200

Essays

insistence on the enjoining of the good and forbidding of the evil went
a critical reinterpretation of the Shi'ite tenet of ta q;yya (self-protection
by dissimulation of faith) which clearly makes for quietism and non
assertiveness.

Taqiyya has been generally denounced and declared

impermissible whenever it entails "a corruption in religion."90

Since the J96Os, jihad has also been predictably brought to the
foreground in the discussions of political ethics.

It is interesting to

note, however, that the basic Shi'ite interpretation of the incumbency

of jihad has so far remained unchanged; it remains restricted to defensive
war during the Occultation of the Twelfth Imam.9J
Another change in the Shi'ite political ethic, a fairly minor one.
took place almost imperceptibly in the early decades of the twentieth
century. A collection of the practical rulings of Mirza-yi Shirazi (d. 1895),
the marja'-i laqlld during the tobacco protest of 1891-92, edited by
Shaykh

Fac;ilallah Nuri (d. 1909),

duties (furu'al-din).92

enumerates ten principal ethical

The last two, lavalla' (friendship [towards 'Ali

and the House of the Prophet]) and taharra' (avoidance [of the enemies
of the House of Prophet-i.e., the Sunnis]) had been given currency
with the establishment of Shi'ism in Iran, and were emphasized through

the centuries of Safavid-Ottoman and Qajar-Ottoman warfare and

rivalry.

Once such rivalry disappeared in the present century, these

provisions of the S hi'ite S acred Law fell into desuetude.

They were

omitted from the Juru' a/-din during the reign of the first Pahlavi,
RiQa Shah.
The ideologues of the Islamic revolution have not restored the
elevated status of lavalla' and tabarra' as Juru'.

They have, however,

reinterpreted these terms in line with the central idea of a purely Islamic
theocratic state.
Tavalla' and tabarra' mean the friendship of the friends of God
and the avoidance of the enemies of God .... [they are] the foundation of
the indepen den ce of the Muslims. an independence based on faith and
belief which would cause their bondedness to other Muslims and their
lack of dependence on the enemies of God. "93

The devotional love for the House of the Prophet is replaced by

the solidarity for the Muslim umma, and the avoidance of the enemies
of the Imams, by the avoidance of the non-Muslim world-eating and
imperialist enemies of God.
Last, but by no means least, we must turn to the topic of martyrdom
prototypically, that of Imam 1;Iusayn in Karbala. The conspicuous use
of the imagery of martyrdom and Karbala in the revolutionary activism

Ideological Revolution in Shi'ism

201

of the recent years should not make us ignore the fact that for many
centuries the tragedy of Karbala constituted an apolitical theodicy of
suffering.94

The idea of the martyrdom of l;Iusayn, the Lord of the

Martyrs, as vicarious atonement undoubtedly prevailed over its inter

pretation as the militant assertion of the Shi'ite cause against oppression
and tyranny.95 A religious book from the last decade of the nineteenth
century typically illustrates the conception of Imam ijusayn as the
vicarious sufferer and other-worldly savior: "The Lord of the Martyrs'
ark of salvation is greater than other ships of salvation. "96
A drastic change in the conception of the martydom of Imam

I:l usayn set in with the clerical agitation of the 1960s. In 1968, Ni'matallah
Salibi Najafabadi, a student of Khumeini's, published the Shahid-i
Jlivid (the Eternal Martyr), offering a radically politicized interpreta
tion of the events of KarbaIa.

Diverging from the doctrinal Shi'ite

position on the infallible Imams' divinely inspired knowledge of the

past, present, and future affairs, especially the knowledge of calamities

('ilm al-balliyii), Najafabadi denied l:Iusayn's foreknowledge of his fate

and maintained that "l:Iusayn began his movement neither to fulfill his
grandfather's foreboding. nor in a reckless mood of defiance, but as a
wholly

rational

and

fairly

well-planned

attempt

at

overthrowing

Yazid. "97 l:Iusayn's martyrdom is thus interpreted as a political uprising

against an unjust and impious government. and thus the model for Shi'ite
political activism.
The book first acquired fame in 1976, when a group said to be
disciples

of

Najafabadi

assassinated

Ayatallah

Shamsabadi.

the

representative in Isfahan of the apolitical Grand AyatalUih Khu'i. After

the revolution, the book was reissued with a foreward by Ayatallah
Munta?iri, Khumeini's designated successor.

Khumeini himself has

excelled in the glorification of martyrdom, at times attaining poetic and

mystical heights.98 He has enjoined martyrdom for Islam as a religious
duty incumbent on each and every individua1.99 The youthful Guardians
of the Islamic Revolution dutifully acknowledge their eagerness for
martyrdom when joining the Corps.

This is done in a last will and

testament which is published in the newspapers if they attain martyrdom.

Conclusion
The militant 'ulamii' who followed Khumeini in the 1960s and
1970s sought to defend and revitalize the Shi'ite tradition through a
political revolution. To secure the leadership of this political revolution
for themselves, they have revolutionized the Shi'ite political ethos