. When Congress adopted a limited definition of what is to be
considered infrastructure in relation to information technology projects
under the GPRA, legislators are presumed to have taken into account
previous laws concerning infrastructure projects, including the BOT Law
and RA 8975, and deliberately adopted the limited definition.
Taking into account the different treatment of information technology
projects under the BOT Law and the GPRA, petitioners contention the trial
court had no jurisdiction to issue a writ of preliminary injunction (because of
the prohibition under RA 8975) would have been correct if the e-Passport
Project was pursued under the BOT Law. However, petitioners presented no
proof that the e-Passport Project was a BOT project. On the contrary,
evidence adduced by both sides tended to show that the e-Passport Project
was a procurement contract under the GPRA. Accordingly, only the civil
works component of the e-Passport Project would be considered an
infrastructure project that may not be the subject of a lower court-issued writ
of injunction under RA 8975.

Could the e-Passport Project be considered as engineering works or a

service contract or as related and necessary activities under RA 8975.
The Court ruled in the negative. Under that law, a service contract refers
to infrastructure contracts entered into by any department, office or agency
of the national government with private entities and nongovernment
organizations for services related or incidental to the functions and
operations of the department, office or agency concerned. On the other
hand, the phrase other related and necessary activities refers to activities
related to a government infrastructure, engineering works, service contract
or project under the BOT Law. In other words, to be considered a service
contract or related activity, petitioners must show that the e-Passport Project
is an infrastructure project or necessarily related to an infrastructure
project. This, petitioners failed to do as they saw fit not to present any
evidence on the details of the e-Passport Project before the trial court and
this Court. There is nothing on record to indicate that the e-Passport Project
has a civil works component or is necessarily related to an infrastructure
project. In fact, the BSPs request for interest and to bid confirms that the ePassport Project is a procurement of goods and not an infrastructure
project. Thus, within the context of the GPRA which is the governing law
for the e-Passport Project the said Project is not an infrastructure project
that is protected from lower court issued injunctions. Department of Foreign
Affairs and Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas vs. Hon. Franco T. Falcon, G.R.
No. 176657, September 1, 2010.
Dissension
in
September 2010
the
Court:
Posted on October 11, 2010 by Jose Ma. G. Hofilea Posted in Constitutional Law,
Criminal Law Tagged Bill of Rights, confession, right to counsel
The following is a decision promulgated by the High Court in September

1. Guilty or Not Guilty (Villarama vs. Carpio and Abad)

The consolidated cases of Lenido Lumanog, et al. vs. People of the

Philippines, Cesar Fortuna vs. People of the Philippines and People of the
Philippines vs. SPO2 Cesar Fortuna y Abudo, et al., involved the criminal
trials and proceedings arising from the macabre ambush-slaying of Colonel
Rolando N. Abadilla done in broad daylight in the morning of June 13,
1996.
In the course of police investigations, certain persons were at various stages,
identified as suspects (both through sworn statements as well as at police
line-ups), apprehended, subjected to custodial investigation and charged in
court.
Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. went to great lengths to detail the facts of the
case, the rulings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, the evidence for
the prosecution and defense and the arguments posited to the Supreme Court
by each side. Although the ponencia touches upon many important aspects
of criminal law and procedure, one of the focal constitutional issues
discussed in the decision revolved around the rights of the accused during
custodial investigation, particularly the right to counsel.
In the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, Article III, Section 12 provides:
Sec. 12 (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
x
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or section 17

hereof (right against self-incrimination) shall be inadmissible in evidence
against him.
x

In implementation of Article Section 12 of the Constitution, Republic Act

No. 7438 provides that:
a. Any person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation shall at all
times be assisted by counsel.
b. Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting under his order or his
place, who arrests, detains or investigates any person for the commission of
an offense shall inform the latter, in a language known to and understood by
him, of his rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel, preferably of his own choice, who shall at all times be allowed to
confer private with the person arrested, detained or under custodial
investigation. If such person cannot afford the services of his own counsel,
he must be provided by with a competent and independent counsel.
x
f. As used in this Act, custodial investigation shall include the practice of

issuing an invitation to a person who is investigated in connection with an
offense he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability
of the inviting officer for any violation of law.
Justice Villarama noted that custodial investigation refers to the critical pretrial stage when the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime, but has begun to focus on a particular person as a
suspect. Since it was the case that at the time the accused were arrested by
the police they were already considered suspects, they were entitled to the
protection of this fundamental constitutional right.
Although in this case, the extrajudicial statements of certain persons (which
formed the basis of including others among the accused) were formally
taken down in the presence of counsel, Justice VIllarama concluded, based
on the then attendant factual circumstances, the constitutional requirement
was not observed. Settled, he stated, is the rule that the moment a police
officer tries to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information
from a suspect, the latter should, at that juncture, be assisted by counsel,
unless he waives this right in writing and in the presence of counsel. The
purpose of providing counsel to a person under custodial investigation is to

curb the police-state practice of extracting a confession that leads appellant

to make self-incriminating statements. In this case, there was evidence
adduced that the initial questioning of suspects began at the Central Police
District Command (CPDC) station, even before being brought to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Office for the taking of formal
statements.
The ponente noted in any case, that even assuming that custodial
investigation of the suspect started only during the execution of his formal
statement before one of the IBP lawyers to whom the suspect was brought,
still the said extrajudicial confession must be invalidated for having failed to
comply with the constitutional requirement that the suspect should be
assisted by counsel preferably of his own choice. A confession is not valid
and not admissible in evidence when it is obtained in violation of any of the
rights of persons under custodial investigation.
The main decision recognized that while the choice of a lawyer in cases
where the person under custodial interrogation cannot afford the services of
counsel or where the preferred lawyer is not available may be naturally
lodged in the police investigators, the suspect has the final choice, as he may
reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. A lawyer
provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused when he
does not raise any objection against the counsels appointment during the
course of the investigation, and the accused thereafter subscribes to the
veracity of the statement before the swearing officer.
Justice Villarama noted however, that in addition to requirement that counsel
must preferably be of the choice of the person under investigation, it is
mandatory that such counsel must be independent and competent. He stated
that [w]e held that the modifier competent and independent in the 1987
Constitution is not an empty rhetoric. It stresses the need to accord the
accused, under the uniquely stressful conditions of a custodial investigation,
an informed judgment on the choices explained to him by a diligent and
capable lawyer. An effective and vigilant counsel necessarily and logically
requires that the lawyer be present and able to advise and assist his client
from the time the confessant answers the first question asked by the
investigating officer until the signing of the extrajudicial
confession. Moreover, the lawyer should ascertain that the confession is
made voluntarily and that the person under investigation fully understands

the nature and the consequence of his extrajudicial confession in relation to

his constitutional rights. A contrary rule would undoubtedly be antagonistic
to the constitutional rights to remain silent, to counsel and to be presumed
innocent.
In this case, the majority of the justices were of the view that the prosecution
failed to prove with clear and convincing evidence that the accused had
enjoyed effective and vigilant counsel before he extrajudicially admitted his
guilt, and accordingly, the extrajudicial confession cannot be given any
probative value. However, while the Supreme Court struck down the
extrajudicial confession extracted in this case in violation of constitutionally
enshrined rights and declared it inadmissible in evidence, the appellants
were nonetheless not entitled to an acquittal because their conviction was not
based on the evidence obtained during such custodial investigation. Even
without these extrajudicial confessions the trial courts conviction was
affirmed, as the testimonial and documentary evidence on record established
the guilt of appellants beyond reasonable doubt.
Two justices, Antonio T. Carpio and Roberto A. Abad, dissented with the
majority and opined that all of the accused should be acquitted.
Actually, they did not dissent on Justice Villaramas conclusions with
respect to failure to comply with the constitutional requirements regarding
assistance of counsel during custodial interrogations. However, Justice
Carpio offers that the in-court testimonies given by witnesses should
likewise be inadmissible for being the direct result of an illegal police
activitythe coerced extraction of confessions. Thus, the in-court
identification of Joel and the rest of the accused did not cure the flawed outof-court identification. Without any credible evidence as to the identity,
there would be no basis for holding the accused guilty.
Justice Abad, on the other hand, echoed Justice Carpios assertions (which
included detailing of various other defects in the manner the police handled
the investigation as well as various circumstances that signal an erroneous
identification) and added his own observations on why the testimony of the
main witness for the prosecution is not worthy of credence.
(Lenido Lumanog, et al. vs. People of the Philippines/Cesar Fortuna vs.

People of the Philippines/People of the Philippines vs. SPO2 Cesar Fortuna

y Abudo, et al., G.R. Nos. 182555/G.R. No. 185123/G.R. No.
187745. September 7, 2010. See dissenting opinions here: J. Carpio, J.
Abad.)

Posted on September 13, 2010 by Vicente D. Gerochi IV Posted in Constitutional Law
Tagged agrarian reform, Civil Service Commission, compensation, due process, eminent
domain, equal protection, evidence, just compensation, public officers, warrantless arrest,
warrantless search
Here are selected August 2010 rulings of the Supreme Court of the
Constitutional Law
Civil Service Commission; jurisdiction. The civil service encompasses all
branches and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters, like the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS), or those created by special law. Thus, GSIS
employees are part of the civil service system and are subject to the law and
to the circulars, rules and regulations issued by the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) on discipline, attendance and general terms and
conditions of employment.The CSC has jurisdiction to hear and decide
disciplinary cases against erring employees. Winston F. Garcia vs. Mario I.
Molina, et al./Winston F. Garcia vs. Mario I. Molina, et al., G.R. No.
157383/G.R. No. 174137, August 18, 2010.
Double compensation. Section 8, Article IX-B of the Constitution provides
that no elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive
additional, double or indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized
by law, nor accept without the consent of the Congress, any present
emolument, office or title of any kind from any foreign
government. Pensions and gratuities shall not be considered as additional,

double or indirect compensation. This provision, however, does not apply to

the present case as there was no double compensation to the petitioners. The
questioned resolutions of the Monetary Board are valid corporate acts of
petitioners that became the bases for granting them additional monthly
representation and transportation allowance (RATA), as members of the
Board of Directors of Philippine International Convention Center Inc.
(PICCI), a government corporation whose sole stockholder is the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). RATA is distinct from salary as a form of
compensation. Unlike salary which is paid for services rendered, RATA is a
form of allowance intended to defray expenses deemed unavoidable in the
discharge of office. Hence, RATA is paid only to certain officials who, by
the nature of their offices, incur representation and transportation
expenses. Indeed, aside from the RATA that they have been receiving from
the BSP, the grant of RATA to each of the petitioners for every board
meeting they attended, in their capacity as members of the Board of
Directors of PICCI, in addition to their per diem, does not violate the
constitutional proscription against double compensation. Gabriel C. Singson,
et al. vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 159355, August 9, 2010.
Eminent domain; voluntary agreement by landowner. Where the landowner
agrees voluntarily to the taking of his property by the government for public
use, he thereby waives his right to the institution of a formal expropriation
proceeding covering such property. Failure for a long time of the owner to
question the lack of expropriation proceedings covering a property that the
government had taken constitutes a waiver of his right to gain back
possession. The landowners remedy in such case is an action for the
payment of just compensation, not ejectment. Here, the Court of Appeals
erred in ordering the eviction of petitioner from the property that it has held
as government school site for more than 50 years. The evidence on record
shows that the respondents intended to cede the property to the City
Government of Lipa permanently. In fact, they allowed the city to declare
the property in its name for tax purposes. And when they sought to have the
bigger lot subdivided, the respondents earmarked a specific portion for the
City Government of Lipa. Under the circumstances, it may be assumed that
the respondents had agreed to transfer ownership of the land to the
government, whether to the City Government of Lipa or to the Republic of
the Philippines, but the parties never formalized and documented such
transfer. Consequently, petitioner should be deemed entitled to possession
pending the respondents formal transfer of ownership to it upon payment of

just compensation. Republic of the Philippines vs. Primo Mendoza and

Maria Lucero, G.R. No. 185091, August 8, 2010.
Equal protection clause. There is no substantial distinction between

municipalities with pending cityhood bills in Congress and municipalities
that did not have similar pending bills for purposes of the income
requirement for converting a municipality into a city under Republic Act No.
9009. The pendency of such a bill does not affect or determine the level of
income of a municipality. Municipalities with pending cityhood bills in
Congress might even have lower annual income than municipalities that did
not have pending cityhood bills. Thus, the classification criterion mere
pendency of a cityhood bill in Congress is not rationally related to the
purpose of RA 9009, which is to prevent fiscally non-viable municipalities
from converting into cities. Moreover, the fact of pendency of a cityhood bill
in Congress limits the exemption (from the income requirement) to a
specific condition existing at the time of passage of RA 9009. That specific
condition will never happen again. This violates the requirement that a valid
classification must not be limited to existing conditions only. Also, the
exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws gives the 16 respondent
municipalities a unique advantage based on an arbitrary date the filing of
their cityhood bills before the end of the 11th Congress as against all other
municipalities that may want to convert into cities after the effectiveness of
RA 9009. Lastly, limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities
violates the Constitutional requirement that the classification must apply to
all those who are similarly situated. Municipalities with the same income as
the 16 respondent municipalities cannot convert into cities, while those 16
municipalities can. Clearly, as worded, the exemption found in the Cityhood
Laws would be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.
League of Cities of the Philippines represented by LCP National President
Jerry P. Trenas, et al. vs. Commission on Elections, et al. G.R. No.
176951/G.R. No. 177499/G.R. No. 178056, August 24, 2010.
Judicial review; justiciable controversy; moot case. Private respondent was
not elected President in the May 10, 2010 election. Since the issue on the
proper interpretation of the phrase any reelection in Section 4, Article VII
of the Constitution will be premised on a persons second (whether
immediate or not) election as President, there is no case or controversy to be

resolved in this case. No live conflict of legal rights exists. There is in this
case no definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy that touches on the
legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. No specific relief
may conclusively be decreed upon by the Court in this case that will benefit
any of the parties. As such, one of the essential requisites for the exercise of
the power of judicial review, the existence of an actual case or controversy,
is sorely lacking in this case. As a rule, the Court may only adjudicate actual,
ongoing controversies. It is not empowered to decide moot questions or
abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot
affect the result as to the thing in issue in the case before it. When a case is
moot, it becomes non-justiciable. An action is considered moot when it no
longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues involved have
become academic or dead or when the matter in dispute has already been
resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial intervention unless the
issue is likely to be raised again between the parties. There is nothing for the
Court to resolve as the determination thereof has been overtaken by
subsequent events. Assuming an actual case or controversy existed prior to
the proclamation of a President who has been duly elected in the May 10,
2010 election, the same is no longer true today. Following the results of that
election, private respondent was not elected President for the second time.
Thus, any discussion of his reelection will simply be hypothetical and
speculative. It will serve no useful or practical purpose. Atty. Evillo C.
Pormento vs. Joseph Erap Ejercito Estrada and Commission on
Elections.G.R. No. 191988. August 31, 2010.
Operative fact doctrine. Under the operative fact doctrine, the law is
recognized as unconstitutional but the effects of the unconstitutional law,
prior to its declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of
equity and fair play. However, in this case, the minoritys novel theory,
invoking the operative fact doctrine, is that the enactment of the Cityhood
Laws and the functioning of the 16 municipalities as new cities with new
sets of officials and employees operate to constitutionalize the
unconstitutional Cityhood Laws. This novel theory misapplies the operative
fact doctrine and sets a gravely dangerous precedent. Under the minoritys
view, an unconstitutional law, if already implemented prior to its declaration
of unconstitutionality by the Court, can no longer be revoked and its
implementation must be continued despite being unconstitutional. This view
will open the floodgates to the wanton enactment of unconstitutional laws
and a mad rush for their immediate implementation before the Court can

declare them unconstitutional. This view is an open invitation to serially

violate the Constitution, and be quick about it, lest the violation be stopped
by the Court.
The operative fact doctrine is a rule of equity. As such, it must be applied
as an exception to the general rule that an unconstitutional law produces no
effects. It can never be invoked to validate as constitutional an
unconstitutional act. The operative fact doctrine never validates or
constitutionalizes an unconstitutional law. The unconstitutional law remains
unconstitutional, but its effects, prior to its judicial declaration of nullity,
may be left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play. The doctrine
affects or modifies only the effects of the unconstitutional law, not the
unconstitutional law itself. Applying the doctrine to this case, the Cityhood
Laws remain unconstitutional because they violate Section 10, Article X of
the Constitution. However, the effects of the implementation of the
Cityhood Laws prior to the declaration of their nullity, such as the payment
of salaries and supplies by the concerned local government units or their
issuance of licenses or execution of contracts, may be recognized as valid
and effective. League of Cities of the Philippines represented by LCP
National President Jerry P. Trenas, et al. vs. Commission on Elections, et al.
G.R. No. 176951/G.R. No. 177499/G.R. No. 178056, August 24, 2010.
Search warrant; requirements for validity. The validity of the issuance of a
search warrant rests upon the following factors: (1) it must be issued upon
probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge
himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination
of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the
complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the
warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and
persons or things to be seized. On the first requisite, a magistrates
determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is paid
great deference by a reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis
for that determination. Substantial basis means that the questions of the
examining judge brought out such facts and circumstances as would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed, and the objects in connection with the offense sought to be
seized are in the place sought to be searched. On the last requirement, a
description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer serving the
warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended

and distinguish it from other places in the community. A designation or

description that points out the place to be searched to the exclusion of all
others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the
constitutional requirement of definiteness. People of the Philippines vs.
Estela Tuan y Baludda. G.R. No. 176066, August 11, 2010.
Warrantless arrest. Appellant was arrested during an entrapment operation
where he was caught in flagrante delicto selling shabu. When an arrest is
made during an entrapment operation, it is not required that a warrant be
secured in line with Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Revised Rules of Court,
which provides that a peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. A
buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment which in recent years has been
accepted as a valid and effective mode of apprehending drug pushers. If
carried out with due regard for constitutional and legal safeguards, a buybust operation, such as the one involving appellant, deserves judicial
sanction. Consequently, the warrantless arrest and warrantless search and
seizure conducted on the person of appellant were allowed under the
circumstances. The search, incident to his lawful arrest, needed no warrant
to sustain its validity. Thus, there is no doubt that the sachets of shabu
recovered during the legitimate buy-bust operation are admissible and were
properly admitted in evidence against him. People of the Philippines vs.
Michael Sembrano y Castro. G.R. No. 185848, August 16, 2010.
Administrative Law
Administrative agencies; findings. Findings of fact of administrative
agencies and quasi-judicial bodies, like the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction
is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded respect. In this case,
there is no ground to disturb the DARABs findings, which affirmed those of
the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board after due hearing and
appreciation of the evidence submitted by both parties. Heirs of Jose M.
Cervantes, et al. vs. Jesus G. Miranda. G.R. No. 183352, August 9, 2010.
Administrative cases; preliminary investigation; due process. Section 45 of
the Government Service Insurance System Act of 1997 gives the President

and General Manager of GSIS the authority and responsibility to remove,

suspend or otherwise discipline GSIS personnel for cause. However, this
power is not without limitations for it must be exercised in accordance with
civil service rules. While the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service (Civil Service Rules) do not specifically provide that a formal
charge issued against a government employee without the requisite
preliminary investigation is null and void, it is required that, upon receipt of
a complaint which is sufficient in form and substance, the disciplining
authority shall require the person complained of to submit a counteraffidavit or comment under oath within three days from receipt. The use of
the word shall quite obviously indicates that it is mandatory for the
disciplining authority to conduct a preliminary investigation or at least give
the respondent the opportunity to comment and explain his side. This must
be done prior to the issuance of the formal charge, and the comment required
is different from the answer that may later be filed by respondents. Contrary
to petitioners claim, no exception is provided for in the Civil Service Rules,
not even an indictment in flagranti as claimed by petitioner.
The above rules apply even if the complainant is the disciplining authority
himself, as in this case. To comply with such requirement, petitioner could
have issued a memorandum requiring respondents to explain why no
disciplinary action should be taken against them instead of immediately
issuing formal charges. With respondents comments, petitioner should have
properly evaluated both sides of the controversy before making a conclusion
that there was a prima facie case against respondents, leading to the issuance
of the questioned formal charges. It is noteworthy that the very acts subject
of the administrative cases stemmed from an event that took place the day
before the formal charges were issued. It appears, therefore, that the formal
charges were issued after the sole determination by the petitioner as the
disciplining authority that there was a prima facie case against respondents.
To condone this would give the disciplining authority an unrestricted power
to judge by himself the nature of the act complained of as well as the gravity
of the charges. Thus, respondents here were denied due process of law. Not
even the fact that the charges against them are serious and evidence of their
guilt is in the opinion of their superior strong can compensate for the
procedural shortcut taken by petitioner. The filing by petitioner of formal
charges against the respondents without complying with the mandated
preliminary investigation or at least giving the respondents the opportunity
to comment violated their right to due process. Accordingly, the formal

charges are void ab initio and may be assailed directly or indirectly at

anytime. Winston F. Garcia vs. Mario I. Molina, et al./Winston F. Garcia vs.
Mario I. Molina, et al. .G.R. No. 157383/G.R. No. 174137, August 18, 2010.
Administrative cases; decision rendered without due process. The cardinal
precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts
are ousted from their jurisdiction. The violation of a partys right to due
process raises a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or
disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right to due process
is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of
jurisdiction. This rule is equally true in quasi-judicial and administrative
proceedings, for the constitutional guarantee that no man shall be deprived
of life, liberty, or property without due process is unqualified by the type of
proceedings (whether judicial or administrative) where he stands to lose the
same. Although administrative procedural rules are less stringent and often
applied more liberally, administrative proceedings are not exempt from basic
and fundamental procedural principles, such as the right to due process in
investigations and hearings. Winston F. Garcia vs. Mario I. Molina, et
al./Winston F. Garcia vs. Mario I. Molina, et al., G.R. No. 157383/G.R. No.
174137, August 18, 2010.
Administrative cases; quantum of evidence. In administrative cases, the
requisite proof is substantial evidence, i.e., the amount of relevant evidence
which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. In
this case, substantial evidence consisted of the uniform findings of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, the Deputy Ombudsman
for Luzon and the Court of Appeals that petitioner connived with his codefendants to destroy the improvements introduced by respondent on the
subject property so they could construct their own cottages thereon. Josephil
C. Bien vs. Pedro B. Bo, G.R. No. 179333, August 3, 2010.
Public officers; statement of assets and liabilities. Even an asset that was
acquired through chattel mortgage must be declared and included in the
Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SSAL). The law requires that the
SSAL be accomplished truthfully and in detail without distinction as to how
the property was acquired. Respondent, therefore, cannot escape liability by
arguing that the ownership of the vehicle has not yet passed to him on the
basis that it was acquired only on installment basis. The requirement to file
the SSAL not later than the first 15 days of April at the close of every

calendar year must not be treated as a simple and trivial routine, but as an
obligation that is part and parcel of every civil servants duty to the people.
It serves as the basis of the government and the people in monitoring the
income and lifestyle of officials and employees in the government in
compliance with the Constitutional policy to eradicate corruption, promote
transparency in government, and ensure that all government employees and
officials lead just and modest lives. It is for this reason that the SSAL must
be sworn to and is made accessible to the public, subject to reasonable
administrative regulations. Hon. Waldo Q. Flores, et al. vs. Atty. Antonio F.
Montemayor. G.R. No. 170146, August 25, 2010.
Local Government
Abuse of authority. Addressing the argument of petitioner, a barangay
official, that there was no abuse of authority because the incident
complained of occurred in another barangay over which he has no authority
and jurisdiction, the Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the Court of
Appeals that petitioner is liable for abuse of authority on the basis that he
participated in the unlawful act as a higher authority that gave a semblance
of legality over that act and influenced the actions of his co-defendants.
Here, petitioner was president of the organization of barangay officials in his
municipality and sat as ex-officio member of the Sangguniang Bayan, which
has power to review barangay ordinances and authority to discipline
barangay officials. His co-defendants were officials in the barangay where
the incident occurred. Josephil C. Bien vs. Pedro B. Bo, G.R. No. 179333,
August 3, 2010.
Creation of local government unit. The Constitution states that the creation
of local government units must follow the criteria established in the Local
Government Code and not in any other law. There is only one Local
Government Code. The Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the
Local Government Code all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city,
including the conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write
such criteria in any other law. The clear intent of the Constitution is to insure
that the creation of cities and other political units must follow the same
uniform, non-discriminatory criteria found solely in the Local Government
Code. Any derogation or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local
Government Code violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.

Republic Act No. 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code
to increase the income requirement from Php20 million to Php100 million
for the creation of a city. This law took effect on 30 June 2001. Hence, from
that moment the Local Government Code required that any municipality
desiring to become a city must satisfy the Php100 million income
requirement. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by
RA 9009, does not contain any exemption from this income requirement. In
enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant any exemption to respondent
municipalities, even though their cityhood bills were pending in Congress
when Congress passed RA 9009. The laws converting these municipalities
into cities, all enacted afterthe RA 9009 became effective, explicitly exempt
respondent municipalities from the increased income requirement in Section
450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. Such
exemption clearly violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and is
thus patently unconstitutional. To be valid, such exemption must be written
in the Local Government Code and not in any other law. League of Cities of
the Philippines represented by LCP National President Jerry P. Trenas, et
al. vs. Commission on Elections, et al. G.R. No. 176951/G.R. No.
177499/G.R. No. 178056, August 24, 2010.
Special Laws
Agrarian reform; deposit of provisional compensation. The amount of
provisional compensation that the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) is
required to deposit in the name of the landowner if the latter rejects the offer
of compensation of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) under
Section 16 of Republic Act No. 6657 should be the LBPs initial valuation
of the land and not, as respondent argues, the sum awarded by DARs
adjudication bodies as compensation in a summary administrative
proceeding. The deposit of such provisional compensation must be made
even before the summary administrative proceeding commences, or at least
simultaneously with it, once the landowner rejects the initial valuation of the
LBP. Such deposit results from the landowners rejection of the DAR offer
(based on the LBPs initial valuation). Both the conduct of summary
administrative proceeding and deposit of provisional compensation follow as
a consequence of the landowners rejection. Land Bank of the Philippines vs.
Heir of Trinidad S. Vda. De Arieta. G.R. No. 161834, August 11, 2010.
Agrarian reform; just compensation. Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657 is

the principal basis for computing just compensation, and the factors set forth
therein have been translated into a formula outlined in DAR Administrative
Order No. 5, series of 1998 (DAR AO 5). While the determination of just
compensation is essentially a judicial function vested in the Regional Trial
Court acting as a Special Agrarian Court, a judge cannot abuse his discretion
by not taking into full consideration the factors specifically identified by law
and its implementing rules. Special Agrarian Courts are not at liberty to
disregard the formula laid down in DAR AO 5, because unless an
administrative order is declared invalid, courts have no option but to apply
it. Courts cannot ignore, without violating the agrarian reform law, the
formula provided by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) for
determining just compensation. In this case, the court adopted a different
formula in determining the land value by considering the average between
the findings of DAR using the formula laid down in Executive Order No.
228 and the market value of the property as stated in the tax declaration.
This is obviously a departure from the mandate of the law and DAR AO 5.
Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Rizalina Gustilo Barrido, et al., G.R. No.
183688, August 18, 2010.
Agrarian reform; sale of land. Petitioners title shows on its face that the
government granted title to them on January 9, 1990, by virtue of
Presidential Decree No. 27. This law explicitly prohibits any form of
transfer of the land granted under it except to the government or by
hereditary succession to the successors of the farmer beneficiary. Upon the
enactment of Executive Order No. 228 in 1987, however, the restriction
ceased to be absolute. Land reform beneficiaries were allowed to transfer
ownership of their lands provided that their amortizations with the Land
Bank of the Philippines have been paid in full. In this case, petitioners title
categorically states that they have fully complied with the requirements for
the final grant of title under PD 27. This means that they have completed
payment of their amortizations with Land Bank. Consequently, they could
already legally transfer their title to another. Heirs of Paulino Atienza vs.
Domingo P. Espidol, G.R. No. 180665, August 11, 2010.
Agricultural land; conversion. Conversion of the subject landholding under
the 1980 Kasunduan is not the conversion of landholding that is
contemplated by Section 36 of Republic Act No. 3844, which governs the
dispossession of an agricultural lessee and the termination of his rights to
enjoy and possess the landholding. Conversion here has been defined as the

act of changing the current use of a piece of agricultural land into some other
use as approved by the Department of Agrarian Reform. More to the point
is that for conversion to avail as a ground for dispossession, Section 36
implies the necessity of prior court proceedings in which the issue of
conversion has been determined and a final order issued directing
dispossession upon that ground. In this case, however, respondent does not
profess that there had been at any tine such proceedings or that there was
such court order. Neither does he assert that the lot in question had
undergone conversion with authority from the Department of Agrarian
Reform. Emilia Micking Vda. De Coronel, et al. Vs. Miguel Tanjangco, Jr.,
G.R. No. 170693, August 8, 2010.
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission; powers. The Court rejected
respondents contention that he was deprived of his right to due process
when the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) proceeded to
investigate him on the basis of an anonymous complaint in the absence of
any documents supporting the complainants assertions. Section 4(c) of
Executive Order No. 12 states that the PAGC has the power to give due
course to anonymous complaints against presidential appointees if there
appears on the face of the complaint or based on the supporting documents
attached to the anonymous complaint a probable cause to engender a belief
that the allegations may be true. The use of the conjunctive word or in the
said provision is determinative since it empowers the PAGC to exercise
discretion in giving due course to anonymous complaints. Because of the
said provision, an anonymous complaint may be given due course even if the
same is without supporting documents, so long as it appears from the face of
the complaint that there is probable cause. Hon. Waldo Q. Flores, et al. vs.
Atty. Antonio F. Montemayor. G.R. No. 170146, August 25, 2010.
Water districts; government-owned and controlled corporations. A local
water district is a government-owned and controlled corporation with special
charter since it is created pursuant to a special law, Presidential Decree No.
198 (1973). PD 198 constitutes the special charter by virtue of which local
water districts exist. Unlike private corporations that derive their legal
existence and power from the Corporation Code, water districts derive their
legal existence and power from P.D. No. 198. Section 6 of the decree in fact
provides that water districts shall exercise the powers, rights and privileges
given to private corporations under existing laws, in addition to the powers
granted in, and subject to such restrictions imposed under this Act.

Therefore, water districts would not have corporate powers without PD 198.
Engr. Ranulfo C. Feliciano vs. Hon. Cornelio C. Gison. G.R. No. 165641,
August 25, 2010.
Dissension in the Court: August 2010

Posted on September 6, 2010 by Jose Ma. G. Hofilea Posted in Commercial Law,
Constitutional Law Tagged local government, merger
The following are selected decisions promulgated by the High Court in

August 2010 where at least one Justice felt compelled to express his or her
dissent from the decision penned by the ponente.
1.
[Union] Shop Talk (Leonardo-De Castro vs. Brion and Carpio)
Apart from the wide-spread paranoia about a possible Y2K global computer
cataclysm, one other significant development occurring around the start of
the twenty-first century was the merger of two giant banking institutions
Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC) and Bank of the Philippine
Islands (BPI)with BPI being the surviving entity. One of several legal
issues spawned by that merger was the subject matter of Republic of the
Philippines vs. Bank of the Philippine Islands penned by Justice Teresita J.
Leonardo-De Castro.
At the time of the merger, the BPI Employees Union-Davao Chapter (the
Union) constituted the exclusive bargaining agent of BPIs rank and file
employees in Davao City. Their existing collective bargaining agreement
(CBA) with BPI included a Union Shop clause which read as follows:
Article II:
x
Section 2. Union Shop New employees falling within the bargaining unit
as defined in Article I of this Agreement, who may hereafter be regularly
employed by the Bank shall, within thirty (30) days after they become

regular employees, join the Union as a condition of their continued

employment. It is understood that membership in good standing in the
Union is a condition of their continued employment with the Bank.
Once the FEBTC-BPI merger took effect, the Union required BPI to
implement the Union Shop Clause and compel the former FEBTC
employees to join the Union. BPI took the position that the former FEBTC
employees were not covered by the Union Security Clause on the ground
that the former FEBTC employees were not new employees who were hired
and subsequently regularized, but were absorbed employees by operation of
law because the former employees of FEBTC can be considered assets and
liabilities of the absorbed corporation.
While the Voluntary Arbitrator sided with BPI, the Court of Appeals
reversed the Voluntary Arbitrators decision. The Court of Appeals held
that while there is indeed a distinction between absorbed employees and
new employees, such distinction applied only with respect to recognition
of the past service of the absorbed employees with their former employer,
FEBTC. However, for purposes of applying the Union Shop Clause, they
should be deemed to be new employees as otherwise, inequities would
arise.
Justice Leonardo-De Castro upheld the position of the Court of Appeals that
the Union Shop Clause should be made applicable to the former FEBTC
employees that were now BPI employees. The ponente reminded the
litigants of the principles behind, and the validity of, union security clause
(of which a union shop clause is one) and likewise pointed out that there is
nothing in the CBA that speaks about how one becomes a regular BPI
employee for purposes of the Union Shop Clause.
Moreover, Justice Leonardo-De Castro added, there is nothing in the
Corporation Law and the merger agreement mandating the automatic
employment of the employees of the absorbed corporation as regular
employees by the surviving corporation in the merger. Contrary to the
assertion of BPI, the former employees of FEBTC are not assets and
liabilities of FEBTC which are required to be absorbed by BPI by operation

of law and it is against public policy to declare the former FEBTC

employees as forming part of the assets or liabilities of FEBTC that were
transferred and absorbed by BPI in the Articles of Merger. In fact, noted
Justice Leonardo-De Castro, the Corporation Code does not also mandate
the absorption of the employees of the non-surviving corporation by the
surviving corporation in the case of a merger.
Unlike chattel, employees may not be unilaterally transferred as employment
is a personal consensual contract and absorption by BPI of a former FEBTC
employee without the consent of the employee is in violation of an
individuals freedom to contract.
Reiterating that it an inequity would arise if the former FEBTC employees
were not made subject of the Union Shop Clause (there being nothing in the
Labor Code and other applicable laws or the CBA provision at issue that
requires that a new employee has to be of probationary or non-regular status
at the beginning of the employment relationship.), the ponente stresses that a
union security clause in a CBA should be interpreted to give meaning and
effect to its purpose, which is to afford protection to the certified bargaining
agent and ensure that the employer is dealing with a union that represents the
interests of the legally mandated percentage of the members of the
bargaining unit.
In his dissent, among other things, Justice Antonio T. Carpio took exception
to the majority decisions ruling regarding the effect of a merger with
respect to the absorption by the surviving corporation of the employees of
the non-surviving entity. In Justice Carpios view, based on the Corporation
Code, [u]pon merger, BPI, as the surviving entity, absorbs FEBTC and
continues the combined business of the two banks. BPI assumes the legal
personality of FEBTC, and automatically acquires FEBTCs rights,
privileges and powers, as well as its liabilities and obligations. Among the
obligations and liabilities that BPI assumes is the obligation of FEBTC to
continue the employment of the latters employees.
He observed that under the CBA, the BPI employees required to acquire or
maintain union membership as a condition for their continued employment
are (1) the union members at the time of the effectivity of the CBA and (2)
the new employees who were hired during the effectivity of the

CBA. Non-union BPI employees at the time of the effectivity of the CBA
were not, and are still not, required to join the Union.
The former employees of FEBTC should not be treated in the same way as
new employees for purposes of the Union Shop Clause. At the time new
employees are hired by BPI, they knew that they were required to join the
Union within 30 days from regularization as a condition for continued
employment with BPI. This is not the case with the absorbed employees
who, upon the merger, are immediately regularized and made permanent
employees of BPI; they are immediately given the same permanent status as
old employees of BPI.
Therefore, In the same way that an existing non-union BPI employee is
given the constitutional right to choose whether or not to join the Union, an
absorbed employee should be equally given the same right. And this right
must be conferred to the absorbed employee upon the effectivity of the
merger between FEBTC and BPI.
Justice Arturo D. Brion observed that the majority decision appears to
consider only the purely labor law aspect of the case in determining the
relationships among BPI, FEBTC and the absorbed employees. However,
he believed that [m]ore than anything else, however, the issues before us
are rooted in the corporate merger that took place; thus, the first priority in
resolving the issues before us should be to consider and analyze the nature
and consequences of the BPI-FEBTC mergeressentially a matter under the
Corporation Code. On the basis of this analysis, the application of labor law
can follow.
He pointed out that under Section 76 of the Corporation Code, in a merger or
consolidation, no liquidation of the assets of the dissolved corporations takes
place, and the surviving or consolidated corporation assumes ipso jure the
liabilities of the dissolved corporations, regardless of whether the creditors
consented to the merger or consolidation. In a total merger, the merged
corporation transfers everything figuratively speaking, its body and
soul to the surviving corporation. This was what happened in the BPIFEBTC merger.
Included among those that the surviving corporation takes over are the

obligations of the non-surviving corporation under the employment contracts

it entered into with its employees. In the BPI-FEBTC situation, these
employment contracts are part of the obligations that the merging parties
have to account and make provisions for under the Constitution and the
Corporation Code; in the absence of any clear agreement, these employment
contracts subsist, subject to the right of the employees to reject them as they
cannot be compelled to render service but can only be made to answer in
damages if the rejection constitutes a breach.
Accordingly, Justice Brion likewise took the position that the absorbed
FEBTC employees are not new employees as contemplated in the Union
Shop Clause. What is clearly a requirement for the application of the Union
Shop Clause is the grant of regular status, or, to those recently given regular
employment and who, by necessary implication, were hired as non-regular
employees and were thereafter accorded regular status.
In contrast with the non-regular employees that the CBA clearly referred to,
absorbed FEBTC employees did not undergo the process of waiting for the
grant of regular status; their regular employment simply continued from
FEBTC to BPI without any break because BPI only succeeded to the role of
FEBTC as employer in a merger, where the same employment was
maintained and only the employers personality changed.
(Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. BPI Employees Union-Davao ChapterFederation of Unions in BPI Unibank; G.R. No. 164301. August 18,
2010. See dissenting opinion of Carpio, J here and dissenting opinion of
Brion, J here.)
(authors note: This author is pretty much convinced that in a merger, the
employees of the non-surviving corporation do become employees of the
surviving entity without interruption even as the employees retain the right
to resign from that employment and the employer retains the right to
terminate the employees to the extent permitted by law. Thus, on this legal
point, he would side with the dissenters. This author is curious as to what
ripple legal effects there might be within the labor/management community
on account of the pronouncementor at least thats how it appears to this
authorthat in a merger of two corporations, employees of the nonsurviving entity are not automatically absorbed into the surviving

corporation.)
2.
Local Government Unit Criteria (Carpio vs. Velasco)
The decision of the Supreme Court in League of Cities of the Philippines, et

al. vs. Commission on Elections, et al. issued in August 21, 2010 followed a
series of prior rulings by the Supreme Court on the same subject matter.
On 18 November 2008,a majority vote of the Supreme Court en banc struck
down 16 Cityhood Laws for violating Section 10, Article X of the 1987
Constitution and the equal protection clause.
On March 31 2009, the Supreme Court En Banc, again by a majority vote,
denied the respondents first motion for reconsideration. On April 28, 2009,
the Supreme Court En Banc, by a split vote, denied the respondents second
motion for reconsideration and accordingly, at least according to the ponente
of the majority decision, Justice Antonio T. Carpio, the November 18, 2008
decision became final and executory and was recorded, in due course, in the
Book of Entries of Judgments on May 21, 2009.
After the finality of the November 18, 2008 decision, however, the Court En
Banc reversed the November 18, 2008 decision by upholding the
constitutionality of the Cityhood Laws in a decision issued on December 21,
2009, prompting the filing of motions to reconsider and annul that December
21, 2009 decision.
In this ruling, the majority ruled to set aside the December 21, 2009 decision
and reinstate the November 18, 2008 decision declaring the Cityhood Laws
to be unconstitutional.
The majority decision ruled that the Cityhood Laws, which consisted of a
series of legislative enactments that essentially exempted certain
municipalities from the generally applicable income requirements set out in
the Local Government Code, as amended, were unconstitutional because
they violated Section 10, Article X of the Constitution which states:

No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided,

merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered, except in
accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and
subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected.
According to Justice Carpio, per the Constitution, the creation of local
government units must follow the criteria established only in the Local
Government Code and not in any other law. Since the Cityhood Laws are
laws different from the Local Government Code, then the Cityhood Laws
are unconstitutional for having adopted criteria that is not set out in the
Local Government Code.
On this point, Justice Presbitero Velasco, the sole dissenter, took the view
that the word code in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution refers to a
law Congress enacts in line with its plenary power to create local political
subdivisions. He noted that the December 21, 2009 Decision explained that
the only conceivable reason why the Constitution employs the clause in
accordance with the criteria established in the local government code is to
lay stress that it is Congress alone, and no other, which can define, prescribe
and impose the criteria. Thus, the imposition may be effected either in a
consolidated set of laws or a single-subject enactment. And provided the
imperatives of the equal protection clause are not transgressed, an exemption
from the imposition may be allowed, just like the Cityhood Laws each of
which contained exemption from the income requirement set out in the
amendatory legislation to the Local Government Code.
Said Justice Velasco, It cannot be emphasized enough that if Congress has
the plenary power to create political units, it surely can exercise the lesser
power of requiring a menu of criteria and standards for their creation. As it
is, the amendatory RA 9009 increasing the codified income requirement
from Php20 million to Php100 million is really no different from the
enactment of any of the Cityhood Law exempting the unit covered thereby
from the codified standards.
(League of Cities of the Phil. rep by LCP National President Jerry P.
Trenas, et al. vs. COMELEC, et al.; G.R. No. 176951/G.R. No. 177499/G.R.
No. 178056. August 24, 2010. See dissenting opinion here.)


Posted on August 12, 2010 by Vicente D. Gerochi IV Posted in Constitutional Law
Tagged COMELEC, constitutional rights, contract, local government, Public Land Act
Here are selected July 2010 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines
on political law:
Agrarian reform; coverage. Lands that are not directly, actually and
exclusively used for pasture nor devoted to commercial livestock raising are
not excluded from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program. A.Z. Arnaiz Realty, Inc. vs. Office of the President. G.R. No.
170623, July 7, 2010.
Certificate of candidacy; residency requirement. The Omnibus Election
Code provides that a certificate of candidacy may be denied due course or
cancelled if there is any false representation of a material fact. The critical
material facts are those that refer to a candidates qualifications for elective
office, such as his or her citizenship and residence. The false representation
must be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would
otherwise render a candidate ineligible. Given the purpose of the
requirement, it must be made with the intention to deceive the electorate as
to the would-be candidates qualifications for public office. Thus, the
misrepresentation cannot be the result of a mere innocuous mistake, and
cannot exist in a situation where the intent to deceive is patently absent, or
where no deception on the electorate results. The foregoing are the legal
standards by which the COMELEC must act on a petition to deny due course
or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. Thus, in considering the residency of
a candidate as stated in the certificate of candidacy, the COMELEC must
determine whether or not the candidate deliberately attempted to mislead,
misinform or hide a fact about his or her residency that would otherwise
render him or her ineligible for the position sought. The COMELEC gravely
abused its discretion in this case when, in considering the residency issue, it
based its decision solely on very personal and subjective assessment
standards, such as the nature or design and furnishings of the dwelling place

in relation to the stature of the candidate. Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra vs.

Commission on Elections, et al. G.R. No. 191938, July 2, 2010.
Citizenship; election and constructive registration. The statutory formalities
of electing Philippine citizenship are the following: (1) a statement of
election under oath; (2) an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and
Government of the Philippines; and (3) registration of the statement of
election and of the oath with the nearest civil registry. Here, petitioners
complied with the first and second requirements upon reaching the age of
majority. However, registration of the documents of election with the civil
registry was done belatedly. Under the facts peculiar to the petitioners, the
right to elect Philippine citizenship has not been lost and they should be
allowed to complete the statutory requirements for such election. Their
exercise of suffrage, being elected to public office, continuous and
uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, and other similar acts showing exercise
of Philippine citizenship do not on their own take the place of election of
citizenship. But where, as here, the election of citizenship has in fact been
done and documented within the constitutional and statutory timeframe,
registration of the documents of election beyond the timeframe should be
allowed if in the meanwhile positive acts of citizenship have been done
publicly, consistently and continuously. These acts constitute constructive
registration. In other words, the actual exercise of Philippine citizenship for
over half a century by the petitioners is actual notice to the Philippine public,
which is equivalent to formal registration of the election of Philippine
citizenship. It is not the registration of the act of election, although a valid
requirement under Commonwealth Act No. 625, that will confer Philippine
citizenship on the petitioners. It is only a means of confirming the fact that
citizenship has been claimed. Having a Filipino mother is permanent. It is
the basis of the right of the petitioners to elect Philippine
citizenship. Petitioners elected Philippine citizenship in form and
substance. The failure to register the election in the civil registry should not
defeat that election and negate the permanent fact that petitioners have a
Filipino mother. The lacking requirements may still be complied with
subject to the imposition of appropriate administrative penalties, if any. The
documents petitioners submitted supporting their allegations that they have
registered with the civil registry, although belatedly, should be examined for
validation purposes by the appropriate agency, in this case the Bureau of
Immigration. Other requirements embodied in the administrative orders and
other issuances of the Bureau of Immigration and the Department of Justice

must be complied with within a reasonable time. Balgamelo Cabiling Ma, et

al. vs. Commissioner Alipio F. Fernandez, Jr., et al. G.R. No. 183133, July
26, 2010.
Double jeopardy; elements. Following are the elements of double jeopardy:

(1) the complaint or information was sufficient in form and substance to
sustain a conviction; (2) the court had jurisdiction; (3) the accused had been
arraigned and had pleaded; and (4) the accused was convicted or acquitted,
or the case was dismissed without his express consent. These elements are
present in this case. The information filed in each of the criminal cases
against respondent was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction. The regional trial court had jurisdiction over these cases. The
respondent was arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty. The court
dismissed both cases on a demurrer to evidence on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence, which amounts to an acquittal from which no
appeal can be had as that would place respondent in double
jeopardy. People of the Philippines vs. Dante Tan. G.R. No. 167526, July
26, 2010.
Double jeopardy; exceptions. The rule on double jeopardy is not without
exceptions. Double jeopardy will not attach when the trial court acted with
grave abuse of discretion, or when the prosecution was denied due
process. Here, the prosecution was given more than ample opportunity to
present its case. No grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the trial
court simply because it chose not to hold in abeyance the resolution of the
demurrer to evidence filed by the accused. While it would have been ideal
for the trial court to hold in abeyance the resolution of the demurrer to
evidence, nowhere in the rules is it mandated to do so. Furthermore, even if
the Supreme Court were to consider the same as an error on the part of the
trial court, the same would merely constitute an error of procedure or of
judgment and not an error of jurisdiction. Errors or irregularities, which do
not render the proceedings a nullity, will not defeat a plea of double
jeopardy. People of the Philippines vs. Dante Tan. G.R. No. 167526, July
26, 2010.
Due process; administrative proceedings. Due process, as a constitutional

precept, does not always, and in all situations, require a trial-type

proceeding. Litigants may be heard through pleadings, written explanations,
position papers, memoranda or oral arguments. The standard of due process
that must be met in administrative tribunals allows a certain degree of
latitude as long as fairness is not ignored. It is, therefore, not legally
objectionable for violating due process for an administrative agency to
resolve a case based solely on position papers, affidavits or documentary
evidence submitted by the parties. Even if no formal hearing took place, it is
not sufficient ground for petitioner to claim that due process was not
afforded it. In this case, petitioner was given all the opportunity to prove
and establish its claim that the properties were excluded from the coverage
of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. Petitioner actively
participated in the proceedings by submitting various pleadings and
documentary evidence. It filed motions for reconsideration of every
unfavorable outcome in all tiers of the administrative and judicial
processes. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard,
or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones
side or an opportunity to seek for a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. Any seeming defect in its observance is cured by the filing
of a motion for reconsideration. Denial of due process cannot be
successfully invoked by a party who has had the opportunity to be heard on
his motion for reconsideration. A.Z. Arnaiz Realty, Inc. vs. Office of the
President. G.R. No. 170623, July 7, 2010.
Exhaustion of administrative remedies. The doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies requires that where a remedy before an
administrative agency is provided, the administrative agency concerned must
be given the opportunity to decide a matter within its jurisdiction before an
action is brought before the courts. Failure to exhaust administrative
remedies is a ground for dismissal of the action. In this case, however, the
doctrine does not apply because petitioners failed to demonstrate that
recourse to the Commission on Higher Education is mandatory or even
possible in an action such as that brought by the respondent, which is
essentially one for mandamus and damages. The doctrine admits of
numerous exceptions, one of which is where the issues are purely legal and
well within the jurisdiction of the trial court, as in the present
case. Petitioners liability, if any, for damages will have to be decided by
the courts, since any judgment inevitably calls for the application and the
interpretation of the Civil Code. As such, exhaustion of administrative

remedies may be dispensed with. University of Santo Tomas, et al. vs. Danes
B. Sanchez. G.R. No. 165569. July 29, 2010.
Freedom of speech. Government workers, whatever their rank, have as
much right as any person in the land to voice out their protests against what
they believe to be a violation of their rights and interests. Civil Service does
not deprive them of their freedom of expression. It would be unfair to hold
that by joining the government service, the members thereof have renounced
or waived this basic liberty. This freedom can be reasonably regulated only
but can never be taken away. Thus, Section 5 of Civil Service Commission
Resolution No. 02-1316, which regulates the political rights of those in the
government service, provides that the concerted activity or mass action
proscribed must be coupled with the intent of effecting work stoppage or
service disruption in order to realize their demands of force
concession. Such limitation or qualification in the above rule is intended to
temper and focus the application of the prohibition, as not all collective
activity or mass undertaking of government employees is prohibited.
Otherwise, government employees would be deprived of their constitutional
right to freedom of expression. Respondents act of wearing similarly
colored shirts, attending a public hearing for just over an hour at the office of
the GSIS Investigation Unit, bringing with them recording gadgets,
clenching their fists, and some even badmouthing the GSIS guards and GSIS
President and General Manager Winston F. Garcia, are not constitutive of an
(i) intent to effect work stoppage or service disruption and (ii) for the
purpose of realizing their demands of force concession. These actuations
did not amount to a prohibited concerted activity or mass
action. Government Service Insurance System and Winston F. Garcia vs.
Dinnah Villaviza, et al. G.R. No. 180291, July 27, 2010.
Government agencies; reorganization. Reorganization in a government
agency is valid provided that it is done in good faith. As a general rule, the
test of good faith is whether or not the purpose of the reorganization is for
economy or to make the bureaucracy more efficient. Removal from office
as a result of reorganization must pass the test of good faith. A demotion in
office, i.e., the movement from one position to another involving the
issuance of an appointment with diminution in duties, responsibilities, status
or rank, which may or may not involve a reduction in salary, is tantamount
to removal, if no cause is shown for it. Consequently, before a demotion
may be effected pursuant to reorganization, the observance of the rules on

bona fide abolition of public office is essential. There was no demotion in

this case because petitioner was appointed to a position comparable to her
former position. In fact, her new position entailed an increase in her salary
grade from 20 to 24. There is, thus, no evidence to suggest that the
Development Bank of the Philippines acted in bad faith. Virginia D.
Bautista vs. Civil Service Commission and Development Bank of the
Philippines. G.R. No. 185215, July 22, 2010.
Government contracts; perfection. Contracts to which the government is a
party are generally subject to the same laws and regulations that govern the
validity and sufficiency of contracts between private individuals. A
government contract, however, is perfected only upon approval of competent
authority, where such approval is required. With respect to contracts of
government-owned and controlled corporations, the provisions of existing
laws are clear in requiring the governing boards approval thereof. For the
Philippine Ports Authority (PPA), its charter (Presidential Decree 857) vests
the general manager with power to sign contracts and to perform such other
duties as the Board of Directors may assign. Therefore, unless the Board
validly authorizes the general manager, the latter cannot bind PPA to a
contract. The authority of government officials to represent the government
in any contract must proceed from an express provision of law or valid
delegation of authority. Without such actual authority being possessed by
PPAs general manager, there could be no real consent, much less a
perfected contract, to speak of. A notice of award signed by the general
manager does not embody a perfected contract without the PPA Boards
prior approval of the contract. Sargasso Construction & Development
Corporation, et al. vs. Philippine Ports Authority. G.R. No. 170530, July 5,
2010.
Local governments; authority of local chief executive. Under Section
444(b)(1)(iv) of the Local Government Code, a municipal mayor is required
to secure the prior authorization of the Sangguniang Bayan (municipal
council) before entering into a contract on behalf of the municipality. In this
case, the Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi unanimously passed Resolution No.
15-92 authorizing the Mayor to hire a lawyer of her choice to represent the
interest of Tiwi in the execution of this Courts Decision in another
case. Such authority necessarily carried with it the power to negotiate,
execute and sign on behalf of Tiwi the Contract of Legal Services. That the
authorization did not set the terms and conditions of the compensation of the

lawyer signifies that the council empowered the Mayor to reach a mutually
agreeable arrangement with the lawyer of her choice subject to the general
limitation that the contractual stipulations should not be contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy, and, considering that
this is a contract of legal services, to the added restriction that the agreed
attorneys fees must not be unreasonable and unconscionable. On its face,
and there is no allegation to the contrary, the prior authorization given under
Resolution No. 15-92 appears to have been given by the council in good
faith in order to expeditiously safeguard the rights of Tiwi. Thus, there is
nothing objectionable to this manner of prior authorization, and the Mayor
was sufficiently authorized to enter into said Contract of Legal
Services. Such contract need not be ratified first by the Sangguniang Bayan
to be enforceable against Tiwi. The law speaks of prior authorization and
not ratification with respect to the power of the local chief executive to enter
into a contract on behalf of the local government unit. That authority was
granted by the Sangguniang Bayan to the Mayor under Resolution No. 1592.Municipality of Tiwi, represented by Hon. Mayor Jiame C. Villanueva
and Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi Vs. Antonio B. Betito, G.R. No. 171873,
July 9, 2010.
Municipal ordinance; deed of restrictions. While a zoning ordinance can
override the deed of restrictions on the use of a property on the basis of the
municipalitys exercise of police power, the Court will reconcile seemingly
opposing provisions in the deed of restrictions and the zoning ordinance
rather than nullify one or the other, particularly where, as here, the continued
enforcement of the deed of restrictions is reasonable and the municipality
was not asserting any interest or zoning purpose contrary to the interest of
the subdivision developer that is seeking to enforce the deed of
restrictions. The Learning Child, Inc., et al. vs. Ayala Alabang Village
Association, et al./Jose Marie V. Aquino, minor and represented by his
parents Dr. Errol Aquino and Atty. Marilyn Aquino, et al. vs. Ayala Alabang
Village Association, et al./Ayala Alabang Village Association, et al. vs.
Municipality of Muntinlupa, et al. G.R. No. 134269/G.R. No. 134440/G.R.
No. 144518, July 7, 2010.
Ombudsman; jurisdiction. The primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to
investigate any act or omission of a public officer or employee applies only
in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. In cases cognizable by regular
courts, the Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction with other investigative

agencies of government. Republic Act No. 8249 (Act Further Defining the
Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan) limits the cases that are cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan to public officials occupying positions corresponding to
salary grade 27 and higher. The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over
private respondent who, as punongbarangay, is occupying a position
corresponding to salary grade 14. Under the Local Government Code, the
sangguniang bayan has disciplinary authority over any elective barangay
official. Clearly, therefore, the Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction with
the sangguniang bayan over administrative cases against elective barangay
officials occupying positions below salary grade 27, such as private
respondent in this case. In administrative cases involving the concurrent
jurisdiction of two or more disciplining authorities, the body in which the
complaint is filed first, and which opts to take cognizance of the case,
acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of other tribunals exercising concurrent
jurisdiction. In this case, since the complaint was filed first in the
Ombudsman, and the Ombudsman opted to assume jurisdiction over the
complaint, the Ombudsmans exercise of jurisdiction is to the exclusion of
the sangguniang bayan exercising concurrent jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is a
matter of law. Jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost upon the instance of the
parties but continues until the case is terminated. When complainants first
filed the complaint in the Ombudsman, jurisdiction was already vested on
the latter. Jurisdiction could no longer be transferred to the sangguniang
bayan by virtue of a subsequent complaint filed by the same
complainants. As a final note, under Section 60 of the Local Government
Code, the sangguniang bayan has no power to remove an elective barangay
official. Apart from the Ombudsman, only a proper court may do
so. Unlike the sangguniang bayan, the Ombudsmans powers are not
merely recommendatory. The Ombudsman is clothed with authority to
directly remove an erring public official other than officials who may be
removed only by impeachment. Office of the Ombudsman vs. Rolson
Rodriquez. G.R. No. 172700, July 23, 2010.
Primary jurisdiction; Commission on Higher Education.The rule on primary
jurisdiction applies only where the administrative agency exercises quasijudicial or adjudicatory functions. Petitioners have not shown that the
Commission on Higher Education (CHED) has power to investigate facts
or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw
conclusions. Section 8 of Republic Act No. 7722 (the Higher Education
Act of 1994), which enumerates the powers and functions of CHED) does

not contain any express grant to CHED of judicial or quasi-judicial power.

In any event, CHED has no authority to adjudicate an action for
damages. University of Santo Tomas, et al. vs. Danes B. Sanchez. G.R. No.
165569. July 29, 2010.
Public lands; registration. All lands not appearing to be clearly of private
dominion presumptively belong to the State. Public lands not shown to have
been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a
private person by the State remain part of the inalienable public
domain. The onus to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the
presumption that the land subject of an application for registration is
alienable or disposable rests with the applicant. A notation on the advanced
survey plan stating in effect that the subject property is alienable and
disposable is not sufficient to establish the actual legal classification of the
disputed lot. It is not the kind of evidence required by law to establish that
the land is alienable and disposable. The approved survey plan merely
identifies the property preparatory to a judicial proceeding for adjudication
of title. Republic of the Philippines vs. Domingo Espinosa. G.R. No.
176885, July 5, 2010.
Public officers; demotion. There is demotion when an employee is appointed
to a position resulting in diminution of duties, responsibilities, status or rank,
which may or may not involve a reduction in salary. Where an employee is
appointed to a position with the same duties and responsibilities but with
rank and salary higher than those enjoyed in his previous position, there is
no demotion and the appointment is valid. In this case, the appointment of
petitioner to Bank Executive Officer II did not constitute a demotion. Her
duties and responsibilities as Account Officer (her previous position) and as
BEO II are practically the same. Rather than lowering her rank and salary,
petitioners appointment as BEO II had, in fact, resulted in an increase
thereof from salary grade 20 to 24. Further, her appointment to BEO II was
done in good faith and pursuant to a valid reorganization. Virginia D.
Bautista vs. Civil Service Commission and Development Bank of the
Philippines. G.R. No. 185215, July 22, 2010.
Review of COMELEC Decision. In light of the Supreme Courts limited
authority to review findings of fact, it does not ordinarily review in a
certiorari case the COMELECs appreciation and evaluation of
evidence. Findings of fact of the COMELEC, supported by substantial

evidence, are final and non-reviewable. Any misstep by the COMELEC in

this regard generally involves an error of judgment, not of jurisdiction. In
exceptional cases, however, when the COMELECs action on the
appreciation and evaluation of evidence oversteps the limits of its discretion
to the point of being grossly unreasonable, the Supreme Court is not only
obliged, but has the constitutional duty to intervene. When grave abuse of
discretion is present, resulting errors arising from the grave abuse mutate
from error of judgment to one of jurisdiction. Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra vs.
Commission on Elections, et al. G.R. No. 191938, July 2, 2010.
Right to information. Like all constitutional guarantees, the right to
information is not absolute. The peoples right to information is limited to
matters of public concern, and is further subject to such limitations as may
be provided by law. Similarly, the States policy of full disclosure is limited
to transactions involving public interest, and is subject to reasonable
conditions prescribed by law. National board examinations, such as the
certified public accountant board examinations, are matters of public
concern. The populace in general, and the examinees in particular, would
understandably be interested in the fair and competent administration of
these examinations in order to ensure that only those qualified are admitted
into the accounting profession. And as with all matters pedagogical, these
examinations could be not merely quantitative means of assessment, but also
means to further improve the teaching and learning of the art and science of
accounting. On the other hand, there may be valid reasons to limit access to
the examination papers in order to properly administer the tests. More than
the mere convenience of the examiner, it may well be that there exist
inherent difficulties in the preparation, generation, encoding, administration,
and checking of the multiple choice examinations that require that the
questions and answers remain confidential for a limited duration. However,
the Professional Regulation Commission is not a party to the proceedings. It
has not been given an opportunity to explain the reasons behind the
regulations or articulate the justification for keeping the examination
documents confidential. In view of the far-reaching implications of the
cases, which may impact on every board examination administered by the
Professional Regulation Commission, and in order that all relevant issues
may be ventilated, the Court remanded the cases to the Regional Trial Court
for further proceedings. Hazel Ma. C. Antolin vs. Abelardo R. Domondon, et
al./Hazel Ma. C. Antolin vs. Antonieta Fortuna-Ibe.G.R. No. 165036/G.R.
No. 175705, July 5, 2010.

Sanggunian resolution; validity. A municipal resolution correcting an

alleged typographical error in a zoning ordinance does not have to comply
with the requirements of notice and hearing, which are required for the
validity and effectiveness of zoning ordinances. The Learning Child, Inc., et
al. vs. Ayala Alabang Village Association, et al./Jose Marie V. Aquino,
minor and represented by his parents Dr. Errol Aquino and Atty. Marilyn
Aquino, et al. vs. Ayala Alabang Village Association, et al./Ayala Alabang
Village Association, et al. vs. Municipality of Muntinlupa, et al. G.R. No.
134269/G.R. No. 134440/G.R. No. 144518, July 7, 2010.
Standing to sue. Legal standing refers to a partys personal and substantial
interest in a case, arising from the direct injury it has sustained or will
sustain as a result of the challenged governmental action. Legal standing
calls for more than just a generalized grievance. The term interest means
a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the governmental action,
as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere
incidental interest. Unless a persons constitutional rights are adversely
affected by a statute or governmental action, he has no legal standing to
challenge the same. In this case, petitioner challenges the constitutionality
of Section 2.6 of the Distribution Services and Open Access Rules
(DSOAR) of the Energy Regulatory Commission, which obligates
residential end-users to advance the cost of extending power distribution
lines and installing additional facilities. However, petitioners members
consist of developers, brokers, appraisers, contractors, manufacturers,
suppliers, engineers, architects, and other persons or entities engaged in the
housing and real estate business. It does not question the challenged
DSOAR provision as a residential end-user, and it cannot do so because the
challenged provision refers only to the rights and obligations of distribution
utilities and residential end-users; neither the petitioner nor its members are
residential end-users. Thus, neither the petitioner nor its members can claim
any injury, as residential end-users, arising from Section 2.6 of the DSOAR;
neither can they cite any benefit accruing to them as residential end-users
that would result from the invalidation of the assailed provision. Chamber of
Real Estate and Builders Association, Inc. Vs. Energy Regulatory
Commission, et al. G.R. No. 174697, July 8, 2010.
Waiver of locus standi rule. The Court can waive the procedural rule on
standing in cases that raise issues of transcendental importance. Following
are the guidelines in determining whether or not a matter is of transcendental

importance: (1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the
case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or
statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of
the government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and
specific interest in the questions being raised. In this case, the three
determinants are absent. Public funds are not involved. The allegations of
constitutional and statutory violations of the public respondent agency are
unsubstantiated by facts and are mere challenges on the wisdom of the
rules. Parties with a more direct and specific interest in the questions being
raised the residential end-users undoubtedly exist and are not included as
parties to the petition. Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association,
Inc. Vs. Energy Regulatory Commission, et al. G.R. No. 174697, July 8,
2010.
Dissension in the Court: July 2010

Posted on August 4, 2010 by Jose Ma. G. Hofilea Posted in Constitutional Law,
Criminal Law, Remedial Law Tagged certiorari, COMELEC, dangerous drugs
The following are selected decisions promulgated by the High Court in July
from the decision penned by the ponente. Coincidentally, the cases
discussed below each involve subject matters that have been proven to
induce perilous narcotic effects: illegal drugs and local elections.
1. Unbroken Chain of Custody (Abad vs. Villarama)
In People of the Philippines vs. Noel Catentay, Justice Roberto Abad noted
that in a case of illegal sale of dangerous drugs it is essential to prove (1) the
identities of the buyer and the seller; (2) the sale of dangerous drugs, and (3)
the existence of the corpus delicti (i.e., the illicit drug) as evidence. In
connection with the last requirement, it is the duty of the prosecution to
prove the integrity of the corpus delicti by establishing the chain of custody
of the alleged illegal substance that the police officers seized from the
accused. In other words, apart from the existence of an accused (who may
or may not have integrity), the prosecution has to establish the integrity of
the seized article; that it had been preserved from the time the same was

seized to the time it was presented in evidence at the trial.

Justice Abad conceded that the prosecution in this case established through
the arresting officers testimonial evidence that the he seized two sachets of
white crystalline substances from Catentay, marked them with his initials,
heat-sealed the sachets and placed his initials on them. However, because the
prosecution did not present the forensic chemist who opened the sachets and
examined the substances in them, the chemist was unable to attest to the fact
that the substances presented in court were the same substances he found
positive for shabu.
The main decision acknowledged that among the stipulations agreed to at the
pre-trial were that the heat-sealed marked sachets were received by the
forensic chemist who concluded that the contents tested positive for
drugs. However, there was no stipulation or evidence to show that the
forensic chemist properly closed and resealed the plastic sachets with
adhesive and placed his own markings on the resealed plastic to preserve the
integrity of their contents until they were brought to court. Instead, the
plastic sachets presented at the pre-trial did not bear the forensic chemists
seal and was brought from the crime laboratory by someone who did not
care to testify how he came to be in possession of the same. Accordingly,
the evidence did not establish the unbroken chain of custody. Catentay
acquitted.
Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr., the sole dissenter, asserted that the fact that
the forensic chemist was not presented should not operate to acquit
Catentay. According to Justice Villarama, in a precedent ruling, the Court
held that the non-presentation of a forensic chemist in illegal drug cases is an
insufficient cause for acquittal since the report prepared by the chemist
regarding a recovered prohibited drug enjoys the presumption of regularity
in its preparation and should be deemed conclusive in the absence of
evidence proving the contrary.
(People of the Philippines vs. Noel Catentay, G.R. No. 183101, July 6, 2010.
See dissenting opinion here.)

(authors note: This author surmises, based on the recital of facts in both
the main decision and the dissent, that the prosecution had this case won
until they curiously failed in the seemingly easy task of presenting the
forensic chemist (this feels much like a basketball game where the team that
is ahead for most of the game squanders its large lead in the last two
minutes). That the prosecution should have presented the forensic chemist
seems clear since it was expressly stipulated at pre-trial that the chemist will
identify the illegal drugs he examined. In support of his contrary
conclusion, Justice Villarama cited a precedent ruling (People
v. Zenaida Quebral y Mateo, et al.). However, from the excerpt from
Quebral that the dissenter himself quoted, the defense in that case actually
agreed during trial to dispense with the testimony of the chemist and
stipulated on his findings. The rulings do not say that there was a similar
agreement in this case. This author thus sides with the majority.)
2. An Arbitrary, Despotic and Hostile Comelec (Brion vs. Velasco)
The case of Mitra vs. Comelec, et al., penned by Justice Arturo D. Brion
involved the qualification of Abraham Kahlil Baham Mitra to be elected to
the post of Governor of the Province of Palawan. In particular, it entailed
ascertaining whether Mitra fulfilled the residency requirement.
At the time this action arose, Mitra, then a domiciliary of Puerto Princesa,
was the duly elected Congressional representative of the second district of
Palawan which district, among others, encompassed the Municipality of
Aborlan and Puerto Princesa City. His term as Representative was to expire
in 2010.
On March 26, 2007, Puerto Princesa City was reclassified as a highly
urbanized city and thus ceased to be a component city of the Province of
Palawan. The direct legal consequence of this new status was the
ineligibility of Puerto Princesa City residents from voting for candidates for
elective provincial officials.
On March 20, 2009, with the intention of running for the position of
Governor, Mitra applied for the transfer of his Voters Registration Record
from a precinct in Puerto Princesa to one in the Municipality of Aborlan. He
subsequently filed his certificate of candidacy (COC) for the position of

Governor of Palawan as a resident of Aborlan.

As a result of this, the private respondents filed a petition to deny due course
or to cancel Mitras COC arguing that Mitra remained a resident of Puerto
Princesa and had not yet established residence in Aborlan and, therefore, he
is not qualified to run for Governor of Palawan. Mitra, on the other hand,
asserted that he had abandoned Puerto Princesa City as his domicile of
origin, and has established a new domicile in Aborlan since 2008.
The matter was first heard summarily at the Commission on Electionss
(Comelec) First Division wherein both parties had submitted evidence
consisting of a miscellany of photographs, affidavits, community tax
certificates, building permit applications, lease and sale deeds and other
legal documents that ostensibly supported each of their conflicting
positions. The First Division evaluated the evidence and ultimately issued a
decision that Mitra had not sufficiently established his residency in Aborlan
and thus, his COC should be cancelled. The matter was expectedly elevated
to the Comelec en banc who likewise reviewed the factual evidence
submitted by the parties and eventually affirmed the decision of the First
Division.
Mitra thus sought relief from the Supreme Court, including injunctive relief
given that the May 2010 elections were fast approaching. Six days before
the elections, the Supreme Court issued a status quo ante order allowing
Mitra to be voted for in the May 10, 2010 elections wherein Mitra obtained
the highest number of votes as Governor of Palawan.
With respect to Mitras assertion that the Comelec acted with grave abuse of
discretion in the manner by which it appreciated the evidence presented,
Justice Brion reiterated that the concept of grave abuse of discretion
generally refers to capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Justice Brion continued to explain that:
the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion
of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to
act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. Mere
abuse of discretion is not enough; it must be grave. We have held, too, that

the use of wrong or irrelevant considerations in deciding an issue is

sufficient to taint a decision-makers action with grave abuse of discretion.
Justice Brion followed with noting that under Section 5, Rule 64 of the
Rules of Court, that findings of fact of the Comelec, supported by substantial
evidence, shall be final and non-reviewable. Accordingly, the Supreme
Court does not ordinarily review the Comelecs appreciation and evaluation
of evidence in a certiorari case as any misstep by the Comelec in this regard
generally involves an error of judgment, not of jurisdiction.
However, the ponente added that:
in exceptional cases, when the Comelecs action on the appreciation and
evaluation of evidence oversteps the limits of its discretion to the point of
being grossly unreasonable, the Court is not only obliged, but has the
constitutional duty to intervene. When grave abuse of discretion is present,
resulting errors arising from the grave abuse mutate from error of judgment
to one of jurisdiction.
On this basis, the majority proceeded to evaluate the evidence of the parties
against the findings of fact of the Comelec and came to the conclusion that
the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in its appreciation of the evidence
that lead it to conclude that Mitra is not a resident of Aborlan, Palawan. The
Comelec used wrong considerations and grossly misread the evidence in
arriving at its ruling. The Comelec also, according to the Court, failed to
critically consider whether Mitra deliberately attempted to mislead,
misinform or hide a fact that would otherwise render him ineligible for the
position of Governor of Palawan (under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code, a petition to cancel a COC requires proof that any material
representation in a COC is false).
In disagreeing with the majority, Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. took issue
with the majoritys determination that the Comelec acted with grave abuse
of discretion. He noted that in the absence of grave abuse of discretion or
any jurisdictional infirmity or error of law, the factual findings, conclusions,
rulings and decisions rendered by the Comelec on matters falling within its
competence should not be interfered with by the Supreme Court. The
Comelecs appreciation and evaluation of evidence is not ordinarily

reviewed by the Supreme Court since any error on this regard generally
involves and error of judgment, not an error of jurisdiction. Thus, where the
issue or question involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the
decision not the jurisdiction of the court to render said decision Justice
Velasco argues that the same is beyond the province of a special civil action
for certiorari.
Accordingly, Justice Brion, in the dissenters consideration, was clearly in
error when he substituted the factual findings of the Comelec based on
substantial evidence with its own findings of facts which were based on
controverted or unsubstantiated evidence.
At any rate, Justice Velasco proceeded to himself evaluate the evidence of
the parties and having done so, maintained the position that in view of the
overwhelming evidence submitted by the private respondents, the Comelec
correctly cancelled Mitras COC.
(Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra vs. Commission on Elections, Antonio vs.
Gonzales and Orlando R. Balbon, Jr., G.R. No. 191938, July 2, 2010. See
dissenting opinion here.)

Posted on July 12, 2010 by Jose Ma. G. Hofilea Posted in Constitutional Law Tagged
immunity, PCGG
Deal or No Deal? (Abad vs. Bersamin)

The following is a decision promulgated by the High Court in June 2010
where one Justice felt compelled to express his dissent from the decision
penned by the ponente.
The case of Jesus P. Disini vs. The Honorable Sandiganbayan and the
Republic of the Philippines (represented by the Presidential Commission on
Good Government) involves a question on the extent to which the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) can enter into an

immunity deal with a person in exchange for the latters testimony.

In early 1989, in order to entice Jesus Disini to testify against Westinghouse
Electric Corporation in a civil case before the United States District Court of
New Jersey and in an arbitration case that Westinghouse International
Projects Company and others filed against the Republic of the Philippines
before the International Chamber of Commerce Court of Arbitration (such
cases pertaining to the scuttled construction of the Bataan Nuclear Power
Plant that was brokered by a company of Disinis cousin, Herminio Disini),
the PCGG entered into an Immunity Agreement under which Disini
undertook to testify for the government and provide necessary information
that they needed for prosecuting those two cases.
Disini, however, was apparently concerned about having to further strain his
familial relationship with his cousin but to assuage his fears, the Republic
guaranteed that, apart from the two cases, it agreed not compel Disini to
testify in any other domestic or foreign proceeding brought by the Republic
against Herminio Disini.
Thus, paragraphs 1 and 3 of the Immunity Agreement stated:
The Republic of the Philippines by this instrument agrees that it shall not
compel the testimony of Jesus P. Disini in any proceeding, domestic or
foreign, other than this civil matter and these arbitration proceedings and, in
the event this civil matter or any portion thereof is referred for arbitration,
then and in that event, in said arbitration proceedings resulting from said
reference.
x
Should the Republic of the Philippines name Herminio T. Disini a defendant

in any of the above-referenced matters, or in any resulting arbitration
proceeding, or any other proceeding ancillary to said matters, the Republic
of the Philippines shall not call Jesus P. Disini to testify as a witness in said
matters on any claim brought by the Republic of the Philippines against
Herminio T. Disini. Nothing herein shall affect Jesus P. Disinis obligation
to provide truthful information or testimony.

In February 2007, however, or 18 years after the Immunity Agreement was

executed, the Sandiganbayan, upon application by the Republic, issued a
subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum against Disini, compelling
Disini to testify and produce documents before the Sandiganbayan in an
action that the Republic had filed against Heminio. Disini filed a motion to
quash the subpoena on the basis of the Immunity Agreement but the
Sandiganbayan ignored the same.
Four months later, or in July 2007, the PCGG issued a resolution revoking
and nullifying the Immunity Agreement insofar as it prohibited the Republic
from requiring Disini to testify against Herminio. Expectedly, Disini
brought the matter up to the Supreme Court.
The Republic first claimed that Section 5 of Executive Order No. 14 gave
the PCGG the power to grant immunity merely from criminal or civil
prosecution and does not cover immunity from giving evidence in a case
before the courts. Section 5 of EO 14 reads:
Sec. 5. The Presidential Commission on Good Government is authorized to
grant immunity from criminal prosecution to any person who provides
information or testifies in any investigation conducted by such Commission
to establish the unlawful manner in which any respondent, defendant or
accused has acquired or accumulated the property or properties in question
in any case where such information or testimony is necessary to ascertain or
prove the latters guilt or his civil liability. The immunity thereby granted
shall be continued to protect the witness who repeats such testimony before
the Sandiganbayan when required to do so by the latter or by the
Commission.
Justice Roberto A. Abad, in speaking for the majority, asserted (based also
on previous rulings of the Court) that the language of Section 5 grants the
PCGG a discretion to extend appropriate levels of criminal immunity and
can even agree to conditions expressed by a witness that it deems sufficient
to induce such witnesss cooperation. Thus, in the Immunity Agreement, the
PCGG was authorized to consent not only to criminal and civil immunity,
but also immunity from being compelled to testify.

In fact, Justice Abad reasoned out, the guarantee given by the PCGG to
Disini against being compelled to testify actually constitutes a grant of
immunity from criminal or civil prosecution. The ponente explained that if
Disini refused to testify, such act would most certainly constitute an act of
indirect contempt for willful disobedience of an order of a
court. Consequently, the grant of immunity to Disini against being
compelled to testify being ultimately a grant of immunity from being
criminally prosecuted by the State for refusal to testify, is something that
falls within the express coverage of the immunity given him.
The Republic countered that the immunity granted to Disini contravenes
public policy relating to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth. Justice Abad
retorted by pointing out that the authority that enunciated such public policy
is the same authority that granted the PCGG with powers to extend
immunity.
On Disinis estoppel argument, the Republic noted that under Section 15,
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, [t]he right of the State to recover
properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees from them
or from their nominees, or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription,
laches or estoppel.
On this point, Justice Abad held that the estoppel that Disini asserted does
not have the effect of denying the State the right to recover ill-gotten wealth
as there are other ways of proving such ill-gotten wealthy without the
testimony of Disini. Moreover, Justice Abad reminded the Republic that the
rule is that the government may not be barred by estoppel for unauthorized
acts of public officers. But in this case, the action of the PCGG in granting
immunity was within its authority.
Finally, in addressing the Republics claim that the last sentence of
paragraph 3 of the Immunity Agreement enjoined Disini, despite the
immunity given him against being compelled to testify in other cases, to
provide truthful information or testimony in such other cases, the ponente
held that such sentence should be interpreted as requiring Disini to provide
truthful information or testimony in the two Westinghouse cases where
Disini undertook to testify.

As his parting shot, Just Abad castigated the Republic for its attempt to
double-cross Disini and admonished it to be fair.
Justice Lucas P. Bersamin came out swinging and commenced his dissent
with a lament that if there was anyone who was double-crossed, it is the
long-suffering Filipino people because the permission given to Disini to
shirk away from his obligation to testify inflicts a severe blow to the
faltering effort of the government to recover ill-gotten wealth from Herminio
and his companies.
The dissenter reasoned out against the majority decisions upholding the
Immunity Agreement in the following manner:
1. The grant of immunity to Disini from testifying against Herminio
pursuant to paragraph 3 of the Immunity Agreement contravened the
essential purpose behind the PCGGs establishment as Disinis refusal to
testify effectively deprives the government of the opportunity to successfully
prosecute Herminio. When the PCGG revoked paragraph 3 of the Immunity
Agreement, it merely acknowledged such paragraphs inherent
inefficaciousness under Section 15, Article XI of the 1987 of the
Constitution. Even so, since paragraph 3 was contrary to the states policy
on the urgent need to recover illegally acquired wealth, the same was void
and inefficacious.
That public policy was the reason why paragraph 3 of the Immunity
Agreement was qualified with the statement that [n]othing herein shall
affect Jesus P. Disinis obligation to provide truthful information or
testimony.
2. Disini himself admitted to the authority of the PCGG to repudiate
Immunity Agreement when in a pleading, Disini asserted that since
Immunity Agreement was approved by the PCGG en banc, then only
PCGG en banc could repudiate the Immunity Agreement (and not
lawyers of the Republic).
the
the
the
the
3. Paragraph 3 of the Immunity Agreement was intended to apply

prospectively. Since the case against Herminio had been pending prior to
the execution of the Immunity Agreement, then the immunity from testifying

cannot be made to apply to that pending case.

(Jesus P. Disini vs. The Honorable Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No. 180564,
June 22, 2010. See dissenting opinion here.)

Posted on July 9, 2010 by Vicente D. Gerochi IV Posted in Constitutional Law
Tagged agrarian reform, arrest, due process, Ecozone, just compensation, party list,
PCGG, warrantless arrest
Here are selected June 2010 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines
on political law:
Administrative cases; quantum of evidence. In administrative cases, the
quantum of evidence necessary to find an individual administratively liable
is substantial evidence. Substantial evidence does not necessarily mean
preponderant proof as required in ordinary civil cases, but such kind of
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion or evidence commonly accepted by reasonably prudent men in
the conduct of their affairs. The evidence upon which respondents
administrative liability would be anchored lacked that degree of certainty
required in administrative cases, because the two separate audits conducted
by the Commission on Audit yielded conflicting results. Evidence of
shortage in respondents cash and accounts, as alleged in the first audit
report, is imperative to hold him liable. In this case, the evidence against
respondent could not be relied upon, because the second audit report, which
was favorable to him, necessarily puts into question the reliability of the
initial audit findings. Whether the zero balance as appearing in the second
audit report was correct or inadvertently indicated, the credibility and
accuracy of the two audit reports were already tarnished. Even in
administrative cases, a degree of moral certainty is necessary to support a
finding of liability. Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) vs. Rodolfo
Zaldarriaga, G.R. No. 175349, June 22, 2010.

Agrarian cases; just compensation. The taking of property under the

Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) is a government exercise of
the power of eminent domain. Since the determination of just compensation
in eminent domain proceedings is a judicial function, a court proceeding to
fix just compensation cannot be made to depend on the existence of, and is
considered separate and independent from, an administrative case of a
similar nature. Thus, the filing by the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP)
of a new petition for judicial determination of just compensation after the
dismissal without prejudice of another LBP-initiated court proceeding on the
same issue cannot be regarded as barred by the filing of the latter proceeding
beyond the 15-day period prescribed under Rule XIII, Section 11 of the
Rules of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).
Although the formula for fixing just compensation found in Section 17 of
the CARL may be justly adopted in certain cases, it is by no means the only
formula that the court may adopt in determining just compensation. Land
Bank of the Philippines vs. Fortune Savings and Loan Association, Inc.,
represented by Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation, G.R. No. 177511,
June 29, 2010.
Due process; local autonomy; police power. Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) Administrative Order No. 01-02, as amended, which sets out rules on
land use conversion, does not violate the due process clause, because in
providing administrative and criminal penalties, the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform simply implements the provisions of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law and the Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization Act, both of
which provide penalties for illegal land conversion. Contrary to petitioners
assertions, the penalties provided under DAR AO No. 01-02 are imposed
upon the illegal or premature conversion of lands within DARs jurisdiction.
In providing that reclassification of agricultural lands by local government
units (LGUs) shall be subject to the requirements of, and procedures for,
land use conversion, including DAR approval or clearance, DAR AO No.
01-02 did not violate the autonomy of the LGUs. The power of LGUs to
reclassify agricultural lands is not absolute, and the Local Government Code
recognizes the authority of DAR to approve conversion of agricultural lands.
DAR Memorandum No. 88, which temporarily suspended the processing
and approval of all land use conversion applications, is a valid exercise of
police power, as it was issued upon the instruction of the President in order
to address the unabated conversion of prime agricultural lands for real estate

development because of the worsening rice shortage in the country at that

time. Such measure was made in order to ensure that there are enough
agricultural lands in which rice cultivation and production may be carried
into. Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Inc. vs. The
Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 183409, June 18, 2010.
Jurisdiction over election cases; administrative regulation; substitution of

party-list nominees. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over a controversy
in which the petitioner is seeking to be seated as the second nominee of a
party-list group on the basis that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it issued a
resolution approving that groups withdrawal of his nomination and
substitution by another nominee. Such controversy is neither an election
protest nor an action for quo warranto, both of which are within the
jurisdiction of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. Petitioner
correctly brought before the Supreme Court this special civil action for
certiorari under Section 7 of Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution,
notwithstanding the proclamation of, and assumption of office by, the
substitute nominee.
The COMELEC exceeded its authority when it issued an implementing
regulation allowing a party-list nominee to be substituted when his
nomination is withdrawn by his party, because the statutory provision
(Section 8 of the Party-List System Act) that such regulation seeks to
implement provides an exclusive list of instances in which a party-list
organization can substitute its nominees, and the above ground for
substitution is not one of those instances. It is basic that implementing rules
and regulations should remain consistent with, and cannot override or
modify, the law they intend to carry out. Luis K. Lokin, Jr. vs. Commission
on Elections, et al./Luis K. Lokin, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, et al.
G.R. Nos. 179431-32/G.R. No. 180443. June 22, 2010.
Party list; Qualifications of party-list nominees. The provision in Section 9
of Republic Act No. 7941 (The Party-List System Act) that a nominee of the
youth sector must be at least 25 but not more than 30 years of age on the day
of the election applies to all youth sector nominees of any party-list group.
Public respondent erroneously interpreted that provision as applying only to
those nominated during the first three congressional terms after the

ratification of the 1987 Constitution or until 1998, unless a sectoral party is

thereafter registered exclusively as representing the youth sector.
Section 15 of RA 7941 provides that a nominee of a sectoral party who
changes his sectoral affiliation within the same party is not eligible for
nomination under the new sectoral affiliation unless such change occurred at
least six months before the elections. There is no textual support in the law
for public respondents argument that Section 15 does not apply to private
respondents shift of affiliation from his partys youth sector to its sector
representing overseas Filipino workers and their families on the basis that
there was no resultant change in party affiliation. Section 15 clearly covers
changes in both political party and sectoral affiliation within the same party.
Milagros E. Amores vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and
Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva. G.R. No. 189600, June 29, 2010.
Philippine Economic Zone Authority; jurisdiction over building and fencing
permits. By specific provision of law, it is the Philippine Economic Zone
Authority (PEZA), through its building officials, which has authority to
issue building permits for the construction of structures within the areas
owned or administered by it, whether on public or private lands. Corollary
to this, PEZA, through its director general, may require owners of structures
built without said permit to remove such structures within 60
days. Otherwise, PEZA may summarily remove them at the expense of the
owner of the houses, buildings or structures. Considering that, in this case, a
fencing permit is issued complementary to a building permit and that, within
its premises, PEZA may properly issue a building permit, it is only fitting
that fencing permits be issued by PEZA within such premises. Philippine
Economic Zone Authority vs. Joseph Jude Carantes, et al., G.R. No. 181274,
June 23, 2010.
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation; power to grant casino
licenses in economic zones. The Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR) draws its authority and power to operate, license
and regulate casinos from its charter, Presidential Decree No. 1869, and not
from Section 5 of Executive Order No. 80, dated April 3, 1993 (which
extended to the Clark Special Economic Zone (CSEZ) all applicable
incentives granted to the Subic Bay Special Economic Zone), in relation to
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 7227, which created the Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority and empowered it to license tourism related

activities except casinos which shall continue to be licensed by

PAGCOR. Thus, PAGCOR did not lose its power to license and regulate
casinos when the Supreme Court nullified Section 5 of EO 80. It incorrectly
argued that such nullification automatically invalidated its memorandum of
agreement with respondent for the operation of a casino inside the CSEZ. It
cannot therefore, on the basis of that position, revoke such memorandum of
agreement and replace it with its new Standard Authority to Operate.
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation vs. Fontana Development
Corporation, G.R. No. 187972, June 29, 2010.
Presidential Commission on Good Government; power to grant
immunity. The scope of immunity that the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG) may offer to witnesses under Section 5 of
Executive Order No. 14 may vary. It has discretion to grant appropriate
levels of criminal immunity depending on the situation of the witness and
his relative importance to the prosecution of ill-gotten wealth cases. It can
even agree to conditions expressed by the witness as sufficient to induce
cooperation. In petitioners case, respondent Republic of the Philippines,
acting through the PCGG, offered him not only criminal and civil immunity
but also immunity against being compelled to testify in any domestic or
foreign proceeding, other than the civil and arbitration cases identified in the
Immunity Agreement, just so he would agree to testify. Trusting in the
Governments honesty and fidelity, petitioner agreed and fulfilled his part of
the bargain. Surely, the principle of fair play, which is the essence of due
process, should hold the Republic on to its promise. The immunity from
criminal or civil prosecution that Section 5 of EO 14 authorizes covers
immunity from giving evidence in a case before a court of law, because in
reality the guarantee given to a witness against being compelled to testify
constitutes a grant of immunity from civil or criminal prosecution. Jesus P.
Disini vs. The Honorable Sandiganbayan, et al.,G.R. No. 180564, June 22,
2010.
Standing to sue. Petitioners citizenship and taxpayer status do not
automatically clothe him with standing to bring suit. The Supreme Court
will grant access to citizens suits on the narrowest of ground: when they
raise issues of transcendental importance calling for urgent
resolution. Three factors are relevant in the Courts determination to allow
third party suits so it can resolve the merits of the crucial issues raised the
character of funds or assets involved in the controversy; a clear disregard of

constitutional or statutory prohibition; and the lack of any other party with a
more direct and specific interest to bring the suit. Petitioners suspension
from the practice of law bars him from performing any activity, in or out of
court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience. Preparing a petition raising carefully crafted
arguments on equal protection grounds and employing highly legalistic rules
of statutory construction falls within the proscribed conduct. Allan F.
Paguia vs. Office of the President, et al., G.R. No. 176278, June 25, 2010.
Warrantless search; arrest without warrant. The search of a moving vehicle
is one of the doctrinally accepted exceptions to the Constitutional mandate
that no search or seizure shall be made except by virtue of a warrant issued
by a judge after personally determining the existence of probable cause. In
the instances the Supreme Court has recognized as exceptions to the
requirement of a judicial warrant, it is necessary that the officer effecting the
seizure must have been impelled to do so because of probable cause. The
essential requisite of probable cause must be satisfied before a warrantless
search can be lawfully conducted. The vehicle that carried the contraband or
prohibited drugs was about to leave. The searching officer had to make a
quick decision and act fast. It would be unreasonable to require him to
procure a warrant before conducting the search under the circumstances. He
only had enough time to board the vehicle before the same left for its
destination. Given the above, and the fact that the officer had probable
cause to search the packages allegedly containing illegal drugs, the search in
this case was valid. A search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest
can precede the arrest if the police has probable cause to make the arrest at
the outset of the search. Given that the search was valid, appellants arrest
based on that search was also valid. People of the Philippines vs. Belen
Mariacos, G.R. No. 188611, June 16, 2010.
May 2010 Philippine Supreme Court

Posted on June 11, 2010 by Vicente D. Gerochi IV Posted in Constitutional Law
Tagged agrarian reform, COMELEC, electoral tribunal, eminent domain, just

compensation, local government
Here are selected May 2010 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines
on political law:
Agrarian reform; coverage. Lands acquired by the National Housing
Authority for resettlement purposes or housing development are exempt
from the coverage of agrarian reform laws. Such acquisition converts the
land by operation of law from agricultural to residential. The National
Housing Authority is not bound to pay disturbance compensation to any
tenant in possession of the purchased land. National Housing Authority vs.
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, et al., G.R. No.
175200, May 4, 2010.
Agrarian reform; just compensation. In computing just compensation for
rice lands tenanted as of October 21, 1972, the grant of 6% yearly interest
under DAR Administrative Order No. 13, Series of 1994, as amended, must
be reckoned from October 21, 1972 up to the time of actual payment of the
compensation, and not only up to the time the Land Bank of the Philippines
approves payment of the compensation and deposits the amount in the name
of the landowner, considering that release of such deposit is still subject to
compliance with documentary requirements. The concept of just
compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to
be paid to the owner of the land, but also payment within a reasonable time
from its taking. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Domingo and Mamerto
Soriano, G.R. No. 180772 & G.R. No. 180776, May 6, 2010.
Commission on Elections; registration of party coalition. Comelec may not,
through a resolution setting the deadline for registration of political parties,
differentiate between political parties, on the one hand, and political
organizations and coalitions, on the other. There is no substantial distinction
among these entities germane to the act of registration that would justify
creating distinctions among them in terms of deadlines. Thus, Comelec
Resolution No. 8646, dated July 14, 2009, which sets August 17, 2009 as the
deadline for filing petitions for registration of political parties, without
mentioning political organizations and coalitions, should be understood as
covering the latter entities as well. A petition for registration as a political
coalition filed beyond that deadline is time-barred, and the Comelec
resolution granting that petition constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

Political coalitions, even if composed of registered political parties, need to

register separately in accordance with established norms and procedures, if
they are to be recognized as such and be given the benefits accorded by law
to registered coalitions. Registered political parties carry a different legal
personality from that of the coalition they may wish to establish with other
registered parties. If parties want to coalesce with one another without the
formal registration of their coalition, they can do so on their own in the
exercise of their and their members democratic freedom of choice, but they
cannot receive official recognition for their coalition. Liberal Party, etc. et
al. vs. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 191771, May 6, 2010.
Electoral tribunals; grave abuse of discretion. The Supreme Courts

jurisdiction to review decisions and orders of electoral tribunals is exercised
only upon showing of grave abuse of discretion committed by the tribunal;
otherwise, the Court will not interfere with the tribunals exercise of its
discretion and jurisdiction. There was no grave abuse of discretion when the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal ordered to continue the revision
and appreciation of ballots after the case had been submitted for
resolution and when it issued its decisions without the participation of any
of the Justices of the Court who were members of that tribunal. Henry Jun
Dueas, Jr. vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, et al., G.R. No.
191550, May 4, 2010.
Province; requirements for creation. Section 10 of Article X of the
Constitution mandates that the criteria in the Local Government Code must
be followed in the creation of a province. Any derogation of or deviation
from those criteria violates the Constitution. Thus, a law creating a
province, which failed to comply with either the population or territorial
requirement of the Local Government Code, is unconstitutional. The Court
can pass upon the validity of such law even if the province it created has
begun its existence. Rodolfo G. Navarro, et al. vs. Executive Secretary
Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 180050, May 12, 2010.
Right to information; duty to disclose. Comelec has the duty and can be

compelled to explain fully its preparations for the May 10, 2010 elections
under Section 7 of Article III of the Constitution on the peoples right to
information and Section 28 of Article II on the States corresponding duty of
full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest. Any
citizen can file a petition for mandamus if the same is anchored on the
peoples right to information. Teofisto Guingona, Jr. et al. vs. Commission
on Elections,G.R. No. 191846, May 6, 2010.
Dissension in the Court: May 2010

Posted on June 7, 2010 by Jose Ma. G. Hofilea Posted in Constitutional Law Tagged
COMELEC, information, local government, mandamus
The following are selected decisions promulgated by the High Court in May
from the decision penned by the ponente. In two out of the three decisions
featured here, we see our new Chief Justice Renato C. Corona parting ways
with the majority on certain aspects of the main decision.
1.
Primary Jurisdiction of the Comelec En Banc (Brion vs. Corona)
Liberal Party vs. Commission on Elections is a case that involves the

registration of political coalitions, the grant of accreditation to the dominant
parties and validity of the Comelec en bancs authority to act on the
registration of political party coalitions.
Briefly, the Nationalista Party (NP) and the Nationalist Peoples Coalition
(NPC) filed a single petition with the Comelec for the registration of their
coalition (the NP-NPC Coalition) and the accreditation of the NP-NPC
Coalition as the dominant minority party for purposes of the May 10, 2010
elections. The Liberal Party, who was also seeking accreditation as dominant
minority party, objected to this petition.
Instead of passing the petition first through a Comelec division, the Comelec
en banc directly assumed jurisdiction of the NP-NPC Coalitions petition
and eventually decided to grant NP-NPC Coalitions petition for registration
as a political party coalition.

In justifying its direct assumption of jurisdiction (as opposed to having the

petition first be heard by division), the Comelec cited a February 2003
Supreme Court ruling in Baytan vs. COMELEC in which it was held that the
registration of coalitions involves the exercise of the Comelecs
administrative powers and not its quasi-judicial powers; hence, the Comelec
en banc can directly act on it. Baytan further held that there is no
constitutional requirement that a petition for registration of a coalition
should be decided first by a division. In Baytan, the Supreme Court held that
the Constitution merely vests the Comelecs administrative powers in the
Commission on Elections, while providing that the Comelec may sit en
banc or in two divisions. Thus, asserted the Comelec, the Comelec en banc
can act directly on matters falling within its administrative powers.
Speaking for the majority, on the matter of the Comelec en bancs direct
assumption of jurisdiction, Justice Arturo D. Brion appears to have upheld
the view espoused by one of the dissenting Comelec Commissioners
Commissioner Rene Sarmiento that the Comelec sitting en banc had no
jurisdiction over the NP-NPC Coalitions petition for registration as a
political party coalition and accreditation as dominant minority party.
According to Commissioner Sarmiento, Rule 32 of the Comelec Rules,

which is found under Letter F of the Rules entitled Special Proceedings,
governs the registration of coalitions. Under Section 3 of the Comelec Rules,
the Commission sitting in two (2) Divisions, shall have jurisdiction to hear
and decide cases falling under special proceedings, with the exception of the
accreditation of citizens arms of the Comelec. His dissent concluded that
the present petition is within the jurisdiction of the Comelec sitting in
Division and not of the Comelec sitting en banc, citing a November 1999
Supreme Court case, Villarosa v. COMELEC.
Even as there seems to have been a finding by Justice Brion that NP-NPC
Coalitions petition for registration as a political party coalition should have
first been heard at the division level, the majority decision proceeded
nonetheless to rule on the rest of the procedural and substantive issues raised
and ultimately held that the NP-NPC petition was filed out of time in
accordance with the Comelecs rules.

Enter Justice Renato C. Corona, objecting to that portion of the majority

decision that found the Comelec to have gravely abused its discretion by the
Comelec en bancs assumption of jurisdiction at the first instance.
Justice
Corona
pointed
out
that
under
the
Constitution,
the Comelec exercises both administrative and quasi-judicial powers and
that the Comelec en banc can act directly on matters falling within its
administrative powers. It is only when the exercise of quasi-judicial powers
are involved that the Comelec is mandated to decide cases first in division,
and then, upon motion for reconsideration, en banc.
He noted that in Baytan (subsequently reiterated in Bautista v. COMELEC),

the power of the Comelec under Section 2(5), Article IX-C of the
Constitution to register political parties, organizations or coalitions is
administrative in nature. Thus, the Comelec en banc acted properly when it
took direct cognizance of the petition of the NP and the NPC.
According to his dissent, the test for determining whether a particular power
of the Comelec is administrative (and may therefore be acted on directly by
the Comelec en banc) or quasi-judicial (and should therefore be brought first
to a Division of the Comelec) employed in the earlier case
of Villarosa v. COMELEC can be said to have been modified by the more
recent case of Baytan. Justice Corona added that while it referred to
the Villarosa test, Bautista invoked and reiterated Baytans delineation of
the administrative and quasi-judicial functions of the COMELEC.
Thus, for Justice Corona, since the Comelec en banc has the authority to
directly take cognizance of the petition for registration of the NP and
the NPC as a coalition, as an independent constitutional body, it may also
exercise its discretion to liberally construe its rules of procedure or even to
suspend the said rules or any portion thereof in the interest of justice.
(Liberal Party, etc. et al. vs. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No.
191771, May 6, 2010. See dissenting opinion here.)

(authors note: first, the disclaimerthis author has not checked out Rule
32 of the Comelec Rules directlynor anything other than the decision,
actually. However, he notes that neither the main decision nor the dissent
makes a reference as to the date when the Comelec Rules were adopted so
perhaps it was not a material fact. That said, this author notes that the
losing party, i.e., the Comelec, explained that the Comelec en banc, in the
exercise of administrative powers, could take first instance cognizance of
the NP-NPC Coalition petition, on the basis of a 2003 Supreme Court
ruling (Baytan). The majority decision, on the other hand, supported a
position that relied on a 1999 decision (Villarosa) in asserting that the
petition had to first be taken up at the division level. Obviously, the 2003
case cited by the Comelec (and by Justice Corona in his dissent) is a more
recent case than the 1999 one. It may seem strange if not unfair then, if
the Comelecs decision to rely on a more recent Supreme Court ruling
rather than an older one is part of what the Supreme Court concluded as
constituting grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Comelec. At any
rate, if this author were a member of the Supreme Courtwhich he is not,
and may never be at the rate he is goinghe would have ruled in favor of
the Liberal Party, as the majority did, on the substantive issues raised
against the NP-NPC Coalitions petition.)
2.
The Right to Information, Mandamus and Tyranny (Carpio vs.
Corona and Abad)
Teofisto Guingona,
Jr. et al vs. COMELEC pits
Justice Antonio
T. Carpio against the tandem of Justice Renato C. Corona and Justice
Roberto A. Abad. Carpio vs. Coronawhere have we heard that before?
With less than three weeks to go before the May 10, 2010 elections, the
petitioners filed with the Supreme Court, a special civil action for mandamus
against the Comelec, compelling it to fully explain details of, and disclose
public documents relating to, its preparations for the May 10, 2010 elections,
in view of the unraveling of alarming events to date as reported in the
media (e.g., wrong ultraviolet ink used in the printing of ballots, overpriced
ballot secrecy folders, failing PCOS machines and, as the court took judicial
notice of from media reports, defects in the configuration of compact flash

cards).
The Comelec responded to the petition by saying that petitioners have no
legal standing to file the special civil action for mandamus. It insisted that
petitioners have no valid cause of action against it and argued there is no
proof petitioners had requested the release of the public documents
mentioned in the petition (a petition for mandamus generally requires that
available administrative remedies must first be exhausted).
On the matter of standing, Justice Antonio T. Carpio ruled that in a petition
anchored on the peoples Constitutional right to information on matters of
public concern, any citizen can be the real party in interest and it is sufficient
that the petitioner is in fact a citizen. The petitioners in this case, all
Filipinos, have the adequate standing to file the action for mandamus.
On the various matters which petitioners seek the Comelec to explain and
disclose, Justice Carpio stated that [t]he peoples constitutional right to
information is intertwined with the governments constitutional duty of full
public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest. For every right
of the people, there is a corresponding duty on the part of those who govern
to protect and respect that right
In validating the information requested by the petitioners as being in the
public interest, Justice Carpio declared that [t]here can be no doubt that the
coming 10 May 2010 elections is a matter of great public concern. On
election day, the countrys registered voters will come out to exercise the
sacred right of suffrage. Not only is it an exercise that ensures the
preservation of our democracy, the coming elections also embodies our
peoples last ounce of hope for a better future. It is the final opportunity,
patiently awaited by our people, for the peaceful transition of power to the
next chosen leaders of our country. If there is anything capable of directly
affecting the lives of ordinary Filipinos so as to come within the ambit of a
public concern, it is the coming elections, more so with the alarming turn of
events that continue to unfold. The wanton wastage of public funds brought
about by one bungled contract after another, in staggering amounts, is in
itself a matter of grave public concern.
With respect to the claim of the Comelec that the petitioners did not

establish that they had made a request with the Comelec in the first instance
for the information the disclosure of which they had filed a case of
mandamus for, the majority decision pointed to a recent
case, Roque vs. COMELEC,
in
which
a
petitioner
against
the Comelec sought a judicial order to require the Comelec to disclose the
source code. In that case, says Justice Carpio the Comelec admitted to
having received a prior request for disclosure of the source code.
Thus, the majority held that [t]he Court may, and given the alarming
developments of late in the run-up to the 10 May 2010 elections, should
compel Comelec to disclose fully the complete details of its preparations
This Court, as the last bulwark of democracy in this country, will spare
nothing in its constitutionally granted powers to ensure that the fundamental
right of the people to information on matters of public concern, especially on
matters that directly affect our democratic processes, is fully guaranteed,
protected, and implemented.
In his dissent, Justice Renato C. Corona derided the way the majority
decision either inadvertently overlooked the duty of self-consciousness
imposed by the Court upon itself or overeagerly sidestepped such duty at the
expense of an independent constitutional body, the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC). He added: In any case, the Court may have scored positive
points with the public but trespassed on the constitutional prerogatives of
the COMELEC. At the same time, the ponencia may have also wittingly or
unwittingly contributed to the very problems that it was supposed to be
addressing.
Justice Corona took exception to the issuance by the Supreme Court of a
writ of mandamus against the Comelec. He noted that for mandamus to lie,
the respondent must have unlawfully neglected to perform the act which is
sought to be compelled. By the majoritys decreeing the issuance of a writ
of mandamus against the Comelec, the ponencia effectively indicts that
body for unlawful negligence in the performance of its duty. Yet, nowhere
did the ponencia make a finding that the COMELEC was guilty of nonfeasance with respect to the matters that the said body had been ordered to
produce. x x x This significant and substantial omission not only makes the
issuance of mandamus against the COMELEC baseless. It is contrary to the
presumption of regularity in the COMELECs performance of its official
duty and, more importantly, it violates the entitlement of that body to

substantive due process.

In addition, Justice Corona chided the majority decision for treating as facts
the media reports cited by the petitioners and for taking cognizance of the
same simply because they were widely reported in media. In effect, such
hearsay evidence is being used as the basis by the Court as it dangerously
dips its finger into the exclusive constitutional authority of the Comelec to
enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of an election by
compelling the Comelec through mandamus to produce the things it is
required to furnish the public in this case.
On the portion of the majority ruling that relates that a prior request
addressed to the Comelec for information relating to the source code was
actually made, the dissent noted that the source code is but one of many bits
of information being sought by the petitioners. That a request had been made
for the source code at one time, does not dispense with the need to first make
a request to the Comelec for all of the other items the petitioners seek to
compel disclosure. Thus, per the dissenter, the petitioners failed to comply
with the required exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Finally, Justice Corona decried that with four days left before the elections,
the order to produce various documents was as tyrannical as it was
unreasonable. Said Justice Corona, [t]he law does not exact compliance
with the unreasonably impossible and impossibly unreasonable.
Justice Roberto A. Abad likewise filed a dissenting opinion. His lament,
however, was because the majority decision did not comply to his
satisfaction, with an agreement amongst the brethren that even as the
Supreme Court would grant the relief sought by the petitioners, the decision
would make no judgment that the Comelec failed to comply with what
Republic Act 8436 (the Act authorizing the Comelec to adopt an automated
election system) requires of it in the conduct of the May 10, 2010
Automated Election System or, if it failed in any way, that the Comelec has
no just reason for such failure or has taken no steps to remedy the situation.
Justice Abad explained that he, together with other like-minded Justices, did
not want to add at this time to the Comelecs woes or to exacerbate the
public fear regarding the conduct of the countrys first automated election.

Every responsible citizen, said Justice Abad, should help make a success of
the election scheduled four days from today. If it fails, despite all the
cooperation given the COMELEC, then that would be the time to inquire
why it failed and make those who contributed to such failure account for
their actions or omissions, a role that does not belong to the Supreme Court.
(Teofisto Guingona, Jr. et al. vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
191846, May 6, 2010. See dissenting opinion of Justice Corona here and
the dissenting opinion of Justice Abad here.)
(authors note: the authors first note, which in some way is in sympathy
with Justice Abads stance, is that he wonders how the Comelec can get
anything done if it keeps having to spend time defending itself at the
Supreme Court. As the authors second note, while the author is a big
believer in, and supporter of, the constitutional right to information on
matters of public concern, he feels the need to express his complete accord
with the caveat relayed by Justice Corona about taking in as facts, or
taking judicial notice of, matters reported by the media. With the stuff that
comes out in the media these days, the author feels that it is but prudent to
take what they dish out with a grain, maybe a bushel, of salt.
Oh and lastly, the author must concede complete ignorance of the socalled duty of self-consciousness that now Chief Justice Corona
mentioned as being imposed upon the Supreme Court. He may have been
absent or asleep when it was taught when he was in law school many
moons ago.)
3.
Creation of a Local Government Unit (Peralta vs. Perez)
Section 461 of the Local Government Code (Republic Act 7160) pertinently
provides as follows:
SEC. 461. Requisites for Creation. (a) A province may be created if it
has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of
not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant
prices and either of the following requisites:

(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers,

as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000)
inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office:
x
(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more
islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to
the income of the province.
x
In February 2010, the Supreme Court issued a decision declaring

unconstitutional that the portion of Article 9 of the implementing rules of the
Local Government Code that states that [t]he land area requirement (of
2,000 square meters) shall not apply where the proposed province is
composed of one (1) or more islands.
In Rodolfo
G.
Navarro et at
vs.
Executive
Secretary et al, Justice Diosdado M. Peralta reaffirmed that earlier ruling
because the exemption in the implementing rules is not found in Section 461
of the Local Government Code. There is no dispute that in case of
discrepancy between the basic law and the rules and regulations
implementing the said law, the basic law prevails, because the rules and
regulations cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law.
In that same February 2010 case, the Supreme Court also declared as
unconstitutional, Republic Act No. 9355 since it created the Province of
Dinagat Islands even if it did not comply with the population and land area
requirements of the Local Government Code.
Apparently, the public respondents conceded to the non-compliance with the
population requirement set out in the Local Government Code. However, the
public respondents attempted to have the Supreme Court reverse its decision
by arguing that the exception in Section 461(b) of the Local Government
Code should be read as to apply to both the requirement of contiguity and

land area as set out in Section 461(a)(i). The Province of Dinagat Islands,
being composed of islands (obviously), did not have a contiguous territory
and had a land area of only 802.12 square kilometers.
Justice Peralta, however, dismissed these arguments because the provisions
of the Local Government Code are clear in that the exception in Section
461(b) pertains only to the requirement of contiguity and not the 2,000
square kilometers minimum land area requirement.
Justice Jose Portugal Perez provided the lone opposing voice. In his
dissenting opinion, Justice Perez asserted that legislative intent placed
primary emphasis on income as a criteria for the establishment of a local
government unit, which the Province of Dinagat Islands met. In addition,
Justice Perez maintained that the exception in Section 461(b) pertains to
both the requirement of contiguity and land area as set out in Section
461(a)(i) as it would be absurd to interpret it otherwise. In other words, the
twin requirements of contiguity and a minimum 200 square kilometer land
area do not apply to the Province of Dinagat Islands because it is composed
of two or more islands.
In Justice Perezs view, quoting excerpts from the constitutional debates, it
should suffice that there is compliance with the income requirement since
the legislative intent is, after all, to the effect that the land area and
population requirements may be overridden by the established economic
viability of the proposed province.
The dissenter then rounded up by chiding the majority for not giving
consideration to the fact that the law creating the Province of Dinagat
Islands was approved in a plebiscite and that there already are existing, duly
elected and fully functioning, provincial officers.
Rodolfo G. Navarro, et al. Vs. Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita,
etc. et al., G.R. No. 180050, May 12, 2010. See dissenting opinion here.)
(authors note: the language of the Local Government Code seems pretty
clear that the exception applies only to the requirement of contiguity and
not to the land area criteria and thus, this author sides with the majority.

On another note, this author believes that there is one item of legal trivia
that can be fashioned out the Navarro case. We all know that when an
administrative regulation is contrary to a statute, the regulation is
unconstitutional and when a statute is contrary to the Constitution, the
statute is unconstitutional. Heres the trivia question: the rule is that a
subsequent statute prevails over an earlier statute on all points where there
is an inconsistency. When a statute conflicts with an earlier statute, can
you name an instance where the more recent statute may be declared
unconstitutional solely because of such conflict? Based on the Navarro
case, it would be when a law creating a local government unit fails to
comply with statutory requirements set out in the Local Government
Code. This, according to the Supreme Court, is because Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution states that [n]o province, city, municipality,
or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in
the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. The
lesson? If the desired new local government unit is short of the standards
set in the Local Government Code, amend the Local Government Code
first.)
Dissension in the Court: April 2010

Posted on May 12, 2010 by Jose Ma. G. Hofilea Posted in Constitutional Law
Tagged appointment, Congress, party list
The following are selected decisions promulgated by the High Court in April
from the decision penned by the ponente. In this episode, we have three
main eventsthe last of which was an awaited rematchthat
coincidentally, and quite timely, all somehow relate to elections.
Once again, lets get ready to rumble.
1.
Legislative Redistricting (Perez vs. Carpio and Carpio-Morales)

The provisions of the Constitution that are at issue in Aquino III (aka,
Noynoy or the uncle of Baby James) and Robredo vs. Comelec are:
ARTICLE VI
The Legislative Department
x
SECTION 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not

more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law,
who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected
through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the
total number of representatives including those under the party list. For three
consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the
seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by
law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be
provided by law, except the religious sector.
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous,
compact and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress
shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards
provided in this section. (underscoring supplied)
Prior to the enactment of Republic Act 9716 (RA 9716), Camarines Sur was
divided into 4 legislative districts with each district having an estimated
population of more than 250,000 people. RA 9716 reconfigured the

legislative districts in Camarines Sur so that there became 5 legislative

districts with one of such districts having a population of less than 250,000.
The issue then was whether RA 9716 violated the Constitution by creating a
legislative district within the Province of Camarines Sur that had a
population of less than 250,000 and therefore transgressed the principle of
proportional representation.
Justice Jose Perez, in writing for the majority, declared that there is no
provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population
requirement that must compose a legislative district. While Section 5(3) of
Article VI of the Constitution requires a minimum population of 250,000 in
order for a city to be entitled to a representative, that same requirement does
not apply to a province.
Justice Perez noted that the prior case of Mariano, Jr. v. Comelec supported
this view considering that in that case, the addition of another legislative
district in Makati was upheld even if, based on the latest population survey
for Makati, one of the two resulting legislative districts for Makati would
have a population of less than 250,000.
In addition, the records of the Constitutional Commission contained
transcripts of deliberations on the districting of Palawan where the 250,000
minimum population requirement was disregarded and was based on other
factors instead. The districting of Benguet and Baguio too, per the records,
did not take population into consideration as a factor.
Justice Perez then pointed to the 2008 case of Bagabuyo vs. Comelec that
states that [u]ndeniably, these figures show a disparity in the population
sizes of the districts. The Constitution, however, does not require exactitude
or rigid equality as a standard in gauging equality of representation
In closing, he cautioned that it should not be said that population is not an
important consideration in the matter of districting. However, it is not the
only factor to be considered.
The majority conclusion: RA 9716 is a valid law.

Justice Antonio Carpio, in his dissent, averred that

[t]he majority opinion allows, for the first time under the 1987 Constitution,
voters in a legislative district created by Congress to send one representative
to Congress even if the district has a population of only 176,383. In sharp
contrast, all other legislative districts created by Congress send one
representative each because they all meet the minimum population
requirement of 250,000.
His dissent pointed to Section 5(4) of Article VI of the Constitution and
asserted that in reapportioning legislative districts, Congress must use as its
basis the standards provided in Section 5. These constitutional standards are
limited to (a) population, and (b) territory.
On the population standard, Justice Carpio enumerated the following as the
necessary elements: (1) proportional representation; (2) minimum population
of 250,000 per legislative district; (3) progressive ratio in the increase of
legislative districts as the population base increases; and (4) uniformity in
apportionment of legislative districts in provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area.
And on territory, the standards are that a legislative district must be as far
as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent.
According to Justice Carpio, the creation of a new legislative district in
Camarines Sur which has a population of less than 250,000 violates the
directive of the Constitution that the reapportionment of legislative districts
must based on the standards set out in Section 5.
With respect to the Mariano case, Justice Carpio observed that Congress did
not actually deviate from the 250,000 minimum population rule as the
population of Makati actually stood at 508,174 or sufficient to accommodate
2 legislative districts having a population of at least 250,000 each. He also
pointed out that in the Bagabuyo case cited by the majority, the legislative
districts created actually each had populations greater than 250,000.
Blood lines bonded together as the other dissent was provided by Justice
Conchita Carpio-Morales. She took the view that Sections 5(3) of Article VI

of the Constitution should be read together with Section 5(1) of the same
Article in light of the constitutional requirements of population and
contiguity.
Justice Carpio-Morales made the same observations as Justice Carpio that
the Mariano and Bagabuyo cases did not dispense with the minimum
population requirement. She then made the further observation that the
manner by which RA 9716 reallocated the districts in Camarines Sur, which
resulted in one legislative district having a very significant drop in
population, violates uniform and progressive ratio requirement of the
Constitution.
Her dissent concluded with emphasizing that the sole standards that must be
used in legislative districting are population and contiguity, and that the
danger in allowing other factors,
aside from population, to be considered in the composition of additional
districts (thereby adding other requisites despite the Constitutions clear
limitation to population and contiguity), is that it effectively opens the
floodgates to opportunistic lawmakers to reconfigure their own principalia
and bantam districts. Leaving open Section 5 of Article VI to arbitrary
factors, such as economic, political, socio-cultural, racial and even religious
ones, is an invitation to a free-for-all.
(Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo vs.
Commission on Elections; G.R. No. 189793,April 7, 2010. See dissenting
opinion of Justice Carpio here and the dissenting opinion of Justice CarpioMorales here.)
(Authors note: this author tends to agree that the reapportionment of
legislative districts must observe the standards in Section 5, Article VI
of the Constitution which includes that it be: in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform
and progressive ratio. Those twin requirements suggest to this author
that population is not something that Congress is allowed to
disregard. He scores this one for the dissenters.)
2.
The Party List System (Del Castillo vs. Corona)

Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Comelec. Yet again, the Comelec is the
respondent.
As a background, the Comelec denied the application of Ang Ladlad LGBT
Party for accreditation as a party list organization on moral grounds. In
particular, the Comelec concluded that Ladlad tolerated immorality in
violation of the Revised Penal Code, the Civil Code, the Bible and the
Koran. The Comelec Chairman, in his separate opinion, added that under the
party list law (RA 7941), the purpose of the party-list system is to enable
citizens belonging to marginalized and under-represented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies
but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the
House of Representatives. The Chairman noted that :
If entry into the party-list system would depend only on the ability of an
organization to represent its constituencies, then all representative
organizations would have found themselves into the party-list race. But that
is not the intention of the framers of the law. The party-list system is not a
tool to advocate tolerance and acceptance of misunderstood persons or
groups of persons. Rather, the party-list system is a tool for the realization of
aspirations of marginalized individuals whose interests are also the nations
only that their interests have not been brought to the attention of the nation
because of their under representation. Until the time comes when Ladlad is
able to justify that having mixed sexual orientations and transgender
identities is beneficial to the nation, its application for accreditation under
the party-list system will remain just that. (underscoring supplied)
Justice Mariano Del Castillo took up the cudgels for the majority and started
off by enunciating that in accordance with the Courts earlier ruling in Ang
Bagong Bayani vs. Comelec, the list of sectors enumerated in the
Constitution and RA 7941 is not an exclusive list. Sectors that are not
specifically named but comply with the requirements of the Constitution and
RA 7941 may be accredited as a party list organization.
The majority held that there was a grave violation of the Constitutions nonestablishment clause when the Comelec used the Bible and the Koran as its
basis to deny Ladlads application. Neither was it proper for the Comelec to

exclude Ladlad on the ground that homosexuality and homosexual conduct

transgresses upon generally accepted public morals. Justice Del Castillo
noted that the Philippines has not seen fit to criminalize homosexual conduct
and moreover, the Comelec failed to identify any specific overt immoral act
performed by Ladlad. The summation provided by Justice Del Castillo
reads:
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient
governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation
in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlads registration on purely
moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of
homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest.
Respondents blanket justifications give rise to the inevitable conclusion that
the COMELEC targets homosexuals themselves as a class, not because of
any particular morally reprehensible act. It is this selective targeting that
implicates our equal protection clause.
The lone dissenting voice was Justice Renato Coronas.
Justice Corona espoused the view that:
[w]ith regard to the matter of what qualifies as marginalized and
underrepresented sectors under the party-list system, Section 5(2), Article VI
of the Constitution mentions the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be
provided by law, except the religious sector. On the other hand, the law
speaks of labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals.
Surely, the enumeration of sectors considered as marginalized and
underrepresented in the fundamental law and in the implementing law (RA
7941) cannot be without significance. To ignore them is to disregard the
texts of the Constitution and of RA 7941. For, indeed, the very first of Ang
Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Partys eight guidelines for screening party-list
participants is this: the parties, sectors or organizations must represent the
marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA
7941.

Thus, on the basis of the Constitution, RA 7941 and Ang Bagong Bayani,
Justice Corona summed up the following as the significant factors in
determining what are the marginalized and underrepresented sectors
contemplated under the party list system:
(a) they must be among, or closely connected with or similar to, the sectors
mentioned in Section 5 of RA 7941;
(b) they must be sectors whose interests are traditionally and historically
regarded as vital to the national interest but they have long been relegated to
the fringes of society and deprived of an opportunity to participate in the
formulation of national policy;
(c) the vinculum that will establish the close connection with or similarity of
sectors to those expressly mentioned in Section 5 of RA 7941 is a
constitutional provision specifically recognizing the special significance of
the said sectors (other than peoples organizations, unless such peoples
organizations represent sectors mentioned in Section 5 of RA 7941) to the
advancement of the national interest and
(d) while lacking in well-defined political constituencies, they must have
regional or national presence to ensure that their interests and agenda will be
beneficial not only to their respective sectors but, more importantly, to the
nation as a whole.
The dissenter did not believe that Ladlad met the above-stated requirements.
Justice Corona called upon the Court to exercise judicial restraint by strictly
adhering to, rather than expanding, legislative policy on the matter of
marginalized sectors as expressed in the enumeration in Section 5 of RA
7941 and expresses that they cannot amend RA 7941 in the guise of
interpretation. Said Justice Corona:
[t]he Constitution expressly and exclusively vests the authority to determine
such other [marginalized] sectors qualified to participate in the party-list
system to Congress. Thus, until and unless Congress amends the law to

include the LGBT and other sectors in the party-list system, deference to
Congress determination on the matter is proper.
(Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190582,
April 8, 2010. See dissenting opinion here.)
(Authors note: this author confesses to having particular difficulty
analyzing this decision primarily because he does not believe that the
party list system makes much sense in the first place. That said, this
author does not believe the Comelec was correct to deny the Ladlad
application on the basis of unestablished immorality. In addition, while
he may harbor some personal disquiet as to branding Ladlad (or the
genre of persons it represents) as marginalized, if the sector of women
is expressly included in the Constitution, there seems to be little space to
argue that Ladlad should not likewise qualify as a party list
organization. This author will have to concur with the conclusions of
the majority.)
3.
The Ban on Midnight Appointments (Bersamin vs. CarpioMorales)
In this rematch, Justice Lucas Bersamin started off, as he did in the previous
bout, by summarizing the positions espoused by all the parties that filed
motions for reconsideration as well as the comments of various parties to
those motions for reconsideration. Once done, Justice Bersamin swiftly
dismissed the same with the final punch: We deny the motions for
reconsideration for lack of merit, for all the matters being thereby raised
and argued, not being new, have all been resolved by the decision of March
17, 2010.
Even so, Justice Bersamin took the opportunity to discuss a few matters for
clarification and emphasis.
Firstly, the majority addressed the matter of their having abandoned In Re
Appointments Dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon.
Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the Regional Trial Court of Branch 62,

Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively. Justice

Bersamin straightforwardly stressed that the Supreme Court, as the highest
court of the land, may be guided but is not controlled by precedent. The
Constitution itself recognizes the innate authority of the Court en banc to
modify or reverse a doctrine or principle of law laid down in any decision
rendered en banc or in division.
Secondly, Justice Bersamin took issue with the insistence by some
intervenors that the Constitutional Commission extended to the Judiciary the
ban on presidential appointments during the restricted period set out in the
Constitution. He pointed out that the excerpt from the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission quoted by Justice Conchita Carpio-Morales in
her previous dissent was a discussion not on the matter of midnight
appointments, but on another provision of the Constitution dealing with
nepotism in Presidential appointments.
Finally, the ponente chided the movants on their claim that the majority did
not observe principles of statutory construction. Justice Bersamin declared
that the movants themselves are the ones that are contravening their avowed
reliance on principles of statutory construction. He reiterated their March
17, 2010 ruling that:
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15,
Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could
have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous
ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the
prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally
applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article
VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification
was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or
Acting President making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting
Presidents term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
(underscoring supplied)
And then concluded with the following statement: We cannot permit the
meaning of the Constitution to be stretched to any unintended point in order
to suit the purposes of any quarter.

Justice Conchita Carpio-Moraless dissenting opinion on the majoritys

ruling that the midnight appointments ban did not extend to appointments to
the judiciary was brief. The three points she raised were the following:
1.
the majority decision disregarded established canons of
statutory construction, placing premium on the arrangement and ordering of
provisions which, she says, is one of the weakest tools of construction;
2.
the majority reversed Valenzuela because it did not firmly rest
on yet did not offer to cite a material Constitutional Commission
deliberation; and
3.
the most legally feasible interpretation (in the limited cases of
temporary physical or legal impossibility of compliance) is to consider the
appointments ban or other substantial obstacle as a temporary impossibility
which excuses or releases the constitutional obligation of the President for
the duration of the ban or obstacle.
Justice Morales added in her opinion that the ruling requiring the Judicial
and Bar Council (JBC) to submit their shortlist to the President before the
vacancy occurs (i) runs counter to Constitutional Commission deliberations
that show that the 90 day period within which the President must fill a
vacancy at the Supreme Court was allotted for both the nomination by the
JBC and the appointment by the President, and (ii) may lead to preposterous
results as in the case where a vacancy occurs as a result of the death of a
justice.
As her last word, she added that the fact that there is a 90 day period during
which the President may appoint to fill in a vacancy at the Supreme Court
rebuts any public policy argument on avoiding a vacuum of even a single
day without a duly appointed Chief Justice.
(Arturo M. De Castro vs. Judicial and Bar Council and President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 191002, April 20, 2010. See dissenting
opinion here.)

(Authors note: as the motions for reconsideration did not raise new
arguments, the majority decision as well as the dissenting opinion, in the
same light, did not arrive at new conclusions. Similarly, this authors
scorecard on the whole has likewise not changed. However, the author
notes with much interest the revelation of the majority that the excerpt
from the Constitutional Commission deliberations quoted by Justice
Carpio-Morales in her previous dissenting opinion actually dealt with
discussions on nepotism and not on the midnight appointments
ban. This author would be just as interested to know, as many would
likewise probably be, why that dissent made it sound likeat least it did
to this authorthat the quote pertained to discussions on the midnight
appointments ban. [the paragraph immediately prefacing the quoted
portion was: Heeding Aytonas admonition, the Constitutional
Commission (ConCom) saw it fit to provide for a comprehensive ban on
midnight appointments, finding that the establishment of the JBC is not
enough to safeguard or insulate judicial appointments from
politicization. The ConCom deliberations reveal: x x x"])
(Note: After this article was written, the Supreme Court made publicly
available the decision in Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI),
etc. vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190529, April 29, 2010, which
contains a dissenting opinion penned by Justice Abad.)
April 2010 Philippine Supreme Court

Posted on May 5, 2010 by Hector M. de Leon Jr. Posted in Constitutional Law Tagged
appointment, Commission on Audit, due process, election protest, freedom of expression,
party list, public officers, reorganization
Here are selected April 2010 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines
on political law:
Constitutional Law
COA; powers. The 1987 Constitution has made the COA the guardian of

public funds, vesting it with broad powers over all accounts pertaining to
government revenue and expenditures and the uses of public funds and
property including the exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and
examination, establish the techniques and methods for such review, and
promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations. Section 11,
Chapter 4, Subtitle B, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987
echoes this constitutional mandate given to COA.
In light of these express provisions of law granting respondent COA its
power and authority, we have previously ruled that its exercise of its general
audit power is among the constitutional mechanisms that give life to the
check and balance system inherent in our form of government. Furthermore,
we have also declared that COA is endowed with enough latitude to
determine, prevent and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of government funds.
Based on the foregoing discussion and due to the lack or absence of any law
or jurisprudence saying otherwise, we rule that, in resolving cases brought
before it on appeal, respondent COA is not required to limit its review only
to the grounds relied upon by a government agencys auditor with respect to
disallowing certain disbursements of public funds. In consonance with its
general audit power, respondent COA is not merely legally permitted, but is
also duty-bound to make its own assessment of the merits of the disallowed
disbursement and not simply restrict itself to reviewing the validity of the
ground relied upon by the auditor of the government agency concerned. To
hold otherwise would render COAs vital constitutional power unduly
limited and thereby useless and ineffective. Ramon R. Yap vs. Commission
on Audit, G.R. No. 158562, April 23, 2010.
Freedom of expression; LGBT group. Under our system of laws, every
group has the right to promote its agenda and attempt to persuade society of
the validity of its position through normal democratic means. It is in the
public square that deeply held convictions and differing opinions should be
distilled and deliberated upon.
The OSG argues that since there has been neither prior restraint nor
subsequent punishment imposed on Ang Ladlad, and its members have not
been deprived of their right to voluntarily associate, then there has been no

restriction on their freedom of expression or association.

The OSG fails to recall that petitioner has, in fact, established its
qualifications to participate in the party-list system, and as advanced by the
OSG itself the moral objection offered by the COMELEC was not a
limitation imposed by law. To the extent, therefore, that the petitioner has
been precluded, because of COMELECs action, from publicly expressing
its views as a political party and participating on an equal basis in the
political process with other equally-qualified party-list candidates, we find
that there has, indeed, been a transgression of petitioners fundamental
rights. Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
190582, April 8, 2010.
Legislative district; population requirement. Petitioners Senator Benigno

Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo seek the nullification as
unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled An Act Reapportioning
the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in
the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative
District From Such Reapportionment.
Petitioners contend, citing Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution,
that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of
the explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of
two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation of a legislative district.
The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of
the first and second districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because
the proposed first district will end up with a population of less than 250,000
or only 176,383.
The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution,
succinctly provides: Each city with a population of at least two hundred
fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative. The
provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a
city to a district on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district
on the other. For while a province is entitled to at least a representative, with
nothing mentioned about population, a city must first meet a population

minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled. Plainly read, Section

5(3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a
city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province. Senator
Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo vs. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010.
Party list; accreditation. Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its
compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation. Indeed, aside from
COMELECs moral objection and the belated allegation of non-existence,
nowhere in the records has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad
is not qualified to register as a party-list organization under any of the
requisites under RA 7941 or the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani. Ang
Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190582, April 8,
2010.
Party list; moral disapproval as ground for accreditation. Moral
disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify
exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The
denial of Ang Ladlads registration on purely moral grounds amounts more
to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool
to further any substantial public interest. Respondents blanket justifications
give rise to the inevitable conclusion that the COMELEC targets
homosexuals themselves as a class, not because of any particular morally
reprehensible act. It is this selective targeting that implicates our equal
protection clause.
It bears stressing that our finding that COMELECs act of differentiating
LGBTs from heterosexuals insofar as the party-list system is concerned does
not imply that any other law distinguishing between heterosexuals and
homosexuals under different circumstances would similarly fail. We
disagree with the OSGs position that homosexuals are a class in themselves
for the purposes of the equal protection clause. We are not prepared to single
out homosexuals as a separate class meriting special or differentiated
treatment. We have not received sufficient evidence to this effect, and it is
simply unnecessary to make such a ruling today. Petitioner itself has merely
demanded that it be recognized under the same basis as all other groups
similarly situated, and that the COMELEC made an unwarranted and
impermissible classification not justified by the circumstances of the
case. Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.

190582, April 8, 2010.

Party list; sectors qualified. The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlads
application for registration on the ground that the LGBT sector is neither
enumerated in the Constitution and RA 7941, nor is it associated with or
related to any of the sectors in the enumeration.
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands
for the proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law
or related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans,
overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered under the party-list
system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
Commission on Elections, the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive. The crucial element is not whether a
sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization
complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941. Ang
Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190582, April 8,
2010.
President; executive prerogative. The Executive Department did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in not espousing petitioners claims for official
apology and other forms of reparations against Japan. From a domestic law
perspective, the Executive Department has the exclusive prerogative to
determine whether to espouse petitioners claims against Japan. Isabelita C.
Vinuya, et al. vs. Hon. Executive Secretary, et al., G.R. No. 162230, April
28, 2010.
President; power of appointment. The incumbent President can appoint the
successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement on May 17, 2010 as the
prohibition against presidential appointments under Section 15, Article VII
does not extend to appointments in the Judiciary. Arturo M. De Castro vs.
Judicial and Bar Council, et al., G.R. No. 191002, April 20, 2010.
President; power to reorganize. It is a well-settled principle in
jurisprudence that the President has the power to reorganize the offices and
agencies in the executive department in line with the Presidents
constitutionally granted power of control over executive offices and by

virtue of previous delegation of the legislative power to reorganize executive

offices under existing statutes.
Executive Order No. 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 gives the
President continuing authority to reorganize and redefine the functions of the
Office of the President. Section 31, Chapter 10, Title III, Book III of the
said Code, is explicit.
It is undisputed that the NPO, as an agency that is part of the Office of the
Press Secretary (which in various times has been an agency directly attached
to the Office of the Press Secretary or as an agency under the Philippine
Information Agency), is part of the Office of the President.
Pertinent to the case at bar, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987
quoted above authorizes the President (a) to restructure the internal
organization of the Office of the President Proper, including the immediate
Offices, the President Special Assistants/Advisers System and the Common
Staff Support System, by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof
or transferring functions from one unit to another, and (b) to transfer
functions or offices from the Office of the President to any other Department
or Agency in the Executive Branch, and vice versa.
There is a view that the reorganization actions that the President may take
with respect to agencies in the Office of the President are strictly limited to
transfer of functions and offices as seemingly provided in Section 31 of the
Administrative Code of 1987.
However, Section 20, Chapter 7, Title I, Book III of the same Code
significantly provides: Sec. 20. Residual Powers. Unless Congress
provides otherwise, the President shall exercise such other powers and
functions vested in the President which are provided for under the laws and
which are not specifically enumerated above, or which are not delegated by
the President in accordance with law.
Pursuant to Section 20, the power of the President to reorganize the
Executive Branch under Section 31 includes such powers and functions that
may be provided for under other laws. To be sure, an inclusive and broad
interpretation of the Presidents power to reorganize executive offices has

been consistently supported by specific provisions in general appropriations

laws. Atty. Sylvia Banda, et al. vs.. Eduardo R. Ermita etc., et al. G.R. No.
166620, April 20, 2010.
Public funds; disbursement. Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1445 lays
out the basic guidelines that government entities must follow in disbursing
public funds. Any disbursement of public funds, which includes payment of
salaries and benefits to government employees and officials, must (a) be
authorized by law, and (b) serve a public purpose.
In this regard, it is necessary for this Court to elaborate on the nature and
meaning of the term public purpose, in relation to disbursement of public
funds. As understood in the traditional sense, public purpose or public use
means any purpose or use directly available to the general public as a matter
of right. Thus, it has also been defined as an activity as will serve as
benefit to [the] community as a body and which at the same time is directly
related function of government. However, the concept of public use is not
limited to traditional purposes. Here as elsewhere, the idea that public use
is strictly limited to clear cases of use by the public has been discarded. In
fact, this Court has already categorically stated that the term public
purpose is not defined, since it is an elastic concept that can be hammered
to fit modern standards. It should be given a broad interpretation; therefore,
it does not only pertain to those purposes that which are traditionally viewed
as essentially government functions, such as building roads and delivery of
basic services, but also includes those purposes designed to promote social
justice. Thus, public money may now be used for the relocation of illegal
settlers, low-cost housing and urban or agrarian reform. In short, public use
is now equated with public interest, and that it is not unconstitutional merely
because it incidentally benefits a limited number of persons.
To our mind, in view of the public purpose requirement, the disbursement of
public funds, salaries and benefits of government officers and employees
should be granted to compensate them for valuable public services rendered,
and the salaries or benefits paid to such officers or employees must be
commensurate with services rendered. In the same vein, additional
allowances and benefits must be shown to be necessary or relevant to the
fulfillment of the official duties and functions of the government officers and
employees. We cannot accept petitioners theory that the compensation and
benefits of public officers are intended purely for the personal benefit of

such officers, or that the mere payment of salaries and benefits to a public
officer satisfies the public purpose requirement. That theory would lead to
the anomalous conclusion that government officers and employees may be
paid enormous sums without limit or without any justification necessary
other than that such sums are being paid to someone employed by the
government. Public funds are the property of the people and must be used
prudently at all times with a view to prevent dissipation and waste. Ramon
R. Yap vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 158562, April 23, 2010.
Administrative Law
Administrative proceedings; due process. On the due process issue, we
agree with the COMELEC that PGBIs right to due process was not violated
for PGBI was given an opportunity to seek, as it did seek, a reconsideration
of Resolution No. 8679. The essence of due process, we have consistently
held, is simply the opportunity to be heard; as applied to administrative
proceedings, due process is the opportunity to explain ones side or the
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances
essential. The requirement is satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What
is frowned upon is absolute lack of notice and hearing x x x. We find it
obvious under the attendant circumstances that PGBI was not denied due
process. In any case, given the result of this Resolution, PGBI has no longer
any cause for complaint on due process grounds. Philippine Guardians
Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI), etc. vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
190529. April 29, 2010
Procedural due process; requirements. The Ang Tibay formulation was
overlapping and repetitious. Hence, in Air Manila, Inc. v. Balatbat, the
formulation was simplified into four basic rights, as follows:
1. The right to notice, be it actual or constructive, of the institution of the
proceedings that may affect a persons legal right;
2. The right to a reasonable opportunity to appear and defend his rights
and to introduce witnesses and relevant evidence in his favor;

3. The right to a tribunal so constituted as to give him reasonable

assurance of honesty and impartiality, and one of competent
jurisdiction; and
4. The right to a finding or decision of that tribunal supported by
substantial evidence presented at the hearing or at least ascertained in the
records or disclosed to the parties.
Gauged upon the foregoing guidelines, Tolentinos gripe was unwarranted.
He was not denied procedural due process. The Division had required him to
provide the names of his revisors whose tasks included the raising of
objections, the claiming votes for him, or the contesting of the votes in favor
of his opponent. He has neither alleged being deprived of this opportunity,
nor indicated any situation in which his revisors were denied access to the
revision proceedings. He could not also insist that the COMELEC did not
consider his legal and factual arguments; besides, he could still raise them in
his memorandum should he chose to. During the revision stage, he should
raise all objections, present his evidence and witnesses, and file his
memorandum before the case would be submitted for resolution. Mayor
Abraham N. Tolentino vs. Commission on Elections, et al./Vice-Mayor Celso
P. De Castro vs. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. Nos. 187958, G.R.
No. 187961 & 187962/G.R. No. 187966, G.R. No. 187967 & 187968. April
7, 2010.
Reorganization; good faith. The presidential power to reorganize agencies
and offices in the executive branch of government is subject to the condition
that such reorganization is carried out in good faith.
If the reorganization is done in good faith, the abolition of positions, which
results in loss of security of tenure of affected government employees,
would be valid. In Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora, we even observed
that there was no such thing as an absolute right to hold office. Except those
who hold constitutional offices, which provide for special immunity as
regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right to an
office or salary. Atty. Sylvia Banda, et al. vs.. Eduardo R. Ermita etc., et
al. G.R. No. 166620, April 20, 2010.
Election Law

Ballots; revision. The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion
when it order the revision of 44 ballots with the Senate Electoral Tribunal
without first reolsivng whether 16 of those 44 ballots should be included in
the revision.
In regular election contests, the general averment of fraud or irregularities in
the counting of votes justifies the examination of the ballots and recounting
of votes. This process of examination is the revision of the ballots pursuant
to Section 6, Rule 20 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
The protests involved herein assailed the authenticity of the election returns
and the veracity of the counting of the ballots. In that regard, the ballots
themselves are the best evidence. The only means to overcome the
presumption of legitimacy of the election returns is to examine and
determine first whether the ballot boxes have been substantially preserved in
the manner mandated by law. Hence, the necessity to issue the order of
revision.
No ruling could be handed down against the integrity of the ballot boxes that
would effectively render naught the evidentiary value of the ballots they
contained unless a full blown trial on the merits was first conducted.
Tolentino should accept the legal impossibility for the Division to rule on
the issue of inclusion or exclusion of the set-aside ballot boxes except after
the revision process. Mayor Abraham N. Tolentino vs. Commission on
Elections, et al./Vice-Mayor Celso P. De Castro vs. Commission on
Elections, et al., G.R. Nos. 187958, G.R. No. 187961 & 187962/G.R. No.
187966, G.R. No. 187967 & 187968. April 7, 2010.
Party list; delisting. Our Minero ruling is an erroneous application of Section
6(8) of RA 7941; hence, it cannot sustain PGBIs delisting from the roster of
registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions
under the party-list system.
First, the law is clear the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified
complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and
hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party,
organization or coalition if it: (a) fails to participate in the last two (2)
preceding elections; or (b) fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the

votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for
the constituency in which it has registered. The word or is a disjunctive
term signifying disassociation and independence of one thing from the other
things enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it
ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word. Thus, the plain, clear and
unmistakable language of the law provides for two (2) separate reasons for
delisting.
Second, Minero is diametrically opposed to the legislative intent of Section
6(8) of RA 7941, as PGBIs cited congressional deliberations clearly show.
Minero therefore simply cannot stand. Its basic defect lies in its
characterization of the non-participation of a party-list organization in an
election as similar to a failure to garner the 2% threshold party-list
vote. What Minero effectively holds is that a party list organization that
does not participate in an election necessarily gets, by default, less than 2%
of the party-list votes. To be sure, this is a confused interpretation of the
law, given the laws clear and categorical language and the legislative intent
to treat the two scenarios differently. A delisting based on a mixture or
fusion of these two different and separate grounds for delisting is therefore a
strained application of the law in jurisdictional terms, it is an interpretation
not within the contemplation of the framers of the law and hence is a gravely
abusive interpretation of the law.
What we say here should of course take into account our ruling in Barangay
Association for Advancement and National Transparency v. COMELEC
(Banat) where we partly invalidated the 2% party-list vote requirement
provided in RA 7941 as follows: We rule that, in computing the allocation
of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold for
the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of
Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the
two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the
maximum number of available party list seats when the number of available
party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent
threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment
of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of
Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.

The disqualification for failure to get 2% party-list votes in two (2)

preceding elections should therefore be understood in light of the Banat
ruling that party-list groups or organizations garnering less than 2% of the
party-list votes may yet qualify for a seat in the allocation of additional
seats.
We need not extensively discuss Banats significance, except to state that a
party-list group or organization which qualified in the second round of seat
allocation cannot now validly be delisted for the reason alone that it
garnered less than 2% in the last two elections. In other words, the
application of this disqualification should henceforth be contingent on the
percentage of party-list votes garnered by the last party-list organization that
qualified for a seat in the House of Representatives, a percentage that is less
than the 2% threshold invalidated in Banat. The disqualification should now
necessarily be read to apply to party-list groups or organizations that did not
qualify for a seat in the two preceding elections for the constituency in
which it registered.
To reiterate, (a) Section 6(8) of RA 7941 provides for two separate grounds
for delisting; these grounds cannot be mixed or combined to support
delisting; and (b) the disqualification for failure to garner 2% party-list votes
in two preceding elections should now be understood, in light of the Banat
ruling, to mean failure to qualify for a party-list seat in two preceding
elections for the constituency in which it has registered. This, we declare, is
how Section 6(8) of RA 7941 should be understood and applied. We do so
under our authority to state what the law is, and as an exception to the
application of the principle of stare decisis. Philippine Guardians
Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI), etc. vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
190529. April 29, 2010.
Voter; residency requirement. The the residency requirement of a voter is at
least one (1) year residence in the Philippines and at least six (6) months in
the place where the person proposes or intends to vote. Residence, as used
in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective office,
is doctrinally settled to mean domicile, importing not only an intention to
reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention inferable from a persons acts, activities,
and utterances. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence where,
when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to

return. In the consideration of circumstances obtaining in each particular

case, three rules must be borne in mind, namely: (1) that a person must have
a residence or domicile somewhere; (2) once established, it remains until a
new one is acquired; and (3) that a person can have but one residence or
domicile at a time.
Domicile is not easily lost. To successfully effect a transfer thereof, one
must demonstrate: (1) an actual removal or change of domicile; (2) a bona
fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a
new one; and (3) acts which correspond with that purpose. There must
be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to
remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of
time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the
place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.
Asistio has always been a resident of Caloocan City since his birth or for
more than 72 years. His family is known to be among the prominent political
families in Caloocan City. In fact, Asistio served in public office as
Caloocan City Second District representative in the House of
Representatives, having been elected as such in the 1992, 1995, 1998, and
2004 elections. In 2007, he also sought election as City Mayor. In all of
these occasions, Asistio cast his vote in the same city. Taking these
circumstances into consideration, gauged in the light of the doctrines above
enunciated, it cannot be denied that Asistio has qualified, and continues to
qualify, as a voter of Caloocan City. There is no showing that he has
established domicile elsewhere, or that he had consciously and voluntarily
abandoned his residence in Caloocan City. He should, therefore, remain in
the list of permanent registered voters of Precinct No. 1811A, Barangay 15,
Caloocan City.
That Asistio allegedly indicated in his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor,
both for the 2007 and 2010 elections, a non-existent or false address, or that
he could not be physically found in the address he indicated when he
registered as a voter, should not operate to exclude him as a voter of
Caloocan City. These purported misrepresentations in Asistios COC, if true,
might serve as basis for an election offense under the Omnibus Election
Code (OEC), or an action to deny due course to the COC. But to our mind,
they do not serve as proof that Asistio has abandoned his domicile in
Caloocan City, or that he has established residence outside of Caloocan

City. Luis A. Asistio vs. Hon. Thelma Canlas Trinidad-Pe Aguirre, etc. et
al., G.R. No. 191124. April 27, 2010.
International Law
International law; binding effect. Although this Court stands willing to
assume the responsibility of giving effect to the Philippines international
law obligations, the blanket invocation of international law is not the
panacea for all social ills. We refer now to the petitioners invocation of the
Yogyakarta Principles (the Application of International Human Rights Law
In Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity), which petitioner
declares to reflect binding principles of international law.
At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these Yogyakarta Principles
contain norms that are obligatory on the Philippines. There are declarations
and obligations outlined in said Principles which are not reflective of the
current state of international law, and do not find basis in any of the sources
of international law enumerated under Article 38(1) of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice. Petitioner has not undertaken any objective
and rigorous analysis of these alleged principles of international law to
ascertain their true status. Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010.
Public Officers
Condonation doctrine; applicability to appointive officials. Petitioners urge
this Court to expand the settled doctrine of condonation to cover
coterminous appointive officials who were administratively charged along
with the reelected official/appointing authority with infractions allegedly
committed during their preceding term.
The Court rejects petitioners thesis.
More than 60 years ago, the Court in Pascual v. Hon. Provincial Board of
Nueva Ecija issued the landmark ruling that prohibits the disciplining of an
elective official for a wrongful act committed during his immediately
preceding term of office. The Court explained that [t]he underlying theory
is that each term is separate from other terms, and that the reelection to

office operates as a condonation of the officers previous misconduct to the

extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor.
The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his
present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of
their right to elect their officers. When the people elect[e]d a man to office,
it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and
character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he
had been guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason of such faults or
misconduct[,] to practically overrule the will of the people. (underscoring
supplied)
Lizares v. Hechanova, et al. replicated the doctrine. The Court dismissed
the petition in that case for being moot, the therein petitioner having been
duly reelected, is no longer amenable to administrative sanctions.
Ingco v. Sanchez, et al. clarified that the condonation doctrine does not apply
to a criminal case. Luciano v. The Provincial Governor, et al.,Olivarez v.
Judge Villaluz, and Aguinaldo v. Santos echoed the qualified rule that
reelection of a public official does not bar prosecution for crimes committed
by him prior thereto.
Consistently, the Court has reiterated the doctrine in a string of recent
jurisprudence including two cases involving a Senator and a Member of the
House of Representatives.
Salalima v. Guingona, Jr. and Mayor Garcia v. Hon. Mojica reinforced the
doctrine. The condonation rule was applied even if the administrative
complaint was not filed before the reelection of the public official, and even
if the alleged misconduct occurred four days before the elections,
respectively. Salalimadid not distinguish as to the date of filing of the
administrative complaint, as long as the alleged misconduct was committed
during the prior term, the precise timing or period of which Garcia did not
further distinguish, as long as the wrongdoing that gave rise to the public
officials culpability was committed prior to the date of reelection.
Petitioners theory is not novel.

A parallel question was involved in Civil Service Commission v. Sojor where

the Court found no basis to broaden the scope of the doctrine of
condonation.
Contrary to petitioners asseveration, the non-application of the condonation
doctrine to appointive officials does not violate the right to equal protection
of the law.
In the recent case of Quinto v. Commission on Elections, the Court applied
the four-fold test in an equal protection challenge against the resign-to-run
provision, wherein it discussed the material and substantive distinctions
between elective and appointive officials that could well apply to the
doctrine of condonation.
The electorates condonation of the previous administrative infractions of
the reelected official cannot be extended to that of the reappointed
coterminous employees, the underlying basis of the rule being to uphold the
will of the people expressed through the ballot. In other words, there is
neither subversion of the sovereign will nor disenfranchisement of the
electorate to speak of, in the case of reappointed coterminous employees.
It is the will of the populace, not the whim of one person who happens to be
the appointing authority, that could extinguish an administrative
liability. Since petitioners hold appointive positions, they cannot claim the
mandate of the electorate. The people cannot be charged with the
presumption of full knowledge of the life and character of each and every
probable appointee of the elective official ahead of the latters actual
reelection.
Moreover, the unwarranted expansion of the Pascual doctrine would set a
dangerous precedent as it would, as respondents posit, provide civil servants,
particularly local government employees, with blanket immunity from
administrative liability that would spawn and breed abuse in the
bureaucracy. Atty. Vicente E. Salumbides, Jr., et al. vs. Office of the
Ombudsman, et al., G.R. No. 180917, April 23, 2010.
Public office; public trust. Unlike private offices which are held largely on
the dictates of market forces, public offices are public trust. Public officers

are tasked to serve the public interest, thus the excessive burden for their
retention in the form of numerous prohibitions. The liberal evidentiary
standard of substantial evidence and the freedom of administrative
proceedings from technical niceties effectuate the fiduciary nature of public
office: they are procedural mechanisms assuring ease in maintaining an
efficient bureaucracy, free of rent-seeking officials who exploit government
processes to raise easy money. Respondents hold on his item at the
Mandaue City revenue office, which, like our customs offices, is a common
situs for corrupt activities, is no more lasting than his fidelity to his
trust. Although no criminal verdict deprives respondent of his liberty,
adequate evidence justifies his removal from the bureaucracy for forfeiting
the public trust. Hon. Primo C. Miro, etc. vs. Reynaldo M. Dosono, G.R.
No. 170697, April 30, 2010.
March 2010 Philippine Supreme

Posted on April 14, 2010 by Hector M. de Leon Jr. Posted in Constitutional Law
Tagged administrative regulation, agrarian reform, appointment, bidding, COMELEC,
due process, equal protection, exhaustion of administrative remedies, freedom of speech,
HRET, leave, misconduct, unfair competition
Here are selected March 2010 rulings of the Supreme Court of the
Constitutional Law
Constitutionality; justiciable controversy. Courts will not assume jurisdiction
over a constitutional question unless the following requisites are satisfied:
(1) there must be an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial review;
(2) the question before the court must be ripe for adjudication; (3) the person
challenging the validity of the act must have standing to do so; (4) the
question of constitutionality must have been raised at the earliest opportunity
and (5) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
Respondents aver that the first three requisites are absent in this case.

According to them, there is no actual case calling for the exercise of judicial
power and it is not yet ripe for adjudication.
An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights or an
assertion of opposite legal claims which is susceptible of judicial resolution
as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. On the
other hand, a question is considered ripe for adjudication when the act being
challenged has a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.
Contrary to respondents assertion, we do not have to wait until petitioners
members have shut down their operations as a result of the MCIT or CWT.
The assailed provisions are already being implemented. As we stated
in Didipio Earth-Savers
Multi-Purpose
Association,
Incorporated
(DESAMA) v. Gozun: By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the
approval of the challenged act, the dispute is said to have ripened into a
judicial controversy even without any other overt act. Indeed, even a
singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken
judicial duty.
If the assailed provisions are indeed unconstitutional, there is no better time
than the present to settle such question once and for all. Chamber of Real
Estate and Builders Associations, Inc. Vs. The Hon. Executive Secretary
Alberto Romulo, et al., G.R. No. 160756, March 9, 2010.
Constitutionality; justiciable controversy. We hold that the petitions set forth
an actual case or controversy that is ripe for judicial determination. The
reality is that the JBC already commenced the proceedings for the selection
of the nominees to be included in a short list to be submitted to the President
for consideration of which of them will succeed Chief Justice Puno as the
next Chief Justice. Although the position is not yet vacant, the fact that
the JBC began the process of nomination pursuant to its rules and practices,
although it has yet to decide whether to submit the list of nominees to the
incumbent outgoing President or to the next President, makes the situation
ripe for judicial determination, because the next steps are the public
interview of the candidates, the preparation of the short list of candidates,
and the interview of constitutional experts, as may be needed.
A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether

the JBC properly initiated the process, there being an insistence from some
of the oppositors-intervenors that the JBC could only do so once the vacancy
has occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of course,
whether the JBC may resume its process until the short list is prepared, in
view
of
the
provision
of
Section
4(1),
Article
VIII,
which unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint one from the short list
to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an
Associate Justice) within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.
The ripeness of the controversy for judicial determination may not be
doubted. The challenges to the authority of the JBC to open the process of
nomination and to continue the process until the submission of the list of
nominees; the insistence of some of the petitioners to compel
the JBC through mandamus to submit the short list to the incumbent
President; the counter-insistence of the intervenors to prohibit the JBC from
submitting the short list to the incumbent President on the ground that said
list should be submitted instead to the next President; the strong position that
the incumbent President is already prohibited under Section 15, Article VII
from making any appointments, including those to the Judiciary, starting on
May 10, 2010 until June 30, 2010; and the contrary position that the
incumbent President is not so prohibited are only some of the real issues for
determination. All such issues establish the ripeness of the controversy,
considering that for some the short list must be submitted before the vacancy
actually occurs by May 17, 2010. The outcome will not be an abstraction, or
a merely hypothetical exercise. The resolution of the controversy will surely
settle with finality the nagging questions that are preventing
the JBC from moving on with the process that it already began, or that are
reasons persuading the JBC to desist from the rest of the process. Arturo M.
De Castro vs. Judicial and Bar Council, et al., G.R. No. 191002, G.R. No.
191032, G.R. No. 191057, A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC, G.R. No. 191149, G.R. No.
191342, March 17, 2010.
Constitutionality;
justiciable controversy. It will not do for
the COMELEC to insist that the reliability and authoritativeness of the
population indicators Congress used in enacting RA 9591 are nonjusticiable. If laws creating legislative districts are unquestionably within the
ambit of this Courts judicial review power, then there is more reason to

hold justiciable subsidiary questions impacting on their constitutionality,

such as their compliance with a specific constitutional limitation under
Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that only cities with at least
250,000 constituents are entitled to representation in Congress. To fulfill this
obligation, the Court, of necessity, must inquire into the authoritativeness
and reliability of the population indicators Congress used to comply with the
constitutional limitation. Victorino B. Aldaba, et al. Vs. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 188078, March 15, 2010.
Constitutionality; standing to sue. The Court rules that the petitioners have
each demonstrated adequate interest in the outcome of the controversy as to
vest them with the requisite locus standi.The issues before us are of
transcendental importance to the people as a whole, and to the petitioners in
particular. Indeed, the issues affect everyone (including the petitioners),
regardless of ones personal interest in life, because they concern that great
doubt about the authority of the incumbent President to appoint not only the
successor of the retiring incumbent Chief Justice, but also others who may
serve in the Judiciary, which already suffers from a far too great number of
vacancies in the ranks of trial judges throughout the country.
In any event, the Court retains the broad discretion to waive the requirement
of legal standing in favor of any petitioner when the matter involved has
transcendental importance, or otherwise requires a liberalization of the
requirement.
Yet, if any doubt still lingers about the locus standi of any petitioner, we
dispel the doubt now in order to remove any obstacle or obstruction to the
resolution of the essential issue squarely presented herein. We are not to
shirk from discharging our solemn duty by reason alone of an obstacle more
technical than otherwise. In Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air
Terminals Co., Inc., we pointed out: Standing is a peculiar concept in
constitutional law because in some cases, suits are not brought by parties
who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other
government act but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually
sue in the public interest. But even if, strictly speaking, the petitioners are
not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the
Court to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to its
addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised. Arturo
M. De Castro vs. Judicial and Bar Council, et al.,G.R. No. 191002, G.R. No.

191032, G.R. No. 191057, A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC, G.R. No. 191149, G.R. No.
191342, March 17, 2010.
Constitutionality; standing to sue. Respondents next argue that petitioner has
no legal standing to sue: Petitioner is an association of some of the real
estate developers and builders in the Philippines. Petitioners did not allege
that [it] itself is in the real estate business. It did not allege any material
interest or any wrong that it may suffer from the enforcement of [the assailed
provisions].
Legal standing or locus standi is a partys personal and substantial interest in
a case such that it has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act being challenged. In Holy Spirit Homeowners Association,
Inc. v. Defensor, we held that the association had legal standing because its
members stood to be injured by the enforcement of the assailed provisions.
In any event, this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which
does not satisfy the requirements of an actual case, ripeness or legal standing
when paramount public interest is involved. The questioned MCIT and CWT
affect not only petitioners but practically all domestic corporate taxpayers in
our country. The transcendental importance of the issues raised and their
overreaching significance to society make it proper for us to take cognizance
of this petition. Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Inc. Vs.
The Hon. Executive Secretary Alberto Romulo, et al., G.R. No. 160756,
March 9, 2010.
Due process; minimum corporate income tax. Petitioner claims that
the MCIT under Section 27(E) of RA 8424 is unconstitutional because it is
highly oppressive, arbitrary and confiscatory which amounts to deprivation
of property without due process of law. It explains that gross income as
defined under said provision only considers the cost of goods sold and other
direct expenses; other major expenditures, such as administrative and
interest expenses which are equally necessary to produce gross income, were
not taken into account. Thus, pegging the tax base of the MCIT to a
corporations gross income is tantamount to a confiscation of capital because
gross income, unlike net income, is not realized gain.
Petitioner failed to support, by any factual or legal basis, its allegation that

the MCIT is arbitrary and confiscatory. The Court cannot strike down a law
as unconstitutional simply because of its yokes. Taxation is necessarily
burdensome because, by its nature, it adversely affects property rights. The
party alleging the laws unconstitutionality has the burden to demonstrate
the supposed violations in understandable terms. Chamber of Real Estate
and Builders Associations, Inc. Vs. The Hon. Executive Secretary
Equal protection; creditable withholding tax. Petitioner claims that the
revenue regulations are violative of the equal protection clause because the
CWT is being levied only on real estate enterprises. Specifically, petitioner
points out that manufacturing enterprises are not similarly imposed a CWT
on their sales, even if their manner of doing business is not much different
from that of a real estate enterprise. Like a manufacturing concern, a real
estate business is involved in a continuous process of production and it
incurs costs and expenditures on a regular basis. The only difference is that
goods produced by the real estate business are house and lot units.
The equal protection clause under the Constitution means that no person or
class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is
enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and in like
circumstances. Stated differently, all persons belonging to the same class
shall be taxed alike. It follows that the guaranty of the equal protection of the
laws is not violated by legislation based on a reasonable classification.
Classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions; (2) be
germane to the purpose of the law; (3) not be limited to existing conditions
only and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class.
The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable classifications for
purposes of taxation. Inequalities which result from a singling out of one
particular class for taxation, or exemption, infringe no constitutional
limitation. The real estate industry is, by itself, a class and can be validly
treated differently from other business enterprises. Chamber of Real Estate
and Builders Associations, Inc. Vs. The Hon. Executive Secretary
Equal protection; NPC regulation. The equal protection clause means that
no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of

laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place
and in like circumstances. The guaranty of the equal protection of the laws
is not violated by a legislation based on a reasonable classification. The
equal protection clause, therefore, does not preclude classification of
individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long
as the classification is reasonable and not arbitrary.
Items 3 and 3.1 clearly did not infringe on the equal protection clause as
these were based on a reasonable classification intended to protect, not the
right of any business or trade but the integrity of government property, as
well as promote the objectives of RA 7832. Traders like Pinatubo could not
claim similar treatment as direct manufacturers/processors especially in the
light of their failure to negate the rationale behind the distinction. National
Power Corporation vs. Pinatubo Commercial, represented by Alfredo A.
Dy, G.R. No. 176006, March 26, 2010.
Freedom of speech; prior restraint. Petitioners threshold posture that the
suspension thus imposed constitutes prior restraint and an abridgement of his
exercise of religion and freedom of expression is a mere rehash of the
position he articulated in the underlying petitions for certiorari and
expounded in his memorandum. So are the supportive arguments and some
of the citations of decisional law, Philippine and American, holding it
together. They have been considered, sufficiently discussed in some detail,
and found to be without merit in our Decision. It would, thus, make little
sense to embark on another lengthy discussion of the same issues and
arguments.
Suffice it to reiterate that the sanction imposed on the TV program in
question does not, under the factual milieu of the case, constitute prior
restraint, but partakes of the nature of subsequent punishment for past
violation committed by petitioner in the course of the broadcast of the
program
on
August
10,
2004.
Eliseo
F. Soriano Vs.
Ma. Consoliza P. Laguardia, etc. et al./Eliseo F. Soriano Vs. Movie and
Television Review and Classification Board, et al., G.R. No. 164785/G.R.
No. 165636, March 15, 2010.
HRET; procedure. It is quite clear that the Tribunal acted in the best
interest of the electorate, ensuring the determination of the latters will

within a reasonable time. In sum, there is absolutely nothing in this case that
would justify a finding that the HRET gravely abused its discretion by not
granting petitioner an extension of time to present additional evidence and
formally offer the same. Representative Alvin S. Sandoval vs. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal Josephine Veronique R. Lacson-Noel
and Hon. Speaker Prospero Nograles, G.R. No. 190067, March 9, 2010.
Legislative districts; contiguous requirement. Aside from failing to comply
with Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution on the population
requirement, the creation by RA 9591 of a legislative district
for Malolos City, carving the city from the former First Legislative District,
leaves the town of Bulacan isolated from the rest of the geographic mass of
that district. This contravenes the requirement in Section 5(3), Article VI
that each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable,
contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. It is no argument to say, as
the OSG does, that it was impracticable for Congress to create a district with
contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory because Malolos city lies at the
center of the First Legislative District. The geographic lay-out of the First
Legislative District is not an insuperable condition making compliance with
Section 5(3) impracticable. To adhere to the constitutional mandate, and thus
maintain fidelity to its purpose of ensuring efficient representation, the
practicable alternative for Congress was to include the municipality
of Bulacan in Malolos Citys legislative district. Although unorthodox, the
resulting contiguous and compact district fulfills the constitutional
requirements of geographic unity and population floor, ensuring efficient
representation
of
the
minimum
mass
of
constituents. Victorino B. Aldaba, et al. Vs. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 188078, March 15, 2010.
President; power of appointment. The incumbent President can appoint the
successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement on May 17, 2010 as the
prohibition against presidential appointments under Section 15, Article VII
does not extend to appointments in the Judiciary. Arturo M. De Castro vs.
Judicial and Bar Council, et al., G.R. No. 191002, G.R. No. 191032, G.R.
No. 191057, A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC, G.R. No. 191149, G.R. No. 191342,
March 17, 2010.
Speedy trial. The constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases is not
limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all

cases, including civil and administrative cases, and in all proceedings,

including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings. Hence, under the Constitution,
any party to a case may demand expeditious action by all officials who are
tasked with the administration of justice.
The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to a speedy trial, is
deemed violated only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the
trial are asked for and secured; or even without cause or justifiable motive, a
long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case
tried. Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine whether a
defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition
of a case for that matter, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and
the defendant is weighed, and such factors as the length of the delay, the
reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the
accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay. The concept of a speedy
disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.
Hence, the doctrinal rule is that in the determination of whether that right
has been violated, the factors that may be considered and balanced are as
follows: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the
assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice
caused by the delay.
Applying the doctrinal ruling vis-a-vis the factual milieu of this case, the
violation of the right to a speedy disposition of the case against petitioner is
clear for the following reasons: (1) the delay of almost five (5) years on the
part of ADT in resolving the motion of petitioner, which resolution
petitioner reasonably found necessary before he could present his defense;
(2) the unreasonableness of the delay; and (3) the timely assertions by
petitioner of the right to an early disposition which he did through a motion
to dismiss. Over and above this, the delay was prejudicial to petitioners
cause as he was under preventive suspension for ninety (90) days, and
during the interregnum of almost five years, the trial of the accusation
against him remained stagnant at the prosecution stage.
The Constitutional guarantee against unreasonable delay in the disposition of
cases was intended to stem the tide of disenchantment among the people in

the administration of justice by our judicial and quasi-judicial tribunals. The

adjudication of cases must not only be done in an orderly manner that is in
accord with the established rules of procedure but must also be promptly
decided to better serve the ends of justice. Excessive delay in the disposition
of cases renders the rights of the people guaranteed by the Constitution and
by
various legislations inutile.
Capt. Wilferdo G. Roquero vs.
The
Chancellor of UP Manila, et al., G.R. No. 181851, March 9, 2010.
Unfair competition; bidding. The provision imposed the precondition that
the contracting parties should be eligible and qualified. It should be
emphasized that the bidding process was not a free-for-all where any and
all interested parties, qualified or not, could take part. Section 5(e) of RA
9184 defines competitive bidding as a method of procurement which is
open to participation by any interested party and which consists of the
following processes: advertisement, pre-bid conference,eligibility screening
of prospective bidders, receipt and opening of bids, evaluation of bids, postqualification, and award of contract x x x. The law categorically mandates
that prospective bidders are subject to eligibility screening, and as earlier
stated, bidding rules may specify other conditions or order that the bidding
process be subjected to certain reservations or qualifications. Thus, in
its pre-qualification guidelines issued for the sale of scrap ACSRs,
the NPC reserved the right to pre-disqualify any applicant who did not meet
the requirements for pre-qualification. Clearly, the competitiveness policy of
a bidding process presupposes the eligibility and qualification of a
contestant; otherwise, it defeats the principle that only responsible and
qualified bidders can bid and be awarded government contracts. Our free
enterprise system is not based on a market of pure and unadulterated
competition where the State pursues a strict hands-off policy and follows the
let-the-devil-devour-the-hindmost rule.
Moreover, the mere fact that incentives and privileges are granted to certain
enterprises to the exclusion of others does not render the issuance
unconstitutional for espousing unfair competition. While the Constitution
enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it nonetheless reserves to the
government the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the
general welfare. In the present case, the unregulated disposal and sale of
scrap ACSR wires will hamper the governments effort of curtailing the
pernicious practice of trafficking stolen government property. This is an evil
sought to be prevented by RA 7832 and certainly, it was well within the

authority of the NPC to prescribe conditions in order to prevent it. National

Power Corporation vs. Pinatubo Commercial, represented by Alfredo A.
Dy, G.R. No. 176006, March 26, 2010.
Administrative Law
Administrative due process. Petitioners allegation of improper venue and
the fact that the complaint was not under oath are not sufficient grounds for
the dismissal of the complaint. Well to remember, the case was an
administrative case and as such, technical rules of procedure are liberally
applied. In administrative cases, technical rules of procedure and evidence
are not strictly applied and administrative due process cannot be fully
equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. The intention is to
resolve disputes brought before such bodies in the most expeditious and
inexpensive manner possible.
Petitioner was likewise amply afforded administrative due process the
essence of which is an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to
seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. The records show
that petitioner filed the following: (1) Compliance-Answer to the Complaint;
(2) Rejoinder; (3) Position paper; (4) Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution of the Board of Professional Teachers finding him guilty as
charged; and (5) Motion for Reconsideration of the decision of the Court of
Appeals. He attended the preliminary conference and hearing where he was
able to adduce his evidence. With the opportunities he had, he cannot claim
he was denied due process. Rene Ventenilla Puse Vs. Ligaya delos SantosPuse, G.R. No. 183678, March 15, 2010
Exhaustion of administrative remedies. Considering that the President has
the power to review on appeal the orders or acts of petitioner NEA, the
failure of respondent to undertake such an appeal bars him from resorting to
a judicial suit. It is settled that under the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, recourse through court action cannot prosper until
after all such administrative remedies have first been exhausted. If remedy is
available within the administrative machinery, this should be resorted to
before recourse can be made to courts. The party with an administrative
remedy must not only initiate the prescribed administrative procedure to
obtain relief but also pursue it to its appropriate conclusion before seeking

judicial intervention in order to give the administrative agency an

opportunity to decide the matter itself correctly and prevent unnecessary and
premature resort to the court. The non-observance of the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies results in lack of cause of action,
which is one of the grounds in the Rules of Court justifying the dismissal of
the complaint.
In the present case, respondent failed to exhaust his administrative remedies
when he filed a case with the RTC without appealing the decision of
the NEA to the Office of the President. As such, his petition filed with the
RTC must necessarily fail. National Electrification Administration vs. Val
L. Villanueva, G.R. No. 168203, March 9, 2010
Regulations; publication. NPC Circular No. 99-75 did not have to be
published since it was merely an internal rule or regulation. It did not
purport to enforce or implement an existing law but was merely a directive
issued by the NPC President to his subordinates to regulate the proper and
efficient disposal of scrap ACSRs to qualified bidders. Thus, NPC Circular
No. 99-75 defined the responsibilities of the different NPC personnel in the
disposal, pre-qualification, bidding and award of scrap ACSRS. It also
provided for the deposit of a proposal bond to be submitted by bidders, the
approval of the award, mode of payment and release of awarded
scrap ACSRs. All these guidelines were addressed to the NPC personnel
involved in the bidding and award of scrap ACSRs. It did not, in any way,
affect the rights of the public in general or of any other person not involved
in the bidding process. Assuming it affected individual rights, it did so only
remotely, indirectly and incidentally. National Power Corporation vs.
Pinatubo Commercial, represented by Alfredo A. Dy, G.R. No. 176006,
March 26, 2010.
Agrarian law
CARL; coverage. Resolution No. 5, passed on March 12, 1981 by the
Sangguniang Bayan of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, showed that the limits of the
poblacion area of the municipality included Barangay Bibincahan, where the
respondents landholdings were situated. The significance of this fact cannot
be overstated, for, thereby, the respondents landholdings were presumed to
be industrial and residential lands. Jurisprudence has been clear about the

presumption. In Hilario v. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court said:

The presumption assumed by the appellate court that a parcel of land which
is located in a poblacion is not necessarily devoted to residential purposes is
wrong. It should be the other way around. A lot inside the poblacion should
be presumed residential, or commercial, or non-agricultural unless there is a
clearly preponderant evidence to show that it is agricultural.
To the same effect was Natalia Realty Corporation v. DAR, thus: We now
determine whether such lands are covered by the CARL. Section 4 of R.A.
6657 provides that the CARL shall cover, regardless of tenurial
arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural
lands. As to what constitutes agricultural land, it is referred to as land
devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as
mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land. The deliberations
of the Constitutional Commission confirm this limitation. Agricultural
lands are only those lands which are arable and suitable agricultural lands
and do not include commercial, industrial and residential lands.
There is no dispute that as early as 1981, the respondents landholdings have
been part of the poblacion of Sorsogon, Sorsogon. Consistent with Hilario
andNatalia, holding that the respondents landholdings were nonagricultural, and, consequently, outside the coverage of the CARL, was fully
warranted. In fact, the excerpt from the Comprehensive Development Plan
of Sorsogon, Sorsogon showed that Barangay Bibincahan was within the
Central Business District of the municipality. Department of Agrarian
Reform,
represented
by
Secretary Hernani A. Braganza vs.
Pablo Berenguer, et al., G.R. No. 154094, March 9, 2010.
CARP;
coverage.
Petitioner
insists
on
exemption
of
the Alangilan landholding from CARP coverage. It argues that the subject
landholding had already been converted into non-agricultural use long
before the advent of the CARP. The passage of the 1982 Ordinance,
classifying the property as reserved for residential, it asserts, effectively
transformed the land into non-agricultural use, and thus, outside the ambit of
the CARL. It cites Natalia, wherein it was ruled that lands intended for
residential use are outside the coverage of the CARL.
Indeed, lands devoted to non-agricultural activity are outside the coverage of

CARL. These include lands previously converted into non-agricultural uses

prior to the effectivity of the CARL on June 15, 1988. Unfortunately,
petitioner failed to convince us that the Alangilan landholding ceased to be
agricultural at the time of the effectivity of the CARL.
It is beyond cavil that the Alangilan landholding was classified as
agricultural, reserved for residential in 1982, and was reclassified as
residential-1 in 1994. However, contrary to petitioners assertion, the term
reserved for residential does not change the nature of the land from
agricultural to non-agricultural. As aptly explained by the DAR
Secretary, the term reserved for residential simply reflects the intended
land use. It does not denote that the property has already been reclassified as
residential, because the phrase reserved for residential is not a land
classification category.
Indubitably, at the time of the effectivity of the CARL in 1988, the subject
landholding was still agricultural. This was bolstered by the fact that
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan had to pass an Ordinance in 1994,
reclassifying the landholding as residential-1. If, indeed, the landholding had
already been earmarked for residential use in 1982, as petitioner claims, then
there would have been no necessity for the passage of the 1994
Ordinance. Alangilan Realty & Development Corporation vs. Office of the
President, represented by Alberto Romulo, as Executive Secretary and
Arthur P. Autea, as Deputy Secretary and Department of Agrarian
Reform, G.R. No. 180471, March 26, 2010.
Election law
COMELEC; findings. The appreciation of election documents involves a
question of fact best left to the determination of the COMELEC, a
specialized agency tasked with the supervision of elections all over the
country. The findings of fact of administrative bodies, when supported by
substantial evidence, are final and nonreviewable by courts of justice. This
principle is applied with greater force when the case concerns
the COMELEC, because the framers of the Constitution intended to place
the poll bodycreated and explicitly made independent by the Constitution
itselfon a level higher than statutory administrative organs. Jesus
O. Typoco vs. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 186359. March 5,

2010.
COMELEC; majority vote. The failure of the COMELEC En Banc to muster
the required majority vote even after the 15 February 2010 re-hearing should
have caused the dismissal of respondents Election Protest. Promulgated on
15 February 1993 pursuant to Section 6, Article IX-A and Section 3, Article
IX-C of the Constitution, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is clear on this
matter. Without any trace of ambiguity, Section 6, Rule 18 of said Rule
categorically provides as follows: Sec. 6. Procedure if Opinion is Equally
Divided. When the Commission en banc is equally divided in opinion, or
the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall be reheard, and if on
rehearing no decision is reached, the action or proceeding shall be dismissed
if originally commenced in the Commission; in appealed cases, the judgment
or order appealed from shall stand affirmed; and in all incidental matters, the
petition or motion shall be denied. Joselito R. Mendoza vs. Commission on
Elections and Roberto M. Pagdanganan, G.R. No. 191084, March 25, 2010.
COMELEC; firearms ban. The main issue is whether or not the COMELEC
gravely abused its discretion in including airsoft guns and their
replicas/imitations in the term firearm in Section 2 (b) of R.A. No. 8714.
The Court finds that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in this case. Atty. Reynante B. Orceo vs. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 190779, March 26, 2010.
HRET; vote count. What petitioner questions is the Tribunals reliance on
election returns and/or tally sheets and other election documents to arrive at
the number of votes for each of the parties. However, jurisprudence has
established that such action of the HRET was well within its discretion and
jurisdiction.
Indeed, the general rule is, if what is being questioned is the correctness of
the number of votes for each candidate, the best and most conclusive
evidence is the ballots themselves. However, this rule applies only if the
ballots are available and their integrity has been preserved from the day of
elections until revision. When the ballots are unavailable or cannot be
produced, then recourse can be made to untampered and unaltered election
returns or other election documents as evidence. Bai Sandra S.A. Sema vs.
House
of
Representatives
Electoral
Tribunal

and Didagen P. Dilangalen, G.R. No. 190734, March 26, 2010.

Local Government
City; population requirement. Under Executive Order No. 135 (EO 135),
the population indicators Congress used to measure Malolos Citys
compliance with the constitutional limitation are unreliable and nonauthoritative. Victorino B. Aldaba, et al. Vs. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 188078, March 15, 2010.
Public officers
Appointment. Section 27 (1), of the Civil Service Law provides: (1)
Permanent status. A permanent appointment shall be issued to a person
who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being
appointed, including the appropriate eligibility prescribed, in accordance
with the provisions of law, rules and standards promulgated in pursuance
thereof. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In the CES under which the position of PEZA Deputy Director General for
Policy and Planning is classified, the acquisition of security of tenure which
presupposes a permanent appointment is governed by the Rules and
Regulations promulgated by the CES Board.
Clearly, for an examinee or an incumbent to be a member of the CES and be
entitled to security of tenure, she/he must pass the CES examinations, be
conferred CES eligibility, comply with the other requirements prescribed by
the CES Board, and be appointed to a CES rank by the President.
Admittedly, before and up to the time of the termination of her appointment,
respondent did not go through the four stages of CES eligibility
examinations.
The appellate courts ruling that respondent became CES eligible upon
earning the MNSA degree, purportedly in accordance with Executive Order
No. 696, as amended by Executive Order No. 771, does not lie.
By respondents attainment of an MNSA degree, she was not conferred

automatic CES eligibility.

It
was,
as
above-quoted
portions
of CESB Resolution No. 204 state, merely accredited as equivalent to
passing the Management Aptitude Test Battery. For respondent to
acquire CES eligibility and CES rank, she could proceed to the second
stage of the eligibility examination process . . . and the other stages of the
examination . . . in accordance with existing policies and regulations; and
that if respondent as MNSA degree holder passed the three other stages of
the CES eligibility examinations and is conferred CES eligibility, she could
qualify for appointment to CES ranks, PROVIDED that she meets and
complies with other requirements of the CES Board and the Office of the
President to qualify for rank appointment.
Since, it is admitted that respondent, who acquired an MNSA degree in
1993, had not undergone the second, third and fourth stages of
the CES eligibility examinations prior to her appointment or during her
incumbency as Deputy Director General up to the time her appointment was
terminated, she was not a CES eligible, as indeed certified to by
the CES Board. Not being a CES eligible, she had no security of tenure,
hence, the termination by the PEZA Board on June 1, 2000 of her
appointment, as well as the appointment in her stead of CES eligible
by Ortaliz, were not illegal. PEZA Board of Directors and Lilia D. De Lima
vs. Gloria J. Mercado, G.R. No. 172144, March 9, 2010.
Leave. Section 49, Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules on Leave requires that
an application for leave should be acted upon within 5 working days from
receipt,
otherwise,
such
application
is
deemed
approved.
The CSC interpreted said provision in this wise It is explicit from
the aforequoted rule that an application for leave of absence which had not
been acted upon either by approving or disapproving by the head of
agency or his/her authorized representative within five (5) working days
from the date of its filing shall be deemed approved.
The CSC also ruled that Section 49 calls for a specific action to be done by
the head of the agency or his duly authorized representative on the
application for leave filed which is either to approve or to deny the same.
Being the central agency mandated to “prescribe, amend, and enforce
rules and regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of the Civil

Service Law and other pertinent laws, the CSC has the power to interpret
its own rules and any phrase contained in them, with its interpretation
significantly becoming part of the rules themselves. The Court has
consistently yielded and accorded great respect to the interpretation by
administrative agencies of their own rules unless there is an error of law,
abuse of power, lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly
conflicting with the letter and spirit of the law.
Clearly, Atty. Nghuatcos memorandum did not cover the action
contemplated by Section 49. For one, it did not bear the imprimatur of the
Commission Chairman (or his duly authorized representative) who was the
proper party to grant or deny the application, as dictated by Section 52 of the
Omnibus Rules on Leave. For another, it only submitted to the Commission
Secretary
Atty. Nghuatcos comments
and/or
recommendations
on Palers application. It was merely preliminary and did not propose any
definitive action (i.e., approval or disapproval) on Palers application, and
simply recommended what action to take. It was obviously not controlling
and the Chairman could have agreed or disagreed with the recommended
action. In fact, the memorandum clearly provided that Palers request was
still to be referred to the Legal Service for comment, and that the application
(could) be acted upon depending on the completion of his work load and
submission of the medical certificate. These circumstances plainly meant
that further action was yet to be made on the application. And since there
was no final approval or disapproval of Palers application within 5 working
days from receipt as required by Section 49, the application was deemed
approved. Paler, therefore, could not be considered on AWOL. Commission
on Appointments, represented herein by its Secretary Hon. Arturo
L. Tiu vs. Celso M. Paler, G.R. No. 172623. March 3, 2010.
Misconduct. Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate
violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior. To constitute an
administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with the
performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer. In grave
misconduct, as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of
corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of an
established rule must be manifest.
Respondents acts of grabbing petitioner and attempting to kiss her were, no
doubt, intentional. Worse, the incident occurred months after he had made

similar but subtler overtures to De la Cruz, who made it clear that his sexual
advances were not welcome. Considering that the acts respondent committed
against petitioner were much more aggressive, it was impossible that the
offensive nature of his actions could have escaped him. It does not appear
that petitioner and respondent were carrying on an amorous relationship that
might have justified his attempt to kiss petitioner while they were separated
from their companions. Worse, as petitioner and respondent were both
married (to other persons), respondent not only took his marital status
lightly, he also ignored petitioners married state, and good character and
reputation. Teresita G. Narvasa vs. Benjamin A. Sanchez, Jr., G.R. No.
169449, March 26, 2010.

Posted on April 8, 2010 by Jose Ma. G. Hofilea Posted in Civil Law, Constitutional
Law Tagged appointment, COMELEC, compensation, election protest, freedom of
speech
Every so often, the members of the Supreme Court, whether sitting in

division or En Banc, are unable to arrive at a unanimous position. In those
cases, as it is in a boxing match, the Honorable Justices have sometimes
been forced to come in from different corners to slug it out.
The following are selected decisions promulgated by the High Court in
March 2010 where at least one Justice felt compelled to express his or her
dissent from the decision penned by the ponente and the summaries below
highlight some issues involved in those cases where the Justices differed in
their opinions. Lets get ready to rumble.
THE UNDERCARDS
1. Mutuality and Conventional Compensation (Peralta vs. Carpio)
In conventional compensation, is it required that the parties be mutual
creditors and debtors of each other?
The essential facts in United Planters Sugar Milling Company, Inc. vs. Court

of Appeals that are relevant to that query are as follows:

(a)
United Planters Sugar Milling Company, Inc. (UPSUMCO) obtained
several loans from Philippine National Bank (PNB).
(b)
To secure UPSUMCOs obligations to PNB, among other things,
UPSUMCO granted PNB contractual rights to set-off against UPSUMCOs
outstanding obligations, moneys of UPSUMCO on deposit with PNB.
(c) PNB subsequently assigned to the Asset Privatization Trust (APT) all
of its rights, title and interest over UPSUMCO.
(d)
Following UPSUMCOs default, moneys in UPSUMCOs deposit
accounts with PNB were applied, without UPSUMCOs knowledge, against
UPSUMCOs outstanding obligations under the takeoff loans and the
operational loans.
As ponente for the majority decision, in denying UPSUMCOs Motion for
Reconsideration, Justice Diosdado Peralta affirmed the earlier decision of
the Supreme Court where it upheld the set-off against the UPSUMCO
deposit accounts held by PNB to satisfy obligations owed to APT:
The right of respondent PNB to set-off payments from UPSUMCO arose

from conventional compensation rather than legal compensation, even if all
the requisites for legal compensation were present between those two
parties. The determinative factor is the mutual agreement between PNB and
UPSUMCO to set-off payments. Even without an express agreement
stipulating compensation, PNB and UPSUMCO would have been entitled to
set-off of payments, as the legal requisites for compensation under Article
1279 were present.
As soon as PNB assigned its credit to APT, the mutual creditor-debtor
relation between PNB and UPSUMCO ceased to exist. However, PNB and
UPSUMCO had agreed to a conventional compensation, a relationship
which does not require the presence of all the requisites under Article 1279.
And PNB too had assigned all its rights as creditor to APT, including its

rights under conventional compensation. The absence of the mutual creditordebtor relation between the new creditor APT and UPSUMCO cannot
negate the conventional compensation. Accordingly, APT, as the assignee of
credit of PNB, had the right to set-off the outstanding obligations of
UPSUMCO on the basis of conventional compensation before the
condonation took effect on 3 September 1987.
In his dissent, Justice Antonio Carpio asserts the complete contrary view that
[r]egardless of the type of compensation exercised (that is, whether legal or
conventional), the irreducible minimum requirement is that the parties must
be creditor and debtor of each other. Otherwise, the remedy for the creditor
to satisfy its credit is to initiate collection proceedings.
Justice Carpios parting shot is an admonition that in this case, the
incoherent theory of conventional compensation without mutuality of
creditssets a dangerous precedent of babying government achieved
through convoluted analysis of facts and untenable application of the law
(United Planters Sugar Milling Company, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 126890, March 9, 2010. See dissenting
opinion here.)
(Authors note: there were other issues in this case where views
diverged although these hinged essentially on factual matters. The
stark, opposing opinions on the necessity of mutuality in conventional
compensation, however, appears to be the most important point of
contention. For this bout, the authors scorecard has it in favor of the
dissenter.)
*************************************************************
*******************************************
2. The High Court as Trier of Fact (Nachura vs. Velasco)
In Typoco vs. Commission on Elections, Justice Eduardo Nachura refused to
entertain arguments of the petitioner asserting errors by the Comelec in the
latters appreciation of election documents as this involves a question of fact
that is best left to the determination of the Comelec as a specialized agency.

In fact, it is the only entity that has the competence to determine the
authenticity of election documents. The findings of fact of administrative
agencies, when supported by substantial evidence, are final and nonreviewable by the courts of justice. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.
On the other hand, Justice Presbitero Velasco sought to remind his brethren
of the settled principle that as an exception, the Court can actually be a trier
of facts when, among other situations, there is grave abuse of discretion.
Justice Velasco took the view that in this case, the Comelecs decision to
rely on one set of Statement of Votes by Precinct and disregard a
conflicting copy of the same statement, constituted a grave abuse of its
discretion.
(Jesus O. Typoco vs. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 186359.
March 5, 2010. See dissenting opinion here.)
(Authors note: there have already been many decisions of the Supreme
Court that confronted the same issue: i.e., was there indeed grave abuse
of discretion that justifies the Supreme Court passing upon questions of
fact? Unfortunately, these are the types of cases that one cannot draw
an objective standard for as a precedent as the determination by the
High Court of grave abuse of discretion is itself matter that is left to its
own discretion. Its a draw.
*************************************************************
*******************************************
3. Bail Pending Appeal (Corona vs. Peralta)
In an application for bail pending appeal filed by an appellant that had been
sentenced by the trial court to a penalty of imprisonment for more than six
years, should bail automatically be granted if none of the circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court are established? The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Renato
Corona, says no.
In the first paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114, it is provided that upon
conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by

death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is

discretionary. At the same time, under the third paragraph, if the penalty
imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the
accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by
the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the circumstances enumerated
therein (e.g., recidivism, quasi-recidivism, habitual delinquency, etc.) or
other similar circumstances.
The gist of one of Justice Coronas principal arguments in ruling that bail is
not automatically granted just because the circumstances mentioned in the
third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 are not present, is that essentially, the
court retains discretionary authority on the matter of bail pending appeal.
The only time it loses discretion is when any of the circumstances
enumerated in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 exists in which
case, the court must deny or revoke bail pending appeal. Justice Corona also
points out that the enumeration in such provision of the Rules of Court is not
exhaustive and allows the court to consider other similar circumstances.
Apparently, even as none of the circumstances in the Rules were shown to
exist in this case, among the other circumstances that the Court of Appeals
took into account in denying bail was the fact that the petitioner was
convicted by the trial court. The majority believed there was no grave abuse
by the Court of Appeals in the exercise of its discretion.
In dissenting, Justice Diosdado Peralta asserted that in a situation where an
accused was charged with a non-bailable offense but convicted by the trial
court of a lesser, bailable, offense (in this case, the accused was charged
with murder but convicted for homicide), the appellate court should not take
into account the fact of conviction at the trial court as a circumstance in the
course of exercising its discretion on whether or not to grant bail.
He argues that if a person charged with a non-bailable offense is, at the
outset, already denied bail as a matter of law, and if the fact of his eventual
conviction for a non-bailable offense renders him likewise not entitled to
bail, then there would never be a situation where such a person could be
eligible for bail pending appeal. He notes on this point that the conviction
for homicide indicates that evidence of guilt for the crime that was charged
(i.e., murder) was actually not strong. Justice Peralta suggests that in these

situations, the court should put much emphasis on the Section 5, Rule 114
circumstances. Since none of such circumstances exist in this case,
Justice Abad votes to grant bail to the petitioner.
(Jose Antonio Leviste vs. The Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 189122,
March 17, 2010. See dissenting opinion here.)
(Authors note: it does not appear to this author that
Justice Peralta necessarily disagrees with the conclusion of the majority
on the point of law as framed by the ponente, but rather, takes issue
with using the fact of conviction (in the specific situation involving a
person charged with a non-bailable offense but conviction for a lesser
offense) as a factor to be considered. Interesting point. But still, for this
authorin the exercise of his discretionthe majority wins.)
*************************************************************
*********************************************
4. Obscene vs. Indecent (Velasco vs. Abad and Carpio)
Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol ka pa sa putang babae o di ba. Yung
putang babae ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba, [dito] kay Michael ang
gumagana ang itaas, o di ba! O, masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sabi ng
lola ko masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng mga
demonyong ito.
For these eloquent utterances, delivered by a well-known religious minister
(allegedly in response to provocative, on-air statements made by a rival
religious organization) during a television broadcast of Ang Dating Daan, a
program having a G rating (or suitable for all ages), the program was
meted out a three-month suspension.
In upholding the suspension, Justice Presbitero Velasco, speaking for the
majority, branded such language as obscene particularly to the average child
and thus is not constitutionally protected speech. In addition, the decision
upholds the rule that the exercise of religious freedom can be regulated by
the State when it will bring about a clear and present danger of some
substantive evil which the State is duty bound to prevent.

Justices Roberto Abad and Antonio Carpio joined forces to counter the
majority.
Justice Abad felt that for a 15-second outburst, it seems not fair for the Court
to close down the petitioners Bible ministry to its large followers altogether
for a full quarter of a year as it would be like cutting the leg to cure a smelly
foot. The petitioners remarks, after all, while perhaps indecent, were not
obscene as they do not appeal to the prurient interest of the average person.
A thing is prurient when it arouses lascivious thoughts or desires or tends to
arouse sexual desire. It was just a figure of speech.
For Justice Abad, the resulting abridgment of speechthree months total
suspension of the programcannot be regarded as permissible for being
merely indirect, conditional, or partial. It is actually a direct, unconditional,
and total abridgment of the freedom of speech, to which a religious
organization is entitled, for a whole quarter of a year.
For Justice Antonio Carpio, the actual and real effect of the three-month
suspension is a prior restraint on expression in violation of a fundamental
constitutional right. According to him, where the medium of a television
broadcast is concerned, as in the case at hand, well-entrenched is the rule
that censorship is allowable only under the clearest proof of a clear and
present danger of a substantive evil to public safety, public morals, public
health, or any other legitimate public interest.
Moreover, according to Justice Carpio, well-settled is the rule that speech, to
be considered obscene, must appeal to prurient interests. The subject speech
cannot be said to appeal to any prurient interest as it is utterly bereft of any
tendency to excite lustful thoughts as to be deemed obscene.
(Eliseo F. Soriano Vs. Ma. Consoliza P. Laguardia, etc. et al./Eliseo
F. Soriano Vs. Movie and Television Review and Classification
Board, et al., G.R. No. 164785/G.R. No. 165636, March 15, 2010. See
Justice Abads dissent here and Justice Carpios dissent here.)
(Authors note: it actually seems a little presumptuous for the dissenters
to make those conclusions about lustful thoughts (or the absence
thereof). This author knows a couple of maniac types who are able to

get aroused just by the sight of a lamppost. Besides, if this author used
the same language on national TV to address the Supreme Court, he
would surely be suspended faster than you could say,
p&#@ng ina, di ba? As he should be. For the majority.)
*************************************************************
*********************************************
5. Comelec Rules on Motions for Reconsideration (Perez vs. A Bunch of
Others)
Mendoza Vs. Comelec et al., with Justice Jose Perez writing the decision for
the majority, involved the disposition of an election protest filed with
the Comelec following the Comelecs Rules of Procedure. Several Justices
filed opinions that were separate concurring (Carpio), separate (CarpioMorales), concurring (Velasco) and dissenting (Leonardo-de Castro
and Abad). While several related issues were discussed, this summary
tackles only what appears to one of the critical issues in this case. Thus:
Section 3, Article IX(C) of the Constitution provides:
Section 3. The Commission on Elections may sit En Banc or in two
divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite
disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All
such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that
motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission
En Banc.
Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides:
Sec. 6. Procedure if Opinion is Equally Divided. When the Commission
en banc is equally divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be
had, the case shall be reheard, and if on rehearing no decision is reached, the
action or proceeding shall be dismissed if originally commenced in the
Commission; in appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed from shall
stand affirmed; and in all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be
denied.

Question: If an election protest is originally filed with a Comelec division,

should the decision reached by the division be considered affirmed if
the Comelec En Banc is not able to obtain the required majority to sustain a
motion for reconsideration filed with it that seeks a reversal of the division
decision?
Justice Jose Perez: No.
Justice Antonio Carpio: Yes.
Justice Conchita Carpio-Morales: Yes.
Justice Presbitero Velasco: No.
Justice Teresita Leonardo-de Castro: Yes.
Justice Roberto Abad: Yes.
(Joselito R. Mendoza vs. Commission on Elections and Roberto
M. Pagdanganan, G.R. No. 191084, March 25, 2010. See separate
concurring opinion of Justice Carpio here, the concurring opinion of
the
concurring
opinion
of
Justice Carpio-Morales here,
Justice Velasco here, the dissenting opinion of Justice Leonardode Castro here, and the dissenting opinion of Jutice Abad here.
(This author: Yes. But dont answer yes in the forthcoming
bar examinations, as that would be contrary to the majority ruling.)
*************************************************************
*********************************************
The
Main
Event:
The
Ban
Midnight Appointments (Bersamin vs. Carpio-Morales)
on
The decision of the Supreme Court on the constitutional prohibition

on Presidential appointments made
during
the
period
of
two
months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end

of his/her term (branded as the Midnight Appointments Ban) is this

months hands down main event, given the importance of the issues as well
as the enormous public attention given to it.
Pre-Fight Weigh-In:
A misinterpretation like Valenzuela should not be allowedto last after its
false premises have been exposed. x x xConsequently, Valenzuela
nowdeserves to be quickly sent to the dustbin of the unworthy and
forgettable. Hon. Lucas Bersamin.
It
is
unfortunate
that
the
ponencia
chiefly
relies
on
the trivialities of draftsmanship style
in
arriving
at
a constitutional construction. x x x All rules of statutory construction revolt
against the interpretation arrived at by the ponencia Hon.
Conchita Carpio-Morales.
The Fight
The crux of the case is whether or not the Midnight Appointments Ban
found in Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution prevents the President
from making appointments to the Supreme Court that the President is
mandated, in Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, to do so within
90 days from when a vacancy occurs.
In the majority decision inked by Justice Lucas Bersamin, the Supreme
Court unequivocally ruled that the Midnight Appointments Ban did not
apply to restrict the ability of the President to make appointments to the
judiciary. Justice Bersamin threw a flurry of punches, which included the
following:
1. The deliberate drafting, styling and arranging of the Constitution reflects
the Constitutional intent that the Midnight Appointments Ban does not
extend to appointments to the judiciary. The Midnight Appointments Ban
does not appear in any of the provisions of Article VIII of
the Constitution that relate to the Presidents powers to appoint members of
the judiciary.

Justice Bersamin recognized that this ruling runs completely opposite to the
decision in In Re Appointments Dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A.
Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the Regional Trial
Court
of
Branch
62, Bago City
and
of
Branch
24, Cabanatuan City, respectively (Valenzuela). Therefore, Valenzuela
should be reversed.
The majority decision reasoned out that Valenzuela arrived at conclusions,
ostensibly on the basis of what it claimed to be the intent of the
Constitutional Commission (ConCom), but the records of the ConCom do
not support those conclusions. Instead, Valenzuela merely interpreted the
language in the relevant Constitutional provisions and concluded that the
mandate to fill a vacancy within 90 days should yield to the prohibition on
midnight appointments just because the prohibition was couched in stronger,
negative language.
But, since the Midnight Appointments Ban does not extend to the
appointments to the judiciary, the matter is not one of whether one
Constitutional provision yields to the other. Rather, it is that by the drafting,
styling and arrangement of the Constitution, the Midnight Appointments
Ban simply does not apply as a restriction in respect of appointments to the
judiciary.
2. To support the view that the framers intended the Midnight Appointments
Ban to apply solely to executive department appointments,
Justice Bersamin explained that the Midnight Appointments Ban seeks to
ensure that Presidential appointments are not made in haste or with
irregularities or to subvert the policies of an incoming president or for
partisanship. However, in the case of appointments to the judiciary, there is a
built-in procedure involving the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) that is
meant to ensure that none of the risks for which a midnight appointments
ban was imposed can occur.
3.
Justice Bersamin also
pointed
out
that
the
former
Justice Florenz Regalado, as consultant to the JBC, had actually advised
the JBC prior to the decision in Valenzuela that the Midnight Appointments
Ban did not apply to appointments to the judiciary. Regalado was a member
of the ConCom that drafted the Constitution.

The Supreme Court faulted Valenzuela anew for not according weight
to Regalados position. Valenzuela, according to Justice Bersamin,
determined constitutional intent from its interpretation of provisions, rather
than from the deliberations of the ConCom which Regaldo himself cited as
his own basis for the position he expressed early on.
4. Justice Bersamin proceeded by noting that Sections 14 and 16 of Article
VII clearly pertain only to appointments by the President to executive
department positions. Since Section 15 (the Midnight Appointments Ban) is
of the same character as Sections 14 and 16, then it is conclusive that all of
Sections 14, 15 and 16 pertain only to appointments to executive department
positions.
5. The majority decision then explicated that the judiciary is independent
from the executive and legislative departments. To say that it must be the
new President rather than the incumbent President that must appoint the new
justice (and Chief Justice), threatens the judiciarys independence and runs
the risk of the appointee being beholden to the new President. No such risk
arises where it is the incumbent that appoints since the term of the
incumbent will end soon after.
6. Justice Bersamin confronted the argument that the issue is moot because
the new President actually has around 45 days to himself appoint the next
Chief Justice. He dismissed this argument as flawed because it is possible
that in the future, the retirement of the Chief Justice may occur on a date
falling within the restricted period although there will be no new President
until a date that is after 90 days from when the vacancy occurs. In
Justice Bersamins calculations. there are possibly 19 times when such a
situation could occur.
Justice Conchita Carpio-Morales provided the sole dissenting opinion (there
were nine signing with the majority decision, two separate opinions, one
dissent and three inhibitions). She counter-punched with the following:
1. Justice Carpio-Morales chided the majority decision for its chief reliance
on the trivialities of draftsmanship style in arriving at a constitutional
construction because, according to her, constitutional draftsmanship style is
the weakest aid in arriving at a constitutional construction. While the

principle of separation of powers is recognized in having three separate

Articles in the Constitution allocated to each of the three branches of
government, the majority failed to acknowledge that the concomitant system
of checks and balances. Section sequencing alone of Sections 14, 15 and 16
of Article VII does not suffice to signify functional structuring.
2. That the power of judicial appointment was lodged in the President is a
recognized limit on the power of the judiciary, which however, is
counterbalanced by the election ban due to the need to insulate the judiciary
from the political climate of presidential elections. To abandon this
interplay of checks and balances on the mere inference that the
establishment of the JBC could de-politicize the process of judicial
appointments lacks Constitutional mooring.
3. To stress that the clear intent of the framers of the Constitution is for the
Midnight Appointments Ban to apply to the appointments to the judiciary,
Justice Carpio-Morales quoted from ConCom records portions where then
Commissioner Hilarion Davide (later to become Chief Justice), in explaining
the proposal relating to the Midnight Appointments Ban, expressly stated
that [t]he idea of the proposal is that about the end of the term of the
President, he may prolong his rule indirectly by appointing people to these
sensitive positions, like the commissions, the Ombudsman,
the JUDICIARY, so he could perpetuate himself in power even beyond his
term of office; therefore foreclosing the right of his successor to make
appointments to these positions.
4. Justice Carpio-Morales described the justification that the Midnight
Appointments Ban did not apply to appointments to the judiciary because
Article VIII of the Constitution did not provide for it as simplistic and
unreliable and ran against all rules of statutory construction.
For her, the general rule (i.e., that the President may not make appointments
during the restricted period) clearly states that the prohibition applies to all
kinds of midnight appointments. The Constitution made no
distinction. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. In addition,
the only exception stated in Section 15, Article VII (i.e., that
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies
therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety may be

made),
should
be
read
as
exception. Expressio unius et exclusio alterius.
being
the
only
5. Valenzuela was a unanimous decision (en banc) which should not have
been hastily overturned on the sole basis of Justice Regalados opinion.
Justice Carpio-Morales sarcastically suggests that if this was going to be the
standard, then all ConCom members should reconvene and put the matter to
a vote. Jurisprudence has set down the principle that resort to constitutional
debates may be had only when other guides fail and that it would be safer to
construe the Constitution from what appears on its face.
6. Justice Carpio-Morales suggests that the 90-day period during which an
appointment to fill in a vacancy must occur may be deemed to be suspended
where there is a legal impossibility (e.g., the Midnight Appointments Ban)
or a physical impossibility.
(Arturo M. De Castro vs. Judicial and Bar Council, et al., G.R. No. 191002,
G.R. No. 191032, G.R. No. 191057, A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC, G.R. No. 191149,
G.R. No. 191342, March 17, 2010.See concurring opinion of
Justice Abad here, the dissenting opinion of Justice Carpio-Morales here,
the separate opinion on Justice Nachura here, and the separate opinion of
Justice Brion here.)
February 2010 Philippine Supreme

Posted on March 5, 2010 by Hector M. de Leon Jr. Posted in Constitutional Law
Tagged Civil Service Commission, COMELEC, election contest, eminent domain, equal
protection, evidence, expropriation, HRET, immunity from suit, judicial review, public
officers
Here are selected February 2010 rulings of the Supreme Court of the
Constitutional Law

Equal protection; requisites. The equal protection clause does not require
the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without
distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined
according to a valid classification. The test developed by jurisprudence here
and yonder is that of reasonableness, which has four requisites:
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
The assailed Decision readily acknowledged that these deemed-resigned
provisions satisfy the first, third and fourth requisites of reasonableness. It,
however, proffers the dubious conclusion that the differential treatment of
appointive officials vis--vis elected officials is not germane to the purpose
of the law. Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. vs. Commission
on Elections, G.R. No. 189698, February 22, 2010.
Expropriation; private use. It is well settled that the taking of private
property by the Governments power of eminent domain is subject to two
mandatory requirements: (1) that it is for a particular public purpose; and (2)
that just compensation be paid to the property owner. These requirements
partake of the nature of implied conditions that should be complied with to
enable the condemnor to keep the property expropriated.
More particularly, with respect to the element of public use, the expropriator
should commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the
petition for expropriation filed, failing which, it should file another petition
for the new purpose. If not, it is then incumbent upon the expropriator to
return the said property to its private owner, if the latter desires to reacquire
the same. Otherwise, the judgment of expropriation suffers an intrinsic flaw,
as it would lack one indispensable element for the proper exercise of the
power of eminent domain, namely, the particular public purpose for which
the property will be devoted. Accordingly, the private property owner would
be denied due process of law, and the judgment would violate the property

owners right to justice, fairness, and equity.

In light of these premises, we now expressly hold that the taking of private
property, consequent to the Governments exercise of its power of eminent
domain, is always subject to the condition that the property be devoted to the
specific public purpose for which it was taken. Corollarily, if this particular
purpose or intent is not initiated or not at all pursued, and is peremptorily
abandoned, then the former owners, if they so desire, may seek the reversion
of the property, subject to the return of the amount of just compensation
received. In such a case, the exercise of the power of eminent domain has
become improper for lack of the required factual justification. Mactan-Cebu
International Airport Authority (MCIAA) and Air Transportation Office
(ATO) vs. Bernardo Lozada, et al., G.R. No. 176625, February 25, 2010.
Gerrymandering; meaning. Gerrymandering is a term employed to
describe an apportionment of representative districts so contrived as to give
an unfair advantage to the party in power. Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, a member
of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, defined gerrymandering as the
formation of one legislative district out of separate territories for the purpose
of favoring a candidate or a party. The Constitution proscribes
gerrymandering, as it mandates each legislative district to comprise, as far as
practicable, a contiguous, compact and adjacent territory.
As stated by the Office of the Solicitor General, the Province of Dinagat
Islands consists of one island and about 47 islets closely situated together,
without the inclusion of separate territories. It is an unsubstantiated
allegation that the province was created to favor Congresswoman Glenda
Ecleo-Villaroman. Rodolfo G. Navarro, et al. vs. Executive Secretary
Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 180050, February 10, 2010.
House of Representative Electoral Tribunal (HRET); jurisdiction. The
HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of petitioners
Abayon and Palparan as nominees of Aangat Tayo and Bantay party-list
organizations, respectively, who took the seats at the House of
Representatives that such organizations won in the 2007 elections.
Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the HRET shall be
the sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the

qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. Since partylist nominees are elected members of the House of Representatives no less
than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and
pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district
representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has
been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as
member of the House of Representatives, the COMELECs jurisdiction over
election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRETs own
jurisdiction begins. Electoral Tribunal, et al. /Congressman Jovito S.
Palparan, Jr. vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), et
al., G.R. No. 189466/G.R. No. 189506,. February 11, 2010.
Judicial review; requisites. The courts power of judicial review, like almost
all other powers conferred by the Constitution, is subject to several
limitations, namely: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling
for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must
have standing to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial
interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as
a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. Respondents assert
that the second requisite is absent in this case.
Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that
he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the
allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable
to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a
favorable action. The question on standing is whether such parties have
alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.
In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, summarizing the rules culled from
jurisprudence, the Supreme Court held that taxpayers, voters, concerned
citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the
following requirements are met:

(1) cases involve constitutional issues;

(2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public
funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional;
(3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of
the election law in question;
(4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are
of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and
(5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained
of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators.
Petitioner having alleged a grave violation of the constitutional prohibition
against Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants holding two
(2) or more positions in government, the fact that he filed this suit as a
concerned citizen sufficiently confers him with standing to sue for redress of
such illegal act by public officials. Dennis B. Funa vs. Executive Secretary
Eduardo R. Ermita, Office of the President, G.R. No. 184740, February 11,
2010.
Judicial review; standing to sue. In her Memorandum, respondent Governor
Geraldine B. Ecleo-Villaroman of the Province of Dinagat Islands raises
procedural issues. She contends that petitioners do not have the legal
standing to question the constitutionality of the creation of the Province of
Dinagat, since they have not been directly injured by its creation and are
without substantial interest over the matter in controversy. Moreover, she
alleges that the petition is moot and academic because the existence of the
Province of Dinagat Islands has already commenced; hence, the petition
should be dismissed.
The contention is without merit.
In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres, the Court held that in
cases of paramount importance where serious constitutional questions are
involved, the standing requirements may be relaxed and a suit may be
allowed to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming

the right of judicial review. In the same vein, with respect to other alleged
procedural flaws, even assuming the existence of such defects, the Court, in
the exercise of its discretion, brushes aside these technicalities and takes
cognizance of the petition considering its importance and in keeping with the
duty to determine whether the other branches of the government have kept
themselves within the limits of the Constitution.
Further, supervening events, whether intended or accidental, cannot prevent
the Court from rendering a decision if there is a grave violation of the
Constitution. The courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic
if it is capable of repetition, yet evading review. Rodolfo G. Navarro, et al.
vs. Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 180050, February
10, 2010.
Local government; creation of province. The Constitution clearly mandates
that the creation of local government units must follow the criteria
established in the Local Government Code. Any derogation of or deviation
from the criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code violates Sec. 10,
Art. X of the Constitution.
R.A. No. 9355 (creating the province of Dinagat Islands) is unconstitutional
for its failure to comply with the criteria for the creation of a province
prescribed in Sec. 461 of the Local Government Code. The provision in
Article 9 (2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code of 1991 stating, The land area requirement shall not
apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands,
is null and void. Rodolfo G. Navarro, et al. vs. Executive Secretary Eduardo
Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 180050, February 10, 2010.
President; immunity from suit. Petitioners first take issue on the Presidents
purported lack of immunity from suit during her term of office. The 1987
Constitution, so they claim, has removed such immunity heretofore enjoyed
by the chief executive under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions.
Petitioners are mistaken. The presidential immunity from suit remains
preserved under our system of government, albeit not expressly reserved in
the present constitution. Addressing a concern of his co-members in the
1986 Constitutional Commission on the absence of an express provision on

the matter, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J. observed that it was already understood
in jurisprudence that the President may not be sued during his or her tenure.
The Court subsequently made it abundantly clear in David v. MacapagalArroyo, a case likewise resolved under the umbrella of the 1987
Constitution, that indeed the President enjoys immunity during her
incumbency.
And lest it be overlooked, the petition is simply bereft of any allegation as to
what specific presidential act or omission violated or threatened to violate
petitioners protected rights. Lourdes D. Rubrico, et al. vs. Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, et al., G.R. No. 183871, February 18, 2010.
Overbreadth. In the United States, claims of facial overbreadth have been
entertained only where, in the judgment of the court, the possibility that
protected speech of others may be muted and perceived grievances left to
fester (due to the possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes)
outweighs the possible harm to society in allowing some unprotected speech
or conduct to go unpunished. Facial overbreadth has likewise not been
invoked where a limiting construction could be placed on the challenged
statute, and where there are readily apparent constructions that would cure,
or at least substantially reduce, the alleged overbreadth of the statute.
In the case at bar, the probable harm to society in permitting incumbent
appointive officials to remain in office, even as they actively pursue elective
posts, far outweighs the less likely evil of having arguably protected
candidacies blocked by the possible inhibitory effect of a potentially overly
broad statute.
In this light, the conceivably impermissible applications of the challenged
statutes which are, at best, bold predictions cannot justify invalidating
these statutes in toto and prohibiting the State from enforcing them against
conduct that is, and has for more than 100 years been, unquestionably within
its power and interest to proscribe. Instead, the more prudent approach
would be to deal with these conceivably impermissible applications through
case-by-case adjudication rather than through a total invalidation of the
statute itself. Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. vs.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 189698, February 22, 2010.

Public assembly; modification of permit. In modifying the permit outright,

respondent Mayor of Manila gravely abused his discretion when he did not
immediately inform the IBP who should have been heard first on the matter
of his perceived imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil that may
warrant the changing of the venue. The opportunity to be heard precedes the
action on the permit, since the applicant may directly go to court after an
unfavorable action on the permit.
Respondent failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying the terms of
the permit against the standard of a clear and present danger test which, it
bears repeating, is an indispensable condition to such modification. Nothing
in the issued permit adverts to an imminent and grave danger of a
substantive evil, which blank denial or modification would, when granted
imprimatur as the appellate court would have it, render illusory any judicial
scrutiny thereof. Intergrated Bar of the Philippines, represented by its
National President Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, H. Harry L. Roque, et al. vs.
Honorable Manila Mayor Jose Lito Atienza, G.R. No. 175241, February
24, 2010.
Public officials; multiple office. The prohibition against holding dual or
multiple offices or employment under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution was held inapplicable to posts occupied by the Executive
officials specified therein, without additional compensation in an ex-officio
capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of said
office. The reason is that these posts do not comprise any other office
within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an
imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials. Apart from
their bare assertion that respondent Bautista did not receive any
compensation when she was OIC of MARINA, respondents failed to
demonstrate clearly that her designation as such OIC was in an ex-officio
capacity as required by the primary functions of her office as DOTC
Undersecretary for Maritime Transport.
Given the vast responsibilities and scope of administration of the MARINA,
we are hardly persuaded by respondents submission that respondent
Bautistas designation as OIC of MARINA was merely an imposition of
additional duties related to her primary position as DOTC Undersecretary
for Maritime Transport. It appears that the DOTC Undersecretary for
Maritime Transport is not even a member of the Maritime Industry Board,

which includes the DOTC Secretary as Chairman, the MARINA

Administrator as Vice-Chairman, and the following as members: Executive
Secretary (Office of the President), Philippine Ports Authority General
Manager, Department of National Defense Secretary, Development Bank of
the Philippines General Manager, and the Department of Trade and Industry
Secretary.
It must be stressed though that while the designation was in the nature of an
acting and temporary capacity, the words hold the office were employed.
Such holding of office pertains to both appointment and designation because
the appointee or designate performs the duties and functions of the office.
The 1987 Constitution in prohibiting dual or multiple offices, as well as
incompatible offices, refers to the holding of the office, and not to the nature
of the appointment or designation, words which were not even found in
Section 13, Article VII nor in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B. To
hold an office means to possess or occupy the same, or to be in
possession and administration, which implies nothing less than the actual
discharge of the functions and duties of the office.
The disqualification laid down in Section 13, Article VII is aimed at
preventing the concentration of powers in the Executive Department
officials, specifically the President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet
and their deputies and assistants. Civil Liberties Union traced the history of
the times and the conditions under which the Constitution was framed, and
construed the Constitution consistent with the object sought to be
accomplished by adoption of such provision, and the evils sought to be
avoided or remedied. We recalled the practice, during the Marcos regime, of
designating members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants as
members of the governing bodies or boards of various government agencies
and instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled
corporations. This practice of holding multiple offices or positions in the
government led to abuses by unscrupulous public officials, who took
advantage of this scheme for purposes of self-enrichment. The blatant
betrayal of public trust evolved into one of the serious causes of discontent
with the Marcos regime. It was therefore quite inevitable and in consonance
with the overwhelming sentiment of the people that the 1986 Constitutional
Commission would draft into the proposed Constitution the provisions under
consideration, which were envisioned to remedy, if not correct, the evils that
flow from the holding of multiple governmental offices and

employment. Dennis B. Funa vs. Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita,

Office of the President, G.R. No. 184740, February 11, 2010.
Administrative Law
Proceedings; evidence. In administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings, the
quantum of proof required for a finding of guilt is only substantial evidence,
that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable,
might conceivably opine otherwise.
In the present case, petitioners Order of May 18, 2004 finding respondent
administratively liable for neglect of duty, which implies the failure to give
proper attention to a task expected of an employee arising from either
carelessness or indifference, was adequately established by substantial
evidence. Office of the Ombudsman (Mindanao) vs. Asteria E. Cruzabra,
G.R. No. 183507, February 24, 2010.
Election Law
Appointive officials; filing of certificate of candidacy. Under Section 13 of
RA 9369, which reiterates Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, any
person holding a public appointive office or position, including active
members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and
employees in government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his
certificate of candidacy. On the other hand, pursuant to Section 14 of RA
9006 or the Fair Election Act, which repealed Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code and rendered ineffective Section 11 of R.A. 8436 insofar as it
considered an elected official as resigned only upon the start of the
campaign period corresponding to the positions for which they are running,
an elected official is not deemed to have resigned from his office upon the
filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elected office
or position. In fine, an elected official may run for another position without
forfeiting his seat.
Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code,
and the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of RA 9369 are

not violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution and does not
suffer from overbreadth. Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. vs.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 189698, February 22, 2010. (Note: The
Supreme Court reconsidered its earlier decision of December 1, 2009.)
Automation project; validity. The contract-award of the 2010 Election
Automation Project to the joint venture of Total Information Management
Corporation (TIM) and Smartmatic International Corporation (Smartmatic)
is valid. H. Harry L. Roque, Jr., Joel R. Butuyan, Romel R. Bagares, et al.
vs. Commission on Elections, represented by Hon. Chaiman Jose Melo, et
al., Pete Quirino-Qaudra (Petitioner-in-intervention) Senate of the
Philippines, represented by its President Juan Ponce Enrili (MovantIntervenor), G.R. No. 188456, February 10, 2010. (Note: The Supreme
Court denied the motion to reconsider its earlier decision of September 10,
2009.)
Ballot; tampering. The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in declaring
Peano, based on the results of the revision of ballots, the winner in the
mayoralty contest for the Municipality of Alfonso, Cavite. The ballots, after
proof of tampering, cannot be considered reflective of the will of the people
of Alfonso. Mayor Virgilio P. Varias vs. Commission on Elections, et al.,
G.R. No. 189078, February 11, 2010.
COMELEC; ballot appreciation. The records of the case indicate that the
COMELEC en banc proceeded to conduct a fresh appreciation of the
contested ballots without first ascertaining whether the ballots to be
recounted had been kept inviolate. The COMELEC cannot proceed to
conduct a fresh appreciation of ballots without first ascertaining the integrity
thereof. Sandra Y Eriguel vs. Commission on Elections and Ma. Theresa
Dumpit-Michelena, G.R. No. 190526, February 26, 2010.
COMELEC; elevation to en banc without division decision. The
COMELEC, in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions, is bound to follow
the provision set forth in Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution,
which reads: SEC. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in
two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to
expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation
controversies.All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division,

provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by

the Commission en banc.
It therefore follows that when the COMELEC is exercising its quasi-judicial
powers such as in the present case, the Commission is constitutionally
mandated to decide the case first in division, and en banc only upon motion
for reconsideration.
Indeed, it is a basic doctrine in procedural law that the jurisdiction of a court
or an agency exercising quasi-judicial functions (such as the COMELEC)
over the subject-matter of an action is conferred only by the Constitution or
by law. Jurisdiction cannot be fixed by the agreement of the parties; it
cannot be acquired through, or waived, enlarged or diminished by, any act or
omission of the parties. Neither can it be conferred by the acquiescence of
the court, more particularly so in election cases where the interest involved
transcends those of the contending parties.
This being so, the Special Second Division of the COMELEC clearly acted
with grave abuse of discretion when it immediately transferred to the
Commission en banc a case that ought to be heard and decided by a division.
Such action cannot be done without running afoul of Section 3, Article IX-C
of the 1987 Constitution. Instead of peremptorily transferring the case to the
Commission en banc, the Special Second Division of COMELEC, should
have instead assigned another Commissioner as additional member of its
Special Second Division, not only to fill in the seat temporarily vacated by
Commissioner Ferrer, but more importantly so that the required quorum may
be attained. Sandra Y Eriguel vs. Commission on Elections and Ma.
Theresa Dumpit-Michelena, G.R. No. 190526, February 26, 2010.
COMELEC; failure of elections. The 1987 Constitution vests in the
COMELEC the broad power to enforce all the laws and regulations relative
to the conduct of elections, as well as the plenary authority to decide all
questions affecting elections except the question as to the right to vote.
Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code provides for the instances when the
COMELEC may declare failure of elections. The COMELEC en banc based
its decision to declare a failure of elections in Precinct No. 6A/7A on the
second instance stated in Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code, that is,

the election in any polling place had been suspended before the hour fixed
by law for the closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence,
terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes.
The COMELEC en banc ruled that since both parties agreed that the
elections were suspended before the hour fixed by law due to violence
caused by undetermined persons, there was obviously a failure of elections
in the aforementioned precinct.
The findings of fact of the COMELEC en banc are binding on this Court.
The grounds for failure of election (i.e., force majeure, violence, terrorism,
fraud, or other analogous cases) involve questions of fact, which can only be
determined by the COMELEC en banc after due notice to and hearing of the
parties. An application for certiorari against actions of the COMELEC is
confined to instances of grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. TheCOMELEC, as the administrative agency and
specialized constitutional body charged with the enforcement and
administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall, has the expertise in its
field so that its findings and conclusions are generally respected by and
conclusive on the Court.
Petitioners allegation of grave abuse of discretion by public respondent
COMELEC en banc implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, the
exercise of the power in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice,
or personal hostility; and it must be so patent or gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined
or to act at all in contemplation of law. It is not present in this case, as public
respondent issued the COMELEC Resolution dated October 17, 2005 based
on the evidence on record and the law on the matter. Abdul Gaffar P.M.
Dibaratun vs. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 170365, February
2, 2010.
COMELEC; injunction. If instead of issuing a preliminary injunction in
place of a TRO, a court opts to decide the case on its merits with the result
that it also enjoins the same acts covered by its TRO, it stands to reason that
the decision amounts to a grant of preliminary injunction. Such injunction

should be deemed in force pending any appeal from the decision. The view
of petitioner Panliliothat execution pending appeal should still continue
notwithstanding a decision of the higher court enjoining such execution
does not make sense. It will render quite inutile the proceedings before such
court. Mayor Jose Marquez Lisboa Panlilio vs. Commission on Elections, et
al., G.R. No. 184286. February 26, 2010
COMELEC jurisdiction over intra-party leadership disputes. The
COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party leadership disputes has already
been settled by the Court. The Court ruled in Kalaw v. Commission on
Elections that the COMELECs powers and functions under Section 2,
Article IX-C of the Constitution, include the ascertainment of the identity
of the political party and its legitimate officers responsible for its acts. The
Court also declared in another case that the COMELECs power to register
political parties necessarily involved the determination of the persons who
must act on its behalf. Thus, the COMELEC may resolve an intra-party
leadership dispute, in a proper case brought before it, as an incident of its
power to register political parties.
The validity of respondent Roxas election as LP president is a leadership
issue that the COMELEC had to settle. Under the amended LP Constitution,
the LP president is the issuing authority for certificates of nomination of
party candidates for all national elective positions. It is also the LP president
who can authorize other LP officers to issue certificates of nomination for
candidates to local elective posts. In simple terms, it is the LP president who
certifies the official standard bearer of the party. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., et al.
vs. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 188920, February 16, 2010.
COMELEC; tampered votes. We find the manner in which the COMELEC
excluded the subject returns to be fatally flawed. In the absence of clearly
convincing evidence, the validity of election returns must be upheld. A
conclusion that an election return is obviously manufactured or false and
consequently should be disregarded in the canvass must be approached with
extreme caution and only upon the most convincing proof. Corrolarily, any
plausible explanation, one which is acceptable to a reasonable man in the
light of experience and of the probabilities of the situation, should suffice to
avoid outright nullification, which results in disenfranchisement of those
who exercised their right of suffrage. As will be discussed shortly, there is a
patent lack of basis for the COMELECs findings that the subject returns

were tampered. In disregard of the principle requiring extreme caution

before rejecting election returns, the COMELEC proceeded with undue
haste in concluding that the subject returns were tampered. This is grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
In sum, it was highly irregular for the COMELEC to outrightly exclude the
subject returns resulting in the disenfranchisement of some 1,127 voters as
per the records of this case. The proper procedure in case of discrepancy in
the other authentic copies of the election returns is clearly spelled out in
Section 236 of the OEC. For contravening this legal provision, the
COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. Rose Marie D. Doromal vs. Hernan G. Biron and
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 181809, February 17, 2010.
Disqualification;
voter
inclusion/exclusion
proceedings.
Voters
inclusion/exclusion proceedings, on the one hand, essentially involve the
issue of whether a petitioner shall be included in or excluded from the list of
voters based on the qualifications required by law and the facts presented to
show possession of these qualifications.
On the other hand, COC denial/cancellation proceedings involve the issue of
whether there is a false representation of a material fact. The false
representation must necessarily pertain not to a mere innocuous mistake but
to a material fact or those that refer to a candidates qualifications for
elective office. Apart from the requirement of materiality, the false
representation must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or
hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible or, otherwise
stated, with the intention to deceive the electorate as to the would-be
candidates qualifications for public office.
In Velasco, the Court rejected Velascos contention that the Comelec
improperly ruled on the right to vote when it cancelled his COC. The Court
stated that the Comelec merely relied on or recognized the RTCs final and
executory decision on the matter of the right to vote in the precinct within its
territorial jurisdiction.
In the present petition, it is Panlaquis turn to proffer the novel interpretation
that the RTC properly cancelled Velascos COC when it ruled on his right to

vote. The Court rejects the same.

It is not within the province of the RTC in a voters inclusion/exclusion
proceedings to take cognizance of and determine the presence of a false
representation of a material fact. It has no jurisdiction to try the issues of
whether the misrepresentation relates to material fact and whether there was
an intention to deceive the electorate in terms of ones qualifications for
public office. The finding that Velasco was not qualified to vote due to lack
of residency requirement does not translate into a finding of a deliberate
attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render
him ineligible. Mozart P. Panlaqui vs. Commission on Elections and Nardo
M. Velasco, G.R. No. 188671, February 24, 2010.
Pre-proclamation controversy; contested returns. It is settled that a preproclamation controversy is summary in character; indeed, it is the policy of
the law that pre-proclamation controversies be promptly decided, so as not
to delay canvass and proclamation. The Board of Canvassers (BOC) will not
look into allegations of irregularity that are not apparent on the face of ERs
that appear otherwise authentic and duly accomplished.
Consistent with the summary character and limited scope of a preproclamation controversy, Section 20 of RA 7166 lays down the procedure
to be followed when ERs are contested before the BOC. Compliance with
this procedure is mandatory, so as to permit the BOC to resolve the
objections as quickly as possible.
Section 20 of RA 7166 and Section 36 of COMELEC Resolution 2962
provide that any candidate may contest the inclusion of an ER by making an
oral objection at the time the questioned return is submitted for canvass; the
objecting party shall also submit his objections in writing simultaneously
with the oral objections. The BOC shall consider the written objections and
opposition, if any, and summarily rule on the petition for exclusion. Any
party adversely affected by such ruling must immediately inform the BOC if
he intends to appeal such ruling.
After the BOC rules on the contested returns and canvasses all the
uncontested returns, it shall suspend the canvass. Any party adversely
affected by the ruling has 48 hours to file a Notice of Appeal; the appeal

shall be filed within five days. Upon receipt of the notice of appeal, the BOC
will make its report to the COMELEC, and elevate the records and evidence.
Moreover, pursuant to Section 235 of the Omnibus Election Code, in cases
where the ERs appear to have been tampered with, altered or falsified, the
COMELEC shall examine the other copies of the questioned returns and, if
the other copies are likewise tampered with, altered, falsified, or otherwise
spurious, after having given notice to all candidates and satisfied itself that
the integrity of the ballot box and of the ballots therein have been duly
preserved, shall order a recount of the votes cast, prepare a new return which
shall be used by the BOC as basis for the canvass, and direct the
proclamation of the winner accordingly.
Based on the records of this case, we find that petitioner failed to timely
make his objections to the contested ERs. Themistocles A. Sao, Jr. vs.
Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 182221, February 3, 2010.
Local Government
Succession; sannggunian. Sec. 45(b) of RA 7160 provides for the rule on
succession in cases of permanent vacancies in the Sanggunian. The law
provides for conditions for the rule of succession to apply: First, the
appointee shall come from the same political party as that of the Sanggunian
member who caused the vacancy. Second, the appointee must have a
nomination and a Certificate of Membership from the highest official of the
political party concerned. Atty. Lucky M. Damasen vs. Oscar G. Tumamao,
G.R. No. 173165, February 17, 2010.
Public officers
Appointment; submission to Civil Service Commission. The deliberate
failure of the appointing authority (or other responsible officials) to submit
respondents appointment paper to the CSC within 30 days from its issuance
did not make her appointment ineffective and incomplete.
Under Article 1186 of the Civil Code, [t]he condition shall be deemed
fulfilled when the obligor voluntarily prevents its fulfillment. Applying this
to the appointment process in the civil service, unless the appointee himself

is negligent in following up the submission of his appointment to the CSC

for approval, he should not be prejudiced by any willful act done in bad faith
by the appointing authority to prevent the timely submission of his
appointment to the CSC. While it may be argued that the submission of
respondents appointment to the CSC within 30 days was one of the
conditions for the approval of respondents appointment, however,
deliberately and with bad faith, the officials responsible for the submission
of respondents appointment to the CSC prevented the fulfillment of the said
condition. Thus, the said condition should be deemed fulfilled.
The Court has already had the occasion to rule that an appointment remains
valid in certain instances despite non-compliance of the proper officials with
the pertinent CSC rules. Arlin B. Obiasca vs. Jeane O. Basallote, G.R. No.
176707, February 17, 2010.
Command responsibility for criminal

acts of subordinates
Posted on March 3, 2010 by Hector M. de Leon Jr. Posted in Constitutional Law,
Criminal Law Tagged immunity from suit, writ of amparo
Can a military commander be held liable for the criminal acts of his
subordinates?
The Supreme Court touched on that issue in Lourdes D. Rubrico, et al. vs.
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al., G.R. No. 183871, February 18, 2010.
However, that case did not provide a venue for the Supreme Court to
provide a definitive ruling on the matter.
The case involved a petition for a writ of amparo filed against the President,
the Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Chief of the
Philippine National Police (PNP), among others. The petition was originally
filed with the Supreme Court, which referred the case to the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals eventually dropped the President as a
respondent (based on presidential immunity from suit during her term).

The Court of Appeals also ordered the dismissal of the case against the AFP
Chief and the PNP Chief. According to the Court of Appeals, AFP Chief
Gen. Esperon and PNP Chief P/Dir. Gen. Razon were included as
respondents on the theory that they, as commanders, were responsible for the
unlawful acts allegedly committed by their subordinates against petitioners.
According to the Court of Appeals, the privilege of the writ of amparo must
be denied as against Gen. Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Razon for the simple
reason that petitioners have not presented evidence showing that those who
allegedly abducted and illegally detained Lourdes and later threatened her
and her family were, in fact, members of the military or the police force.
The Court of Appeals hinted that the two generals would have been
accountable for the abduction and threats if the actual malefactors were
members of the AFP or PNP.
The Supreme Court discussed the current status of Philippine law regarding
command responsibility for criminal acts of subordinates:
The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the
development of laws of war and armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas,
command responsibility, in its simplest terms, means the responsibility of
commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed
forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or
domestic conflict. In this sense, command responsibility is properly a form
of criminal complicity. The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the
doctrine of command responsibility, foreshadowing the present-day precept
of holding a superior accountable for the atrocities committed by his
subordinates should he be remiss in his duty of control over them. As then
formulated, command responsibility is an omission mode of individual
criminal liability, whereby the superior is made responsible for crimes
committed by his subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the
perpetrators (as opposed to crimes he ordered).
The doctrine has recently been codified in the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court (ICC) to which the Philippines is signatory.
Sec. 28 of the Statute imposes individual responsibility on military
commanders for crimes committed by forces under their control. The

country is, however, not yet formally bound by the terms and provisions
embodied in this treaty-statute, since the Senate has yet to extend
concurrence in its ratification.
While there are several pending bills on command responsibility, there is
still no Philippine law that provides for criminal liability under that doctrine.
It may plausibly be contended that command responsibility, as legal basis to
hold military/police commanders liable for extra-legal killings, enforced
disappearances, or threats, may be made applicable to this jurisdiction on the
theory that the command responsibility doctrine now constitutes a principle
of international law or customary international law in accordance with the
incorporation clause of the Constitution.
While the Supreme Court left open the possibility that command
responsibility for criminal acts is part of international law and is deemed
incorporated into Philippine law pursuant to the incorporation clause of
the Constitution, the Supreme Court held that command responsibility as a
concept defined, developed, and applied under international law, has little, if
at all, bearing in amparo proceedings. According to the Supreme Court:
Still, it would be inappropriate to apply to these proceedings the doctrine of
command responsibility, as the CA seemed to have done, as a form of
criminal complicity through omission, for individual respondents criminal
liability, if there be any, is beyond the reach of amparo. In other words, the
Court does not rule in such proceedings on any issue of criminal culpability,
even if incidentally a crime or an infraction of an administrative rule may
have been committed. As the Court stressed in Secretary of National
Defense v. Manalo, the writ of amparo was conceived to provide expeditious
and effective procedural relief against violations or threats of violation of the
basic rights to life, liberty, and security of persons; the corresponding
amparo suit, however, is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring
proof beyond reasonable doubt x x x or administrative liability requiring
substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings. . . .
If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these
proceedings, it should, at most, be only to determine the author who, at the
first instance, is accountable for, and has the duty to address, the

disappearance and harassments complained of, so as to enable the Court to

devise remedial measures that may be appropriate under the premises to
protect rights covered by the writ of amparo. As intimated earlier, however,
the determination should not be pursued to fix criminal liability on
respondents preparatory to criminal prosecution, or as a prelude to
administrative disciplinary proceedings under existing administrative
issuances, if there be any.

Posted on February 19, 2010 by Hector M. de Leon Jr. Posted in Constitutional Law
Tagged COMELEC, election contest, eminent domain, judicial review, just compensation
Constitutional Law
Eminent domain; prompt payment of just compensation. The concept of just
compensation contemplates just and timely payment; it embraces not only
the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the landowner, but also
the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without
prompt payment, compensation cannot, as Land Bank of the Philippines v.
Court of Appeals instructs, be considered just, for the owner is made to
suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while
being made to wait for years before actually receiving the amount necessary
to cope with his loss. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board and Heirs of Vicente Adaza, Heirs of
Romeo Adaza, Heirs of Cesar Adaza, represented by Russel Adaza, G.R. No.
183279, January 25, 2010.
Judicial review; creation of city. On the OSGs contention that Congress
choice of means to comply with the population requirement in the creation
of a legislative district is non-justiciable, suffice it to say that questions

calling for judicial determination of compliance with constitutional

standards by other branches of the government are fundamentally justiciable.
The resolution of such questions falls within the checking function of this
Court under the 1987 Constitution to determine whether there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Even under the 1935 Constitution, this Court had already ruled, The
overwhelming weight of authority is that district apportionment laws are
subject to review by the courts. Compliance with constitutional standards
on the creation of legislative districts is important because the aim of
legislative apportionment is to equalize population and voting power among
districts. Victorino Aldaba, et al. vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
188078, January 25, 2010.
Local government; creation of city. RA 9591
is unconstitutional for being violative of Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987
Constitution.
The 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to have a legislative district,
the city must have a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand. The
only issue here is whether the City of Malolos has a population of at least
250,000, whether actual or projected, for the purpose of creating a legislative
district for the City of Malolos in time for the 10 May 2010 elections. If not,
then RA 9591 creating a legislative district in the City of Malolos is
unconstitutional.
There is no official record that the population of the City of Malolos will be
at least 250,000, actual or projected, prior to the 10 May 2010 elections, the
immediately following election after the supposed attainment of such
population. Thus, the City of Malolos is not qualified to have a legislative
district of its own under Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987
Constitution. Victorino Aldaba, et al. vs. Commission on Elections, G.R.
Administrative Law
No. 188078, January 25, 2010.
Administrative agencies; findings of fact. The findings of fact of
administrative bodies, such as the SEC, will not be interfered with by the
courts in the absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of said

agencies, or unless the aforementioned findings are not supported by

substantial evidence. These factual findings carry even more weight when
affirmed by the CA. They are accorded not only great respect but even
finality, and are binding upon this Court, unless it is shown that the
administrative body had arbitrarily disregarded or misapprehended evidence
before it to such an extent as to compel a contrary conclusion had such
evidence been properly appreciated. By reason of the special knowledge and
expertise of administrative agencies over matters falling under their
jurisdiction, they are in a better position to pass judgment thereon.
A review of the petition does not show any reversible error committed by the
appellate court; hence, the petition must be denied. Petitioner failed to
present any argument that would convince the Court that the SEC and the
CA made any misappreciation of the facts and the applicable laws such that
their decisions should be overturned. Catmon Sales International
Corporation vs. Atty. Manuel D. Yngson, Jr. as Liquidator of Catmon Sales
International Corporation, G.R. No. 179761, January 15, 2010.
Election Law
Ballots; nuisance candidates. Ensconced in our jurisprudence is the wellfounded rule that laws and statutes governing election contests especially
appreciation of ballots must be liberally construed to the end that the will of
the electorate in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by
technical infirmities. An election protest is imbued with public interest so
much so that the need to dispel uncertainties which becloud the real choice
of the people is imperative. The prohibition against nuisance candidates is
aimed precisely at preventing uncertainty and confusion in ascertaining the
true will of the electorate. Thus, in certain situations as in the case at bar,
final judgments declaring a nuisance candidate should effectively cancel the
certificate of candidacy filed by such candidate as of election day.
Otherwise, potential nuisance candidates will continue to put the electoral
process into mockery by filing certificates of candidacy at the last minute
and delaying resolution of any petition to declare them as nuisance
candidates until elections are held and the votes counted and canvassed.
We therefore hold that ballots indicating only the similar surname of two (2)
candidates for the same position may, in appropriate cases, be counted in

favor of the bona fide candidate and not considered stray, even if the other
candidate was declared a nuisance candidate by final judgment after the
elections. Accordingly, the 5,401 votes for MARTINEZ or C.
MARTINEZ should be credited to petitioner giving him a total of 72,056
votes as against 67,108 total votes of private respondent. Petitioner thus
garnered more votes than private respondent with a winning margin of 4,948
votes. Celestino A. Martinez III vs. House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal and Benhur L. Salimbangon, G.R. No. 189034, January 11, 2010.
Election contest; appeal. For the sake of laying down clearly the rules
regarding the payment of the appeal fee, a discussion of the application of
the recent Divinagracia v. COMELEC to election contests involving elective
municipal and barangay officials is necessary. Divinagracia explained the
purpose of Resolution No. 8486 which, as earlier stated, the COMELEC
issued to clarify existing rules and address the resulting confusion caused by
the two appeal fees required, for the perfection of appeals, by the two
different jurisdictions: the court and COMELEC. Divinagracia stressed that
if the appellants had already paid the amount of PhP 1,000 to the lower
courts within the five-day reglementary period, they are further required to
pay the COMELEC, through its Cash Division, the appeal fee of PhP 3,200
within fifteen (15) days from the time of the filing of the notice of appeal
with the lower court. If the appellants failed to pay the PhP 3,200 within the
prescribed period, then the appeal should be dismissed. The Court went on
to state in Divinagracia that Aguilar did not dilute the force of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8486 on the matter of compliance with the COMELECrequired appeal fees. The resolution, to reiterate, was mainly issued to
clarify the confusion caused by the requirement of payment of two appeal
fees.
Divinagracia, however, contained the following final caveat: that for notice
of appeal filed after the promulgation of this decision, errors in the matter
ofnon-payment or incomplete payment of the two appeal fees in election
cases are no longer excusable. Mateo R. Nollen, Jr. vs. Commission on
Elections and Susana M. Caballes, G.R. No. 187635, January 11, 2010.
Election protest; nuisance candidates. The purpose of an election protest is
to ascertain whether the candidate proclaimed by the board of canvassers is
the lawful choice of the people. What is sought is the correction of the
canvass of votes, which was the basis of proclamation of the winning

candidate. Election contests, therefore, involve the adjudication not only of

private and pecuniary interests of rival candidates, but also of paramount
public interest considering the need to dispel uncertainty over the real choice
of the electorate.
In controversies pertaining to nuisance candidates as in the case at bar, the
law contemplates the likelihood of confusion which the similarity of
surnames of two (2) candidates may generate. A nuisance candidate is thus
defined as one who, based on the attendant circumstances, has no bona fide
intention to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been
filed, his sole purpose being the reduction of the votes of a strong candidate,
upon the expectation that ballots with only the surname of such candidate
will be considered stray and not counted for either of them.
In elections for national positions such as President, Vice-President and
Senator, the sheer logistical challenge posed by nuisance candidates gives
compelling reason for the Commission to exercise its authority to eliminate
nuisance candidates who obviously have no financial capacity or serious
intention to mount a nationwide campaign. Celestino A. Martinez III
vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Benhur L.
Salimbangon, G.R. No. 189034, January 11, 2010.
Electoral tribunal; judicial review. The judgments of the Electoral Tribunals
are beyond judicial interference, unless rendered without or in excess of
their jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The power of judicial
review may be invoked in exceptional cases upon a clear showing of such
arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a
clear denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear
unmitigated error, manifestly constituting such grave abuse of direction that
there has to be a remedy for such abuse. Grave abuse of discretion implies
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, or arbitrary and despotic exercise of power because of passion
or personal hostility. The grave abuse of discretion must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion or refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law.
Respondent HRET gravely abused its discretion in affirming the
proclamation of respondent Salimbangon as the duly elected Representative

of the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu despite the final outcome of

revision showing 5,401 ballots with only MARTINEZ or C.
MARTINEZ written on the line for Representative, votes which should
have been properly counted in favor of petitioner and not nullified as stray
votes, after considering all relevant circumstances clearly establishing that
such votes could not have been intended for Edilito C. Martinez who was
declared a nuisance candidate in a final judgment. Celestino A. Martinez III
vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Benhur L.
Salimbangon, G.R. No. 189034, January 11, 2010.
December 2009 Philippine Supreme

Posted on January 15, 2010 by Hector M. de Leon Jr. Posted in Constitutional Law
Tagged Bill of Rights, Civil Service Commission, COMELEC, constitutional rights,
contempt, contract, dacion en pago, due process, electoral tribunal, eminent domain,
equal protection, interest, jurisdiction, nationality restrictions, Ombudsman, police power,
speedy trial
Here are selected December 2009 rulings of the Supreme Court of the
Philippines on political law and related laws:
Constitutional Law
Bill of rights; eminent domain. Expropriation is not limited to the
acquisition of real property with a corresponding transfer of title or
possession. The right-of-way easement resulting in a restriction or limitation
on property rights over the land traversed by transmission lines also falls
within the ambit of the term expropriation. National Power Corporation vs.
Hon. Amer Ibrahim, etc., et al., G.R. No. 183297, December 23, 2009.
Bill of Rights; eminent domain. In computing for the value of the land
subject to acquisition, the formula provided in DAO No. 6, Series of 1992,
as amended, requires that figures pertaining to the Capitalized Net Income
(CNI) and Market Value (MV) of the property be used as inputs in arriving
at the correct land valuation. Thus, the applicable formula, as correctly used

by the LBP in its valuation, is LV (Land Value) = (CNI x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1).
To arrive at the figure for the CNI of lands planted to a combination of
crops, Item II B.5 of the said administrative order provides that the same
should be computed based on the combination of actual crops produced on
the covered land. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Kumassie Plantation
Company Incorporated/Kumassie Plantation Company Incorporated vs.
Land Bank of the Philippines, et al. G.R. No. 177404/G.R. No. 178097.
December 4, 2009.
Bill of rights; eminent domain; interest. The taking of property under CARL
is an exercise by the State of the power of eminent domain. A basic
limitation on the States power of eminent domain is the constitutional
directive that private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation. Just compensation refers to the sum equivalent to the market
value of the property, broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller in
open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and
competition, or the fair value of the property as between one who receives
and one who desires to sell. It is fixed at the time of the actual taking by the
State. Thus, if property is taken for public use before compensation is
deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the case, the final
compensation must include interests on its just value, to be computed from
the time the property is taken up to the time when compensation is actually
paid or deposited with the court. National Power Corporation vs. Hon.
Amer Ibrahim, etc., et al., G.R. No. 183297, December 23, 2009.
Bill of rights; eminent domain; interest. In Philippine Railway Company v.

Solon, decided in 1909, the Court treated interest as part of just
compensation when the payment to the owner was delayed. Apo Fruits
Corporation and Hijo Plantation, Inc. vs. The Hon. Court of Appeals, and
Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 164195. December 4, 2009.
Bill of rights; eminent domain; just compensation. The term just
compensation had been defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property
taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the takers
gain, but the owners loss. The word just is used to intensify the meaning of

the word compensation and to convey thereby the idea that the equivalent to
be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, and
ample.
In Camarines Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Court of Appeals and
National Power Corporation v. Manubay Agro-Industrial Development
Corporation, the Court sustained the award of just compensation equivalent
to the fair and full value of the property even if petitioners only sought the
continuation of the exercise of their right-of-way easement and not the
ownership over the land. There is simply no basis for NPC to claim that the
payment of fair market value without the concomitant transfer of title
constitutes an unjust enrichment.
Bill of Rights; equal protection. In order that there can be valid classification
so that a discriminatory governmental act may pass the constitutional norm
of equal protection, it is necessary that the four (4) requisites of valid
classification be complied with, namely:
(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;
(2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.
The first requirement means that there must be real and substantial
differences between the classes treated differently. As illustrated in the fairly
recent Mirasol v. Department of Public Works and Highways, a real and
substantial distinction exists between a motorcycle and other motor vehicles
sufficient to justify its classification among those prohibited from plying the
toll ways. Not all motorized vehicles are created equala two-wheeled
vehicle is less stable and more easily overturned than a four-wheel vehicle.
Nevertheless, the classification would still be invalid if it does not comply
with the second requirementif it is not germane to the purpose of the law.
The third requirement means that the classification must be enforced not

only for the present but as long as the problem sought to be corrected
continues to exist. And, under the last requirement, the classification would
be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not treated
similarly, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.
Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the
differential treatment of persons holding appointive offices as opposed to
those holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes of the
law. Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. vs. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 189698, December 1, 2009.
Bill of rights; equal protection. To the petitioners, the cityhood laws, by
granting special treatment to respondent municipalities/LGUs by way of
exemption from the standard PhP 100 million minimum income
requirement, violate Sec.1, Art. III of the Constitution, which in part
provides that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws.
The equal protection guarantee is embraced in the broader and elastic
concept of due process, every unfair discrimination being an offense against
the requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless come as a
separate clause in Sec. 1, Art. III of the Constitution to provide for a more
specific protection against any undue discrimination or antagonism from
government. Arbitrariness in general may be assailed on the basis of the due
process clause. But if a particular challenged act partakes of an unwarranted
partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal
protection clause. This constitutional protection extends to all persons,
natural or artificial, within the territorial jurisdiction. Artificial persons, as
the respondent LGUs herein, are, however, entitled to protection only insofar
as their property is concerned.
In the proceedings at bar, petitioner LCP and the intervenors cannot
plausibly invoke the equal protection clause, precisely because no
deprivation of property results by virtue of the enactment of the cityhood
laws. The LCPs claim that the IRA of its member-cities will be
substantially reduced on account of the conversion into cities of the
respondent LGUs would not suffice to bring it within the ambit of the
constitutional guarantee. Indeed, it is presumptuous on the part of the LCP
member-cities to already stake a claim on the IRA, as if it were their

property, as the IRA is yet to be allocated. For the same reason, the
municipalities that are not covered by the uniform exemption clause in the
cityhood laws cannot validly invoke constitutional protection. For, at this
point, the conversion of a municipality into a city will only affect its status
as a political unit, but not its property as such.
As a matter of settled legal principle, the fundamental right of equal
protection does not require absolute equality. It is enough that all persons or
things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights or
privileges conferred and responsibilities or obligations imposed. The equal
protection clause does not preclude the state from recognizing and acting
upon factual differences between individuals and classes. It recognizes that
inherent in the right to legislate is the right to classify,necessarily implying
that the equality guaranteed is not violated by a legislation based on
reasonable classification. Classification, to be reasonable, must (1) rest on
substantial distinctions; (2) be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) not be
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) apply equally to all members of
the same class. The Court finds that all these requisites have been met by the
laws challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory under the equal protection
clause. League of Cities of the Philippines, et al. vs. COMELEC,G.R. No.
176951/G.R. No. 177499 & G.R. No. 178056. December 21, 2009.
Bill of rights; non-impairment clause. PICOPc cause of action consists in
the allegation that the DENR Secretary, in not issuing an IFMA, violated its
constitutional right against non-impairment of contracts. The 1969 document
signed by President Marcos is not a contract recognized under the nonimpairment clause. The conclusion that the 1969 Document is not a contract
recognized under the non-impairment clause has even been disposed of in
another case decided by another division of this Court, PICOP Resources,
Inc. v. Base Metals Mineral Resources Corporation, the Decision in which
case has become final and executory. Hon. Heherson T. Alvarez vs. PICOP
Resources, Inc./PICOP Resources, Inc. vs. Hon. Heherson T. Alavarez/Hon.
Angelo T. Reyes vs. Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines
(PICOP), G.R. No. 162243/G.R. No. 164516/G.R. No. 171875. December 3,
2009
Bill of Rights; right to speedy trial. The time limits set by the Speedy Trial
Act of 1998 do not preclude justifiable postponements and delays when so
warranted by the situation. The reasons for the postponements and delays

attendant to the present case reflected above are not unreasonable. While the
records indicate that neither petitioner nor his counsel was notified of the
resetting of the pre-trial to October 23, 2003, the same appears to have been
occasioned by oversight or simple negligence which, standing alone, does
not prove fatal to the prosecutions case. The faux pas was acknowledged
and corrected when the MeTC recalled the arrest warrant it had issued
against petitioner under the mistaken belief that petitioner had been duly
notified of the October 23, 2003 pre-trial setting.
Reiterating the Courts pronouncement in Solar Team Entertainment, Inc.
that speedy trial is a relative and flexible term, Lumanlaw v. Peralta, Jr.
summons the courts to maintain a delicate balance between the demands of
due process and the strictures of speedy trial on the one hand, and the right
of the State to prosecute crimes and rid society of criminals on the other.
Applying the balancing test for determining whether an accused has been
denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of his
case, taking into account several factors such as the length and reason of the
delay, the accuseds assertion or non-assertion of his right, and the prejudice
to the accused resulting from the delay, the Court does not find petitioner to
have been unduly and excessively prejudiced by the delay in the
proceedings, especially given that he had posted bail. Federico Miguel
Olbes vs. Hon. Danilo A. Buemio, etc. et al., G.R. No. 173319. December 4,
2009.
Bill of Rights; right to travel. Petitioner invokes the extraordinary remedy of
the writ of amparo for the protection of his right to travel. He insists that he
is entitled to the protection covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo
because the Hold Departure Order is a continuing actual restraint on his right
to travel. The Court is thus called upon to rule whether or not the right to
travel is covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
The rights that fall within the protective mantle of the Writ of Amparo under
Section 1 of the Rules thereon are the following: (1) right to life; (2) right to
liberty; and (3) right to security.
The right to travel refers to the right to move from one place to another. As
stated in Marcos v. Sandiganbayan, xxx a persons right to travel is subject

to the usual constraints imposed by the very necessity of safeguarding the

system of justice. In such cases, whether the accused should be permitted to
leave the jurisdiction for humanitarian reasons is a matter of the courts
sound discretion.
Here, the restriction on petitioners right to travel as a consequence of the
pendency of the criminal case filed against him was not unlawful. Petitioner
has also failed to establish that his right to travel was impaired in the manner
and to the extent that it amounted to a serious violation of his right to life,
liberty and security, for which there exists no readily available legal recourse
or remedy. Rev. Father Robert P. Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R.
No. 182161, December 3, 2009.
Civil Service Commission; jurisdiction over court personnel. The CSCs
authority and power to hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases are
not in dispute. The question is whether the CSCs disciplinary jurisdiction
extends to court personnel in view of Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution.
In the Julaton and Sta. Ana cases, the CSC recognized the disciplinary
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over court personnel. This is consonant
with Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution vesting in the Supreme
Court administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.
By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the
judges and court personnels administrative compliance with all laws, rules
and regulations. No other branch of government may intrude into this power,
without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. This we have
ruled in Maceda v. Vasquez and have reiterated in the case of Ampong v.
Civil Service Commission. In Ampong, we also emphasized that in case of
violation of the Civil Service Law by a court personnel, the standard
procedure is for the CSC to bring its complaint against a judicial employee
before the Office of the Court Administrator of the Supreme Court. Civil
Service Commission vs. Herminigildo L. Andal, G.R. No. 185749, December
16, 2009.
Civil Service Commission; jurisdiction. The CSC, as the central personnel
agency of the Government, has jurisdiction over disputes involving the

removal and separation of all employees of government branches,

subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including government-owned
or controlled corporations with original charters. Simply put, it is the sole
arbiter of controversies relating to the civil service.
In this case, petitioners are former local government employees whose
services were terminated due to the reorganization of the municipal
government under Resolution Nos. 27 and 80 of the Sangguniang Bayan of
San Isidro, Nueva Ecija. Considering that they belong to the civil service,
the CSC has jurisdiction over their separation from office. Evelyn S.
Cabungcal, et al. vs. Sonia R. Lorenzo, et al., G.R. No. 160367, December
18, 2009.
COMELEC; contempt. The main thrust of petitioners argument is that the
COMELEC exceeded its jurisdiction in initiating the contempt proceedings
when it was performing its administrative and not its quasi-judicial functions
as the National Board of Canvassers for the election of senators. According
to petitioner, the COMELEC may only punish contemptuous acts while
exercising its quasi-judicial functions.
The COMELEC, through the Task Force Maguindanao, was exercising its
quasi-judicial power in pursuit of the truth behind the allegations of massive
fraud during the elections in Maguindanao. To achieve its objective, the
Task Force conducted hearings and required the attendance of the parties
concerned and their counsels to give them the opportunity to argue and
support their respective positions.
To withhold from the COMELEC the power to punish individuals who
refuse to appear during a fact-finding investigation, despite a previous notice
and order to attend, would render nugatory the COMELECs investigative
power, which is an essential incident to its constitutional mandate to secure
the conduct of honest and credible elections. In this case, the purpose of the
investigation was however derailed when petitioner obstinately refused to
appear during said hearings and to answer questions regarding the various
election documents which, he claimed, were stolen while they were in his
possession and custody. Undoubtedly, the COMELEC could punish
petitioner for such contumacious refusal to attend the Task Force
hearings. Lintang Bedol vs. Commssion on Elections, G.R. No. 179830,

December 3, 2009.
Constitutionality; locus standi. Central to the determination of locus standi is
the question of whether a party has alleged such a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends
for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. In this case, petitioners
allege that they will be directly affected by COMELEC Resolution No. 8678
for they intend, and they all have the qualifications, to run in the 2010
elections. The OSG, for its part, contends that since petitioners have not yet
filed their CoCs, they are not yet candidates; hence, they are not yet directly
affected by the assailed provision in the COMELEC resolution.
The Court, nevertheless, finds that, while petitioners are not yet candidates,
they have the standing to raise the constitutional challenge, simply because
they are qualified voters. A restriction on candidacy, such as the challenged
measure herein, affects the rights of voters to choose their public officials.
The rights of voters and the rights of candidates do not lend themselves to
neat separation; laws that affect candidates always have at least some
theoretical, correlative effect on voters. The Court believes that both
candidates and voters may challenge, on grounds of equal protection, the
assailed measure because of its impact on voting rights.
In any event, in recent cases, this Court has relaxed the stringent direct
injury test and has observed a liberal policy allowing ordinary citizens,
members of Congress, and civil organizations to prosecute actions involving
the constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and rulings. Eleazar P.
Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
189698, December 1, 2009.
Constitutionality; locus standi. A taxpayer is allowed to sue where there is a
claim that public funds are illegally disbursed, or that the public money is
being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is wastage of public
funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. A
person suing as a taxpayer, however, must show that the act complained of
directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from
taxation. He must also prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the
illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he will sustain a

direct injury because of the enforcement of the questioned statute or

contract. In other words, for a taxpayers suit to prosper, two requisites must
be met: (1) public funds derived from taxation are disbursed by a political
subdivision or instrumentality and in doing so, a law is violated or some
irregularity is committed and (2) the petitioner is directly affected by the
alleged act.
In light of the foregoing, it is apparent that contrary to the view of the RTC,
a taxpayer need not be a party to the contract to challenge its validity. As
long as taxes are involved, people have a right to question contracts entered
into by the government.
In this case, although the construction of the town center would be primarily
sourced from the proceeds of the bonds, which respondents insist are not
taxpayers money, a government support in the amount of P187 million
would still be spent for paying the interest of the bonds. In fact, a Deed of
Assignment was executed by the governor in favor of respondent RCBC
over the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) and other revenues of the
provincial government as payment and/or security for the obligations of the
provincial government under the Trust Indenture Agreement dated
September 17, 2003. Records also show that on March 4, 2004, the governor
requested the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to appropriate an amount of P25
million for the interest of the bond. Clearly, the first requisite has been met.
As to the second requisite, the court, in recent cases, has relaxed the
stringent direct injury test bearing in mind that locus standi is a procedural
technicality. By invoking transcendental importance, paramount public
interest, or far-reaching implications, ordinary citizens and taxpayers
were allowed to sue even if they failed to show direct injury. In cases where
serious legal issues were raised or where public expenditures of millions of
pesos were involved, the court did not hesitate to give standing to
taxpayers. Manuel Mamba, et al. vs. Edgar R. Lara, et al., G.R. No. 165109,
December 14, 2009.
Constitutionality; justiciability. A political question is a question of policy,
which is to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity or by the
legislative or the executive branch of the government to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated.

In filing the instant case before the RTC, petitioners seek to restrain public
respondents from implementing the bond flotation and to declare null and
void all contracts related to the bond flotation and construction of the town
center. In the petition before the RTC, they alleged grave abuse of discretion
and clear violations of law by public respondents. They put in issue the
overpriced construction of the town center; the grossly disadvantageous
bond flotation; the irrevocable assignment of the provincial governments
annual regular income, including the IRA, to respondent RCBC to cover and
secure the payment of the bonds floated; and the lack of consultation and
discussion with the community regarding the proposed project, as well as a
proper and legitimate bidding for the construction of the town center.
Obviously, the issues raised in the petition do not refer to the wisdom but to
the legality of the acts complained of. Thus, we find the instant controversy
within the ambit of judicial review. Besides, even if the issues were political
in nature, it would still come within our powers of review under the
expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us by Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution, which includes the authority to determine whether grave abuse
of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed
by any branch or instrumentality of the government. Manuel Mamba, et al.
vs. Edgar R. Lara, et al., G.R. No. 165109, December 14, 2009.
Constitutionality; overbroad. The challenged provision also suffers from
the infirmity of being overbroad.
First, the provision pertains to all civil servants holding appointive posts
without distinction as to whether they occupy high positions in government
or not. Certainly, a utility worker in the government will also be considered
as ipso facto resigned once he files his CoC for the 2010 elections. This
scenario is absurd for, indeed, it is unimaginable how he can use his position
in the government to wield influence in the political world.
While it may be admitted that most appointive officials who seek public
elective office are those who occupy relatively high positions in government,
laws cannot be legislated for them alone, or with them alone in mind. For the
right to seek public elective office is universal, open and unrestrained,
subject only to the qualification standards prescribed in the Constitution and
in the laws. These qualifications are, as we all know, general and basic so as

to allow the widest participation of the citizenry and to give free rein for the
pursuit of ones highest aspirations to public office. Such is the essence of
democracy.
Second, the provision is directed to the activity of seeking any and all public
offices, whether they be partisan or nonpartisan in character, whether they be
in the national, municipal or barangay level. Congress has not shown a
compelling state interest to restrict the fundamental right involved on such a
sweeping scale.
Specific evils require specific treatments, not through overly broad measures
that unduly restrict guaranteed freedoms of the citizenry. After all,
sovereignty resides in the people, and all governmental power emanates
from them. Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. vs. Commission
on Elections, G.R. No. 189698, December 1, 2009.
HRET; jurisdiction. The 1987 Constitution explicitly provides under Article
VI, Section 17 thereof that the HRET and the Senate Electoral Tribunal
(SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of their respective members. The authority conferred upon
the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete. The use of the word sole
emphasizes the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these Tribunals, which is
conferred upon the HRET and the SET after elections and the proclamation
of the winning candidates. A candidate who has not been proclaimed and
who has not taken his oath of office cannot be said to be a member of the
House of Representatives.
Thus, private respondent correctly pointed out that a petition for quo
warranto is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET, and cannot be
considered forum shopping even if, as in this case, the COMELEC had
already passed upon in administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings the issue
of the qualification of the Member of the House of Representatives while the
latter was still a candidate. Representative Danila Ramon S. Fernandez vs.
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Jesus L. Vicente, G.R. No.
187478, December 21, 2009.
Natural resources; land ownership. Radstock is a private corporation
incorporated in the British Virgin Islands. Its office address is at Suite 14021

Duddell Street, Central Hongkong. As a foreign corporation, with unknown

owners whose nationalities are also unknown, Radstock is not qualified to
own land in the Philippines pursuant to Section 7, in relation to Section 3,
Article XII of the Constitution.
Consequently, Radstock is also disqualified to own the rights to ownership
of lands in the Philippines. Contrary to the OGCCs claim, Radstock cannot
own the rights to ownership of any land in the Philippines because Radstock
cannot lawfully own the land itself. Otherwise, there will be a blatant
circumvention of the Constitution, which prohibits a foreign private
corporation from owning land in the Philippines. In addition, Radstock
cannot transfer the rights to ownership of land in the Philippines if it cannot
own the land itself. It is basic that an assignor or seller cannot assign or sell
something he does not own at the time the ownership, or the rights to the
ownership, are to be transferred to the assignee or buyer. Strategic Alliance
Development Corporation vs. Radstock Securities Limited and Philippine
National Construction Corporation, G.R. No. 178158/G.R. No. 180428,
December 4, 2009.
Police power; MMDA. MMDA simply had no power on its own to
dismantle, remove, or destroy the billboards, signages and other advertising
media installed on the MRT3 structure by Trackworks. In Metropolitan
Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.,
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Viron Transportation Co.,
Inc., and Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Garin, the Court
had the occasion to rule that MMDAs powers were limited to the
formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation,
management, monitoring, setting of policies, installing a system, and
administration. Nothing in Republic Act No. 7924 granted MMDA police
power, let alone legislative power. Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority vs.. Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending and
Promotions, Inc., G.R. No. 179554, December 16, 2009.
Public funds; appropriation. Applying Section 29(1), Article VI of the
Constitution, as implanted in Sections 84 and 85 of the Government
Auditing Code, a law must first be enacted by Congress appropriating
P6.185 billion as compromise money before payment to Radstock can be
made. Otherwise, such payment violates a prohibitory law and thus void
under Article 5 of the Civil Code which states that [a]cts executed against

the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when

the law itself authorizes their validity.
Indisputably, without an appropriation law, PNCC cannot lawfully pay
P6.185 billion to Radstock. Any contract allowing such payment, like the
Compromise Agreement, shall be void as provided in Section 87 of the
Government Auditing Code.
PNCC cannot use public funds, like toll fees that indisputably form part of
the General Fund, to pay a private debt of CDCP Mining to Radstock. Such
payment cannot qualify as expenditure for a public purpose. The toll fees are
merely held in trust by PNCC for the National Government, which is the
owner of the toll fees.
Considering that there is no appropriation law passed by Congress for the
P6.185 billion compromise amount, the Compromise Agreement is void for
being contrary to law, specifically Section 29(1), Article VI of the
Constitution and Section 87 of PD 1445. And since the payment of the
P6.185 billion pertains to CDCP Minings private debt to Radstock, the
Compromise Agreement is also void for being contrary to the fundamental
public policy that government funds or property shall be spent or used solely
for public purposes, as provided in Section 4(2) of the Government Auditing
Code. Strategic Alliance Development Corporation vs. Radstock Securities
Limited and Philippine National Construction Corporation, G.R. No.
178158/G.R. No. 180428, December 4, 2009.
Suffrage; extension of voter registration. Section 8 of RA 8189 decrees that
voters be allowed to register daily during regular offices hours, except
during the period starting 120 days before a regular election and 90 days
before a special election.
By the above provision, Congress itself has determined that the period of
120 days before a regular election and 90 days before a special election is
enough time for the COMELEC to make ALL the necessary preparations
with respect to the coming elections. The COMELECs rule-making power
should be exercised in accordance with the prevailing law.
Respecting the authority of the COMELEC under RA 6646 and RA 8436 to

fix other dates for pre-election acts, the same is not in conflict with the
mandate of continuing voter registration under RA 8189. Both R.A. No.
6646, Section 29 and R.A. No. 8436, Section 28 grant the COMELEC the
power to fix other periods and dates for pre-election activities only if the
same cannot be reasonably held within the period provided by law. This
grant of power, however, is for the purpose of enabling the people to
exercise the right of suffrage the common underlying policy of RA 8189,
RA 6646 and RA 8436.
In the present case, the Court finds no ground to hold that the mandate of
continuing voter registration cannot be reasonably held within the period
provided by RA 8189, Sec. 8 daily during office hours, except during the
period starting 120 days before the May 10, 2010 regular elections. There is
thus no occasion for the COMELEC to exercise its power to fix other dates
or deadlines therefor.
The present case differs significantly from Akbayan-Youth v. COMELEC.
In said case, the Court held that the COMELEC did not commit abuse of
discretion in denying the request of the therein petitioners for an extension
of the December 27, 2000 deadline of voter registration for the May 14,
2001 elections. For the therein petitioners filed their petition with the Court
within the 120-day prohibitive period for the conduct of voter registration
under Section 8 of RA 8189, and sought the conduct of a two-day
registration on February 17 and 18, 2001, clearly within the 120-day
prohibitive period.
In the present case, as reflected earlier, both the dates of filing of the petition
(October 30, 2009) and the extension sought (until January 9, 2010) are prior
to the 120-day prohibitive period. The Court, therefore, finds no legal
impediment to the extension prayed for. Kabataan Party List vs.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 189868, December 15, 2009.
Administrative Law
Administrative proceedings; due process. It is settled that in administrative
proceedings, a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain ones side suffices
to meet the requirements of due process. The essence of procedural due
process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity

to be heard.
In the present case, since PCMC was properly informed of the supposed
discrepancy in its import and export liquidations, that it was given ample
opportunity by the PEZA management to be heard or to explain its side in
relation to its unaccounted imported materials and that it was subsequently
informed of the decision of the PEZA Board to cancel its registration on the
basis of its assessment of the evidence presented or lack thereof, petitioners
cannot claim that they were denied their right to due process of
law. Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA), et al. Vs. Pearl City
Manufacturing Corporation, et al., G.R. No. 168668, December 16, 2009.
Administrative proceedings; due process. The CA correctly concluded that
petitioners right to due process was not violated. Due process, as a
constitutional precept, does not always, and in all situations, require a trialtype proceeding. Litigants may be heard through pleadings, written
explanations, position papers, memoranda or oral arguments. Due process is
satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an
opportunity to explain or defend himself. In administrative proceedings,
filing charges against the person and giving reasonable opportunity to the
person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the
minimum requirements of due process. The essence of due process is simply
to be heard; or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to
explain ones side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action
or ruling complained of.
Petitioner actively participated in the proceedings before the Office of the
Ombudsman. She was given every opportunity to submit various pleadings
and documents in support of her claim, which she, in fact, did through her
counter-affidavit and documentary evidence, manifestation and motion,
memorandum on appeal, etc. In her Manifestation and Motion, petitioner
moved and submitted the case for resolution based on the arguments and
evidentiary records that were submitted before the Ombudsman. These were
all duly acted upon by the Ombudsman. Petitioner was given all the
opportunity to present her side. Due process was, therefore, properly
observed. Lily O. Orbase Vs. Office of the Ombudsman and Adoracion
Mendoza-Bolos, G.R. No. 175115. December 23, 2009

Administrative proceedings; exhaustion of remedies. The rule on exhaustion

of administrative remedies provides that a party must exhaust all
administrative remedies to give the administrative agency an opportunity to
decide the matter and to prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the
courts. This, however, is not an ironclad rule as it admits of exceptions, viz:
1.
when there is a violation of due process;
2.
when the issue involved is purely a legal question;
3. when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or

excess of jurisdiction;
4.
when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency
concerned;
5.
when there is irreparable injury;
6.
when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter
ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter;
7.
when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be
unreasonable;
8.
when it would amount to a nullification of a claim;
9.
when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings;
10. when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy;
and
11. when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial
intervention.
The instant case does not fall under any of the exceptions. Petitioners filing
of a petition for mandamus and prohibition with the CA was premature. It
bears stressing that the remedies of mandamus and prohibition may be

availed of only when there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Moreover, being
extraordinary remedies, resort may be had only in cases of extreme necessity
where the ordinary forms of procedure are powerless to afford relief.
Thus, instead of immediately filing a petition with the CA, petitioners should
have first brought the matter to the CSC which has primary jurisdiction over
the case. Evelyn S. Cabungcal, et al. vs. Sonia R. Lorenzo, et al., G.R. No.
160367, December 18, 2009.
EO 259; lack of implementing rules. Carabeo impugns the validity of EO
259 for lack of implementing rules and regulations. Indeed, EO 259 lacks
any implementing guidelines. However, such fact is immaterial and does not
affect, in any manner, the validity of the criminal and administrative charges
against Carabeo. While the DOF-RIPS derived from EO 259 its power and
authority to gather evidence against DOF officials and employees suspected
of graft and corruption, the DOF-RIPS need not be vested with such power
in order to validly file criminal and administrative charges against Carabeo.
In fact, any concerned ordinary citizen can file criminal and administrative
charges against any corrupt government official or employee if there exists
sufficient evidence of culpability. Hence, the DOF-RIPS, even without EO
259 and whether as subordinates of the Secretary of Finance or as private
citizens, can validly file criminal and administrative charges against
Carabeo.
At any rate, the Court finds that EO 259 is basically internal in nature
needing no implementing rules and regulations in order to be enforceable.
Principally aimed at curbing graft and corruption in the DOF and its attached
agencies,[14] EO 259 covers only officers and employees. Liberato M.
Carabeo vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 178000 & G.R. No. 178003,
December 4, 2009.
LLDA; fines. The Laguna Lake Development Authority has the power to
impose fines. Pacific Steam Laundry, Inc. vs. Laguna Lake Development
Authority G.R. No. 165299. December 18, 2009
Ombudsman; jurisdiction. At the time of the filing of the case against
petitioner, she was the Assistant Director of the National Library; as such, as

an appointive employee of the government, the jurisdiction of the Office of

the Ombudsman to take cognizance of the action against the petitioner was
beyond contestation.
Moreover, petitioners claim that the Ombudsman does not have jurisdiction
over the action, since the act complained of was committed before her
entering government service, cannot be sustained. Under Section 46 (18),
Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 198, even if the dishonest act
was committed by the employee prior to entering government service, such
act is still a ground for disciplinary action. Lily O. Orbase vs. Office of the
Ombudsman and Adoracion Mendoza-Bolos, G.R. No. 175115. December
23, 2009
Ombudsman; prescription. Petitioner insists that Section 20 (5) of R.A. No.
6770 proscribes the investigation of any administrative act or omission if the
complaint was filed one year after the occurrence of the act or omission
complained of.
In Office of the Ombudsman v. De Sahagun, the Court held that the period
stated in Section 20 (5) of R.A. No. 6770 does not refer to the prescription of
the offense, but to the discretion given to the Office of the Ombudsman on
whether it would investigate a particular administrative offense. The use of
the word may in the provision is construed as permissive and operating to
confer discretion. Where the words of a statute are clear, plain and free from
ambiguity, they must be given their literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation.
It is, therefore, discretionary upon the Ombudsman whether or not to
conduct an investigation of a complaint filed before it even if it was filed
one year after the occurrence of the act or omission complained of. Thus,
while the complaint herein was filed three years after the occurrence of the
act imputed to petitioner, it was within the authority of the Office of the
Ombudsman to act, to proceed with and conduct an investigation of the
subject complaint. Lily O. Orbase vs. Office of the Ombudsman and
Adoracion Mendoza-Bolos, G.R. No. 175115. December 23, 2009
OSG. Only the OSG can bring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic or
represent the People or the State in criminal proceedings pending in this

Court and the CA.

While there may be rare occasions when the offended party may be allowed
to pursue the criminal action on his own behalf, as when there is a denial of
due process, this exceptional circumstance does not obtain in the instant
case. Elvira O. Ong vs. Jose Casim Genio, G.R. No. 182336, December 23,
2009.
Election Law
Appointive officials; resignation. In considering persons holding appointive
positions as ipso facto resigned from their posts upon the filing of their
CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil servants, specifically the
elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against the first class. The fact
alone that there is substantial distinction between those who hold appointive
positions and those occupying elective posts, does not justify such
differential treatment. Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. vs.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 189698, December 1, 2009.
Candidates; residency requirement. The qualifications of a member of the
House of Representatives are found in Article VI, Section 6 of the
Constitution.
The evidence presented by private respondent before the HRET hardly
suffices to prove that petitioner failed to comply with the one-year residency
requirement under the Constitution. Private respondents documentary
evidence to disqualify petitioner mainly consisted of (a) petitioners
certificates of candidacy (COCs) for various positions in 1998, 2001 and
2004, which all indicated his residence as Pagsanjan, Laguna within the
Fourth District of said province; (b) his application for a drivers license in
August 2005 that indicated Pagsanjan, Laguna as his residence; and (c) the
statement in his COCs including his 2007 COC for Congressman for the
First District of Laguna that his place of birth was Pagsanjan, Laguna.
The HRET puts undue emphasis on the fact that petitioner is only leasing a
townhouse in Sta. Rosa while he owns houses in Pagsanjan and Cabuyao.
His ownership of properties in other places has been taken to mean that
petitioner did not intend to make Sta. Rosa his permanent residence or that

he had not abandoned his domicile of origin.

Although it is true that the latest acquired abode is not necessarily the
domicile of choice of a candidate, there is nothing in the Constitution or our
election laws which require a congressional candidate to sell a previously
acquired home in one district and buy a new one in the place where he seeks
to run in order to qualify for a congressional seat in that other district.
Neither do we see the fact that petitioner was only leasing a residence in Sta.
Rosa at the time of his candidacy as a barrier for him to run in that district.
Certainly, the Constitution does not require a congressional candidate to be a
property owner in the district where he seeks to run but only that he resides
in that district for at least a year prior to election day. To use ownership of
property in the district as the determinative indicium of permanence of
domicile or residence implies that only the landed can establish compliance
with the residency requirement. This Court would be, in effect, imposing a
property requirement to the right to hold public office, which property
requirement would be unconstitutional.
This case must be distinguished from Aquino v. COMELEC and Domino v.
COMELEC, where the disqualified candidate was shown to be merely
leasing a residence in the place where he sought to run for office. In Aquino
and Domino, there appeared to be no other material reason for the candidate
to lease residential property in the place where he filed his COC, except to
fulfill the residency requirement under election laws.
In the case at bar, there are real and substantial reasons for petitioner to
establish Sta. Rosa as his domicile of choice and abandon his domicile of
origin and/or any other previous domicile. Representative Danila Ramon S.
Fernandez vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Jesus L.
Vicente,G.R. No. 187478, December 21, 2009.
Term limit; preventive suspension. The preventive suspension of an elected
public official does not interrupt of his term of office for purposes of the
three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and
Section 43(b) of Republic Act No. 7160. Simon B. Aldovino, Jr., Danilo B.
Faller and Ferdinand N. Talabong vs. Commission on Elections and
Wilfredo F. Asilo, G.R. No. 184836, December 23, 2009.


Creation of cities. When Article X, Section 10 of the 1987 Constitution
speaks of the LGC, the reference cannot be to any specific statute or
codification of laws, let alone the LGC of 1991. At the time of the adoption
of the 1987 Constitution, Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 337, the then LGC, was
still in effect. Accordingly, had the framers of the 1987 Constitution
intended to isolate the embodiment of the criteria only in the LGC, then they
would have actually referred to BP 337. Also, they would then not have
provided for the enactment by Congress of a new LGC, as they did in Art.
X, Sec. 3 of the Constitution.
Consistent with its plenary legislative power on the matter, Congress can,
via either a consolidated set of laws or a much simpler, single-subject
enactment, impose the said verifiable criteria of viability. These criteria need
not be embodied in the local government code, albeit this code is the ideal
repository to ensure, as much as possible, the element of uniformity.
Congress can even, after making a codification, enact an amendatory law,
adding to the existing layers of indicators earlier codified, just as
efficaciously as it may reduce the same. In this case, the amendatory RA
9009 upped the already codified income requirement from PhP 20 million
toPhP 100 million. At the end of the day, the passage of amendatory laws is
no different from the enactment of laws, i.e., the cityhood laws specifically
exempting a particular political subdivision from the criteria earlier
mentioned. Congress, in enacting the exempting law/s, effectively decreased
the already codified indicators. League of Cities of the Philippines, et al. vs.
COMELEC,G.R. No. 176951/G.R. No. 177499 & G.R. No. 178056.
December 21, 2009.
Sanggunian approval. PICOP had claimed that it complied with Sections
2(c), 26 and 27 of the Local Government Code (which requires the prior
approval of the Sanggunian concerned) by submitting a purported resolution
of the Province of Surigao del Sur indorsing the approval of PICOPs
application for IFMA conversion. This cannot be deemed sufficient
compliance with the foregoing provision. Surigao del Sur is not the only
province affected by the area covered by the proposed IFMA. Hon.
Heherson T. Alvarez vs. PICOP Resources, Inc./PICOP Resources, Inc. vs.
Hon. Heherson T. Alavarez/Hon. Angelo T. Reyes vs. Paper Industries
Corporation of the Philippines (PICOP), G.R. No. 162243/G.R. No.

164516/G.R. No. 171875. December 3, 2009

Other laws
Public bidding; dacion en pago. Under Section 79 of the Government
Auditing Code, the disposition of government lands to private parties
requires public bidding. COA Circular No. 89-926, issued on 27 January
1989, sets forth the guidelines on the disposal of property and other assets of
the government.
Under the Compromise Agreement, PNCC shall dispose of substantial
parcels of land, by way of dacion en pago, in favor of Radstock. Citing Uy v.
Sandiganbayan, PNCC argues that a dacion en pago is an exception to the
requirement of a public bidding.
PNCCs reliance on Uy is misplaced. There is nothing in Uy declaring that
public bidding is dispensed with in a dacion en pago transaction.
Suffice it to state that in Uy, neither PIEDRAS nor the government suffered
any loss in the dacion en pago transactions, unlike here where the
government stands to lose at least P6.185 billion worth of assets.
Besides, a dacion en pago is in essence a form of sale, which basically
involves a disposition of a property. Strategic Alliance Development
Corporation vs. Radstock Securities Limited and Philippine National
Construction Corporation, G.R. No. 178158/G.R. No. 180428, December 4,
2009.
Presidents
refusal
DOJ decisions
to
review
Posted on December 23, 2009 by Hector M. de Leon Jr. Posted in Constitutional Law,
Criminal Law Tagged appeal, petition for review
Can the President legally refuse to review the decisions of the Secretary of

Justice except under certain circumstances? Does that diminish the power of
control of the President and bestow upon the Secretary of Justice, a
subordinate officer, unfettered power?
In Judge Adoracion G. Angeles vs. Hon. Manuel B. Gaite, et
al., G.R. No. 165276, November 25, 2009, the Provincial Prosecutor denied the
recommendation of the Investigating Prosecutor that Michael Vistan be
indicted for violation RA 7610. He also approved the recommendation for
the dismissal of the charge of violation of PD 1829. The petitioner filed a
petition for review with the Department of Justice, which eventually
dismissed the petition.
The petitioner then filed a Petition for Review before the Office of President.
The Office of the President dismissed the petition, citing Memorandum
Circular No. 58 which bars an appeal or a petition for review of decisions,
orders, and resolutions of the Secretary of Justice except those involving
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua or death.
The petitioner then appealed to the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the
petition.
The petitioner argued before the Supreme Court that Memorandum Circular
No. 58 is an invalid regulation because it diminishes the power of control of
the President and bestows upon the Secretary of Justice, a subordinate
officer, almost unfettered power.
The Supreme Court rejected this argument. It ruled:

This argument is absurd. The Presidents act of delegating authority to the
Secretary of Justice by virtue of said Memorandum Circular is well within
the purview of the doctrine of qualified political agency, long been
established in our jurisdiction.
Under this doctrine, which primarily recognizes the establishment of a single
executive, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the
Executive Department; the heads of the various executive departments are

assistants and agents of the Chief Executive; and, except in cases where the
Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the
exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious
executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed
by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of
such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of
business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive,
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. The CA cannot be deemed
to have committed any error in upholding the Office of the Presidents
reliance on the Memorandum Circular as it merely interpreted and applied
the law as it should be.
. . . the President himself set the limits of his power to review
decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice in order to expedite
the disposition of cases. Petitioners argument that the Memorandum
Circular unduly expands the power of the Secretary of Justice to the extent
of rendering even the Chief Executive helpless to rectify whatever errors or
abuses the former may commit in the exercise of his discretion is purely
speculative to say the least. Petitioner cannot second- guess the Presidents
power and the Presidents own judgment to delegate whatever it is he deems
necessary to delegate in order to achieve proper and speedy administration
of justice, especially that such delegation is upon a cabinet secretary his
own alter ego.
The Supreme Court observed that the President cannot delegate certain of
her powers:
. . . the power of the President to delegate is not without limits. No less than
the Constitution provides for restrictions. . .
These restrictions hold true to this day as they remain embodied in our
fundamental law. There are certain presidential powers which arise out of
exceptional circumstances, and if exercised, would involve the suspension of
fundamental freedoms, or at least call for the supersedence of executive
prerogatives over those exercised by co-equal branches of government. The
declaration of martial law, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and
the exercise of the pardoning power, notwithstanding the judicial
determination of guilt of the accused, all fall within this special class that

demands the exclusive exercise by the President of the constitutionally

vested power. The list is by no means exclusive, but there must be a showing
that the executive power in question is of similar gravitas and exceptional
import.
In the case at bar, the power of the President to review the Decision of the
Secretary of Justice dealing with the preliminary investigation of cases
cannot be considered as falling within the same exceptional class which
cannot be delegated. Besides, the President has not fully abdicated his power
of control as Memorandum Circular No. 58 allows an appeal if the
imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua or higher. Certainly, it would be
unreasonable to impose upon the President the task of reviewing all
preliminary investigations decided by the Secretary of Justice. To do so will
unduly hamper the other important duties of the President by having to
scrutinize each and every decision of the Secretary of Justice
notwithstanding the latters expertise in said matter.
Finally, the Court ruled that the memorandum circular do not deprive the
President of her power of control:
Petitioners contention that Memorandum Circular No. 58 violates both the
Constitution and Section 1, Chapter 1, Book III of EO No. 292, for depriving
the President of his power of control over the executive departments
deserves scant consideration. In the first place, Memorandum Circular No.
58 was promulgated by the Office of the President and it is settled that the
acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in
the regular course of business are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the
Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
Memorandum Circular No. 58 has not been reprobated by the President;
therefore, it goes without saying that the said Memorandum Circular has the
approval of the President.
Rehabilitation proceedings and the

non-impairment clause

Posted on December 16, 2009 by Hector M. de Leon Jr. Posted in Civil Law,
Commercial Law, Constitutional Law Tagged contract, loan
Can a rehabilitation court compel a lender to accept a 50% reduction in the

borrowers principal obligation? Would that violate the non-impairment of
contracts clause of the Constitution?
In Pacific Wide Realty and Development Corporation vs. PuertoAzul Land,
Inc./Pacific Wide Realty and Development Corporation Vs. PuertoAzul
Land, Inc., G.R. No. 178768/G.R. No. 180893, November 25, 2009, the
borrower, Puerto Azul Land, Inc. (PALI) is the owner and developer of the
Puerto Azul Complex situated in Ternate, Cavite. Its business involves the
development of Puerto Azul into a satellite city with residential areas, resort,
tourism and retail commercial centers with recreational areas. In order to
finance its operations, it obtained loans from various banks, the principal
amount of which amounted to aroundPhP640 million.
Because of financial difficulties, PALI subsequently filed a petition for
rehabilitation. After trial, the rehabilitation court issued a decision which
reads, in part:
The rehabilitation of the petitioner, therefore, shall proceed as follows. . .
2.
Creditors who will not opt for dacion shall be paid in accordance with
the restructuring of the obligations as recommended by the Receiver as
follows:
a)
The obligations to secured creditors will be subject to a 50% haircut of
the principal, and repayment shall be semi-annually over a period of 10
years, with 3-year grace period. Accrued interests and penalties shall be
condoned. Interest shall be paid at the rate of 2% p.a. for the first 5 years and
5% p.a. thereafter until the obligations are fully paid. The petitioner shall
allot 50% of its cash flow available for debt service for secured creditors.
Upon completion of payments to government and employee accounts, the
petitioners cash flow available for debt service shall be used until the
obligations are fully paid.
b)
One half (1/2) of the principal of the petitioners unsecured loan
obligations to other creditors shall be settled through non-cash offsetting

arrangements, with the balance payable semi-annually over a period of 10

years, with 3-year grace period, with interest at the rate of 2% p.a. for the
first 5 years and 5% p.a. from the 6th year onwards until the obligations are
settled in full. Accrued interest and penalties shall be
condoned. (underscoring supplied)
One of the lenders, Export and Industry Bank (EIB), filed with the Court of
Appeals (CA) a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. The
CA affirmed the decision of the rehabilitation court.
In its petition before the Supreme Court, EIB argues that the rehabilitation
plan was unreasonable and in violation of the non-impairment clause. The
Supreme Court disagreed. The court first explained the nature of
rehabilitation proceedings:
Rehabilitation contemplates a continuance of corporate life and activities in
an effort to restore and reinstate the corporation to its former position of
successful operation and solvency. The purpose of rehabilitation proceedings
is to enable the company to gain a new lease on life and thereby allow
creditors to be paid their claims from its earnings. The rehabilitation of a
financially distressed corporation benefits its employees, creditors,
stockholders and, in a larger sense, the general public.
Under the Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation, rehabilitation
is defined as the restoration of the debtor to a position of successful
operation and solvency, if it is shown that its continuance of operation is
economically feasible and its creditors can recover by way of the present
value of payments projected in the plan, more if the corporation continues as
a going concern than if it is immediately liquidated.
An indispensable requirement in the rehabilitation of a distressed
corporation is the rehabilitation plan . . .
On EIBs argument that the rehabilitation plan violates the non-impairment
clause, the court ruled:
In G.R. No. 180893, the rehabilitation plan is contested on the ground that
the same is unreasonable and results in the impairment of the obligations of

contract.PWRDC contests the following stipulations in PALIs rehabilitation

plan: fifty percent (50%) reduction of the principal obligation; condonation
of the accrued and substantial interests and penalty charges; repayment over
a period of ten years, with minimal interest of two percent (2%) for the first
five years and five percent (5%) for the next five years until fully paid, and
only upon availability of cash flow for debt service.
We find nothing onerous in the terms of PALIs rehabilitation plan. The
Interim Rules on Corporate Rehabilitation provides for means of execution
of the rehabilitation plan, which may include, among others, the conversion
of the debts or any portion thereof to equity, restructuring of the debts,
dacion en pago, or sale of assets or of the controlling interest.
The restructuring of the debts of PALI is part and parcel of its rehabilitation.
Moreover, per findings of fact of the RTC and as affirmed by the CA, the
restructuring of the debts of PALI would not be prejudicial to the interest of
PWRDC as a secured creditor. Enlightening is the observation of the CA in
this regard,viz.:
There is nothing unreasonable or onerous about the 50% reduction of the
principal amount when, as found by the court a quo, a Special Purpose
Vehicle (SPV) acquired the credits of PALI from its creditors at deep
discounts of as much as 85%. Meaning, PALIs creditors accepted only 15%
of their credits value. Stated otherwise, if PALIs creditors are in a position
to accept 15% of their credits value, with more reason that they should be
able to accept 50% thereof as full settlement by their debtor. x x x.
We also find no merit in PWRDCs contention that there is a violation of the
impairment clause. Section 10, Article III of the Constitution mandates that
no law impairing the obligations of contract shall be passed. This case does
not involve a law or an executive issuance declaring the modification of the
contract among debtorPALI, its creditors and its accommodation
mortgagors. Thus, the non-impairment clause may not be invoked.
Furthermore, as held in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. even assuming that the same
may be invoked, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power
of the State. Property rights and contractual rights are not absolute. The
constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations is limited by the
exercise of the police power of the State for the common good of the general

public.
Successful rehabilitation of a distressed corporation will benefit its debtors,
creditors, employees, and the economy in general. The court may approve a
rehabilitation plan even over the opposition of creditors holding a majority
of the total liabilities of the debtor if, in its judgment, the rehabilitation of
the debtor is feasible and the opposition of the creditors is manifestly
unreasonable. The rehabilitation plan, once approved, is binding upon the
debtor and all persons who may be affected by it, including the creditors,
whether or not such persons have participated in the proceedings or have
opposed the plan or whether or not their claims have been scheduled.
November 2009 Philippine Supreme

Posted on December 4, 2009 by Hector M. de Leon Jr. Posted in Constitutional Law
Tagged ballot appreciation, Civil Service Commission, election contest, equal protection,
jurisdiction, political question
Here are selected November 2009 Philippine Supreme Court decisions on

political law:
Constitutional Law
Civil Service Commission; jurisdiction. TThe Civil Service Commission
(CSC) Caraga has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation of a
possible administrative case of dishonesty against PO1 Capablanca for
alleged CSP examination irregularity.
The CSC, as the central personnel agency of the Government, is mandated to
establish a career service, to strengthen the merit and rewards system, and to
adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency and integrity in the civil
service. The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the government, including governmentowned or controlled corporations with original charters. Specifically,
Section 91 of Republic Act (RA) No. 6975 (1990) or the Department of

Interior and Local Government Act of 1990 provides that the Civil Service
Law and its implementing rules and regulations shall apply to all personnel
of the Department, to which herein petitioner belongs.
Section 12 of Executive Order (EO) No. 292 or the Administrative Code of
1987, enumerates the powers and functions of the CSC. In addition, Section
28, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations
specifically confers upon the CSC the authority to take cognizance over any
irregularities or anomalies connected with the examinations. To carry out
this mandate, the CSC issued Resolution No. 991936, or the Uniform Rules
on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, empowering its Regional
Offices to take cognizance of cases involving CSC examination anomalies.
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the CSC acted within its jurisdiction
when it initiated the conduct of a preliminary investigation on the alleged
civil service examination irregularity committed by the petitioner. Eugenio
S. Capablanca vs. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 179370, November
18, 2009.
Civil Service Commission; jurisdiction. It has already been
settled in Cruz v. Civil Service Commission that the appellate power of the
CSC will only apply when the subject of the administrative cases filed
against erring employees is in connection with the duties and functions of
their office, and not in cases where the acts of complainant arose from
cheating in the civil service examinations. Eugenio S. Capablanca vs. Civil
Service Commission, G.R. No. 179370, November 18, 2009.
Constitutionality; equal protection. The equal protection guarantee under
the Constitution is found under its Section 2, Article III, which provides:
Nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
Essentially, the equality guaranteed under this clause is equality under the
same conditions and among persons similarly situated. It is equality among
equals, not similarity of treatment of persons who are different from one
another on the basis of substantial distinctions related to the objective of the
law; when things or persons are different in facts or circumstances, they may
be treated differently in law.
Appreciation of how the constitutional equality provision applies inevitably
leads to the conclusion that no basis exists in the present case for an equal
protection challenge. The law can treat barangay officials differently from

other local elective officials because the Constitution itself provides a

significant distinction between these elective officials with respect to length
of term and term limitation. The clear distinction, expressed in the
Constitution itself, is that while the Constitution provides for a three-year
term and three-term limit for local elective officials, it left the length of term
and the application of the three-term limit or any form of term limitation for
determination by Congress through legislation. Not only does this disparate
treatment recognize substantial distinctions, it recognizes as well that the
Constitution itself allows a non-uniform treatment. No equal protection
violation can exist under these conditions.
From another perspective, we see no reason to apply the equal protection
clause as a standard because the challenged proviso did not result in any
differential treatment between barangay officials and all other elective
officials. This conclusion proceeds from our ruling on the retroactivity issue
that the challenged proviso does not involve any retroactive
application. Commission on Elections vs. Conrado Cruz, et al., G.R. No.
186616, November 20, 2009.
Constitutionality; lis mota. In its last-ditch effort to salvage its case, SEM
contends that Proclamation No. 297, issued by President Gloria MacapagalArroyo and declaring the Diwalwal Gold Rush Area as a mineral
reservation, is invalid on the ground that it lacks the concurrence of
Congress as mandated by Section 4, Article XII of the Constitution; Section
1 of Republic Act No. 3092; Section 14 of Executive Order No. 292,
otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987; Section 5(a) of
Republic Act No. 7586, and Section 4(a) of Republic Act No. 6657.
It is well-settled that when questions of constitutionality are raised, the court
can exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are
present: (1) an actual and appropriate case exists; (2) there is a personal and
substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the
exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the
constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.
Taking into consideration the foregoing requisites of judicial review, it is

readily clear that the third requisite is absent. The general rule is that the
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity, so
that if it is not raised in the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised at the
trial; and if not raised in the trial court, it will not be considered on appeal.
Apex Mining Co. Inc. Vs. Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corp., et
al.,G.R. No. 152613/G.R. No. 152628, November 20, 2009.
Constitutionality; one subject one title rule. Every bill passed by the
Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof.
We find, under these settled parameters, that the challenged proviso does not
violate the one subject-one title rule.
First, the title of RA No. 9164, An Act Providing for Synchronized
Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataang Elections, amending Republic Act
No. 7160, as amended, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of
1991, states the laws general subject matter the amendment of the LGC
to synchronize the barangay and SK elections and for other purposes. To
achieve synchronization of the barangay and SK elections, the reconciliation
of the varying lengths of the terms of office of barangay officials and SK
officials is necessary. Closely related with length of term is term limitation
which defines the total number of terms for which a barangayofficial may
run for and hold office. This natural linkage demonstrates that term
limitation is not foreign to the general subject expressed in the title of the
law.
Second, the congressional debates we cited above show that the legislators
and the public they represent were fully informed of the purposes, nature and
scope of the laws provisions. Term limitation therefore received the notice,
consideration, and action from both the legislators and the public.
Finally, to require the inclusion of term limitation in the title of RA No.
9164 is to make the title an index of all the subject matters dealt with by law;
this is not what the constitutional requirement contemplates. Commission on
Elections vs. Conrado Cruz, et al., G.R. No. 186616, November 20, 2009.
Constitutionality; political question. Congress has plenary authority under

the Constitution to determine by legislation not only the duration of the term
of barangay officials, but also the application to them of a consecutive term
limit. Congress invariably exercised this authority when it enacted no less
than six (6) barangay-related laws since 1987.
Through all these statutory changes, Congress had determined at its
discretion both the length of the term of office of barangay officials and their
term limitation. Given the textually demonstrable commitment by the 1987
Constitution to Congress of the authority to determine the term duration and
limition of barangay officials under the Constitution, we consider it
established that whatever Congress, in its wisdom, decides on these matters
are political questions beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny, subject only to
the certiorari jurisdiction of the courts provided under Section 1, Article VIII
of the Constitution and to the judicial authority to invalidate any law
contrary to the Constitution.
Political questions refer to those questions which, under the Constitution,
are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to
which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of the government; it is concerned with issues dependent
upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure. These questions,
previously impervious to judicial scrutiny can now be inquired into under
the limited window provided by Section 1, Article VIII.
Other than the Section 1, Article VIII route, courts can declare a law invalid
when it is contrary to any provision of the Constitution. This requires the
appraisal of the challenged law against the legal standards provided by the
Constitution, not on the basis of the wisdom of the enactment. To justify its
nullification, the breach of the Constitution must be clear and unequivocal,
not a doubtful or equivocal one, as every law enjoys a strong presumption of
constitutionality. These are the hurdles that those challenging the
constitutional validity of a law must overcome. Commission on Elections
vs. Conrado Cruz, et al., G.R. No. 186616, November 20, 2009.
Constitutionality; retroactivity. The constitutional challenge must fail for a
more fundamental reason the respondents retroactivity objection does not
involve a violation of any constitutional standard.

Retroactivity of laws is a matter of civil law, not of a constitutional law, as

its governing law is the Civil Code, not the Constitution. Article 4 of the
Civil Code provides that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the
contrary is provided. The application of the Civil Code is of course selfexplanatory laws enacted by Congress may permissibly provide that they
shall have retroactive effect. The Civil Code established a statutory norm,
not a constitutional standard.
The closest the issue of retroactivity of laws can get to a genuine
constitutional issue is if a laws retroactive application will impair vested
rights. Otherwise stated, if a right has already vested in an individual and a
subsequent law effectively takes it away, a genuine due process issue may
arise. What should be involved, however, is a vested right to life, liberty or
property, as these are the ones that may be considered protected by the due
process clause of the Constitution.
In the present case, the respondents never raised due process as an issue. But
even assuming that they did, the respondents themselves concede that there
is no vested right to public office. As the COMELEC correctly pointed out,
too, there is no vested right to an elective post in view of the uncertainty
inherent in electoral exercises. Commission on Elections vs. Conrado Cruz,
et al., G.R. No. 186616, November 20, 2009.
Election law
Ballots; appreciation. Although as a rule, the appreciation of contested
ballots and election documents involves a question of fact best left to the
determination of the COMELEC, still when it can be shown that, as in this
case, it grossly misread evidence of such nature that compels a different
conclusion, the Court will not hesitate to reverse that bodys factual findings.
It is by now a settled truth that no two persons write alike. Even if two
handwritings have a common general outlook, they are apt to be at variance
in some basic characteristics that set them apart. Every person uses his own
style for forming letters, technically called personal characteristics.
Whatever features two specimens of handwriting may have in common, they
cannot be regarded as written by one person if they show even but one
consistent dissimilarity in any feature which is fundamental to the structure

of the handwriting.
Here, the Court did not find, after examining 93 of the excluded ballots
pertaining to petitioner Torres, any two or more of ballots that were filled in
by a single hand. Of the 47 pairs of ballots that the En Banc excluded, only
two pairs were correctly excluded because they were written by one person
for each pair. 45 pairs turned out to have been filled up by different hands.
While the general outlook of the handwritings on each of the two ballots in
any given pair is the same, such handwritings have distinct personal
characteristics. In the same way, the three ballots that were supposedly
written on by one person turned out to have been the work of three different
hands. Ramon P. Torres vs. Commission on Elections and Josephine Joy
H. Gaviola, G.R. No. 187956, November 19, 2009.
Candidates; liability for election offenses. Congress has laid down the law
a candidate is liable for election offenses only upon the start of the
campaign period. This Court has no power to ignore the clear and express
mandate of the law that any person who files his certificate of candidacy
within [the filing] period shall only be considered a candidate at the start of
the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy. Neither
can this Court turn a blind eye to the express and clear language of the law
that any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect
only upon the start of the campaign period. Rosalinda A. Penera vs.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 181613, November 25, 2009. Note: The
Supreme Court reversed its earlier decision dated September 11, 2009.
October 2009 Philippine Supreme

Posted on November 9, 2009 by Hector M. de Leon Jr. Posted in Constitutional Law
Tagged bail, Civil Service Commission, COMELEC, Commission on Audit, eminent
domain
Here are selected October 2009 Philippine Supreme Court decisions on

political law:

Constitutional Law
Bail. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that All persons,
except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law.
Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, thus
provides that all persons in custody shall, before conviction by a regional
trial court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of right.
The exercise by the trial court of its discretionary power to grant bail to an
accused charged with a capital offense thus depends on whether the evidence
of guilt is strong. The People of the Philippines vs. Luis Plaza y Bucalon,
G.R. No. 176933, October 2, 2009.
Civil Service Commission; powers. The Commission, as the central
personnel agency of the government, has statutory authority to establish
rules and regulations to promote efficiency and professionalism in the civil
service. Presidential Decree No. 807, or the Civil Service Decree of the
Philippines, provides for the powers of the Commission, including the power
to issue rules and regulations and to review appointments. Leah M.
Nazareno, et al. vs. City of Dumaguete, et al., G.R. No. 181559, October 2,
2009.
Commission on Audit; powers. Under Commonwealth Act No. 327, as
amended by P.D. No. 1445, the COA, as one of the three independent
constitutional commissions, is specifically vested with the power, authority
and duty to examine, audit and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue
and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property owned or
held in trust by the government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies or
instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled corporations.
To ensure the effective discharge of its functions, it is vested with ample
powers, subject to constitutional limitations, to define the scope of its audit
and examination and establish the techniques and methods required therefor,
to promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those
for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive,

extravagant or unconscionable expenditures or uses of government funds

and properties.
Clearly, the matter of allowing or disallowing a money claim against
petitioner is within the primary power of the COA to decide. This no doubt
includes money claims arising from the implementation of R.A. No. 6758.
Respondents claim against petitioner, although it has already been validated
by the trial courts final decision, likewise belongs to that class of claims;
hence, it must first be filed with the COA before execution could proceed.
And from the decision therein, the aggrieved party is afforded a remedy by
elevating the matter to this Court via a petition for certiorari in accordance
with Section 1 Rule XI, of the COA Rules of Procedure. National Home
Mortgage Finance Corporation vs. Mario Abayari, et al., G.R. No. 166508,
October 2, 2009.
COMELEC; certiorari. It is settled that under Section 7, Article IX-A of the

Constitution, what may be brought to this Court on certiorari is the decision,
order or ruling of the COMELEC en banc. However, this rule should not
apply when a division of the COMELEC arrogates unto itself and deprives
the en banc of the authority to rule on a motion for reconsideration, like in
this case.
In this case, the First Division of the COMELEC violated the cited
provisions of the Constitution and the COMELEC Rules of Procedure when
it resolved petitioners motion for reconsideration of its final Order dated
November 25, 2008, which dismissed petitioners appeal. By arrogating unto
itself a power constitutionally lodged in the Commission en banc, the First
Division of the COMELEC exercised judgment in excess of, or without,
jurisdiction. Hence, the Order issued by the First Division of the COMELEC
dated January 9, 2009, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration, is
null and void. Carmelinda C. Barror vs. The Commission on Elections, et
al., G.R. No. 186201, October 9, 2009.
COMELEC; powers. The COMELEC under our governmental structure is
a constitutional administrative agency and its powers are essentially
executive in nature (i.e., to enforce and administer election laws), quasi-

judicial (to exercise original jurisdiction over election contests of regional,

provincial and city officials and appellate jurisdiction over election contests
of other lower ranking officials), and quasi-legislative (rulemaking on all
questions affecting elections and the promulgation of its rules of procedure).
Historically, the COMELEC has always been an administrative agency
whose powers have been increased from the 1935 Constitution to the present
one, to reflect the countrys awareness of the need to provide greater
regulation and protection to our electoral processes to ensure their integrity.
The COMELECs adjudicative function is quasi-judicial since it is a
constitutional body, other than a court, vested with authority to decide
election contests, and in the course of the exercise of its jurisdiction, to hold
hearings and exercise discretion of a judicial nature; it receives evidence,
ascertain the facts from these submissions, determine the law and the legal
rights of the parties, and on the basis of all these decides on the merits of the
case and renders judgment. Despite the exercise of discretion that is
essentially judicial in character, particularly with respect to election contests,
COMELEC is not a tribunal within the judicial branch of government and is
not a court exercising judicial power in the constitutional sense; hence, its
adjudicative function, exercised as it is in the course of administration and
enforcement, is quasi-judicial.
The 1973 Constitution used the unique wording that the COMELEC shall
be the sole judge of all contests, thus giving the appearance that judicial
power had been conferred. This phraseology, however, was changed in the
1987 Constitution to give the COMELEC exclusive jurisdiction over all
contests, thus removing any vestige of exercising its adjudicatory power as
a court and correctly aligning it with what it is a quasi-judicial
body.Consistent with the characterization of its adjudicatory power as quasijudicial, the judicial review of COMELEC en banc decisions (together with
the review of Civil Service Commission decisions) is via the prerogative
writ of certiorari, not through an appeal, as the traditional mode of review of
quasi-judicial decisions of administrative tribunals in the exercise the
Courts supervisory authority. This means that the Court will not supplant
the decision of the COMELEC as a quasi-judicial body except where a grave
abuse of discretion or any other jurisdictional error exists. Joselito R.
Mendoza vs. Commission on Elections and Roberto M. Pagdanganan, G.R.
No. 188308, October 15, 2009.

COMELEC; decisions. Petitioners argue that the February 28, 2003

resolution of the COMELEC violates Article VIII, Section 14 of the
Constitution, which states that no decision shall be rendered by any court
without expressing clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based. The COMELEC allegedly made generalizations without detailing
the basis for its findings.
The assailed resolution substantially complied with the constitutional
mandate of Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution. The resolution
detailed the evidence presented by the parties. Thereafter, it weighed the
respective pieces of evidence submitted by the prosecution and the defense
and chose the one that deserved credence. It contained findings of facts as
well as an application of case law.
The purpose of Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution is to inform the
person reading the decision, especially the parties, of how it was reached by
the court after a consideration of the pertinent facts and an examination of
the applicable laws. The losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he
may appeal to a higher court, if permitted, if he believes that the decision
should be reversed. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the
facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how
it was reached and is especially prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable
to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal.
Thus, a decision is adequate if a party desiring to appeal therefrom can
assign errors to it. Roberto Albaa, et al. vs. Pio Jude Belo, et al., G.R. No.
158734, October 2, 2009.
COMELEC; due process. Based on the pleadings filed, there is no factual
and legal basis for the petitioner to complain of denial of his hearing stage
rights. In the first place, he does not dispute that he fully participated in the
proceedings of the election protest until the case was deemed submitted for
resolution; he had representation at the revision of the ballots, duly presented
his evidence, and summed up his case through a memorandum. These
various phases of the proceedings constitute the hearing proper of the
election contest and the COMELEC has more than satisfied the opportunity
to be heard that the Ang Tibay hearing stage rights require. In these
proceedings, the petitioner stood head-to-head with the respondent in an
adversarial contest where both sides were given their respective rights to
speak, make their presentations, and controvert each others submission,

subject only to established COMELEC rules of procedures. Under these

undisputed facts, both parties had their day in court, so to speak, and neither
one can complain of any denial of notice or of the right to be heard. Joselito
R. Mendoza vs. Commission on Elections and Roberto M.
Pagdanganan, G.R. No. 188308, October 15, 2009.
Eminent domain; damages. In taking respondents property without the
benefit of expropriation proceedings and without payment of just
compensation, the City of Pasig clearly acted in utter disregard of
respondents proprietary rights. Such conduct cannot be countenanced by the
Court. For said illegal taking, the City of Pasig should definitely be held
liable for damages to respondents. Again, in Manila International Airport
Authority v. Rodriguez, the Court held that the government agencys illegal
occupation of the owners property for a very long period of time surely
resulted in pecuniary loss to the owner. Hon. Vicente P. Eusebio, et al. vs..
Jovito M. Luis, et al. G.R. No. 162474, October 13, 2009
Eminent domain; estoppel. Just like in the Forfom case, herein respondents
also failed to question the taking of their property for a long period of time
(from 1980 until the early 1990s) and, when asked during trial what action
they took after their property was taken, witness Jovito Luis, one of the
respondents, testified that when we have an occasion to talk to Mayor
Caruncho we always asked for compensation. It is likewise undisputed that
what was constructed by the city government on respondents property was a
road for public use, namely, A. Sandoval Avenue in Pasig City. Clearly, as
in Forfom, herein respondents are also estopped from recovering possession
of their land, but are entitled to just compensation. Hon. Vicente P. Eusebio,
et al. vs. Jovito M. Luis, et al., G.R. No. 162474, October 13, 2009.
Eminent domain; just compensation. In fixing the just compensation in the
present case, the trial court, adopting the market data approach on which
Commissioner Chua relied, merely put premium on the location of the
property and the crops planted thereon which are not among the factors
enumerated in Section 17 of RA 6657. And the trial court did not apply the
formula provided in DAR AO 6-92, as amended. This is a clear departure
from the settled doctrine regarding the mandatory nature of Section 17 of
RA 6657 and the DAR issuances implementing it.

Not only did Commissioner Chua not consider Section 17 of RA 6657 and
DAR AO 6-92, as amended, in his appraisal of the property. His conclusion
that the market data approach conformed with statutory and regulatory
requirements is bereft of basis. Department of Agrarian Reform, rep. OICSecretary Nasser C. Pangandaman vs. Jose Marie Rufino, et al., G.R. No.
175644/G.R. No. 175702, October 2, 2009.
Eminent domain; just compensation. With regard to the time as to when
just compensation should be fixed, it is settled jurisprudence that where
property was taken without the benefit of expropriation proceedings, and its
owner files an action for recovery of possession thereof before the
commencement of expropriation proceedings, it is the value of the property
at the time of taking that is controlling. Hon. Vicente P. Eusebio, et al. vs.
Jovito M. Luis, et al., G.R. No. 162474, October 13, 2009.
Eminent domain; just compensation. Petitioners interpretation is flawed. In
the recent case of Land Bank of the Philippines v. Chico, the Court declared
in no uncertain terms that R.A. No. 6657 is the relevant law for determining
just compensation after noting several decided cases where the Court found
it more equitable to determine just compensation based on the value of the
property at the time of payment. This was a clear departure from the Courts
earlier stance in Gabatin v. Land Bank of the Philippines where it declared
that the reckoning period for the determination of just compensation is the
time when the land was taken applying P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228.
P.D. No. 27/E.O. No. 228 vis a vis R.A. No. 6657 was applied to cases
involving lands placed under the coverage of P.D. No. 27/E.O. No. 228
where payment of just compensation had not been completed. When in the
interim R.A. No. 6657 was passed before the full payment of just
compensation, as in the case at bar, the provisions of R.A. No. 6657 on just
compensation control. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. J. L. Jocson and
Sons, G.R. No. 180803, October 23, 2009.
Eminent domain; prescription. Where private property is taken by the
Government for public use without first acquiring title thereto either through
expropriation or negotiated sale, the owners action to recover the land or the
value thereof does not prescribe. Hon. Vicente P. Eusebio, et al. vs. Jovito
M. Luis, et al., G.R. No. 162474, October 13, 2009.

Right to be informed. Under the Constitution, a person who stands charged

of a criminal offense has the right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him. The Rules of Court, in implementing the right,
specifically require that the acts or omissions complained of as constituting
the offense, including the qualifying and aggravating circumstances, must be
stated in ordinary and concise language, not necessarily in the language used
in the statute, but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is being charged and the attendant
qualifying and aggravating circumstances present, so that the accused can
properly defend himself and the court can pronounce judgment. To broaden
the scope of the right, the Rules authorize the quashal, upon motion of the
accused, of an Information that fails to allege the acts constituting the
offense. Jurisprudence has laid down the fundamental test in appreciating a
motion to quash an Information grounded on the insufficiency of the facts
alleged therein. Jose C. Go vs. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, G.R. No.
178429, October 23, 2009.
Public Officers
Mass appointments. It is not difficult to see the reasons behind the
prohibition on mass appointments before and after the elections.
Appointments are banned prior to the elections to ensure that partisan
loyalties will not be a factor in the appointment process, and to prevent
incumbents from gaining any undue advantage during the elections. To this
end, appointments within a certain period of time are proscribed by the
Omnibus Election Code and related issuances. After the elections,
appointments by defeated candidates are prohibited, except under the
circumstances mentioned in CSC Resolution No. 010988, to avoid
animosities between outgoing and incoming officials, to allow the incoming
administration a free hand in implementing its policies, and to ensure that
appointments and promotions are not used as a tool for political patronage or
as a reward for services rendered to the outgoing local officials.
Indeed, not all appointments issued after the elections by defeated officials
are invalid. CSC Resolution No. 010988 does not purport to nullify all
mass appointments. However, it must be shown that the appointments
have undergone the regular screening process, that the appointee is qualified,
that there is a need to fill up the vacancy immediately, and that the
appointments are not in bulk. Leah M. Nazareno, et al. vs. City of

Dumaguete, et al., G.R. No. 181559, October 2, 2009.

Administrative Law
Cardinal rights; administrative proceedings. The first of the enumerated
rights pertain to the substantive rights of a party at hearing stage of the
proceedings. The essence of this aspect of due process is simply the
opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration
of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at
all times and in all instances essential; in the case of COMELEC, Rule 17 of
its Rules of Procedure defines the requirements for a hearing and these serve
as the standards in the determination of the presence or denial of due
process.
The second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth aspects of the Ang Tibay
requirements are reinforcements of the right to a hearing and are the
inviolable rights applicable at the deliberative stage, as the decision-maker
decides on the evidence presented during the hearing. These standards set
forth the guiding considerations in deliberating on the case and are the
material and substantial components of decision-making. Briefly, the
tribunal must consider the totality of the evidence presented which must all
be found in the records of the case (i.e., those presented or submitted by the
parties); the conclusion, reached by the decision-maker himself and not by a
subordinate, must be based on substantial evidence.
Finally, the last requirement, relating to the form and substance of the
decision of a quasi-judicial body, further complements the hearing and
decision-making due process rights and is similar in substance to the
constitutional requirement that a decision of a court must state distinctly the
facts and the law upon which it is based. As a component of the rule of
fairness that underlies due process, this is the duty to give reason to enable
the affected person to understand how the rule of fairness has been
administered in his case, to expose the reason to public scrutiny and
criticism, and to ensure that the decision will be thought through by the
decision-maker. R. Mendoza vs. Commission on Elections and Roberto M.
Pagdanganan, G.R. No. 188308, October 15, 2009.

Exhaustion of administrative remedies. It is true that the general rule is that

before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, he or she
should have availed himself or herself of all the means of administrative
processes afforded him or her. Hence, if resort to a remedy within the
administrative machinery can still be made by giving the administrative
officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within
his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the
courts judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of the
intervention of the court is fatal to ones cause of action. The doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on practical and legal
reasons. The availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and
provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. Furthermore, the courts
of justice, for reasons of comity and convenience, will shy away from a
dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and
complied with, so as to give the administrative agency concerned every
opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the case. However, there are
several exceptions to this rule.
The rule on the exhaustion of administrative remedies is intended to
preclude a court from arrogating unto itself the authority to resolve a
controversy, the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an
administrative body of special competence. Thus, a case where the issue
raised is a purely legal question, well within the competence; and the
jurisdiction of the court and not the administrative agency, would clearly
constitute an exception. Resolving questions of law, which involve the
interpretation and application of laws, constitutes essentially an exercise of
judicial power that is exclusively allocated to the Supreme Court and such
lower courts the Legislature may establish. Evelyn Ongsuco and Antonia
Salaya vs. Hon. Mariano M. Malones, etc., G.R. No. 182065, October 27,
2009.
Election Law
Pre-proclamation controversy. Section 243 of the Omnibus Election Code
limits a pre-proclamation controversy to the questions enumerated therein.
The enumeration is restrictive and exclusive. Resultantly, the petition for a
pre-proclamation controversy must fail in the absence of any clear showing
or proof that the election returns canvassed are incomplete or contain
material defects (Section 234, Omnibus Election Code); or appear to have

been tampered with, falsified or prepared under duress (Section 235,

Omnibus Election Code); or contain discrepancies in the votes credited to
any candidate, the difference of which affects the result of the election
(Section 236, Omnibus Election Code).
To be noted, too, is that in a pre-proclamation controversy, the COMELEC
is restricted to an examination of the election returns and is without
jurisdiction to go beyond or behind the election returns and to investigate
election irregularities. For as long as the election returns appear to be
authentic and duly accomplished on their faces, the Board of Canvassers
cannot look beyond or behind the election returns in order to verify
allegations of irregularities in the casting or counting of votes. Ismunlatip
H. Suhuri vs. The Honorable Commssion on Elections (En Banc), The
Municipal Board of Canvassers of Patikul, Sulu and Kabir E.
Hayundini,G.R. No. 181869, October 2, 2009.
Residency requirement. The issue of petitioners disqualification for failure
to comply with the one-year residency requirement has been resolved by this
Court in Norlainie Mitmug Limbona v. Commission on Elections and Malik
Bobby T. Alingan. This case stemmed from the first disqualification case
filed by herein respondent against petitioner, docketed as SPA No. 07-611.
Although the petitioner had withdrawn the Certificate of Candidacy subject
of the disqualification case, the Comelec resolved the petition and found that
petitioner failed to comply with the one-year residency requirement, and
was, therefore, disqualified from running as mayor of Pantar. Norlainie
Mitmug Limbona vs. Commssion on Elections and Malik Bobby T.
Alingan, G.R. No. 186006, October 16, 2009.
Statistical improbability doctrine. Under Lagumbay, the doctrine of
statistical improbability is applied only where the unique uniformity of tally
of all the votes cast in favor of all the candidates belonging to one party and
the systematic blanking of all the candidates of all the opposing parties
appear in the election return. The doctrine has no application where there is
neither uniformity of tallies nor systematic blanking of the candidates of one
party. Thus, the bare fact that a candidate for public office received no votes
in one or two precincts, standing alone and without more, cannot adequately
support a finding that the subject election returns are statistically
improbable. Verily, a zero vote for a particular candidate in the election
returns is but one strand in the web of circumstantial evidence that the

electoral returns were prepared under duress, force and intimidation.

The Court has thus warned that the doctrine of statistical improbability must
be restrictively viewed, with the utmost care being taken lest in penalizing
fraudulent and corrupt practices which is truly called for innocent voters
become disenfranchised, a result that hardly commends itself. Such
prudential approach makes us dismiss Suhuris urging that some of the
electoral results had been infected with the taint of statistical improbability
as to warrant their exclusion from the canvass in a pre-proclamation
controversy. Specifically, his petition and the records nowhere show that his
party-mates received a similar number of votes (or lack of any) by which to
conclude that there were a unique uniformity of tally and a systematic
blanking of other candidates belonging to one party. Ismunlatip H.
Suhuri vs. The Honorable Commssion on Elections (En Banc), The
Municipal Board of Canvassers of Patikul, Sulu and Kabir E.
Hayundini,G.R. No. 181869, October 2, 2009.

Posted on October 5, 2009 by Hector M. de Leon Jr. Posted in Constitutional Law
Tagged burden of proof, citizenship, Civil Service Commission, COMELEC, eminent
domain, misconduct, PCGG, public officers, warrantless search
Here are selected September 2009 Philippine Supreme Court decisions on

political law:
Constitutional Law
Citizenship; election. Com. Act No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to
Section 1(4), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes the procedure
that should be followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine
citizenship. Under Section 1 thereof, legitimate children born of Filipino
mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention in a
statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any
officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest

civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with
the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the
Philippines.
However, the 1935 Constitution and Com. Act No. 625 did not prescribe a
time period within which the election of Philippine citizenship should be
made. The 1935 Charter only provides that the election should be made
upon reaching the age of majority. The age of majority then commenced
upon reaching 21 years. In the opinions of the then Secretary of Justice on
cases involving the validity of election of Philippine citizenship, this
dilemma was resolved by basing the time period on the decisions of the
Supreme Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In these
decisions, the proper period for electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn,
based on the pronouncements of the Department of State of the United
States Government to the effect that the election should be made within a
reasonable time after attaining the age of majority. The phrase reasonable
time has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made within
three (3) years from reaching the age of majority.
It is true that we said that the 3-year period for electing Philippine
citizenship may be extended as when the person has always regarded himself
as a Filipino. In hits case, not a single circumstance was sufficiently shown
meriting the extension of the 3-year period. The fact that Carlos exercised
his right of suffrage in 1952 and 1955 does not demonstrate such belief,
considering that the acts were done after he elected Philippine citizenship.
On the other hand, the mere fact that he was able to vote does not validate
his irregular election of Philippine citizenship. At most, his registration as a
voter indicates his desire to exercise a right appertaining exclusively to
Filipino citizens but does not alter his real citizenship, which, in this
jurisdiction, is determined by blood (jus sanguinis). The exercise of the
rights and privileges granted only to Filipinos is not conclusive proof of
citizenship, because a person may misrepresent himself to be a Filipino and
thus enjoy the rights and privileges of citizens of this country.
It is incumbent upon one who claims Philippine citizenship to prove to the
satisfaction of the court that he is really a Filipino. No presumption can be
indulged in favor of the claimant of Philippine citizenship, and any doubt
regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of the state. Carlos T. Go.,
Sr., vs. Luis T. Ramos/Jimmy T. Go vs. Luis T. Ramos/Hon. Alipio F.

Fernandez, etc., et al. vs. Jimmy T. Go a.k.a. Jaime T. Gaisano, G.R. No.
167569/G.R. No. 167570/G.R. No. 171946, September 4, 2009.
Citizenship; jus soli. The doctrine of jus soli was for a time the prevailing
rule in the acquisition of ones citizenship. However, the Supreme Court
abandoned the principle of jus soli in the case of Tan Chong v. Secretary of
Labor. Since then, said doctrine only benefited those who were individually
declared to be citizens of the Philippines by a final court decision on the
mistaken application of jus soli.
Neither will the Philippine Bill of 1902 nor the Jones Law of 1916 make
Carlos a citizen of the Philippines. His bare claim that his father, Go Yin An,
was a resident of the Philippines at the time of the passage of the said laws,
without any supporting evidence whatsoever will not suffice.
It is a settled rule that only legitimate children follow the citizenship of the
father and that illegitimate children are under the parental authority of the
mother and follow her nationality. Moreover, we have also ruled that an
illegitimate child of a Filipina need not perform any act to confer upon him
all the rights and privileges attached to citizens of the Philippines; he
automatically becomes a citizen himself. However, it is our considered view
that absent any evidence proving that Carlos is indeed an illegitimate son of
a Filipina, the aforestated established rule could not be applied to
him. Carlos T. Go., Sr., vs. Luis T. Ramos/Jimmy T. Go vs. Luis T.
Ramos/Hon. Alipio F. Fernandez, etc., et al. vs. Jimmy T. Go a.k.a. Jaime
T. Gaisano, G.R. No. 167569/G.R. No. 167570/G.R. No. 171946, September
4, 2009.
Civil Service Commission; jurisdiction. The CSC is the constitutional body
charged with the establishment and administration of a career civil service
which embraces all branches and agencies of the government. In the recent
case of Civil Service Commission v. Alfonso, the Court held that special
laws such as R.A. 4670 did not divest the CSC of its inherent power to
supervise and discipline all members of the civil service, including public
school teachers. This Court has also previously held in Civil Service
Commission v. Albao that the CSC has the authority to directly institute

proceedings to discipline a government employee in order to protect the

integrity of the civil service. Civil Service Commission vs. Fatima
A. Macud, G.R. No. 177531. September 10, 2009
COMELEC: poll automation contract. Assayed against the provisions of
the Constitution, the enabling automation law, RA 8436, as amended by RA
9369, the RFP and even the Anti-Dummy Law, which petitioners invoked as
an afterthought, the Court finds the project award to have complied with
legal prescriptions, and the terms and conditions of the corresponding
automation contract in question to be valid. No grave abuse of discretion,
therefore, can be laid on the doorsteps of respondent Comelec. And surely,
the winning joint venture should not be faulted for having a foreign
company as partner.
The Comelec is an independent constitutional body with a distinct and
pivotal role in our scheme of government. In the discharge of its awesome
functions as overseer of fair elections, administrator and lead implementor of
laws relative to the conduct of elections, it should not be stymied with
restrictions that would perhaps be justified in the case of an organization of
lesser responsibility. It should be afforded ample elbow room and enough
wherewithal in devising means and initiatives that would enable it to
accomplish the great objective for which it was createdto promote free,
orderly, honest and peaceful elections. This is as it should be for, too
often, Comelec has to make decisions under difficult conditions to address
unforeseen events to preserve the integrity of the election and in the process
the voice of the people. Thus, in the past, the Court has steered away from
interfering with the Comelecs exercise of its power which, by law and by
the nature of its office properly pertain to it. Absent, therefore, a clear
showing of grave abuse of discretion on Comelecs part, as here, the Court
should refrain from utilizing the corrective hand of certiorari to review, let
alone nullify, the acts of that body. Harry L. Roque, et al. vs.
COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 188456, September 10, 2009.
Eminent domain; just compensation. Section 18 of the CARL mandates that
petitioner shall compensate the landowner in such amount as may be agreed
upon by the landowner, DAR, and petitioner, or as may be finally
determined by the court, as the just compensation for the land. In
determining just compensation, Section 17 of the CARL enumerates the
factors to be considered in the determination of just compensation, namely,

the cost of acquisition of the land; the current value of like properties; its
nature, actual use and income; the sworn valuation by the owner; the tax
declarations; and the assessment made by government assessors. The social
and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farm workers and
by the government to the property, as well as the non-payment of taxes or
loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land,
shall be considered as additional factors to determine its value.
In the case at bar, the SAC arrived at the just compensation due respondents
for their subject property by taking into account the market value of the
subject property, the tax declaration of respondents, the actual use of and
income from the subject property, the assessors valuation, and the volume
and value of its produce; and factors specifically mentioned under Section
17 of the CARL. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the determination of
just compensation by the SAC. There being no allegation or evidence that
the determination of just compensation for the subject property by the SAC,
as affirmed by the appellate court, was not in conformity with or was in
violation of the provisions of the CARL, the applicable law, then we have no
reason to disturb the same. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Heirs of
Asuncion Anonuevo Vda. Santos, et al., G.R. No. 179862, September 3,
2009.
PCGG; power. The PCGGs power to sequester alleged ill-gotten properties
is likened to the provisional remedies of preliminary attachment or
receivership which are always subject to the control of the court.
The PCGG, therefore, as the receiver of sequestered assets and in
consonance with its duty under EO 1, Series of 1986, to protect and preserve
them, has the power to exercise acts of dominion provided that those acts are
approved by the proper court.
From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that it is the PCGG
not COCOFED or the CIIF companiesthat has the right and/or authority
during sequestration to seek this Courts approval for the proposed
conversion. Consequently, the terms and conditions sought
by COCOFED for the conversion are not material to the proposed
conversion. At most, COCOFEDs prayer for approval of the conversion
reflects its conformity to said transfiguration.

After a circumspect evaluation of the incident at bar, we resolve to approve

the conversion. The Court holds that respondent Republic has satisfactorily
hurdled the onus of showing that the conversion is advantageous to the
public interest or will result in clear and material benefit to the eventually
declared stock owners, be they the coconut farmers or the government
itself. Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED),
Manuel V. Del Rosario, Domingo P. Espina, et al. vs. Republic of the
Philippines, G.R. Nos. 177857-58, September 17, 2009.
Search; plain view. The plain view doctrine may not be used to launch
unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures or to extend a general
exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendants guilt. The
doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for
evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an
incriminating object. Sr. Inspector Jerry Valeroso vs. Court of Appeals and
People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 164815, September 3, 2009.
Search; warrantless arrest. When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the
arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapon
that the latter might use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape.
Otherwise, the officers safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself
frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to
search for and seize any evidence on the arrestees person in order to prevent
its concealment or destruction.
Moreover, in lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the
apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless search not only on the person
of the suspect, but also in the permissible area within the latters reach.
Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or dangerous
weapons either on the person of the one arrested or within the area of his
immediate control. The phrase within the area of his immediate control
means the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or
destructible evidence. A gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is
arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the
clothing of the person arrested. Sr. Inspector Jerry Valeroso vs. Court of
Appeals and People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 164815, September 3,
2009.

Statutes; constitutionality. Article 202(2) of the RPC, which penalizes any

person found loitering about public or semi-public buildings or places or
tramping or wandering about the country or the streets without visible means
of support, is constitutional. The provision is not vague and does not violate
the equal protection clause. People of the Philippines vs.
Evangeline Siton y sacil, et al., G.R. No. 169364, September 18, 2009.
Administrative Law
Administrative proceedings; liability. An administrative proceeding is
different from a criminal case and may proceed independently thereof. Even
if respondents would subsequently be found guilty of a crime based on the
same set of facts obtaining in the present administrative complaint, the same
will not automatically mean that they are also administratively liable.
A finding of guilt in the criminal case will not necessarily result in a finding
of liability in the administrative case. Conversely, respondents acquittal will
not necessarily exculpate them administratively. The basic premise is that
criminal and civil cases are altogether different from administrative matters,
such that the disposition in the first two will not inevitably govern the third
and vice versa.
It must be stressed that the basis of administrative liability differs from
criminal liability. The purpose of administrative proceedings is mainly to
protect the public service, based on the time-honored principle that a public
office is a public trust. On the other hand, the purpose of criminal
prosecution is the punishment of crime. To state it simply, petitioner
erroneously equated criminal liability to administrative liability. Dr. Castor
C. De Jesus vs. Rafael D. Guerrero III, Cesario R. Pagdilao and Fortuna B.
Aquino,G.R .No. 171491, September 4, 2009.
Administrative proceedings; quantum of proof. In administrative
proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is
substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Further, the
complainant has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the
allegations in his complaint. The basic rule is that mere allegation is not
evidence and is not equivalent to proof. Charges based on mere suspicion

and speculation likewise cannot be given credence. Hence, when the

complainant relies on mere conjectures and suppositions, and fails to
substantiate his allegations, the administrative complaint must be dismissed
for lack of merit. Dr. Castor C. De Jesus vs. Rafael D. Guerrero
III, Cesario R. Pagdilao and Fortuna B. Aquino, G.R .No. 171491,
September 4, 2009.
Administrative remedies; exhaustion. The doctrine of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies requires that resort be first made with the
administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under
their jurisdiction before the controversy may be elevated to a court of justice
for review. A premature invocation of a courts intervention renders the
complaint without cause of action and dismissible.
EO 149 transferred LLDA from the Office of the President to
the DENR for policy and program coordination and/or administrative
supervision x x x. Under EO 149, DENR only has administrative power
over LLDA. Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying
policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs.
However, Executive Order No. 192 (EO 192), which reorganized the DENR,
mandates the DENR to promulgate rules and regulations for the control of
water, air and land pollution and to promulgate ambient and effluent
standards for water and air quality including the allowable levels of other
pollutants and radiations. EO 192 created the Pollution Adjudication Board
under the Office of the DENR Secretary which assumed the powers and
functions of the NPCC with respect to the adjudication of pollution cases,
including NPCCs function to [s]erve as arbitrator for the determination of
reparation, or restitution of the damages and losses resulting from pollution.
Hence, TACC has an administrative recourse before the DENR Secretary
which it should have first pursued before filing a petition for certiorari
before the Court of Appeals. The Alexandra Condominium Corporation vs.
Laguna Lake Development Authority, G.R. No. 169228. September 11, 2009.
Dismissal; gross misconduct. Pursuant to Section 52, Rule IV of the Civil
Service Rules, gross misconduct is a grave offense punishable with dismissal
for the first offense, without prejudice to the Ombudsmans right to file the
appropriate criminal case against the petitioner or other responsible

individuals. We are, of course, aware that in several administrative cases,

this Court has refrained from strictly imposing the penalties provided by the
law, in light of mitigating factors such as the offending employees length of
service, acknowledgment of his or her infractions and feeling of remorse,
family circumstances, advanced age, and other equitable considerations.
However, we find that petitioners recalcitrant refusal to explain the use (or
misuse) of the more than P700,000.00 in cash placed in her possession
makes her unworthy of such humanitarian consideration, and merits the most
serious penalty provided by law. Gloria G. Hallasgo, Municipal Treasurer
of Damulong, Bukidnon vs. Commission on Audit (COA), Regional Office
No. X, G.R. No. 171340, September 11, 2009.
Public officer; private sector representative. A private sector representative
appointed to the National Book Development Board is a public officer for
purposes of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and the Revised Penal
Code. Carolina R. Javier vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. Nos. 147026-27,
September 11, 2009.
Election law
Ballots; appreciation. The neighborhood rule is a settled rule stating that
where the name of a candidate is not written in the proper space in the ballot,
but is preceded by the name of the office for which he is a candidate, the
vote should be counted as valid for said candidate. Such rule is usually
applied in consonance with the intent rule which stems from the principle
that in the appreciation of the ballot, the object should be to ascertain and
carry into effect the intention of the voter, if it could be determined with
reasonable certainty. Ernesto Batalla vs. Commission on Elections and
Teodoro Bataller, G.R. No. 184268, September 15, 2009.
Candidates; domicile. In Japzon v. Commission on Elections, it was held
that the term residence is to be understood not in its common acceptation
as referring to dwelling or habitation, but rather to domicile or legal
residence, that is, the place where a party actually or constructively has his
permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given
time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi).
In Domino v. Commission on Elections, the Court explained that domicile

denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, whenever absent for business,

pleasure, or some other reasons, one intends to return. It is a question of
intention and circumstances. In the consideration of circumstances, three
rules must be borne in mind, namely: (1) that a man must have a residence
or domicile somewhere; (2) when once established it remains until a new
one is acquired; and (3) a man can have but one residence or domicile at a
time.
If one wishes to successfully effect a change of domicile, he must
demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile,
a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one, and definite acts which correspond with the purpose.
Without clear and positive proof of the concurrence of these three
requirements, the domicile of origin continues. Makil U. Pundaodaya vs.
Commission on Elections, et al.,G.R. No. 179313. September 17, 2009
Candidates; premature campaigning. The conduct of a motorcade is a form
of election campaign or partisan political activity, falling squarely within the
ambit of Section 79(b)(2) of the Omnibus Election Code, on
[h]olding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or
other similar assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or
undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a candidate[.] A
motorcade is a procession or parade of automobiles or other motor
vehicles.[31] The conduct thereof during election periods by the candidates
and their supporters is a fact that need not be belabored due to its widespread
and pervasive practice. The obvious purpose of the conduct of motorcades is
to introduce the candidates and the positions, to which they seek to be
elected, to the voting public; or to make them more visible so as to facilitate
the recognition and recollection of their names in the minds of the voters
come election time. Unmistakably, motorcades are undertaken for no other
purpose than to promote the election of a particular candidate or candidates.
In the instant Petition, Penera never denied that she took part in the conduct
of the motorcade after she filed her COC on the day before the start of the
campaign period.
For violating Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, proscribing election
campaign or partisan political activity outside the campaign

period, Penera must be disqualified from holding the office of Mayor of Sta.
Monica. Rosalinda A. Penera vs. Commission on Elections and Edgar
T. Andanar,G.R. No. 181613, September 11, 2009.
Candidates; premature campaigning. The Dissenting Opinion ultimately
concludes that because of Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended,
the prohibited act of premature campaigning in Section 80 of the Omnibus
Election Code, is practically impossible to commit at any time.
We disagree. Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code remains relevant and
applicable despite Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended.
A close reading of the entire Republic Act No. 9369, which amended
Republic Act No. 8436, would readily reveal that that it did not contain an
express repeal of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. An express
repeal is one wherein a statute declares, usually in its repealing clause, that a
particular and specific law,identified by its number or title, is repealed.[35]
Absent this specific requirement, an express repeal may not be presumed.
To our mind, there is no absolute and irreconcilable incompatibility between
Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, and Section 80 of the
Omnibus Election Code, which defines the prohibited act of premature
campaigning. It is possible to harmonize and reconcile these two provisions
and, thus, give effect to both. Rosalinda A. Penera vs. Commission on
Elections and Edgar T. Andanar,G.R. No. 181613, September 11, 2009.
Private Sector
Public Officer
Representative
as
Posted on October 1, 2009 by Hector M. de Leon Jr. Posted in Constitutional Law

Tagged public officers
Various laws provide for the appointment of a private sector representative

in governmental bodies. For example, the Renewable Energy Act of 2008
creates the National Renewable Energy Board and provides for the
appointment of private sector representatives to the board.

Is a private sector representative to the board a public officer?

In Carolina R. Javier vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. Nos. 147026-27,
September 11, 2009, Javier was charged with malversation of public
funds. Javier was the private sector representative in the National Book
Development Board (NBDB), which was created by Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 8047, otherwise known as the Book Publishing Industry Development
Act. R.A. No. 8047 provided for the creation of the NBDB, which was
placed under the administration and supervision of the Office of the
President. The NBDB is composed of eleven (11) members who are
appointed by the President, five (5) of whom come from the government,
while the remaining six (6) are chosen from the nominees of organizations
of private book publishers, printers, writers, book industry related activities,
students and the private education sector.
The Ombudsman found probable cause to indict Javier for violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and recommended the filing of the
corresponding information. In an Information dated February 18, 2000,
Javier was charged with violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act before the Sandiganbayan.
The Commission on Audit also charged Javier with malversation of public
funds, as defined and penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal
Code. Thus, an Information dated February 29, 2000 was filed before the
Sandiganbayan.
On October 10, 2000, Javier filed a Motion to Quash Information, averring
that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction to hear the case as the
information did not allege that she is a public official who is classified as
Grade 27 or higher. Neither did the information charge her as a coprincipal, accomplice or accessory to a public officer committing an offense
under the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction. She also averred that she is not a
public officer or employee and that she belongs to the NBDB only as a
private sector representative under R.A. No. 8047, hence, she may not be
charged under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the
Sandiganbayan or under any statute which covers public officials. Moreover,
she claimed that she does not perform public functions and is without any
administrative or political power to speak of that she is serving the private

book publishing industry by advancing their interest as participant in the

governments book development policy.
On January 17, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying

Javiers motion. Javier filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme
Court.
Javier hinges her petition on the ground that the Sandiganbayan has
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction for not
quashing the two informations charging her with violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act and the Revised Penal Code on malversation of
public funds. She advanced the following arguments in support of her
petition, to wit: first, she is not a public officer, and second, she was being
charged under two (2) informations, which is in violation of her right against
double jeopardy.
The Supreme Court ruled that Javier was a public officer:
To substantiate her claim, petitioner maintained that she is not a public
officer and only a private sector representative, stressing that her only
function among the eleven (11) basic purposes and objectives provided for
in Section 4, R.A. No. 8047, is to obtain priority status for the book
publishing industry. At the time of her appointment to the NDBD Board, she
was the President of the BSAP, a book publishers association. As such, she
could not be held liable for the crimes imputed against her, and in turn, she
is outside the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The NBDB is the government agency mandated to develop and support the
Philippine book publishing industry. It is a statutory government agency
created by R.A. No. 8047, which was enacted into law to ensure the full
development of the book publishing industry as well as for the creation of
organization structures to implement the said policy. To achieve this end, the
Governing Board of the NBDB was created to supervise the implementation.
..
A perusal of the above powers and functions leads us to conclude that they

partake of the nature of public functions. A public office is the right,

authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given
period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power,
an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the
government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The
individual so invested is a public officer.
Notwithstanding that petitioner came from the private sector to sit as a
member of the NBDB, the law invested her with some portion of the
sovereign functions of the government, so that the purpose of the
government is achieved. In this case, the government aimed to enhance the
book publishing industry as it has a significant role in the national
development. Hence, the fact that she was appointed from the public sector
and not from the other branches or agencies of the government does not take
her position outside the meaning of a public office. She was appointed to the
Governing Board in order to see to it that the purposes for which the law was
enacted are achieved. The Governing Board acts collectively and carries out
its mandate as one body. The purpose of the law for appointing members
from the private sector is to ensure that they are also properly represented in
the implementation of government objectives to cultivate the book
publishing industry.
Moreover, the Court is not unmindful of the definition of a public officer
pursuant to the Anti-Graft Law, which provides that a public officer includes
elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary,
whether in the classified or unclassified or exempt service receiving
compensation, even nominal, from the government.
Thus, pursuant to the Anti-Graft Law, one is a public officer if one has been
elected or appointed to a public office. Petitioner was appointed by the
President to the Governing Board of the NDBD. Though her term is only for
a year that does not make her private person exercising a public function.
The fact that she is not receiving a monthly salary is also of no moment.
Section 7, R.A. No. 8047 provides that members of the Governing Board
shall receive per diem and such allowances as may be authorized for every
meeting actually attended and subject to pertinent laws, rules and
regulations. Also, under the Anti-Graft Law, the nature of ones
appointment, and whether the compensation one receives from the
government is only nominal, is immaterial because the person so elected or

appointed is still considered a public officer.

On the other hand, the Revised Penal Code defines a public officer as any
person who, by direct provision of the law, popular election, popular
election or appointment by competent authority, shall take part in the
performance of public functions in the Government of the Philippine Islands,
or shall perform in said Government or in any of its branches public duties
as an employee, agent, or subordinate official, of any rank or classes, shall
be deemed to be a public officer.
Where, as in this case, petitioner performs public functions in pursuance of
the objectives of R.A. No. 8047, verily, she is a public officer who takes part
in the performance of public functions in the government whether as an
employee, agent, subordinate official, of any rank or classes. In fact, during
her tenure, petitioner took part in the drafting and promulgation of several
rules and regulations implementing R.A. No. 8047. She was supposed to
represent the country in the canceled book fair in Spain.
In fine, We hold that petitioner is a public officer.
On the issue of double jeopardy, the Supreme Court ruled that there was no
double jeopardy.
Records show that the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 25867 and 25898
refer to offenses penalized by different statues, R.A. No. 3019 and RPC,
respectively. It is elementary that for double jeopardy to attach, the case
against the accused must have been dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon valid
information sufficient in form and substance and the accused pleaded to the
charge. In the instant case, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the Information
for violation of the Anti-Graft Law. She was not yet arraigned in the
criminal case for malversation of public funds because she had filed a
motion to quash the latter information. Double jeopardy could not, therefore,
attach considering that the two cases remain pending before the
Sandiganbayan and that herein petitioner had pleaded to only one in the
criminal cases against her.
It is well settled that for a claim of double jeopardy to prosper, the following

requisites must concur: (1) there is a complaint or information or other

formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2)
the same is filed before a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) there is a valid
arraignment or plea to the charges; and (4) the accused is convicted or
acquitted or the case is otherwise dismissed or terminated without his
express consent.[38] The third and fourth requisites are not present in the
case at bar.
Purchase of
Election Ban
Land
During
the
Posted on September 23, 2009 by Hector M. de Leon Jr. Posted in Constitutional Law
The Omnibus Election Code prohibits the construction of public works and
the issuance of treasury warrants during a period of 45 days prior to a
regular election and 30 days prior to a special election. Section 261 (w)
reads:
(w) Prohibition against construction of public works, delivery of materials
for public works and issuance of treasury warrants and similar devices.During the period of forty five days preceding a regular election and thirty
days before a special election, any person who: (a) undertakes the
construction of any public works, except for projects or works exempted in
the preceding paragraph; or (b) issues, uses or avails of treasury warrants or
any device undertaking future delivery of money, goods or other things of
value chargeable against public funds.
In Robert P. Guzman vs. Commission on Elections, Mayor Randolph S. Ting
and Salvacion Garcia, G.R. No. 182380, August 28, 2009, the issue that
arose is whether the purchase by the city mayor of land for use as a public
cemetery and the issuance of a treasury warrant as payment for the land
violate the Omnibus Election Code.
On March 31, 2004, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Tuguegarao City
passed Resolution No. 048-2004 to authorize City Mayor Ting to acquire
two parcels of land for use as a public cemetery of the City. Pursuant to the

resolution, City Mayor Ting purchased the two parcels of land. As payment,
City Treasurer Garcia issued and released Treasury Warrant No.
0001534514 dated April 20, 2004 in the sum of P8,486,027.00. On May 5,
2004, the City Government of Tuguegarao caused the registration of the sale
and the issuance of new certificates in its name.
Based on the transaction, the petitioner filed a complaint in the Office of the
Provincial Election Supervisor of Cagayan Province against City Mayor
Ting and City Treasurer Garcia, charging them with a violation of Section
261, paragraphs (v) and (w), of the Omnibus Election Code, for having
undertaken to construct a public cemetery and for having released, disbursed
and expended public funds within 45 days prior to the May 9, 2004 election,
in disregard of the prohibitions under said provisions due to the election ban
period having commenced on March 26, 2004 and ended on May 9, 2004.
After investigation, the Acting Provincial Election Supervisor of Cagayan
recommended the dismissal of the complaint.
The COMELEC en banc adopted the foregoing recommendation in its own
resolution dated February 18, 2008 issued in E.O. Case No. 06-14 and
dismissed the complaint for lack of merit, holding that the acquisition of the
two parcels of land for a public cemetery was not considered as within the
term public works; and that, consequently, the issuance of Treasury Warrant
No. 0001534514 was not for public works and was thus in violation of
Section 261 (w) of the Omnibus Election Code.
The Supreme Court ruled that the purchase of the lots for use as a public
cemetery does not constitute construction of a public work within the
context of the prohibition under the Omnibus Election Code. According to
the Supreme Court:
We first construe the term public works which the Omnibus Election Code
does not define with the aid of extrinsic sources.
The Local Government Code of 1991 considers public works to be the fixed
infrastructures and facilities owned and operated by the government for
public use and enjoyment. According to the Code, cities have the
responsibility of providing infrastructure facilities intended primarily to

service the needs of their residents and funded out of city funds, such as,
among others, roads and bridges; school buildings and other facilities for
public elementary and secondary schools; and clinics, health centers and
other health facilities necessary to carry out health services.
Likewise, the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), the
engineering and construction arm of the government, associates public
works with fixed infrastructures for the public. . .
The enumeration in Sec. 1, supra infrastructure facilities, especially
national highways, flood control and water resources development systems,
and other public works in accordance with national development objectives
means that only the fixed public infrastructures for use of the public are
regarded as public works. This construction conforms to the rule
of ejusdem generis . . .
Accordingly, absent an indication of any contrary legislative intention, the
term public works as used in Section 261 (v) of the Omnibus Election Code
is properly construed to refer to any building or structure on land or to
structures (such as roads or dams) built by the Government for public use
and paid for by public funds. Public works are clearly works, whether of
construction or adaptation undertaken and carried out by the national, state,
or municipal authorities, designed to subserve some purpose of public
necessity, use or convenience, such as public buildings, roads, aqueducts,
parks, etc.; or, in other words, all fixed works constructed for public use.
It becomes inevitable to conclude, therefore, that the petitioners insistence
that the acquisition of Lots 5860 and 5881 for use as a public cemetery be
considered a disbursement of the public funds for public works in violation
of Section 261(v) of the Omnibus Election Code was unfounded and
unwarranted.
However, the Supreme Court ruled that the issuance of the treasury warrant
violated the Omnibus Election Code:
The OSG posits that [Section 261(w)] is violated in either of two ways: (a)
by any person who, within 45 days preceding a regular election and 30 days
before a special election, undertakes the construction of any public works

except those enumerated in the preceding paragraph; or (b) by any person

who issues, uses or avails of treasury warrants or any device undertaking
future delivery of money, goods or other things of value chargeable against
public funds within 45 days preceding a regular election and 30 days before
a special election.
We concur with the OSGs position.
Section 261 (w) covers not only one act but two, i.e., the act
under subparagraph (a) above and that under subparagraph (b) above. For
purposes of the prohibition, the acts are separate and distinct, considering
that Section 261(w) uses the disjunctive or to separate subparagraphs (a) and
(b). In legal hermeneutics, or is a disjunctive that expresses an alternative or
gives a choice of one among two or more things. The word signifies
disassociation and independence of one thing from another thing in an
enumeration. It should be construed, as a rule, in the sense that it ordinarily
implies as a disjunctive word. According to Black, too, the word and can
never be read as or, or vice versa, in criminal and penal statutes, where the
rule of strict construction prevails. Consequently, whether or not the treasury
warrant in question was intended for public works was even of no moment
in determining if the legal provision was violated.
There
was
a
probable
cause
to
believe
that
Section
261(w), subparagraph (b), of the Omnibus Election Code was violated when
City Mayor Ting and City Treasurer Garcia issued Treasury Warrant No.
0001534514 during the election ban period. For this reason, our conclusion
that the COMELEC en banc gravely abused its discretion in dismissing E.O.
Case No. 06-14 for lack of merit is inevitable and irrefragable.

Posted on September 7, 2009 by Hector M. de Leon Jr. Posted in Constitutional Law
Tagged COMELEC, Congress, contract, double jeopardy, electoral tribunal, eminent
domain, expropriation, free access, illegal strike, just compensation, tax, warrantless

search
Here are selected August 2009 Philippine Supreme Court decisions on

political law:
Constitutional law
Congress; legislative immunity. The immunity Senator Santiago claims is
rooted primarily on the provision of Article VI, Section 11 of the
Constitution.
As American jurisprudence puts it, this legislative privilege is founded upon
long experience and arises as a means of perpetuating inviolate the
functioning process of the legislative department. Without parliamentary
immunity, parliament, or its equivalent, would degenerate into a polite and
ineffective debating forum. Legislators are immune from deterrents to the
uninhibited discharge of their legislative duties, not for their private
indulgence, but for the public good. The privilege would be of little value if
they could be subjected to the cost and inconvenience and distractions of a
trial upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment against
them based upon a judges speculation as to the motives.
This Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront in
upholding the institution of parliamentary immunity and promotion of free
speech. Neither has the Court lost sight of the importance of the legislative
and oversight functions of the Congress that enable this representative body
to look diligently into every affair of government, investigate and denounce
anomalies, and talk about how the country and its citizens are being served.
Courts do not interfere with the legislature or its members in the manner
they perform their functions in the legislative floor or in committee rooms.
Any claim of an unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of the
statement uttered by the member of the Congress does not destroy the
privilege. The disciplinary authority of the assembly and the voters, not the
courts, can properly discourage or correct such abuses committed in the
name of parliamentary immunity.
For the above reasons, the plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal of the
complaint for disbarment or disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed, her
privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding

under the Rules of Court. It is felt, however, that this could not be the last
word on the matter. Antero J. Pobre vs. Sen. Miriam DefensorSantiago, A.C. No. 7399. August 25, 2009.
Double jeopardy; judgment of acquittal. Double jeopardy exists when the

following requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy attached prior to the
second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second
jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first. A first jeopardy attaches only
(a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after
arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the
accused was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent.
A judgment of acquittal is final and is no longer reviewable. It is also
immediately executory and the State may not seek its review without placing
the accused in double jeopardy. The Constitution has expressly adopted the
double jeopardy policy and thus bars multiple criminal trials, thereby
conclusively presuming that a second trial would be unfair if the innocence
of the accused has been confirmed by a previous final judgment. Further
prosecution via an appeal from a judgment of acquittal is likewise barred
because the government has already been afforded a complete opportunity to
prove the criminal defendants culpability; after failing to persuade the court
to enter a final judgment of conviction, the underlying reasons supporting
the constitutional ban on multiple trials applies and becomes compelling.
The reason is not only the defendants already established innocence at the
first trial where he had been placed in peril of conviction, but also the same
untoward and prejudicial consequences of a second trial initiated by a
government who has at its disposal all the powers and resources of the
State. Unfairness and prejudice would necessarily result, as the government
would then be allowed another opportunity to persuade a second trier of the
defendants guilt while strengthening any weaknesses that had attended the
first trial, all in a process where the governments power and resources are
once again employed against the defendants individual means. That the
second opportunity comes via an appeal does not make the effects any less
prejudicial by the standards of reason, justice and conscience.

Thus, the absolute and inflexible rule is that the State is proscribed from
appealing the judgment of acquittal through either a regular appeal under
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, or an appeal by certiorari on pure questions of
law under Rule 45 of the same Rules. People of the Philippines vs. Dir.
Cesar P. Nazareno, Dir. Evelino Nartatez, Dir. Nicasio Ma. S. Custodio and
The Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 168982, August 5, 2009.
Eminent domain; just compemsation. Eminent domain is the authority and
right of the State, as sovereign, to take private property for public use upon
observance of due process of law and payment ofjust compensation.
Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the property sought to be
expropriated. Among the factors to be considered in arriving at the fair
market value of the property are the cost of acquisition, the current value of
like properties, its actual or potential uses, and in the particular case of lands,
their size, shape, location, and the tax declarations thereon. The measure is
not the takers gain but the owners loss. To be just, the compensation must
be fair not only to the owner but also to the taker.
Just compensation is based on the price or value of the property at the time it
was taken from the owner and appropriated by the government. However, if
the government takes possession before the institution of expropriation
proceedings, the value should be fixed as of the time of the taking of said
possession, not of the filing of the complaint. The value at the time of the
filing of the complaint should be the basis for the determination of the value
when the taking of the property involved coincides with or is subsequent to
the commencement of the proceedings.
The procedure for determining just compensation is set forth in Rule 67 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 5 of Rule 67 partly states that
[u]pon the rendition of the order of expropriation, the court shall appoint
not more than three (3) competent and disinterested persons as
commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for
the property sought to be taken. However, we held in Republic v. Court of
Appeals that Rule 67 presupposes a prior filing of complaint for eminent
domain with the appropriate court by the expropriator. If no such complaint
is filed, the expropriator is considered to have violated procedural
requirements, and hence, waived the usual procedure prescribed in Rule 67,

including the appointment of commissioners to ascertain just

compensation. In National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we
clarified that when there is no action for expropriation and the case involves
only a complaint for damages or just compensation, the provisions of the
Rules of Court on ascertainment of just compensation (i.e., provisions of
Rule 67) are no longer applicable, and a trial before commissioners is
dispensable. Republic of the Philippines through the Department of Public
Works and Highways vs. Court of Appeals and Rosario Rodriguez
Reyes,G.R. No. 160379, August 14, 2009.
Eminent domain; just compensation. PD 27 and RA 6657 provide different
factors for the computation of just compensation. The former uses average
crop harvest as a consideration, whereas, the latter uses the current value of
like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the
owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government
assessors as factors for consideration in determining just compensation.
In the case at bar, it is undisputed by the parties that the lands were acquired
under PD 27. Moreover, it is also undisputed that just compensation has not
yet been settled prior to the passage of RA 6657. Thus, the issue to be
determined is what law shall govern in the determination of just
compensation.
If just compensation was not settled prior to the passage of RA 6657, it
should be computed in accordance with the said law, although the property
was acquired under PD 27. Department of Agrarian Reform (etc.) vs.
Carmen S. Tongson, G.R. No. 171674, August 4, 2009.
Eminent domain; taking. It is the date of the issuance of emancipation
patents that should serve as the reckoning point for purposes of computation
of just compensation. Copies of the emancipation patents issued to the
farmer-beneficiaries, however, have not been attached to the records of the
case. Department of Agrarian Reform (etc.) vs. Carmen S. Tongson, G.R.
No. 171674, August 4, 2009.
Free access clause; court filing fees. The basis for the exemption from legal
and filing fees is the free access clause, embodied in Sec. 11, Art. III of the
1987 Constitution.

The importance of the right to free access to the courts and quasi judicial
bodies and to adequate legal assistance cannot be denied. A move to remove
the provision on free access from the Constitution on the ground that it was
already covered by the equal protection clause was defeated by the desire to
give constitutional stature to such specific protection of the poor.
In implementation of the right of free access under the Constitution, the
Supreme Court promulgated rules, specifically, Sec. 21, Rule 3, Rules of
Court, and Sec. 19, Rule 141, Rules of Court.
The clear intent and precise language of the aforequoted provisions of the
Rules of Court indicate that only a natural party litigant may be regarded as
an indigent litigant. The Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., being a
corporation invested by the State with a juridical personality separate and
distinct from that of its members, is a juridical person. Among others, it has
the power to acquire and possess property of all kinds as well as incur
obligations and bring civil or criminal actions, in conformity with the laws
and regulations of their organization. As a juridical person, therefore, it
cannot be accorded the exemption from legal and filing fees granted to
indigent litigants. Query of Mr. Roger C. Prioreschi re exemption from legal
and filing fees of the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc.,A.M. No. 09-6-9-SC,
August 19, 2009.
Laws; presumption of constitutionality. Every statute is presumed to be
constitutional. The presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a
valid, sensible and just law. Those who petition the court to declare a law
unconstitutional must show thta there is a clear and unequivocal breach of
the Constitution, not merely a doubtful, speculative or argumentative
one. Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency
(BANAT) Partylist represented by Salvador B. Britanico vs. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 177508, August 7, 2009.
Laws; title. Petitioner alleges that the title of RA 9369 is misleading because
it speaks of poll automation but contains substantial provisions dealing with
the manual canvassing of election returns. Petitioner also alleges that
Sections 34, 37, 38, and 43 are neither embraced in the title nor germane to
the subject matter of RA 9369.

The constitutional requirement that every bill passed by the Congress shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof has
always been given a practical rather than a technical construction. The
requirement is satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough to include
subjects related to the general purpose which the statute seeks to achieve.
The title of a law does not have to be an index of its contents and will suffice
if the matters embodied in the text are relevant to each other and may be
inferred from the title. Moreover, a title which declares a statute to be an act
to amend a specified code is sufficient and the precise nature of
the amendatory act need not be further stated.
RA 9369 is an amendatory act entitled An Act Amending Republic Act No.
8436, Entitled An Act Authorizing the Commission on Elections to Use an
Automated Election System in the May 11, 1998 National or Local Elections
and in Subsequent National and Local Electoral Exercises, to Encourage
Transparency, Credibility, Fairness and Accuracy of Elections, Amending
for the Purpose Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as Amended, Republic Act No.
7166 and Other Related Election Laws, Providing Funds Therefor and For
Other Purposes. Clearly, the subject matter of RA 9369 covers the
amendments to RA 8436, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (BP 881), Republic Act
No. 7166 (RA 7166), and other related election laws to achieve its purpose
of promoting transparency, credibility, fairness, and accuracy in the
elections. The provisions of RA 9369 assailed by petitioner deal with
amendments to specific provisions of RA 7166 and BP 881, specifically: (1)
Sections 34, 37 and 38 amend Sections 26, 30 and 15 of RA 7166,
respectively; and (2) Section 43 of RA 9369 amends Section 265 of BP 881.
Therefore, the assailed provisions are germane to the subject matter of RA
9369 which is to amend RA 7166 and BP 881, among
others. Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency
(BANAT) Partylist represented by Salvador B. Britanico vs. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 177508, August 7, 2009.
Non-impairment of contract. Petitioner assails the constitutionality of the
provision which fixes the per diem of poll watchers of the dominant majority
and dominant minority parties at poll election day. Petitioner argues that this
violates the freedom of the parties to contract and their right to fix the terms
and conditions of the contract they see as fair, equitable and just. Petitioner
adds that this is a purely private contract using private funds which cannot
be regulated by law.

There is no violation of the non-impairment clause. First, the nonimpairment clause is limited in application to laws that derogate from prior
acts or contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing the
intention of the parties. There is impairment if a subsequent law changes the
terms of a contract between the parties, imposes new conditions, dispenses
with those agreed upon or withdraws remedies for the enforcement of the
rights of the parties.
As observed by the OSG, there is no existing contract yet and, therefore, no
enforceable right or demandable obligation will be impaired. RA 9369 was
enacted more than three months prior to the 14 May 2007 elections. Hence,
when the dominant majority and minority parties hired their respective poll
watchers for the 14 May 2007 elections, they were deemed to have
incorporated in their contracts all the provisions of RA 9369.
Second, it is settled that police power is superior to the non-impairment
clause. The constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of contracts is limited
by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public
health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the community. Barangay
Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) Partylist
represented by Salvador B. Britanico vs. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 177508, August 7, 2009.
Presidential electoral tribunal. Petitioner argues that Sections 37 and 38 of
RA 9369 violate Section 17, Article VI and Paragraph 7, Section 4, Article
VII of the Constitution for encroaching upon the jurisdiciton of the PET and
the SET.
Congress and the COMELEC en banc do not encroach upon the jurisdiction
of the PET and the SET. There is no conflict of jurisdiction since the powers
of Congress and the COMELEC en banc, on one hand, and the PET and the
SET, on the other, are exercised on different occasions and for different
purposes. The PET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the President or Vice President. The SET is the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications
of members of the Senate. The jurisdiction of the PET and the SET can only
be invoked once the winning presidential, vice presidential or senatorial
candidates have been proclaimed. On the other hand, under Section 37,

Congress and the COMELEC en banc shall determine only the authenticity
and due execution of the certificates of canvass. Congress and
the COMELEC en banc shall exercise this power before the proclamation of
the
winning
presidential,
vice
presidential,
and
senatorial
candidates. Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT) Partylist represented by Salvador B. Britanico vs.
Strike;
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 177508, August 7, 2009.
illegal strike. It is hornbook principle that the exercise of the right of private
sector employees to strike is not absolute (see Section 3 of Article XIII of
the Constitution). A. Soriano Aviation vs. Employees Association of
A. Soriano Aviation, et al., G.R. No. 166879, August 14, 2009.
Taxation; double taxation. Double taxation means taxing the same property
twice when it should be taxed only once; that is, taxing the same person
twice by the same jurisdiction for the same thing. It is obnoxious when the
taxpayer is taxed twice, when it should be but once. Otherwise described as
direct duplicate taxation, the two taxes must be imposed on the same
subject matter, for the same purpose, by the same taxing authority, within
the same jurisdiction, during the same taxing period; and the taxes must be
of the same kind or character.
Using the aforementioned test, the Court finds that there is indeed double
taxation if respondent is subjected to the taxes under both Sections 14 and 21
of Tax Ordinance No. 7794, since these are being imposed: (1) on the same
subject matter the privilege of doing business in the City of Manila; (2) for
the same purpose to make persons conducting business within the City of
Manila contribute to city revenues; (3) by the same taxing authority
petitioner City of Manila; (4) within the same taxing jurisdiction within the
territorial jurisdiction of the City of Manila; (5) for the same taxing periods
per calendar year; and (6) of the same kind or character a local business
tax imposed on gross sales or receipts of the business. The City of Manila,
Liberty M. Toledo in her capacity as the Treasurer of Manila, et al. vs.
Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 181845, August 4, 2009.
Warrantless search; plain view doctrine. Under the plain view doctrine,
objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the
position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as
evidence. The plain view doctrine applies when the following requisites
concur: (1) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior

justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a

particular area; (2) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent;
and (3) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes
may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.
In this case, the police authorities were in the area because that was where
they caught up with petitioner after the chase. They saw the firearms inside
the vehicle when petitioner opened the door. Since a shooting incident just
took place and it was reported that petitioner was involved in the incident, it
was apparent to the police officers that the firearms may be evidence of a
crime.
Hence,
they
were
justified
in
seizing
the
firearms. Judge Felimon Abelita, III vs. P/Supt. German Doria and SPO3
Cesar Ramirez, G.R. No. 170672, August 14, 2009.
Public Officers
Practice of profession. Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713 generally provides for
the prohibited acts and transactions of public officials and employees.
Subsection (b)(2) prohibits them from engaging in the private practice of
their profession during their incumbency. As an exception, a public official
or employee can engage in the practice of his or her profession under the
following conditions: first, the private practice is authorized by the
Constitution or by the law; and second, the practice will not conflict, or tend
to conflict, with his or her official functions.
The Section 7 prohibitions continue to apply for a period of one year after
the public official or employees resignation, retirement, or separation from
public office, except for the private practice of profession under subsection
(b)(2), which can already be undertaken even within the one-year prohibition
period. As an exception to this exception, the one-year prohibited period
applies with respect to any matter before the office the public officer or
employee used to work with.
The Section 7 prohibitions are predicated on the principle that public office
is a public trust; and serve to remove any impropriety, real or imagined,
which may occur in government transactions between a former government
official or employee and his or her former colleagues, subordinates or
superiors. The prohibitions also promote the observance and the efficient use

of every moment of the prescribed office hours to serve the public.

Parenthetically, in the case of court employees, Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No.
6713 is not the only prohibition to contend with; Section 5, Canon 3 of the
Code of Conduct for Court Personnel also applies.
A clerk of court can already engage in the practice of law immediately after
her separation from the service and without any period limitation that applies
to other prohibitions under Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713. The clerk of courts
limitation is that she cannot practice her profession within one year before
the office where he or she used to work with. Query of Atty. Karen
M. Silverio-Buffe, former Clerk of Court, Branch 81, Romblon, Romblon, on
the prohibition from engaging in the private practice of law, A.M. No. 08-6352-RTC, August 19, 2009.
Agrarian law
Tenants. To qualify for protection under PD 1517 and avail of the rights and
privileges granted by the said decree, the claimant must be: (1) a legitimate
tenant of the land for ten (10) years or more; (2) must have built his home on
the land by contract; and, (3) has resided continuously for the last ten (10)
years. The tenant covered by PD 1517 is, as defined under Section 3(f)
thereof, the rightful occupant of land and its structures, but does not include
those whose presence on the land is merely tolerated and without the benefit
of contract, those who enter the land by force or deceit, or those whose
possession is under litigation.
Stated differently, those whose possession or occupation of land is devoid of
any legal authority or those whose contracts of lease are already terminated,
or had already expired, or whose possession is under litigation are not
considered tenants under the decree. Conversely, a legitimate tenant is one
who is not a usurper or an occupant by tolerance. The petitioners-defendants
whose occupation has been merely by the owners tolerance obviously fall
outside the coverage of PD 1517 and cannot seek its protection. Francisco
Madrid
and
Edgardo
Bernardo
vs.
Spouses Bonifacio Mapoy and Felicidad Martinez, G.R. No. 150887, August
14, 2009.

Election Law
COMELEC; powers. We do not agree with petitioner and
the COMELEC that the Constitution gave the COMELEC the exclusive
power to investigate and prosecute cases of violations of election laws.
Section 2(6), Article IX-C of the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the
power to investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations
of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds,
offenses, and malpractices. This was an important innovation introduced by
the Constitution because this provision was not in the 1935 or 1973]
Constitutions. The phrase [w]here appropriate leaves to the legislature the
power to determine the kind of election offenses that the COMELEC shall
prosecute exclusively or concurrently with other prosecuting arms of the
government. Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT) Partylist represented by Salvador B. Britanico vs.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 177508, August 7, 2009.
Forfeiture of Senate seat for holding

another government office
Posted on August 19, 2009 by Hector M. de Leon Jr. Posted in Constitutional Law
Tagged corporation, public officers
In Dante Liban, et al. vs. Richard J. Gordon, G.R. No.

175352, July 15, 2009, the petitioners filed with the Supreme Court a
Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat in the
Senate.
During Gordons incumbency as a member of the Senate of the Philippines,
he was elected Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC)
during the 23 February 2006 meeting of the PNRC Board of Governors.
Petitioners allege that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of
Governors, respondent has ceased to be a member of the Senate as provided
in Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution, which reads:

SEC. 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold

any other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without
forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may
have been created or the emoluments thereof increased during the term for
which he was elected.
Petitioners cite Camporedondo vs. NLRC, which held that the PNRC is a
government-owned or controlled corporation. Petitioners claim that in
accepting and holding the position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of
Governors, respondent automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate,
pursuant to Flores vs. Drilon, which held that incumbent national legislators
lose their elective posts upon their appointment to another government
office.
The Supreme Court addressed the preliminary issue of whether the

petitioners have standing to file the petition. The Supreme Court answered
in the negative:
. . . petitioners are alleging that by accepting the position of Chairman of the
PNRC Board of Governors, respondent has automatically forfeited his seat
in the Senate. In short, petitioners filed an action for usurpation of public
office against respondent, a public officer who allegedly committed an act
which constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his public office. Clearly,
such an action is for quo warranto, specifically under Section 1(b), Rule 66
of the Rules of Court.
Quo warranto is generally commenced by the Government as the proper
party plaintiff. However, under Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, an
individual may commence such an action if he claims to be entitled to the
public office allegedly usurped by another, in which case he can bring the
action in his own name. The person instituting quo warranto proceedings in
his own behalf must claim and be able to show that he is entitled to the
office in dispute, otherwise the action may be dismissed at any stage. In the
present case, petitioners do not claim to be entitled to the Senate office of
respondent. Clearly, petitioners have no standing to file the present petition.

On the merits, the Supreme Court ruled that PNPRC is a private organization
performing public functions:
The PNRC is not government-owned but privately owned. The vast
majority of the thousands of PNRC members are private individuals,
including students. Under the PNRC Charter, those who contribute to the
annual fund campaign of the PNRC are entitled to membership in the PNRC
for one year. Thus, any one between 6 and 65 years of age can be a PNRC
member for one year upon contributing P35, P100, P300, P500 or P1,000 for
the year. Even foreigners, whether residents or not, can be members of the
PNRC. . .
. . . the PNRC is a privately owned, privately funded, and privately run
charitable organization. The PNRC is not a government-owned or controlled
corporation.
Petitioners anchor their petition on the 1999 case of Camporedondo v.
NLRC, which ruled that the PNRC is a government-owned or controlled
corporation. In ruling that the PNRC is a government-owned or controlled
corporation, the simple test used was whether the corporation was created by
its own special charter for the exercise of a public function or by
incorporation under the general corporation law. Since the PNRC was
created under a special charter, the Court then ruled that it is a government
corporation. However, the Camporedondo ruling failed to consider the
definition of a government-owned or controlled corporation as provided
under Section 2(13) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative
Code of 1987. . .
A government-owned or controlled corporation must be owned by the
government, and in the case of a stock corporation, at least a majority of its
capital stock must be owned by the government. In the case of a non-stock
corporation, by analogy at least a majority of the members must be
government officials holding such membership by appointment or
designation by the government. Under this criterion, and as discussed earlier,
the government does not own or control PNRC.
Finally, the Supreme Court held that the PNRC Charter is violative of the
constitutional proscription against the creation of private corporations by
special law, as provided in Article XII, Section 16 of the Constitution:

Congress cannot enact a law creating a private corporation with a special

charter. Such legislation would be unconstitutional. Private corporations
may exist only under a general law. If the corporation is private, it must
necessarily exist under a general law. Stated differently, only corporations
created under a general law can qualify as private corporations. Under
existing laws, the general law is the Corporation Code, except that the
Cooperative Code governs the incorporation of cooperatives.
The Constitution authorizes Congress to create government-owned or
controlled corporations through special charters. Since private corporations
cannot have special charters, it follows that Congress can create corporations
with special charters only if such corporations are government-owned or
controlled. . .
. . . although the PNRC is created by a special charter, it cannot be
considered a government-owned or controlled corporation in the absence of
the essential elements of ownership and control by the government. In
creating the PNRC as a corporate entity, Congress was in fact creating a
private corporation. However, the constitutional prohibition against the
creation of private corporations by special charters provides no exception
even for non-profit or charitable corporations. Consequently, the PNRC
Charter, insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation and grants it
corporate powers, is void for being unconstitutional. Thus, Sections 1, 2, 3,
4(a), 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of the PNRC Charter, as amended, are
void.

Posted on August 3, 2009 by Hector M. de Leon Jr. Posted in Constitutional Law
Tagged COMELEC, constitutional rights, election contest, election protest, habeas
corpus, HRET, just compensation, laches, party list, public officers, search, security of
tenure
Here are selected July 2009 Philippine Supreme Court decisions on political
law:

Constitutional Law
Double positions. The office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red
Cross is not a government office or an office in a government-owned or
controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution, which provides: No Senator or Member of the
House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries,
during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to
any office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof
increased during the term for which he was elected. Dante Liban, et al. vs.
Richard J. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, July 15, 2009.
Illegal search. Even assuming that petitioner or any lawful occupant of the
house was not present when the search was conducted, the search was done
in the presence of at least two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion
residing in the same locality. Manalo was the barangay chairman of the
place while Velasco was petitioners employee. Petitioner herself signed the
certification of orderly search when she arrived at her residence. Clearly, the
requirements of Section 8, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court were complied
with by the police authorities who conducted the search. Further, petitioner
failed to substantiate her allegation that she was just forced to sign the search
warrant, inventory receipt, and the certificate of orderly search. In fact, the
records show that she signed these documents together with three other
persons, including the barangay chairman who could have duly noted if
petitioner was really forced to sign the documents against her will.
Articles which are the product of unreasonable searches and seizures are
inadmissible as evidence pursuant to Article III, Section 3(2) of the
Constitution. However, in this case, the Supreme Court sustained the validity
of the search conducted in petitioners residence and, thus, the articles seized
during the search are admissible in evidence against petitioner. Rosario
Panuncio vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 165678, July 17, 2009.
Just compensation. Section 17 of Republic Act (RA) No. 6657 applies only

if the amount of just compensation of lands acquired through Presidential

Decree No. 27 remains unresolved despite the passage of RA No. 6657. It is
only in such a case, and to such extent only, that this provision on the
determination of just compensation in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law (CARL) of 1988 is made to apply retrospectively. Land Bank of the
Philippines vs. Josefina R. Dumlao, et al., G.R. No. 167809, July 23, 2009.
Landholding limitation. Section 11 of Article XIV of the governing 1973
Constitution states that no private corporation or association may hold by
lease, concession, license, or permit, timber or forest lands and other timber
or forest resources in excess of one hundred thousand hectares.
Complementing this provision was Chapter I, No. 3(e) of Forestry
Administrative Order (FAO) No. 11 prohibiting any individual, corporation,
partnership, or association from acquiring a timber license or license
agreement covering an area in excess of 100,000 hectares. Likewise, Chapter
I, No. 3(d) of FAO No. 11 states that no individual corporation, partnership,
or association who is already a holder of an ordinary timber license or
license agreement nor any member of the family, incorporator, director,
stockholder, or member of such individual, corporation, partnership, or
association shall be allowed to acquire a new timber license or license
agreement or any interest or participation in it.
The constitutional and statutory limitations on allowable area leases and
concessions were obviously meant to prevent the concentration of large
tracts of public land in the hands of a single individual. Republic of the
Philippines vs. Estate of Alfonso Lim, Sr., et al., G.R. No. 164800, July 22,
2009.
Party List. There are four parameters in a Philippine-style party-list election
system:
1. Twenty percent of the total number of the membership of the House of
Representatives is the maximum number of seats available to party-list
organizations, such that there is automatically one party-list seat for every
four existing legislative districts.
2. Garnering two percent of the total votes cast in the party-list elections
guarantees a party-list organization one seat. The guaranteed seats shall be

distributed in a first round of seat allocation to parties receiving at least two

percent of the total party-list votes.
3. The additional seats, that is, the remaining seats after allocation of the
guaranteed seats, shall be distributed to the party-list organizations including
those that received less than two percent of the total votes. The continued
operation of the two percent threshold as it applies to the allocation of the
additional seats is now unconstitutional because this threshold
mathematically and physically prevents the filling up of the available partylist seats. The additional seats shall be distributed to the parties in a second
round of seat allocation according to the two-step procedure laid down in the
Supreme Courts Decision of 21 April 2009 as clarified in this Resolution.
4.
The three-seat cap is constitutional. The three-seat cap is intended by
the Legislature to prevent any party from dominating the party-list system.
There is no violation of the Constitution because the 1987 Constitution does
not require absolute proportionality for the party-list system. The wellsettled rule is that courts will not question the wisdom of the Legislature as
long as it is not violative of the Constitution. BANAT vs. COMELEC, G.R.
No. 179271/G.R. No. 179295, July 8, 2009.
Private corporations. Congress cannot enact a law creating a private
corporation with a special charter. Such legislation would be
unconstitutional. Private corporations may exist only under a general law. If
the corporation is private, it must necessarily exist under a general law.
Stated differently, only corporations created under a general law can qualify
as private corporations. Under existing laws, the general law is the
Corporation Code, except that the Cooperative Code governs the
incorporation of cooperatives. The Charter of the Philippine National Red
Cross (PNRC) is void insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private
corporation. The PNRC should incorporate under the Corporation Code and
register with the Securities and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a
private corporation. Dante Liban, et al. vs. Richard J. Gordon, G.R. No.
175352, July 15, 2009.
Right to be informed of nature and cause of accusation. It is settled that it is
the allegations in the Information that determine the nature of the offense,
not the technical name given by the public prosecutor in the preamble of the

Information. From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no

concern to the accused what is the technical name of the crime of which he
stands charged. It in no way aids him in a defense on the merits. That to
which his attention should be directed, and in which he, above all things
else, should be most interested, are the facts alleged. The real question is not
did he commit a crime given in the law some technical and specific name,
but did he perform the acts alleged in the body of the information in the
manner therein set forth.
Gauging such standard against the wording of the Information in this case,
the Supreme Court held that there was no violation of petitioners rights. The
recital of facts and circumstances in the Information sufficiently constitutes
the crime of qualified theft. Sheala P. Matrido vs. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 179061, July 13, 2009.
Search warrants. Under Section 12, Chapter V of the Guidelines on the
Selection and Appointment of Executive Judges and Defining their Powers,
Prerogatives and Duties, as embodied in A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC,The
Executive Judges and, whenever they are on official leave of absence or are
not physically present in the station, the Vice-Executive Judges of the RTCs
of Manila and Quezon City shall have authority to act on applications filed
by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Philippine National
Police (PNP) and the Anti-Crime Task Force (ACTAF), for search warrants
involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, illegal possession of firearms
and ammunitions as well as violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002, the Intellectual Property Code, the Anti-Money
Laundering Act of 2001, the Tariff and Customs Code, as amended, and
other relevant laws that may hereafter be enacted by Congress, and included
herein by the Supreme Court.
The applications shall be endorsed by the heads of such agencies or their
respective duly authorized officials and shall particularly describe therein the
places to be searched and/or the property or things to be seized as prescribed
in the Rules of Court. The Executive Judges and Vice-Executive Judges
concerned shall issue the warrants, if justified, which may be served outside
the territorial jurisdiction of the said courts. Re: Request of the Police
Director General Avelino I. Razon for authority to delegate the endorsement
of application for search warrant, A.M. No. 08-4-4-SC, July 7, 2009.

Security of tenure. Article IX (B), Section 2(3) of the 1987 Constitution

expressly provides that [n]o officer or employee of the civil service shall be
removed or suspended except for cause provided by law. The
aforementioned constitutional provision does not distinguish between a
regular employee and a probationary employee.
The constitutional guaranty of security of tenure in the civil service has two
legal ramifications. In Tria v. Chairman Patricia Sto. Tomas, et al., the
Supreme Court held that the prohibition against suspension or dismissal of
an officer or employee of the Civil Service except for cause provided by
law is a guaranty of both procedural and substantive due process. Not
only must removal or suspension be in accordance with the procedure
prescribed by law, but also they can only be made on the basis of a valid
cause provided by law.
Procedural due process basically requires that suspension or dismissal comes
only after notice and hearing. Thus, the minimum requirements of due
process are: (1) that the employees or officers must be informed of the
charges preferred against them, and the formal way by which the employees
or officers are informed is by furnishing them with a copy of the charges
made against them; and (2) that they must have a reasonable opportunity to
present their side of the matter, that is to say, their defenses against the
charges and to present evidence in support of their defenses
Here, the ground the petitioner invoked is not sufficient basis for the
respondents dismissal, and her dismissal was effected without the
observance of both procedural and substantive due process. Land Bank of
the Philippines vs. Rowena O. Paden, G.R. No. 157607, July 7, 2009.
Writ of habeas corpus. The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is
to relieve a person from unlawful restraint. The writ exists as a speedy and
effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint and as an
effective defense of personal freedom.
Where the restraint of liberty is allegedly authored by the State, the very
entity tasked to ensure the liberty of all persons (citizens and aliens alike)
within its jurisdiction, courts must be vigilant in extending the habeas corpus
remedy to one who invokes it. To strictly restrict the great writ of liberty to

technicalities not only defeats the spirit that animates the writ but also waters
down the precious right that the writ seeks to protect, the right to liberty. To
dilute the remedy that guarantees protection to the right is to negate the right
itself. Thus, the Court will not unduly confine the writ of habeas corpus in
the prison walls of technicality. Otherwise, it will betray its constitutional
mandate to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights.
Here, petitioners continued imprisonment is by virtue of a valid judgment
and court process. Martin Gibbs Fletcher vs. The Director of Bureau of
Corrections or his representative, UDK-14071, July 17, 2009.
Election Law
Appeal fee; election cases. Considering that a year has elapsed after the
issuance on July 15, 2008 of Comelec Resolution No. 8486, and to further
affirm the discretion granted to the Comelec which it precisely articulated
through the specific guidelines contained in said Resolution, the Supreme
Court declared that for notices of appeal filed after the promulgation of its
decision, errors in the matter of non-payment or incomplete payment of the
two appeal fees in election cases are no longer excusable. Salvador
Divinagracia, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections and Alex A. Centena, G.R.
Nos. 186007 & G.R. No. 186016, July 27, 2009.
Appreciation of ballots. Appreciation of the contested ballots and election
documents involves a question of fact best left to the determination of the
COMRLEC, a specialized agency tasked with the supervision of elections all
over the country. In the absence of grave abuse of discretion or any
jurisdictional infirmity or error of law, the factual findings, conclusions,
rulings and decisions rendered by the Comelec on matters falling within its
competence shall not be interfered with by this Court. Salvador
Divinagracia, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections and Alex A. Centena, G.R.
Nos. 186007 & G.R. No. 186016, July 27, 2009.
COMELEC; interlocutory order. Since the COMELECs Division issued
the interlocutory Order, the same COMELEC Division should resolve the
motion for reconsideration of the Order. The remedy of the aggrieved party
is neither to file a motion for reconsideration for certification to the

COMELEC En Banc nor to elevate the issue to this Court via a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Eddie T.
Panlilio vs. Commission on Elections and Lilia G. Pineda, G.R. No.
181478, July 15, 2009.
COMELEC; cancellation of COC. Under Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code (OEC), a false representation of material fact in the
Certificate of Candidacy (COC) is a ground for the denial or cancellation of
the COC. The false representation must pertain to a material fact that affects
the right of the candidate to run for the election for which he filed his COC.
Such material fact refers to a candidates eligibility or qualification for
elective office like citizenship, residence or status as a registered voter.
Aside from the requirement of materiality, the false representation must
consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that
would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. In other words, it must be
made with the intention to deceive the electorate as to the would-be
candidates qualifications for public office.
It is settled that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over a petition filed under
Section 78 of the OEC. In the exercise of such jurisdiction, it is within the
competence of the COMELEC to determine whether false representation as
to material facts was made in the COC.
If the candidate states a material representation in the COC that is false, the
COMELEC is empowered to deny due course to or cancel the COC. The
person whose COC is denied due course or cancelled under Section 78 of the
OEC is not treated as a candidate at all, as if such person never filed a
COC. Jamela Salic Maruhom vs. Commssion on Elections and Mohammad
Ali Mericano A. Abinal, G.R. No. 179430, July 27, 2009.
COMELEC; orders of division. Only final orders of the COMELEC in
Division may be raised before the COMELEC en banc. Section 3, Article
IX-C of the 1987 Constitution mandates that only motions for
reconsideration of final decisions shall be decided by the COMELEC en
banc. It is clear from the foregoing constitutional provision that the
COMELEC en banc shall decide motions for reconsideration only of
decisions of a Division, meaning those acts having a final character. Here,
the assailed Second Division order did not completely dispose of the case, as

there was something more to be done, which was to decide the election
protest. Being interlocutory, the assailed Second Division orders may not be
resolved by the COMELEC en banc. Eddie T. Panlilio vs. Commission on
Elections and Lilia G. Pineda, G.R. No. 181478, July 15, 2009.
COMELEC; powers. The COMELEC has broad power, derived from our
fundamental law, to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative
to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall; its
power of supervision and control over boards of election inspectors and
boards of canvassers; the concomitant need to do everything in its power to
secure a fair and honest canvass of the votes cast in the elections; the grant
to it of broad and flexible powers to effectively perform its duties and to
ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections; and its role as
the guardian of the peoples sacred right of suffrage.
In particular, the statutory power of supervision and control by the
COMELEC over the boards of canvassers includes the power to revise or
reverse the action of the boards, as well as to do what the boards should have
done. Such power includes the authority to initiate motu propio such steps or
actions as may be required pursuant to law, like reviewing the actions of the
board; conducting an inquiry affecting the genuineness of election returns
beyond the election records of the polling places involved; annulling canvass
or proclamations based on incomplete returns or on incorrect or tampered
returns; invalidating a canvass or proclamation made in an unauthorized
meeting of the board of canvassers either because it lacked a quorum or
because the board did not meet at all; or requiring the board to
convene. Rafael Flauta, Jr., et al. vs. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R.
No. 184586, July 22, 2009.
COMELEC; protests. Under Section 2(2), Article IX-C of the 1987
Constitution, the COMELEC exercises exclusive original jurisdiction over
all contests relating to the elections of all elective regional, provincial, and
city officials. Since the COMELEC has jurisdiction over petitioners
election protest, it has the authority to issue the assailed Orders. Eddie T.
Panlilio vs. Commission on Elections and Lilia G. Pineda, G.R. No.
181478, July 15, 2009.
Double registration. Maruhom, at the time she filed her COC, could not have

honestly declared therein that she was a registered voter of Marantao and an
eligible candidate for mayor of the said municipality. It is incumbent upon
Maruhom to truthfully state her eligibility in her COC, especially so because
the COC is filled up under oath. An elective office is a public trust. He who
aspires for elective office should not make a mockery of the electoral
process by falsely representing himself. Jamela Salic Maruhom vs.
Commssion on Elections and Mohammad Ali Mericano A. Abinal, G.R.
No. 179430, July 27, 2009.
Estoppel by laches. The doctrine of estoppel by laches is not new in election
cases. It has been applied in at least two cases involving the payment of
filing fees. Salvador Divinagracia, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections and
Alex A. Centena, G.R. Nos. 186007 & G.R. No. 186016, July 27, 2009.
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). The Constitution
mandates that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of its members. By employing the
word sole, the Constitution is emphatic that the jurisdiction of the HRET
in the adjudication of election contests involving its members is exclusive
and exhaustive. Its exercise of power is intended to be its own full,
complete and unimpaired.
Due regard and respect for the authority of the HRET as an independent
constitutional body require that any finding of grave abuse of discretion
against that body should be based on firm and convincing proof, not on
shaky assumptions. Any accusation of grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the HRET must be established by a clear showing of arbitrariness and
improvidence. The Supreme Court did not find evidence of such grave abuse
of discretion by the HRET.
At the risk of unduly encroaching on the exclusive prerogative of the HRET
as the sole judge of election contests involving its members, the Supreme
Court cannot substitute its own sense or judgment for that of the HRET on
the issues of whether the evidence presented during the initial revision could
affect the officially proclaimed results and whether the continuation of the
revision proceedings could lead to a determination of the true will of the
electorate. That is what petitioner actually wants the Supreme Court to do.
But in the exercise of its checking function, the Supreme Court should

merely test whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone
beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or had a
different view. Henry June Dueas, Jr. vs. House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal and Angelito Jett P. Reyes, G.R. No. 185401, July 21,
2009.

Posted on July 6, 2009 by Hector M. de Leon Jr. Posted in Constitutional Law Tagged
agricultural lease, boundary dispute, exhaustion of administrative remedies, immunity
from suit, judicial review, jurisdiction, Ombudsman, public officers, speedy disposition
of cases, suspension, undue delegation of legislative power
Here are selected June 2009 decisions of the Philippine Supreme Court on
political and related laws.
Constitutional Law
Immunity from suit. The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent
is embodied in Section 3, Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution and has been
an established principle that antedates the Constitution. It is a universally
recognized principle of international law that exempts a state and its organs
from the jurisdiction of another state. The principle is based on the very
essence of sovereignty, and on the practical ground that there can be no legal
right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.
It also rests on reasons of public policy that public service would be
hindered, and the public endangered, if the sovereign authority could be
subjected to law suits at the instance of every citizen and, consequently,
controlled in the uses and dispositions of the means required for the
proper administration of the government.
The proscribed suit that the state immunity principle covers takes on various
forms, namely: a suit against the Republic by name; a suit against

an unincorporated government agency; a suit against a government agency

covered by a charter with respect to the agencys performance
of governmental functions; and a suit that on its face is against a government
officer, but where the ultimate liability will fall on the government. In the
present case, the writ of attachment was issued against a government agency
covered by its own charter.
The TESDA performs governmental functions,
and
the
issuance
of certifications is a task within its function of developing and establishing a
system of skills standardization, testing, and certification in the country.
From the perspective of this function, the core reason for the existence of
state immunity applies i.e., the public policy reason that the performance
of governmental function cannot be hindered or delayed by suits, nor can
these suits control the use and disposition of the means for the performance
of governmental functions.
Even assuming that TESDA entered into a proprietary contract
with PROVI and thereby gave its implied consent to be
sued, TESDAs funds are still public in nature and, thus, cannot be the valid
subject of a writ of garnishment or attachment. Professional Video, Inc.
vs. Technical Education and Skills Development Authority, G.R. No. 155504,
June 26, 2009.
Just compensation; easement right of way. Easement of right of way falls
within the purview of the power of eminent domain. In installing the
230 KV Talisay-Compostela transmission lines which traverse respondents
lands, a permanent limitation is imposed by petitioner National Power
Corporation against the use of the lands for an indefinite period. This
deprives respondent of the normal use of the lands. In fact, not only are the
affected areas of the lands traversed by petitioners transmission lines but a
portion is used as the site of its transmission tower. Because of the danger to
life and limbs that may be caused beneath the high-tension live wires, the
landowner will not be able to use the lands for farming or
any agricultural purposes.
Thus, there is no reason to disturb the findings of the trial and appellate
courts. Respondent is entitled to just compensation or the just and complete
equivalent of the loss which the owner of the thing expropriated has to suffer

by reason of the expropriation.

Since the determination of just compensation in expropriation proceedings is
essentially a judicial function, the Supreme Court held that the amount of
P450 per square meter to be just and reasonable compensation for
the expropriated lands of respondent. National Power Corporation vs.
Carlos Villamor,G.R. No. 160080, June 19, 2009.
Ombudsman; prosecutorial powers. Giving prosecutorial powers to the
Ombudsman is in accordance with the Constitution as paragraph 8, Section
13, Article XI provides that the Ombudsman shall exercise such other
functions or duties as may be provided by law.
The constitutionality of Section 3 of R.A. No. 6770, which subsumed
the OSP under the Office of the Ombudsman, was likewise upheld by the
Court in Acop. The foregoing ruling of the Court has been reiterated
in Camanag v. Guerrero. More recently, in Office of the Ombudsman v.
Valera, the Supreme Court, basing its ratio decidendi on its ruling in Acop
and Camanag, declared that the OSP is merely a component of the Office
of the Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision and control, and
upon authority of the Ombudsman and ruled that under R.A. No. 6770, the
power to preventively suspend is lodged only with the Ombudsman and
Deputy Ombudsman. The Courts ruling in Acop that the authority of the
Ombudsman to prosecute based on R.A. No. 6770 was authorized by
the Constitution was also made the foundation for the decision in Perez
v. Sandiganbayan, where it was held that the power to prosecute carries with
it the power to authorize the filing of informations, which power had not
been delegated to the OSP. It is, therefore, beyond cavil that under
the Constitution, Congress was not proscribed from legislating the grant of
additional powers to the Ombudsman or placing the OSP under the Office of
the Ombudsman. Carmelo Lazatin, et al. vs. Hon. Aniano A. Disierto, et al.,
G.R. No. 147097, June 5, 2009.
Ombudsman; removal powers. The Office of the Ombudsman, in the
exercise of its administrative disciplinary authority, is vested by the
Constitution and R.A. No. 6770 with the power to impose the penalty of
removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public
officer or employee found to be at fault. Office of the Ombudsman vs.

Fernando J. Beltran, G.R. No. 168039, June 5, 2009.

Judicial review; actual case. This Supreme Courts power of review may be
awesome, but it is limited to actual cases and controversies dealing with
parties having adversely legal claims, to be exercised after full opportunity
of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question
raised or the very lis mota presented. The case-or-controversy requirement
bans this court from deciding abstract, hypothetical or contingent
questions, lest the court give opinions in the nature of advice concerning
legislative or executive action. Atty. Oliver O. Lozano and Atty. Evangeline
J. Lozano-Endriano vs. Speaker Prospero C. Nograles, Representative,
Majority, House of Representatives / Louis Barok C. Biraogo vs. Speaker
Prospero C. Nograles, Representative, Congress of the Philippines, G.R. No.
187883, June 16, 2009.
Judicial review; ripeness for adjudication. An aspect of the case-orcontroversy requirement is the requisite of ripeness. In the United States,
courts are centrally concerned with whether a case involves uncertain
contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not
occur at all. Another approach is the evaluation of the twofold aspect of
ripeness: first, the fitness of the issues for judicial decision; and second, the
hardship to the parties entailed by withholding court consideration. In
our jurisdiction, the issue of ripeness is generally treated in terms of actual
injury to the plaintiff. Hence, a question is ripe for adjudication when the act
being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual
challenging it. An alternative road to review similarly taken would be to
determine whether an action has already been accomplished or performed by
a branch of government before the courts may step in. Atty. Oliver O.
Lozano and Atty. Evangeline J. Lozano-Endriano vs. Speaker Prospero C.
Nograles, Representative, Majority, House of Representatives / Louis
Barok C. Biraogo vs. Speaker Prospero C. Nograles, Representative,
Congress of the Philippines, G.R. No. 187883, June 16, 2009.
Judicial review; standing to sue. Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate
only when he can demonstrate that (1) he has personally suffered some
actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and
(3) the injury is likely to be redressed by the remedy being sought. In the
cases at bar, petitioners have not shown the elemental injury in fact that

would endow them with the standing to sue. Locus standi requires a personal
stake in the outcome of a controversy for significant reasons. It assures
adverseness and sharpens the presentation of issues for the illumination of
the Court in resolving difficult constitutional questions. The lack of
petitioners personal stake in this case is no more evident than in
Lozanosthree-page petition that is devoid of any legal or jurisprudential
basis.
Neither can the lack of locus standi be cured by the claim of petitioners that
they are instituting the cases at bar as taxpayers and concerned citizens. A
taxpayers suit requires that the act complained of directly involves the
illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. It is undisputed
that there has been no allocation or disbursement of public funds in this case
as of yet. To be sure, standing as a citizen has been upheld by this Court in
cases where a petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental importance
or when paramount public interest is involved. While the Court recognizes
the potential far-reaching implications of the issue at hand, the possible
consequence of House Resolution No. 1109 is yet unrealized and does not
infuse petitioners with locus standi under the transcendental importance
doctrine.
The rule on locus standi is not a plain procedural rule but a constitutional
requirement derived from Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, which
mandates courts of justice to settle only actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable.
Moreover, while the Court has taken an increasingly liberal approach to the
rule of locus standi, evolving from the stringent requirements of personal
injury to the broader transcendental importance doctrine, such liberality
is not to be abused. It is not an open invitation for the ignorant and the
ignoble to file petitions that prove nothing but their cerebral deficit. Atty.
Oliver O. Lozano and Atty. Evangeline J. Lozano-Endriano vs. Speaker
Prospero
C. Nograles, Representative, Majority, House of
Representatives/Louis Barok C. Biraogo vs. Speaker Prospero C.
Nograles, Representative, Congress of the Philippines, G.R. No. 187883,
June 16, 2009.
Speedy disposition of cases. In ascertaining whether the right to speedy

disposition of cases has been violated, the following factors must be

considered: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the
assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice
caused by the delay. The right to a speedy disposition of cases is considered
violated only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious,
and oppressive delays. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved
is not sufficient. In the application of the constitutional guarantee of the right
to a speedy disposition of cases, particular regard must also be taken of the
facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.
In Bernat v. Sandiganbayan, the Court denied petitioners claim of denial of
his right to a speedy disposition of cases considering that the petitioner in
that case chose to remain silent for eight years before complaining of the
delay in the disposition of his case. The Court ruled that petitioner failed to
seasonably assert his right and he merely sat and waited from the time his
case was submitted for resolution. In this case, petitioner similarly failed to
assert his right to a speedy disposition of his case. He did not take any step
to accelerate the disposition of his case. He only invoked his right to a
speedy disposition of cases after the Sandiganbayan promulgated its decision
convicting him for malversation of public funds. Petitioners silence may be
considered as a waiver of his right. Raul S. Tello vs. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 165781, June 5, 2009
Undue delegation of legislative power. Revenue Regulations Nos. 9-2003,
22-2003, and Revenue Memorandum Order No. 6-2003, as pertinent to
cigarettes packed by machine, are invalid insofar as they grant the BIR the
power to reclassify or update the classification of new brands every two
years or earlier. Hon. Secretary of Finance, et al. vs. La Suerte Cigar and
Cigarette Factory, et al., G.R. No. 166498. June 11, 2009.
Boundary disputes between cities. Now that Makati is already a highly
urbanized city, the parties should follow Section 118(d) of the Local
Government Code (LGC) and should opt to amicably settle this dispute by
joint referral to the respective sanggunians of the parties. This has become
imperative because, after all, no attempt had been made earlier to settle the
dispute amicably under the aegis of the LGC. The specific provision of

the LGC, now made applicable because of the altered status of Makati, must
be complied with. In the event that no amicable settlement is reached, as
envisioned under Section 118(e) of the LGC, a certification shall be issued
to that effect, and the dispute shall be formally tried by
the Sanggunian concerned within sixty (60) days from the date of
the aforementioned certification. In this regard, Rule III of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the LGC shall
govern.
Municipality of Pateros vs.The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No.
157714, June 16, 2009
Administrative and Civil Service Law
Exhaustion of administrative remedies. The petitioners failed to appeal the
decision of the Adjudication and Settlement Board (ASB) of the
Commission on Audit to the Commission on Audit proper before filing the
petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, in derogation of the principle
of exhaustion of administrative remedies. The general rule is that before a
party may seek the intervention of the court, he should first avail himself of
all the means afforded him by administrative processes. The issues
which administrative agencies are authorized to decide should not be
summarily taken from them and submitted to the court without first giving
such administrative agency the opportunity to dispose of the same after
due deliberation. It is, therefore, imperative that the Commission Proper be
first given the opportunity to review the decision of the ASB. Only after the
Commission shall have acted thereon may a petition for certiorari be brought
to the Supreme Court by the aggrieved party. While the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies admits of exceptions, the Supreme
Court did not find any cogent reason to apply the cited exceptions to the
instant case. The non-observance of the doctrine results in the petition
having no cause of action, thus, justifying its dismissal. Joseph
Peter Sison, et al. vs. Rogelio Tablang, G.R. No. 177011, June 5, 2009.
Preventive suspension. There are two kinds of preventive suspension of
government employees charged with offenses punishable by removal or
suspension, viz: (1) preventive suspension pending investigation; and (2)
preventive suspension pending appeal if the penalty imposed by
the disciplining authority is suspension or dismissal and, after review, the
respondent is exonerated. Preventive suspension pending investigation is not
a penalty. It is a measure intended to enable the disciplining authority to

investigate charges against respondent by preventing the latter

from intimidating or in any way influencing witnesses against him. If
the investigation is not finished and a decision is not rendered within that
period, the suspension will be lifted and the respondent will automatically be
reinstated. If after investigation, respondent is found innocent of the charges
and is exonerated, he should be reinstated. Civil Service
Commission, Anicia De Lima, in her capacity as Regional Director of CSCNCR vs. Larry M. Alfonso, G.R. No. 179452, June 11, 2009.
Public officers; power of appointment. Well-settled is the rule that an oath of
office is a qualifying requirement for a public office, a prerequisite to the
full investiture of the office. Since petitioner petitioner took his oath and
assumed office only on February 26, it was only then that his right to enter
into the position became plenary and complete. Prior to such
oath, Gasgonia still had the right to exercise the functions of her office. It is
also well to note that per certification issued by Raymond C. Santiago,
Accountant of PCUP, Gasgonia received her last salary for the period
covering February 1-25, 2001; and petitioner received his first salary for the
period covering February 26 to March 7, 2001.
Clearly, at the time of respondents appointment on February
23, Gasgonia still was the rightful occupant of the position and was,
therefore, authorized to extend a valid promotional appointment. Chairman
Percival
C.
Chavez,
Chair
and
Chief
Executive
Officer, Presidential Commission for the Urban Poor vs. Lourdes
R. Ronidel and Honorable Court of Appeals 9th Division, G.R. No. 180941,
June 11, 2009.
Public officers; honorarium. An honorarium is defined as something given
not as a matter of obligation but in appreciation for services rendered, a
voluntary donation in consideration of services which admit of
no compensation in money. Section 15 of R.A. No. 9184 uses the word
may which signifies that the honorarium cannot be demanded as a matter
of right.
The government is not unmindful of the tasks that may be required of
government employees outside of their regular functions. It agrees that they
ought to be compensated; thus, honoraria are given as a recompense for their

efforts
and
performance
of substantially similar
duties,
with substantially similar
degrees
of responsibility and accountability.
However, the payment of honoraria to the members of the BAC and
the TWG must be circumscribed by applicable rules and guidelines
prescribed by the DBM, as provided by law. Section 15 of R.A. No. 9185 is
explicit as it states: For this purpose, the DBM shall promulgate the
necessary guidelines. The word shall has always been deemed
mandatory, and not merely directory. Thus, in this case, petitioners should
have first waited for the rules and guidelines of the DBM before payment of
the honoraria. As the rules and guidelines were still forthcoming, petitioners
could not just award themselves the straight amount of 25% of their monthly
basic salaries as honoraria. This is not the intendment of the law. Joseph
Peter Sison, et al. vs. Rogelio Tablang, G.R. No. 177011, June 5, 2009.
Election law
Disqualification for public office. R.A. No. 9225 was enacted to allow reacquisition and retention of Philippine citizenship for: 1) natural-born
citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of
their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country; and 2) natural-born
citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of the law, become
citizens of a foreign country. The law provides that they are deemed to have
re-acquired or retained their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of
allegiance.
In the instant case, petitioners Oath of Allegiance and Certificate of
Candidacy did not comply with Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 which further
requires those seeking elective public office in the Philippines to make a
personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship. Petitioner failed to
renounce his American citizenship; as such, he is disqualified from running
for vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2007
elections. Roseller De Guzman vs. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R.
No. 180048, June 19, 2009.
Election case; moot. A case becomes moot when there is no more actual
controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in
passing upon the merits. Courts will not determine a moot question in a case
in which no practical relief can be granted. It is unnecessary to indulge in

academic discussion of a case presenting a moot question, as a judgment

thereon cannot have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of things,
cannot be enforced.
Since the present Petition is grounded on petitioner Baldos specific
objections to the 26 ERs in the previous local elections, no practical or
useful purpose would be served by still passing on the merits thereof. Even
if the Court sets aside the assailed COMELEC Resolutions and orders the
exclusion of the disputed ERs from the canvass of votes, and as a result
thereof, petitioner Baldo would emerge as the winning candidate for
municipal mayor of Camalig, Albay, in the 10 May 2004 local elections, it
would be an empty victory. It is already impossible for petitioner Baldo to
still assume office as municipal mayor of Camalig, Albay, elected in the 10
May 2004 local elections, since his tenure as such had ended on 30 June
2007. Petitioner Baldo himself is currently occupying the very same office
as the winning candidate in the 14 May 2007 local elections. Irrefragably,
the Court can no longer grant to petitioner Baldo any practical relief capable
of enforcement. Consequently, the Court is left with no other recourse than
to dismiss the instant Petition on the ground of mootness. Carlos Irwin
G. Baldo vs. Commission on Elections. et al., G.R. No. 176135, June 16,
2009.
Agrarian law
Jurisidiction; DAR. Under Section 50 of Rep. Act No. 6657, the DAR is
vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian
reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters
involving the implementation of agrarian reform. An agrarian dispute refers
to any controversy relating to, inter alia, tenancy over lands devoted to
agriculture. Under Section 3(d) of Rep. Act No. 6657, an agrarian dispute
refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether
leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to
agriculture,
including
disputes
concerning farmworkers associations or representation of
persons
in
negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or
conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy
relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms
and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowner to farmworkers,
tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand

in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and

tenant, or lessor and lessee. It refers to any controversy relating to, inter alia,
tenancy over lands devoted to agriculture. Zosimo Octavio and
Jesus Albona (substituted by his wife, Violeta Albona) vs. Enrico
R. Perovano,G.R. No. 172400, June 23, 2009.
Jurisdiction; DAR. DAR has primary jurisdiction to determine and
adjudicate agrarian reform matters and exclusive original jurisdiction over
all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those
falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the DA and the DENR. Further
exception to the DARs original and exclusive jurisdiction are all petitions
for the determination of just compensation to landowners and the
prosecution of all criminal offenses under RA No. 6657, which are within
the jurisdiction of the RTC sitting as a Special Agrarian Court.
Thus, jurisdiction on just compensation cases for the taking of lands under
RA No. 6657 is vested in the courts. Land Bank of the Philippines vs.
Rene Ralla Belista, G.R. No. 164631. June 26, 2009.
Just compensation; determination.
The
procedure
for
the determination of compensation cases under Republic Act No. 6657, as
devised by this Court, commences with the valuation by the LBP of the
lands taken by the State from private owners under the land reform program.
Based on the valuation of the land by the LBP, the DAR makes an offer to
the landowner through a written notice. In case the landowner rejects the
offer, a summary administrative proceeding is held and, afterwards,
depending on the value of the land, the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (PARAD), the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
(RARAD), or the DARAB, fixes the price to be paid for the said land. If the
landowner still does not agree with the price so fixed, he may bring the
matter to the RTC, acting as Special Agrarian Court.
In the process of determining the just compensation due to landowners, it is
a necessity that the RTC takes into account several factors enumerated in
Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657. Land Bank of the Philippines vs.
Kumassie Plantation
Company Incorporated/Kumassie Plantation
Company Incorporated vs. Land Bank of the Philippines and the Secretary
of the Department of Agrarian ReformG.R. No. 177404/G.R. No. 178097,
Tenants. Tenants are defined as persons who in
June 25, 2009.
themselves and with the aid available from within their immediate farm

households cultivate the land belonging to or possessed by another, with

the latters consent, for purposes of production, sharing the produce with the
landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a
price certain or ascertainable in produce or money or both under the
leasehold tenancy system.
Based on the foregoing definition of a tenant, entrenched
in jurisprudence are the following essential elements of tenancy: 1) the
parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) the subject
matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; 3) there is consent between
the parties to the relationship; 4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring
about agricultural production; 5) there is personal cultivation on the part of
the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) the harvest is shared between
landowner and tenant or agricultural lessee. The presence of all these
elements must be proved by substantial evidence. Unless a person has
established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of
tenure and is not covered by the Land Reform Program of the Government
under existing tenancy laws. Tenancy relationship cannot be presumed.
Claims that one is a tenant do not automatically give rise to security of
tenure. Joaquin Soliman, et al., vs. Pampanga Sugar Development Company
(PASUDECO), Inc., and Gerry Rodriguez, G.R. No. 169589, June 16, 2009.
Tenants. The CA held that there is no tenancy relationship between the
private respondents and petitioners Apolonia, Carlos, Lourdes and Rogelio
Tarona due to the absence of personal cultivation of the subject landholding
by the latter
In arriving at such a finding, the appellate court gave full credence to the
evidence
proffered
by
private
respondents
showing
that
the aforementioned petitioners are not residents of the locality where the
subject landholding is and neither are they tenants of any lot thereat. The
evidence, among others, consists of the Certification dated October 9, 2003
issued by the Barangay Captain of Mauban, now Nagbalayong, Morong,
Bataan, stating that Apolonia, Carlos, Lourdes and Rogelio Tarona are not
residents therein and that they do not personally cultivate the subject
property; and the Certification of the election officer of Caloocan City
showing that said persons are residents and registered voters of Caloocan
City.

We find no reason to disturb the aforesaid finding of the CA. Clearly, private
respondents evidence, which significantly the petitioners failed to refute,
more than substantially proved the impossibility of personal cultivation.
Petitioners (intervenors) have already left the place where the subject land
lies in Morong, Bataan, and now live in another locality which is in
Caloocan City. Since Bataan is of a considerable distance from Caloocan
City, it would undeniably be physically impossible for the petitioners to
personally cultivate the landholding. Leonardo Tarona, et al. vs. Court of
Appeals, et al.G.R. No. 170182. June 18, 2009
May 2009 Decision on Political Law

Posted on June 2, 2009 by Hector M. de Leon Jr. Posted in Constitutional Law Tagged
just compensation
Based on the Supreme Courts website (as of today), it appears that only one
case decided by the Supreme Court in May 2009 relates to political law. In
Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Heirs of Honorio De Leon, represented by
Ambrosio De Leon, the Supreme Court reiterated its previous rulings that
when just compensation for land acquired pursuant to the agrarian reform
program was not yet paid when the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(or R.A. No. 6557) took effect, the provisions of R.A. No. 6557 will apply
with respect to the payment of just compensation. The Supreme Court
ruled:
On 15 June 1988, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) or

R.A. No. 6657 was enacted to promote special justice to the landless farmers
and provide a more equitable distribution and ownership of land with due
regard to the rights of landowners to just compensation and to the ecological
needs of the nation.
Section 4 of R.A. No. 6657 provides that the CARL shall cover all public
and private agricultural lands including other lands of the public domain
suitable for agriculture. Section 7 provides that rice and corn lands under
P.D. No. 27, among other lands, will comprise phase one of the acquisition

plan and distribution program. Section 75 states that the provisions of P.D.
No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, and other laws not inconsistent with
R.A. No. 6657 shall have suppletory effect.
Furthermore, in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Heirs of Domingo, the
Court stressed the duty of the Court to balance the interests of both the
landowner and the farmer-beneficiaries, to wit:
Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that no private
property shall be taken for public use without just compensation. As a
concept in the Bill of Rights, just compensation is defined as the fair market
value of the property as between one who receives, and one who desires to
sell.
Section 4, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution mandates that the
redistribution of agricultural lands shall be subject to the payment of just
compensation. The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission on
this subject reveal that just compensation should not also make an
insurmountable obstacle to a successful agrarian reform. Hence, the
landowners right to just compensation should be balanced with agrarian
reform. In Land Bank v. Court of Appeals, we declared that it is the duty of
the court to protect the weak and the underprivileged, but this duty should
not be carried out to such an extent as to deny justice to the landowner
whenever truth and justice happen to be on his side.
In the instant case, respondents were furnished with the notice of coverage
sometime in 1988 only. Even if respondents property were acquired
pursuant to P.D. No. 27, the fixing of just compensation based on the values
under P.D. No. 27/E.O. No. 228 would render meaningless respondents
right to a just compensation.
Thus, the Court ruled in Paris v. Alfeche that when the passage of R.A. No.
6657 supervened before the payment of just compensation, the provisions of
R.A. No. 6657 on just compensation would be applicable. The same
pronouncement has been reiterated in Land Bank of the Philippines v.
Natividad, Land Bank of the Philippines v. Estanislao, Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Heirs of Domingo and LBP v. Heirs of Cruz.

Pertinently, Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 provides:

Sec. 17. Determination of Just Compensation.In determining just
compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of the
like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the
owner, the tax declarations, and the assessments made by government
assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed
by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the Government to the property
as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government
financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional factors
to determine its valuation.
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Celada, the Court ruled that the factors
enumerated under Section 17, R.A. No. 6657 had already been translated
into a basic formula by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) pursuant
to its rule-making power under Section 49 of R.A. No. 6657. Thus, the Court
held in Celada that the formula outlined in DAR A.O. No. 5, series of 1998
should be applied in computing just compensation.
Likewise, in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Sps. Banal, the Court ruled that
the applicable formula in fixing just compensation is DAR A.O. No. 6,
series of 1992, as amended by DAR A.O. No. 11, series of 1994, then the
governing regulation applicable to compulsory acquisition of lands, in
recognition of the DARs rule-making power to carry out the objectives of
R.A. No. 6657. Because the trial court therein based its valuation upon a
different formula and did not conduct any hearing for the reception of
evidence, the Court ordered a remand of the case to the SAC for trial on the
merits.
The mandatory application of the aforementioned guidelines in determining
just compensation has been reiterated recently in Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Lim and Land Bank of the Philippines v. Heirs of Cruz, where
the Court also ordered the remand of the cases to the SAC for the
determination of just compensation strictly in accordance with the applicable
DAR regulation.
Conformably with the aforequoted rulings, the instant case must be
remanded to the SAC for the determination of just compensation in

accordance with DAR A.O. No. 5, series of 1998, the latest DAR issuance
on fixing just compensation.
See Land Bank of the Philippines Vs. Heirs of Honorio De Leon,
represented by Ambrosio De Leon, G.R. No. 164025, May 8, 2009.
April
2009
Decisions
Constitutional and Related Laws
on
Posted on May 2, 2009 by Hector M. de Leon Jr. Posted in Constitutional Law Tagged
administrative regulation, agrarian reform, arrest, COMELEC, deportation, double
jeopardy, due process, Ecozone, election contest, election protest, eminent domain, equal
protection, excise tax, freedom of expression, immunity from suit, judicial review, just
compensation, legislative inquiry, party list, police power, political question, Public Land
Act, search, subpoena, unfair competition, warrantless arrest, warrantless search, writ of
possession
Here are selected April 2009 decisions of the Supreme Court on

constitutional and related laws:
Constitutional Law
Administrative regulation; void. Executive Order No. 566, which grants the
CHED the power to regulate review center, is unconstitutional as it expands
Republic Act No. 7722,. The CHEDs coverage under RA 7722 is limited to
public and private institutions of higher education and degree-granting
programs in all public and private post-secondary educational
institutions. EO 566 directed the CHED to formulate a framework for the
regulation of review centers and similar entities. A review center is not an
institution of higher learning as contemplated by RA 7722. It does not offer
a degree-granting program that would put it under the jurisdiction of the
CHED. Review Center Associations of the Philippines vs. Executive
Secretatry Eduardo Ermita, et al.,G.R. No. 180046, April 2, 2009.
Agrarian reform; coverage. For the parcels of land subject of this petition to
come within the coverage of P.D. No. 27, it is necessary to determine

whether the land is agricultural. Here, the subject parcels of land cannot be
considered as within the ambit of P.D. No. 27 considering that the subject
lots were reclassified by the DAR Secretary as suited for residential,
commercial, industrial or other urban purposes way before petitioner filed a
petition for emancipation under P.D. No. 27. Laureano V. Hermoso, et al.
vs. Heirs of Antonio Francia and Petra Francia,G.R. No. 166748, April 24,
2009.
Compensation. Officers who in good faith have discharged the duties
pertaining to their office are legally entitled to the compensation attached to
the office for the services they actually rendered. Although the present
petition must inevitably be dismissed on a technicality that serves as penalty
for the pernicious practice of forum shopping, the Court nevertheless cannot
countenance the refund of the compensation differential corresponding to
petitioners tenure as HEDF head with the upgraded rank of Director III,
since she had actually rendered services in the office with the elevated grade
for that period. Alicia D. Tagaro vs. Ester A. Garcia, etc.,G.R. No. 173931,
April 2, 2009.
COMELEC; voting. Section 5 (a)of Rule 3 of the Comelec Rules of

Procedure and Section 7 of Article IX-A of the Constitution require that a
majority vote of all the members of the Comelec, and not only those who
participated and took part in the deliberations, is necessary for the
pronouncement of a decision, resolution, order or ruling. Rodante
Marcoleta, et al. vs. Commission on Elections, et al./ Alagad Party-list
represented by Diogenes S. Osabel, President vs. Commission on Elections,
et al.,G.R. No. 181377, April 24, 2009.
Deportation; power. The settled rule is that the entry or stay of aliens in the
Philippines is merely a privilege and a matter of grace; such privilege is not
absolute or permanent and may be revoked. However, aliens may be
expelled or deported from the Philippines only on grounds and in the manner
provided for by the Constitution, the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as
amended, and administrative issuances pursuant thereto.
It must be remembered that aliens seeking entry in the Philippines do not

acquire the right to be admitted into the country by the simple passage of
time. When an alien, such as respondent, has already physically gained entry
in the country, but such entry is later found unlawful or devoid of legal
basis, the alien can be excluded anytime after it is found that he was not
lawfully admissible at the time of his entry. Every sovereign power has the
inherent power to exclude aliens from its territory upon such grounds as it
may deem proper for its self-preservation or public interest. The power to
deport aliens is an act of State, an act done by or under the authority of the
sovereign power. It is a police measure against undesirable aliens whose
continued presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public good
and the domestic tranquility of the people. The Secretary of Justice, et al. vs.
Christopher Koruga, G.R. No. 166199, April 24, 2009.
Double jeopardy. The elements of double jeopardy are (1) the complaint or
information was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2)
the court had jurisdiction; (3) the accused had been arraigned and had
pleaded; and (4) the accused was convicted or acquitted or the case was
dismissed without his express consent. These elements are present here: (1)
the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 96-413 against Postanes was
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the MeTC had
jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 96-413; (3) Postanes was arraigned
and entered a non-guilty plea; and (4) the MeTC dismissed Criminal Case
No. 96-413 on the ground of insufficiency of evidence amounting to an
acquittal from which no appeal can be had. Clearly, for this Court to grant
the petition and order the MeTC to reconsider its decision, just what the
RTC ordered the MeTC to do, is to transgress the Constitutional proscription
not to put any person twice x x x in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense.David Tiu vs. Court of Appeals and Edgardo Postanes, G.R. No.
162370, April 21, 2009.
Due process; court decisions. Faithful adherence to Section 14, Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution is indisputably a paramount component of due
process and fair play. The parties to a litigation should be informed of how
it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led
to the conclusions of the court.
In the assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals reiterates the rule that a
notarized and authenticated deed of sale enjoys the presumption of
regularity, and is admissible without further proof of due execution. On the

basis thereof, it declared Antonio a buyer in good faith and for value, despite
petitioners contention that the sale violates public policy. While it is a part
of the right of appellant to urge that the decision should directly meet the
issues presented for resolution, mere failure by the appellate court to specify
in its decision all contentious issues raised by the appellant and the reasons
for refusing to believe appellants contentions is not sufficient to hold the
appellate courts decision contrary to the requirements of the law and the
Constitution. So long as the decision of the Court of Appeals contains the
necessary findings of facts to warrant its conclusions, we cannot declare said
court in error if it withheld any specific findings of fact with respect to the
evidence for the defense. We will abide by the legal presumption that
official duty has been regularly performed,and all matters within an issue in
a case were laid down before the court and were passed upon by it. Marissa
R. Unchuan vs. Antonio J.P. Lozada, Anita Lozada and the Register of
Deeds of Cebu City, G.R. No. 172671, April 16, 2009.
Ecozone. R.A. No. 7903 does not authorize the ZAMBOECOZONE
Authority to operate and/or license games of chance/gambling. Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation, etc. vs. Philippine EGaming
Jurisdiction, Incorporated (PEJI) Zamboanga City Special Economic Zone
Authority (ZAMBOECOZONE), et al., G.R. No. 177333, April 24, 2009.
Election contests; jurisdiction. The House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunals (HRETs) sole and exclusive jurisdiction over contests relative to
the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives begins only after a candidate has become a member of the
House of Representatives. Thus, once a winning candidate has been
proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of
Representatives, COMELECs jurisdiction over elections relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRETs own jurisdiction
begins.
Seeres filed this petition before this Court on July 23, 2007, the right of the
nominees as party-list representatives had been recognized and declared in
the July 19, 2007 Resolution and the nominees had taken their oath and
already assumed their offices in the House of Representatives. As such, the
proper recourse would have been to file a petition for quo warranto before
the HRET within ten (10) days from receipt of the July 19, 2007 Resolution
and not a petition for certiorari before this Court. Dr. Hans Christian M.

Seeres vs. Commission on Elections and Melquiades A. Robles,G.R. No.

178678, April 16, 2009.
Eminent domain; proceedings. In an expropriation proceeding there are two
stages: first, the determination of the validity of the expropriation, and
second, the determination of just compensation. In Tan v. Republic, the
Supreme Court explained the two (2) stages in an expropriation proceeding,
to wit:
(1)
Determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the
power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of
the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the
action, with condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to
take the property sought to be condemned for the public use or purpose
described in the complaint, upon payment of just compensation. An order of
expropriation is final. An order of dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a
final one, as it finally disposes of the action and leaves nothing more to be
done by the courts on the merits. The order of expropriation would also be a
final one for after its issuance, no objection to the right of condemnation
shall be heard. The order of expropriation may be appealed by any party
aggrieved thereby by filing a record on appeal.
(2)
Determination by the court of the just compensation for the
property sought to be taken with the assistance of not more than three (3)
commissioners. The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the
evidence before the court and findings of the commissioners would likewise
be a final one, as it would leave nothing more to be done by the court
regarding the issue. A second and separate appeal may be taken from this
order fixing the just compensation. Metropolitan Cebu Water District vs. J.
King and Sons Company, Inc., G.R. No. 175983, April 16, 2009.
Eminent domain; power. For Metropolitan Cebu Water District to exercise
its power of eminent domain, two requirements should be met, namely: first,
its board of directors passed a resolution authorizing the expropriation, and;
second, the exercise of the power of eminent domain was subjected to
review by the LWUA. In this case, petitioners board of directors approved
on 27 February 2004, Board Resolution No. 015-2004 authorizing its
general manager to file expropriation and other cases. Moreover, the LWUA

did review and gave its stamp of approval to the filing of a complaint for the
expropriation of respondents lot. Specifically, the LWUA through its
Administrator, Lorenzo H. Jamora, wrote petitioners manager, Armando H.
Paredes, a letter dated 28 February 2005 authorizing petitioner to file the
expropriation case against the owner of the five-square meter portion of Lot
No. 921-A covered by TCT No. 168805, pursuant to Section 25 of P.D. No.
198, as amended. Metropolitan Cebu Water District vs. J. King and Sons
Company, Inc., G.R. No. 175983. April 16, 2009
Eminent domain; writ of possession. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8974 is emphatic
to the effect that upon compliance with the guidelinesthe court shall
immediately issue to the implementing agency an order to take possession of
the property and start the implementation of the project. Under this
statutory provision, when the government, its agencies or governmentowned and controlled corporations, make the required provisional payment,
the trial court has a ministerial duty to issue a writ of
possession.Metropolitan Cebu Water District vs. J. King and Sons
Company, Inc., G.R. No. 175983, April 16, 2009.
Eminent domain; just compensation. Under the factual circumstances of
the case, the agrarian reform process is still incomplete as the just
compensation to be paid respondents has yet to be settled. Considering the
passage RA 6657 before the completion of this process, the just
compensation should be determined and the process concluded under the
said law.
Excise tax. Section 145 of the Tax Code, as amended by RA
9334: (1) does not violate the equal protection and unformity of taxation
clauses; (2) does not violate the constitutional prohibition on unfair
competition; and (3) does not vilate the constitutional prohibition on
regresssive and inequitable taxation. British American Tobacco vs. Jose
Isidro N. Camacho, et al. G.R. No. 163583, April 15, 2009.
Freedom of expression. Jurisprudence distinguishes between a contentneutral regulation, i.e., merely concerned with the incidents of the speech, or
one that merely controls the time, place or manner, and under well defined
standards; and a content-based restraint or censorship, i.e., the restriction is
based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech. Content-based laws

are generally treated as more suspect than content-neutral laws because of

judicial concern with discrimination in the regulation of
expression. Content-neutral regulations of speech or of conduct that may
amount to speech, are subject to lesser but still heightened scrutiny.
Ostensibly, the act of an LGU requiring a business of proof that the property
from which it operates has been zoned for commercial use can be argued,
when applied to a radio station, as content-neutral since such a regulation
would presumably apply to any other radio station or business enterprise
within the LGU.
However, the circumstances of this case dictate that we view the action of
the respondents as a content-based restraint.
The Court is of the position that the actions of the respondents warrant
heightened or strict scrutiny from the Court, the test which we have deemed
appropriate in assessing content-based restrictions on free speech, as well as
for laws dealing with freedom of the mind or restricting the political process,
of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as
other fundamental rights as expansion from its earlier applications to equal
protection. The immediate implication of the application of the strict
scrutiny test is that the burden falls upon respondents as agents of
government to prove that their actions do not infringe upon petitioners
constitutional rights. As content regulation cannot be done in the absence of
any compelling reason, the burden lies with the government to establish such
compelling reason to infringe the right to free expression. Newsounds
Broadcasting Network, Inc., et al. vs. Hon. Ceasar G. Dy, et al.,G.R. No.
170270/G.R. No. 179411, April 2, 2009.
Immunity from Suit. GTZ consistently has been unable to establish with
satisfaction that it enjoys the immunity from suit generally enjoyed by its
parent country, the Federal Republic of Germany. Consequently, both the
Labor Arbiter and the Court of Appeals acted within proper bounds when
they refused to acknowledge that GTZ is so immune by dismissing the
complaint against it. Our finding has additional ramifications on the failure
of GTZ to properly appeal the Labor Arbiters decision to the NLRC. As
pointed out by the OSG, the direct recourse to the Court of Appeals while
bypassing the NLRC could have been sanctioned had the Labor Arbiters
decision been a patent nullity. Since the Labor Arbiter acted properly in
deciding the complaint, notwithstanding GTZs claim of immunity, we

cannot see how the decision could have translated into a patent nullity.
Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Techniche Vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R.
No. 152318, April 16, 2009.
Inquiry in aid of legislation. A legislative investigation in aid of legislation
and court proceedings has different purposes. On one hand, courts conduct
hearings or like adjudicative procedures to settle, through the application of
a law, actual controversies arising between adverse litigants and involving
demandable rights. On the other hand, inquiries in aid of legislation are, inter
alia, undertaken as tools to enable the legislative body to gather information
and, thus, legislate wisely and effectively; and to determine whether there is
a need to improve existing laws or enact new or remedial legislation, albeit
the inquiry need not result in any potential legislation. On-going judicial
proceedings do not preclude congressional hearings in aid of legislation.
While Sabio and Standard Chartered Bank advert only to pending criminal
and administrative cases before lower courts as not posing a bar to the
continuation of a legislative inquiry, there is no rhyme or reason that these
cases doctrinal pronouncement and their rationale cannot be extended to
appealed cases and special civil actions awaiting final disposition before this
Court. . .
When the Committee issued invitations and subpoenas to petitioners to
appear before it in connection with its investigation of the aforementioned
investments, it did so pursuant to its authority to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation. This is clearly provided in Art. VI, Sec. 21 of the Constitution,
which was quoted at the outset. And the Court has no authority to prohibit a
Senate committee from requiring persons to appear and testify before it in
connection with an inquiry in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure. Sabio emphasizes the importance of the duty
of those subpoenaed to appear before the legislature, even if incidentally
incriminating questions are expected to be asked. Reghis M. Romero II,
Edmond Q. Sese, Leopoldo T. Sanchez, Reghis M. Romero III, Michael L.
Romero, Nathaniel L. Romero and Jerome R. Canals vs. Sen. Jinggoy E.
Estrada and Senate Committee on Labor, Employment and Human
Resources Development,G.R. No. 174105, April 2, 2009.
Judicial review. It is beyond cavil that the BI has the exclusive authority and

jurisdiction to try and hear cases against an alleged alien, and that the BOC
has jurisdiction over deportation proceedings. Nonetheless, Article VIII,
Section 1 of the Constitution has vested power of judicial review in the
Supreme Court and the lower courts such as the CA, as established by law.
Although the courts are without power to directly decide matters over which
full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive
branch of the government and are not empowered to execute absolutely their
own judgment from that of Congress or of the President, the Court may look
into and resolve questions of whether or not such judgment has been made
with grave abuse of discretion, when the act of the legislative or executive
department is contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence, or when
executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily out of malice, ill will or
personal bias. The Secretary of Justice, et al. vs. Christopher Koruga, G.R.
No. 166199, April 24, 2009.
Judicial review; political question. In asking the Supreme Court to declare
Section 19 of the Oil Deregulation Law as unconstitutional for contravening
Section 19, Article XII of the Constitution, petitioner invokes the exercise by
the Supreme Court of its power of judicial review, which power is expressly
recognized under Section 4(2), Article VIII of the Constitution. The power
of judicial review is the power of the courts to test the validity of executive
and legislative acts for their conformity with the Constitution. Through such
power, the judiciary enforces and upholds the supremacy of the Constitution.
For a court to exercise this power, certain requirements must first be met,
namely:
(1)
an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial
power;
(2) the person challenging the act must have standing to challenge; he
must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;
(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity; and
(4)
the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

The Supreme Court ruled that that the issues petitioner presented to thee
Supreme Court are non-justiciable matters that preclude the Supreme Court
from exercising its power of judicial review. The immediate implementation
of full deregulation of the local downstream oil industry is a policy
determination by Congress which the Supreme Court cannot overturn
without offending the Constitution and the principle of separation of
powers. Congressman Enrique T. Garcia Vs. The Executive Secretary, et
al.G.R. No. 157584, April 2, 2009.
Just compensation. The Special Agrarian Court and the Court of Appeals
committed no reversible error when it ruled that it is the provisions of RA
6657 that is applicable to the present case. The SAC arrived at the just
compensation for respondents property after taking into consideration the
commissioners report on the nature of the subject landholding, its proximity
from the city proper, its use, average gross production, and the prevailing
value of the lands in the vicinity. The SAC correctly determined the amount
of just compensation due to respondents in accordance with, and guided by,
RA 6657 and existing jurisprudence. Land Bank of the Philippines vs.
Carolina vda. de Abello, et al., G.R. No. 168631, April 7, 2009.
Partisan political activity. Robles act of submitting a nomination list for
BUHAY cannot, without more, be considered electioneering or partisan
political activity within the context of the Election Code. The twin acts of
signing and filing a Certificate of Nomination are purely internal processes
of the party or organization and are not designed to enable or ensure the
victory of the candidate in the elections. The act of Robles of submitting the
certificate nominating Velarde and others was merely in compliance with the
COMELEC requirements for nomination of party-list representatives and,
hence, cannot be treated as electioneering or partisan political activity
proscribed under by Sec. 2(4) of Art. IX(B) of the Constitution for civil
servants. Dr. Hans Christian M. Seeres vs. Commission on Elections and
Melquiades A. Robles, G.R. No. 178678, April 16, 2009.
In determining the allocation of seats for party-list
Party list.
representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure
shall be observed:
(1)
The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the

highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the
elections.
(2) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent
(2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one
guaranteed seat each.
(3) Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking
in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total
number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
(4) Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than
three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be
included because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every
two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as
additional seats are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List
System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the
absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of
fractional seats.Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT) vs. Commission on Elections/ Bayan Muna, et al. vs.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 179271/G.R. No. 179295, April 21,
2009.
Police power. Police power to prescribe regulations to promote the health,
morals, education, good order or safety, and the general welfare of the
people flows from the recognition that salus populi est suprema lex the
welfare of the people is the supreme law. Police power primarily rests with
the legislature although it may be exercised by the President and
administrative boards by virtue of a valid delegation. Here, no delegation of
police power exists under RA 7722 authorizing the President to regulate the
operations of non-degree granting review centers. Review Center
Associations of the Philippines vs. Executive Secretatry Eduardo Ermita, et
al.,G.R. No. 180046, April 2, 2009.
Public domain; classification. The classification of lands of the public
domain is of two types, i.e., primary classification and secondary

classification. The primary classification comprises agricultural, forest or

timber, mineral lands, and national parks. These are lands specifically
mentioned in Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution. The same provision
of the Constitution, however, also states that agricultural lands of the public
domain may further be classified by law according to the uses to which they
may be devoted. This further classification of agricultural lands is referred to
as secondary classification.
Under existing laws, Congress has granted authority to a number of
government agencies to effect the secondary classification of agricultural
lands to residential, commercial or industrial or other urban uses. Laureano
V. Hermoso, et al. vs. Heirs of Antonio Francia and Petra Francia,G.R. No.
166748, April 24, 2009.
Public Land Act; encumbrance. Section 118 of the Public Land Act, as
amended, prohibits any encumbrance or alienation of lands acquired under
homestead provisions from the date of the approval of application and for a
term of five years from and after the date of issuance of the patent or
grant. The same provision provides that no alienation, transfer, or
conveyance of any homestead after five years and before 25 years after
issuance of title shall be valid without the approval of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, which approval shall not be denied
except on constitutional and legal grounds.
A homestead patent is one of the modes to acquire title to public lands
suitable for agricultural purposes. Under the Public Land Act, as amended, a
homestead patent is one issued to any citizen of this country, over the age of
18 years or the head of a family, and who is not the owner of more than 24
hectares of land in the country. To be qualified, the applicant must show
that he has resided continuously for at least one year in the municipality
where the land is situated and must have cultivated at least one-fifth of the
land applied for.
The Court also cannot consider the subject property to have been held in
trust by Hermogenes for and on behalf of Hizon. Settled is the rule that a
homestead applicant must personally comply with the legal requirements for
a homestead grant. The homestead applicant himself must possess the
necessary qualifications, cultivate the land, and reside thereon. It would be a

circumvention of the law if an individual were permitted to apply in behalf

of another, as the latter may be disqualified or might not comply with the
residency and cultivation requirements. Marcelino Lopez, et al. vs. Hon.
Court of Appeals, et al./ Noel Rubber and Development Corp, et al. vs. Jose
Esquivel, Jr., et al.,G.R. No. 168734/G.R. No. 170621, April 24, 2009.
Small scale mining permits. Petitioners small-scale mining permits are
legally questionable. Under Presidential Decree No. 1899, applications of
small-scale miners are processed with the Director of the Mines and GeoSciences Bureau. Pursuant to Republic Act No. 7076, which took effect on
18 July 1991, approval of the applications for mining permits and for mining
contracts are vested in the Provincial/City Mining Regulatory
Board. Composed of the DENR representative, a representative from the
small-scale mining sector, a representative from the big-scale mining
industry and a representative from an environmental group, this body is
tasked to approve small-scale mining permits and contracts.
In the case under consideration, petitioners filed their small-scale mining
permits on 23 August 1991, making them bound by the procedures provided
for under the applicable and prevailing statute, Republic Act No.
7076. Instead of processing and obtaining their permits from the Provincial
Mining Regulatory Board, petitioners were able to get the same from the
governor of Davao del Norte. Considering that the governor is without legal
authority to issue said mining permits, the same permits are null and
void. Leonora P. Calanza, et al. vs. Paper Industries Corp., et al.,G.R. No.
146622, April 24, 2009.
Speedy Trial. Under the circumstances of the cases, the right to the accused
to a speedy tril was not violated. Dante Tan vs. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 173637, April 21, 2009.
Subpoena; Congress. PS Resolution Nos. 537 and 543 were passed in 2006
and the letter-invitations and subpoenas directing the petitioners to appear
and testify in connection with the twin resolutions were sent out in the
month of August 2006 or in the past Congress. On the postulate that the
Senate of each Congress acts separately and independently of the Senate
before and after it, the aforesaid invitations and subpoenas are considered
functos oficio and the related legislative inquiry conducted is, for all intents

and purposes, terminated. Reghis M. Romero II, Edmond Q. Sese, Leopoldo

T. Sanchez, Reghis M. Romero III, Michael L. Romero, Nathaniel L. Romero
and Jerome R. Canals vs. Sen. Jinggoy E. Estrada and Senate Committee on
Labor, Employment and Human Resources Development,G.R. No.
174105, April 2, 2009.
Usurpation of legislative power. EO 566 in this case is not supported by any
enabling law. Since EO 566 is an invalid exercise of legislative power, the
RIRR is also an invalid exercise of the CHEDs quasi-legislative
power. Review Center Associations of the Philippines vs. Executive
Secretatry Eduardo Ermita, et al. G.R. No. 180046, April 2, 2009.
Warrantless search. There is no question that the police officers went to
the house of petitioner because of the information relayed by Sunit that
petitioner had in his possession illegally cut lumber. When the police
officers arrived at the house of petitioner, the lumber were lying around the
vicinity of petitioners house. The lumber were in plain view. Under the
plain view doctrine, objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a
right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be
presented as evidence. When asked whether he had the necessary permit to
possess the lumber, petitioner failed to produce one. Petitioner merely
replied that the lumber in his possession was intended for the repair of his
house and for his furniture shop. There was thus probable cause for the
police officers to confiscate the lumber. There was, therefore, no necessity
for a search warrant. The seizure of the lumber from petitioner who did not
have the required permit to possess the forest products cut is sanctioned by
Section 68 of the Forestry Code. Olympio Revaldo vs. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 170589, April 16, 2009.
Warrantless arrest. On whether the police officers had the authority to
arrest petitioner, even without a warrant, Section 80 of the Forestry Code
authorizes the forestry officer or employee of the DENR or any personnel of
the PNP to arrest, even without a warrant, any person who has committed or
is committing in his presence any of the offenses defined by the Forestry
Code and to seize and confiscate the tools and equipment used in
committing the offense or the forest products gathered or taken by the
offender. Petitioner was in possession of the lumber without the necessary
documents when the police officers accosted him. In open court, petitioner
categorically admitted the possession and ownership of the confiscated

lumber as well as the fact that he did not have any legal documents therefor
and that he merely intended to use the lumber for the repair of his
dilapidated house. Mere possession of forest products without the proper
documentation consummates the crime. Dura lex sed lex. The law may be
harsh but that is the law. Olympio Revaldo vs. People of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 170589, April 16, 2009.
Election Law
Election contests. Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his
oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the
jurisdiction of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal begins over
election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications, and
mere allegation as to the invalidity of her proclamation does not divest the
Electoral Tribunal of its jurisdiction. Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong vs.
COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 178831-32/G.R. No. 179120/G.R. Nos. 17913233/G.R. Nos. 179240-41, April 1, 2009.
Election protests. Jurisprudence makes it clear that the mere filing of a
petition denominated as a pre-proclamation case or one seeking the
annulment of a proclamation will not suspend the ten-day period for filing
an election protest. It is required that the issues raised in such a petition be
restricted to those that may be properly included therein. in the absence of
any clear showing or proof that the election returns canvassed are
incomplete or contain material defects; appear to have been tampered with,
falsified or prepared under duress; and/or contain discrepancies in the votes
credited to any candidate, which would affect the result of the election, a
petition cannot be properly considered as a pre-proclamation controversy.
The purpose of a pre-proclamation controversy is to ascertain the winner or
winners in the election on the basis of the election returns duly authenticated
by the board of inspectors and admitted by the board of canvassers. It is a
well-entrenched rule that the Board of Canvassers and the COMELEC are
not to look beyond or behind electoral returns. A pre-proclamation
controversy is summary in nature. It is the policy of the election law that
pre-proclamation controversies be summarily decided, consistent with the
laws desire that the canvass and proclamation be delayed as little as
possible. There is no room for the presentation of evidence aliunde, the
inspection of voluminous documents, and for meticulous technical
examination. That is why such questions as those involving the appreciation

of votes and the conduct of the campaign and balloting, which require more
deliberate and necessarily longer consideration, are left for examination in
the corresponding election protest. Harlin Castillo Abayon Vs. Commission
on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 181295, April 2, 2009.
Administrative Law
Dishonesty. The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees enunciates the States policy of promoting a high standard of
ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service. And no other office in
the government service exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness and
uprightness from an employee than in the judiciary. Persons involved in the
dispensation of justice, from the highest official to the lowest clerk, must
live up to the strictest standards of integrity, probity, uprightness and
diligence in the public service. As the assumption of public office is
impressed with paramount public interest, which requires the highest
standards of ethical standards, persons aspiring for public office must
observe honesty, candor and faithful compliance with the law.
While dishonesty is considered a grave offense punishable by dismissal even
at the first instance, jurisprudence is replete with cases where the Court
lowered the penalty of dismissal to suspension taking into account the
presence of mitigating circumstances such as length of service in the
government and being a first time offender. Office of the Court
Administrator Vs. Ma. Celia A. Flores, A.M. No. P-07-2366, April 16, 2009.
Re-assignment; detail. A reassignment is a movement of an employee from
one organizational unit to another in the same department or agency which
does not involve a reduction in rank, status or salary and does not require the
issuance of an appointment. A detail, on the other hand, is a movement from
one agency to another. National Transmission Corp. Vs. Venusto D. Hamoy,
Jr., G.R. No. 179255. April 2, 2009
March
2009
Decisions
on

Constitutional and Related Laws

Posted on April 17, 2009 by Hector M. de Leon Jr. Posted in Constitutional Law,
Criminal Law Tagged agricultural lease, amnesty, ballot appreciation, bidding, burden
of proof, COMELEC, equal protection, immunity from suit, just compensation,
Ombudsman, pre-proclamation, qualified rape, right to counsel, term limits
Here are selected March 2009 decisions on constitutional and related laws:
Administrative Law
Bidding. During the preliminary examination stage, the Bids and Awards
Committee (BAC) checks whether all the required documents were
submitted by the eligible bidders. Note should be taken of the fact that the
technical specifications of the product bidded out is among the documentary
requirements evaluated by the BAC during the preliminary examination
stage. At this point, therefore, the BAC should have already discovered that
the technical specifications of Audio Visuals document camera differed
from the bid specifications in at least three (3) respects, namely: the 15
frames/second frame rate, the weight specification, and the power supply
requirement. Using the non-discretionary criteria laid out in R.A. No. 9184
and IRR-A, therefore, the BAC should have rated Audio Visuals bid as
failed instead of passed. Commission on Audit, etc. vs. Link Worth
International Inc., G.R. No. 184173, March 13, 2009.
Burden of proof. It is settled that in administrative proceedings, the burden

of proof that the respondent committed the acts complained of rests on the
complainant. In fact, if the complainant upon whom rests the burden of
proving his cause of action fails to show in a satisfactory manner the facts
upon which he bases his claim, the respondent is under no obligation to
prove his exception or defense. Even in administrative cases, if a court
employee or magistrate is to be disciplined for a grave offense, the evidence
against him should be competent and should be derived from direct
knowledge. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the presumption that
the respondent has regularly performed his duties will prevail.
In the present case, complainant failed to substantiate his imputations of

impropriety and partiality against respondent Justice. Aside from his naked
allegations, conjecture and speculations, he failed to present any other
evidence to prove his charges. Hence, the presumption that respondent
regularly performed his duties prevails. On the other hand, respondent
Justice adequately explained that since his voluntary inhibition from the
case, he no longer participated in the case and his perceived participation in
the issuance of the assailed Resolution was a result of a typographical
mistake. The Law Firm of Chavez Miranda Aseoche, etc. vs. Justice Isaias
P. Dicdican, A.M. No. CA-09-48-J, March 13, 2009., see also Rodolfo B.
Baygar, Sr. vs. Judge Lilian D. Panontongan, et al., A.M. No. MTJ-081699, March 17, 2009.
Agrarian law
Breach by agricultural lessee. R.A. No. 3844 does not operate to take away
completely every landowners rights to his land. Nor does it authorize the
agricultural lessee to act in an abusive or excessive manner in derogation of
the landowners rights. After all, he is just an agricultural lessee. Although
the agrarian laws afford the opportunity for the landless to break away from
the vicious cycle of having to perpetually rely on the kindness of others, a
becoming modesty demands that this kindness should at least be
reciprocated, in whatever small way, by those benefited by them. Here, the
Supreme Court held that the construction of the reservoir by the leseee
constitutes a violation of Section 36 of R.A. No. 3844, an unauthorized use
of the landholding for a purpose other than what had been agreed upon, and
a violation of the leasehold contract between the lessee and lessor, for which
the former was penalized with permanent dispossession of his
leasehold. PCarlo A. Castillo vs. Manuel Tolentino, G.R. No.
181525, March 4, 2009.
Just compensation; when determined. As to the legal basis of just
compensation for land taken by the Department of Agrarian Reform for
distribution to farmer-beneficiaries, the Supreme Court held that the
applicable law is R.A. No. 6657. In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Pacita

Agricultural Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc., etc., et al., the Court made a

comparative analysis of cases that confronted the issue of whether properties
covered by P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228, for which the landowners had yet
to be paid, would be compensated under P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228 or
under the pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 6657. The Court observed that in
Gabatin v. Land Bank of the Philippines a case which LBP invokes in this
controversy the Court declared that the reckoning period for the
determination of just compensation should be the time when the land was
taken, i.e., in 1972, applying P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228. However, the
Court also noted that after Gabatin, the Court had decided several cases in
which it found it more equitable to determine just compensation based on
the value of the property at the time of payment. Land Bank of the
Philippines vs. Hernando T. Chico, et al., G.R. No. 168453. March 13, 2009
Just compensation; market data approach. In the instant case, the regional
trial court (RTC) did not consider Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657 as
well as Department Administrative Order (DAO) DAO No. 6 in determining
just compensation for agrarian reform cases. Instead, it adopted, hook, line
and sinker, the market data approach introduced by the commissioner
nominated by Allied. This undoubtedly constitutes a glaring departure from
the established tenet on the mandatory nature of Section 17 of Republic Act
No. 6657 and DAO No. 6, as amended. It is worthy to note that Allied did
not provide any evidence that the market data approach, which based the
value of the land in question on sales and listings of similar properties
situated within the area, conformed to the subject administrative order, and it
is not also clear if same approach took into consideration the said
administrative order. Such being the case, the market data approach
espoused by Allied cannot be a valuation that complies with the
requirements under the agrarian law. Besides, this Court has once refused to
accept the market data approach as a method of valuation compliant with the
agrarian law and enforced by the DAR. Allied Banking Corp. vs. The Land
Bank of the Philippines, et al., G.R. No. 175422, March 13, 2009
Constitutional Law.
COMELEC powers. Under Sec. 2, Article IV-C of the 1987 Constitution,
the COMELEC exercises original jurisdiction over all contests, relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial,
and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over election contests involving

elective municipal and barangay officials, and has supervision and control
over the board of canvassers. The COMELEC sitting en banc, however, does
not have the authority to hear and decide election cases, including preproclamation controversies in the first instance, as the COMELEC in
division has such authority. The COMELEC en banc can exercise
jurisdiction only on motions for reconsideration of the resolution or decision
of the COMELEC in division. Petitioners contention that the COMELECs
choice of officials to substitute the members of the Board of Canvassers is
limited only to those enumerated under Sec. 21 of Republic Act. No. 6646 is
untenable. Contrary to petitioners assertion, the enumeration above is not
exclusive. Members of Board of Canvassers can be filled up by the
COMELEC not only from those expressly mentioned in the above-quoted
provision, but from others outside if the former are not available. Arturo F.
Pacificador and Jovito C. Plameras, Jr. vs. Comelec, etc., et al., G.R. No.
178259, March 13, 2009.
Equal protection clause. Prior to R.A. No. 8042, OFWs and local workers
with fixed-term employment who were illegally discharged were treated
alike in terms of the computation of their money claims: they were
uniformly entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired portions of their
contracts. But with the enactment of R.A. No. 8042, illegally dismissed
overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) with an unexpired portion of one year or
more in their employment contract have since been differently treated in that
their money claims are subject to a 3-month cap, whereas no such limitation
is imposed on local workers with fixed-term employment. The Court
concludes that the subject clause contains a suspect classification in that, in
the computation of the monetary benefits of fixed-term employees who are
illegally discharged, it imposes a 3-month cap on the claim of OFWs with an
unexpired portion of one year or more in their contracts, but none on the
claims of other OFWs or local workers with fixed-term employment. The
subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it with a
peculiar disadvantage. There being a suspect classification involving a
vulnerable sector protected by the Constitution, the Court now subjects the
classification to a strict judicial scrutiny, and determines whether it serves a
compelling state interest through the least restrictive means. What
constitutes compelling state interest is measured by the scale of rights and
powers arrayed in the Constitution and calibrated by history. It is akin to the
paramount interest of the state for which some individual liberties must give
way, such as the public interest in safeguarding health or maintaining

medical standards, or in maintaining access to information on matters of

public concern. In the present case, the Court dug deep into the records but
found no compelling state interest that the subject clause may possibly serve.
Antonio M. Serrano vs. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., et al.,G.R. No.
167614, March 24, 2009.
Immunity from suit. The Commission on Audit (COA) is an
unincorporated government agency which does not enjoy a separate juridical
personality of its own. Hence, even in the exercise of proprietary functions
incidental to its primarily governmental functions, COA cannot be sued
without its consent. Assuming that the contract it entered into with Audio
Visual can be taken as an implied consent to be sued, and further that
incidental reliefs such as damages may be awarded in certiorari proceedings,
Link Worth did not appeal the Court of Appeals Decision deleting the
award of damages against COA. Consequently, Link Worth is bound by the
findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Court of Appeals, including
the deletion of the award of exemplary damages, attorneys fees and costs.
Commission on Audit, etc. Vs. Link Worth International Inc., G.R. No.
182559, March 13, 2009.
Ombudsman. The scope of the authority of the Ombudsman in
administrative cases as defined under the Constitution and R.A. No. 6770 is
broad enough to include the direct imposition of the penalty of removal,
suspension, demotion, fine or censure on an erring public official or
employee.
Right to counsel. Under Section 12(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution,
an accused is entitled to have competent and independent counsel preferably
of his own choice. The phrase preferably of his own choice does not
convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under
investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and
independent attorneys from handling the defense. Otherwise, the tempo of
custodial investigation would be solely in the hands of the accused who can
impede, nay, obstruct, the progress of the interrogation by simply selecting a
lawyer who, for one reason or another, is not available to protect his interest.
While the choice of a lawyer in cases where the person under custodial
interrogation cannot afford the services of counsel or where the preferred
lawyer is not available is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the
suspect has the final choice, as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and

ask for another one. A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed

engaged by the accused when he does not raise any objection to the
counsels appointment during the course of the investigation, and the
accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of the statement before the
swearing officer. Appellants Arnaldo and Flores did not object to the
appointment of Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous as their lawyers, respectively,
during their custodial investigation. Prior to their questioning, appellants
Arnaldo and Flores conferred with Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous. Appellant
Arnaldo manifested that he would be assisted by Atty. Uminga, while
appellant Flores agreed to be counseled by Atty. Rous. Atty. Uminga and
Atty. Rous countersigned the written extra-judicial confessions of appellants
Arnaldo and Flores, respectively. Hence, appellants Arnaldo and Flores are
deemed to have engaged the services of Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous,
respectively. Since the prosecution has sufficiently established that the
respective extra-judicial confessions of appellant Arnaldo and appellant
Flores were obtained in accordance with the constitutional guarantees, these
confessions are admissible. They are evidence of a high order because of the
strong presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately and
knowingly confess to a crime, unless prompted by truth and
conscience. People of the Philippines vs. Domingo Reyes Y Paje, et
al., G.R. No. 178300, March 17, 2009.
Term limits. The three-term limit for elective local officials is contained in
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. The Constitution did not expressly
prohibit Congress from fixing any term of office for barangay officials,
thereby leaving to the lawmakers full discretion to fix such term in
accordance with the exigencies of public service. The discussions in the
Constitutional Commission showed that the term of office of barangay
officials would be [a]s may be determined by law, and more precisely,
[a]s provided for in the Local Government Code. Section 43(b) of the
Local Government Code provides that barangay officials are covered by the
three-term limit, while Section 43(c) thereof states that the term of office of
barangay officials shall be five (5) years. The rule on the three-term limit,
embodied in the Constitution and the Local Government Code, has two
parts.
The first part provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more
than three consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms
count in determining the three-term limit rule. The second part states that

voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt the
continuity of service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance from
office for any length of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the
service before and after the interruption from being joined together to form a
continuous service or consecutive terms. After three consecutive terms, an
elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth term.
The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office
following the end of the third consecutive term.
The second part of the rule on the three-term limit shows the clear intent of
the framers of the Constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the threeterm limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect
the peoples choice and grant their elected official full service of a term. The
Court held that two conditions for the application of the disqualification
must concur: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three
consecutive terms in the same government post; and (2) that he has fully
served three consecutive terms.
In this case, it is undisputed that petitioner was elected as Punong Barangay
for three consecutive terms, satisfying the first condition for disqualification.
Indeed, petitioner was serving his third term as Punong Barangay when he
ran for Sangguniang Bayan member and, upon winning, assumed the
position of Sangguniang Bayan member, thus, voluntarily relinquishing his
office as Punong Barangay which the Court deems as a voluntary
renunciation of said office. Nicasio Bolos, Jr. vs. The Commission on
Election, et al., G.R. No. 184082, March 17, 2009.
Criminal Law
Amnesty. The Supreme Court held that there is prima facie evidence for the
prosecution of the petitioners for the murders of Rolando Olalia and Leonor
Alay-ay. The arguments that petitioners are exempt from prosecution on
account of the grants of amnesty they had received are ultimately without
merit, on account of the specified limitations in the said grant of
amnesty. Oscar E. Legaspi vs. Serafin R. Cuevas etc., et al. / Eduardo E.
Kapunan, Jr. vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 148243/G.R. No. 148213-17, March
13, 2009.

Qualified Rape; Penalty. With the abolition of the death penalty by

Republic Act No. 9346, the penalty for qualified rape is reclusion perpetua.
Pursuant to People v. Bon, the penalty for attempted rape should also be
reckoned from reclusion perpetua. In the scale of penalties in Article 71 of
the Revised Penal Code, the penalty two degrees lower than reclusion
perpetua is prision mayor. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, absent
any modifying circumstance, the maximum term of the indeterminate
penalty shall be taken from the medium period of prision mayor or from 8
years and 1 day to 10 years, while the minimum term is one degree lower
than prision mayor,i.e., prision correccional, from 6 months and 1 day to 6
years. People of the Philippines vs. Manuel Brioso y Tanda, G.R. No.
185278, March 13, 2009.
Election Law
Appreciation of Ballots. The object of the appreciation of ballots is to
ascertain and carry into effect the intention of the voter, if it can be
determined with reasonable certainty. When placed in issue, the appreciation
of contested ballots and election documents, which involves a question of
fact, is best left to the determination of the COMELEC. The Supreme Court
did not find grave abuse of discretion when the COMELEC credited to
respondent the vote for Mantete, following the idem sonans rule. Aldo B.
Cordia Vs. Joel G. Monforte and Comelec, G.R. No. 174620, March 4,
2009.
Pre-proclamation cases. The COMELEC should rule on pre-proclamation
cases individually, even if the ruling is simply couched in a minute
resolution. This will dispel qualms about lack of adequate notice to party
litigants, and obviate the confusion that generally results from the issuance
of omnibus resolutions. In all, such a practice would be consistent with the
constitutional principle of transparency, and lend itself to greater public
confidence in our electoral system. In the case at bar, the petitioner may
have been equally confused on the remedies available to him vis--vis
Resolution No. 8212. We do not fault him for this, but we nonetheless
dismiss his petition because we find no grave abuse of discretion in the
assailed COMELEC Resolution and Order. Elpidio B. Valino vs. Alvin P.
Vergara, Tomas N. Joson III, et al., G.R. No. 180492, March 13, 2009.

February
2009
Decisions
Constitutional
Law
Administrative Law
on
and
Tagged administrative liability, dual citizenship, expropriation, political question,
reorganization
Here are some of the decisions promulgated by the Supreme Court in

February 2009 on constitutional law and administrative law.
Administrative Law
1. Administrative liability. It is a fundamental principle in the law on public
officers that administrative liability is separate from and independent of
criminal liability. A simple act or omission can give rise to criminal, civil or
administrative liability, each independently of the others. This is known as
the threefold liability rule. Thus, absolution from a criminal charge is not a
bar to an administrative prosecution, and vice-versa. The dismissal of the
administrative cases against the petitioners will not necessarily result in the
dismissal of the criminal complaints filed against them. Eleno T. Regidor,
Jr. etal. Vs. People of the Philippines, et al. G.R. No. 166086-92, February
13, 2009.
2. Reorganization. A reorganization involves the reduction of personnel,
consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or
redundancy of functions. It alters the existing structure of government
offices or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and
responsibility between them to make the bureaucracy more responsive to the
needs of the public clientele as authorized by law. It could result in the loss
of ones position through removal or abolition of an office. For a
reorganization for the purpose of economy or to make the bureaucracy more
efficient to be valid, however, it must pass the test of good faith, otherwise it
is void ab initio. In the case at bar, petitioner claims that there has been a
drastic reduction of plantilla positions in the new staffing pattern in order to

address the local government units gaping budgetary deficit. Thus, he states
that in the municipal treasurers office and waterworks operations unit where
respondents were previously assigned, only 11 new positions were created
out of the previous 35 which had been abolished; and that the new staffing
pattern had 98 positions only, as compared with the old which had 129. The
CSC, however, highlighted the recreation of six (6) casual positions for clerk
II and utility worker I, which positions were previously held by respondents
Marivic, Cantor, Asor and Enciso. Petitioner inexplicably never disputed
this finding nor proferred any proof that the new positions do not perform
the same or substantially the same functions as those of the abolished.
Nowhere in the records does it appear that these recreated positions were
first offered to respondents. The appointment of casuals to these recreated
positions violates R.A. 6656. Pan vs. Pena, G.R. No. 174244, February 13,
2009.
Constitutional Law
1. Expropriation. The National Power Corporation (NPC) filed a complaint
for the acquisition of easement right of way over lots of Co in connection
with the construction of NPCs transmission lines. The Supreme Court held
that: (a) Republic Act No. 8974 applies applies to properties expropriated for
the installation of NPCs power transmission lines; (b) NPC is liable to pay
the full amount of the fair market value and not merely a 10 percent
easement fee for the expropriated property; (c) the value of the property
should be reckoned as of 27 June 2001, the date of the filing of the
complaint in compliance with Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. National
Power Corporation vs. Co, GR No. 166973, February 10, 2009.
2. Political question. The challenge to the jurisdiction of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee to hear the so called Moscow incident effectively asks
the Court to inquire into a matter that is within the full discretion of the
Senate. The issue partakes of the nature of a political question that, in
Taada v. Cuenco, was characterized as a question which, under the
Constitution, is to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government. Pursuant to this

constitutional grant of virtually unrestricted authority to determine its own

rules, the Senate is at liberty to alter or modify these rules at any time it may
see fit, subject only to the imperatives of quorum, voting and publication. It
is not for the Supreme Court to intervene in what is clearly a question of
policy, an issue dependent upon the wisdom, not the legality, of the Senates
action. Sps. PNP Director Eliseo D. Dela Paz, et al. Vs. Senate Committee.,
G.R. No. 184849, February 13, 2009.
3. Dual citizenship. Dual citizenship is not a ground for disqualification
from running for any elective local position. Cordora vs. Comelec, et al..R.
No. 176947, February 19, 2009.
Miscellaneous Laws
Witness. The Supreme Court held that for an allegation of tampering to be
the basis for the disconnection of a customers electric supply, the discovery
of such must be personally witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law
or an ERB representative. This requirement can not be dispensed with. In the
present case, it is admitted that no police officer or ERB representative was
present during the inspection, removal and subsequent replacement of the
electric meters alleged to have been tampered with, hence, the requirement
of the law was not complied with a lapse fatal to MERALCOs
cause. Manila Electric Company Vs. Hsing Nan Tannery Phils., Inc., G.R.
No. 178913, February 12, 2009
A Debate Over A Regime of Islands

Tagged Kalayaan, national territoy, Spratly
On March 10, 2009, the President signed into law Republic Act No. 9522,
entitled An Act to Amend Certain Provisions of Republic Act No. 3046, as
Amended by Republic Act No. 5446, to Define the Archipelagic Baselines
of the Philippines, and for Other Purposes.
Congress passed the law in order to comply with a May 13, 2009 deadline of
the United Nations for countries to define the boundaries of its continental

shelf under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
Section 1 of the law defined the baselines of the Philippine

archipelago. The geographic coordinates mentioned in Section 1 do not
include the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), or better known as the Spratly
Islands (which are also being claimed by such countries as China, Vietnam
and Malaysia). Congress chose to deal with the KIG (and Scarborough
Shoal) in Section 2, which provides:
The baselines in the following areas over which the Philippines likes (sic)
exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction shall be determined as Regime of
Islands under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121 of
the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS):
a)
The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree
No. 1596; and
b)
Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal.
Prior to the passage of the law, it appears that four options were being
considered in defining the territorial baselines of the country:
1.
The main archipelago and Scarborough Shoal are enclosed by the
baselines while KIG is classified as regime of islands. . .
2.
Only the main archipelago is enclosed by the baselines while KIG and
Scarborough Shoal are classified as regime of islands. . .
3.
The main archipelago and KIG are enclosed by the baselines while
Scarborough Shoal is classified as regime of islands.
4.
The main archipelago, KIG and Scarborough Shoal are enclosed by the
baselines. . .
(see Senator Antonio F. Trillanes IV, The territorial baseline issue, Malaya,

March 14, 2009)

According to reports, the House of Representatives version of the bill
includes the Scarborough Shoal and KIG within the baselines (see option 4)
while the Senate version classified the disputed territory as a regime of
islands (see option 2). The Senate position prevailed during the bicameral
conference committee deliberations held for the purpose of reconciling the
two bills. (see Congress set to ratify baselines bill, Inquirer.net)
In her sponsorship speech on her version of the 2009 baselines bill, Senator
Miram Defensor-Santiago explains the adoption of the regime of island
principle.
There are three important reasons why the bill adopts the regime of islands
principle:
First, it has the advantage of avoiding conflicting basepoints with other
claimants to the Spratlys. Conflicting basepoints is the reason why your
Committee decided not to adopt other bills. The Committee takes the view
that if a modern baselines bill includes conflicting basepoints with other
claimant states, this would certainly be a source of diplomatic strain with
such states as China , Vietnam , Malaysia , and Taiwan .
Second, the regime of islands principle increases the size of our
archipelagic waters and EEZ by about 76,518 nautical miles over existing
laws.
Third, the pending bill does not deviate from the natural shape of our
archipelago, thus complying with Unclos, Article 47, para. 3, which provides
that the drawing of such baselines shall not depart to any appreciable extent
from the general configuration of the archipelago.
(see Sponsorship Speech, The 2009 Baseline Bill)
Not everyone agrees that KIG and Scarborough Shoal should be excluded
from the baselines. For example:
. . . former Ambassador to the United Nations Lauro Baja says the baseline

bill is seriously flawed because it excludes the disputed Kalayaan islands

from Philippine territory.
Baja says the exclusion of the Kalayaan islands, which is part of the
province of Palawan, runs counter to national interest.
Thats because Kalayaan is part of the Spratly Group of Islands, a disputed
atoll in the South China Sea that is claimed not just by the Philippines but by
China, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, and Taiwan.
Baja says these countries have included the Spratlys in their own baselines,
and that by excluding it from our own baseline law, the Philippines is
effectively undermining our claim to Kalayaan. (see Baja: Baselines bill
weakens RP claim to Kalayaan, ABS-CBN News) ,
On the other hand, while Senator Trillanes does not have objections to the
exlcusion of the KIG from the baselines, he disagrees with the exclusion of
the Scarborough Shoal from the baselines. In his version of the baselines bill
(Senate Bill No. 1467), he included the Scarborough Shoal in the baselines.
He says:
. . . there are some misconceptions regarding the label regime of islands
that it supposedly weakens our claim or reduces our sovereignty over the
areas labeled as such. On the contrary, regime of islands is defined in Art.
121 [of the UNCLOS] as: 1) island/s that is naturally formed, surrounded by
water and is above water at high tide; and 2) it shall have its own 12nm
territorial sea, 24nm contiguous zone, 200nm EEZ and continental shelf. In
other words, islands classified as regime of islands are treated the same way
as other land territory. The only possible reason that coastal states would be
forced to classify their territory as a regime of islands is because such
territory is impossible to enclose within the baselines without violating other
UNCLOS provisions. The Falkland island group is one example. Since the
UK is at the other end of the Atlantic which made it impossible to include
Falkland in its own baseline, it has no choice but to classify Falkland as a
regime of islands.
The Scarborough Shoal was included in the baselines [of Senate Bill No.
1467] primarily because its distance from Luzon is less than the 125nm

limit. With this, our country stands to gain approximately 14,500sq nm of

EEZ and continental shelf. Another reason for its inclusion is that
Scarborough Shoal is basically a rock and according to Paragraph 3 of Art.
121, the regime of islands definition has an exception and that is: Rocks
which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall
have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf. Therefore, while it is
advantageous for us to designate KIG as a regime of islands, we would be
depriving ourselves of the EEZ and continental shelf of Scarborough Shoal
if it would be designated as a regime of islands. (see Senator Antonio F.
Trillanes IV, The territorial baseline issue, Malaya, March 14, 2009)
ABS-CBN News has learned that some lawyers are considering questioning
the baseline bill before the Supreme Court. (see Baja: Baselines bill
weakens RP claim to Kalayaan, ABS-CBN News) .

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ATTY.

RESCI ANGELLI RIZADA

January 2014 Philippine Supreme

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procedural and substantive due process; the constitutional guarantee of

Constitutional bodies; concept of independence. The independence enjoyed

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III v. Office of the President, etc., et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty.

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et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No.

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criticisms in the performance of his duties. On the contrary, respondents

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and balances that the creation of an Ombudsman office seeks to revitalize.

Dissension in the Court: July 2013

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In a decision penned by Justice Peralta and promulgated last July 1, 2013,

Acting on petitioners motion, the RTC dismissed the complaint based on

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ATTY. RESCI ANGELLI RIZADA

respondents just compensation of Php1,500/sqm as recommended by the

Dissension in the Court: June 2013

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On February 8, 2013, Tan filed a Manifestation with Motion to Admit

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requirements under RA 9225. She also attached to her motion an Affidavit

ATTY. RESCI ANGELLI RIZADA

ATTY. RESCI ANGELLI RIZADA

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ATTY. RESCI ANGELLI RIZADA

after the candidate has assumed office on June 30 is contrary to prevailing

SEC Guidelines on Compliance with

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued Memorandum

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Nationalized activities refer to those areas of investments which are

Dissension in the Court: April 2013

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stakeholders in the judicial appointment process to recommend nominees to

The majority cannot accede to the argument of respondents that allowing

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JBC, failed to consider the impact of a changed character of the Legislature

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propose a bicameral Congress.

Posted on May 1, 2013 by Vicente D. Gerochi IV Posted in Constitutional Law,

Much like a swinging pendulum, the decision of the Supreme Court on

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The New Ruling

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district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields

ATTY. RESCI ANGELLI RIZADA

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its specific implementing provisions, bearing in mind the applicable

ATTY. RESCI ANGELLI RIZADA

ATTY. RESCI ANGELLI RIZADA

Dissension in the Court: March 2013

In a majority decision penned by J. Perlas-Bernabe and promulgated last

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In reversing the HRET ruling, the Supreme Court distinguished between a

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of a permanent resident status in a foreign country or (ii) his commission of