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Thi~:'casewas written by Christop~ Loch, Professor of Technolo~y Management, and Svenja SoJnmer,
Ph.P. candidate, both at INSEAq: While the events described~n this case have happened in feality,
aIl {Dames and locations are di~guised. The purpose of this,:case is Dot to discuss effec~ve or
in~ffective actions of individual actors in a specifie situat\on, but to highlight the mana,gerial
C1allengesof breakthrough inno~~tionprojects in large organizafions.

~pyright @ 2003 INSEAD, Fon,tainebleau,France.

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Introduction
On September 1, 2001, Antoine Alsace sat in bis office in Lemond Automobiles SA's
development center in Guyancourt and pondered how he might keep the "Vol de Nuit"l
project alive. He was the head of the innovation management department, which managed
Lemond's pre-development portfolio and also had the mission to capture and filter radically
new vehic1eideas, inc1udingconcept proofs. The project had consumed him so much over the
previous 18 months that bis wife complained that he no longer talked about anything e1se.But
it was such a thrill to be the driver of a dream project, the development of a flying car with
attachable wings and propeller. Everyone who saw the prototype had reacted first with
incredulity and then with enthusiasm.
The project had arisen by accident, when an inventor approached the innovation group with a
half-baked idea of a flying car. They had assembled an extraordinary group of experts, who
were competent, stubborn, and linked by a shared enthusiasm for the project. With their
combined expertise and a lot of help frOIDexternal partners, they had transformed the halfbaked idea into workable concepts. Working on a shoestring budget, and with everyone
putting in bis private time, they at first pursued three concepts in paralle1. After a year, the
most advanced of these concepts had been chosen to continue, while the other two were
stopped. The final concept, the Duosport, was based on an experimental narrow lane vehic1e
that existed already. Technical development was progressing well.

'\
'--

The projecthad a soundstrategierationale- besiclesthe (albeitrisky)possibilityof openinga

new market niche (three-dimensional transportation), it promised PR for the company ("the
true visionary innovator"), and offered technology transfer, e.g., of new lightweight carbon
composite materials, into the mainstream car products.
However, the company found itself in a general c1imate of scarce resources. Although
Lemond was doing well, an extremely ambitious investment and restructuring program forced
everyone to stretch to the limit to reach operational goals. ln this c1imate,the project had met
with resistance in the organization, partly due to an overly hasty approach of the media. ln
the summer of 2001, all future communication regarding the project, internaI and external,
had been called off. The CEO was rumored to have made a negative comment about the
inappropriateness of "secret submarine projects". The narrow lane base vehic1e,on which the
project was based, was to be shelved after it reached its next design milestone. At that point,
no one dared to move any further on the project, for fear of jeopardizing their careers.
Alsace was also keeping a low profile, while supporting the construction of the full-scale
flying prototype with the remaining budget, and thrashing about for alternative action plans to
keep the project going. "If someone at Lemond said, 'Here is the money, find an empty
hangar, biTe50 people and develop the thing', 1 would go for it right away. If the prototype
works and a promising business plan exists. If 1 keep pushing this and then cannot deliver,
that's the end."

'\

J,

"Vol de Nuit" is the French title of the famous novel "Night Flight" by Antoine de Saint-Exupry.

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He mulled over other options as well. "Maybe l should use a different strategy, and write a
book about three-dimensional mobility without mentioning Vol de Nuit at all. The book sales
could be an indicator of the market potential. Or, even better, a Hollywood film! Maybe that
would convince the conservative souls. l definitely want to continue this project, but right
now, Ijust don't know how."

Chronology

r--

One gray winter morning in late February 2000, a certain Mr. Finisterre stood on the doorstep
of Frdric Normand, Alsace's "idea scouting manager" for external innovative ideas.
Finisterre was a tinkerer and private inventor, and had brought along drawings of bis idea: a
flying vehicle. Alsace happened to pass by and saw the pictures. Finisterre's idea connected
to something he had long (although unconsciously) been looking for. He was hooked right
away. "Imagine you're in a gigantic traffic jam, and you put your wings on and simply fly
over the traffic jam! We ought to do something like that!"
Concept Generation - Three Ideas Emerge
Normand organized a kick-off workshop in March, to which he invited Olivier LeMans froID
the new car concepts department, and Philippe Ardeche, a senior engine design manager for
the high-end model range. Both were known to Alsace as particularly innovative and as flight
enthusiasts. Ardeche brought several articles to the workshop showing that the idea was far
frOIDnew: the idea had been pursued for the first time in 1917. Silice then, amateur designers
had tried and, in some cases, succeeded in building prototypes of flying cars (see Exhibit 1 for
various concepts). However, no one had succeeded in building anything that combined the
full capabilities of a ground vehicle and an aircraft into a single vehicle, nor had full-scale
development been attempted. ln the discussion, it quickly became clear that Finisterre's
propeller-driven concept was impractical as a ground vehicle ("imagine pedestrians ducking
for cover as it blows up a dust storm!").

r---..

Ardeche brought the discussion clown to earth with the realistic comment: "Maybe we
shouldn't start by trying to make a sport utility vehicle fly ... let's proceed in small steps."
This sparked an idea in LeMans. From weekly department meetings, he knew that bis
colleague, Jean-Pierre Breton, was working on a narrow lane experimental vehicle, with a
shape that resembled that of a sailplane (Exhibit 2). Ardeche suggested building a flying
motorcycle. He would talk to bis longtime friend, Roussel, an ex-professional sport pilot who
now had bis own ultralight airplane company and was known throughout Europe.
That evening, LeMans asked bis colleague, Breton, for the narrow lane's package plan. He
worked aIl night and produced the first concept drawings for the "Duosport", which he
brought along to the next meeting (Exhibit 3). At this point, Breton joined the project team,
to be able to consider the Duosport's needs in the development of the ground vehicle.
ln addition to Alsace, Normand, LeMans, Ardeche, and Breton, the emerging team also
included Grard Picardie, the original designer of the narrow lane concept that Breton was
now (10 years later) building. Picardie was now design manager for ergonomies and became
a valued advisor in the team. Andr Simon was a controller with an open mind for innovative

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ideas, who came on board to help the team gain access to aIl available channels of funding
and to control costs. Finally, Christelle Labelge was a business student from Metz and
worked on the project writing ber matrise thesis, also filling the "project office" role for the
emerging project (for an overview of the team members, see Exhibit 4). The organization was
loose, and had no formaI project manager.
A month later, Ardeche mentioned the idea of building a hybrid ground-air vehicle to Roussel
at a local air show in Nancy. Roussel responded with enthusiasm: "Philippe, guess what, l
have been dreaming about a flying motorbike for years!" Right there in Roussel's exhibition
booth, they made the first concept drawing for the "Flybike", a standard motorcycle combined
with a Delta wing (Exhibit 5). This would emerge as concept #2.
At the same air show, Labelge carried out a smaIl informaI survey of possible interest in such
a crossover vehicle. The survey indicated general interest, although the numbers were highly
uncertain, and the market would, at best, be a niche for the foreseeable future (Exhibit 6).

1'\

ln the summer of 2000, a third concept added itself to the stable. When Breton heard Ardeche
talk about the flying motorcycle, he thought of another of bis ongoing projects, the "Leonardo
Sport". Lemond and the Italian motorcycle company, Aprilia, had a marketing collaboration
to appeal to young urban consumers, and as part of a mobility service concept, Breton worked
with Aprilia to design a slimmed-down version of the Aprilia Leonardo ST 150 scooter. At
100 kg, the Leonardo Sport was only half the weight of the Aprilia SL 1000 Falco touring
bike that Ardeche wanted to use, so they should be able to get that to fly? He had built one
exploratory prototype, and he still had a second set of parts "in reserve". With LeMans and
the company, Plastic Omnium, the extemal partner with whom he worked on the narrow lane
vehicle, he explored the concept of adding a foldable wing to the Leonardo Sport. When they
were sure they could do this for about 90,00O, they dubbed it "Skyscooter" and proposed it
to Aisace's astonished team (see Exhibit 7).
From Concept to Reality
This was how far they could go without a budget. Now, serious work had to begin requiring
resources, and thus, support from higher up. Thierry LeCorse, the executive vice president
for research and advanced development, found the idea of a flying vehicle exciting. ln a
confidential meeting, he said: ''l've always wanted to see a really spectacular idea. Most
things we do are so incremental. We need a visionary project for a change."
With limited resources and lacking the full breadth of necessary know-how, the team quickly
decided to utilize extemal partners as much as possible. They convinced Plastic Omnium,
already the extemal partner for the narrow lane concept, to act as general contractor for the
Duosport. This eliminated the need for complex contract negotiations (including secrecy and
intellectual property rights). ln fact, Lemond's involvement did flot even have to be revealed
at an early stage. Plastic Omnium hired a project manager, Sbastien Savoie, solely for this
project, a level of support that Alsace had flot even hoped for at the outset. They also
coordinated the Skyscooter project, subcontracting execution to Marchin & Son, a small
"motorized power sailplane" company and flying school. Marchin Senior was widely known
as the "father ofultralight airplanes" in France.

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The advantage of having an established contractor became evident when the contract
negotiations for the Flybike between Roussel and Lemond's legal department dragged on for
months. The contract was signed only in early October 2000, months after the project was
initialized. Only then did Roussel receive the base motorcycle, which Ardeche had secured
from Aprilia, and could finally start construction. At that time, the feasibility study and
constructive calculations for the Duosport, performed by the engineering company, Pinson
Engineering, were complete.
Prototype Execution and InternaI Selling of the Project

On December 10, the team held the first workshop for everyone involved. ln this workshop,
the three subproject teams found out that there were, in fact, three efforts being fUnin parallel,
and each sub-team presented their progress update. Alsace had also commissioned a short
film showing photos of the three prototypes and interviews with the participants. The film
was intended as a powerful communication tool to sell the project within the company.

The externalpartnerswereexcitedto workwith Lemond- the PinsonEngineeringpeoplehad

first dismissed the idea of a flying sport vehicle as crazy, and came on board only when they
heard that Lemond was behind it. But several of the external partners were upset that they
had flot been told about the concept competition. The contract delay meant that Roussel was
lagging behind, but in the two and a half months, he had nevertheless managed to produce a
set of animated drawings and a plastic model of the aliter skin put on top of the SL 1000
Falco touring bike.
On January 29, 2001, the Skyscooter actually flew for the first time over a small airfield
outside Montargis, with Marchin Junior as the pilot (Exhibit 8). ln February, the 1:6 model of
the Duosport flew for the first time. (This was actually very difficult and the device crashed
several times because it was tao small to have a stable airflow on the wings. ln August of that
year, the 1:2.5 model flew perfectly at the first attempt). Progress was phenomenal because
everyone involved had their soul in the project and worked clayand night, even without pay.
Several of the external partners reduced their engineering hourly rates substantially, and
everyone worked much more than they billed. Lemond' s internaI team was essentially doing
this project "on top" of their normal jobs anyway.
By the end of April, the project was advanced enough to be presented to Michel Loiret, the
CTO. The team presented 1:1 mock-ups of the three concepts, with photos of the successful
flights, next to each other. During the presentation, LeCorse was rather tense. While initially
enthusiastic about the idea, he had flot expected the project to advance so fast. This was kind

of getting out of contrai - where would it end? But Loiret was excited: "ln the next
presentation of new vehicle concepts to the CEG, why don't we fly the Skyscooter over the
heads of the group?"
Unfortunately, the excitement was short-lived. ln the next team meeting, resource problems
became pressing. Through different channels, they had cobbled together a total budget of
1.9 million to cover all three concepts. The bulk of the money would have to be spent on the
fully functional prototypes, but it DOWbecame evident that the budget did flOtsuffice, and no
more money was forthcoming. The team was faced with bard choices as to which concepts to
keep and which to discontinue. The Skyscooter was the first to go. ln April 2001, it was
announced that the mobility service concept with Aprilia would be stopped. This included the

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halting of the development of the Leonardo Sport, which was to serve as the base vehicle for
the Skyscooter.

By mid-May, money was still in short supply, and the team decided to cease the development
of the Flybike as well. It was not as advanced as the Duosport, and Roussel's effort had been
disappointing in the presentation in April, lacking bath constructive and design progress. ln
addition, the Flybike was seen as more risky because it required a fundamental reconstruction
of the base vehicle (the SL 1000 Falco was much tao heavy and needed a lightweight
composite material frame that would have to be developed frOIDscratch). Ardeche felt that
bis project was disadvantaged because less time and money had been invested in it than in the
Duosport. However, he acquiesced because he, tao, had been disappointed by the progress.
Roussel agreed to make another presentation in October, at bis own expense, with the chance
of reconsideration.
Development of the Duosport continued on schedule. The bigger 1:2.5 model, which was a
better predictor of the flying properties of the future prototype, flew successfully in August
2001, a little more than a year after project start. The final prototype would incorporate
advanced lightweight carbon fiber materials and fly-by-wire technology, bath of which would
be directly transferable into Lemond's mainstream car development after successful
implementation in the project.

Strategie Rationale
While hybrid ground-air vehicles would clearly be, at best, a niche market for the foreseeable
future, there were signs that a market for personalized air transport was emerging, bath on the
customer and on the technology side. For example, wealthy people in So Paulo or Monaco
nowboughta helicopterrather than a Ferrari- So Paulo had the highest helicopter density in
the world. There were also several independent efforts reported in the press of developing
much lower cost small airplanes. It was expected that these trends would significantly widen
the market for individually owned or used air vehicles.
Lemond's competition also seemed to recognize the idea that the third dimension, air space,
might gain importance for them. Toyota was currently working on a business airplane, and
Audi had even approached Roussel, as a Europe-wide known expert, to ask him about a threedimensional mobility idea that was similar to Vol de Nuit. However, he maintained a silence
because of bis contract with Lemond. NASA had presented a study on Dual-Mode Air-Car
Concepts at the AirVenture 2001 in Oshkosh, where the large potential for such vehicles in
the US was stressed: apart frOIDthe 29 major airports, accounting for 75% of air traffic, there
were thousands of smaller alles. Ninety-eight percent of the US population lived within 20
miles of at least one public airport.
ln addition to the creation of a new market niche, which could be huge in the long run but
which was very risky, the Vol de Nuit project offered several different strategie benefits to
Lemond. First, there was huge PR value in being the first to credibly develop this
breakthrough concept (which had impressed everyone who had seen it). Second, regardless of
whether the Duosport would ever enter the market, a technology transfer into car development
was virtually guaranteed: the Duosport design was optimized for carbon fibers. The transfer

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of these 1ightweight materia1s into the car had been slow because of the need for different
design principles, and the know1edge gained from the Vol de Nuit project could be
transferred.2 Third, the Duosport incorporated tly-by-wire technology, which was already
recognized as important for cars in the future (eliminating wire harnesses and pipes). Fourth,
the Duosport tested a new graphical man-machine interface, which allowed instant switching
between car mode controls and tlight controls and offered 3D graphical steering and
orientation support.
Finally, Vol de Nuit fit Lemond's newly announced techno10gystrategy. ln September 2001,
the CTO made a presentation to the managers of the engineering division, stating: "We must
move from being a leader in accessories to being the core technology leader. The technica1
substance of a product will become the most important differentiating factor. We must learn
to achieve at least one major technical innovation peT year." The CTO also stressed the
importance of cooperating with externat partners, an approach successfully used in the Vol de
Nuit project. He also urged a change in management style, "that continuously looks out for
new ideas and motivates their team members to do likewise."

Conflicts in the Extended Vol de Nuit Team

Friction within the Development Team

While the project made breathtaking progress during the 18 months of its development, strong
personalities clashed. Early on, rivalry developed between the champions of the two main
concepts, who were both convinced that they were right. Ardeche was more senior and the
widely acknowledged expert whenever the topic of tlying came up. ln bis view, the younger
LeMans had no business coming up with a rival proposaI. LeMans felt unfairly treated
because Ardeche's pressure against bis concept, expressed at the level of Ardeche's peers,
including LeMans' former boss, possibly contributed to a lower annual evaluation for
LeMans. This contlict led to some bad blood within the team.
Communication with upper management also turned out to be more difficult than expected.
Jacques Ardennes took over the position of Alsace's boss in March 2001, long after the
project's start. Progress was incredibly fast, so Ardennes had to worry about being
confronted with afait accompli. Thus, he was initially cautious, and the team suspected that,
fearing for bis career, he might Dotbe on their side if they advanced too faTwithout the goahead from the top. Communication with him was thug hesitant and caused uncertainty on
both sides. It turned out that he was looking for other ways of bringing the project into the
company's officiaI funding system, white trying to avoid a complete stop in this way.

Carbon fibers are very strong with respect to pull forces, but weaker than steel with respect to shear. Thus,
simply replacing steel by fibers without a change in the design required much more bulk, wbich weakened
the weight advantages and exacerbated the cost disadvantages. Changing the design in tbis way had to be
leamed over time, and the Duosport was a first test case.

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Friction Among Externat Partners

Major irritation arose with the external partners when the two concepts were abandoned.
Marchin had started to work essentially on a basis of trust, without officiaI intellectual
property rights, believing he would be able to continue to develop the Skyscooter without
paying royalties. He shortened testing delays by signing a piece of paper before the maiden
flight to the effect that "the prototype was bis, and that bis son would fly at bis own risk".
(Had Lemond's processes prevailed, the insurance question would have taken two months).
The decision to stop the project, which to him seemed out of the bIlle, disappointed him.
Moreover, he was hurt that Lemond had filed the patent without him, although he had been
promised a very cheap license to commercialize the Skyscooter if he so wished. He
concluded, "This was the last time 1worked with a big company."
Roussel was even angrier. He was already upset when he found out in December 2000, eight
months after starting development on the Flybike, that he was competing with other concepts.
He fumed when he had to wait outside during the presentation to the CTO in April 2001,
while they were discussing bis "baby" without him being there to defend it. When the
Flybike was discontinued shortly afterwards, bis interpretation was that the decision had
already been made at the presentation.
These irritations proved detrimental to the morale of the Plastic Omnium people, who
wondered whether they, tao, might be tossed out at Saille point. Moreover, Roussel and
Marchin could destroy Lemond's reputation as a reliable partner in the small and clubby
flying community, possibly compromising Lemond's ability to revitalize its efforts in the
future.

The Reaction of the Wider Lemond Automobiles SA Organization

New concepts always pose a strategie dilemma of what should be pursued with scarce

resources. This dilemmamight be expressedin differentways - when Breton showedthe

Leonardo Sport to higher management, he was threatened that "heads would roll" if he
continued to show it around.
Mistrust, or perhaps misunderstandings, in the larger organization also led to communication
problems. Breton presented the narrow lane vehicle to higher management in the Committee
of Experimental Mobility, and everyone expressed excitement. But, despite the secretive
nature of these presentations, apparently someone had leaked ward of it to the press, and two
weeks later, an article appeared in the Weekly "L'Auto-Journal" with a phantom picture of a
mixture of several in-house pursued narrow lane concepts. As a result, the team feared further
communication of their idea within the organization. Indeed, in the spring 2001 strategie
council meeting, where the end of the mobility service concept was decided, Marketing
argued and got the termination of the narrow lane vehicle concept: "It is flOta car, and thug
outside our strategie focus". The meeting minutes stressed that all work on it would have to
be brought to a conclusion by the next milestone.
The communication problems got worse. At the April 2001 presentation to Loiret, the team
proposed an external presentation to the press at a motorcycle event of Aprilia, which would

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also help to push the mobility service concept, a suggestion that was a1soput in the meeting
minutes. The only reaction to the minutes came from Ardennes, who wanted to ensure that
Marketing wou1dbe informed before any external communication activities took place.

,--

At this point, the external communications department joined the act. They proceeded
without further coordination with Alsace, calling several newspapers to reserve a full page for
"a big announcement". Hearing rumors that LeCorse found a press release too risky, the VP
of communications, Didier Delon, asked Loiret for clarification (catching him on a business
trip in Spain) the day before sending the press release. Delon obtained Loiret's go-ahead to
spearhead the communication activities for the press release at the motorcycle event. On the
day of the planned re1ease,Friday June 22, LeCorse and Ardennes decided that the risk could
flot be taken and stopped the press release, calling Communications as weIl as Loiret. ln a last
minute effort, the letters to the newspapers, containing the press release, had to be handpicked
from the outgoing mail baskets. The project team ended up being blamed for flot keeping
their own upper management properly informed.
On the following Monday, aIl
communication was called off.

The team felt an increasingneed to informthe CEO - he wouldreact negativelyif the project
progressed too faTwithout him knowing about it. After a team discussion with the external
communications department to clarify the misunderstanding, the communications people
decided to ask their head, Louis Fontaine, the executive VP for external relations, to take the
opportunity to talk to the CEO at a scheduled meeting about miscellaneous issues. Fontaine
informed the CEO only about the Skyscooter. The CEO was "flot amused" that secret, socalled "submarine projects", were still allowed to exist in the company under the CUITent
challenging circumstances. The Vol de Nuit team, however, was never informed about what
exactly the CEO had been told; they only heard that he had made a negative comment. After
this initial reaction, nobody dared to talk to the CEO, fearing that he might simply order the
project to be cancelled.
The project also faced sceptical reactions from other departments. Marketing saw the whole
thing as a distraction. The chief designer had been given the mission to establish a "common
recognizable design language" for Lemond, and thug he saw this project as an unauthorized
design effort that should have gone through him.
The supportive stance of upper research management began to reverse. The research and
advanced development group had overrun its budget that year. On the defensive and facing
resistance from the side and from above, they became worried about the reaction of others
who said: "There is no money left to get aIl our new car introductions ready on time, and you
have money for something like that?" Skepticism became prevalent, although the total cost of
Vol de Nuit was so low.

The Situation Today

Following the successful flight of the 1:2.5 model in August 2001, the Duosport was weIl on
its way. The maiden flight of the full-scale prototype was realistically planned for May 2002.
However, they faced a budget shortfall of 140,00O, due to unavoidable uncertainties (more
stringent requirements of the French Aviation Authority, one additional iteration of the wing
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construction) and to a cautious approach to design risks (the 1:6 flying mode1tumed out, with
hindsight, to have been unnecessary). Given the total budget of1.9 million, this was a miner
estimation errer. But in the CUITenteconomic situation, it was still a prob1em. Budgets were
being eut everywhere in the organization. Since even projects for the core product were
stopped, it was difficult to stand up and defend the Vol de Nuit project. It simply did DOtfit
the financial situation, even if its total costs were minute, relative to Lemond's total R&D
budget.
Even if the budget shortfaIl could be covered until May and the maiden flight was successfu1,
the future of the project would remain uncertain. Commercial development would require a
much larger investment as weIl as a revision of the strategie decision to stop the development
of the narrow lane vehicle concept.
On the other band, it was clear to the team that the strategie potential for Lemond remained
real, bath with respect to technology transfer and as a proof of innovative power. Breton's
boss, Franois Lorraine, put it: "Lemond should retain the know-how and continue to work in
this direction, in whatever form." LeCorse had praised the technica1 success of the project:
"If the prototype flies successfuIly in May, this will be the fastest airplane development and
the fastest vehicle development ever. This is unbelievable." lndeed, the team had shawn
tremendous competence and attitude. Yet, for bath LeCorse and Alsace, the project had, at
times, progressed toc fast for comfort. Alsace commented: "When the communication
incidents happened, l had the feeling of losing controI. The system picked up such

"

tremendousmomentum- this bas nothingto do with normalprojectmanagement."

The tense position toward the organization at large posed the biggest problem. They feared
that if they approached the CEO DOW,he would probably stop the project. If, however, they
kept silent, he might seme day hold that against the research and advanced development area.
The only reassurance was that Loiret was supportive and wanted to change the attitude of the
company in bis quest to move the company "from being a leader in accessories to being the
core technology leader". But in the CUITentbudget situation, even Loiret was hesitant to talk
to the CEO, and a presentation prepared by the team for this purpose remained unused.
1'"'"\

Conclusion
Antoine Alsace was weighing up bis options. "ln December, l thought that we had reached a
point where my Damewas becoming linked to the project. And l do DOtknow whether l want
to become the 'flying Alsace'. That means yeu risk your career extensively." Seme people in
the organization joked that LeCorse was pushing so courageously only because he had two
yeaTsleft to retirement and nothing to loge.
Loiret's (and top management's) calI for a willingness to take risks did DOtcorrespond to
currently perceived incentives. If someone pursued a risky project and it fai1ed,it usuaIly had
a negative impact on bis career. "A family man, who bas just paid the first instaIlments on bis
bouse, bas no chance to pursue such a project in the organization, unless bis family bas money
or he is very confident of finding a job anywhere. It is a miracle that we found enough people
willing to take a risk in the CUITentenvironment," said Alsace. LeMans' view on that was, "1
don't give a boat about my career. Ijust want to be treated fairly; that would be kind ofnice."

Copyright

<1;J2003 INSEAD,

Fontainebleau,

France.

'.

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Alsace had already drawn a conclusion for himself for the next time. "It was very exciting,
but l would not do a similar project a second time. rH be happy if it works, but l would not
push another wild idea. The thrill quickly tums into brutal fear." But for this one, the
question remained how to continue.

.
.
.

ShaH we stop? That would be safe, but l still think value will be destroyed for the
company, and the people will become cynical.
ShaH we go on without permission? It will be hard to find the larger amounts of money
for prototypes, and the risk to our careers will be serious.
ShaH we go on until the first prototype flies in March 2002 and hope the demonstration

will tum people around? The dangeris that it will aHbe to no avail - "Whenit flies,l can
say the matter is closed, and l can caB my professor at INSEAD and tell him that this
radical innovations thing does work. But whether it was of any use to anyone, l doubt it."

Or shaH we pursue the project with outside partners and a minority stake for Lemond?
This entails the risk of not maintaining control for Lemond, and the question remains how
to get the permission to do that.

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Exhibit 1
Flying Car Concepts Bui/t since 1917

Curtiss Autoplane (Glen Curtiss, 1917):

first attempt at such a vehicle,
it managed only a few short hors.

.
..

Arrowbile (Waldo Waterman, 1937):

lacked funding 10 continue the project.

..
.

~p."'::::::'gwWHf ::.
.'t;t&U;lit"..~..~......................

Airphibian (Robert Fulton, 1946):

adapted plane for road (50 mph),
lacked financial backing to continue.

Aerocar (Moulton Taylor, late 1960s):

Most successful concept to date, but
Ford Motor Co.'s plans to market the vehic1e
ended with the oil crisis in 1970.
Source: http://www.howstuffworks.com/flying-carl.htm

Copyright

'\

<1;J
2003 INSEAD,

Fontainebleau,

France.

ConvAir Car (Consolidated-Vultee, 1947):

Plans to market the car ended
when it crashed on its 3rdflight.

Moller Skycar (Paul Moller)

currently best-known development.
Moller bas been working on the idea
for 40 years, but the CUITentmodel is
still Dot stable enough.

"

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Exhibit 2
Jean-Pierre Breton in the Narrow-/ane Vehicle

Exhibit 3
Duosport 1:2.5 Mock-up

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Exhibit 4
The Vol-de-Nuit Participants in the Organization

Th. LeCorse
Exec. V.P. R & Adv.
Ph. Ardeche
Engine Design
high-end models

J. Ardennes
V.P. Adv. Dev. Strategy

P. Bellifontain
V.P. Vehicle Concepts

A. Simon
Financing &
Project Controlling

1
1

A. Alsace
Innovation Management

F. Lorraine
New Vehicle and
Special Concepts

F. Normand
Scouting for outside ideas

O. LeMans
Coord. Skyscooter

J.-P. Breton
Coord. Duosport

Ch. Labelge
Business Plan

Exhibit 5
Concept Drawing and Mock-up of the Flybike

G. Picardie
Design Ergonomies

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Exhibit 6
Revenue Estimates (in '000 Euro)from Ch. Labe!ge 's Informa! Survey in May 2001

Duosport
Flybike
Skvscooter

Year 1

Year 2

Year 3

Year 4

203,500
16,500
12,000

148,500
11,000
0

82,500
5,500
0

984,500
99,000
75!000

Exhibit 7
The Aprilia Leonardo ST 150

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Exhibit 8
The Maiden Flight of the Skyscooter

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