87

Villa ColombeUa Papers on Federalism,

A.Breton, G.Galeotti, P.Salmon and R.Wimrobe (eds.),

European JournM of Political Economy,

Special Issue, Vol.3, No. 1 + 2 (1987)
Copyright Transfer. Verlag, Regensburg, FRG.

FEDERALISM AND P O L I T I C A L PARTIES

William M. Chandler*
McMaster University
Marsha A. Chandler*
University of Toronto
1.

H o w Federalism Conditions the Character o f Party

Politics

Federalism provides multiple arenas of semiautonomous

decision-making in which leaders are given special
opportunities, not available able in unitary states, to
respond
to
regionally distinct
electorates.
These
opportunities for representation are dualistic. They take
the form of constitutionally guaranteed regional political
units where regional majorities can directly shape those
policy sectors primarily within the jurisdiction of the
provinces/states. But they are also to be found in means
of direct representation for regional interests at the
national level. That representation could occur either
through inter- or intra-state modes. Inter-state refers to
representation of territorial interests through provincial or
state governments and often takes the form of
quasi-diplomatic state-to-state relationships.
Intra-state
federalism connotes a pattern of representation within the
institutions of the national government. In this case
territorial interests but not territorial governments are
directly represented at the centre (Gibbins, 1982,
p p . 4 5 - 4 6 ; Smiley, 1977, p p . 9 - 1 0 ) .
Both modes of

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Political Parties

representation are likely to contain some partial veto

power
for
regional
minorities,
which
implies
consensus-building rather than majority as the prevailing
rule for resolving conflicts.
Regional opinion and regional elites may, of course,
exist within unitary states. But by contrast with a federal
order, these interests are only hkely to achieve
representation as a faction within a larger party or at most
as a stable regional ally of some larger party. ~ Because
the unitary structure of government affords little
alternative to direct representation, influence must be
sought within a national political force.
States with strong unitary traditions, it is often claimed,
tend to repress regionalist sentiments only to see them
sometime explode in separatist demands and political
violence. Belgium, Spain, France and Italy, all sharing a
centralist tradition, have from time to time experienced
these effects. It is, however, important to note that all of
these states over the past decade or more have become
increasingly sensitive to decentralist trends and have made
significant efforts to regionalize, or even federalize, their
political institutions. 2
The combination of regionally autonomous units with
their
own
electoral process
and
direct
regional
representation within federal institutions at the centre
provides a distinctive set of incentives for leaders to
articulate regionally identifi able interests and problems
(Simeon, 1975). In other words, given a decentralization
of functions, regional elites working through local or
regional parties are able to offer voters distinctive sets of
policy packages (Breton, 1974, pp.114 - 115). Nationally,
elites may also have positive incentives to respond to
regional
interests
within
the
federal
order
(Prichard-Benedickson, 1983). Both of these tendencies
will correspondingly generate a decentralizing impulse for
the structure of parties and party competition. At the
same time, federalism allows for regional governing
coalitions to co-exist with politically incompatible national
majorities, and this may be both a source of on-going
tension and a basis for federal bargaining modes.

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89

The linkage between federalism and partisan conflict is

found in the structural incentives that an institutional
arrangement creates for elites in their quest for political
control. Our discussion is intended to elucidate the
dynamics and constraints of the "political games"
(Trebilcock et al., 1982) in the struggle for power as
functions of federalism and party systems.
These effects may be expressed in the form of general
propositions.
In doing so, we must first distinguish
between the status of a federal system and the type of
federal system. By status we mean simply that a regime
fits the general category of federal versus non-federal
(unitary). The first set of propositions therefore describes
general conducive qualities associated with the existence of
a federal order. The second distinction suggests that
institutional impacts may vary depending on the
structuring of federal arrangements.

H.I.

Federalism fosters complex multipartism

Although it is undoubtedly true that federal structures

are but one of several sets of factors influencing the
tendency towards bipolar or multiparty competition
(Cairns, 1968, p p . 5 5 - 8 0 ) , the general argument is that
federalism, where based on territorial pluralism (i.e., a
federal society), will encourage distinctive regional
majorities/coalitions within regional units. If so, federalism may also stimulate contradictory pressures on parties
that will tend to undermine internal party cohesion and
obstruct
the
establishment
of
coherent
national
organizations. Federalism therefore also encourages very
loose, non-programmatic catch-all formations that can
accommodate divergent regional interests (von Beyme,
1983, p p . 1 6 5 - 167). At the national level, the incentives
for catch-all pragmatic alliances will of course mitigate the
spread of regionally defined parties. However, at the
state/province level the weight of political incentives is
more likely to be in favour of regionally autonomous
parties.

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Political Parties

Federalism creates incentives for regional elites to

sustain parties that may be both regionally dominant and
federally minor; for example, the C C F - N D P and Social
Credit in Canada. Still others remain purely provincial
formations but often with tacit alliances with federal
parties (Social Credit in British Columbia, the Union
Nationale in Quebec). In Germany the Bavarian CSU
combines these two patterns. It operates as a dominant
party within Bavaria but also directly in Bonn as an ally
of the C D U , which in return does not compete in
Bavaria.
Territorially divergent majorities suggest the probability
of politically incompatible governments among states and
between national and state levels.
The virtue of
federalism
is,
of course,
that
by
decentralizing
decision-making it segments or compartmentalizes political
tensions and therefore allows for the coexistence of varying
majorities (Scott, 1977). From the perspective of elite
incentives, this means that the competition for political
power may be carried on simultaneously by elites building
diverse popular coalitions within subsets of the political
system. The decentralization of function makes regionally
tailored policy packages politically attractive.

H.2.

Federalism encourages the rise of minor parties

Related to the association of federalism with forms of

complex multipartism is a more specific argument about
the rise of third (or minor) parties. The argument is not
that federal arrangements are a fundamental cause of new
parties. The thesis is simply that federalism provides
special opportunities for political oppositions (Friedrich,
1968, p p . 5 8 - 6 9 ) and, more especially, that it provides
opportunities for those minor parties that do not represent
direct threats to the ruling party or coalition at the federal
level.
The principle of regional majorities already indicates
one reason for predicting the existence of regional parties,
but the emphasis of this second hypothesis is explicitly on
the rise of new political formations (Lemco-Regenstrief,

Political Parties

91

1984, p p . 1 1 4 - 1 1 5 ) .
In systems where electoral laws
handicap minor parties, federalism can provide alternate
routes for the emergence of new parties. The argument
in brief is that sub-national legislatures provide arenas in
which new forces may find lower barriers to entry than
would normally apply nationally.' This obviously applies
to regionalist movements but can be an advantage for any
new party proposing a distinct set of public goods and
services. The success of the Greens in the Federal
Republic of G e r m a n y is probably the best recent example
of this. Their crucial initial victories occurred in local
and regional elections before they were able to surpass the
m i n i m u m five percent of the national vote necessary to
elect members to the Bundestag. 4 Federalism faciliated
repeated Green success at the Land level where the role of
national issues and national party organizations remained
limited. Thus Land victories became building-blocks for
generating nation-wide support.

H.3. Federalism permits the co-existence of incongruent

majorities and the transformation of partisan conflict
into federal-provincial arena
From the prior two hypotheses, the likelihood of
incongruent
governing
majorities,
regionally
and
nationally, is apparent.
What is less obvious and of
greater significance is that this incongruence may
constitute an incipient source of tension. It creates the
possibility of federal-provincial relations being defined in
partisan terms and provides opposition forces with an
incentive for using regional arenas as a means for
challenging the legitimacy of an existing federal majority
party or coalition. W h e r e majorities are congruent, there
is no partisan basis for federal-provincial conflict. There
still may be a strong regional basis for this type of
conflict.
Generally, regional conflict presumes some
degree of territorial pluralism, which necessarily will create
severe strains within parties (Black, 1979, p p . 8 9 - 99).
Incongruent majorities can be viewed in a far more
positive way both at the individual voter and system level.

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Political Parties

For the individual it can maximize the opportunities for

representation and for finding parties in power that reflect
ones own preferences (Sproule-Jones, 1975).
At the
system level it provides for countervailing powers
(West-Winer, 1980, p.7). As we shall see below, the
direction and character of these effects may depend on the
type or quality of federal arrangements. One can note
initiaUy that Canada and West Germany have very
different
experiences
concerning
this
aspect
of
federal-partisan linkages. In Canada, the tendency has
been for parties to develop separate organizations and
distinctive bases of support at each level of government
(Smiley, 1980, p p . 1 2 9 - 1 3 7 ; Whitaker, 1974), whereas in
Germany a strong integrating pressure has predominated,
reflected in the fact that Land elections are normally
perceived as mini-tests for national political leaders.
H.4. Federalism encourages a style o f policy-making based
on consensus-building
Lehmbruch has argued that federal relationships are
inherently ones of a complex bargaining process
(Verhandlung) in which conflicts are resolved not by
imposing the will of the majority but by consensus-seeking
and accommodation (Lehmbruch, 1976) which may often
imply concessions to both the national opposition and to
regional governments (yon Beyme, 1981, p.344). This
hypothesis indirectly opens the debate about the viability
of the federal-parliamentary m i x . ' Particularly for political
elites operating within the Westminster tradition, two
distinct sets of "rules of the game" intersect. If federalism
implies conflict resolution through bargaining and
consensus-building,
the
principles
of parliamentary
supremacy and party government stress conflict resolution
according to simple majority (Smiley, 1980, p p . 9 - 1 3 ) .
Hence one-party government is the norm, and government versus opposition structures political debate. The
problem then is not so much one of incongruence in
ruling majorities at different levels but one of styles of
governance (Lehmbruch, 1976, pp.11 - 16).

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93

A variation on the implications of the consensus versus

majoritarian style of governance is the criticism that
federalism distorts or thwarts the linkage between citizens
and the state that is guaranteed by parties and elections.
Federalism connotes a division of authority and
interdependence and therefore multiple decision points.
Thus lines of accountability are confounded and the
principle of responsible government undermined.
In
modern federal orders when the scope of the public sector
has produced large and complex governing machinery, the
emphasis of political debate may, as Simeon has argued,
drift away from the question of what is to be done to who
should do it (Simeon, 1975, p.299).

2.

Types o f Federalism and Differential Impacts on party

politics

So far the discussion has been confined to the general

effects associated with the presence or absence of federal
structures.
Obviously, federal systems vary among
themselves, and the question must be asked whether
variations in the nature of federalism influence party
systems.
Degrees of decentralization and degrees of
interdependence are the most widely used yardsticks for
comparing
federal
institutions
(Courchene,
1983,
p p . 7 6 - 78). Some of the implications of these distinctions
are built into the hypotheses found in both the preceding
sections and in this one.
A more fundamental differentiation is related to the
purpose and effect of federal divisions of authority. These
terms can be more usefully translated as divisions of
jurisdictions versus divisions of labour. In those federal
regimes organized primarily in terms of jurisdictional
principles, the object is to create two levels of authority,
each with its own well-defined policy sectors, operating
semi-autonomously. The entire machinery of governments
tends to be duplicated at each level, and there is a
presumption that each level can and should manage its
own affairs. This model in its classic and most extreme

94

Political Parties

form suggests "water-tight" compartments, or in Wheare's

formulation, an arrangement in which each level is
coordinate and independent (Wheare, 1946, p p . 2 , 1 1 - 15).
The second model stresses a very different concept of
federalism based not on a division of tasks but on a
division of labour. There exists some allocation of policy
primacy to one level or the other; but the essence of
federation in this model is that for most major policy
concerns one level of government wiU be responsible only
for certain stages in the policy process and the other level
for other stages. This division of authority does not
produce replicas of the machinery of government at both
levels. Instead, given some policy sector, it allocates
subsets of the decision-making process and each level.
Thus, as in the Federal Republic of Germany, the central
government will be primarily concerned with policy
initiation, formulation and legislation, while sub-units will
be strongly oriented towards policy implementation and
administration. ~
To the extent that functional federalism does not
allocate policy fields to a single level of government, it is
predictable that the regional distinctiveness of policy
packages will be less than under jurisdictional federalism.
However, it must be remembered that a functionally
oriented division will nevertheless also allocate some policy
sectors to one level primarily. For example, education,
police, municipal affairs in the Federal Republic of
Germany. As a result one should not think that regional
elections are all alike in terms of issues and policy options,
even though it is true that they will tend to involve
national issues and national parties on a regular basis. In
contrast provincial politics as a mirror of national politics
are the exception under jurisdictional federalism.
Functional federalism assumes a high degree of
cooperative interdependence and tends to spawn stable
patterns of consultation and bargaining, for neither level
will succeed in providing policy or resolving conflicts
without the help of the other. From this emerges a strong
institutional bias in favour of a complex meshing of
political and bureaucratic interests.
In comparxson,
jurisdictional federalism holds to an ideal of each level

Political Parties

95

going it alone wherever possible. Furthermore, the fact

that decision makers at each level possess a fully
developed policy apparatus means that when conflicts
prove intractable, unilateral action often remains as a
politically advantageous alternative.
Given this important structural distinction among
federal regimes, it remains to stipulate its implicit
incentives for political actors that may shape the character
of political parties and party systems. This can be done
by developing a second set of working hypotheses.
Although the object is not one of a case-by-case
comparison, it is useful to recognize the obvious reference
points for jurisdictional federalism in Canada and of
functional federalism in West Germany.
H.5. Jurisdictional federalism encourages politicization o f
federal-provincial relations
As a general pattern, jurisdictional federalism will
expand the incentives for political elites to exploit regional
conflicts. There can be little doubt from Canadian
political history that there are political advantages for
provincial leaders in fighting Ottawa. Political support
can usually be maximised by casting Ottawa as the enemy
and portraying the provincial governing party as the sole
defender of regional interests. This has the advantageous
side effect of making provincial oppositions appear
irrelevant. It also suggests a related hypothesis.
H.6. Jurisdictional federalism facilitates patterns o f one
party dominance.
As Levesque and Norrie have shown, overwhelming
provincial majorities occur
"whenever major federal-provincial conflicts are
present or anticipated.
I f intergovernmental
relations are more harmonious, domestic issues
will play a greater part in the outcome o f the

96

Political Parties
election. In this case the greater dispersion o f
most preferred positions on intraprovincial
matters wouM suggest a much smaller plurality
for the winning party, and a higher vote for the
opposition forces." (Levesque and Norris, 1979,
p.466).

With functional federalism intergovernmental issues are

likely to be of lower salience to voters. Parties distinguish
themselves not in terms of provincial rights or in terms of
credibility in resisting the centre but by alternative sets of
policy options for national government.
Thus the
dispersion of preferences external to the region is not
likely to differ significantly from the dispersion over
intra-regional issues.
One-party dominance reflects the tendency for the
politicization
of
provincial
governments
in
the
intergovernmental policy process. That is, provinces act
as if they were in a partisan opposition role vis-a-vis the
federal government. In line with this it may be proposed
that:
H. 7. Jurisdictional federMism tends to displace parties in
intergovernmental relations; functional federalism
integrates parties into the process.
Interdependence
of
policy
sectors
makes
intergovernmental relations essential, but these may
constitute decisional arenas in which the traditional
functions of parties have little place.
Typically in
jurisdictional federalism intergovernmental relations are
based primarily within executive-bureaucratic bargaining
(Smiley,
1980,
p. 146 ft.), which operate
extraconstitutionally, usually on an ad hoc basis, and outside
the normal arenas of party activity - elections and
parliament. In this way parties may be displaced and
made peripheral to much of the policy process despite the
traditions
of parliamentary
supremacy
and
party
government.

Political Parties

97

In functional federalism the displacement of parties is

less likely because regional-provincial elites have little
incentive to structure federal-provincial conflict as
government versus opposition. Without this adversarial
motive there is litde reason for elites to take on
partisan-like roles. The central role of parties in the
federal bargaining process may also be guaranteed by the
integrative effects of functional federalism on party
organization 7 (to be discussed in H.8 below).
Post-war German practice exemplifies the integration of
party influence within federal structures.
Historically,
prior to the Third Reich, a bureaucratic-executive style of
government enjoyed power and prestige while parties
suffered from questionable legitimacy and
severe
fragmentation (Smith, 1979). This situation was radically
transformed with the establishment of the Federal
Republic as parties assumed the role of defender of
democracy and virtually monopolized the recruitment of
governing elites. The concentration of the party system
and the transformation from ideological movements into
convergent
Volksparteien pushed parties in their
governing role increasingly towards building broad
majority-oriented coalitions.
The significance of this
pattern of partisan development i s that despite the fact
that the policy process is characterized by highly
developed networks of bureaucratic consultation and
bargaining, parties are never excluded from this process.
To the contrary, they are deeply embedded in it. Party
organizations have internally taken on some of the
characteristics of large-scale bureaucracy and have
recruited a substantial portion of elected officials from the
public service.
The Bundesrat is but the pinnacle of this vast
inter-governmental decision-making apparatus and must
be understood in this context. For this reason, outside
observers who see in the Bundesrat model a possible
replacement for the Canadian Senate are likely to be
disappointed. Its role is not that of a parliamentary upper
house. It is instead the legitimizing public form of a
highly elaborate style of intergovernmental decisionmaking
that
allows for the
simultaneous integration of

98
partisan-administrative
interactions
inter-governmental relations.

Political Parties
with

purely

H.8. Jurisdictional federalism encourages the bifurcation

o f party organization, while functional federalism
facilitates organizational integration.
A functional division of labour necessitates co-operative
bargaining over policy differences and a stable process of
co-ordination/consultation.
It also provides a strong
incentive for co-ordinated party positions and alliances
between levels of government. Even from the early years
of the Federal Republic as the m o d e r n post-war party
system was evolving, u n d e r A d e n a u e r ' s majority-building
there was an effort to pressure L a n d politicians into
coalitions compatible with the one in Bonn ( L e h m b r u c h ,
1976, p p . 1 2 5 - 1 2 7 ) .
A crucial factor in this process was
the need for the federal g o v e r n m e n t to assure the
cooperation of the Bundesrat.
O v e r time there has
developed a strong incentive on the part of federal
politicians to intervene in L a n d elections, often involving
the parachuting of national leaders into L a n d politics. It
has also m e a n t that L a n d elections are fought, to some
degree, over national rather than provincial issues, m a k i n g
these elections mini-tests of national party support. In
terms of elite recruitment, the Lfinder have been an
important source of future national leaders. 8
Generally, it can be said that regional party elites are
tightly integrated and have an active voice within the
federal party organization, a fact which complements and
reinforces the formal role of L a n d governments in the
Bundesrat.
In C a n a d a , for m a n y of the reasons already noted,
federalism has generated strains within national parties
(Black, 1979). Politicians at either level have found it
costly to be closely associated with the policies or stances
of their nominal party allies at the other level. Typically,
federal and privincial parties coexist and overlap but they
remain largely a u t o n o m o u s as organizations.
Furthermore, there are no strong structural incentives to create

Political Parties

99

parallel majorities as there are in West Germany.

Provincial elections are never taken as votes of confidence
in the federal governing party. Federal politicians do not
normally intervene in provincial contests, while provincial
premiers do so to only a limited degree federally.'
H.9. Federalism commonly produces shifts in partisan
support across two levels o f elections. However, the
explanation and significance o f this phenomenon
vary depending on whether it occurs in a
jurisdictional or functional framework.

There are two competing explanations for inconsistency

in federal versus provincial voting behaviour. One derives
from models of public choice and suggests that voters
support different parties at the two levels of government
as they seek to maximize their preferences.
A
decentralized system allows voters to select different policy
packages as they are offered by parties at the two levels
(Breton, 1974, pp. l l 4 - 1 1 5 ; Sproule-Jones, 1975, p.76).
The second explanation posed by some political scientists
proposes what may be called a countervailing powers
model, which proposes that voters seek to constrain the
power of the governing party at the centre by electing its
political opponents in the provinces/states. Thus there is
a balancing effect (and in some formulations a cyclical
pattern of support in which the opposition party support
builds over time to depose the existing federal majority
party.l Such inconsistent voting patterns exist, for
example, in both Canada and West Germany.
A
comparison of the two demonstrates the utility of the two
models and the importance of the federal context in
interpreting such patterns of voting. Within functional
federalism the phenomenon of voters supporting regionally
a party they did not support federally can be interpreted
as a shift in partisan support. As the German case, with
its integrated policy process and integrated party
organization suggests, these electoral swings represent
partial tests of national public opinion and serve to
caution or reinforce ruling coalitions in Bonn. Repeated

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Political Parties

losses at the Land level can provoke a governing crisis

nationally. The routine Canadian occurrence of a federal
governing party losing votes in all provinces would be
politically untenable in Germany because, due to party
system integration, these votes are perceived as support
for the national opposition. For West Germany, vote
splitting as a signal to the federal majority must also be
seen within the context of the strong inter-state federal
structure. Land elections are also Bundesrat elections and
may alter the partisan composition of the second chamber,
sometimes with dramatic effects on federal policy-making.
Land voting can therefore enhance the strength of federal
opposition parties. Unlike Canada, this occurs within the
constitutionally defined federal policy process rather than
in extra-constitutional intergovernmental arenas.
Thus
regional elections within functional, integrated federalism
do not provide incentives for regional elites to portray
themselves as defenders of regional interests. Nor do they
encourage the distinctiveness of regional policy packages.
More typically because federal issues structure to some
degree political debate within regional competition,
regional voting choice is conditioned by the policy options
offered by national parties.

3.

How Party Systems Condition the Character of

Federalism

Many of the hypotheses advanced in the previous

sections contain hints of the reciprocal nature of the
federalism-party system relationship. The structuring of
conflict through parties provides them with an influence
on the policy process and on the effective character of
federal arrangements.
It is therefore important to
consider direcdy the ways in which party system traits are
likely to shape federalism.
Some of the ways in which parties may influence the
workings of federal systems are identifiable in the
reciprocal linkages implicit in the prior hypotheses, and
these need not be discussed further here. There are,

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101

however, two general trends in party competition,

concentration and convergence, that contain important
consequences for the political process within federal
systems.
H. 10. Concentration facilitates conflict resolution by
majority rule and therefore may generate on-going
tension within a federal regime built on bargaining
and consensus.

The concentration of a party system refers to the

transformation from fragmented multipartism to a simpler,
bipolar configuration, where competition is dominated by
two large partisan blocs. To the extent that party
competition becomes concentrated, it will increase elite
incentives for organizational integration and for the
paraUelization ~ of political forces and the consequent
tendency to limit incongruent majorities. However, this
need not mean the demise of all minor parties, for as the
political evolution of the Federal Republic of Germany
indicates, small parties like the FDP may co'ntinue to play
a vital balancing role between two large catch-aU parties.
The shift towards bi-polar partisan conflict encourages
one-party government or minimal coalitions and institutionalizes the majority rule as the primary basis for
conflict
resolution
(Lehmbruch,
1976,p. 7,11 - 17).
However, the rationale for decision-making in all federal
systems also involves the protection of minority or
regional interests through intergovernmental bargaining
and intragovernmental sharing of power. Thus, some
degree of multipartism is more compatible with federal
regimes than is a pure bipartite relationship.
H.11. Party system convergence expands the consensual
base o f political conflict and is broadly compatible
with federal modes o f conflict resolution.

Convergence refers to the ideological space of partisan

conflict (rather than the number of competing units) and

102

Political Parties

to the centripetal tendencies in party competition 12. The

classic formulation of convergence models are those
associated with the "end of ideology" and the "waning of
opposition". In Downsian terminology convergence in
party competition means the maximising of electoral
support from the centre (Bell, 1960; Kirchheimer, 1966).
Divergence or polarization suggests that party elites have
incentives to differentiate themselves not just from their
ideological opposites but from their political neighbours as
well. Where such centrifugal effects are based on regional
demands, federalism provides a means of defusing political
conflict by guaranteeing territorial autonomy. In contrast
to polarized pluralism, fragmented (multiparty) but
convergent
party
competition
implies
moderated
competition with a proclivity for post-election coalition
building based on trade-offs and complex power-sharing
arrangements. The incentives for gaining power in this
type of party system approximate the incentives for
cooperative bargaining that are essential for a smooth
working federal system. Conflict resolution that does not
violate the spirit of federal bargains must allow for
considerable consensus-building and must guarantee
minority interests through partial veto powers. This style
of governance prescribes complex procedures for concertation which can assure the representation of vital regional
interests within the process.
Lijphart has drawn
important parallels between this style of federal bargaining
and the operative principles of consociational democracy
(Downs, 1957). Lehmbruch has most directly posed the
dilemma for federal systems that may arise when party
competitic, n becomes increasingly concentrated and when
decisional rules are grounded in the majority principle
rather than in consensus-seeking (Lehmbruch, 1976,
p p . 1 5 8 - 177).
An important post-war development in Western systems
has been the rise of so-called catch-all parties. This has
been clearest where the tendencies towards ideological
convergence and concentration have been combined.
Whether in a bi-polar or multi-polar context the flexible,
pragmatic style of catch-all parties appears relatively
conducive to bargaining modes of conflict resolution and

Political Parties

1(13

therefore is compatible with federal structures.

4. Conclusions: Evaluating Political Systems

Political systems may be judged by the degree to which
citizen preferences are satisfied by the public sector. In
one stream of democratic thought, for this to occur there
must be responsible government, clear lines of accountability and means of translating public preferences into
public policy. In a second stream of democratic, theory,
satisfaction of citizen preferences are maximized wa
dispersion of authority and the presentation of alternative
sets of public goods and services (Ostrom et al., 1980;
Ostrom, 1973, pp. 1 9 7 - 2 3 7 ) . From this perspective
federalism facilitates the ability of citizens to signal their
preferences through multiple levels of government.
However, the availability of different policy packages as a
basis for voter choice depends on parties being
decentralized. Put another way, the more centralized the
party system, the less likely it is that voters will be able to
select among distinct options at different levels or across
regions. 1~ In this model of democracy, countervailing
powers and pluralism, not party government, are the goals
of institutional arrangements.
What is important to
recognize is that the comparative study of parties and
party systems has tended to stress the first conception of
democracy. The literature on federalism has stressed the
second. The dilemma emerging from these two models is
found in the apparent contradiction between the principles
of accountability based on party government and citizen
choice based on countervailing powers. It is a dilemma
that confronts virtually all proposals for the reform of
federal systems.
A second problem for federal systems arises when one
views political parties as institutions designed to limit the
diseconomies of decentralization, for example, the
undersupply of public goods with interjurisdictional
(regional) spillovers.
Several institutional mechanisms
have been put forward for alleviating this and other

104

Political Parties

problems. Political scientists have often looked to political

parties
as
critical
institutions
for alleviating
the
shortcomings
of
decentralization
(Smiley,
1980,
p p . 1 4 3 - 148), for parties m a y serve as integrative
mechanisms, which through formal and informal ties can
prevent regional parties from neglecting the interests of
those outside their own jurisdiction.
In some federal systems, like C a n a d a , parties have
ineffectively performed this integrative function. It should
be clear from the distinction between jurisdictional and
functional federalism that in the former incentives favour
the bifurcation of party systems. As previously indicated,
there is by contrast in the functional case a m i n i m a l
division by jurisdiction and therefore fewer policy choices
that can be differentiated at the regional level. T h e
general point is that regional parties in a functional system
cannot systematically differentiate their positions from
those of the national party leadership. F r o m this there
results an overall integrative tendency within functional
federalism.
By comparison regional parties within
jurisdictional federalism are encouraged to distinguish
themselves from federal parties. W h e r e this is the case,
the effects of federalism make it unlikely that parties can
serve as vehicles for internalizing externalities.
The
absence of ties to a national constituency (more likely
u n d e r jurisdictional federalism) means that regional parties
will be more likely to impose costs on those outside the
region.

Notes

*This report is part of a larger project on the role of parties in federal

systems. Portions of the material presented here appear in Herman
Bakvis and William M. Chandler (eds.), FederMism and the Role of
the State, chapter 9 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987).
For example, the Ulster Unionists and the British Conservatives or in
Italy the SVP and the Christian Democrats.
2On regionalist political movements, see Sharpe, 1979; Foster, 1980;
Tarrow et al., 1978.

Political Parties

10 5

JAlbert Breton and Anthony Scott (1978, p.9) argue that local or
regional entry points may entail lower signalling costs for new
participants.
On the origins and early growth of the German Greens, see Troitzsch
(1980, p p . 2 6 0 - 294) and Chandler and Siaroff (1986).
5On this theme from a somewhat different perspective, see Verney
(1983, p p . 2 2 - 24). Based on Canadian experience, Gibbins (1982,
p.78) argues that "Canadians have tried to combine parliamentary
and federal forms of government. The marriage has not been
successful.
Parliamentary forms have dominated and, as a
consequence, national institutions have become too majoritarian in
character, too insensitive to the diverse and pluralistic interests of a
federal society. ~
6For general sources on German federalism see Laufer (1974) and
Mathews (1980).
7 Although functional federalism, by its stress on interdependence, may
reinforce the bureaucratization of intergovernmental relations and may
minimize overt politicization of these relations, it does not necessarily
reduce the role of parties in the process. The German federal
example suggests that partisan influence within executive-bureaucratic
frameworks may be maintained in part through a partisan penetration
of the higher levels of the public service. There may also be a reverse
flow of bureaucratic influence on parties through the recruitment of
elected officials from bureaucratic ranks. For a detailed treatment of
this phenomenon see Dyson (1977).
8 Chancellors
Kiesinger
and
Kohl
both
served
as
Land
Minister-Presidents: Brandt was Mayor of Berlin, and Schmidt had
an early career in H a m b u r g politics.
~Some important exceptions to this are noted by Smiley (1980,
pp.143-4).
lThe balance theory was first proposed by Frank Underhill (1955).
See Smiley's (1980) discussion of the debate over balancing and
Muller (1967, p p . 1 4 4 - 161).
l lLehmbruch (1976, p. 126) provides the most systematic formulation of
this thesis.
12On theories of convergence and polarization, see Sartori (1976, part
II).
13Riker (1964, p.129) provides a different but related formulation of
this general proposition.

106

Political Parties

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