43. RBCI BOHOL v. FLORIDO(A.C. No.

5736, June 18, 2010

)FACTS: This is a complaint for disbarment filed by the members of the Board of
Directors of the Rural Bank of Calape, Inc. (RBCI) Bohol against Atty. James

Benedict Florido,herein respondent. RBCI alleged that respondent violated

his oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility. According to RBCI,
respondent and his clients, Dr.Domeciano Nazareno, Dr. Remedios
Relampagos, Dr. Manuel Relampagos, and FelixRengel, through force and
intimidation, with the use of armed men, forcibly took over the management
and the premises of RBCI. They also forcibly evicted Cirilo A.Garay, the bank
manager, destroyed the banks vault, and installed their own staff to run the
bank. However, In his comment, respondent denied RBCIs allegation and
explained that he acted in accordance with the authority granted upon him
by the Nazareno-Relampagos group, the lawfully and validly elected Board of
Directors of RBCI. Respondent said he was merely effecting a lawful and valid
change of management. Respondent alleged that a termination notice was
sent to Garay but herefused to comply and to ensure a smooth transition of
managerial operations,respondent and the Nazareno-Relampagos group
went to the bank to ask Garay to step down. However, Garay reacted
violently and grappled with the security guards long firearm. Respondent
then directed the security guards to prevent entry into the bank premises of
individuals who had no transaction with the bank and also, throughthe orders
of the Nazareno Relampagos group, also changed the locks of the banks
vault.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. James Floridos act is a ground for violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD: Canon 19 of the Code provides that a lawyer shall represent his client
with zeal within the bounds of the law. Lawyers are indispensable
instruments of justice and peace. Upon taking their professional oath, they
become guardians of truth and therule of law. Verily, a lawyers duty is not to
his client but to the administration of justice. Thus, their duty to protect their
clients interests is secondary to their obligation to assist in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice. While the yare obliged to present every
available legal remedy or defense, their fidelity to their clients must always
be made within the parameters of law and ethics, never at the expense of
truth, the law, and the fair administration of justice and that, any means, not

honorable, fair and honest which is resorted to by the lawyer, even in the
pursuit
of his devotion to his clients cause, is condemnable and unethical.
WHEREFORE, court finds respondent Atty. James Benedict Florido GUILTY
of violating Canon 19 and Rules 1.02 and 15.07 of the Code of
ProfessionalResponsibility. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for one yeareffective upon finality of the Decision.
CASE 141: FERNANDO MARTIN O. PEA v. ATTY. LOLITO APARICIO
(2007)
FACTS: Atty. Aparicio was hired as counsel by an employee who has been
complaining at the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for alleged
illegal dismissal. The NLRC arranged for a mandatory mediation/conciliation
conference to be attended by both parties. Atty. Aparicio, in behalf of his
client, filed a claim for separation pay and damages, during the conference,
but the company (represented by the complainant, Pea) rejected these as
baseless. The company thru Mr. Pea sent a letter to the employee and Atty.
Aparicio, requiring an explanation as to her absences, and to return to work.
However, Atty. Aparicio, representing his client, made a response reiterating
their arguments re: illegal dismissal. The letter also contained the following
threats to the company: But if these are not paid on August 10, 2005, we
will be constrained to file and claim bigger amounts including moral
damages to the tune of millions under established precedence of cases and
laws. In addition to other multiple charges like (1) Tax evasion by the millions
of pesos of income not reported to the government, (2) Criminal Charges for
Tax Evasion, (3) Criminal Charges for Falsification of Documents, and (4)
Cancellation of business license to operate due to violations of laws. These
are reserved for future actions in case of failure to pay the above amounts as
settlements in the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
Mr. Pea then filed this complaint for disciplinary action with the IBP,
believing that the letter was unethical. Atty. Aparicio claimed that the
complaint is malicious; that it must be dismissed because of procedural
matters which were not complied with, e.g. certification against forum
shopping. Atty. Aparicio also claims that the issuance of demand letters had
been an accepted practice in the legal profession. There was amandatory
conference but Atty. Aparicio failed to appear. The investigating
commissioner recommended the dismissal of the case for failure to comply
with procedural matters. The IBP Board of Governors adopted the

recommendation and forwarded it to the Supreme Court. Mr. Pea then

appealed the recommendation of the IBP.
ISSUE/S: WON the demand letter made by Atty. Aparicio is unethical and
the act, violative of the CPR
HELD: Yes, he violated Rule 19.01. However, disbarment is too harsh a
penalty considering that he acted overzealously to protect the interests of
his client. He is therefore reprimanded, and given a stern warning.
RATIO: Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that a
lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law,
reminding legal practitioners that a lawyers duty is not to his client but to
the administration of justice; to that end, his clients success is wholly
subordinate; and his conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously
observant of law and ethics. Under Rule 19.01, a lawyer should not file or
threaten to file any unfounded or baseless criminal case or cases against the
adversaries of his client designed to secure a leverage to compel the
adversaries to yield or withdraw their own cases against the lawyers client.
It is clear in the content of the demand letter that Atty. Aparicio did what was
exactly prohibited by Rule 19.01. Not only do they violate the CPR, but they
also amount to blackmail, for which he may be criminally liable. Aparicio
does not find anything wrong with what he wrote, dismissing the same as
merely an act of pointing out massive violations of the law by the other
party, and, with boldness, asserting that a lawyer is under obligation to tell
the truth, to report to the government commission of offenses punishable by
the State. He further asserts that the writing of demand letters is a standard
practice and tradition and that our laws allow and encourage the settlement
of disputes. This is misleading. It cannot be denied that he implied in the
letter that if the company heeds to his demands, he shall keep silent on the
other alleged violations.
Indeed, the writing of demand letters is a standard practice and tradition in
this jurisdiction. However, the letter in this case contains more than just a
simple demand to pay. It contains a threat to file retaliatory charges against
the company which have nothing to do with his clients claim for separation
pay. The letter was obviously designed to secure leverage to compel the
company to yield to their demands. Indeed, letters of this nature are
definitely proscribed by the Code of Professional Responsibility.
CASE 70: Millare v. Montero

FACTS: Petitioner Rodolfo Millares mother, Pacifica Millare obtained a

favorable judgement from the MTC, Bangued, Abra which ordered
Respondent Eustaquio Monteros client, Elsa Dy Co to vacate the premises
which is the subject of the ejectment case. Thereafter, Montero filed
numerous cases in hopes of getting a favorable decision for Co. (1) Civil Case
No. 344 which is an appeal from the decision rendered in civil case no. 844 of
the MTC of Bangued, Abra with the RTC, Abra (2) CA-G.R. CV No. 11404 which
is an appeal from the decision of the RTC, Abra (3) CA-G.R. SP No. 11690
which is an action for the annulment of decisions and/or reformation or
novation of decisions filed with the CA (4) G.R. No. 86084 which is a petition
for review on certiorari filed with the Supreme Court (5) CA-G.R. SP No.
17040 which is an appeal and/or review by certiorari filed with the CA as well
(6) SP Civil Action No. 624 which is a petition for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus with preliminary issuance of prohibitory order filed with the RTC
of Abra.
ISSUE:WON Montero violated Canon 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility HELD:Yes. The rights of Co as Monteros client were fully
protected and her defenses were properly ventilated when Montero filed an
appeal from the MTC to the RTC but Montero thereafter resorted to devious
and underhanded means to delay the execution of judgement by the MTC
adverse to Co.
RATIO:Canon 12 of the CPR provides that a lawyer is required to exert every
effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice. It is unethical for a lawyer to abuse or wrongfully
use the judicial process, like filing of dilatory motions, repetitious litigation
and frivolous appeals for the sole purpose of frustrating and delaying the
execution of a judgement.
CASE 144: Corpus vs. CA, et al.
FACTS: David accepted the case of Corpus even though there was no
express agreement regarding the attorneys fees. Corpus was
administratively charged and he employed the services of David. David won
the administrative case for Corpus. Corpus gave a check to David, but was it
was returned by David with the intention of getting paid after the case is
ruled with finality by the SC and Corpus gets his back salaries and wages. In
a letter sent by David to Corpus, he said Your appreciation of the efforts I
have invested in your case is enough compensation therefor, however, when
you shall have obtained a decision which would have finally resolved the

case in your favor, remembering me then will make me happy. In the

meantime, you will make me happier by just keeping the check. David
continued to fight for Corpus case and got a favorable judgment. Corpus
refused to pay David contending that since David refused the first check
given by him, he gave his services gratuitously.
ISSUE/S: WONprivate respondent Atty. Juan T. David is entitled to attorney's
fees
HELD: Yes because there was at least an implied agreement for the
payment of attorney's fees
RATIO: Payment of attorney's fees to respondent David may be justified by
virtue of the innominate contract of facio ut des (I do and you give which is
based on the principle that "no one shall unjustly enrich himself at the
expense of another." Innominate contracts have been elevated to a codal
provision in the New Civil Code by providing under Article 1307 that such
contracts shall be regulated by the stipulations of the parties, by the general
provisions or principles of obligations and contracts, by the rules governing
the most analogous nominate contracts, and by the customs of the people.
Jurisprudence provides Where one has rendered services to another, and
these services are accepted by the latter, in the absence of proof that the
service was rendered gratuitously, it is but just that he should pay a
reasonable remuneration therefor because 'it is a well-known principle of law,
that no one should be permitted to enrich himself to the damage of another.
CASE 142: Albano v. Coloma
FACTS:Petitioner Angel Albano and his mother retained the services of
Respondent Atty. Perpetua Coloma. Coloma was their counsel in a civil case
during the Japanese occupation. However, Coloma failed to expedite the
hearing and termination of the case which prompted Albano to sought a
different counsel. Coloma intervened in such case in order to collect her
attorneys fees base on a document allegedly signed by Albano where an
agreement to pay her a contingent fee of 33 and 1/3% of whatever could be
recovered whether in land or damages is stipulated. Albano claims that such
document was not signed by him nor his mother and the NBI found that the
signature is not in the hand of the person whose sample signatures were
submitted. Coloma denied the allegations and claimed that the matters
covered therein were untrue, unfounded and imaginary. Coloma claims that
her services were contracted for such case and that there was agreed upon
fee. Coloma also claims that there is record to show that she was able to file

dozens of papers and pleadings and went to trial with the assistance of her
sister.
ISSUE/S:WON Coloma can collect her attorneys fees
HELD:Yes. The Solicitor General found that the genuineness and due
execution to pay respondent her attorneys fees.
RATIO:Any counsel, who is worthy of his hire is entitled to be fully
recompensed for his services. With his capital consisting solely of his brains
and with his skill, acquired at tremendous cost not only in money but in
expenditure of time and energy, he is entitled to the protection of any
judicial tribunal against any attempt on the part of a client to escape
payment of his fees. It is indeed ironic if after putting forth the best that is in
him to secure justice for the party he represents, he himslef would not get
his due.
CASE 145: Traders Royal Bank Union-Independent v. NLRC, GR
120592, March 14, 1997 FACTS: In February 1987, petitioner Traders
Royal Bank Employees Union (Union) and private respondent Atty. Emmanuel
Cruz, head of the E.N.A Cruz and Associates law firm, entered into a retainer
agreement. The Union would pay Atty. Cruz a monthly retainer fee of P3000.
The Union referred to Atty. Cruz the claims of its members for holiday, midyear and year-end bonuses against their employer, Trader Royal Bank (TRB).
Atty. Cruz filed the complaint and the Labor Secretary to the NLRC certified
the case. In September 1988, the NLRC ruled in favor of the employees,
awarding them holiday pay differential, mid-year bonus differential and yearend bonus differential. Acting on the motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution Atty. Cruz filed, the NLRC raffled the case to Labor Arbiter Oswald
Lorenzo. However, pending the hearing of the application for the writ of
execution, TRB challenged the NLRC decision before the Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court modified the decision by deleting the award of mid-year and
year-end bonus differentials. TRB complied with the final judgment and
determined the holiday pay differential. The Union members were paid
through their payroll. In April 1990, the retainer agreement was terminated.
In September 1990, Atty. Cruz received the Supreme Court decision and
notified the Union. Through a latter, he informed the Union, the TRB
management and the NLRC of his right to exercise and enforce his attorneys
lien over the award of holiday pay differential. In July 1991, he filed a motion
before Labor Arbiter Lorenzo for the determination of his attorneys fees,
praying that 10% of the total reward for holiday pay differential be declared

as his attorneys fees. Lorenzo granted the motion. The NLRC affirmed the
grant. The Union filed a motion for reconsideration but the NLRC denied it.
Hence, this petition. The Union maintained that: (1) the NLRC committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in upholding the
award of attorneys fees in violation of the retainer agreement, (2) the award
for attorneys fees should have been incorporated in the main case and not
after the Supreme Court had already reviewed and passed upon the NLRC
decision. It argued that since the Supreme Court had neither taken up nor
approved Atty. Cruzs claim for attorneys fees, the NLRC should not have
allowed said attorneys fees. Thus, the Union posited that the NLRC acted
without jurisdiction in making the award of attorneys fees, as said act
constituted a modification of a final and executor Supreme Court judgment
which did not award attorneys fees.
On the other hand, Atty. Cruz maintained that his motion to determine
attorneys fees was just an incident of the main case where the Union was
awarded its money claims. The grant of attorney's fees was the consequence
of his exercise of his attorney's lien. Such lien resulted from and corresponds
to the services he rendered in the action wherein the favorable judgment
was obtained. To include the award of the attorney's fees in the main case
presupposes that the fees will be paid by TRB to the adverse party. All that
the non-inclusion of attorney's fees in the award means is that the Supreme
Court did not order TRB to pay the opposing party attorney's fees in the
concept of damages. He is not therefore precluded from filing his motion to
have his own professional fees adjudicated.
ISSUE/S: WON Atty. Cruz should be awarded attorneys fees.
HELD: Yes. Atty. Cruz should be awarded attorneys fees.
RATIO: Rule 20.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that
a lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients concerning his
compensation and shall resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition,
injustice or fraud. This Rule requires that a lawyer shall first and foremost
take care of his clients interest before he concerns himself with his personal
compensation. And in times when there are controversies about it, he has
the remedy of judicial action to claim the amount for the services he
rendered. In the case at bar, the controversy started when the Union refused
to pay Atty. Cruz attorneys fees for the latters render of service in the
litigation of a particular case because they were already paying him a
retainers fee. It is therefore imperative to distinguish an attorneys fee from

a retainers fee. An attorneys fee is either ordinary or extraordinary. In its

ordinary concept, an attorney's fee is the reasonable compensation paid to a
lawyer by his client for the legal services he has rendered to the latter. The
basis of this compensation is the fact of his employment by and his
agreement with the client. In its extraordinary concept, an attorney's fee is
an indemnity for damages ordered by the court to be paid by the losing party
in a litigation. The basis of this is any of the cases provided by law where
such award can be made. The controversy of this case started when the
Union had the false conception that NLRC has jurisdiction over claims for
attorneys fees only before its judgment is reviewed and ruled by the
Supreme Court. This is false because it is a well settled rule that a claim for
attorneys fees may be asserted either in the very action in which the
services of a lawyer had been rendered or in a separate action. situation, the
remedy for recovering attorney's fees as an incident of the main action may
be availed of only when something is due to the client. Attorney's fees
cannot be determined until after the main litigation has been decided and
the subject of the recovery is at the disposition of the court. The issue over
attorney's fees only arises when something has been recovered from which
the fee is to be paid. While a claim for attorney's fees may be filed before the
judgment is rendered, the determination as to the propriety of the fees or as
to the amount thereof will have to be held in abeyance until the main case
from which the lawyer's claim for attorney's fees may arise has become final.
Otherwise, the determination to be made by the courts will be premature. Of
course, a petition for attorney's fees may be filed before the judgment in
favor of the client is satisfied or the proceeds thereof delivered to the client.
In the case at bar, Atty. Cruz demanded the first type of attorneys fees.
Heneither filed any claim for attorneys fees before the NLRC when the latter
acted on the Unions money claims nor before the Supreme Court when it
reviewed the NLRC decision. It was only after the Supreme Court modified
the NLRC decision that he demanded his claim before the NLRC for it would
be impossible and improper for the NLRC and for the Supreme Court to make
an award for attorneys fees when no claim for it was pending before them.
The Union argued that the retainer fee they paid Atty. Cruz was already the
attorneys fees. Atty. Cruz disagreed and said that they had no such
agreement. The contract provides that the P3000 retainer fee does not cover
the services the latter actually rendered before the labor arbiter and the
NLRC in behalf of the former. The monthly payment is intended merely as a
consideration for the law firms commitment to render the services
(general and special legal services) of the retainer agreement. A general
retainer, or retaining fee, is the fee paid to a lawyer to secure his future

services as general counsel for any ordinary legal problem that may arise in
the routinary business of the client and referred to him for legal action. The
future services of the lawyer are secured and committed to the retaining
client. For this, the client pays the lawyer a fixed retainer fee which could be
monthly or otherwise, depending upon their arrangement. The fees are paid
whether or not there are cases referred to the lawyer. The reason for the
remuneration is that the lawyer is deprived of the opportunity of rendering
services for a fee to the opposing party or other parties. In fine, it is a
compensation for lost opportunities. A special retainer is a fee for a specific
case handled or special service rendered by the lawyer for a client. A client
may have several cases demanding special or individual attention. If for
every case there is a separate and independent contract for attorney's fees,
each fee is considered a special retainer. Evidently, the P3,000.00 monthly
fee provided in the retainer agreement between the union and the law firm
refers to a general retainer, or a retaining fee, as said monthly fee covers
only the law firm's pledge, or as expressly stated therein, its "commitment to
render the legal services enumerated." The fee is not payment for Atty.
Cruzs execution or performance of the services listed in the contract, subject
to some particular qualifications or permutations stated there. Also, he
asserted that there was no express agreement as to the amount of his fees
for services rendered in the case for recovery of differential pay. However, he
argued that in the absence of such agreement, Article 111 of the Labor Code
supplants this omission by providing for an award of ten percent (10%) of a
money judgment in a labor case as attorney's fees. It is elementary that an
attorney is entitled to have and receive a just and reasonable compensation
for services performed at the special instance and request of his client. As
long as the lawyer was in good faith and honestly trying to represent and
serve the interests of the client, he should have a reasonable compensation
for such services.