Port State Control Perception of the Safe Management of Bulk Carriers

Cheng-Chi Chung
Associate Professor, Department of Shipping and Transportation Management,
National Taiwan Ocean University, Taiwan
No. 2, Pei-Ning Road, Keelung 20224 Taiwan, ROC
Tel: +886-2-24622192 Ext. 3421, E-mail: jackie@ntou.edu.tw
Mong-Tang Her
Ph.D. Student, Department of Shipping and Transportation Management,
National Taiwan Ocean University, Taiwan
No. 2, Pei-Ning Road, Keelung 20224 Taiwan, ROC
Tel: +886-9-13659219, E-mail: mther@couragemarine.com

Abstract
The development of port state control (PSC) has come a long way since its first appearance in
January 1982. Maritime experts focus on the safe management of ships, which allows a better
understanding of the factors that influence the safe management of ships. This paper presents a
BOCR model, based on the modified Delphi method and AHP approach, to establish a hierarchy
structure that is a useful ship safety management system for the control of bulk carriers. The
structure validates the relative priorities of each hierarchy for different PSC regimes and
compares the view of different PSC regimes with the perceptions of crews, ship managers for
shipping companies, or governments, using absolute measurement by paired comparison
performance, using the hierarchy for each bulk carrier. In addition, other types of ship safety
management ranking systems can be structured using PSC perceptions and a slightly modified
BOCR model.
Keywords: Shipping, Bulk carriers, BOCR model, Port state control (PSC), Maritime safety
management
1. Introduction
The Royal Mail Steamer, Titanic, was a British registered four funnel ocean liner constructed at
the Harland and Wolff shipyard in Belfast. She collided with an iceberg and sank on her maiden
voyage, in 1912. Maritime nations were shocked and desirous of promoting safety at sea; so
uniform principles and rules were established in a common agreement. This agreement led to
the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), in 1929. Since then,
maritime nations have adopted newer versions to further protect maritime safety. The global
view is conscious of the need to preserve the human environment in general and the marine
environment in particular. The importance of this international convention, whose prime
objective is protecting the environment, is widely recognized. The preservation of the
environment, particularly the marine environment, along with prevention of pollution at sea, is
the prime objectives of the treaty.
Global vision emerged in the 1980s, along with organization culture, system thinking and
quality management. The consultancy process requires an interpretative ability that relies on the
knowledge and experience of the organizations members, in order to jointly identify and solve
problems (Grieves, 2000). Under the International Safety Management (ISM) code for the safe
operation of ships and for pollution prevention was adopted and amended by the International
Maritime Organization (IMO) and entered into force on 1 July 1998, ships must be periodically
verified by the administration, or an organization recognized by the administration, or at the
request of the administration by another contracting government to the convention. It requires
shipowners to develop a safety management system that ensures that equipment has been
properly tested and maintained, staff properly trained and deficiencies in the system promptly
identified and rectified (Chen, 2000). Knapp and Franses (2010) noted that a revision of the
ISM code could further enhance the level of safety at sea and that an intelligent ship safety

management system can be used as a good reference for bulk shipping carriers involved in the
charter business (Chung et al., 2011). This means that ship managers have to establish an
intelligent ship safety management system to meet international standards for the safe
management and operation of ships and the prevention of marine pollution.
The major dry bulk cargoes, i.e., iron ore, coal, grain, bauxite/alumina and phosphate rock,
carried by bulk carriers will increase in volume in the near future. One study to identify and map
the common patterns of human and organizational causes found that collisions often involve a
fishing boat and a bulk carrier (Macrae, 2009), which means that the huge numbers of bulk
carriers are the main group to which the safe operation of ships and pollution prevention applies.
The managers of shipping companies understand that major accidents have long been a key
issue in assessments of risk and safety management and recognize the need to develop a safety
management system that is controlled. It is necessary to control this system with limited
boarding resources, before they find the best model for support, shipside.
The classification societies rely on their own subjective judgment and a rule of thumb supply
registered shipowners with a reference guide on the management and maintenance of the safety
system. However, such guidelines lack objectivity and a quantitative means of evaluating inside
sourcing priorities, which barely ensures that the most appropriate limited boarding resources
are allocated. The adoption of management techniques influences organizational performance,
especially when supported by clear vision and mission statements (Arzu et al., 2008). Therefore,
the adoption of safety management techniques for shipping companies should influence the
performance of bulk carrier operation in the system, especially when supported by a clear vision
and mission statements with priorities. The purposes are explained briefly as follows: (1) to use
observed deficiencies categorized according to the main deficiency in the view of Port State
Control (PSC) to establish a hierarchy structure; (2) to use the hierarchy structure to compute
the relative priorities for each hierarchy in the perception of PSC; (3) to visualize the differences
in the relative priorities of each hierarchy from the view of PSC, using an Analytic Hierarchy
Process (AHP), which may apply to the crews and managers of shipping companies.
Governments can also use this model as a relative governmental guide.
The development of PSC began more than thirty years ago, in January 1982, when fourteen
European states agreed to establish a harmonized system of control, resulting in the signing of
the Paris MOU (Memorandum of Understanding) on PSC. The authors agree that PSC regimes
provide an objective inspection of foreign ships entering a countrys waters. Knapp and Velden
(2007) and confirm that differences between PSC inspections exist, but these differences would
be eliminated by the use of combined training and an exchange of databases. The PSC programs
are effective in raising the maritime safety level (Li and Zheng, 2008). However, shipping
companies focusing more on existing infrastructure could easily be asked to carry out the
additional task of collection, processing, storage and interchange of safety information,
including failure rates in all sections (Wang and Foinikis, 2001).
Thai and Grewal (2006) applied a two-stage methodological approach, in which a focus group
discussion was first used to explore the initial ideas from maritime experts, followed by a mail
survey, to reflect the perceptions of the international shipping community of the maritime safety
management system. It must be remembered that crews are the operators on board and every
port state should nominate experienced people who are fully qualified, well-trained and familiar
with ships as PSC officers (PSCO). The authors found a few articles discussing maritime safety
that use the PSC view and crew perception to improve the maritime safety system.
2. Literature Review
Since the IMO adopted the ISM code in 1994, shipping companies have assumed duties in
safety and environmental protection policy, corporate responsibilities and authority, designated
person(s), masters responsibility and authority, resources and personnel, development of plans
for shipboard operations, emergency preparedness, reports and analysis of abnormalities,

maintenance of ships and equipment, documentation and company audits. Although the ISM
documents may prove that the shipowner has done much to adhere to good practice in shipping
(Chen, 2000), it is necessary to have efficient paper work and a safety culture. Knapp and
Velden (2007), used correspondence analysis to study the distribution of observed deficiencies,
categorized according to the main deficiency codes. Li and Zheng (2008) studied the methods
adopted by the regional PSC in identifying substandard ships. There was no emphasis on the
improvement of the safety management on ships, so this study investigates the shipping industry
using the viewpoint of PSC.
The formal safety assessment (FSA) is a new approach to marine safety, which combines
various techniques to develop risk and cost benefit assessments. Container ships following the
general pattern have similar structure, strength and stability, cargo and ballast operations,
maneuverability, power and propulsion, cargo carried, cargo recipients, ports and terminals
(Wang and Foinikis, 2001). The contents of an effective maritime safety plan should include
operating systems, emergency response procedures, occupational health and safety management
plans and security management plans (Thai and Grewal, 2006) that apply a two-stage
methodological approach to be defined by maritime experts. The major content is the
establishment of a safety management system for shipping companies, the enhancement of ship
safety, the improvement of the quality of seafarers, the construction of a safe traffic environment,
the reinforcement of the PSC for substandard ships, the establishment of an efficient response
system for maritime accidents, the advancement of a maritime safety management system and
the establishment of a maritime safety culture for maritime safety (Cho, 2007). In view of the
nature and semantics of the measurement indicator descriptions of the respective factors of
quality management, there is senior management commitment and participation, quality
information and performance measurement, employee training and empowerment and customer
focus (Cheng and Choy, 2007). In summary, the components of a safety management system for
the shipping industry are shown in Table 1.
Table 1 The components of a safety management system for the shipping industry
Rules/Authors
Components
Safety and environmental protection policy, company responsibilities and authority,
International code
designated person(s), masters responsibility and authority, resources and personnel,
for fire safety
development of plans for shipboard operations, emergency preparedness, reports
system, as
and analysis of abnormal, maintenance of the ship and equipments, documentation,
amended (2000)
and company audits.
Wang and Foinikis Structure, strength and stability, cargo and ballast operations, maneuverability,
(2001)
power and propulsion, the cargo carried, cargo recipients, ports and terminals.
Thai and Grewal Operating systems, emergency response procedures, occupational health and safety
(2006)
management plan, security management plan.
Establishment of safety management for shipping companies, enhancement of ship
safety, enhancement of quality of seafarers, building of a safety traffic environment,
Cho (2007)
reinforcement of the PSC for substandard ships, establishment of an efficient
response system for maritime accidents, advancement of a maritime safety
management system and establishment of maritime safety culture.
Senior management commitment and participation, quality information and
Cheng and Choy
performance measurement, employee training and empowerment and customer
(2007)
focus.

Some papers have used the normative Delphi method to check how the information system
managers of large Spanish firms value information system outsourcing (Gonzalez et al., 2010).
The modified Delphi method is used to accumulate expert opinions and to establish an
appropriate assessment criterion (Hsu et al., 2008). The AHP is a multi-criteria process that
combines the priorities of the alternatives derived using the different criteria (Saaty, 2006). This
paper presents a model based on the modified Delphi method and AHP approach to visualize the
differences in the relative priorities of each hierarchy, across the PSC perception.

In general, there are two kinds of structures that represent problems: hierarchies and networks
(Saaty and Shih, 2009). Classification uses a hierarchy that aids understanding of the
complexity of the world. A variety of information is gained from experience, or from the order
and distribution of influences that make certain outcomes happen. The users of AHP should be
aware of AHPs assumptions and their corresponding implications (Leung and Cao, 2001). The
result from a pairwise comparison matrix is a normalized set of priority values that allow
ranking of the options considered (Beynon, 2002). Using conventional AHP, Saaty proposed a
four-step methodology, comprising modeling, valuation, priorization and synthesis (Altuzarra et
al., 2007).
3. The Methodology
Four rating priorities are used to synthesize the priorities of each alternative evaluated within the
benefits, opportunities, costs and risks (BOCR) framework (Saaty, 2006). Appropriate rankings
must be normative objectively and systematically from the mentioned items, using the concept
of BOCR (Saaty, 2005). The Delphi method shows the reasons underlying the first conclusions,
since knowledge of the actual worlds of the interviewees allow a better understanding of the
results obtained (Gonzalez et al., 2010). The Delphi technique uses three survey rounds, in
which the panel of experts provides a probability of occurrence for the given event and their
rationale behind their prediction (Baldwin and Trinkle, 2011). The modified Delphi method
performs a questionnaire survey to achieve consistency in the opinion of experts and subjective
factors are identified using an objective measurement method (Hsu et al., 2008).
The AHP is used with relative and absolute measurement and paired comparisons are performed
through the hierarchy (Saaty, 1990). The measuring criteria, C1, C2,, Cn, denotes the set of
measuring elements required to establish a pairwise comparison matrix, A. aij represents a
quantified judgment of a pair of measuring elements, Ci, and Cj. The relative importance of the
two measuring elements is a numerical value and the perceptions are: 1=equal importance,
3=weak importance, 5=essential importance, 7=very strong importance and 9=absolute
importance, along with intermediate values (2, 4, 6, 8) to allow comparisons within one unit.
When i = j , let aij = 1 , and a ji = 1 / aij , i, j = 1,2,..., n , has positive entries everywhere.
This yields a n n matrix, A, as follows:
C1, C2, ..., Cn

C1 1
C2 a21
A = aij =

Cn an1

a1n
a2 n
. ---------------------------------------------------------------- (1)

a12
1

[ ]

an 2

The problem involves assignment to the n measuring elements, C1, C2,, Cn. A set of numerical
weights, W1, W2,,Wn, reflects the recorded judgments in matrix A. These processes create a
ratio scale from the fundamental scale of absolute numbers.
Pi is the criteria weight, Wi, and after normalization they sum to 1. They can be written as:
n

P = 1 . ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- (2)
i =1

If there are r surveyors to measure the criteria and Pik represents a priority of the i th criteria
measured by the k th surveyor and to be accepted, the following are available:

Pi =

1 r
Pik for
r k =1

P
k =1 i =1

ik

= r . ---------------------------------------------------------------------- (3)

If A is a consistency matrix, the relationship between the weight, Wi, and judgment, aij, can be
simply calculated by Wi /Wj = aij (for i, j = 1, 2, , n) and C1, C2, ..., Cn.

C1 w1 w1
C2 w2 w1
A=

Cn wn w1

w1 w2
w2 w2

wn w2

w1 wn
w2 wn
. ---------------------------------------------------------- (4)

wn wn

Saaty (1990) suggested that the largest eigenvalue, max, is satisfied:

n

Wj

j =1

Wi

max = aij

. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ (5)

If A is a consistency matrix, the eigenvector, X, can be calculated by

( A max I )X = 0 . ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- (6)

Saaty (1990) proposed the use of a consistency index (CI) and a consistency ratio (CR), to
verify the consistency of the comparison matrix. CI and CR are defined as follows:

CI = (max n) (n 1) ; --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- (7)

CR = CI / RI. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- (8)

If CR0.1, the estimate is accepted; otherwise, a new comparison matrix is solicited, until
CR0.1. CR verifies that the judgments from the different decision makers are acceptably
inconsistent.
4. Priority Model
All concepts are seen from the PSC view. The modified Delphi method was used to accumulate
the opinions of maritime experts and to identify a normal criterion. The AHP method is used to
establish a model to compare with the crews concepts.
The problem PSC faces for quality ship control is that there is only one incentive scheme used
in the world today (Shinohara, 2005). According to the main deficiency categories of the Paris
MOU and the Tokyo MOU, 16 items are grouped, as listed in Table 2.
No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Table 2 Main deficiencies by categories

main deficiencies
No.
main deficiencies
Ships certificate and logbooks
9 Water and weather tight conditions
Crews certificate
10 Structural conditions
Living and working conditions
11 Safety of navigation
Life saving appliances
12 Radio communication
Fire safety
13 Pollution prevention
Additional measures to enhance maritime safety
14 Propulsion and auxiliary machinery
Alarm signals
15 ISM related deficiencies
Cargo operations including equipments
16 Other deficiencies

1. Ships certificate and logbooks: Ships certificates must be issued and logbooks recorded
under the rules of international conventions, as amended.
2. Crews certificate: Crews certificates must be issued under the international convention on
the standards of training, certification and watchkeeping (STCW) for seafarers and its Code
1995, as amended.
3. Living and working conditions: Living and working conditions must be maintained under
the merchant shipping (minimum standards) convention, 1976 (ILO Convention No. 147),
as amended, and the maritime labour convention (MLC), 2006, as amended.

4. Life saving appliances: Life saving appliances must be maintained under the international
life saving appliances code 1996, as amended.
5. Fire safety: The relative equipment for fire safety must be maintained under the
international codes for fire safety systems 2000, as amended.
6. Additional measures to enhance maritime safety: Diverse measures to enhance maritime
safety must comply with the relevant rules.
7. Alarm signals: Alarm signals must be maintained under the relevant rules.
8. Cargo operations including equipments: Cargo operations, including equipment, must be
maintained under the international maritime solid bulk cargos code 2010, and the relative
rules, as amended.
9. Water and weather tight conditions: Water and weather tight conditions of the ship must be
maintained under the 1988 Protocol for international conventions on load lines, 1966, and
the relative rules, as amended.
10. Structural conditions: Structural conditions must be maintained under the relevant rules.
11. Safety of navigation: Safety of navigation must be maintained under international
conventions for the safety of life at sea, 1974, and the international regulations for
preventing collisions at sea, 1972, as amended.
12. Radio communication: The equipment for radio communication must be maintained under
the international conventions for the safety of life at sea, 1974, as amended.
13. Pollution prevention: Pollution prevention is enacted under the 1978 and 1997 Protocol to
international conventions for the prevention of pollution from ships, 1973, as amended.
14. Propulsion and auxiliary machinery: Propulsion and auxiliary machinery must be
maintained under the international conventions for the safety of life at sea, 1974, as
amended.
15. ISM related deficiencies: The management for ships must comply with the ISM code 2000,
as amended.
16. Other deficiencies: Deficiencies under other relative rules.
Table 1 synthesizes four rating criteria under the concept of BOCR. Benefits to shipping
companies, crews and ship safety, ship structure and equipment and risk factors are
appropriate evaluation criteria. Table 2 categorizes the evaluation criteria using experts, in
which the modified Delphi method is adopted to reach a consensus among maritime experts. A
list of the criteria list is shown in Table 3.
Table 3 Criteria List
Concepts of BOCR

Criteria

Benefits

Benefits to shipping
companies

Opportunities

Crews and ship safety

Costs

Ship structure and

equipment

Risks

Risk factors

Subcriteria
Ships certificate and logbooks
Crews certificate
Cargo operations including equipments
Living and working conditions
Life saving appliances
Fire safety
Alarm signals
Water and weather tight conditions
Structural conditions
Safety of navigation
Radio communication
Propulsion and auxiliary machinery
Additional measures to enhance maritime safety
Pollution prevention
ISM related deficiencies
Other deficiencies

Quality bulk carrier safety management is the principal goal of this hierarchy and Table 3 allots
the remaining levels. A hierarchy structure is constructed as Figure 1.
Goal

Criteria

Subcriteria
Ships certificate and logbooks

Benefits of
shipping
companies

Crews certificate
Cargo operations including equipments
Living and working conditions
Life saving appliances

Assessmen
t model of
bulk
carriers
safety
manageme
nt

Crews and
ship safety

Fire safety
Alarm signals
Water and weather tight conditions
Structural conditions

Ship
structure
and
equipment

Safety of navigation
Radio communication
Propulsion and auxiliary machinery
Additional measures to enhance maritime safety

Risk
factors

Pollution prevention
ISM related deficiencies
Other deficiencies

Figure 1 Hierarchical Structure for Priority

5. Empirical Study
The shipping companies and crews shipside must rectify the deficiencies identified by
administration, or by any authorized person or organization, any institution for insurance, PSC,
or by any relevant person, as soon as possible, to ensure the quality of bulk carriers. This paper
uses the 2009-2011 statistical ratios of deficiencies calculated by the Paris MOU and the Tokyo
MOU, as indicated in Table 4.
Table 4 is a ratio scale that uses the criteria and subcriteria from the annual reports of the past
three years on PSC. A normalized priority of the PSC view is constructed for the criteria or
subcriteria by determining the ratio scale. Arithmetic mean is used for they sum to 1. Table 5
summarizes those results.
Table 5 shows that the Paris MOU focused on benefits to shipping companies (31.27%), but
the Tokyo MOU focused on crews and ship safety (37.06%). The sum of top six subcriteria
was 68.61% in Paris MOU and 69.93% in Tokyo MOU, for the respective factors in PSC
regimes.

Table 4 Ratios of deficiencies of the Paris MOU and the Tokyo MOU
MOU
Paris MOU
Tokyo MOU
Ratio (%)
2009
2010
2011
2009
2010
2011
Ships certificate and logbooks
13.44 13.02 12.79 27.09 26.75 26.46
Crews certificate
2.53
2.59
2.15
1.58
1.72
1.59
Benefits to
shipping
Cargo operations including
0.73
0.83
0.89
0.56
0.64
0.62
companies
equipments
Living and working conditions
14.7
15.36 14.79
3.27
3.23
3.21
Life saving appliances
9.55
8.66
9.35
13.70 11.95 11.56
Fire safety
11.55 11.82 12.89 16.51 17.26 17.06
Crews and ship
Alarm signals
0.83
0.76
0.91
0.60
0.72
0.66
safety
Water and weather tight
4.44
4.38
5.08
6.83
6.67
7.66
conditions
Structural conditions
4.29
4.54
5.49
7.30
7.47
7.77
Safety of navigation
13.28 13.30 12.76 16.04 16.88 16.42
Ship structure
Radio communication
3.37
3.38
3.33
3.79
3.25
2.89
and equipment
Propulsion and auxiliary
6.29
6.52
5.77
6.46
6.73
6.75
machinery
Additional measures to enhance
3.64
3.37
3.82
1.36
1.48
1.30
maritime safety
3.73
4.06
4.59
8.32
8.37
8.96
Risk factors Pollution prevention
ISM related deficiencies
5.91
5.32
3.21
8.49
7.84
7.93
Other deficiencies
1.74
2.09
2.19
2.50
3.13
2.95

Table 5 PSC perceptions of the Paris MOU and the Tokyo MOU
Paris Tokyo
Paris
Criteria
Subcriteria
MOU MOU
MOU
Ships certificate and logbooks
13.08 ( 3)
Benefits to
2.42 (13)
31.27
8.15 Crews certificate
shipping
Cargo operations including equipments
0.82 (16)
(1)
(4)
companies
Living and working conditions
14.95 ( 1)
Life saving appliances
9.19 ( 5)
12.09 ( 4)
Crews and 26.74 37.06 Fire safety
ship safety
Alarm signals
0.83 (15)
(3)
(1)
Water and weather tight conditions
4.63 ( 9)
Structural conditions
4.77 ( 8)
Ship structure
13.11 ( 2)
27.44 33.91 Safety of navigation
and
Radio communication
3.36 (12)
(2)
(2)
equipment
Propulsion and auxiliary machinery
6.19 ( 6)
Additional measures to enhance maritime
3.61 (11)
safety
14.55 20.88
Pollution prevention
4.13 (10)
Risk factors
(4)
(3)
ISM related deficiencies
4.81 ( 7)
Other deficiencies
2.01 (14)

Tokyo
MOU
2.68 (12)
1.63 (13)
0.61 (16)
3.24 (10)
12.40 ( 3)
16.94 ( 1)
0.66 (15)
7.05 ( 7)
7.51 ( 6)
16.44 ( 2)
3.31 ( 9)
6.65 ( 8)
1.38 (14)
8.55 ( 4)
8.09 ( 5)
2.86 (11)

6. Discussion
Ships must be under the direction of the administration or an organization recognized by the
administration that provides guidelines on maritime safety management. The check table or list
may be used as guidance. The authors could find no ranking system already in existence for this
purpose. Even PSC regimes, which provide statistics and an analysis of main deficiencies, by
category, every year, do not clearly show ship managers of shipping companies or governments
how to improve the internal system, step by step.

An intelligent ship safety management ranking system could be structured by using PSC
perceptions and the BOCR model. Table 5 shows the result of AHP for this research. The
findings reveal that benefits to shipping companies (31.27%) in the Paris MOU and crews and
ship safety (37.06%) in the Tokyo MOU, under main criteria, has more priority. This means
that benefits to shipping companies and crews and ship safety are often ignored by crews.
The ship manager must concentrate on the management of those criteria. The Paris MOU and
the Tokyo MOU show more correspondence on ship structure and equipment (27.44% and
33.92%) and risk factors (14.56% and 20.88%). These respected perceptions of PSC regimes
correspond to improve deficiencies in ships.
The Paris MOU focuses on ships certificate and logbooks (13.08%) and living and working
conditions (14.95%), while the Tokyo MOU focuses less on benefits to shipping companies.
The Paris MOU and the Tokyo MOU almost correspond on the subcriteria of crews and ship
safety, ship structure and equipment and risk factors. The findings of this paper confirmed
that the treatment of ships across PSC regimes shows differences (Knapp and Velden, 2007; Li
and Zheng, 2008) that are a reference for ship managers.
The PSC regimes maintain and report a trend in development and achievement of PSC activities
every year. The crews or ship managers of shipping companies or governments are asked to
identify the subjective factors using the objective measurement method, which provides
knowledge of how to enhance concentrated management of those criteria and the differences in
perceptions between different PSC regimes, using the model or the minor modified model.
7. Concluding Remarks
In an AHP procedure, this study identifies a model of the PSC perception on maritime safety
management for bulk carriers. The conclusions are explained briefly, as follows:
1. According to the main deficiencies in the view of PSC, this paper uses expert opinion to
confirm an AHP structure for the maritime safety management assessment for bulk carriers.
An intelligent ship safety management ranking system is structured using PSC perceptions
and the BOCR model.
2. The AHP structure validates the relative priorities of each hierarchy, in the view of different
PSC regimes. The PSC regimes show differences that are a controlling reference for ship
managers.
3. The structure compares the view of different PSC regimes with the perceptions of crews or
ship managers of shipping companies or governments, using absolute measurement, with
paired comparisons performed throughout the hierarchy for each bulk carrier.
Overall, this study contributes to the structure by expanding the PSC view of maritime safety
management for bulk carriers and by deepening the understanding of the factors that influence
maritime safety management in bulk carriers. Each type of ship should be manned with
qualified, certificated and medically fit seafarers, in accordance with national and international
requirements. Future research could use this structure to compare the view of different PSC
regimes with the perceptions of crews or ship managers of shipping companies, for other ship
types. They should ensure that the safety management ranking system for other ship types could
be structured by using PSC perceptions and a BOCR model that is slightly modified.
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