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RISTO
SAARINEN
AND DONALD
JOHN BURIDAN
DAVIDSON
ON AKRASIA
1.
INTRODUCTORY
REMARKS
some
This article has two objectives.
it is my aim to outline
First,
medieval
views concerning
the acts that oppose one's better judgment.
term akrasia to denote the moral state of an agent
I will use Aristotle's
treatment of akrasia
in
this
way. John Buridan's
(1285-1349)
behaving
is especially
it will be argued that some impor
relevant here. Second,
tant philosophical
ideas proposed
in his
recently by Donald Davidson,
influential study 'How isWeakness
discussion.
pated in the medieval
or
''weakness
Aristotle's
akrasia,
of the Will
Possible?',1
are antici
96: 133-154,
1993.
Synthese
1993 Kluwer Academic
Publishers.
Printed
in the Netherlands.
134
RISTO
SAARINEN
neo
and in sixteenthand seventeenth-century
philosophy
The conceptual
refinement
of the fourteenth-century
scholasticism.7
to
that are wholly comparable
medieval
discussion makes contributions
those of twentieth-century
philosophers.
as it is well
is rather surprising,
The neglect
of medieval
authors
on the Nicoma
known that many of them wrote lengthy commentaries
in his recent
Justin Gosling,
chean Ethics. Nevertheless,
e.g., wrote
to Weakness
historical
introduction
of the Will that "so far as I know
in medieval
Al
there is no literature on the problem
philosophers".8
scholastic
the medieval
dis
studies have been done,9
though some preliminary
The short chapter on "Aquinas
been neglected.
cussion has obviously
own
in Gosling's
and Others"
is, in any case, not very
monograph10
to
because
he
attention
Anselm
of Canterbury,
pays
only
illuminating,
and John Duns Scotus, none of whom wrote compre
Thomas Aquinas,
hensive
treatises on akrasia}1
for this state of affairs might be
the simplest explanation
Although
to modern
texts are largely unknown
that medieval
per
philosophers,
a
reason
common
more
it
is
the
that the
for
likely
prejudice
haps
notion of 'free will' does not allow any proper philo
to this prejudice,
akrasia has
of akrasia. According
sophical
no special philosophical
considers
interest, since Christian
psychology
an
autonomous
in
human
action.
Such
the will an autonomous
faculty
Judaeo-Christian
discussion
faculty
need
not
is not
bound
reason's
obey
to any
intellectual
judgment;
therefore
the will
commands.12
2.
THE
DEVELOPMENT
2.1. Augustine's
OF
"Two Wills":
AKRASIA
Doing
text of Aristotle's
complete
Robert
Grosseteste
by
philosophy
The
IN MEDIEVAL
Something
THOUGHT
Only Reluctantly
to Western
Ethics was
introduced
in the 1240s. Before
that time Augus
JOHN
BURIDAN
AND
DONALD
DAVIDSON
ON
AKRASIA
135
dominated
the ethical discussion.14 Although
tinian psychology
Augus
ethical works
and
tine (354-430)
had no familiarity with Aristotle's
the lack
although he used the Latin term incontinentia only to denote
of chastity and temperance,15
he often analyzed
of moral
examples
Ethics.
conduct that are similar to those found in Nicomachean
comes to the conclusion
In De spiritu et litera Augustine
that good
or "reluctantly"
actions, if performed
only unwillingly
(invitus), do not
a person does something
count as true merits.
If, for example,
against
his action is not
his primary wishes only in order to avoid punishment,
does he receive
meritorious.16
Only if the person acts wholeheartedly
the merit
toward a true reward. Nonetheless,
also asserts
Augustine
that by acting reluctantly a person can be held responsible
for both his
external act and his intention.17 This reluctant acquiescence
bears some
enkrateia, since in both a person does something
analogy to Aristotle's
to thwart his evil desire to do otherwise.
right and manages
In his Confessiones
Augustine
speaks also of doing evil reluctantly.
before his own conversion,
the church father continued
Immediately
his bad habits only reluctantly,
because his will could already see the
It is no wonder
that some modern
authors have
right alternatives.18
seen here a counterpart
to Aristotle's
akrasia.19 But unlike Aristotle,
thinks that the agent in some sense chooses his own inconti
Augustine
nent behavior,
however
reluctant this assent and choice20 may be.
of 'weakness of the
Moreover,
Augustine's
psychological
explanation
will' differs significantly
from Aristotle's
doctrine. Augustine
speaks of
"two wills" struggling within the same person. He is not referring here
to two autonomous
of the
wills, but rather to two initial tendencies
human appetite.21 He stresses that this disintegration
of the motives
takes place within the same mind and its single will. Moreover,
the act
of willful choice creates a unity and wholeness
within the will.22
in Augustine's
Another
thought is his view of the
important element
of desired ends. The highest goals are to be willed
for the
hierarchy
sake of their own, inherent goodness.
But some lower ends are to be
willed
for the sake of the higher and final goals.23 This distinction
for its own sake (propter se) and for the
willing
something
an integral part of
sake of something
else (propter aliud) will become
medieval
discussions
akrasia.
concerning
only
between
136
RISTO
SAARINEN
the Vulgate
translation of Sapientia Salomonis
8, 21: "And as I knew
be continent,
that I could not otherwise
gave it". For
except God
valid: no man can be continent
this verse is universally
Augustine,
God's grace.25 Thus in Augustinian
the state of being
theology
in the realm of sexuality)
becomes
the fate of
'incontinent'
(mainly
the Aristotelian
scholastics gave up much
every human being. Although
the presupposed
of 'incon
of this Augustinian
background,
universality
is one reason why the topic was so extensively
tinent' behavior
discussed
without
2.2. Anselm
Ages.
and Abelard
on Reluctant
Actions
In his De
of Canterbury
lib?rtate arbitrii Anselm
radicalizes
(1033-1109)
of
will.
the
For
the will'
"freedom
of
Anselm,
theory
Augustine's
not
to
sin
does
the
but
the
(libertas arbitrii)
ability
only
ability
imply
to carry forward rational decisions.
The freedom of a rational being
means acting in accordance with reason.26 Anselm
holds that a rational
so
can
will
that
he
in
irrational
evil
could resist it
only
being
principle
Because
Anselm
argues strongly that the
(ut possit quidem nolle)27
freedom of the will is a rational capacity, we cannot explain our ir
to
rational behavior
against our better judgment by simply referring
com
this freedom.
In this way the Augustinian
theory of will becomes
action theory.
intellectualistic
patible with Anselm's
discusses
In his Ethics,
Scito teipsum, Peter Abelard
(1079-1142)
or against
act reluctantly
their
what actually happens when people
of a sin
better judgment. He wants to show that the actual committing
in respect to the mere consent
does not increase its degree of sinfulness
to commit
'will' and
sin. This idea leads him to distinguish
between
that resemble Aristot
is relevant in examples
'consent'. The distinction
For instance, a man who falls into longing for a
le's akratic behavior.
or for fruit that does not belong
woman
to him has "the will which
lacks
consent".28
in cases where
is also interested
the consent can be under
Abelard
to
sake of something
else
stood as allowing
for
the
something
happen
if
is
For
that
bears
willed.
actually
somebody
example,
(propter aliud)
a painful operation
in order to be healed, we don't say that he wants
the pain. He doesn't will it, but only allows it to happen for the sake
a "passio",
is for Abelard
in which
of something
else. Such behavior
a person
"endures
what
he does
not will"
(quod
non
vult
tol?rai)
in
JOHN
BURIDAN
AND
DONALD
DAVIDSON
ON
AKRASIA
137
The Semantics
of Will
in Peter
of Poitiers
in many
and Abelard's
ideas are reflected
twelfth-century
at
that aim
the conceptual
discussions
of Au
understanding
deepening
gustinian topics, such as acting reluctantly and willing something propter
took place in the Sentendae of
aliud.31 Some significant developments
Peter of Poitiers
At least three distinct points are here of
(1130-1205).
Anselm's
interest.
138
RISTO
SAARINEN
31
Point three above is very con
volendi sub conditione)
(promptitudo
seems
to
it
of willing a goal
troversial, because
say that the side-effects
are not necessarily
themselves
willed. This idea in turn leads to dis
cussion about the possibility
of "doing evil to achieve good".38 How
ever, we will only here follow the results of Peter's analysis insofar they
are relevant
2.4. Albert
and
of akrasia.
the Problem
of Moral
Certainty
Before
JOHN
AND
BURIDAN
DONALD
DAVIDSON
ON
AKRASIA
139
as probabais Albert
endoksos
By rendering Aristotle's
(probabilid)44
we do not possess
thus introduces
the idea of ethical probabilism:
(scientia) of the Tightness of particular actions and, there
knowledge
from more or less probable
fore, must proceed
concerning
opinions
their Tightness. Moreover,
Albert here distinguishes
the strong
between
which has some degree of
(opinio ex rationibus probabilibus)
opinion
is
(opinio ex aliquo debili signo) which
certainty and the weak opinion
very
uncertain.45
on the problem
It is evident
that Aristotle
deliberates
concerning
whether
the akrates can act against his own clear and distinct scientia.
But, in addition to this, Albert now raises the issue whether we might
cases in which we do not
not speak of akrasia even in those ambiguous
In doing this he extends
the Aristotelian
knowledge.46
no
can exist, how
that
absolute
akrasia"47
"clear-eyed
given
problem:
can we describe
that is not based on scientia but
and judge behavior
on more or less probable
evidence?
answer between
Albert
in
his
three senses of 'ambigu
distinguishes
ous'. One,
in some cases neither of two alternatives must necessarily
be chosen;
then it is best to choose
neither
and look for such an
alternative
that has some firmness (firmitas). Two, if one of the alterna
tives must be chosen, the agent should choose the alternative possessing
more firmness (quod magis habet firmitatem).
Acting
against one's bet
as akrasia. But if, three,
ter judgment
in this sense can be described
the case is totally ambiguous,
then we cannot speak of akrasia.49,
answer is interesting for two reasons: first, he holds that we
Albert's
can speak of akrasia as regards cases in which
the agent's judgment
possess
certain
JOHN
BURIDAN
ON
AKRASIA
John
Buridan's
written
libros Ethicorum,
super decem
Quaestiones
1330, was an influential textbook of ethics until the seventeenth
dis
century.50 Buridan was also well aware of the earlier medieval
about
cussion.51
In Book
Buridan
develops
an elaborate
action
140
RISTO
SAARINEN
the agent's
is
process
thought and decision-making
theory in which
into three parts. Each of these parts causes some activation
analyzed
in the will. The first act of the will is the act of complacence
and/or
which emerges as a re
(actus complacentiaeldisplicentiae),
displacence
to
intellect. According
sult of the primary
judgment of the practical
a plu
this first act does not yet lead into action. Moreover,
Buridan,
in respect to their realization
rality of such acts which are incompossible
in the soul. As the first act is something
like
may reside simultaneously
a passive
at
the
of
sense-data
offered
the
will
intellect,
by
reception
no freedom. The second act of the will is called the
this point possesses
act of acceptation
of refutation
The
(actus acceptationis/refutationis).
to its second act: it can either follow the
freedom of the will pertains
action proposed
by the intellect or it can defer its act. The third act is
of the action (prosecutiolfuga).52
manifestation
to the
first and second acts of the will are rather analogous
consent.
and
distinction
between
desire
Moreover,
Stoic-Augustinian
them with the volo-vellem
distinction
he himself connects
by
presented
Peter of Poitiers and others. The first act of the will is the hypothetical
velleitas; only the second act can be called the act of the will in a proper
the external
Buridan's
sense.53
Buridan
defines enkrateia
commentary
us
to right reason
to
that
stick
disposition
helps
But these
deviant
behavior.
and thus to resist the passions
suggesting
an
cause
of
that
the first
additional
resisting impulse, namely,
passions
to become
with our actual
act of the will (displicentia),
connected
in akratic behavior
the resisting displac
behavior.54 Correspondingly,
sense
reason
some
in
within
the agent.55
remains
ency defending
right
occur
in
to
in
situations
akrasia
and
enkrateia
Buridan,
According
are
acts
two or more
first
of
the
will
which
simultaneous
conflicting,
In the seventh book
as a moral
(continentia)
of his
active within
the agent's mind. The incompossible
to the agent sub ratione
B are both presented
desirable. Buridan calls this a situation of "double
alternatives
boni,
i.e.,
inclination"
A and
as being
(inclina
tio duplex).56
that it is impossible
Buridan shares the view of Albert and of Aristotle
to act against knowledge
of the good in the strict sense (scientia per
stresses
fecta). Such 'clear-eyed akrasia' is impossible. But he repeatedly
the agent normally does not possess
that in practical decision-making
a framework
of conflicting
scientia but operates within
such perfect
to the
attention
that
he
It is no wonder,
reasons.57
therefore,
pays
JOHN
BURIDAN
AND
DONALD
DAVIDSON
ON
AKRASIA
141
other
concerning
(4), where
B.60
in its capacity
nected with his idea that the will's freedom consists mainly
to withdraw
view that the free
its own act. Buridan
shares the medieval
to
will is a rational capacity. But then it would be highly misleading
is the source of irrational behavior. There
say that the will's freedom
fore, the free will never resists the rational judgments of the intellect.62
and Albert
the Great
We already saw that Peter Abelard
regarded
to not doing anything as useful in some situations.
the will's consent
it a cornerstone
this view and makes
of his action
Buridan
cultivates
to
not
will's
remain
consider
the
He
does
decision
passive as
theory.63
an irrational liberty, but argues that in cases of double inclination
it is
often
the most
rational
choice.
This
rationality
is founded
in the nature
142
RISTO
SAARINEN
of practical decision-making:
Buridan
says that it is often better not to
choose to act too rapidly, because what seems good prima facie might
It is difficult
to see
consideration.
prove to be wrong after thorough
of practical decisions;
the latent consequences
therefore
it is useful to
possess the capacity of delaying the actual decision for a while.64 Impor
tant decisions,
too long.65
should not be delayed
however,
an aspect
to postpone
The capacity
the will-act
is thus for Buridan
our
of prudential66
of moral
behavior.
Because
estimations
situations
remain incomplete and our practical judgments weak,
it is often pruden
a decision. Moreover,
in his discussion
of prima facie
tial to postpone
seems to adopt the above-mentioned
view
willing
something Buridan
to which we often will something without
of Peter of Poitiers,
according
all of the consequences.
For Buridan,
the pruden
necessarily
willing
the will-act
derives
from the fact that it offers
tiality of withdrawing
of investigating whether
the agent in fact wants all the
the possibility
implied consequences.
is weak and
We have already seen that the akratic man's
judgment
to the Aristotelian
adheres
uncertain
Buridan
view
(debile, dubium).
that the akratic intellect is somehow
captured by the passions. But, in
to that, with the help of his idea that the freedom of the will
addition
to defer its own act, he also develops
consists in its possibility
another
akratic action. If the agent in the case of conflict
way of understanding
his decision
and weak judgment postpones
for the sake
ing alternatives
the judgment attains greater certainty, until most doubts
of reflection,
as certain as
at which
time it has become
have been extinguished,
act
to
in
accordance
then
is
it
with
it.67
Only
prudential
possible.
seems to think that passion causes the agent to act hastily,
Buridan
that is, without paying enough respect to the eventual consequences
of
if
the action. The weak judgment would have gained more certainty,
the evidence
had given the agent enough
time to weigh
pro
man
reason
the
akratic
later
after
is
also
the
repents:
why
perly.
the passion has extinguished
become
itself, the consequences
evident,
which affords rational consideration.68
can be removed
that all ambiguities
Buridan certainly does not mean
a
he is
of
moral
situation.
On
the
consideration
contrary,
by proper
passion
This
certainty
likely to think that in most cases we do not reach absolute
in the context of ambiguous
and often simply have to make judgments
ifmade
in totally ambiguous
situations. But false judgments
situations,
are not instances of akrasia.69
after proper moral consideration,
JOHN
BURIDAN
AND
DONALD
DAVIDSON
ON
AKRASIA
143
4.
akrasia
is due
to weak
in Davidson's
elements
'medieval'
of
4.1.
The Distinction
judgment
between
influenced
by passion.
explanation
akrasia
Prima Facie
and Unconditional
Judgments
an akratic
to perform
that it is possible
action while judging that, all things considered,
it would be better not
to do it than to do it. Moreover,
Davidson
holds that the existence of
such akrasia is compatible
with the principle
(which he calls P2) that
"[i]f an agent judges that it would be better to do x than to do y, then
he wants to do x more than he wants to do y".71
Davidson
makes
the existence
of akrasia compatible
with P2 by
between prima facie (conditional,
distinguishing
'all-things-considered')
and unconditional
(sans phrase, absolute)
judgments
judgments.72 He
in the sense
argues that the akrates operates with prima facie judgments
that both the reasons for and against an action in question
and the
are not unconditional
and absolute,
but only 'all
resulting decision
But the judgment pre
things-considered'
judgments.
(prima facie)
in
is
P2
absolute.73
supposed
He
further holds
that "reasoning
that stops at conditional
judg
... is
ments
in
its
subject, not in its issue".74 By this he
practical only
means
an action do
that the agent's prima facie thoughts concerning
not necessarily
materialize
as actions. As
from absolute
144
SAARINEN
RISTO
if used in practical
have the proposed
which,
judgments,
syllogisms,
Of course there is something
action as their conclusion.75
irrational in
akratic behavior,
since it is nevertheless
odd to act against one's best
all-things-considered
judgment.76 But akratic actions are not logically
a
prima facie judgment does not compel the action
impossible, because
to materialize.
Therefore
Davidson
can conclude
that
We
have
the moral
describing
some
has produced
emerged.
Buridan's
It would
use of
interior
be highly
the term
judgments.80
in how they employ
and Davidson
the
Buridan
differ, of course,
distinction
and
Whereas
between
David
imperfect judgments.
perfect
son describes akratic behavior as an irrational course of action left open
JOHN
AND
BURIDAN
DONALD
DAVIDSON
ON
AKRASIA
145
practical judgments.
to know the
Davidson
remarks that "it is not enough
Moreover,
reasons on each side: he [the agent] must know how they add up".
And he claims that this cannot be done in a syllogistic way.81 Thus, he
stresses the prima facie character of even the best 'all-things-considered'
In holding
that no logical calculus can determine
the out
judgments.
come of moral
in complex
situations, Davidson
reasoning
approaches
Buridan's
view that the so-called
'weak judgment'
the Tightness of the outcome of the action.
4.2.
We
Prima Facie
have
ditional'.
Judgments
as Conditional
seen
does
not guarantee
Judgments
that Davidson
also calls his prima facie
In his article 'Intending' Davidson
concludes
judgments
that
'con
reasons
felt duties,
and obligations
for
[w]ants, desires,
principles,
prejudices,
provide
actions and intentions,
and are expressed
intentions
and the
by prima facie judgements;
are distinguished
that go with
intentional
actions
judgements
by their all-out or uncon
ditional
form.82
to point
out
that
an action ought
to learn whether
to be performed
[w]e can hardly expect
simply from
....
the fact that it is both prima facie right and prima facie wrong
... if we are to have a coherent
reason, we must give up the idea
theory of practical
or obligatory
that we can detach conclusions
is desirable
about what
from the
(or better)
principles
that
lend
those
conclusions
colour.83
146
RISTO
SAARINEN
Poitiers and used by Buridan. The wants and desires that are recognized
as counterfactual,
or con
but not carried forward can be explained
sense
In this
Peter of Poitiers's
of the
ditional,
judgments.
example
wishes
sinner who says that he counterfactually
(vellet) to abstain from
sin would be an instance of Davidson's
Simi
prima facie judgment.84
he wants
larly, in Buridan's
example a continent man is asked whether
to fornicate. He answers that he wants it only conditionally
(non respon
debit "vol?", sed dicet "vellem"),
namely, only under the counterfactual
that it were not sinful. In Buridan's
analysis this answer
pre-condition
means
the fornication.
that there exists a first act of the will supporting
no conclusion
is detached
from that conditional
However,
judgment,
and the second act of the will refutes it.85
and Buridan
in fact operate accord
It looks as though both Davidson
in which
between
desire and assent,
the
ing to a kind of distinction
rea
desires are prima facie evaluations
conditioned
by the respective
sons. This conditional
does not lead to action;
(prima facie) evaluation
as the 'second act' of the agent's
the actual assent can be described
mind,
judgment.
emerging as the result of an unconditional
Reasoning
from Prima Facie Judgment
Evidence
Reasoning
from Probabilistic
4.3.
as an Instance
of
Davidson
it is already
any elaborate
suppose
theory concerning
probabilities,
it implies that our moral judgments
evident that for Albert and Buridan
are conditioned
lack absolute certainty.
by finite reasons and, therefore,
The same analogy is also visible in Davidson's
principle of continence,
the action judged best on the
which asserts that we should perform
this directive
is
basis of all available relevant reasons.88 For Davidson,
to
of
total
evidence
for
inductive
the
so-called
analogous
requirement
to the hypo
reasoning, which states that we should give our credence
as
evidence.
Just
this latter
all
available
relevant
thesis supported
by
the
maxim
is not part of the logic of inductive reasoning but a directive
JOHN
BURIDAN
AND
DONALD
DAVIDSON
ON
AKRASIA
147
has no compel
accept, so the principle of continence
a
of rational be
ling logical force, though it is nevertheless
guideline
the akratic person acts against his own 'all-things-con
havior. When
sidered' best judgment, he is not breaking any syllogistic structure but
only this directive principle.89
to what we
Davidson's
has some resemblance
principle of continence
rational man will
directive of prudentiality,
which asserts that a pru
might call Buridan's
man
his
dent
should postpone
decision until all relevant considerations
have been completed.90 As we have seen, Buridan considers
the will's
of its will-act as prudential
it gives an oppor
postponement
just because
tunity to collect and to weigh properly more evidence.
Davidson's
and Buridan's directive of pruden
principle of continence
the ethical decision-making
tiality are meaningful
only if we consider
evidence. David
process as analogical with reasoning from probabilistic
son's important point in stressing this analogy is that we need to know
reasons
in ethics as well how the different
'add up'. In other words,
of the practical
besides Aristotle's
deductive model
ethical
syllogism,
to be supported
thinking needs
by some kind of inductive
logic of
the Great and Buridan
When Albert
consider ethics
decision-making.
as proceeding
ex probabilibus,
that inductive think
they are recognizing
in situations permeated
with a plurality of, more or
ing is necessary
less, probable prima facie reasons.
NOTES
1
First
published
Recent
studies.
3
For Socrates'
position,
see,
e.g.,
Charlton
as reprinted with
and philosophical
corrections
discussion
(1988,
pp.
13-33).
(1982).
of Aristot
and Gosling
(1990,
the most
important
For Aristotle's
view,
cf.
the will"
as
Charles (1984).
4
Cf. Mortimore (1971); Vermazen and Hintikka (1985);Mele (1987).
5
See Broadie and Pybus (1982); Hintikka (1988); Gosling (1990).
6
We
will
use
the expressions
John Buridan's
Medieval
Thought,
(1968) commentaries.
these commentaries
and "weakness
"incontinence",
"akrasia",
synonymous.
7
the most
medieval
Perhaps
interesting
commentaries
of Albert
the Great
(1891;
discussions
1987),
on
as well
In my forthcoming
will be analyzed.
akrasia
are
of
found
as inWalter
in the
two
(1521) and
Burley's
in
of the Will
study, Weakness
148
RISTO SAARINEN
and Saarinen
See Kent
(1986).
1989), Krieger
(1986, pp. 184-92),
(1984, pp. 269-331;
10
(1990, pp. 69-86).
Gosling
11
see Kent
In my opinion,
the relevant
for Anselm
For Aquinas,
and
(1989).
problem
but rather
Scotus was not the 'fall of the devil' described
(1990, pp. 74-86),
by Gosling
or with
of doing
the help of some
the problem
something
only reluctantly,
'probable'
reasons.
12
This
13
This
and Scotus
For this, see below
Ill, d. 36, q. 1).
(1968: Opus oxon.
is consequently
followed
Charlton
line of thought
(1988, e.g., pp. 5-7,
by
177).
to Charlton
is contrary
Philos
(1988, p. 7), who claims that "Western
European
of will before
the present
century".
ophy has little to show on the subject of weakness
on inconti
to Kent
"Franciscan
literature
(1984, p. 295), even the medieval
According
as voluminous".
nence
can only be described
14
Cf. Wieland
(1982).
15
Cf. Zumkeller
of
got the notion
(1986, p. 35). As Zumkeller
points out, Augustine
from Cicero.
continentia
16
See Augustine
De spiritu et litera, 8.13 and 31.53.56.
latina, Vol.
(1844-: Patrolog?a
44, pp.
17
Cf.,
207-08,
234, 236-37).
De sermone Domini
1294).
18
Cf.
19
E.g.,
20
Cf.,
in monte,
e.g.,
Confessiones,
Charlton
e.g.,
pp.
(Patrolog?a
For an English
translation,
and Gosling
(1990, p. 70).
5.11-12.
is not
Augustine
VIII.5.11-12.
(1988,
11.17.54-55
5-6)
VIII.
For Augustine's
Stoicism,
90-98).
Cf. Bourke
(1966, p. 207).
22
VIII. 10.24.
Confessiones,
23
case is Augustine's
A paradigmatic
that the
the church
father concludes
cf. Colish
of
the eternal
goal
(De
p. 1294).
24
VII.4.6.
Confessiones,
25
"Scivi quoniam
aliter
Wolfson
sermone
34,
p.
(1966).
II, pp.
142-218).
on the Mount,
of the Sermon
where
exposition
temporal
things are to be willed
only for the sake
in monte,
Domini
11.17.56: Patrolog?a
latina, Vol.
34,
non possem
counts
p. 167), who
(1985,
cf. Bourke
Vol.
influenced
by Aristotle's
desire
and (rational)
(animal)
use see, e.g., Lapidge
(1988,
Confessiones,
but by the Stoic distinction
between
and its later Christian
this distinction
prohairesis
(choice),
For
assent/consent.
pp.
21
latina,
(1965,
also Zumkeller
(1986, pp. 35, 39).
26
Cf.
Anselm
(1938, pp. 213-14).
arbitrii".
libertatem
27
Anselm
(1938, p. 217.26-32).
28
Peter Abelard
(1971, pp. 24-25).
esse
over
also
nisi Deus
continens
twenty
p.
references
207.3:
"Potestas
det".
The
to this verse
peccandi
is from
translation
in Augustine.
non
ad
pertineat
a man
In another
example
(pp. 24-25),
evil will.
his master
in self-defense
has an evil consent without
29
Ibid. (pp. 8.26-10.21).
30
"nolo"
In medieval
"non vol?"
refers to a passive
state, whereas
Latin,
case of active resistance.
31
and Holopainen
See Knuuttila
(1993).
32
For "synteresis",
11.14. Peter
of Poitiers
Sent.
p. 98.256-64).
(1950-61,
Baylor (1977).
See
who
kills
denotes
see,
e.g.,
JOHN
33
34
BURIDAN
Sent.
11.14. Peter
Sent.
11.17.
example
35
Sent.
Peter
of wanting
1.9. Peter
AND
of Poitiers
of Poitiers
the death
DONALD
(1950-61,
ON
DAVIDSON
AKRASIA
149
p. 98.271-84).
p.
(1950-61,
of Christ: Peter
124.84-91).
of Poitiers
See
also
Sent.
IV.16
of Poitiers
p. 83.141-44):
(1950-61,
ad aliud, et aliquis vult vel potest
antecedens,
quod si aliquid antecedat
. .". Here
as mere
vel possit consequens.
the view is presented
opinion
for
the
accidere
ideo velit
quod
("dicunt quid
in Christ
of the two wills
1855, pp. 1199-1202),
am"), but in his discussion
(Sent. IV.16:
this view.
Peter adopts
36
Sent. IV.16. Peter of Poitiers
(1855, p. 1199).
37
inWilliam
of Auxerre's
Summa
?urea,
I, XII,
4, q. 3 (1980-86,
pp. 235-36).
E.g.,
38
and Ramsey
Cf., e.g., McCormick
(1978).
39
Albert
second commentary:
1987, pp. 532-36;
1891, pp. 474-76).
(first commentary:
40
He here (1987, p. 523.45-47)
Albert
considers
1987, pp. 523-24).
(1891, pp. 206-07;
in keeping with Augustine.
De duabus animabus,
6.6
this view as wholly
Cf. Augustine's
latina, Vol.
42, p. 98).
(Patrolog?a
41
Albert
(1891, pp. 214-19).
42
Ibid. (pp. 53-54).
43
For example,
Albert
(1891, p. 54)
ethics. Later, Albert
(p. 176) concludes
the certainty
of rhetorics with
that of
compares
that the knowledge
of the virtues
is less certain
to the technical
certain than knowledge
pertaining
quaedam
ipsarum, propter quod operi nostro contradicentia
55
Ibid. (p. 143va).
56
Ibid. (p. 141rb-va:
Book VII, q. 3).
57
Cf., e.g., Buridan
sepe, ut mihi
(1968, 143rb): "Quoniam
vel displicentia
videtur,
expertus
rationis
tractum
annexa
est".
sum, quod
150
cum
rationes
determinabam
RISTO SAARINEN
viderem
ad utramque
partem probabiles,
. . . sed in
...
me
tenebam me
suspenso
Cf. also p. 42va (cited below).
tarnen
. Imo
ad neutram
iudicii
partem
est prius examin
prudentis
are consilia".
58
Ibid. (p. 143va: Book VII, q. 6).
59
Ibid. (pp. 142va, 143va).
60
Ibid. (p. 143ra).
61
that the "certum
Ibid. (p. 145rb). Here Buridan
also concludes
iudicium"
need not be
that the agent adopts because
he has no reason
it can as well be an opinion
"scientia"',
to think otherwise.
whatsoever
62
This point
is made with great clarity by Krieger
the most
radical non
(1986). Only
such as Walter
of Bruges
that the will
Aristotelian
Franciscans,
(around
1270), claimed
See St?dter
could be the source of irrational behavior.
(1971).
63
For this, cf. Krieger
(1986, pp. 146-208).
64
est sciendum
Buridan
III, q. 3): "Ad cuius evidentiam
(1968, p. 42va: Book
quod
fuerit sub
libertas secundum
quam voluntas
potest non acceptare
quod sibi presentatum
vel non
boni
ad vite
directionem
see Krieger
(1986, pp. 15-145).
67
Buridan
(1968, p. 145rb-va).
68
Cf. again Buridan
(1968, pp. 142va; 143va: Book VII, q. 6).
69
This point was explicitly made by Albert
the Great
Buridan
(1987, p. 530, see above).
that even the "opinio falsa" may be certain,
also concludes
(1968, p. 145rb, see above)
reason opposes
and if it is considered
if no available
the opinion
long enough.
70
and Hintikka
For these, see Vermazen
(1988, pp. 114-34),
(1985), Charlton
Gosling
and Hurley
(1992).
(1990, pp. 103-18),
71
Davidson
(1982a, pp. 22-23).
72
are used
in Davidson's
article.
It is problematic
whether
All
these expressions
they
can
in the
presupposed
be divided
into two
last analysis
in discussion
around Davidson's
synonymous
See
point.
Gosling
(1990, pp. 104-05).
73
Davidson
(1982a, p. 39).
74
Ibid.
75
(1982a, p. 26; 1982b, p. 98).
E.g., Davidson
76
Davidson
(1982a, p. 41).
77
Ibid. (p. 39).
78
Buridan
(1968, p. 42va, cited above).
79
See above.
Ibid. (pp. 144vb-145va).
80
Cf. also Gosling
Davidson
(1982a, pp. 40-41).
81
Davidson
(1982a, p. 36).
(1990,
groups,
Charlton
p.
but
this
(1988,
105).
is normally
115) and
p.
JOHN
82
83
84
85
86
Davidson
(1982b,
Davidson
(1982a,
of Poitiers
Peter
Buridan
AND
BURIDAN
(1968,
Davidson
p. 102).
p. 37). On
(1950-61,
p. 43ra-rb).
DONALD
ON
DAVIDSON
AKRASIA
(1990,
pp.
151
107-09).
p. 37).
as we have seen, that in practical
Davidson
it is
claims,
reasoning
(pp. 37-39).
as actions,
to detach absolute
fallacious
i.e. conclusions
from
that materialize
judgments,
of the
prima facie reasons. He compares
practical
reasoning with probabilistic
reasoning
is falling;
falls, it almost certainly will rain; (b) the barometer
type: (a) if the barometer
87
(1982a,
Ibid.
In this example,
(a) and (b) do not "allow detachment
Davidson
further
that practical
should
argues
(p. 37).
reasoning
not proceed
in the form of universalized
conditionals.
For discussion,
cf., e.g., Charlton
and Gosling
(1990, pp. 105-07).
(1988, pp. 118-23)
88
Davidson
(1982a, p. 41).
89
Ibid. (pp. 41-42).
90
Buridan
(1968, pp. 143rb, 42va, cited above).
will
rain.
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