A Primer on the

Transparent and Credible Election System (TCrES)

(by Gus Lagman)
The objective of this paper is to explain, as completely and as clearly as I can,
the alternative to Smartmatics PCOS (Precinct Count Optical Scan) system, that the
group of election advocates (all IT practitioners) has been recommending to the
COMELEC since 2008. The version that is described here truly enhances the
transparency that, on the other hand, was lost when Smartmatics PCOS was employed
in the 2010 and 2013 elections. For this reason and the many other benefits TCrES
offers, the IT practitioners believe that this alternative is by far, the most appropriate and
most suitable to Philippine elections today.
While I have written more than a dozen articles about the automation of
elections, most of them, however, are on specific issues, rather than a comprehensive
discussion of this alternative system. This paper discusses in detail the Transparent and
Credible Election System that I and the other members of the group designed.
There are basically two technologies that those countries which automate their
elections choose from: the Direct Recording Electronic System, or DRE, and the Optical
Mark Recognition System, or OMR. The much older punch-card systems are no longer
being actively marketed. But whichever of these is used for precinct-counting,
automation of the consolidation, or canvassing (as it is more popularly referred to in the
Philippines) would employ the same technology PCs and servers and laptops. This is
a fact that very few people understand and appreciate. Having to choose an election
technology therefore is only relevant for precinct-level equipment.
I will not dwell too much on the DRE System (also referred to as the touch
screen system) because it is the most non-transparent election system and would cost
us about four times that of OMR/PCOS. It would be foolish to even consider it. Why the
COMELEC Advisory Council (CAC) suggested that it be tried in Pateros, is beyond me.
Let me therefore focus only on the OMR System, under which PCOS falls.
To appreciate the automated election system, it would be best to first understand
how the old manual system works and what its problems and good points are.
The purely manual system
Except for one extremely damaging problem, the old manual system is really not
all that bad. It is the most transparent system. Voters understand and witness the
counting. The Board of Election Inspectors, or BEI (the teachers), can attest to the
accuracy of the count since they did it themselves. Consequently, there are two
trusted documents the ballot and the Election Returns (ERs the results of
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counting). If cheating occurs, losing candidates can gather witnesses to sign affidavits
attesting to what they saw.
Unfortunately, the COMELEC, an election lawyer, several pro-Smartmatic
congressmen, and even an NGO have been demonizing manual elections for years,
forgetting that its a system our country had used, quite successfully, since the 1940s
and until 2007. Its the system that elevated Roxas, Quirino, Magsaysay, Garcia,
Macapagal, Marcos, C. Aquino, Ramos, Estrada, and Arroyo to the presidency.
Manual counting at the precincts is also acknowledged the world over to be the
most transparent system available today and is therefore used in most developed
countries.
Surely, it has its disadvantages. And we should recognize them, if we are to
eliminate, or at least minimize them. Manual counting by the teachers is prone to
inaccuracies, especially after they have been at it for many hours. It is back-breaking
work for the teachers. Tension at the precincts can build up especially in hot spots,
which can then lead to violence. During the transport of the ballot boxes, they can be
snatched and the contents replaced by fake ballots, or destroyed.
Then, the worst problem of all: the canvassing (or consolidation) - from
municipal, to provincial, to national canvassing - can take 25 to 40 days! Because of this
slow process, the results become very vulnerable to manipulation, or as it has been
commonly referred to in the country, vulnerable to dagdag-bawas.
At this point, it is important to understand that dagdag-bawas occurs in
canvassing, and hardly in precinct-counting. The reason is obvious: the counts at the
precincts are too small that manipulating the results wouldnt give candidates who
commit the fraud, much advantage anyway; and its much more difficult to execute
clandestinely, as there are too many voters watching the process at the precincts. In
contrast, the numbers are much, much bigger during canvassing at the municipal and
provincial levels where only a few people witness the consolidation.
However, the COMELEC and the pro-Smartmatic congressmen, while
demonizing manual counting, fail to explain that that step only took 5 to 12 hours in the
past and that it was canvassing that took many weeks to complete. This omission is
what has deceived the public.
A brief history of election automation in the Philippines
At any rate, because of the above problems in the old manual system, the
COMELEC (under Chairman Christian Monsod), as early as 1992, started researching
on the automation of our elections. I was tasked with the creation of the committee.
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After scanning the available technologies at the time, OMR became the choice. It was
tested during the 1996 ARMM elections, using a Central Count Optical Scan (CCOS)
system - meaning the uncounted ballots, in ballot boxes, are brought to a central
location where they are counted by a high-speed OMR machine - and proved to be
successful, albeit with some minor problems.
It was going to be tried on a national level for the 2004 presidential elections.
However, the Supreme Court nullified the award of the contract due to the anomalous
bidding process conducted by the Abalos Commission. The machines had already been
delivered and one billion pesos had already been paid. That SC decision, released in
January, 2004, also directed the Office of the Solicitor-General to recover the money
and the Office of the Ombudsman to prosecute the criminals, but up to now - eleven
years later the COMELEC has not recovered the money and the criminals are still at
large.
The automation law, R.A. 8436, passed in late 1997, was amended by R.A. 9369
(to make it technology-neutral), passed in early 2007. Despite the passage of the new
laws, the 1998 and the 2007 presidential elections were not automated because in both
instances, there was not enough time to prepare for them.
For the 2008 ARMM elections, two systems were tried one province used
Smartmatics DRE, while five provinces used Avantes CCOS. Despite the different
technologies used at the precinct and municipal levels, consolidation did not pose too
many problems. Procedural and technical problems occurred but they were rectified to
the satisfaction of the COMELEC. One sour note: Smartmatic showed, unwittingly, that
results can even be altered remotely when it did just that to correct counts in a
Maguindanao municipality that zeroed out.
Smartmatics PCOS system
In 2009, the Melo Commssion decided to automate the 2010 presidential
elections, choosing the OMR-PCOS technology for precinct-counting. With PCOS, the
5-12 hours of manual counting was reduced to almost instantaneous counting. The
teachers, therefore, were able to go home earlier. And because canvassing was
automated, this 25-40-day step was shortened to approximately 5 days. PCOS (which
cost us many billions of pesos), therefore, saved the counting process some 8 hours
(average); the laptops and its peripheral equipment (which cost us about 300 million
pesos) that were used in canvassing, saved the process 20-35 days.
Despite the many objections from election advocates because of the
Commissions and the vendors non-compliance with the law, which the advocates
expressed before and after the 2010 elections, the COMELEC again decided to use
Smartmatics PCOS machines for the 2013 mid-term elections. That was to be an even
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worse implementation of election automation. Adding insult to injury, COMELEC

decided to purchase the PCOS machines in March, 2012. As a result, we also had to
spend for warehousing them and putting them back in working order a waste of public
money.
Heres how the respondents to the Electoral Integrity Project that was conducted
by the University of Sydney in cooperation with the Kennedy School of Government of
the Harvard Business School graded our 2013 elections:

Our grade

Grade of highest

Voting process
53
88
Vote count
68
99
Vote results
61
96
Electoral authorities
64
98
Considering all the categories, Philippine elections landed in the bottom third of
127 countries surveyed. Notable, as well, is the Venezuelan elections, which
landed as 110th (1 being the highest; 127, the lowest).
And while there were a few good points experienced, there were, on the other
hand, many problems with the system, most of which were inherent to the technology
chosen.
The most disadvantageous, of course, was the loss of transparency when the
precinct-counting was automated. It became secret counting, rather than public
counting. When is it easier to cheat? When its public, or when its secret? Its really a
very simple choice.
Why is transparency important?
If the voters do not see how their votes are counted, how will they know that they
were counted correctly? How can the voters trust the result of counting when its done
secretly? Any IT person will tell you that computer programs can be altered to produce
fake results.
If theres cheating in manual precinct-counting, the voters and candidates would
see and would have a basis for protesting; in automated precinct-counting, nobody sees
the cheating. Also, if automated canvassing were transparent, voters could do their own
consolidation; they could then easily compare their results with the official ones.
And whats more, transparency is required by R.A. 9369.
The teachers obviously could not attest to the accuracy of the count that they did
not do. They could only attest that they saw PCOS printing the ERs. The only trusted
document therefore was the ballot, which, according to our laws, could not be accessed
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unless theres a protest. But how does a losing candidate convince the judge to open
the ballot box in the first place? Its a Catch-22 situation that impairs the protest process
seriously.
The possibility of ballot box snatching was replaced by the possibility of CF
(Compact Flash) card snatching the latter being much easier because of the small
size of the cards (can fit in a shirt pocket). Fake CF cards can replace the official one.
After the 2010 elections, there were CF cards found in a garbage can in Cagayan de
Oro.
The PCOS machines were vulnerable to internal tampering, and because of very
weak controls, so also Smartmatics canvassing system,. A small group of technical
insiders could have altered the results of Philippine elections. This vulnerability is
unacceptable! It endangers the countrys democratic system.
While the Smartmatics PCOS system is cheaper than a DRE system, its still too
expensive considering what we are getting limited gains, many problems.
Transparent and Credible Election System
Given the above facts, it now becomes easier to analyze the past manual system
and Smartmatics PCOS system, then design a sound technology-assisted version that
responds to most, if not all the problems and disadvantages in the two systems.
Lets focus on the old, pure manual system: Precinct-counting, 5-12 hours lets
increase this by 100% to allow for a bigger number of voters per precinct ... so roughly,
10-24 hours. Canvassing, 25-40 days.
Just look at the numbers. One doesnt have to be a systems practitioner;
choosing the right approach in adopting technology is pure common sense. Automate
the canvassing. Retain manual precinct-counting (and save billions of pesos), but look
for a way by which the results can be transmitted electronically to the canvassing points
so consolidation can be automated.
Canvassing can be shortened to about five days (same as the PCOS system),
barring major transmission problems. With proper control procedures, dagdag-bawas
can be eliminated. Completely. With electronic transmission of Election Returns,
ballot-snatching during transport can also be eliminated. Again, with proper control
procedures, tampering during transmission can be prevented, or at the very least, easily
rectified.
Theres more than one way of converting the results of manual counting to digital
format so they can be transmitted electronically, but I find the following the most
attractive because it also enhances the transparency of counting: use a laptop to
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duplicate the manual counting (using the taras system) and project it to a big screen,
so more people can witness the progress. At the end of the counting, the manual and
laptop counts can be compared and corrections, if needed, made. (Note: When
corrections are made, it should always be remembered that the manual count is the
official count.)

Manual count

Laptop count

Printing of the 30 copies of the Election Returns would be automated; and

transmission of the ERs to the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC) would be done
electronically through communication lines.
Redesigning the ballot form, the Election Returns, the Tally Sheet can speed up
manual counting. Reorganizing the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) can also lighten
the load on the teachers (hire more people, create counting team/s). Time and motion
studies should be done long before the elections.
Problems with manual counting will not be completely eliminated, but will,
however, be substantially reduced due to the greater transparency of the process. And
aside from the much lower cost, there are other advantages. All the equipment (laptops,
projectors, printers) can be donated to public schools after each election; therefore, no
storage and maintenance expenses. All software can be made available to the public.
Is TCrEs compliant with the provisions of R.A. 9369?
It is. The system is not untried: it is one of the most common applications of
computers, i.e., counting and consolidation. Many countries use this system in their
election processes (manual precinct-counting, electronic transmission, and automated
canvassing).
R.A. 9369 does not mandate that all steps in our election system be automated;
in fact, PCOS does not automate the voting step. And the original law (R.A. 8436) was
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precisely amended to make the system technology-neutral. We know ... because

several of us who designed TCrES were members of the Technical Working Group
(TWG) that helped the Senate craft the law.
TCrES implementation
TCrES implementation is very much simpler. COMELEC only needs to bid out
laptops, servers, printers, and projectors; or even better, acquire them through the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM), which has taken advantage of volume
discounts by centralizing the procurement of ordinary office equipment and supplies.
COMELEC should also bid out the transmission facilities, or negotiate with all the
existing telcos since all of them may have to participate anyway. It should also bid out
the project management, by region, perhaps, so the task is spread out.
It should plan out the manpower requirements, considering the possibility of
creating teams for the voting and counting phases. Because of the billions of pesos in
savings, COMELEC can plan on increasing the allowances of the teachers and other
government employees who will participate in the process. For sure, Filipinos would
prefer to see the funds benefitting these people, rather than one foreign vendor.
Conclusion
One thing is certain TCrES, which was designed by Filipino IT practitioners, is
definitely much better than the Smartmatic PCOS system used in the 2010 and 2013
elections where precinct-counting was secret; therefore, results were suspect.
Canvassing lacked proper controls; therefore it was extremely vulnerable to internal
tampering (which we suspect could very well have happened). Indeed, we should not
buy any more PCOS machines, nor use them ever again for our elections!
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