People just want to get on with their lives: civil society and the production of

normality in post-conflict Nepal

Celayne Heaton Shrestha & Ramesh Adhikari

Introduction
In the political transition following the end of a 11 year Maoist insurgency (1996-2006) and the end
of ex-king Gyanendras autocratic regime (2002-2006) civil society in Nepal has been expected to
play a major role by the international community, and has frequently been consulted by national
political actors. Manuals detailing and workshops exploring the roles to be played by civil society
groups in the political transition have proliferated. 1 However, public discourse about civil society
has yet to appreciate the ways in which civil society in Nepal has been transformed by the end of
the conflict and autocracy, and how is continuing to change in the current context. The account
developed here seeks to contribute to understandings of Nepals civil society in the contemporary
setting (post-jana andolan II or JAII)2 as well as to understandings of the ways in which civil society
change during political transitions more broadly.
This paper is an ethnographically informed account of some significant changes that parts of
Nepals civil society have undergone in the post-autocratic period (2006-2010). It traces these
changes within a group of human rights organizations in the capital, Kathmandu, and looser
alliances that were active and visible from 2005 in Nepal. The changes that are considered here
were deemed significant by the researchers by virtue of being the subject of particular and
frequent commentary by observers of civil society in Nepal, including activists and the media. The
ethnographic material allows us to add to existing work on civil society and political transition in
the wake of violent conflict and autocracy in two main areas: firstly, in relation to the nature of the
changes undergone by civil society during such transitions and the drivers of change; and
secondly, in relation to the nature of civil societys engagement in projects of reconstruction,
particularly the restoration of normality in everyday life.
In relation to the first area, there is a substantial body of work that has examined the ways in
which civil society changes during political transitions. It spans several countries and has
considered the ideological, strategic and organizational aspects of these changes. For example,
Alison Brysk (1994) shows how in Argentina the human rights movement effectiveness in dealing
with the regime decreased after the completion of the transition. The movements strengths under
authoritarianism such as its resolute leadership, its focus on non-negotiable demands and
emphasis on symbolic strategies of protest, proved limiting in the post-authoritarian setting. These
constrained the movements ability to establish cross-sectoral alliances and bargain with
democratic institutions. Krygier (1997) provides another example, this time, in Poland. Here, he
found that once communism had collapsed, the democratic movement lost its organizational
strength and fragmented as it lost the ability to contain within itself a multiplicity of ideologies in
the absence of a clearly defined enemy. Valenzuelas 1989 study of labour movements and
democratic transitions in Argentina, Greece, Peru, the Phillipines, Portugal, Spain and Urugyay
notes that often, as transition gets underway, demands, protest and strikes tend to proliferate.
While differences might have been put on the back burner as the various sectors focused on
opposing the regime, re-democratisation will see these differences and competition reemerge and
groups scramble to ensure control over their usual turf and expand beyond it. The image is of a
fragmented civil society unable to bridge internal differences. In Valuenzuela, the fragmentation is
driven by the attempts, by various groups, to broaden their constituency; in all cases, authors
suggest that the dynamics observed can be traced to a wish to have a voice in the new political
set-up or at least remain relevant to political life. In other words, civil society is moved by the
same dynamics as civil society in more politically stable times. We take issue with this point.
1

See for example documents at: http://www.icsw.org/doc/Nepal_National_Consultation_Workshop_%2039pp_Jul09.pdf

(Accessed on 11/02/2011).
2
Jana andolan II or peoples movement II refers to the 19-day long popular uprising of April 2006 that brought an end to the
kings autocratic rule.

Grounding our analysis in the detail of the performance of actions by civil society groups, and the
meanings these hold for activists, we argue that civil society is animated by drives that may be
specific to post-conflict/post-autocratic periods. Specifically, we argue that it is predominantly
driven by a will towards the restoration of normality. 3 By normality we mean the sense of
living in normal as opposed to exceptional times, when anything can happen; we do not
mean the situation that prevailed prior to a disruptive incident (e.g. the way that civil society
functioned prior to the emergency of 2002). The drive towards restoring normality was not
manifested explicitly in the agendas and programs of the civil society organizations (CSOs)
observed. There were no calls for a return to normality within civil society. In fact, many of these
CSOs aimed, explicitly, towards social transformation, change, rather than restoration. Rather, it
was manifest implicitly, in the manner of performances, and fleetingly, in off-hand or off-therecord remarks uttered in the flow of everyday interactions and conversations.
This takes us to the second area to which this paper hopes to contribute. That civil society actors
were engaged in projects to restore normality is not surprising. 4 The un-ordering effects of violence
on life-worlds (Nordstrom 1997) and efforts to restore normality in the wake of conflict, such as the
repairing of relationships enabling commerce to resume (Das et al. 2001), restoring trust (Last
2000) or the narrative construction of normal time in opposition to the time of riots and violence
(Mehta & Chatterjee 2001) have been widely documented. But that this restoration occurs within
the institutions of civil society and their actions has less commonly been observed. More
frequently, civil society has been seen as an agent of the restoration of normality in others
disrupted lives and lifeworlds, for example, in the literature on peace-building (Gready 2003; Pajibo
2007; Paffenholz 2009; Kage 2010). Here, we propose to see civil society as the object of this
restoration and also its means. That is, civil society discourses, repertoires of action, material and
human resources are shown to provide the means for civil society actors engaged in projects to
restore normality in their own lives in the wake of violent conflict and political upheaval. This has
not been dealt with adequately by the literature on civil society and political transition which has
focused more on program contents or features of organization (eg relations between CSOs, or
between political parties and CSOs and so forth) rather than everyday life within the space of civil
society.
Before we turn to the ethnography, we should state how we understand the term civil society.
Hearn (2001) points out that, for all its diversity, some elements are consistently found across
visions and versions of civil society in public discourse today. There is, minimally, an
understanding that civil society constitutes a sphere that is relatively autonomous from the state,
even if boundaries across the state and non-state sector are porous (Lewis 2008) and populated
by a plethora of social actors acting collectively and voluntarily for purposes other than making a
profit. In the context of Nepal, definitions in the published literature have not departed
significantly from these (eg Dahal 2006; Panday 2008). Consistently, albeit more narrowly, public
discourse about civil society has emphasized its normative opposition to both profit and to
political parties.
Few non-state actors, however, are felt to fit this ideal. Non-governmental organization (NGO)
claims to be part of civil society are frequently rejected on the grounds that they serve as the
means for symbolic and material accumulation for its members (Siwakoti 2000; Sangroula 2009);
and any claim by non-state groups to being apolitical is received with equal cynicism by the public.
Statements such as all political parties have their own civil society are routine in discussions of
civil society in Nepal.
We wish to state from the outset that we do not take such statements at face value. This is both a
function of the theoretical approach informing the study and also the empirical material, which
3

When we write of will or drive we do not wish to suggest that civil society can be analysed as a single agent imbued
with a human-like consciousness; we use these terms as a shorthand for a series of apparently congruent tendencies
across a range of practices and discourses.
4

By civil society actors we mean social actors whose identity and everyday lives are strongly tied to civil society activity.

showed that any action or organization, regardless of its orientation and the nature of its activities,
and no matter how cross-cutting its political connections, could be labeled as partisan. As in
Heaton Shrestha and Adhikari (2011), we took the politicality or apoliticality of any act or
event as socially constructed. In this earlier paper, we sought to understand when a phenomenon
got read as political and when not. We argued and still hold that the tendency to read specific
events as political party motivated (politicised) is itself in need of explanation. Overall, while
we acknowledge that relations with political parties and political beliefs have implications for the
alliances formed within civil society and the actions by civil society groups, we do not privilege
these beliefs in the explanation of these alliances or actions and how they change over time.
In this paper, when we write of civil society, we intend to refer to the multitude of non-state
associations, from the more formal (including NGOs) to the less formal social movements,
normatively distinct from both the market and political parties but with diverse and complex
relations to the market and political parties in practice.
The paper proceeds as follows: after a short account of the methodology adopted in the study, we
describe each one of the three processes mentioned above in turn, that is, the process of
differentiation occurring within civil society; the process of ritualization of public actions by civil
society groups and the process of politicisation of civil society actions. In the final section, we
summarize the argument so far and discuss the significance of these processes for our
understanding of civil society in periods of political transition.

Methodology
The paper is based on material collected as part of an Economic and Social Research Council
(ESRC) funded research project. 5 It draws on interviews with members of civil society, senior NGO
representatives, human rights volunteers; newspaper clippings of civil society events prior to 2007
and notes from observations of events organised by various civil society groups in Nepal over the
course of 13 months (April 2007-July 2008), supplemented by on-going documentation of civil
society events during repeated visits in 2009 and 2010. All of the organizations and looser
networks included in the study were based in the capital, Kathmandu, though these frequently
operated outside of the capital and on issues considered of national relevance.

Differentiation of civil society space post-JAII

One of the key characteristics of post-autocratic Nepal was its highly diversified character. While
the last year of ex-king Gyanendras autocratic regime witnessed a qualitative change in civil
society activism,6 the number of civil society actors and issues raised during the years of
autocracy remained limited. By contrast, the period following JAII saw groups and demands
multiply exponentially. Living in the capital city in this period, it seemed as though not a day went
by without a protest. Even as much as four years after the CPA, reported a national daily
newspaper:
Nepal has witnessed to an unbelievable number of protests in the preceding month... If the
statistics compiled by the Nepal Police...Headquarters is anything to go by, in Mangsir alone
(November 16 - December 15), the country recorded at least 599 nationwide protests in
various forms and dimensions. The data disclosed by the Nepal Police show a staggering
165 sit-in protests during the period. Mid-region tops the chart with 34 instances of sit-ins
when compared to 32 in the Western region. Mid-western witnessed 3 sit-ins, Eastern
region 22 and Far-western 14 (The Himalayan Times 2010).
Not only was the number of protests high, protest activities would be carried out by the most
unlikely groups. Consider, for example, the following actions in a single month in early 2007:
5

For details, see http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/NGPA/Research_projects/Default.htm.

This is so particularly with the emergence of the Citizens Movement for Democracy and Peace or CMDP. For details see
Heaton-Shrestha & Adhikari 2010.
6

The Committee against HIV/AIDS threatens to launch an agitation if the state doesnt meet its
demands by mid-April. The committee further states that it will organize awareness programs, a
signature campaign and so forth in order that the state ensures the proportional representation of
affected people in the constituent assembly (CA); and the drafting and implementation of policies
and bye-laws to combat HIV/AIDS.
The Central struggle committee of family of deceased police and disability retired police
association says it will protest till its demands are met. It will submit a 35-point demand to the
Home Ministry and stage sit-ins at Maitighar from April 3rd and in front of the PMs residence.
An indefinite strike (bandh) is declared by industrialists, in protest at the beating of a hotel
owner by supposed Maoist cadres (Woodland Hotel, DurbarMarg, Kathmandu), and the refusal by
the PM to see a group of businessmen and industrialists (including the injured individual). They
state that they will hold a rally and force the closure of shops, factories, banks, educational
establishments unless the security situation improves.
The Fruits and Vegetables Vocational Committee announces protest programs, and threatens
to close the Kalimati fruits and vegetable market (KFVM) if the government doesnt fulfill its
demand of a separate policy for the production, storage and dissemination of fruits and
vegetables, and a clear marketing policy. The committee warns that they will burn an effigy of the
Minister for Agriculture and Cooperatives on March 23rd, padlock the administration building of
KFVM on March 22nd and close KFVM on March 25th.
Summarizing the situation, an activist we were interviewing commented: everyone takes out a
rally for anything now. There has even been a rally against rallies! 7
Alongside a proliferation of issues and groups, Nepals civil society experienced what can be
described as fragmentation in the post-JAII period. Older groups were splitting and new alliances
forged. Many of the activists interviewed deplored the fragmentation of a once solidary civil
society. Civil society leaders were condemned for having become like political party leaders by
many; a few vented Nepal doesnt need this kind of civil society.
For writers such as Valenzuela (1989), the proliferation and fragmentation of movements is a
natural outcome of liberalization, where civil society had been characterised by sharp political and
ideological differences and competition, in the pre-authoritarian setting. A similar argument has
been made by civil society observers in Nepal. They point out, rightly, that civil society in Nepal
prior to 2005 was very fragmented and competitive as large numbers of organizations pursued
limited resources and visibility. They further hold that the emphasis on solidarity and collective
actions and campaigns in the 2005 period was exceptional and the re-emergence of differences
and fragmentation was inevitable, post-autocracy. This point, we argue, needs to be qualified
somewhat. Rather than a re-emergence of pre-existing differences, what we witness in the postJAII period is a re-emergence of differentiation. This, in turn, heralds the resumption of individual
life projects set in abeyance during the period of intense activism under autocratic rule. We
suggest that this applies to both the proliferation of groups and agendas and the fragmentation of
pre-JAII groups. We illustrate this in relation to fragmentation as the study focused on this
aspect. Arguably, proliferation can also be understood as a process of differentiation as different
groups seek to assert a distinct identity in the post-JAII public domain and extricate themselves
from the undifferentiated mass movement of the 2005-6 period (Heaton Shrestha & Adhikari
2010). We illustrate this in relation to splits within the Citizens Movement (CM) or the Citizens
movement for Democracy and Peace (CMDP) in full, and the reasons given for the split.
Among most publicized splits was the rift between the well known figures Krishna Pahadi and Dr
Devendra Raj Panday that occurred in May 2007.8 We have written about the citizens movement
7

Stated on 27/03/07.

They subsequently rejoined forces and appeared in programmes together during the course of 2010. All along, some
within the CM denied there had been a split altogether: only 2 people have made themselves free, its not a split (CM
core activist: date: day/month/year).

elsewhere (Heaton Shrestha & Adhikari 2010). Officially, the CM was formed five months after the
kings coup of 1st February 2005. It went on to lead a series of events, widely acknowledged as
having acted as a catalyst for the broader movement that gathered strength from September 2005
and culminated in the Peoples Movement of April 20069. Unsurprisingly given the historical
significance of the CM, the split made headline news. Articles appeared in the national media
concerning the breakup (My Disagreement by Krishna Pahadi, 16 th May 2007: no citation in
back, incomplete citation here) and the breakup was also reported on national radio on 17 May,
2007. Subsequently, other well known figures and groups that had once stood side by side in
CMDP events began not to appear in the same programs. Pahadis press release of May 16 th
mentioned theoretical differences or differences in our objectives. A later interview appeared to
contradict the earlier press release: here, Krishna Pahadi emphasized a difference in approach
style of functioning rather than a difference of objective or ideology had caused the split (The
Kathmandu Post 2007).
In the first part of 2008, the CM appeared to undergo a further split, with news of the formation
of a new group called C-9, which included several figures earlier associated with CMDP. We asked
members of C-9 on the one hand, and members of the CM, on the other, for the reasons behind
the establishment of this new group. Explanations again referred to differences in style:
This is a new group. Its not time to draw a line of difference between this and other groups
but the difference can be done like this: in this group there are people who dont
like to participate in sit-ins (dharna). I never go in dharna. Later in the movement I
attended one but that was not a good thing. I favour demonstrationWith CMDP, we are
good friends but program-wise, we sometimes share, sometimes we dont share. I dont
know the reason why a separate group was needed. My answer would be to do
something different from what other groups were doing, different in approach
and program (C-9 member 1) (08/01/08) .
The name [C-9] was created by us. They formed a group of nine persons having some
dispute in agenda with CMDP. We didnt know why they formed the group. So the
name was for the number of the members.Some of the friends were interested
to do daily programs but what we do is put on a program based on the issues.
That was the disagreement. That might be the reason behind the formation of C9: to have a forum to run daily activities. But they are not doing so (CMDP member,
30/06/08).
And again:
C-9 is different from CMDP in two respects: [C-9] is not organized, its just some individuals
together without any formality. We sit together whenever we think we have to, we have no
formal agenda. We are just to tell the government, the [political party] leaders, to find a
peaceful solution all the time. .C-9 is quite informal, based on individuals, not based on
any committee or government (C-9 member 2, 29/06/08).
Some activists and journalists concurred in their explanations for the breakup, for example:
Within civil society [the CM] theres been a division into the Devendra Raj Panday and
Krishna Pahadi factions; in principle they are not different, the working process between
them is different (Young activist, 15/06/2007).
The early movement had been characterized by a high degree of informality as described in
Heaton Shrestha & Adhikari (2010). For a number of activists, the post-JAII saw a return to more
top-down or conventional forms of leadership and this was the basis for the split:

CMDP mass events and the demands put forward by them until the Peoples Movement are listed in the annex to this
paper.

They started to impose decisions on a large number of people. Because of that kind of
working pattern, Krishna Pahadi has said that he doesnt want to be associated with that
movement unless that kind of behaviour changes (CM activist, 26/06/07).
But while the core CM members interviewed focused their explanations on the style of their
activism or differences in approach to activism, activists and observers put forward a broader
range of explanations. For some, the splits within the CM were the product of personality
clashes. Others argued that the fundamental reason was political, and revolved around how to
deal with the former rebels. Reportedly, while one group within the CM believed that adequate
political space was to be granted to the Maoists, another group felt that the Maoists were intent on
destroying Nepals political and social fabric and thus needed to be controlled and tamed. Yet
others expressed that the splits had to do with the desire for power, name and visibility. For
example, in relation to C-9:
They [C-9] didnt find a role in CMDP and so established their own group (CM activist,
27/06/08)
The same was applied to the CM. It was rumored, for instance, that the split between Dr Panday
and Krishna Pahadi was occasioned by the formers intention to make a project under the banner
of CMDP, that is, formalize CM activities and turn these into a money-making opportunity (by
approaching donors for funding).
We would like to make three points from the foregoing. First, it is unlikely that the splits were a
matter of pre-existing differences re-emerging since many of the issues which reportedly caused
the splits were not matters of concern prior to 2005-6. The way in which the CM organized its
activities and mobilized supporters was new for civil society; as was the political quandary that
divided key figures within the CM. Second, that rather than fragmentation, it is more appropriate
to speak of differentiation, as this is in keeping with the way in which activists represented the
splits (i.e. emphasizing difference in their accounts). The third point concerns the explanation for
differentiation. Observers of civil society in Nepal have generally favored one of two explanations
for the splits: that these are due to a process of politicization or the result of a scramble for
power. Both of these may be correct for some individuals within the CM, however, they
significantly underestimate the value of the particular style of activism for those involved and
also the significance of individual name and identity for social actors. In many cases, asserting a
distinct identity was meaningful in itself, as was the pursuit of specific styles of organizing and
campaigning.
We wish to propose an explanation for the differentiation observed that can account for all the
various reasons given for the fragmentation of post-JAII civil society. A notable feature of all the
explanations given for the splits focused on individuals, their preferences, interests, characteristics
and so forth, rather than on collectives. We suggest that the post-JAII expression of differences are
manifestations of the resuming of individual (rather than societal or political) life projects,
interrupted during the period of increasing authoritarianism. This view is lent support by
occasional comments by activists concerning the years (of schooling, study, career advancement)
that they had lost to activism.
We therefore suggest that rather than being the product of pre-existing differences re-emerging,
the post-JAII fragmentation is an active process of differentiation, intrinsically linked with the
resuming of life projects of individual civil society actors. This link renders the fragmentation of
post-JAII civil society qualitatively different from the process of fragmentation in normal times;
we return to this in the final section. First, we will highlight two further characteristics of Nepals
post-JAII civil society.

Ritualization of civil society actions

A second remarkable feature of post-JAII civil society was a certain degree of ritualization in the
performance of its public actions. Key elements of rituals, namely, repetitiveness, the selforiented nature of communication and the familiarity of participants with each other (Rappaport

1999), 10 were pronounced in the civil society programs observed during the course of the study.
Arguably, these also characterized pre-JAII civil society events. What was new in the post-JAII
period was that these features had become the object of explicit commentary by participants and,
in some cases, repetitiveness had become a deliberate objective of programs. Indeed, during the
course of research, many activists would refer to civil society actions (rallies, sit-ins etc.) in which
they were taking part or to which they had been summoned, as ritual or a formality. A concern
with convention, another key feature of ritual was highly evident in this period, in contrast with the
pre-JAII years.
In this section, we describe several events by different civil society groups. In each case, we
endeavour to bring out the ritual-like features of the performance. At the outset, we wish to make
clear that these programs were only ritual-like; many of the elements of ritual, in particular, its
relation to a concept of the Sacred or evocation of the Holy were absent from the events observed.
A corner meeting at Bhotahity 22 November, 2007
On the 1 June, 2007, the then PM Girija Prasad Koirala set the date for the election of the CA for
the 22 November of the same year. The elections for a CA had been one of the key elements of the
Comprehensive Peace Agreeement of November 2006 that brought the 11 year long insurgency to
an end. The elections, first intended to be held in June 2007, had been postponed due to the
unpreparedness by the Election Commission as well as the political parties. As the 22 November
neared, it became clear to observers that the long awaited elections risked being postponed once
again. Just days before the elections, the CPN-Maoist decided to pull out from government stating
the party felt that the situation was not favorable to hold the CA elections. Sure enough, the
elections were postponed due to disagreements among the political parties as to when Nepal
would become a republic (immediately or after debate within the CA) and over the modality of
elections (full proportional representation system, first-past-the-post, or a mix of the two). The
following civil society program took place on the 22 November, 2007 in Kathmandu.11
1.40pm, in the office of a human rights NGO. Y breezes into the office and, as she pops her
head around the door of the library, says: lets go to New Road theres a peace rally!
Then N says wait - tea has just been ordered; lets have tea and then go. C says he
doesnt feel like going. L wants to go but has to stay in the office, as no one else is in today;
M and D have gone to book a vehicle for the NGOs forthcoming AGM. 2.15pm. Finally, tea
arrives. The NGO volunteers gulp it down and leave. We take a taxi to new road. As we
climb out, we spot G, walking towards Basantapur. We yell to call him over, he sees us. We
stop, and ask where hes going: hes off to the peace rally; he was called over by [youth
focused NGO]. Someone phones him on his mobile: the rally has already reached Asan.
We walk faster, Indrachowk, Asan, still nothing; Bhotahity and then N jumps and
screams! There! I look and see a collection of placards with 14-point Devanagri print. We
are greeted by familiar faces: B is already here, girls from [youth focused NGO] are there,
holding placards. There is a small crowd near the barriers at the bottom of the overhead
steps at Bhotahity. Some person speaks into a mike. We edge forward, because we cant
see anything. The corner meeting is very tight indeed: the blue banner held by people
beside the speakers has no room to be fully stretched. Participants and media persons take
pictures. A few point some recording device at the speakers face, at one point a shoulder
camera. There may be a 100 or so people here: its a tight crowd, mostly men. Girls from
[youth focused NGO] go around handing out leaflets to participants and passers-by. It is
entitled sambidhan sabhako aparivartaniya miti tatkal ghoshana gar! Janatako
sarvabhaum matadhikarko samman gar! (announce the definite date for the CA election!
10

Rappaport points out that whereas in other types of performances (eg theatre, sports games), there are performers on
one hand and an audience on the other hand, in ritual, those present are all participants. Passers-by witnessing
proceedings might have an audience-like relation to the ritual for the performance is not primarily directed towards them.
Unlike an audience, furthermore, people in a congregation will generally know each other; or, if they do not, they will be
able to assume that they are members of a community and stand on common grounds. Furthermore, auto-communication
is important in ritual: the transmitters of messages are among the most important receivers (1999: 39, 41, 51).
11
This passage as all others, is based on the researchers field notes. It has been made anonymous and edited but the
details are as they appear in the notes.

Respect the peoples sovereign right to vote) and bears the names of supporting
institutions. They also hand out a copy of the press release that will be delivered to
relevant institutions. The heads of several well known human rights organizations and
professional associations speak into the mike, turn by turn. One reminds the crowd that this
very place, Bhotahity, is the place from which the citizens movement started. He appeals
that the date be fixed, promptly; this is not the time [for MPs] to just sit around, receiving
daily allowances from the state and arranging matters among themselves, he further
proffers. We will submit a memorandum he concludes, and passes on the mike. The head
of an international human rights organization is next to speak into the mike. It is 3.25pm.
The crowd has thinned somewhat. N and others say lets go. Minutes pass as we continue
to chat with friends and activists from other organizations. The speaker begins to read the
contents of the memorandum aloud. Again N urges lets go; she turns to B: are you
going also? and again lets go. And so, leaving the small crowd behind, we begin walking
back to our own office.
(From fieldnotes; 22/11/07)
This event was unremarkable as an action aiming to put pressure on the national political parties.
In terms of size, it was anything but the mass meeting portrayed in the press (Nepalnews
22/11/2007). As for its contents, neither were the demands controversial nor was the language
particularly provocative. The event was, however, remarkable in one respect, that is its reference
in format, location and in name, to the CM of 2005-6. The public events organized by CMDP were
unprecedented and the image of thousands of ordinary people sitting, standing, covering the steps
of Kathmandus Basantapur area temples, filling the large highway and spilling onto the
pavements, over barriers, clinging to lampposts, was still vivid among activists at the time of
research. The kon sabha or corner meeting had been one of their first forms of action though
unintended: protestors had been blocked by the police ahead and, decided to avoid too much
confrontation on their first event, stopped and ended up holding a corner meeting. Bhotahity had
been the location of this very first action, on 25 July, 2005. The Bhotahity event of 2007 and that of
July 2005, and other events by CMDP, differed in many ways, not least in the identity of the
speakers. Indeed, many of the leading figures of the CM such as Krishna Pahadi or Devendra Raj
Panday, Khagendra Sangraula or Shyam Shrestha were conspicuously absent in the 2007 meeting.
In the leaflets and memorandum, the listed participants in the 2007 event were institutions, not
named individuals, in stark contrast with practice within the CM. In spite of these differences, this
event self-consciously sought to inscribe itself within the precedent set by the CM.
Several years later a yet more striking example of such an inscription was to occur, though this
time the reference to the CM was not made explicitly.
May 7th 2010 peace assembly
In early May 2010, a general strike was launched by Unified Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist
(UCPN-M) so as to force the resignation of PM Madhav Kumar Nepal and the formation of a national
unity government including the Maoists (who had walked out of government in May 2009). This
followed months of political wrangling and failure of the main three political parties to come to an
agreement over major issues, particularly that of army integration. The strike brought 100,000s of
Maoist cadres and supporters to the capital from across the country. A huge logistical effort, the
general strike forced shops and businesses to close from 8am to 6pm, and brought traffic to a
standstill. It featured rallies, cultural programs and speeches and on the 4 May, the encircling, by
strikers holding hands, of the capital city along the 28km ring-road. Though largely peaceful, the
strike brought havoc for businesses and inconvenience to ordinary people in the capital. On the 7 th
day, a peace assembly was scheduled by 48 non-state groups. These included the Federation of
the Nepalese Chambers of Commerce and Industries (FNCCI), the Nepal Chamber of Commerce,
the Professionals Alliance for Peace and Democracy and the Hotel Association of Nepal. Besides
these were various professional associations and human rights organizations. FNCCI president, the
Nepal Bar Association president, along with popular actors Madan Krishna Shrestha and Hari
Bansha Acharya addressed the gathering. Calling on political parties to forge a consensus, the
speakers gave a two day ultimatum to political parties to find a way out of the deepening political
deadlock. The assembly proved one of the largest non-political party gatherings since the CM

events of 2005. In the press coverage of the 7 May program in Basantpur, the peace assembly,
seemed to bring back those times: the artists were there, the seas of people were there. The
venue, Basantapur, was also significant: it had been the site of one of the CMs most successful
citizens assemblies, on 16 August, 2005. Although here the CM was never mentioned, the event
clearly drew on the CMs repertoire and sought to evoke the citizens assemblies under the kings
regime, perhaps in a bid to imbue the event with legitimacy and power.
As in the case of the 2007 Bhotahity event, there were differences between this and the CM
assemblies. None of the senior figures of the CM were present; many human rights organizations
were not represented some deliberately refused to participate, seeing the event as political
and unhelpful in the current context. The politicization of this event that is, its being read as the
pitching of one set of political party interests against another also distinguished the two sets of
events. We return to this point below. Here, it suffices to say that while the CM had sought to work
with all political parties equally, in this case, many saw the peace assembly as political party
motivated, admittedly, against the intentions of the organizers. Indeed, despite the proffered
agenda of the assembly to put pressure on political parties to forge a consensus, the rumours
had already circulated within the public domain (electronic and face to face) that the assembly
was against the bandha (general strike called by UCPN-M). During the program itself, similarly,
alongside statements that political parties should come to a consensus within two days, noted
artistes called upon the UCPN-M to withdraw the strike, violence and protests. These words led
the event to be seen as a move against one single party, namely UCPN-M. The interpretation was
supported by regrettable developments later in the day. It is beyond the scope of this paper to
examine these. Here, we wish to highlight the similarities in form between the CM and the 2010
peace assemblys unmistakable attempt to recall the CM symbolically. Neither in the Bhotahity
event of 2007 nor the Basantapur assembly of 2010 was the will to innovate, expressed; rather,
these were suffused with the symbolism and references to the past.
The CM, by contrast, had been deliberately innovating. To be sure, the CMs style of protest had
drawn on political parties repertoires. However, in each program, it sought new venues, new
elements, new more - participants. New-ness and experimentation were central to the narratives
of activists that had been involved in the CM. in interviews, some senior figures expressed that,
through the CM, they found themselves taking on new roles and discovering unknown skills and
qualities in themselves. Many recalled their surprise at the movements success:
At 4 oclock we were at Bhotahity and we saw that there were so many people! More than
1000 were there. It was a surprising thing for us: we didnt expect that so many people
would be there!
(CM activist, 23/05/07)
While some elements were repeated, repetition was not an important objective. The CM never
sought, in other words, and in contrast to the events just recounted, to inscribe itself within a
tradition of protest or activism at least, till after the popular movement of April 2006. Indeed, in
interviews with CM activists in 2007 and 2008, several labeled the remaining core activists in the
CM as purists. The very term suggests some reference point in the past and some original
mandate (for the republic, no projects) to which the CM sought to return and which would
inform its actions in the future. It appeared that the CM, too, in the post- autocratic period was
starting to turn towards the past and tradition (which itself had established), with the attendant
circularity and repetition characteristic of ritual and the programs observed here. While not all
programs referred to the CM implicitly or explicitly, many evidenced a tendency towards
repetitiveness and circularity. Another peculiar feature of the events observed, and that has a
parallel in ritual, concerned the relation of participants to the proceedings. Rather than an
audience, events appeared to be directed towards a specific congregation. We describe two
further events below, to highlight this point.
Shanti Vatika October 2007: supporting press freedom
On the 4 October, 2007, we are called to a program in Shanti Vatika, near Ratna Park in
Kathmandu. The event is a gathering of human rights defenders, in support of press freedom. The

background to this particular event is a dispute between the Maoist-affiliated trade union and the
management of the Kantipur Publications over facilities for its workers. Negotiations unexpectedly
collapsed when the Union issued an ultimatum for its demands to be met by 25 September, and
the very next day, the union staged the first in a series of protest activities, which soon turned
violent. On the 30 September, members of the All Nepal Communication, Printing, and Publication
Workers Union locked the main entrance of Kantipur complex in Kathmandu from the inside, and
reportedly attempted to set the buildings on fire by burning tires and newspapers; assaulted the
Kantipur Publications managing director and vandalized his vehicle (according to reports by
Kantipur Online and the Federation of Nepali Journalists). Later that night, members of the same
group allegedly vandalized two of Kantipur's printing presses, effectively preventing the
newspapers' publication from Kathmandu (though the union claims the Kantipur itself damaged
the machines). In the days that followed, what was essentially an industrial dispute became
represented as a human rights issue. This drew widespread condemnation and was widely
represented as a case of violation of press freedom from members of the international
community (EU, Carter Center, British Embassy), national bodies (Advertising Association of Nepal
and Nepal Association of Tour Operators) and politicians (Nepali Congress). The National Forum for
Photo Journalists staged a silent protest at Maitighar Mandala, protesting the Maoist attack and
their obstruction of newspaper publishing and distribution. Meanwhile, we were called to join a
protest program in Shanti Vatika.
Six of us, including human rights volunteers and staff, arrive from our human rights
organizations office at 4pm. The program has been running for half-an-hour or so by then.
Its a small crowd, all facing one way, holding placards as TV cameras shoot pictures. We
notice the heads of several well known national and international human rights
organizations. One human rights defender comments: its always the same people in all
programs! As the heads speak in front of cameras, passers-by continue passing by,
tempos and microbuses stop, pick up passengers and hurry to their destinations. Bhotahity
a stones throw away is crawling with people. Participants stand, many wear a black
band or kerchief over their mouths. Most people hold placards (A4 sheets, glued to
cardboard and stapled to a stick) with slogans such as respect freedom of the press and
others calling for the right to speech, to writing, to publishing. This seems incongruous in
2007 when basic freedoms have been restored and considering that just two years back,
security forces had been deployed across media houses and would themselves edit the
news. Todays situation is a far cry from the severe repression and censorship that followed
the kings coup of 2005. Back in the program, participants greet others as they notice a
familiar face in the crowd. I notice a senior human rights defender, at the front near the
cameras. G says lets move to the front. I laugh, you want to have your picture on TV,
she says no, M (another human rights defender) wants to have his picture on TV. To which
M responds Ive had many times. In one program I was at the beginning and also at the
end of the program. We move forward a little with placards (we has sat down 5 minutes or
so) but then already the group loosens. Someone asks for the placards we were handed
upon arrival and I see another person collecting the black kerchiefs from other
participants. Its already over, 4.30pm. The gathering disperses into the rush hour crowd.
We get back into a taxi and drive back to our office.
(From fieldnotes, 04/10/07).
We have sought to highlight our main point here by bolding certain aspects of the event. Two
features stood out. First, the circularity of time or the assumption of repeatability of the event
implicit in the collection of items such as the placards and kerchiefs for future use. Second, the
self-oriented nature of the program. The event was staged in a busy part of the capital at a busy
time of day; the presence of TV crews suggested that the organizers wished to reach out to a
broad public. But rather than addressing and engaging with the public, the program blithely
ignored the passers-by and the passers-by appeared little concerned with the event. It appeared
as though the event was performed for the benefit of the activists themselves, who came to act as
both performers and audience. The role of the cameras, arguably, was more symbolic than
instrumental. Thirdly, as before, participants comments of the sameness of the event.

10

In the final description in this section, the inaccessibility of the venue and the identity of the
participants (staff) made the self-orientedness of the program stand out more starkly yet. In
addition, features of repetitiveness and conventionality were also in evidence.
ICC campaign event at the Maitighar Mandala, July 2007
The final event that well describe here was the final day of a week-long campaign to pressurize
the Nepal government to ratify the Rome Statute and join the International Criminal Court. This
had been a demand by some human rights NGOs since 2001, and, in the aftermath of the
insurgency, a group of human rights organizations felt that the campaign should be intensified in
order to help prevent future conflict. Nepal had still not ratified the statute by early 2011. The
starting point for this program, as before, was the office of our organization. The venue was the
Matighar Mandala, a large roundabout at a busy junction in Kathmandu and a regular venue for
protest programs. In Heaton Shrestha and Adhikari (2010), we described a CM sit-in program in
this very place.
Leaving the office, we reached the Mandala, after a perilous crossing of the road
encircling the roundabout: the road at this point is wide and the flow of vehicles continuous
and fast. To the surprise of some activists, very few people are here! One senior member
of the organization comments these are the same people as at the beginning of the
week!, with characteristic good humor. One of the participating organizations had been
entrusted with the task of organizing a rally but somehow this hasnt materialized. The
participants are mostly the staff from the various organizations involved in the ICC
campaign and explains G: its not possible to send 100 staff; they have expectations of
hotels and tea and things. In most cases, the organizations have sent staff working on a
particular issue, for example international conventions. A blue banner bearing the name of
the week-long campaign is draped over the steps at the Mandala. Five policemen hang
around, two speaking into their walkie-talkies. Placards with slogans about the ICC
ratification and ending impunity are placed against the steps. Participants form a semicircle to watch volunteer activists perform a play on the theme of the campaign, in the
scorching sun. As the play ends, the audience claps and engage in a fund-raising session
for the campaign. Each participant, in turn, pledges or hands over a sum of money to the
campaign treasurer, as other participants greet the pledge/etc with a round of applause.
The sum is not bad, we congratulate ourselves: we have raised 2065 rupees from the
congregation today! And with those words, participants begin turning their attention to the
journey back home or to their respective offices. We leave the Mandala behind, until the
next program.12
(From fieldnotes: 07/07/07).
As in the preceeding event this was marked by self-orientedness: the inaccessibility of the venue
meant that the general public was even less likely to be engaged the possibility that members of
the public might become engaged accidentally, as s/he passed-by, was almost nil. The
participants were staff and members of organizations staging the event; and fund-raising was
taking part among organizers rather than the public or associations that had not been involved in
organizing the event. It was also marked by repetitiveness: the participants, the venue, the
modality, the materials (banner, placards, cameras) were the same.
In different ways, an element of repetition and reproduction was an important feature of almost all
programs attended as part of the research. Often, too, campaigns were designed so as to be
immune from the vagaries of politics, that is, pitched at a high level of abstraction and generality
demands with a long-term validity; slogans that would be reusable over a longer period of time.
There were, to be sure, some attempts at innovation. Some groups put on highly innovative events
such as a pangre julus (5 May, 2010) or wheel-plying rally. In it, activists pushed tires the
length of the capitals main artery, the road running from Maitighar to the airport, in protest at
12

Arguably, joining the ICC is not an issue of widespread interest in Nepal. However, the small number of people present
cannot be attributed solely to a disinterest in the issue, as low attendance was characteristic of programs raising issues with
greater resonance, such as the matter of disappearances.

11

political party and party wings practice of prohibiting vehicles from plying during strikes.
However, these exceptions notwithstanding, a great number of programs appeared ritual-like and,
like ritual, were expressly concerned with convention and repetition.
Alongside ritualization and differentiation, there occurred in the post-autocratic period a firming of
boundaries, notably between civil and political society. This is the subject of the final section.
Becoming too political
In Heaton Shrestha &Adhikari (2009) we showed how in the CM, there occurred a blurring of the
boundary between civil and political society (see also Shah 2008: 24). CM activists reported that
many political party cadres joined the CM as party activism had become ineffective and
increasingly risky in the wake of the coup of February 2005. In addition to this social blurring,
there occurred in this period a performative blurring, as a movement rooted in the networks of civil
society began borrowing elements from political parties repertoires of protest and include these
in their public performances.
There also occurred a blurring at the conceptual level in terms of the roles or areas of activity
generally expected of political parties on the one hand and civil society on the other hand. We
described the various ways in which the CM had acted in a party-like manner. The CMs
leadership was dramatically enacted in the citizens assemblies mentioned above. During these
events, political party leaders were invited but not allowed to take to the stage; rather, they were
made to sit below the stage; forced to listen and compelled to regret their misdeeds. Like a
political party, now civil society was summoning; mobilizing; giving speeches, while political
parties were listening. But if civil society, through the CM, took on the role of political parties,
they did so without becoming a political party (the fate of many social movements elsewhere eg
Goldstone 2003). We further highlighted that the CM was not only party-like; it was carrying out
the expected functions of political parties more effectively than existing political parties. CM
members saw themselves as beyond (existing) political parties in several ways: in the style of
their protest (more aggressive); their more radical agenda and their willingness to go beyond the
law during the kings administration. On several occasions, CM leaders were to issue statements
urging the political parties to intensify their stir and be more aggressive in their agitation.
While seeing political parties as essential to the kind of democracy they wished to see in Nepal,
civil society (and in particular, the CM) saw itself as a guardian of democracy, more central to
democracy than political parties. CM activities served to shift understandings of the roles of civil
society and political parties and the boundary between them. But if this expanded understanding
of the relation of civil society and political society encountered relatively little resistance during
the kings regime, matters were to change in the post-JAII period.
For many CM activists, the political party-like role of civil society was to cease with the return of
political parties to government and politics. A professor and former CM activist, for instance,
told us:
After the Peoples Movement-II, I have not been with CMDP, more with my party to make
it strong. I didnt make a dissenting note, but I quietly withdrew. I support the movement
still, but I am not involved physically. People dont like [if] one day [you work] as a civil
movement activist and the next day, as [a] party activist.
(20/0707)
In doing so, such individuals reproduced the distinctions between civil society and political party
by withdrawing from the movement. The often-noted diminution (in terms of size) of the CM, too,
can be traced to the reassertion of boundaries. In 2009, the CM no longer mobilized people in their
1000s as it had done during the 2005-6 period. In 2007-2009, programs organized under the name
of the CM usually counted between 30 and 500 participants. One commonly encountered
explanation was that erstwhile members had gone back to their respective political party. In
interviews, former CM activists (who denied having party affiliations themselves) claimed that it
was now the time for political parties to act. A well known writer clarified:

12

Now its political parties jobI withdrew after the restoration of democracy because I
thought it was not my job. We [civil society] are like an emergency rescue team; since the
emergency is over, political parties should do their job. Apparently some people feel this is
still an emergency situation I frankly disagree. (20/06/07).
The CM, however, persisted, albeit with a reduced membership and continued to challenge the
boundaries of political party activity and civil society roles. CM members explained that, even after
the return of political parties to power, they were still having to act in cases where political parties
should have done so. Civil society action was still filling a vacuum: paying attention to disasterstruck areas and communal unrest; listening to grievances and mobilising the general public in
support of democracy, and leading national celebrations on occasion. 13 This vacuum filling role,
which had (albeit grudgingly) been welcomed in 2005, was no longer hailed by political parties.
The relation between political party and civil society became one of rivalry. One former CM
member explained:
[Political parties] see [civil society] as competitors. Now some are saying that the
government is lacking legitimacy. Those in power are thinking civil society leaders are the
alternative to power. Every time the CA election is postponed, all eyes turn towards civil
society leaders and political parties are also seeing them in that light. Suppose that the
political parties fail to hold CA elections, people will be restless. Who will fill the vacuum?
Civil society leaders. (09/01/08)
In the Latin American context, Schneider (1991) encountered a similar situation. There, as the
transition got under way, political parties rose and began to compete with movements for popular
support. Conflicts and tensions increased between movements and political parties as well as
between movements (p106). Schneider does not tell us of the relation between political parties
and civil society movements prior to transition. In the Nepal case, our material showed that the
transition saw not just political parties and movements increasingly competing with each other,
but that it also involved their becoming cast as rivals or competitors, that is, distinct and opposite
(although equivalent). Whereas during the 2005 period political parties and civil society (in the
CM) had become indistinct (or less distinct), the period following the JAII saw a re-assertion of their
distinctiveness.
In early May 2009, for example, CMDP had staged a sit-in program, in protest at the Nepali
Presidents move against the Maoist-led governments decision to sack Chief of Army Staff (COAS)
Katuwal. The latter was accused of disobeying orders by reinstating eight brigadiers and recruiting
new personnel, in direct violation of the provisions in the CPA of 2006. After weeks of wrangling
between the army chief and the government, the Maoist-led government convened a special
cabinet meeting to take a decision on the COAS. However, ministers belonging to four coalition
government political parties walked out of the meeting when the prime minister tabled a proposal
to sack the COAS. For many, the proposed sacking was an attempt by the Maoists to gain the
upper hand in the issue of army integration as this would allow them to place a sympathiser in
the position of COAS. Despite the boycott, the remaining ministers voted to sack Katuwal on
charges of insubordination. Meanwhile, 17 political parties, which together held the majority of
seats in the country's interim legislature, asked the president to intervene against the "unilateral
decision of the Maoists" and reinstate the COAS. On the evening of 3 May, the president was to
send a letter to Katuwal, the PMs secretariat and the defense ministry, nullifying the cabinets
decision, on the grounds that the governments act did not meet the constitutional provision
(The Telegraph 2009). The president's move to intervene in state affairs was decried as being
unconstitutional by Unified Marxist Leninist (UML) and UCPN-M, among others. It was, by all
accounts questionable, given that Nepal's interim constitution in 2007 states that the president is
ceremonial and is a titular head of the Nepalese army. This incident was to prompt the resignation
of the Maoist PM Prachanda on the 4 May, 2009. Immediately after the PM's resignation, UCPN-M
was to file a case against the president's move in the Supreme Court and announced that it would
launch nationwide protests to pressurize the president into withdrawing his decision. Fears that the
13

In particular, the celebrations of the declaration of Nepal as a republic on 28 th May 2008. This was led by various civil
society groups. One senior civil society figure recalled: if we had left the parties alone, the leadership alone, maybe we
would still not be having any kind of celebration at all. DATE: 29/06/08.

13

country would once more plunge into political chaos and conflict began to surface among the
general public.
Against this background, members of the CM decided to stage a protest program outside of the
Presidents office, asking that he withdraw his decision to reinstate the COAS and tender his
resignation. As this was a prohibited zone, the police was prompt to arrest the 63 protestors (which
included Dr Devenrdra Raj Panday, Dr Sundar Mani Dixit and Krishna Pahadi). The protestors
described the president's move as autocratic and dangerous for the country. This protest was
in keeping with the CMs pre-JAII activities In both its agenda (against autocracy or autocratic
tendencies) and the manner of protest (rally in prohibited zone). Yet CMDPs protests against the
president received heavy criticism for being political. Critics objected that the time was now for
civil society to limit itself to advising political parties and not taking to the streets or expressing
opinions on political matters.
Earlier, the CM had met with similar disapproval and accusations when they formed a factfinding mission and went to visit troubled Tarai districts. While Madhesi discontent was relatively
muted during the insurgency, it was to awaken soon after the popular movement of 2006, when it
appeared that the new political set up would not lead to their grievances being addressed rapidly.
The interim constitution of early 2007 was silent on key issues for the Madhesh, namely,
federalism, and the election system that had led to the political marginalisation of the Madhesh
over time. These omissions, and the manner of drafting the interim constitution (without broad
consultation) prompted series of protests, starting in January 2007. The Madhesh Movement
witnessed the large scale destruction of symbols of hill nationalism, and the forced displacement
of people of hill origins. By and large, the Madhesh movement was seen by the Kathmandu elites
(and much of the media) as the work of self-interested separatists, and without broad-based
legitimacy. Writer and well known civil society figure explained that, by contrast:
We saw a different thing there. We were also raising questions about the nature and
background of some of the Madheshi leaders but all the people in the Madhesh were on the
streets. So we said that the protest was not only the interest of some persons but the
people are asking for a space in the state. And we played a role in bringing the Madhesh
and political parties nearer.
(02/07/07)
The outcome of the CM teams Tarai visit appeared mixed. A report by the International Crisis
Group found that the visit had had a positive effect: the medias attention was drawn to Madheshi
concerns, and reporting had become more sympathetic (ICG 2007:14). 14 On the other hand, the
tour members felt ignored by political parties and here too, the CMs actions were criticised for
being too political. A member of the tour team recalled:
Many intellectuals were not happy when we went to the Madhesh. We came back and said
these concerns should be addressed and some people inside the Citizens Movement and
outside said we were getting involved in politics and we should not be (02/07/07).
As in the case of protests after the presidents move, the actions by the CM here did not deviate
significantly from pre-JAII activities. For many in the CM, the Madhesh Andolan represented a
continuation of the JAII, a deepening of democracy, the expression of long-repressed voices. But
these actions, in the post-JAII context, were no longer deemed appropriate for civil society. The
charge of politicisation of the CM as political analyst Aditya Adhikari has pointed out only started
to occur in the period following the JAII (Adhikari 2010).
Alongside charges of being too political, civil society groups experienced an increasing
reluctance, on the part of political parties to include them in the political process. Immediately
following the JAII, civil society groups had received public acknowledgements of the important role
they played in bringing the autocratic regime to an end. They were subsequently invited, in June
2006, to monitor the truce between the government and Maoist forces, in clear recognition of civil
14

See ICG (2007) also for an account of the Madesh movement and its background.

14

societys political clout and moral authority (Shah 2008: 27). But this was to change as the
transition got underway. By 2008, an artist and well known civil society figure expressed a
widespread feeling among civil society activists that had been at the forefront of the democratic
movement of 2005-6:
Political parties asked civil society for help when they were in a critical situation but after
the movement, they forgot civil society.
(05/07/08)
In the wake of the popular movement of 2006, therefore, it appeared that various actors within
civil society and more closely affiliated with political parties were increasing pressure for a return
to a status quo ante, and the strict separation of roles between political party and civil society. In
the new political context, a blurred boundary between the civil and political was fast losing its
appeal. In the final section, we discuss the significance of the hardening of this key boundary for
civil society together with the other processes described in this paper.
Final Remarks: Civil Society-In-Transition As The Site For Establishing Normality
To summarize the argument so far: the post-jana andolan II civil society was marked by three
processes: a process of differentiation and the resumption of individual life projects; a process of
ritualization (repetition of venues, equipment, participants and, above all, an express concern with
convention) and a process of hardening of conceptual and social boundaries (notably, between
civil and political society). This contrasted with an emphasis on de-differentiation, innovation and
the blurring of boundaries in the last years of the kings regime.
These processes have been noted in relation to a specific class of phenomena described as
liminal. As developed by Van Gennep (1960) (and later Turner eg 1974), the term is used to
refer to in-between situations and conditions that are characterized by the dislocation of
established structures, the reversal of hierarchies, and uncertainty regarding the continuity of
tradition and future outcomes (Horvath, Thomassen & Wydra 2009). In liminal phases, differences
in status, rank etc are in abeyance temporarily or regarded as irrelevant; the subjects become
ambiguous, in between all points of classification. Fundamental principles lose their efficacy and
their capacity to orient behavior. It is a moment of creativity and potency, a moment in which all
prior standards and models are subject to criticism and fresh and new ways of describing and
interpreting socio-cultural experience are formulated (Turner 1974: 13-14). Liminal periods are
followed by re-aggregation, in which subjects re-enter the social structure and the ambiguity and
uncertainty of the liminal phase brought to an end. The ritual subject is in a stable state once more
(Lambek 2002). Initially developed in the context of rites of passage, the concept of liminality has
since then been applied to a wide range of situations and settings, ranging from the individual,
momentary experience (eg individual rite of passage such as baptism, or following a sudden
death) to the longer term, societal experience (eg revolutions, war or prolonged political
instability) (Thomassen 2009). In the case of society-wide liminality, these phases are
characterized by a wholesale collapse of order and a loss of background structure, agency is
pushed to the forefront and reorientations in modes of conduct and thought are produced within
larger populations (Thomassen 2009: 22).
From the perspective of activists, the period of the kings autocratic rule (especially in 2004 and
2005) possessed the character of a liminal period, when anything could happen. As we have
shown in detail elsewhere (Heaton Shrestha & Adhikari 2009; 2010) this was a period of confusion
and loosening of boundaries framing civil society: a sense that the usual rules of the (political)
game no longer applied that politics-as-usual, that is, as practiced by political parties till mid2005 was devoid of power in the new political environment. It was also a period of innovation and
creativity within civil society.
Thomassen (2009) further comments, in relation to the ending of liminal phases:

15

...relating to crisis periods of larger societies where the social drama has no foregone
conclusion, the question becomes: how is the liminal period dealt with, and how (if at all) is
it ended? The question can again be posed in Weberian terms: how and when does a
routinization or an everydayinization of the out-of-ordinary situations take place? And
who will become the carriers of the new world-view that is eventually institutionalized?
We propose here that the processes that we observed in post-JAII civil society in Nepal represent a
process of re-aggregation and that one of the sites for the routinization and
everydayinization of the out-of-the-ordinary period of 2004-6 was civil society itself. The social
networks and the programs of civil society provided the means for a broader process of societal
re-aggregation, the transition out of a liminal period of political uncertainty and instability and
towards a more normal, predictable, stable state. Establishing normality in the post-autocratic
period involved ad ritualization of public actions, a differentiation of the space of civil society,
resuming of individual life projects, and a hardening of defining conceptual and social boundaries
of civil society. The formal transition to democracy and a post-conflict situation was
accompanied by a new kind of civil society or rather, a civil society animated by a different set of
dynamics. We argue that a civil society-in-transition is not simply a fragmented or more diverse
pre-transition civil society. It must be considered as a distinct phenomenon. Civil society-intransition (post-JAII civil society) was unlike the civil society that preceded the autocratic period
and may be unlike the civil society that emerges as the political situation stabilizes. The peculiar
dynamics of a civil society-in-transition should be acknowledged by researchers and those intent
on working with civil society on post-conflict reconstruction projects. In particular, the latter should
be mindful of the fact that civil society may be engaged in their own implicit projects of
reconstruction and that official program and implicit project might not always harmonize.
Practitioners might wish to consider whether civil society (or particular groups within civil society)
is the best place for introducing innovation in post-conflict settings given that in large part it seeks
and is moved by efforts at restoration.
Finally we would like to clarify two points: firstly, that we do not wish to claim that all of civil
society is involved in projects of restoration. Our point was that this represents an important
dynamic within post-autocratic civil society and must be acknowledged alongside the drive
towards change and new-ness. That is, civil society actions are in part informed by the fact that, as
one activist put it, people just want to get on with their lives. Secondly, we wish to point
out that our claim that civil society actions were ritual-like is not meant to be pejorative. The
activists involved were more often than not very concerned with the issues raised by their
campaigns and actions. Whether these ritualized forms of public action are more or less
politically effective in the changed context is a matter for activists and their organizations to
establish and future research to document.
Acknowledgements
The authors wish to acknowledge all those who gave their time to share with them their
experiences and opinions about civil society in Nepal. They are also grateful to the UKs ESRC,
members of the Non-Governmental Public Action research program, and the Department of
Anthropology at the University of Sussex, UK, for their generous support in bringing this work to
fruition. Finally we wish to thank two anonymous SINHAS reviewers for their constructive feedback
on the draft paper.
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Annex: CMDP mass events and the demands put forward by them till the
Peoples Movement of April 2006
25 July 2005: First CMDP program: demanding the restoration of human rights, civil liberties and
the rule of law. Safeguarding the achievements of the 1990 movement and establishing absolute
democracy are declared as major objectives of the movement started by civil society; CMDP states
that it aims to boost the movement already launched by political parties, lawyers, journalists and
civil servants in the country.
5 August 2005: CMDP program protesting the king's February takeover and urging all citizens to
join the movement to establish people's sovereignty; urging Maoists to immediately shun violence
and initiate coordination with political parties for the larger interest of democracy.
16 August 2005: CMDP program demanding the immediate restoration of the democratic system,
peace and civil liberties.
2 September 2005: CMDP urges political parties to jointly carry forth the slogan of democratic
republic to settle the current political crisis; warns political parties to recognize and respect the
public spirit, stating that "democratic republic has become the agenda of the entire nation. CMDP
also protests the king's visit to the UN, claiming he is not our representative.
26 September 2005: CMDP urges leaders of the seven-party alliance to intensify their ongoing prodemocratic movement with a more aggressive agenda, to serve the greater interest of people and
establish a democratic republic.
26 October 2005: CMDP urges all countrymen and democratic communities to unite against the
autocratic regime.
12 November 2005: CMDP demands an end to 'autocracy' and the withdrawal of a new
'draconian' media ordinance.
25 November 2005: CMDP demands an end to 'autocracy.
10 December 2005: CMDP program in defiance of the government imposed prohibitory order in
vast areas of Kathmandu.
19 December 2005: CMDP program protesting the Nagarkot massacre and the government's
stubbornness not to reciprocate the unilateral ceasefire declared by the Maoists.

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