Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Volume 1
Volume 2
Volume 3
Volume4
Volume 5
Volume6
Metadebates on Science
The Blue Book of 'Einstein Meets Magritte'
Edited by Gustaaf C. Comelis, Sonja Smets, Jean Paul Van Bendegem
Volume 7
Volume 8
VOLUME6
Metadebates on Science
The Blue Book of
"Einstein Meets Magritte"
Edited by
ISBN 978-90-481-5242-1
ISBN 978-94-017-2245-2 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-2245-2
Table of contents
General Introduction
Diederik Aerts
vu
Acknowledgments
xv
xvii
17
31
43
63
71
89
101
119
139
VI
TABLE OF CONTENTS
149
163
197
213
225
237
243
267
281
291
Index
303
DIEDERIK AERTS
viii
DIEDERIK AERTS
of his life and discussed his rightness, as he did repeatedly, with a confidence and suppleness that distinguished him so sharply from modern
science. Albert listened enthralled and Rene was fascinated, and once
more my heart was in my mouth, but Nicole winked reassuringly, and
Sylvie brought us snacks on cushions of Brussels lace and sweet white
wine in tall, old-fashioned crystal glasses.
The topic of discussion for the evening turned out to be 'the doubts
of modern science'. In science there is not a single hypothesis for which
one cannot find two groups of hard-working scientists, one of which can
'prove' the hypothesis while the other can 'prove' its negation. And the
more fundamental and important the question is, the more clearly the
situation turns out like this.
"It's crazy," maintained Jacky, "In fact science states that one doesn't
know anything anymore."
"That's right," said Albert, "Truth is not a simple concept, and I
believe that the history of science makes it clear how often erroneous
hypotheses have been believed over the centuries."
"A good thing too," replied Rene, "Things can only happen as a result
of the movement brought about by that constant doubt."
Meanwhile Sylvie came to join us and handed round pictures of the
exhibitions of Jacky's paintings and poems. Jacky suddenly got very excited, as if something had inspired him, and he leapt up and vanished
into his studio. A few minutes later he returned with his palette and
brush poised. Before I could stop him he had started painting violently
right at the spot where Albert and Rene were sitting. A large, gossamerthin piece of Brussels lace gradually took shape and Albert and Rene
vanished. Fortunately, my young assistants, Jacky's girlfriends and myself got away with just a few vicious daubs of paint in the face.
The series of eight volumes introduced here are not just the results of
the conference, as would be the case with a record of the proceedings.
The authors were invited to write with the events at the conference in
the back of their mind, so that the books would form a second phase in
the process of thought set in motion at the conference. A second phase
more clearly crystallised than the self-organising forum that arose during
the conference, but one which focuses on the same timeless questions and
problems.
The whole ensemble was already streamlined at the conference into
a number of main topics named after the colours of the rainbow - red,
orange, yellow, green, blue, indigo and violet, as well as white, the synthesis of all colours. This order was maintained and led to eight separate
books in the series.
ix
DIEDERIK AERTS
xi
'A World in Transition. Humankind and Nature' is appropriately entitled after its aim for an intrinsic property of reality: change. Of major
concern, in this era of transformation, is the extensive and profound interaction of humankind with nature. The global scaled, social and technological project of humankind definitely involves a myriad of changes of
Xll
DIEDERIK AERTS
the ecosphere. This book develops, from the call for an interdisciplinary
synthesis and respect for plurality, acknowledging the evolving scientific
truth, the need for an integrated but inevitably provisional world view.
Contributors from different parts of the world focus on four modes of
change: i) Social change and the individual condition, ii) Complex evolution and fundamental emergent transformations, iii) Ecological transformation and responsibility inquiries, iv) The economic-ecological and
socio-technical equilibria. Primarily reflecting on the deep transformations of humankind and on the relationship between humans and nature
it addresses major points of contemporary concern.
Volume 6: Metadebates
The Blue Book of Einstein meets M agritte
This book provides a meta-disciplinary reflection on science, nature, human action and society. It pertains to a dialogue between scientists,
sociologists of science, historians and philosophers of science. It covers
several topics: (1) the relation between science and philosophy, (2) new
approaches to cognitive science, (3) reflections on classical thinking and
contemporary science, (4) empirical epistemology, (5) epistemology of
quantum mechanics. Indeed, quantum mechanics is a discipline which
deserves and receives special attention here, for it still is a fascinating
and intriguing discipline from a historiographical and philosophical point
of view. This book does not only contain articles on a general level, it
also provides new insights and bold, even provocative theories on the
meta-level. That way, the reader gets acquainted with 'science in the
making', sitting in the front row.
Volume 7: Quantum Structures and the Nature of Reality
The Indigo Book of Einstein meets M agritte
This book refers to the satellite symposium that was organised by the
International Quantum Structure Association (IQSA) at Einstein meets
Magritte. The IQSA is a society for the advancement and dissemination
of theories about structures based on quantum mechanics in their physical, mathematical, philosophical, applied and interdisciplinary aspects.
The book contains several contributions presenting different fields of research in quantum structures. A great effort has been made to present
some of the more technical aspects of quantum structures for a wide
audience. Some parts of the articles are explanatory, sketching the historical development of research into quantum structures, while other
parts make an effort to analyse the way the study of quantum structures
has contributed to an understanding of the nature of our reality.
Xlll
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT S
The editors wish to thank the Center Leo Apostel (Clea) at Brussels
Free University and ORGAMED for their persistence in the organization of the Einstein meets M agritte conference, for taking the initiative
to publish its outcomes, and for providing the dynamic structure and
stimulating surroundings to work in.
Explicit thanks are due to Sami Amira, Jan Broekaert, and Didier
Durlinger for their excellent handling of the material to be published.
Meeting the final deadline would not have been possible without their
flexibility that went well beyond any obligations.
We would also like to express our thanks to everyone at Kluwer Academic Publishers and the VUB-Press for the practical realization of the
volume.
Finally, and most important, we would like to thank the authors for
their contributions, as well as for their patience and responsiveness during the editing.
Brussels, 5 June 1998.
XV
GUSTAAF C. CORNELIS
METADEBATES ON SCIENCE
INTRODUCTION
xviii
GUSTAAF C. CORNELIS
In his contribution to this volume, it is argued by A.M. Adam (Universite de Geneve, Switzerland) that Einstein had, indeed, a pronounced
philosophy of science, without being a philosopher of science. Doing so,
Adam runs counter to Pais's ideas, reasoning that Einstein's Induktion
und Deduktion in der Physik (1919) was clearly a defense of hypothetical deductivism, hence Einstein was for sure a true philosopher. For
that matter, Einstein's philosophy of science was elaborated, expanded,
developed, and systematized by Popper.
Don Fawkes (Fayetteville State University, U.S.A.) goes even a little
further in his "Einstein, ethics and action". He argues that relativity
METADEBATES ON SCIENCE
xix
theory apparently cannot provide support for ethical relativism. Nevertheless, Einstein did defend certain ethics. Taking these as starting
point, Fawkes makes a case for a new course between relativism and
absolutism.
COGNITIVE SCIENCE: AN EVALUATION
XX
GUSTAAF C. CORNELIS
METADEBATES ON SCIENCE
xxi
This volume concludes with a section uniquely devoted to the epistemology of quantum mechanics. All contributions tackle the problem of
complementarity. By considering the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox,
Bohr's response to it, Bohm's hidden variables theory and Bell's theorem, Arkady Plotnitsky (University of Pennsylvania, U.S.A.) explores
how the debate on the relation between classical and quantum mechanics, has implications for classical conceptions. His paper discusses the
significance of the controversy for classical rather than only quantum
physics, and the relevancy for traditional and postmodern philosophy
(Deleuze, Serres, Derrida).
Lars Lofgren (University of Lund, Sweden) argues that as a theory of
measurability, i.e. of what is measurable and is not measurable, quantum
theory ought to contain decidable levels as well as less constructive ones.
As a corollary, Lofgren concludes that such levels might resolve a recent
challenge against Bohr's wave-particle complementarity by Ghose, Home
and Agarwal.
In his contribution, Enrico Giannetto (Universita di Pavia, Italy) analyses the definition of logical truth in quantum physics. An 'empirical'
logic and category theory are taken as a point of departure. The logical
incompleteness of quantum mechanics and non-separability which implies the 'death of atomism' are discussed both from the physical and
logico-epistemological points of view, also dealing with the problem of
quantum reality.
Geoffrey Hunter (York University, Canada) reassesses the approach
of de Broglie. This fitting article provides a good introductory to the
non-specialist: the problem at stake is described very transparently.
The title of the article by Dan Nesher (University of Haifa, Israel),
concerning the epistemological aspects of quantum physics, is a counterfactual: "Which side would Spinoza have taken (between Einstein and
Bohr) if he had lived to see the [scientific] development of our days."
Needless to say that this is reminiscent of the conference's title. The
article elucidates the controversy about complementarity.
In his text on General Relativity Theory and Quantum Theory, Steven
Weinstein compares the respective ontologies which go with these two
approaches to the world. According to Weinstein, GRT's ontology is related to either a particle based or a field based view. QT's ontology
is essentially a field based ontology. Weinstein points out that several
problems emerge when one tries to reconcile the two theories from an
ontological point of view. Nevertheless, according to Weinstein, a reconcilement remains conceivable.
xxii
GUSTAAF C. CORNELIS
A.M. ADAM
1. INTRODUCTION
A.M. ADAM
part of the strategy pursued by them. Instead of strategy, the word crusade would be more appropriate. Reichenbach himself warned that logical
positivism should be looked upon as a crusade and not as an abstract philosophizing. Intellectual crusades have their inner logic to which logical positivists were not immune. Or, as Herbert Feigl admitted well over a decade
ago: 'Confession, it is said, is good for the soul. Undoubtedly we [logical
positivists] made up some facts of scientific history to suit our theories'[18].
A.M. ADAM
According to the article "Rationalism" in the 11th edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica [1910], the rationalist asserts that the source of
knowledge is mental, the sensationalist (the empiricist), that it is empirical. As regards the issue of scientific method: the rationalist says,
it is deductive; the empiricist says, it is inductive. Both, the rationalist
and empiricist presuppose that, in principle, if one uses the right method
one should arrive at true knowledge; this I shall call the certitude thesis. The debate between the empiricist and rationalist on the sources
of knowledge and methodology of knowledge is central to the philosophies of Bacon, and to Descartes' responses to Bacon, and it is central
to Hume's attack on Cartesian epistemology, and it is central to Kant's
consideration of Hume's attack and his own response to Hume. One of
the leading debates, which is traced back to the philosophies of Bacon
and Descartes, was common amongst late 19th century scientists. Mach
and Planck debated the sources of knowledge, Mach defended empiricism
whereas Planck defended rationalism. Indeed it became an unsettled central debate, and was put again on the agenda of philosophers in Russell's
classic [26].
4. INDUCT IV ISM V S. DEDUCT IV ISM
In the first paragraph of his paper Einstein presents the standard answer
of the empiricist to the question of scientific method, the development
of natural science can be looked at as if it follows the inductive method:
Singular facts are chosen and grouped in such a way that the law of
nature which connects them becomes evident. By grouping these laws
more general ones can be derived until a more or less homogeneous
system would have been created for this set of singular facts. Starting from these generalisations, the retrospective mind could then,
inversely, arrive back at the singular facts by pure reasoning. [6]
This is an elucidation of the empiricist view. General theories are induced
from singular facts. The main assumption shared by the empiricists, ever
since Bacon, was (the universal judgment) that all researchers should be-
A.M. ADAM
gin the inquiries about nature without any prejudgment. This is where
Einstein begins his argument against the standard answer of the empiricist to the question of scientific method. He is not repeating the Humean
argument that inductive inference is invalid (he does this elsewhere [10]),
but Einstein denies that the researcher begins his inquiries tabula rasa.
Einstein argues that in principle the scientist cannot select singular facts
unless he has prejudgments. Einstein's attack is made by a counter example, a singular case which counters (refutes) the universal judgment.
Einstein's counter example is an example of Galilee's scientific work. In
Einstein's opinion, the scientist has a prejudgment when he begins his
inquiries of nature. Otherwise, how should we understand, the essential
part of scientific discovery, the selection of facts done by the scientist?
Galileo could never have discovered the law of free falling bodies, had
he not maintained the preconceived opinion that the circumstances
which we really encounter are complicated by the effects of air resistance so that one has to focus on cases in which air resistance plays
as marginal a role as possible. [6]
6. CRITICAL RAT I 0 N ALI S M IS P R 0 P 0 SED
Einstein, then, asserts that in fact the scientist begins in almost a diametrical way, to the inductive method. The source of scientific theory is
not the singular facts by themselves but general hypothesis based on the
scientist's mental intuition which evaluates ensemble of facts. Then, the
scientist constructs a hypothetical theory with general laws and their
logical consequences, particular statements, which can be tested against
experience. Note that this is a characterization of what is known to be
the "hypothetico deductive" structure of scientific theory. Einstein describes it as follows:
Intuitive comprehension of the essentials about the large complex of
facts leads the researcher to construct one or several hypothetical
fundamental laws. From the fundamental law (system of axioms) the
researcher draws as completely as possible its consequences by purely
deductive logical method. These consequences, which often can only
be derived from the fundamental law by extensive elaborations and
calculations, can then be compared with experience yielding a criterion for the validity of the supposed fundamental law. Both the
fundamental law (axioms) and the consequences form what we call
a "theory" [6].
Einstein is rejecting the scientific outlook of the empiricist: first and
foremost Galilee's main discovery cannot be understood according to
that view (i.e., that scientific method is inductive), secondly, contrary
to this view, the scientist has prejudgment, otherwise how could we understand his selection of facts; finally, we can better understand the way
of scientific discovery by assuming that scientific theory is hypothetico
deductive. Einstein illustrates that indeed all branches of physics need
to be understood in that way:
Newton's theory of gravitation, thermodynamics, the kinetical theory
of gas, modern electrodynamics and so forth, all arose in this way
and their foundations have in principle a hypothetical character [6].
The question which is left open is: what is the scientific method, if not
inductive? Does Einstein say that the scientific method is deductive? Or
does he think that science has any particular method? Or the question
we should ask is not, what is the method of science, if any, but rather
how do we conjecture a scientific theory? That is, how do we arrive at
scientific knowledge? Einstein, in my opinion, does not advocate that
the scientific method is deductive. I doubt that he thinks that this is the
case because when he arrives to describe the scientific method he begins
to describe it in a metaphoric language:
But he [the researcher] doesn't arrive at his system of thought in a
methodical, inductive way, he rather, snuggles to the facts by intuitive choice among the imaginable axiomatic theories [6].
Thus, in Einstein opinion, the method of science is neither inductive nor
deductive. There is no scientific method in the traditional sense. In the
sense that both, the traditional rationalist and empiricist presuppose
the certitude thesis. If anything, a scientific method cannot license true
knowledge. Here Einstein attempted to put an end to the feeling of
certainty in science (end of certitude). Nevertheless, the scientist creates
a hypothetico deductive theory. What is the truth value of a scientific
theory? Can we know, in principle, whether a scientific theory is correct?
Every student of early 20th century philosophy of science knows that
these are all central issues to heated debates between philosophers. These
are the questions Einstein was considering.
But before we turn to Einstein's answers to these questions, it is worthwhile to dwell on their opposition as represented by Born in particular since Born's assertions are in straight contradiction with Einstein's.
Twenty years later, in his book on philosophy of nature, Born asserts
that relativity illustrates that the scientist begins from hard facts rather
than preconceived ideas [3, pp. 141-142]. Born is not referring to Einstein's philosophical views on this question. Prima facie it is quite strange
that Born argues that the empiricist way to describe relativity is better. Born followed Einstein's publications and activity ever since 1915
and closely in the 1919-1920s from Gottingen where he held a post until
A.M. ADAM
Consider what is to be done in the case when two scientific theories "are
capable of joining together the same given facts". This is where Einstein
cannot give a criterion for choice between the two theories. In this case,
the choice of the scientist then depends on the scientist's intuition, says
Einstein, where he attempts to explain why bright scientists hold contradictory theories. Einstein, however, did not hold contradictory theories:
If two theories are available, both of which are compatible with the
given factual material, then there is no other criterion for preferring
the one or the other then the intuitive view of the researcher. Thus we
may understand how sharpwitted researches, who have command of
theories and facts, can still be passionate supporters of contradictory
theories. [6]
Interestingly enough the last three quotes from Einstein's paper serve a
respectable Einsteinian scholar, Howard, to argue that (I shall number
the sentences for the sake of convenience):
(1) What is significant [says Howard] is Einstein's claim that a theory can never be proven true, not only because new discoveries might
overturn it, but also because alternative theories are "always conceivable" which can account for the same evidence. (2) Einstein is saying
that in addition to the old Humean problem of inductive uncertainty,
we also have to acknowledge the radical underdetermination of theory by evidence. (3) But this latter is just Schlick's point that "under
certain conditions several theories may be true at once, in that they
provide a different but in each case perfectly univocal designation of
the facts." [15, pp. 620-621]
Howard's statement (1) is true to the text, but his statement (2) is not.
If you recall, Einstein's attack on the inductive method is on the assumption that the scientist begins tabula rasa in his inquiries of nature.
Einstein did not attack the invalidity of inductive inference, which is
10
A.M. ADAM
known to be the "old Humean problem of inductive uncertainty". Further, and most crucial, Einstein does not say what (as Howard seems to
think) Schlick says. Einstein does not state Schlick's possible conditions
under which "theories may be true at once". Recall that Einstein asserts
that a theory can never be proven to be true and that when he says anything about two theories which agree with the same set of facts, he does
not say that they are both true. Einstein rather says that the choice of
the scientist in this case depends on his own intuition. It is very bizarre
that Howard is off the mark because from Einstein [6] the translation of
the fifth paragraph only appears in Howard's paper.
Worse, Howard alleges that Einstein believes in conventionalism:
Einstein and Schlick both believed then that experience does not
uniquely determine a correct theory, from which it follows that one's
choice of a theory has the logical status of convention [15, p. 621].
I will not say a thing about Schlick's beliefs. As regards Einstein's, he
offers arguments and assertions. He does not use the verb "to believe"
at all in his paper of 1919. So I do not know what is the source of
Howard's observation. Further, Einstein in fact does not assert positive
criteria, that is, neither does he assert how we do recognise a theory free
of errors (a logically consistent), nor a correct theory (a theory which
agrees with experience). Einstein, rather, argues that: "A theory can thus
be recognised as erroneous if there is a logical error in its deductions, or
as incorrect if a fact is not in agreement with its consequences." Thus
Einstein offers negative criteria. From this does not follow Howard's
claim "that one's choice of a theory has the logical status of convention".
I should elaborate here. In a (misleading) footnote in his [16], Howard
references Einstein [7] as a supporting source to the (false) claim that
Einstein subscribes to conventionalism. According to Howard, Einstein
"concludes : 'In my opinion, Poincare is correct sub specia aeterni, in this
conception' " [16, p. 380]. There is no contradiction here. Einstein seems
to hold that conventionalism in mathematics is right. But Einstein says
no to conventionalism in science. How was Howard led astray? It begins
with his presentation of Einstein's argument which is not true to the
text since Einstein does not "conclude" with this remark. The truth is
that in his [7], Einstein after suggesting that Schlick's descriptions of the
axioms of mathematics as "implicit definitions" is "apt", then Einstein
was suggesting "that mathematics as such cannot predicate anything
about perceptual objects or real objects" [7, p. 30]. Then Einstein turns
to describe his philosophy of science in contrast with Poincare's. Einstein
goes on to describe how geometry can do this job, i.e., to predict, with
the addition of the hypothesis: "Solid bodies are related, with respect to
11
12
A.M. ADAM
13
by Einstein:
It is certainly not by chance that Einstein stated the main points of
the Popperian program many years before the publication of Logik
der Forschung [1935], as early as 1919: 'But the truth of a theory will
never be proved. Because one can never know if, in the future, some
experience will become known that would contradict its conclusions
(Einstein 1919)'[14].
It is regrettable that Eisenstaedt neither pauses to elaborate once he
made an explicit strong historical comment, i.e., Einstein's philosophical view predates Popper's; nor does he say how significant Popper's
philosophy was, if at all. Nor does he say, If Einstein contributed so
much to an acknowledged philosopher's philosophy of science, how come
Einstein's philosophy of science is rarely discussed or why he himself does
not discuss it but reference to by passing. I shall discuss Eisenstaedt's
important observation in another essay.
AFFILIATION
14
A.M. ADAM
REFERENCES
[1] Adam, A.M., "Einstein, Michelson, and the Crucial Experiment
Revisited", Methodology and Science, 25, 1992, pp. 117-228.
[2] Bergman, G., "Book review" of [29] in: The Philosophical Review,
15
[19] Mach, E., Erkenntnis und Irrtum. Skizzen zur Psychologie der
Forschung, 1905.
[20] Meyerson, E., The Relativistic Deduction, 1925.
[21] Nagel, E., a book review: "Einstein's Philosophy of Science", on
[29] in: The Kenyon Review, XII, 1950, pp. 521-531.
[22] Pais, A., Subtle is the Lord: The science and the life of Albert
Einstein, Oxford, UP, 1982.
[23] Pais, A., Einstein Lived Here, Oxford, UP, 1994.
[24] Poincare, H., Science and Hypothesis, 1902.
[25] Paty, M., Einstein philosophe: La physique comme pratique philosophique, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1993.
[26] Russell, B., The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford, UP, 1912.
[27] Russell, B., The Scientific Outlook, London, Allen, 1931.
[28] Schilpp, P.A., The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, Evanston, Illinois, 1944.
[29] Schilpp, P.A., Albert Einstein Philosopher Scientist, 1951.
[30] Zahar, E.G., Einstein Revolution, New York, Open Court, 1989.
DON FAWKES
We will deal with the view that morality is based on authority in its
most persistent form: That God is the authority. If we can show the
17
1999 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
18
DON FAWKES
DET: The deity wills right acts because these acts are right. (Divine
Expert Theory)
DCT: Right acts are right because the deity wills them. (Divine Command Theory)
NDRT: The deity wills nothing concerning people's actions. (No Divine
Relation Theory)
NDRT is consistent with deism, the opinion held by many, perhaps
most, of the "founding fathers" of the United States. Deism holds that
although a deity began the universe at a time long past, the deity has
no dealings with it now, and certainly no concern for human beings;
whatever it is that "began" the universe is the deity, the Creator. In
other words, there is no relationship between the deity and morality.
This, of course, is possible but we will have little further to say about
it, since our primary interest is to discuss the possible bearing of a deity
on morality.
This leaves us to consider Divine Expert Theory and Divine Command
Theory. If there is a deity, does the deity will that we do right acts
because these acts are right, or are these acts right simply because the
deity wills that we do them? What kinds of reasons could be given to
answer this question?-We can approach this question in two ways: (a)
We can give reasons to believe that one of the views is true; and, (b) we
can reason by finding grounds for believing that one of them is false.
19
most knowing deity would know the right acts from the wrong ones, and
would will that we do the right ones (DET). But it does not seem to be
likely that a deity like this would command a set of acts saying that these
acts are "right" just because the deity says so (DCT); in fact, believers
often refer to a supernatural being who acts in this way by a name other
than "deity". Thus, it is compatible with this notion of the deity that
the deity would make decisions on the basis of goodness and knowledge;
but Divine Command Theory is incompatible with this concept of the
deity.
Ways to State Divine Command Theory and its Consequences
Before we proceed further, we should state some of the alternative ways
in which Divine Command Theory can be expressed, and consider what
are its consequences. As it is expressed above, DCT is a "metaphysical"
claim; it is a claim about reality, about the way things are. Now this
metaphysical claim also can be expressed "linguistically"; expressed as
a claim about the meaning of words. In linguistic form, DCT could be
rendered by some such words as: "The word 'right' simply means 'what
the deity commands.' "; or, "The entire meaning of 'Act X is right' is
'the deity commands that we do X.' " There may be some who would
wish to make a great fuss over this technicality, but our primary purpose
in bringing it up is to make sure that we are able to recognize DCT if it
is raised. We will continue to discuss DCT in both forms, and everything
that we say about it will apply (with perhaps very minor modification)
to either form. As for the consequences of DCT, they are the following:
(a) If DCT were true then no acts would be right unless a deity existed;
if there is no deity, then there is no morality. And, (b) no matter what
the deity commanded us to do, it would be right. For instance, if the
deity commanded that we slowly torture-to-death a two-year-old child,
or commit genocide, then these acts would be right just because the deity
commanded them.
Arguments Against Divine Command Theory
We can now turn to the problems with DCT. There are four major
arguments of this kind, and we can label them the problems of meaning,
autonomy, variety, and interpretation.
a. Meaning. If right actions are held to be what the deity commands,
then the result is a curious emptiness in the meaning of the term "right".
For now it has no meaning apart from whatever is commanded. Perhaps
"right" in this setting is a way to remind us that the deity has power;
20
DON FAWKES
21
know that these prophets are the true prophets because it says so in
the Bible.
This is a case of circular reasoning (begging the question). Wherever
we enter the circle we find that the very thing for which we need evidence
is simply assumed. This leads to the following considerations: When we
make a judgement concerning which possible set of commands we ought
to follow we are, in effect, making a moral judgement. But if Divine
Command Theory is true, no moral judgement can be made without
first having the deity's commands. Divine Expert Theory does not lead
to this situation, but Divine Command Theory does. And this is the case
no matter whether our "judgement" is based on reason, or sentiment, or
"upbringing," or emotion, or intuition, or ... and so on. Now we should
note that such a judgement is in effect a moral one because, once made,
it determines the rest of our "moral duties." Some may wish to say that
the judgement itself is not a moral one. But even granting this, if we
must somehow decide which claims to divine revelation are genuine and
which are false, then reason, or intuition, etc. is the final authority in
the decision. This is contrary to the notion that a particular revelation
provides knowledge that is absolutely certain just because it comes from
the deity. (We should not need here to take one more turn around a
circular reasoning track by introducing a notion of "divine guidance" or
"divine inspiration," etc.)
d. Interpretation. Even if we could solve the variety problem for DCT,
we would be faced with interpreting the commands. Some of the most
troublesome moral issues have to do with interpreting alleged commands.
We can find, for example, (in the U.S.A.) members of the Christian
Knights of the Ku Klux Klan and members of the Southern Christian
Leadership Conference marching, carrying Bibles, and each claiming to
have the true interpretation of the deity's commands. (But these interpretations arc contrary to each other.) Even people who are members of
the same sect and who have a shared tradition often disagree concerning how to interpret the set of divine commands that they believe are
genuine. Now this is also a difficulty for those who accept Divine Expert
Theory, but at least they can try to reason things out or consult their intuitions, etc. But if we adopt Divine Command Theory, then how can we
interpret the commands? To interpret requires making moral decisions.
But to do that requires further divine commands, and so on for as long
as we need to interpret ... Here again we are reminded, as we were when
we considered the problem of meaning, that according to DCT "things
are already as clear as they can get."- At least they are as clear as
commands can make them.
22
DON FAWKES
23
a) The deity is good because the deity is, for example, benevolent,
merciful and just. But then are benevolence, mercy and justice
genuine standards of goodness? If so, then they are standards
which are independent of the deity's will. And thus, these are
genuine standards even if there is no deity. So, we are led back
to DET and its consequences.
b) On the other hand, if benevolence, mercy and justice are genuine standards of goodness just because the deity wills that
they be part of the deity's character, then if the deity were
to will malevolence, ruthlessness, and injustice be part of the
deity's character, then these would be the genuine standards of
goodness. Thus we are led back to DCT and its consequences,
and its problems. Thus, we can see that nothing is added to our
discussion above by the claim that the goodness of the deity
guarantees that DET is true and that a version of DCT is true;
24
DON FAWKES
25
Since Einstein's work can be represented only falsely as promoting relativism in ethics, what has motivated this popular view? It may be that
thinking people, who sensed the weaknesses of Divine Command Theory, were impressed with the findings of social scientists. These findings
revealed widely variant codes of morality among different cultures, societies, and even family groups. So, the conclusion that morality is relative
to one's family, or culture, or society seemed appropriate. But there is
a fatal flaw to this line of thought: We may as well conclude that geography is relative to one's family, or culture, or society from the premise
that some families, cultures, or societies believe that the earth is flat,
while others believe that the earth is round.
However, there are several senses of "relativism" in ethics and these
warrant review concerning (a) whether they are true, and (b) whether
they are relevant to the possibility of objective ethical truth, confirmed
by experience. These senses of relativism are as follows:
(ri) What one person, family, culture, or society believes to be right
often differs from what other persons, families, cultures, or societies
believe to be right.
(rii) What is right in one situation or circumstance differs from what is
right in another situation or circumstance.
(riii) What is right is determined by one's family, culture, or society.
(riv) The meaning of terms like "right," and "good," etc. can only be
determined by reference to one's family, culture, or society.
By now there is an extensive body of evidence to show that (ri) is true.
But, as we already have observed, this is simply irrelevant to the question of whether there are objective, principles of morality: The fact that
people, or families, or cultures, or societies disagree about something
26
DON FAWKES
does not show that there is no objective truth about it. But furthermore, concluding that "morality is relative" on such grounds assumes
that all moral propositions are on the same level of specificity; and, that
assumption is simply false. For, consider the following hypothetical example: Suppose that we encounter two cultures with very different moral
rules concerning human reproduction. In culture A the rules encourage
the increase of population as rapidly as possible; in culture B reproduction is strongly discouraged. But suppose we then observe that in B the
ratio of population to resources is very high; while in A this ratio is very
low. We then further observe that the members of A and B agree completely concerning the preservation and enjoyment of people's lives. The
apparent moral disagreement now can be understood as a difference in
circumstances combined with a complete agreement about ethics. Having
said this much, what about (rii)?-Well, suppose that we demonstrate
(see section 4 below) that objective reasons show that lying is wrong
and truth-telling is right. Does this mean that it would be wrong to lie
in order to save the life of a Jew being pursued by Nazis?-Countless
examples like this (at every level of specificity) show that there are no
absolute nor universal moral rules. So, (rii) is not only true, but also a
significant part of morality. Now consider (riii). A little reflection will
make plain that (riii) is just another version of the view that morality
is founded on authority; (riii) replaces the deity's commands with those
of society, etc. So, we need not consider (riii) any further. As for (riv),
it is just the "linguistic" equivalent of the "metaphysical" (riii); so once
again, our work is done. (There are several more difficulties for (riii)
and (riv), and a concise exposition can be found in [2, pp. 160~172]. To
sum up then, our conclusions are that (ri) is true but irrelevant to the
question of whether ethics can be objective; that (rii) is both true and
relevant to morality; and that both (riii) and (riv) are false.
4. EINSTEIN, MAGRITTE, AXIOMS, AND PRACTICE
27
because they don't understand what they are supposed to think when
they confront the painting ... They want something to lean on, so they
can be comfortable. They want something secure to hang on to, so
they can save themselves from the void. People who look for symbolic
meanings fail to grasp the inherent poetry and mystery of the image.
No doubt they sense this mystery, but they wish to get rid of it. They
are afraid. By asking 'what does this mean?' they express a wish that
everything be understandable. But if one does not reject the mystery,
one has quite a different response. One asks other things. [3, p. 11]
So I will not ask that anyone find a meaning in the images I am about
to suggest, but only recommend that one contemplate the images along
with the prose to follow. Perhaps the images can play as a heuristic. It is
not necessary to reject the "mystery of the image" in order to see such
a heuristic role. One can bring a meaning of one's own to an image, and
appreciate the mystery too (I suppose Magritte brings some of his own
meaning to his works by giving titles to them). Consider then: Evening
Falls, 1964 [3, fig. 62].-I suggest, "Ordinary morals remain mostly only
with dogmatic structures shattered." And consider: The Two Mysteries,
1966 [3, fig. 110].-I suggest, "Description falls short of image, but has
its roles; it exists too. Image falls short of object ... Object falls short
of description ... Think of practice as object here." These are speculations that I bring to the paintings, expressed allegorically for heuristic
purposes.
We can return from speculation to Einstein for a concrete example of
the use of "principles" or "axioms" in the understanding of moral rules .
. . . we do not feel at all that it is meaningless to ask such questions as:
"Why should we not lie?" We feel that such questions are meaningful
because in all discussions of this kind some ethical premises are tacitly
taken for granted. We then feel satisfied when we succeed in tracing
back the ethical directive in question to these basic premises. In the
case of lying, this might perhaps be done in some way such as this:
Lying destroys confidence in the statements of other people. Without
such confidence, social cooperation is made impossible or at least
difficult. Such co- operation, however, is essential in order to make
human life possible and tolerable. This means that the rule "Thou
shalt not lie" has been traced back to the demands: "Human life
shall be preserved" and "Pain and sorrow shall be lessened as much
as possible."
But what is the origin of such ethical axioms? Are they arbitrary?
Are they based on mere authority? Do they stem from experiences
of men and are they conditioned indirectly by such experiences?
28
DON FAWKES
For pure logic all axioms are arbitrary, including the axioms of ethics.
But they are by no means arbitrary from a psychological and genetic
point of view. They are derived from our inborn tendencies to avoid
pain and annihilation, and from the accumulated emotional reaction
of individuals to the behavior of their neighbors. [1, p. 115]
So, the rules need not be all on the same level of specificity. More general rules may be called "principles", and these can serve the purpose of
helping to keep the more specific rules consistent with the point of morality. They also can help us to apply the more specific rules to concrete
cases, and help to eliminate apparent conflicts. But the entire structure
is based in experience.
Think of morality as a game, a social game. It is partly constituted of
rules in varying degrees of specificity. Applications of the rules depend
on circumstances. Rules apply in some situations and not in others, and
there is always space for originality. But the morality game has not only
rules and circumstances, but also a point. [6, p. 150] That point is to
promote the common good.
Without apprehending the point of morality we can get only rules that
are mere commands of authority or whims of culture. Just as morality
has nothing to do with the cynicism of ethical relativism, so also does it
have nothing to do with pious moralizing backed by commands. Morality has to do, instead, with careful recognition of natural facts, and with
recognizing and attempting to deal with real problems, like poverty in
the midst of plenty; and yet, morality docs not posit any utopia. Morality, instead, charges us to work, to strive, and to enjoy our efforts in the
knowledge that, although we may achieve much, those who may follow
us will find more to do. The choice is ours, and it is the same for each
of us in every age, every culture, and every generation: We can delude
ourselves in escapist cynicism, or pious certainty, or comforting conformity; or, we can face ourselves and the natural world, and get on with
a moral life. It is in the (at least tacit) context of this understanding of
morality that interpersonal relationships, and intercultural relationships
are possible, beyond force competition. It often can be of help, when
we are unsure of a judgement, to recall the point of the game. A little
reflection should show how far removed is this understanding of morality
(though it is only a sketch) from that of either moral relativism or moral
absolutism. But what they say is likely to be what we shall get, if we
cannot make clear the point of the game.
There is a saying that "Too great a sense of identity makes a man
feel he can do no wrong; and, too little does the same." The human
history of religious and ideological violence shows that identification with
either the appeal to absolutism or to relativism produces people who
29
Don Fawkes
Fayetteville State University
Fayetteville, North Carolina
U.S.A.
REFERENCES
[1] Einstein, A., "The Laws of Science and the Laws of Ethics", 1950, as
found in: Einstein, A., Out of My Later Years, Secaucus, The Citadel
Press, NJ, (Rev. ed.), 1956.
[2] Feldman, F., Introductory Ethics, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall,
NJ, 1978.
30
DON FAWKES
[3] Gablik, S., Magritte, Little Brown and Company, Boston 1976.
[4] Sagan, C., The Dragons of Eden, Random House, New York, 1977.
[5] Time Magazine, 26 February 1979.
[6] Wittgenstein, L., Philosophical Investigations, Macmillan, New
York, 1958.
MAREK W. BIELECKI
OF COGNITIVE SCIENCE
Cognitive science, a mixture of psychology, computer science, neurophysiology, linguistics and philosophy has been hailed by many as the
first genuine science of cognitive phenomena. Its composition signals
that the discipline employs methodologies of the 'two cultures,' of the
natural sciences represented most clearly by neurophysiology and of the
humanities represented by philosophy. Cognitive science, thus, becomes
an interesting new area for the Erkliiren- Verstehen controversy. There
are voices which, citing this methodological eclecticism, deny cognitive
science the status of a separate discipline. Others disagree arguing that
a 'naturalized' philosophy is not much different from psychology or even
neuroscience. Many researchers believe that there is a central idea that
unifies all the different approaches belonging to cognitive science. It is
the idea represented by the model of algorithmic processing of information with all its related concepts and techniques. Thus the main goal of
cognitive science in this view is to understand and explain the nature
of perception, memory, learning, linguistic abilities, etc. by representing
them in terms of their underlying computational processes.
1.1. Philosophical Roots of Cognitive Science
31
1999 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
32
MAREK W. BIELECKI
33
processes and about their "functional modularity," i.e., their decomposability into functionally simple components, and a related
meta-thesis about the "functionalist" method of explanation that is
said to be the only proper for such systems. These assumptions are
even more controversial than the basic five and belong to the area
of study that can be called "the foundations of cognitive science."
This area is almost exclusively the domain of philosophy.
Since its inception the computational model of information processing
has played an important role in linguistics, psychology, neuroscience, and
philosophy. In linguistics it has influenced Chomsky's idea of Universal
Grammar and more recently lead to the emergence of computational
linguistics. In computer science it has lead to the emergence of artificial intelligence (AI) as an independent subdiscipline. In psychology it
has paved the way to the rise of cognitive psychology after a period
dominated by behaviorism. In neuroscience it has influenced the models
explaining how the brain processes sensory stimuli. Finally, in philosophy, according to some, it has helped to find solutions to seemingly
intractable problems arising in connection with attempts to explain the
nature of thought processes. One of such celebrated problems is the so
called "ghost in the machine" problem. D. Dennett calls it "Burne's
problem" and offers his own, he believes more satisfactory solution than
that of Humc [4].
Some philosophers consider the attempts to apply the computational
model of the mind to tackling philosophical problems completely mistaken and not even worth refutation. One of few exceptions is H. Dreyfus
[5]. His criticism, however, does not extend to the scientific method as
such, as he accepts the view that by studying the brain we may get a
better understanding of the nature of mind. Similar views are expressed
by .J. Searle [6], who additionally thinks that we need to modify basic
scientific and philosophical conceptions about the nature of causality. A
more deeply sceptical position is adopted by T. Winograd [7], who inspired by the ideas of a biologist and system theorist, H. Maturana paints
a bleak picture of the traditional research effort in cognitive science.
Regardless, however, of whether one is optimistic or not about the
prospects of current research trends in cognitive science, its influence on
philosophy cannot be denied. Part of this influence stems from providing philosophy, especially philosophy and methodology of science with
new models, e.g., models of intertheory relations and models of crossdisciplinary endeavors. More importantly, however, because philosophy
is itself a participant in this endeavor, the philosophy's own identity,
the way it poses and tries to answer "philosophical" questions has been
34
MAREK W. BIELECKI
The domain of the foundations of cognitive science is frequently characterized by simply listing the problems that fall in its scope. These
problems can be divided into three broad categories: methodological,
ontological and epistemological. The central methodological problems
include: the nature of the research method proper to cognitive science,
its method of explanation and the scope of its studies, the nature of its
fundamental concepts and theories, and the relationship between various
concepts and theories of the disciplines that constitute cognitive science.
The fundamental ontological issues include: the nature of entities and
constructs (such as the physical symbol system, an information processing system and symbolic representation) and processes (e.g., interpretation and algorithmic processing) that cognitive science presupposes and
their relationship to commonsense concepts of folk psychology and to
physical or biological structures and processes. Finally, the fundamental
epistemological issues include: the nature of knowledge, the methods of
processing and applying knowledge by intelligent systems, the mechanisms of memory, learning and concept formation.
As it almost always happens in philosophy, all these methodological,
ontological and epistemological issues are interdependent. For example,
the central problem that lies at the heart of cognitive science, the problem of the origin and nature of intentionality cuts across all three categories.
2.1. Methodological Issues
35
36
MAREK W. BIELECKI
37
38
MAREK W. BIELECKI
39
Besides the two leading paradigms there is one other approach worth
to be mentioned here. It is the 'emergent computation' approach (14],
which adopts the view that an emergent pattern of behavior can be interpreted as processing information. Its modeling tools of choice are cellular
automata, genetic algorithms, and adaptive neural nets. This approach
comes closer than the classical ones to capturing the dynamic, adaptive
nature of natural cognitive systems. This robustness comes at a price,
however. It is not clear at all how the emergent transient patterns can
be harnessed to perform specific, repeatable tasks of information processing. The main stumbling block in this and in all other approaches
adopted in cognitive science and other scientific disciplines is the incorrect notion of information they presuppose. This is a result of their
inability to tackle the problem of intentionality (meaning).
There exists at present only one theoretical perspective that is robust
enough conceptually to provide a new general framework for cognitive
40
MAREK W. BIELECKI
41
They should do so, unless they are content to reinvent the wheel every
few days and when AI reinvents a wheel, it is typically square, or at
best hexagonal. His justification as to why philosophers should study
AI is unconvincing, however. Philosophers' wheels, he says, are perfect
circles that require in principle no lubrication and can go in at least
two directions at once. If by this he means that philosophers' wheels
can go in either direction, then he is perhaps right but there is nothing
wrong with it. Philosophers should certainly keep in mind the lesson
learned from the failure of behaviorism or logical positivism, and from
the insurmountable difficulties encountered by the symbolic AI and, I believe, also connectionismconnectionism. The lesson is precisely opposite
to what Dennett implies. Dennett, the Churchlands, and other cognitive
scientists are trying to come up with solutions to philosophical problems
by invoking scientific models, for example to solve the problem of intentionality by adopting the connectionist model of cognition. A more
meaningful approach involves, I believe, a move in the opposite direction,
where shortcomings of scientific models are exposed by pointing out the
unsophisticated and simplistic nature of philosophical assumptions underlying such models. This is particularly true of cognitive science where
philosophy can and should play a unique and special role.
AFFILIATION
Marek W. Bielecki
Philosophy Department
California State University
Hayward, CA 94542
USA
Department of Philosophy and Sociology
University of Warsaw
Warsaw
Poland
42
MAREK W. BIELECKI
REFERENCES
BURTON VOORHEES
1. INTRODUCTION
An article in The Spectator (Oct. 8, 1994), for example, suggests this will happen
within the next 30 to 50 years-unless something is done.
43
44
BURTON VOORHEES
Trek episode I referred to, this question is gently raised by Mr. Data.
He points out that Lieutenant LaForge, another member of the Enterprise crew, has artificial eyes which provide him with vision which is
far superior to ordinary human vision. Why, Data asks, don't the rest
of the humans have their eyes replaced by similar cybernetic implants?
Picard's response, that this is inconceivable, begs the question. Supporters of strong AI should sec no problem with such replacement. Indeed,
the far more radical idea of achieving immortality by downloading mind
onto mainframe has been seriously suggested [2].
As that suggestion indicates, the question of whether or not machines
can think is intimately connected to a number of other questions: What
is thinking? What is consciousness? What is self-consciousness? These
questions have been central to philosophy from its very beginnings, but
the invention of digital computers has brought them down from the
high mountains of philosophical speculation to the cultivated plains of
practical application. The number of angels that dance on the head of a
pin may not be relevant, but the number of transistors on a silicon chip
certainly is!
2. FORMAL SYSTEMS
45
nary definitions are necessary to make this idea precise, and to formulate
the Godelian argument against it:
1. A Formal System consists of a set A of abstract symbols together
with a set R of rules for operating on strings of these symbols to
form new strings. The set A is called the alphabet of the system.
The set R is divided into rules of gmmmarwhich specify constraints
which a string of symbols must satisfy to be admissible, and rules
of inference which specify the way in which admissible strings can
be operated upon in order to form new strings. The grammar and
rules of inference must be compatible in the sense that it cannot be
possible to transform a non-admissible sequence into an admissible
sequence by application of any rules of inference.
2. Any admissible string which is specified a priori as a starting point
for application of the rules of inference is called an axiom. The
system is finitely determined if the rules and axioms can be specified
by a finite procedure. A finite sequence of admissible strings such
that each string is obtained from its predecessor by application of
one of the rules of inference is called a proof sequence (or proof),
and the final string in a proof is called a theorem of the system.
Two simple examples of formal systems will illustrate this definition:
1. The game of chess: The symbols are the game pieces; the admissible
strings are the ways in which the pieces can be arranged on a chessboard; the grammar specifies the set of legal chess positions; there
is one axiom, the initial position at the start of the game (or, in a
chess problem, the specified initial position). The rules of inference
are just the rules governing the legal movement of pieces. Thus the
"theorems" of chess are all positions which can be reached from the
starting position by a legal sequence of moves. (Note, however, that
there are only three ultimately significant theorems: white mate,
black mate, and draw. The game consists of a struggle between
players to produce a proof sequence culminating in a particular
conclusion.)
2. Define a formal system A with alphabet {0, 1} and the strings as
all finite sequences of O's and 1 's, taken in any order. Admissible
strings are those which begin with a block of 0 or more O's followed
by a block of 0 or more 1 's. That is, admissible strings have the
form 0 ... 01. .. 1. There are two axioms, the strings 0 and 1, and
a single rule of inference: if S and S' are admissible strings then
( S, S') ----+ S" where S" is the string obtained by dropping the leading
O's from S' and adjoining the 1's of S' to the right of S. For example,
(0011, 0111) ----7 0011111.
46
BURTON VOORHEES
47
In 1931 the mathematical logician Kurt Godel proved the following theorems [10]:
Let F be a formal system such that: a) F is finitely describable,
and b) F is strong enough to contain a sub-system with ordinary
arithmetic as a model. Then:
1. F cannot be both consistent and complete.
2. F is consistent if and only ifF cannot prove its own consistency.
To prove these theorems, Godel developed a way to code logical propositions as statements in arithmetic. He then showed that there was an
arithmetic statement which corresponded to the proposition G(F) =
"System F Cannot Prove This Statement." This led to the following
possibilities:
48
BURTON VOORHEES
49
R.
With this construction, Lewis claims that so long as the Peano axioms
are accepted as consistent, the Lucas arithmetic L cannot be generated as
the output of any Turing machine. If it could, it would have a consistency
sentence s which by construction was contained in L. This would imply
that L, and hence the Peano axioms were inconsistent.
Lewis now argues that although Lucas may believe that all of the
theorems of L are true, he cannot show that all of the sentences of L
are contained in his own potential output, but that is what is required
if his anti-mechanist argument is to succeed. Benacerraf [5] uses his own
reconstruction of Lucas' argument to claim that all that is shown is that
if Lucas is an instantiation of a Turing machine, he cannot know this
to be the case: "It seems to be consistent . .. that I am indeed a Turing
machine, but one with such a complex machine table (program) that I
cannot ascer-tain what it is." (Benacerraf's emphasis)
Lucas [15] has responded to these criticisms by saying that both Lewis
and Benacerraf have misunderstood his real point. He is not required to
best all possible Turing machines. Rather, his argument is a dialectic. If
somebody claims that his mind is a particular machine he can produce a
true sentence which that machine cannot prove. Further, he can do this,
no matter what machine it is claimed that he is, hence he can be no
machine. This argument evades the issue, however, since it is not clear
that Lucas actually possesses the capacities which he claims.
The most extensive presentation of the argument from Godel has been
given by Penrose [7-9]. As with Lucas, the basic form of this argument
is that there are things which the mind can do, which computers, even
in principle, cannot. Therefore, computation is not sufficient to produce
minds. Penrose gives the basic reasoning for this as follows:
IfF is a formal system then there is a Godel statement G(F) which
can be stated in the system F, but which cannot be proved or disproved
within F. Yet we, on the basis of the meaning of the symbols involved in
the statement, can know that it must be true.
Given F, the simplest Godel proposition is G(F) = "F cannot prove
this sentence." Through a complicated numbering scheme G(F) is translated into an arithmetic proposition involving numbers, and other elements of the alphabet of F. Penrose writes this as
50
BURTON VOORHEES
51
[8]
For a survey of the Penrose argument and responses to it, readers are referred to
52
BURTON VOORHEES
In the final analysis, Penrose's ultimate appeal is to mathematical intuition. It is this that allows the human mathematicians to "see" the truth
of theorems in a way that computers cannot. Further, since intuition
is an aspect of consciousness, computers (or at least algorithmic based
computers) cannot be conscious.
To approach the deeper issue underlying the preceding discussion, consider the relation between formal systems and their models. Ordinary
arithmetic, for example, is a model involving concepts such as number,
addition, and multiplication. Concepts are semantic, and semantics is not
found in the purely syntactic formal system. But mathematical intuition,
at least in experience, involves concepts. It is inherently semantic.
The direct connection between the semantic nature of mathematical
intuition and consciousness is found in the idea of a reflection principle,
which asserts that even in certain cases in which a formal proof is not
available, the truth of a mathematical statement may be seen by "reflection" on the meaning of the terms; i.e., by calling into consciousness a
basis of background knowledge and mathematical experience, and in this
3
It is not necessary for subjective mathematics to coincide with objective mathematics in order that it be inexhaustible, it is only necessary that there does not exist
a finite formal system which generates all of its axioms.
53
54
BURTON VOORHEES
they represent. In making this criticism, he might well have had the
formalist mathematician David Hilbert in mind. In an often quoted passage [21], Hilbert asserts that the objects of mathematical intuition are
" ... the concrete signs themselves, whose shape, according to the conception we have adopted, is immediately clear and recognizable.".
For Plato, intuition was the faculty giving access to the abstract world
of Forms. He held that this was the true reality, of which the ordinary
sensory world was but a shadow.
Aristotle dissented from this view, holding that the universals (i.e.,
the Forms) had their existence only as they were instantiated in matter.
Nevertheless, the universals were real, and were the true objects of intuitive knowledge once the mind had abstracted them from the experience
of a certain amount of concrete exemplars. Further, the universals are
the principles behind the manifestations of matter so that knowledge of
them is the fundamental knowledge. Once the mind has grasped the universal, or essential nature of a thing, all other knowledge of that thing
follows immediately by logical deduction.
"Only intuition yields a clearer knowledge of reality than the knowledge resulting from science and proof. The intuitive mind is the principle of science, for it knows the principles which form the startingpoint of science.
" ... intuition is true in a higher sense than science because it provides
science with principles." [22]
Writing 2100 years later, Kant distinguished sensory and internal intuitions and found both to be closely related to consciousness. In Kant's
view, sensory intuition leads to the apprehensions which the mind structures into the objects of sensory perception, while mathematical objects
are derived from the mind's intuition of certain necessary aspects of its
own functioning. Kant also believed that mind could never gain knowledge of reality as it is, apart from the necessary categories of its mental
construction, a view in which he differed strongly from Plato and Aristotle.
A possible clue to the nature of intuition might also be found in educational research which indicates a relation between the ability to grasp and
manipulate abstract concepts, and the capacity for "distancing," that is,
mentally detaching from an immediate context in order to "view" it from
a more objective position [23].
5. S C H 0 0 L S 0 F MATHEMATICAL T H 0 UGH T
55
how could a machine have intuition? It cannot be the result of a simple enumeration of possibilities-there are too many, and no mechanism
is known for determination of significance. By reflection on a particular problem a human mathematician may realize that a theorem must
be proved, and that the proof will require a new definition or axiom.
Further, this reflection indicates the general nature of the required definition or axiom. Strong AI supporters are challenged to show how this
process could be formalized. How could a machine ever distinguish the
meaningful from the trivial?
In considering how a machine might develop intuition, however, the
question of how it is possible to have an experience of an abstract object
which has no sensory qualities must be addressed. This question was
finessed by Godel [24], who claimed that the question of the reality of
the objects of mathematical intuition is the same as that of the reality of
objects of the perceptual world. Perceptual objects are constructed in the
mind from data supplied by sensory intuitions, and mathematical objects
are constructed in the same way from data supplied by mathematical
intuitions.
There are different views in mathematics, however, regarding the reality of mathematical objects. The three major schools of thought within
mathematics are:
Formalism: Mathematical objects have no real meaning or existence.
Mathematics is the manipulation of abstract symbols according to
formal rules. It is content free and new mathematical results are
human inventions.
Platonism: Mathematical objects have real existence whether any human is aware of them or not. Mathematicians gain access to the
world of mathematical objects through mathematical intuition, and
new mathematical results are discoveries.
Intuitionism: Only those mathematical objects exist which have been
constructed and can be viewed as intuitively present. Mathematical
results are human constructions4 .
6. AN 0 NT 0 L 0 G I C A L ASS U M P T I 0 N
Some intuitionists, exhibiting a certain hubris, would say create rather than construct.
56
BURTON VOORHEES
The pre-Socratic philosopher Parmenides made two very famous statements, usually translated as "It is the same to think and to be," and
"What cannot be thought cannot be." A more accurate rendering of
these is: "It is the same to be conscious and to exist," and "What cannot
be an object of consciousness, cannot exist. 5 "
Parmenides' statements can be interpreted as an ontological and epistemological assumption: "It is the same to exist and to be a possible
object of consciousness." Since the time of the Greeks, this has been the
fundamental assumption of science: what exists can be known 6 . Restricting consideration to mathematics, this has different implications when
considered from the viewpoints of the different mathematical schools.
Formalists deny the real existence of abstract mathematical objects.
Thus, in accepting the existential criterion of possibility as an object of
consciousness, they would deny that abstract mathematical objects are
possible objects of consciousness. This may seem to be contradictory.
After all, I draw a circle and am certainly conscious of it, how then can
it be claimed that a circle is not a possible object of consciousness? The
reply is that that circle right there is certainly real, but the abstract idea
of a perfect circle is not. No one will ever see a perfect circle, or have any
real consciousness of such a thing. Thus, since it cannot be thought, it
has no existence except as a set of symbols which may be manipulated
in certain ways.
A Platonist, accepting the ontological assumption would take it as
meaning that all mathematical objects, no matter how complicated, are
possible objects of consciousness. This raises the question of infinity.
That is, there are mathematical objects such as certain numbers, or the
Mandelbrot set, which have infinite complexity. The question is, how
could these ever be objects of consciousness?
It seems to me that the Platonist has two options. The first is to claim
that it is sufficient that the axioms defining an infinite set are possible
objects of consciousness, and that any suitably delimited finite portion
of these sets may be an object of consciousness. This is Penrose's view.
The second response is more mystical: to claim that the experience of
human consciousness gives the concept of infinite, hence unrestricted
5
57
[25]:
"I do not just question whether the real numbers, or the integers,
characterize the physical world. I assert that the real numbers, or
unlimited sets of integers, have no available physical representation,
and therefore cannot be specified, manipulated, used, etc. They do
not 'exist' just because they have been named and can be invoked in
a closed formal axiom system.
"I maintain an open mind about the existence of a largest number. I
suspect that God was not that digital in orientation, and that there
is no sharp cutoff, but rather a statistical sort of blur that sets in as
numbers get larger."
When combined with the Parmenidean assumption, the strong AI thesis creates problems. If mind is based on a formal system, then there are
perfectly well defined mathematical objects which cannot be thoughtthey remain forever incomprehensible. We are forced to the conclusion
that these finite, apparently well defined mathematical objects do not,
in fact, exist. This conclusion would be especially bitter for a Platonist such as Penrose, but it creates difficulties for formalists as well. The
formalist is faced with the idea that certain well defined sequences of
symbols, written down following allowed inference rules, will be forever
incomprehensible. The intuitionist would seem to get off scot-free, but at
the cost of having to deny much of modern mathematics, and radically
change our view of the physical world.
One possible out is to deny the Parmenidean ontology. Doing this,
however, requires acceptance of the idea that there are things which
exist, but which cannot, even in principle, be known. If the unknowable
can causally influence us, then we are at the mercy of unknown and
unknowable forces, to which we can only respond with some form of
New Age irrationalism.
It was the Greeks who first introduced the idea of a rational macrocosm
which could be rationally known by the human microcosm. This idea of a
rationally comprehensible cosmos is the basis of science, and lies behind
58
BURTON VOORHEES
59
This is very similar to the "nyte, nyte" exercise in esoteric Buddhism, in which
a person is instructed to say "nyte, nyte" to all thoughts and perceptions: "I am not
that, I am not that."
60
BURTON VOORHEES
In a lighter vein, one might say that the formalist attempts to bootstrap consciousness while the Platonist looks for a sky hook.
61
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This paper derives in part from a survey paper presented at the Workshop on Logic held in July, 1992 at the University of Victoria. The
present paper is based on work carried out in January, 1995 during a
visit to the Santa Fe Institute, whose hospitality is gratefully acknowledged. Early versions of the paper were presented as seminars at the
Santa Fe Institute, January 24, 1995 and at Athabasca University, April
27, 1995. A shorter version has been published in Complexity under the
title "Gi:idel's Theorem and the Possibility of Thinking Machines".
Supported by operating grant OGP 0024871 from the National Science
and Engineering Research Council of Canada.
AFFILIATION
Faculty of Science
Athabasca University
Athabasca, Canada TOG 2RO
burt@cs. athabascau. ca
REFERENCES
[1] Minsky, M., "Will robots inherit the Earth?", Scientific American,
271, No. 4, 1994, pp. 108-113.
[2] Moravec, H., Mind Child, Cambridge, MA, Harvard Univ., 1988.
[3] Lucas, J.B., "Minds, machines, and Godel", Philosophy, 36, 1961,
pp. 112-127.
[4] Lewis, D., "Lucas against mechanism", Philosophy, 44, 1969, p. 231.
[5] Benacerraf, P., "God, the devil, and Gi:idel", The Monist, 51, 1967,
pp. 9-32.
[6] Good, I.J., "Gi:idel's theorem is a red herring", British Journal for
the Philosophy of Science, 19, 1969, pp. 359-373.
[7] Penrose, R., The Emperor's New Mind, NY, Oxford Univ., 1989.
[8] Penrose, R., "Precis on the emperor's new mind: concerning computers, minds, and the laws of physics", Behavioral and Brain Sciences,
13, 1990, pp. 643-705.
[9] Penrose, R., Shadows of the Mind, NY, Oxford U. Press, 1994.
[10] Godel, K., "On formally undecidable propositions of Principia
mathematica and related systems: I", In: Solomon Feferman (ed.),
Collected Works, Vol. I, NY, Oxford University Press, 1986.
62
BURTON VOORHEES
SUZAN LANGENBERG
63
64
SUZAN LANGENBERG
66
SUZAN LANGENBERG
consciousness rather than the reverse. Only what the human mind was
capable of conceiving, could exist. Being was shown to depend on Knowing. The primacy of consciousness as the constituting center was bound
up with three notions: the freedom of consciousness, its self-creating nature, and its status as a complete and lucid source of truth. Beside the
almighty power of the church it was necessary to create an even more
powerful concept of knowing based upon cognitivist truth, a product of
the mind as a human source, instead of knowing based upon the truth
of an almighty god as a product of faith.
In the modern era however, consciousness as a seemingly self-aware
foundation and transparent medium of representation, is also found to
be surrounded by and imbued with a kind of obscurity. Consciousness
discovers at its borders an element of darkness, an apparently inert density in which it is embedded, an unthought which it contains entirely,
yet in which it is also caught. This contradicts the other notion of consciousness that all of reality exposes itself before the mind and at the
same time is constituted by it. This gives a sort of tunnel-vision solipsism: an experience in which consciousness is felt to be both an ultimate
constituting source and a limiting and mysterious channel-omniscient
and omnipotent, but only within a sphere, the boundaries of which are
acutely felt from within.
REFLECTION
68
SUZAN LANGENBERG
inner perception, of inner speech and the outer world, with the different
other, with the unusual, with the unfamiliar?
Descartes was the first philosopher who explicitly formulated a concept
of the instrument, our consciousness, that realises this relationship in
terms of self perception. But this concept of self perception can lead to an
extreme interpretation of the self; the self fixated on its own inwardness.
In this case the meditation will not stop.
Descartes meditated within a certain context: religious power ended,
the development of different sciences began. Within that specific framework his meditation made sense because of the principle of true thinking,
of objectivity, made it possible to escape the continuing domination of
the church onto the moral and scientific development of human nature.
In the social interaction of human beings this context is no longer
current. It is our history that again and again must be reinterpreted by
each individual in each event. Which context will stop our thinking, will
stop our intense focus on the self and make the passage from inner to
outer world possible? The concept of self perception is a possible rupture
of the inner from each possible outer.
KAFKA
ing noTmal steps, of not tapping the pavement with my stick ... ? Am
I not mtheT entitled to complain bitter-ly at having to skip along the
houses like a shadow without a cleaT outline, sometimes disappearing
in the panes of the shop windows? [3, p. 825]
70
SUZAN LANGENBERG
CONCLUSION
How can we know that what we experience of the world is not merely
a hallucination? We have met a number of artists who have their own
interpretation/hallucination of the world outside them. They have found
a universal accepted modus for sublimating their vision upon life- and
system-world. There are a greater number of human beings who cannot
cope in such a manner with their existential questions. They cannot
make people listen to their critical attitude towards family, society or
'dehumanised' daily living.
Leo Beyers gives a possible opening to other ways of conceptualisation when human beings want to cope with the complexity of human
behaviour. The will to speak ('zeggingswil'), present in all of us, gives
us, as a human condition, as a way of being, a concept to make cooperation thinkable between cognitive, moral and emotional claims in social
events. The will to speak happens and, only if noticed, brings humans
into the inter-esse, the being between. Inter-esse is a tenuous state that
throws humans into conflicting qualities of life, while being in the event,
without classifying the event. Conflict is understood as a driving force
in bringing together simultaneously attention, intention, cognition, and
feeling again and again and again and again ...
AFFILIATION
Suzan Langenberg
Academie Leo Beyers for Art and Life Sciences
Kortenaken
Belgium
REFERENCES
JAMES WILK
The universe was put into equations the way the history of France
was put into madrigals.
~Maeterlinck
INTRODUCTION
Over these few short pages, I should like to offer you a brief introduction, or rather, a lengthy invitation, to an emerging field of scientific
study. Rather than attempt, impossibly, to convey the richness of the
tapestry, and its significance, I shall confine myself instead to drawing
your attention to just a few of the threads running through it, and say
a little about why I think these threads worth pursuing.
A NEW SCIENCE OF CHANGE?
The word "metamorphology," not a pretty word, comes from the Greek
"metamorphosis," the equivalent of the Latin "transformation." The Oxford English Dictionary reminds us that a century ago it was applied to
the study of "change of form" solely in the context of post-embryonic
ontogenesis. Today it refers more broadly to the study of transformation
in general~the emerging science of change.
This admission should at once arouse our deepest suspicions! After
all, which branch of science does not study change? Does physics, and
indeed each of the special sciences, not deal with change of one kind
or another? When one has said everything the various sciences have to
say about specific classes of changes, what more is there to say on the
subject of change? Surely, one might argue, if there are any fundamental
principles underlying change in general, these would turn out to be none
other than the laws discovered by physics!
Now on the basis of prevailing views on change we should be fully
warranted in drawing such a conclusion. And yet, I have come to believe,
to do so would be a grave error. If nothing else, I hope in this brief
discussion to indicate just a little of why I think so.
71
72
JAMES WILK
Now you might say that, as scientists, whatever our particular discipline,
we study certain observed invariances of interest to us. In fact, each
branch of science concerns itself with a certain class of invariances. We
study the contexts within which certain invariances occur, and we seek,
empirically, to define the limits of those contexts~that is, to identify
where the invariances do not occur. We aim finally, when all goes well,
to account for those context-bound invariances in terms of a smaller
number of others which are considered more fundamental, and which in
turn account for a wide range of still other invariances too, some perhaps
as yet undiscovered.
So we may study mirages, for example, and come eventually to delineate precisely the physical contexts in which mirages can uniquely be
observed, and do the same, say, for rainbows, and account for each of
these context-bound invariances in terms of, at most, a few of the laws
(the more fundamental invariances) of optics and atmospheric physics.
Or again, we may study certain invariances in the degree of darkening
of the skin on exposure to sunlight, and come to account for these, in
the first instance, say, with reference to the quantity of melanin, and so
on. But whilst the appearance of mirages on a hot country road, or of a
rainbow after a shower, or of a tan after a holiday may all be considered
to be changes, what we are normally interested in, as scientists, is to
account for observed invariances as they happen to be exhibited in these
specific changes.
The changes themselves may provide us with observational fodder,
they may offer us the very clues we need to penetrate more deeply into
the nature of things, but they provide only one starting point of our
inquiry and perhaps some of the signposts along the way. Change is not,
in such cases, the subject of our investigation itself. How could it be, or
rather, why should it ever be?
CHANGE IS INESCAPABLE
Well, certain changes can indeed be, and often are, the very subject of
a scientific investigation, but normally only tacitly. So let me state the
obvious.
Once we turn our attention from physics to the biological sciences,
let alone the human sciences, we note that change, as a phenomenon,
has long been as indispensable in scientific explanation as it has been
ubiquitous. For any biological assembly, the perception of and differential
response to changes in its environment has long been taken tacitly to
A N I NT R 0 D U C T I 0 N T 0 MET A M 0 R P H 0 L 0 G Y
73
But now let me point something out that may be less obvious.
To rely on the notion of change in nature, in our explanations, or to
refer to it at all, is 'Officially' an illicit move. That is, within nature as
Officially conceived over the past three centuries, there is no room for
the concept of change. For change is a difference over time, and, logically
speaking, any difference in a given particular can only be a descriptive
difference. For some particular p to be regarded as different at time T2
to the way it was at some earlier time T1 , it must be identifiably the
same p, which is now different in some (descriptive) respect.
What is more, we can readily prove the following from first principles:
To state the matter somewhat informally, for an assembly a to perceive or
respond to a change in some particular p, a must at the very least detect
a descriptive difference in some pattern or invariance of p--a descriptive
difference in pattern, moreover, which is of significance from a's point of
view.
DESCRIPTION, POINT OF VIEW, AND SIGNIFICANCE
IN SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION
But whoa! Wait a minute. How did description and point of view and
significance (meaning, no less!) suddenly appear amongst the would-be
fundamentals of the universe? How did these three interlopers manage
to gatecrash the explanatory party? If it is indeed the case that, in
logic, any attempt to invoke the concept of change is, however tacitly, to
presuppose the concepts of description and point of view and significance,
can we permit scientific explanations to rely so heavily, as they therefore
currently do rely implicitly, on such concepts as these? Can we permit a
key role for description and point of view and meaning (Heaven forfend!)
in the fundamental mechanics of the physical universe?
The short answer goes something like this: We might as well, and for
two reasons. First of all, it is unlikely that we could get by in scientific
explanation without making use of the notion of change, at least outside
of basic physics (and even there, for reasons we cannot go into here, it is
unlikely that we could get by without it for long). And second of all, the
concepts of description and point of view and significance turn out to
be analysable as more austere and theoretically parsimonious concepts
than we might at first be inclined to fear. In fact, within the theoretical edifice of metamorphology, these concepts are logically derived
74
JAMES WILK
In metamorphology, we avoid the understandable but muddling tendency in science to reify "events" -a tendency many have long critiqued-by turning our attention from events to states-of-affairs described
in terms of pattern or invariance. We seek to account for states-of-affairs
obtaining at certain points in time, and eschew all talk of events.
Conceptually, this is closely related to a second further thread I must
tease out for you. Namely, in metamorphology it is persistence and not
flux which is the focus of our inquiry. This may sound odd for an engagement concerned with the study of change! But first of all, we distinguish
flux sharply from change. To oversimplify rather drastically our own
account of the matter, flux refers merely to variance-the temporal differentiae in nature which make the attribution of change possible at all.
Flux may be random, chaotic, or it may be simply patterned, and it
is characterised as much by continuity as by change-where the latter
refers to an attribution of a descriptive difference in some defined in
variance. The tides-here is example of patterned flux-may fluctuate
continuously, but as the tide tables show, they can hardly be said, in
AN INTRODUCTION TO METAMORPHOLOGY
75
this strict sense, to change. A 'sudden' solar eclipse from our (layman's,
frightened natives') point of view is only continuity from an astronomer's
point of view. If a solar eclipse just failed to occur when expected by the
astronomers-well now, that would be a turn-up for the books!
As to the question of where change comes into our investigations, I
shall return to this in a few moments. For now, let us note that we seek
in this area of work to account for pattern, that is, the persistence of
descriptive invariance in states of affairs.
A "PHOTOG RAP HI C NEGATIVE" VIEW OF NATURE
Moreover, we adopt, if you will, a "photographic negative" view of nature. On this figure-ground reversal of the Official view of the universe,
we hold that, all things being equal, we are entitled to expect continuous,
random flux everywhere; the persistence of any particular order or pattern in any region of this universe is thus viewed as highly improbable,
and needs accounting for. From this perspective, persistence presupposes
mechanism, and it is our job, as scientists, to elucidate the mechanism
that accounts for the persistence of any descriptive invariance-pattern.
If there were ceaseless, unconstrained, random flux, there would be,
in any assembly we might be observing, an infinity of possibilities that
might now be realised just here. But only a small subset of the logical
possibilities are actual. The behaviour of the assembly is thus said to
exhibit constraint.
THE SEARCH FOR CONSTRAINTS
Our scientific inquiry is aimed at revealing the nature of these constraints. These constraints will include certain universal, empirically
established invariances we normally refer to as "laws of nature" or of
physics (e.g., that light cannot travel faster than c).
But our inquiry need not stop there, that is, we need not confine ourselves to citing only such universal invariances as happen to apply. For
in specifying more fully the set of constraints-on-variance that preclude
all states of affairs other than the one we are seeking to account for,
the theoretical edifice of metamorphology provides us with a rich set
of methods for additionally specifying, with the highest degree of scientific rigour, those far more numerous sources of constraint which are
not universal at all but quite concrete, local, and idiosyncratic to the
situation.
76
JAMES WILK
NEGATIVE EXPLANATION
Our scientific explanation is not complete until we can satisfy a questioner's quite specific "why this rather than that." To do so we shall find
it essential to specify constraints which may be idiosyncratic to this assembly, in this context. And so, in metamorphological explanation, the
concept of flux-and-constraint replaces the much more epistemically permissive concept of cause- and-effect. A state-of-affairs is now only to be
regarded as having been explained scientifically once it can be demonstrated to be the only state-of-affairs not currently precluded [3]. As you
can begin to see, perhaps with some horror, our explanations are always
explanations in terms of unities.
At the risk of damaging my credibility further still, perhaps now to
a point beyond all repair, I must confess to you that the concepts with
which we are able to operate rigorously, in metamorphology, include
purpose, intention, and design, which again can be defined in terms of
imparity and rigorously derived theoretically [25] from some pretty basic
logical and physical concepts, once we allow description an explicit and
legitimate place in our armoury of fundamentals.
THE NATURE OF CHANGE
A N I NT R 0 D U C T I 0 N
T 0 M ETA M 0 R P H 0 L 0 G Y
77
be deduced from its value on any or all of the others). The description
of a particular along all of the dimensions constituting the descriptive
space can be given by a vector (n-tuple) specifying the coordinates of the
particular's "representative point" [1] within the space (For shorthand,
rather than speaking of 'the location of a particular's representative
point' within the space, we shall refer to 'the particular's location' in
the space). The concept of a descriptive space is developed much more
rigorously in [25]. As a particular's description along these dimensions
changes over time, the particular will come to occupy different locations within the space, and we can track the trajectory of the particular
through the descriptive space over time.
For some agent assembly to intervene in the free fall of some patient
assembly is for the agent to act upon it such that the patient's trajectory
through a defined descriptive space will be different to the trajectory it
would have followed had the agent not so acted. But it is only meaningful
to consider the "free fall" of an assembly with respect to the possibility
of some agent's intervention. Free fall is thus defined as an assembly's
trajectory through some descriptive space over time~the description
of some assembly as it would unfold over time~if the agent did not
intervene at all. Free fall is thus always relative to a point of view of~a
set of descriptive aspects heeded by~an agent. The agent intervenes in
order that the patient will be descriptively different over time~from the
agent's point of view~to what it would have been in the absence of his
intervention.
THE NATURE OF BEHAVIOUR
78
JAMES WILK
According to the Official view, which has held sway for over three and a
half centuries, the universe comprises a vast, hugely complex and richly
interconnected causal system of events, governed by a relatively small
number of universal causal laws, some yet to be discovered. This Official
universe is hierarchically arrayed in a sequence of interlocking stratified
layers (or nested shells), with the phenomena of subatomic physics at the
lowest level (or at the core), and with layers of 'higher-level' phenomena
successively arrayed upwards from this base (or outwards from this core).
AN IN T R 0 D U C T I 0 N T 0 MET AM 0 R P H 0 L 0 G Y
79
The laws, known and unknown, governing the behaviour of the various classes of interacting elements together determine the course of everything that transpires in the universe. On the Official view, if there
is any room for slippage between these universal laws and individual
goings-on, it can only be the result of a kind of leakage-some residual
indeterminism in the universe due either to quantum uncertainty or to
the predictive difficulties of non-linear equations [22].
THE END OF THE OFFICIAL UNIVERSE
There was once, and for many there still is, a heady and enticing rationalist dream of nature as such a universal, richly interconnected system
unfolding from a relative handful of fundamental laws. I have come to
believe, however, that this dream is just that: a dream. In its place,
metamorphology posits an uncompromisingly empiricist alternative.
In metamorphology, we replace the Official triad of notions of objectand-forces, cause-and-effect, and conformity to universal laws or regularities, with an alternative triad of notions: flux-and-constraint, purposeand-design, and adjustment to locally prevailing conditions. And we replace the Official picture of the universe as consisting of a hierarchically
ordered system of interacting, homogeneous classes of events with an
alternative picture of the universe as consisting of a myriad of idiosyncratic, autonomous phenomena, unfolding and responding to the vagaries
of local circumstances which are always unique and unrepeatable.
The success of Official, rationalist science at uncovering general laws
with wide applicability shows not that all phenomena in the universe are
to be completely described by such regularities. Rather, it only shows
that the severely limited rationalist methodology, however redoubtably
successful it has been within its own terms of reference, is suited only
to discovering such universal regularities and is eo ipso oblivious to the
vast majority of distinct phenomena that occur in the universe and which
equally merit rigorous empirical, scientific study [28].
THE REALITY OF DIVERSITY
80
JAMES WILK
81
The laws of physics are at a very high level of abstraction and apply equally to phenomena that are widely dispersed in space and time.
However, the laws of physics tell us very little about what goes on in
the universe, and for all but a relatively small number of very simple
phenomena they explain-and, even ultimately, can explain--very little
indeed. This is not to imply the least discredit to physics (where indeed
would we be without it and its dazzling record of achievements?), any
more than it is a discredit to the aeronautics industry that their products are quite useless for getting about town. Universal laws, such as
those discovered by physicists, are handy and, when aptly abstracted
and accurately delineated, quite effective for getting us to the sorts of
theoretical and practical destinations to which such laws are useful for
taking us. But there are other sorts of places, more local destinations,
where we shall need to go, and there we must rely on more local forms
of-equally scientific-transport.
82
JAMES WILK
Most excitingly, in my view, metamorphology permits us to deal rigorously with the rich, concrete, idiosyncratic details of real life, to treat
diversity seriously as an essential feature of the universe, and to accord
fundamental explanatory significance to those very features of everyday
life which the man or woman in the street knows to be of importance.
From this point of view, the rules of bridge or cricket, and the kinds
of information contained in Hoyle or Wisden, may turn out to be every bit as fundamental as the laws of physics in accounting scientifically
for what transpires at a given juncture in space-time, if what transpires
there is, say, a card game or a cricket match.
THE NATURE OF MIND
What then, on this view, is the relationship of mind and body? Quite
simply, on this view, there is no relationship between mind and body.
The alleged mind-body 'relationship' is like the relationship between
the separation of powers in the American Constitution, on the one
hand, and the arrangement of partition walls in the architecture of the
AN IN T R 0 D U C T I 0 N
T 0 MET AM 0 R P H 0 L 0 G Y
83
White House, on the other hand. One has nothing to do with the other.
'The mind' and 'the body' are both, equally, abstractions, but they are
abstractions- abridgements, 'arrests in description' [8]-along very different lines. To the extent that we are only concerned with the handful
of aspects of some assembly corresponding to the tiny handful of aspects studied by physics (aspects concerned with, or derivable from, the
descriptive dimensions of distance, time, mass, etc.), to that extent we
abstract the physical aspects. To the extent that we are concerned to
understand the mechanisms of behaviour by placing the behaviour in
the realm of conduct ("the complex background in which it is enacted"
[4]) to make it intelligible, to that extent we abstract the mental.
There is an important sense in which 'the mind' is no more closely
related to the brain than it is to any other organ of the body [25]. And
for my own part I can confidently assert, after more than two decades
of investigation as a neurophysiologist, cybernetician, cognitive scientist
and philosopher of mind, that the study of the brain has so far thrown
no light (but much darkness) on our understanding of the mind, nor
is it ever likely to do so. The whole business, on my reading of things,
involves a philosophical error of the first water [25].
Now 'traditionally', cognitive science has started from the false premiss
that we have nature (equated spuriously with the so-called 'physical
world') pretty well understood, at least in broad outline. In other words,
we've got nature taped. The anomaly remaining to be accommodated
within the physical scheme, so the story goes, is mind, and cognitive
science seeks accordingly to understand the nature of mind and its place
within nature as thus, Officially, understood. The approach adopted by
my colleagues and myself, however, has been to start from the other
end and proceed in the opposite direction. We aim, as D.J. Stewart has
aptly remarked [14], not to reduce psychology to physics but to bring
physics up to the level of psychology. And so, in stark contrast to the
prevailing view in cognitive science, we have taken the view that we have
not yet even begun to understand the mechanics of nature-blinded, as
we have been, by the physicists whom we have permitted, in E.A. Burtt's
phrase, to make a metaphysic out of a method. But if we understand
nature aright, along the incomparably richer lines of metamorphology,
mind is no longer an anomaly at all.
THE MIND OF NATURE
For mind, more generally, from this point of view, can be seen to refer
to those aspects of phenomena in the universe which inherently involve
description, significance and point of view, where a defined pattern has
84
JAMES WILK
its source in imparity, and so is the result of a design, and no less so even
where, as in Darwinian evolutionary theory, there is no designer [30].
Design or purpose-what Cudworth (1628) [5] called "plastic natures"can be shown, in metamorphology, to be as essential to understanding
the mechanics of the majority of observable phenomena in the universe
as are the concepts of mass/energy, length, and time.
The framework of metamorphology thus not only provides a philosophical and natural-scientific basis for taking purpose as central to our
understanding of human conduct. For more broadly, it provides a theoretically parsimonious basis for including purpose and meaning within
nature, yielding a new and readily tractable understanding of the relationship between the mental and the physical.
A GENERAL THEORY OF INTERVENTION
What has so far interested some people the most, however, about the
field of metamorphology-particularly in government and industry-has
been, predictably, the emerging practical applications of this work. The
core of the detailed theoretical structure of metamorphology, which we
have hardly even alluded to, is a General Theory of Intervention which
provides an account of what it is for anyone or anything to act and
what it is for anyone or anything to be acted upon. This theory turns on
the concepts of description, point of view, agent, patient, free fall, and
intervention.
TRANSFORMATION UNLEASHED:
THE POWER OF THE NUDGE
AN IN T R 0 D U C T I 0 N T 0 M ETA M 0 R P H 0 L 0 G Y
85
can pinpoint which constraints, if lifted, will yield the transformation desired. This theoretical capacity for "minimalist intervention" has already
been applied successfully to creating significant real-world transformations by means of very small sets of precisely pinpointed actions. Some
of the practical implications have already been tested impressively by a
number of sponsoring government agencies and multinational corporations, in applications ranging from the resolution of intractable problems
to the overnight transformation of corporate culture.
TRANSFORMING HOW NATURE IS SAID
It is heartening, to say the least, to find that what has seemed to me and
my colleagues to be such a rich field of study, such a powerful explanatory framework, and such a profound and fertile epistemological shift,
should turn out, so early in the game, to have such profound empirical and pragmatic consequences. These consequences, of course, sound
startling only from within the narrow stable of the Official View. If we
can include within Nature a cluster of fundamental concepts traditionally excluded, we can come to adopt an epistemology possessing better
fit to the way Nature herself in fact would appear to operate~namely,
locally, concretely, and in terms of unities, within a universe in which
description and meaning play a critical determining role.
The founder of modern scientific methodology, Francis Bacon, said
that nature can be commanded only by obeying her. If we can achieve
this better fit, this greater obedience of our explanations and interventions to the actual dictates of Nature, then we can expect far greater
(and more ecologically robust) command of Nature than the Official
universe has so far accommodated.
AFFILIATION
[1] Ashby, W.R., An Introduction to Cybernetics, Methuen & Co, London, 1956.
[2] Austin, J .L., Philosophical Papers, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1961.
86
JAMES WILK
[3] Bateson, G., "Cybernetic Explanation", American Behavioral Scientist, X, 8, April 1967, pp. 29-32. Reprinted in Bateson, G., Steps to
an Ecology of Mind, Paladin, London, 1973.
AN I NT R 0 D U C T I 0 N
T 0 M ETA M 0 R P H 0 L 0 G Y
87
WILLIAM E. HERFEL
INTRODUCTION
Juxtaposing the work of Einstein and Magritte has made for a wonderfully diverse and stimulating conference. As Michel Foucault has pointed
out, many of Magritte's works have entertained themes about the openendedness, indeterminateness and complexity of the relations between
language, world and imagination. His paintings reveal a world whereby
simple objects from our experience are combined in novel ways, providing
an elegant way to construct strange new phenomena from the familiar.
Einstein, on the other hand, urged us to accept a theory in which it is
possible to explain all novelty within a deterministic framework. The theories of relativity show how it is possible to derive a complex world from
the geometrical structure of space-time alone. Many things could be said
about how we react when asked to think about the relationships between
these world-views. And indeed, many imaginative responses have been
forthcoming in the course of these proceedings. Unfortunately, I possess
neither the time nor the space to say anything more that is immediately
about the relationship between the work of these two great artists.
Nevertheless, my work meshes quite well with several themes addressed
at this conference. Following are a few words about how this paper fits
with others presented here. I am attempting a synthesis between the
work of social constructivists (particularly Bruno Latour) and that of
complex adaptive systems theorists (the likes of Ilya Prigogine, Heinz
von Foerster, Brian Arthur and Christopher Langton, to name a few
representatives present at the conference). Despite the surface tensions
between these diverse vantage points, I think that at a deeper level these
ideas can be married quite happily. To see how, one must first see the
task of philosophy of science from my perspective. In my view, the job
of philosophy of science is to construct models of the scientific process.
( C.A. Hooker and I have recently shown to what extent traditional philosophy science succeeds in this regard in a paper presented to the 1995
International LMPS Congress.) Since scientific research is a social process, this work becomes fundamentally one of social dynamics. Social
constructivists have been busily amassing data toward this end.
89
90
WILLIAM E. HERFEL
Recently, constructivist accounts of science have been proposed by philosophers (e.g., Churchland and Hooker [3]; Giere [7]; Hacking [9]; van
Fraassen [23]), historians (e.g., Galison [5]) and sociologists (e.g., Latour
and Woolgar [13], [14]), sharing the view that scientific facts (and in
some cases entities) are human constructs. Constructivist accounts contrast with those provided by formalists who sought to explain science in
terms of application of a priori, formally and eternally valid methodology
(say e.g., the work of Hempel and Popper).l Formalists trivialise social
factors, for the details of scientific dynamics don't matter, so long as
ultimately the only social aspect that counts is the actualisation of the
application of the proven methodology to the subject matter at hand.
In fact, the only other way that political, economic or social influences
can enter into this account are as impediments to the process. Thus
the traditional account entails that science must be insulated from such
1
91
92
WILLIAM E. HERFEL
one or the other side of the duality is more appropriate for our understanding of science. [14]
Among the methodological reasons for rejecting the dichotomy Latour
and Woolgar cite Barnes' "symmetry thesis": social factors are no more
or less relevant for explaining the successes of science than explaining
its failures [14].
Applying the tools of nonlinear dynamics permits a finer-grained account than is currently available in the social studies of science literature.
Considered from the perspective of nonlinear dynamics, the dichotomy
becomes a strategy employed in the modeling of science as a complex
system. Imagine a model of science in a state space whereby dynamical constraints pick out a collection of trajectories through the space,
a specific trajectory selected by particular initial conditions. To construct such a model we must choose features of the system which will
appear as dimensions represented by orthogonal axes. For example, we
could choose for our dimensions: available methodology, economic resources, career interests and technological expertise. One reading, from
our present perspective, renders the dichotomy between the rational and
the social conceptual: in the terms of systems dynamics, this amounts to
stating that the social and the cognitive dimensions can be realistically
modeled on orthogonal state space axes.
It is compatible with Latour and Woolgar's account that the dynamics
of science is not (conceptually) decomposable along such lines, thereby
social and cognitive factors could not lie on orthogonal axes. But let us
suppose that they can. Even then the dichotomy could be maintained
dynamically only if the space in which science's dynamics could be captured has a linear topography. In such a (linear) space all vectors relevant
to the dynamics can be decomposed into the sum of orthogonal vectors.
Thus translated, even without the assumption that the cognitive and
social are conceptually inseparable, we can still retain a Latourian objection. For if the dynamics of science is nonlinear then any model in
a linear space, in which the dynamics is decomposed into the additive
play of independent forces, is bound to mislead. Hence even without Latour's radical assumption, which amounts to a very strong form of social
holism, we are still left with quite a powerful conclusion: rational and
social factors in science are dynamically interdependent making social
elements intrinsic to scientific activity.
NONDECOMPOSABILITY IN NONLINEAR DYNAMICS
C 0 N S T R U C T IV IS M & N 0 N LINE A R D Y N AM I C S
93
dx
dt
dy
dt
dz
dt
-lOx+ lOy
rx- y- xz
8
--z +xy
3
with r representing the control parameter. While no general analytic
solution of the equations is known outside the stable range (r > 24.74),
the behaviour of the system is observed by programming a computer to
iteratively generate a map of the trajectory of the system. 2 The result
is the now familiar Lorenz at tractor, the first strange attractor to be
observed with the aid of a digital computer. The attractor is strange
because, although the behaviour it describes is highly structured, it is
aperiodic. There are three aspects of the system's complexity:
1. While the behaviour is mathematically determined, it is aperiodic,
or non-repetitive. The trajectory neither fills the space nor visits
any point more than once.
2. Like many other chaotic trajectories, it exhibits a fractal structure.
Such structure is exemplified by self-similarity across scales. That
is, any magnified portion of the trajectory reveals a fine-grained
geometrical structure similar to the unmagnified trajectory.
3. The system is sensitively dependent on initial conditions. Simply
put, nearby trajectories diverge exponentially. Two time series generated by starting the system with initial conditions infinitesimally
close to one another diverge rapidly, and are eventually, after relatively few iterations, no more alike than two trajectories generated
by initial conditions chosen at random. Thus errors made in the
measurement of the initial conditions of a system exhibiting such
sensitive dependence will grow exponentially with time, making predictive accuracy quickly evaporate as temporal span of prediction
is lengthened.
2
94
WILLIAM E. HERFEL
I am not in a position to prove that science is a nonlinear dynamical system. First we must address the issue of whether we should think about
science as a dynamical system at all. Certainly science has a history,
and it is not outlandish to attempt to understand that history by constructing models. To be dynamic, such a model would describe science's
components in terms of their states, and change in the states would be
described in terms of the "forces" that play among them. At this juncture I think the only alternative to such an approach is to marvel at the
miracle of scientific prowess. I do not pretend to have a tidy set of equations upon which to base a dynamical model of science. Nevertheless, we
3
95
96
WILLIAM E. HERFEL
One might argue that order, not chaos, is what we want to promote
in science. And the surest way to guarantee order in a system is to
constrain it to linearity. But the robust chemical oscillators found in
organisms are nonlinear, as are a wide variety of other biological phenomena [8]. There is no simple correspondence between orderly periodicity and health. While chaotic cardiac fibrillation leads quickly to death,
aperiodicity is a ubiquitous feature of other healthy biological rhythms.
No general rule governs whether organic oscillations are normally either
chaotic or quasi-periodic (we rarely find strict periodicity). Instead it appears that life depends on a wide range of context dependent dynamical
patterns.
It is particularly noteworthy that aperiodicity occurs throughout neural processes. The olfactory systems of higher animals rely on chaotic
searching mechanisms in order to rapidly respond to smells [20]. Active
desynchronization through chaotic fluctuation is essential for healthy
97
Consider techno-science to be a complex social system, an evolving institutionalised structure, for obtaining information about, and constructing devices for, the manipulation and prediction of the environment. One
aim of philosophy of science should be to understand this institution in
order to improve and coordinate it. The structure is complex and delicate. The attractors, as well as the basin boundaries, may well be fractal
whereby small events can have large consequences. But we can recognise the coherence: we can identify such complex patterns. Nonlinear
dynamics lends precision to our pretheoretic recognition.
If Latour is correct, and cognition is distributed throughout the scientific process, from decisions made at the laboratory bench to political
decisions of rival research groups to economic decisions of funding agencies, then an account of scientific cognition will emerge only from an
accurate study of this multi-dimensional dynamic. As Galison [5] has
argued, while acknowledging the role of "sociological influences" cuts-off
the rationalists' caricature of science as the conjunction of formal logic
and observation, placing science in a constructive social context need
not render science or scientists unreasonable. In fact, within the context
of social dynamics, scientific decision making becomes less, not more,
arbitrary.
4
See also Hooker, Penfold and Evans [10] for a similar local controller, announced
as exemplifying a new control paradigm, capable of steering nonlinear (including
chaotic) systems.
98
WILLIAM E. HERFEL
William E. H erfel
Department of Philosophy
The University of Newcastle
New South Wales
Australia
P L WEH @cc. newcastle. edu. au
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to thank John Atkins, Wayne Christensen and Barry Hodges
for free exchange of ideas and moral support. Special thanks go to Cliff
Hooker for his careful reading and critique of the manuscript and to
Chuck Dyke for critical comments and provision of his manuscript prepublication. Thanks to Kelly Boyle for proofreading and recommendations for stylistic improvements. This research was made possible in part
by support from ARC Grant AC9031991.
C 0 N S T R U C T IV IS M & N 0 N LINE A R D Y N AM I C S
99
REFERENCES
[1] Arthur, W.B., Increasing returns and path dependence in the economy, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1994.
[2] Berge, P. et al., Order within chaos, Thckerman (tr.), Wiley, New
York, 1984.
[3] Churchland, P.M. and Hooker, C.A. (eds.), Images of science,
University Press, Chicago, 1985.
[4] Dyke, C., "Addition accretion accumulation acceleration alteration:
technology and nonlinearity.", (forthcoming).
[5] Galison, P., How experiments end, University Press, Chicago, 1987.
[6] Garfinkel, A., "A mathematics for physiology", American journal
of physiology, 245, 14, 1983, R455-466.
[7] Giere, R., Explaining science, University Press, Chicago,1988.
[8] Glass, L. and Mackey, M., From clocks to chaos, University Press,
Princeton, 1988.
[9] Hacking, 1., Representing and intervening, University Press, Cambridge, 1983.
[10] Hooker, C.A., Penfold, H.B., and Evans, R.J., "Cognition
under a new control paradigm", Topoi, 11, 1992, pp. 71-88.
[11] Kourany, J. (ed.), Scientific knowledge, Wadsworth, Belmont, 1987.
[12] Kuhn, T., Structure of scientific revolutions, University Press,
Chicago, 1962.
[13] Latour, B., Science in action, Cambridge, Harvard, MA, 1987.
[14] Latour, B. and Woolgar, S., Laboratory life, University Press,
Princeton, 1986.
[15] Lorenz, E.N., "Deterministic nonperiodic flow", Journal of the
atmospheric sciences, 20, 1963, pp. 282-93.
[16] Peacocke, A.R., An introduction to the physical chemistry of biological organization, Clarendon, Oxford, 1983
[17] Rapp, P. et al., "Experimental studies of chaotic neural behavior: cellular activity and electroencephalographic signals", in: Othmer,
H.G. (ed.), Nonlinear oscillations in biology and chemistry, SpringerVerlag, Berlin, 1986.
100
WILLIAM E. HERFEL
[20] Skarda, C. and Freeman, W., "How brains make chaos in order
to make sense of the world", Behavioral and brain sciences, 10, 1987,
pp. 161-195.
[21] Stewart, I., Does God play dice? The mathematics of chaos, Basil
Blackwell, Oxford, 1989.
[22] Stewart, I., "Warning-handle with care", Nature, 355, 1992,
pp. 16-17.
[23] Van Fraassen, B.C., The scientific image, Clarendon, Oxford,
1980.
[24j Watson, J.D., The double helix, Weidenfield and Nicholson, London, 1968.
102
to reject all the peculiarities and abnormal facts already observed independently by many scientists in their different fields of research or to
accept a new paradigm that could interpret them; as stated by T. Kuhn
"paradigm changes do cause scientists to see the world of their research
engagement differently". Let me illustrate this with his most familiar
demonstration showing "what were ducks in the Scientist's world before
the revolution are rabbits afterwards".
Reproducibility in space and time, is based on the dogma that we
could operate in our laboratories in "identical conditions".
This meant not only a correct control of the inner parameters of the
systems observed, but also of the environmental factors already known
as able to act on a particular process, like light, temperature, pressure
and humidity, in a phytotron for example. But effects of low-energy
electric, magnetic or electromagnetic fields from our natural environment
were mostly ignored. Air pollution was known well before Lavoisier and
Priestley could identify the normal composition of pure air and our vital
need for oxygen ... because everybody could smell it! But radioactive
or electromagnetic pollution required not only specific instrumentation
to be detected, but also knowledge of their existence in our natural
environment and possible vital effects in spite of their low energy level.
It was when studying the effects and ways of action of such physical
factors, as they were used in industry for physical treatment of hard waters to prevent scaling in boilers, that abnormal facts were noticed quite
independently by G. Piccardi and myself, with different physical factors
and processes studied in carefully controlled laboratory conditions [15,
16, 18, 20].
1. the effects from such physical treatments of water could result from
an action on water itself persisting for days or hours.
2. laboratory test-reactions to characterize any effect of treated (activated) water against untreated water (control in otherwise similar conditions) showed differences that could vary considerably and
even change from positive to negative effects in the course of time.
These could no more be considered as usual "experimental errors".
To test his hypothesis that the disturbing factors were of the same
nature, and could also act uncontrolled on water itself, Piccardi chose a
simple hydrolysis precipitation reaction (Bi Ch + H2 0 = Bi OCI + 2
H Cl) that could be carried out simultaneously with pre-treated or untreated distilled water, to observe in suitable conditions the variability
of the effect of a controlled physical treatment of the water. The effects
observed were on the germination, growth and subsequent sedimentation
of the resulting precipitate. The anomalous variability observed on the
104
~F
70
60
50
40
30
20
I 9 51
1952
1953
I 9 54
I 9 55
Apex
105
Apex
I ji
Figure 2. The Piccardi "Solar hypothesis" (A) Trajectory of the Earth in the Galaxy
(B) Resulting speed of the Earth in the spring and autumn (C) equinox
106
0
50
40-
s
30-
I I I I I I I I I I I I I
J MM J S N J
Figure 3. Mean annual variation of D'-test (under a horizontal copper sheet) in Northern and Southern hemispheres in 1957- 1960.
0 -
50-
.1610
JO
-f
1sso
R
0
100
200
Figure 4. Relation of the results of the D-tests in Florence with solar activity from
solar rotations 1610 to 1700. Ordinate: mean values of 20 daily experiments for 13
successive 27 days rotation of the sun ( =20 x 27 x 13 = 7000 observations for each
point) Abscissa: same mean values for Wolf's number R characterizing the importance
of solar spots.
The proper motion of the sun by reference to its local system of stars
is characterized by a speed vector of 19.4 km/s towards the direction of
the Apex which is situated in the constellation of Hercules. The plane of
the planetary solar system (the plane of the ecliptic) is tilted from 52.3
on the Apex Axis. The orbital velocity vector of the Earth has a mean
amplitude of 29.9 kmjs and is normal to the radius vector Sun-Earth. It
turns in this plane with the annual motion of the Earth. In the plane of
the ecliptic the vernal equinox is turned approximately from 270 of the
plane who contains the poles, the Apex and the direction of the center
of the Galaxy. Thus, around the month of march, the vectorial addition
of the two vectors-reported on the Earth center-presents a maximum
in March and a deep minimum in September. We note that the northern
108
f
I'
,r~ '
'
,;
.fJJ.', '
'
'
'
'
N
''
BRL'XELLES
FLOR E!'.:CE
LlBREVll.LE
l.EOPOLOVIl.l.E
'
FORT DAUPHIN
..
I<ERGUE l.E N
Figure 5. Dissymmetry of results of Piccardi F-tests in Northern and Southern hemispheres in September 1958.
60-
so-
I
5
r
0
+5
Figure 6. Effect of solar flares on mean values ofF and D-tests in Florence, significant
on keyday (0) only for test F, and not significant for 5 days before or afterwards.
Earth referred to the galactic center-and the dependence of the latitude of the observing station, as it was known for the flux of cosmic
particles in the Earth magnetic field.
110
Er,;\~~-h c
Cn,tcr
Figure 7. Combination of the motions of the Solar system towards the Apex and of
the Earth around the Sun. The largest arrow is the resulting vector of the proper
motion of the Solar system towards the Apex and of the projection on the same axis
of the tangential speed of the Earth in its orbital motion.
Figure 8. The "solar ballerine skirt". An approximate schema of the structure of the
magnetic field of the sun in-between the opposite N and S magnetic hemispheres
(neglecting the effect of the rotation of the sun)
112
114
116
[12] GalOr, B., "The crisis about the origin of irreversibility and time
anisotropy", Science, 176,4030, 1972, pp. 11-17.
[13] Kuhn, T.S., The structure of scientific revolutions, The University
Chicago press, (Ist. Phoenix ed. 1964).
[14] Piccardi, G., "L'influence des phenomEmes terrestres, solaires et
cosmiques sur les reactions physico-chimiques et biologiques", Ciel et
Terre, 5-6, 1956, pp. 227-244.
[15] Piccardi, G. and Cini, R., "The action of an electromagnetic field
of 10 KHz frequency on the chemical tests: the problem of the influx of
"atmospherics"", Geofisica e meteorologia, 4, 1956, p. 25.
[16] Piccardi, G., "On the structure of water and the influx of lowfrequency electromagnetic fields", La Ricerca Scientifica, 29, 1959,
p. 1252.
[17] Piccardi, G., "Expose introductif- les tests chimiques", In: Symposium International sur les Relations entre Phenomenes solaires et
terrestres en chimie-physique et biologie, Presses Academiques Europeennes, Bruxelles, 1960, pp. 9-49 and pp. 121-130.
[18] Piccardi, G., The chemical Basis of Medical Climatology, Charles
C. Thomas, Springfield, 1962.
[19] Piccardi, G. and Capel-Boute, C., "The 22-year solar cycle and
chemical tests", J. Interdiscip. Cycle Res., 3, 1972, pp. 413-417.
[20] Pourbaix, M. and Rorive-Boute, C., " Procedes electrochimiques anti-incrustrants", In: Proceedings 2nd meeting of CITCE, Tamburini, Milano, 1951, pp. 240-241.
[21] Schoffeniels, E., "Generalizing information theory to an open system", Biometeorology, 10, part 2. Suppl. to Int. J. Biometeor., 29, 1985,
pp. 41-56.
[22] Schnol, S.E. and Udaltsova, N.V., "On space-geo-physical correlations in biological and physical chemistry processes", (3rd Intern. Symposium in Pushchino- 26/9 -1/10/1993) CIFA-news, 15, 1994, pp. 2-6;
CIFA-news, 16, p. 6.
[23] Vladimirsky, B., Problemy kosmicheskoi biologii, vol. 5, Leningrad
Nauks, 1989, pp. 210-221.
[24] Vladimirsky, B., "Sector structure of interplanetary magnetic field
and F-tests of Piccardi", CIFA-news, 14, Febr. 1994 pp. 3-4.
[25] Vladimirsky, B. and Bruns, A.V., "Heliogeophysical disturbances influence upon the results of the measurements of gravitation
constant", CIFA-news, 19, May-June 1995, p. 2.
1999
120
Scientometrics is that branch of the Science of Science dealing with quantitative assessment of science indicators (like the number of researchers,
amounts of funding to support research activity etc., but mostly the
quantity of the scientific documents (articles, reports, books, patents
etc.) as the latter is a normal immediate formally assessable result of research activity. Scientometrics does not deal so much with the content of
the indices under assessment. Our idea is that the "obviousness" of the
current conclusion of Chapter 2 ought to be supported by documented
data, obtained by "mere" scientometric calculations that-though often
looking superficial-are never open for prejudice. It goes without saying
that scientometric study is also -on a larger scale-used in the present
work for investigating the characteristics of biomedical applications of
magnetic fluids as an interdisciplinary problem. At the same time, analysis of the content of relevant publications is simultaneously used for the
same purpose. So, if we reformulate one of the basic questions put by
the present Conference as "Do we have to oppose the understanding of
science 'within object' (e.g., peer assessments, expert evaluation, prog-
121
122
The disciplinary structure of the mentioned references in the whole Proceedings is presented in Table 1. The number of disciplines, presented by
the cited journals, has increased from 30 (which is, by itself, an unusually large number of disciplines, cited by such a compact and relatively
"young" domain) up to 44 (the increase is 46.90%). It means that, first,
MF research is really a highly interdisciplinary one. Further, such an
increase is normally interpreted as evidence of the increased use of the
123
Table 2 plots the data on the relative increase or decrease of the portion
of citations to the journals in various disciplinary groups in the ICMF6 Proceedings as compared with the Proceedings of the ICMF-5. By
relative increase or decrease we mean the alteration not in number of citations but in their portion expressed in per cent. Besides 357.45 per cent
increase of citations to biological and medical journals, 65.90% of all the
disciplines cited in the ICMF-6 Proceedings are biological and medical
disciplines, while the part of medical and biological publications in the
Proceedings is but 12.87%. In the ICMF-6 Proceedings citations to biological and medical journals have the 4th rank after physics, mechanics,
engineering and there are more citations to medical and biological jour-
124
Tl
Mechanics
("Physics" group including:}
Physics
Physics, Applied
Physics, Fluids and Plasmas
Physics, Condensed Matter
Physics, Atomic, Molecular
and Chemical
Physics, Mathematical
( "Material Sciences"
group including:}
Material Sciences
Material Sciences, Ceramics
("Chemistry" group including:}
Chemistry, Physical
Chemistry
Chemistry, Applied
Chemistry, Inorganic and
Nuclear
Chemistry, Analytical
122
182
81
64
13
12
26.49
29.49
17.57
13.88
2.82
2.60
14.09
32.26
18.17
7.98
0.17
2.21
2
3
7
9
83
190
107
47
1
13
1
4
34
11
11
2.38
0.22
10
23
18
4
3.06
0.70
8
20
57
57
1
40
30
4
3
12.36
12.36
0.17
8.68
6.51
0.87
0.65
74
73
12.56
12.56
45
35
7
7.64
5.94
1.19
6
14
0.22
2
1
0.34
0.17
26
43
4
34
6
13
14
23
125
20
13
5
1
4.35
2.82
1.05
0.22
7
11
23
0.22
23
13
5
2
2
2
1
2.82
1.05
0.43
0.43
0.43
0.22
11
17
17
17
23
0.22
23
14
3
3
2
3.04
0.65
0.65
0.43
6
14
14
17
0.43
17
1
1
0.22
0.22
23
23
79
35
7
13.41
5.94
1.19
6
14
41
6.96
76
10
6
4
15
12.90
1.70
1.02
0.70
2.55
13
16
20
9
0.34
26
14
5
4
2.38
0.85
0.70
10
18
20
4
3
2
2
1
1
1
1
12
0.70
0.51
0.34
0.34
0.17
0.17
0.17
0.17
2.04
20
24
26
26
34
34
34
34
12
3
2
1
0.51
0.34
0.17
24
26
34
2
6
0.34
1.02
26
16
126
Work 2
Polymer Sciences
Energy and Fuels
Geosciences
Computer Applications and
Cybernetics
Metallurgy and Mining
Meteorology and Atmosphere
Sciences
Photographic Technology
I Total dzsczplznary cztatwns
0.22
23
461
5
2
2
0.85
0.34
0.34
18
26
26
1
1
0.17
0.17
34
34
1
1
589
0.17
0.17
34
34
TABLE II
The disciplinary distribution of the bibliographic citations to the journals in the
Proceedings of the ICMF-5 and ICMF-6 (only highly cited disciplines and disciplinary groups)
The discipline or disciplinary group
"Physics" group
Mechanics discipline
"Material Sciences"
group
"Chemistry" group
"Engineering" group
"Biology and Medical
Sciences" group
Relative
increase
(+)/decrease (-)
in the I CMF-6
Proceedings
r
1
2
- 18.29
- 46.75
57
40
20
12.36
8.68
4.83
3
4
5
74
45
79
12.56
7.64
13.41
5
6
3
+ 1.62
- 11.98
+177.63
13
2.82
76
12.90
+357.45
The only discipline name that was taken from the Ulrich's Periodical International
Directory since a directly corresponding name was not found in the Science Citation
Index
127
TABLE III
The disciplinary structure of the bibliographic citations to the journals in
the articles on biomedical applications published in the ICMF-6 Proceedings
The disciplines presented
by the cited journals
Table 1 plots the disciplinary structure of references in all the Proceedings articles, not in the ones specially devoted to biomedical applications.
If we pass to the latter, we should see that 29 disciplines are presented by
the periodicals cited in the papers on biomedical MF applications published in the ICMF-6 Proceedings (Table 3). The increase of the number
of disciplines cited in the articles on biomedical MF applications published in the ICMF -6 Proceedings as compared with the ones published
in the Proceedings of the ICMF-5 is 222.22% (from 9 to 29 disciplines),
128
LAZARE V, R 0 AT H, Y UN US 0 VA & SA F 0 N EN K 0
129
The obtained data on the disciplinary structure of references in the papers devoted to MF biomedical applications support the opinion that the
research problem is both a highly interdisciplinary and progressive one
(the latter being supported also by the data of the previous Chapter). It
is also of interest to obtain a formali:6ed notion of the thematic structure
of the research themselves as reflected in the content of the ICMF-5 and
ICMF-6 abstracts (to support or disprove our opinion). So as not to miss
any possible trend, we read thoroughly all the corresponding abstracts,
trying to classify first the subjects of their research.
The results of this attempt are presented in Table 4, the latter demonstrating that three main subjects still exist, viz. cell separation and drug
transportation systems, and MF-based imaging techniques. As for two of
them, viz. cell separation and imaging techniques, there is an apparent
tendency to an increase, whereas for the use of magnetic fluids as drug
carriers the increase is a minor one. Little attention seems to be paid to
the studies of the interactions of MF with biological structures in general. A visible expansion of the S'ubject structure of the studies is obvious.
This also looks to be a sign of a research progress.
Another way of presenting the thematic structure of the research is to
determine disciplines under which framework research may be classified
(as it was done with the cited references). For the content of the abstracts
such an attempt was also made (Table 5) since it is of an interest to
compare the disciplinary structure of published and cited works. The
most prominent finding plotted in Table 5 is the increase of research in
such vital areas as oncology and immunology.
130
LAZARE V, R 0 AT H, Y UN US 0 VA & SA F 0 N EN K 0
9. RETURNING T 0 SPECULATIONS:
POPULAR REVIEW OF SOME RECENT WORKS ON
MAGNETIC FLUIDS BASED
DRUGS TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS
Drugs transportation is being undertaken by means of an applied magnetic field to a MF drug carrier. Though the subdivision of the research
is both important and promising, there is not such a great absolute increase in the number of abstracts ( +40.00% ), while in relative terms the
decrease is -58.25%.
The mentioned decrease does not seem to be occasional since "such
drug transporting system must have definite, very often controversial
( ... ) characteristics:
- Particles in magnetic fluid compositions stabilized by biocompatible
substances must have appropriate shape and size ( ... ) in order to
pass through capillary systems of organs and tissues without posing
the threat of vessel embolisation.
- Compositions containing both [magnetic] fluid and a chemotherapeutic agent must have sufficiently high magnetization [to be captured in a target site at the physiological velocities of blood flow].
- Magnetically guided carrier systems must be able to transport the
necessary amount of pharmacologically active compounds, and there
must be an effective mechanism for the release of drug from the
carrier at the target site.
All components of the drug carrier complex must be non-toxic, finally biodegradable and removable from the reticuloendothelial system" [10, p. 335].
Besides these problems, it seems that just not very much attention is
paid to the problem of the studies of interactions of MF with "biological
structures" (i.e., "blood components, membranes of cells and subcellular structures" [11, p. 266]). However, "investigations in this field are
being done in oncology ( ... ) , in the treatment of diseases of heart and
blood vessels ( ... ) and hollow organs" [10, p. 335]. There are reports of
successful experimental treatment of some malignancies with the aid of
water-based MF drug carriers [12] and of a number of malignancies with
the aid of ferromagnetic microspheres that immobilize antitumor drugs
and consist of microcrystalline ferric oxide and a polymeric matrix [13],
131
TABLE IV
The subject structure of the abstracts on biomedical applications published in the
ICMF-5 and ICMF-6 Proceedings
Number of the abstracts in the abstract
Subject
compendium
(purpose or
the ICMF-5
of the ICMF-6
sphere of
application
original reviews total original rev1ews total
or an objective)
cell separation"
7
0
7
2
0
2
1
drug carriers
5
0
5
6
7
image techniques
1
0
1
6
1
7
biomedical research
in general
1
0
1
alignment of biome0
1
1
dical assemblies
experimental medicine and oncology
0
1
1
in general
development of
immunological
compositions
1
0
1
fabrication of
carbon
0
1
hyperthermia of
cancer
1
0
1
immobilization of
cytochrome-c-oxidase
1
0
1
obturation of
digestive tracts
external fistulas
1
0
1
obturation of
hollow organ
fistulas
1
0
1
smear examination
1
0
1
studies of biotransformation of
magnetic powders
1
0
1
studies of MF
interactions with
biological structures
1
0
1
antifiammatory
effects
1
0
1
treatment of
0
1
plants
1
0
1
1
" Italicized are the titles of the mam general subjects
132
LA Z ARE V , R 0 AT H , Y UN US 0 VA & S A F 0 N EN K 0
TABLE V
The disciplinary structure of the abstracts on biomedical applications published in the ICMF-5 and ICMF-6 Proceedings
Scientific discipline
Biophysics
Hematology
Medicine, General and Internal
Biology
Oncology
Cardiovascular System
Cytology
Genetics
Immunology
Surgery
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
15.38
15.38
15.38
7.69
7.69
7.69
7.69
7.69
7.69
7.69
3
3
8.57
8.57
4
1
11.34
2.86
1
8
2
2.86
22.86
5.71
MF-based and related techniques are good for cell separation systems
used, e.g., for human lymphocyte subset removal, tumor cell removal,
selection of self-replicating bone marrow cells, hybridoma selection, separation of endothelial cells [16].
The most acute challenge in the context of the listed applications
is bone marrow transplantation which is an aid in the management of
leukemia, cancer, and lethal radiation exposure. Human lymphocyte subset removal and the selection of self-replicating bone marrow cells are
among the possible problems to be resolved during the procedure of bone
marrow transplantation:
Removal of human lymphocyte subsets using a suitable magnetic bead
labelled with an antibody to the targeted lymphocyte and being performed by methods of magnetic filtration, is still a good biological com-
133
134
LA Z ARE V, R 0 AT H , Y UN US 0 VA & SA F 0 N EN K 0
The description of the studies of the rest-mostly specific than generalof the applications is contained in some 1/3 of the ICMF- 5 and some
36% of the ICMF-6 abstracts. There are no small groups as we see, but
the distribution of the subjects-one abstract per two conferences except
the "treatment of plants" (one abstract per one conference )-does not
allow us to make any distinctly generalized grouping. Neither does it
inspire us to produce a review of the rest of the applications.
A P PLICA T I 0 N S 0 F M A G NET I C F L U I D S
135
V.S. Lazarev
Department of Scientific Information and Patentology
Belarusian State Polytechnic Academy
Minsk, Belarus
136
Stuart Roath
Cancer Research Division, Walt Disney Memorial Cancer Institute
Altamonte Springs, FL, USA
O.K. Safonenko
Laboratory for Thermomechanics of Magnetic Fluids
Belarusian Polytechnic Academy
Minsk, Belarus
D.A. Yunusm~a
Research Institute of Hematology and Blood Transfusion
Minsk, Belarus
REFERENCES
[3] Kozlyakovskiy, P.A., Research of the specialists needs in interdisciplinary information, Nauchnyie i tekhnicheskiye biblioteki SSSR, N
6, 22-27, 1977 (in Russian), Komlev, A.D., Inter-branch interaction
and its information-and-bibliographic support, PhD Thesis, Leningrad,
1981 (in Russian), Neeley-Jr, J.D., "The management and social science literature: an interdisciplinary cross-citation analysis", Journal of
the American Society for Information Science, 32, 1981, pp. 217-223,
Porter, A.L., Chubin, D.E., "An indicator of cross-disciplinary research", Scientometrics, 8, 1985, pp. 161-176. Ajiferuke, 1., Burell,
Q., Tague, J ., "Collaborative coefficient: a single measure of the degree
of collaboration in research", Scientometrics, 14, 1988, pp. 421-433.
[4] Lazarev, V.S., "When Science Citation Index is of no use ... ", in:
Tyutyunnik, V .M. (ed.), Information Science and Science of Science:
Proceedings of the 3rd International (5th Tambov) Scientific Conference,
Tarnbov, 28-29 November, 1994, Tambov, INIC Publishers, 1994, pp. 4344.
[5] Martens, B., Saretski, T., "Conferences and courses on biotechnol-
137
ogy. Describing scientific communication by exploratory method", Scientometrics, 27, 1993, pp. 237-260.
[6] Lazarev, V.S.," Studies of documentary information flows by means
of citation analysis", Voprosy bibliografovedeniya i bibliotekovedeniya, 7,
1986, pp. 114-125, 1986 (in Russian).
[7] Lazarev, V.S., "Bibliometric studies of the proceedings of the Fifth
International Conference on Magnetic Fluids. Structure of bibliographic
references as an indicator of knowledge foundation of the field of science",
Magnitnaya Gidrodinamika, N 1, 1993, pp. 109-116 (in Russian).
[8] Lazarcv, V.S., "Bibliographic references as the aid of assessment of
scientific value of cited papers", in: Eve-Marie Lacroix, Local Organizing Committee of the 7th International Congress on Medical
Librarianship, ed., Health information for global village: Proceedings of
the 'lth International Congress on Medical Librarianship, Washington,
D.C., May 10-12, 1995, Washington, 1995, pp. 276-277.
[9] Karas, G.A., Lazarev, V.S., "The use of some scientometric methods for rapid assessment of scientific activity of scientific research institutions", Vestnik Akademiyi meditsinkikh nauk SSSR, N 4, 1991, pp. 61-65
(in Russian).
[10] Ruuge, E.K., Rusetski, A.N., "Magnetic fluids as drug carriers:
Targeted transport of drugs by a magnetic field", Journal of Magnetism
and Magnetic Materials, 122 (1-3: Proceedings of the 6th International
Conference on Magnetic Fluids), 1993, pp. 335-339.
[11] Ahalaya, M.G., Kakiashvili, M.S., Volter, E.P., "Investigation of the mechanisms of magnetic fluids interactions with biological
structures", in: Fifth International Conference on Magnetic Fluids. Riga,
18-22 September, 1989: Abstracts, Salaspils, 1989, pp. 266-267.
[12] Brusentsov, N.A., Lukashevich, M.V., Lykov, V.V., Knorin,
E.A., Pechennikov, A.V., Chechernikov, V.I., Martynova, L.F.,
"The magnetic fluid for medicine application", in:Fifth International
Conference on Magnetic Fluids. Riga, 18-22 September, 1989: Abstracts,
Salaspils, 1989, pp. 258-259.
[13] Syrkin, A.B., Brusentsov, N.A., "Ferri- and ferromagnetics in
experimental oncology and medicine", in: Sixth International Conference
on Magnetic Fluids. July 20-24, 1992: Programme & Abstracts, S.l., s.a.,
pp. 480-481.
[14] Rusakova, N.N., Nikolaenkov, Y.V., Nechaeva, A.B., "Modeling of magnetic fluid effect on the magnetofluid obturation of hollow
organ fistulae", in: Sixth International Conference on Magnetic Fluids.
July 20-24, 1992: Programme & Abstracts, S.l., s.a., pp. 492-493.
138
GUSTAAF C. CORNELIS
INTRODUCTION
Proliferation
This talk concerns the diffusion of hypothetical knowledge. Hence, the
concept of proliferation is defined as uncontrolled growth: too many different theories emerge. The other interpretation, namely as sociological
dispersion or circulation of knowledge through different types of media,
is not of any relevance to us now. The following picture shows what the
concept 'proliferation' stands for.
different theories
,----,,---------------~
time
The originally thick line represents a standard theory, which becomes
gradually more and more contestable, because alternatives (thin lines)
emerge almost continuous. There's more going on here than just a Kuhnian crisis: quantitatively and qualitatively as well, the situation can be
hardly overseen, due to the-at first sight-completely irrational way in
which alternatives show up and are elaborated.
Non-Specialist Literature
In the non-specialist literature, in general, cosmology is regarded as
an utmost speculative science. If this opinion is not shared in certain
books-mainly the case, when the author is a cosmologist him- or herself-the publication itself makes the reader's head spin: he or she will
139
140
GUSTAAF C. CORNELIS
Plan
First, the early stages of modern or twentieth century cosmology will be
dealt with. Second, the problem of the effective geometry of the universe
is examined. Third, the current views are discussed and finally, the future
developments are mapped.
EARLY STAGES
141
1914
1915
._s_li.;.p-rhe_r""""'!"'_..,. .......................X~
1916
Einstein
1917
1918
e Sitter
,..... .p.-.jmodel
1919
1920
1921
1922
1Einstein
Fried:m.an
'
1923
r----'------,4;
1924
dis tan.c es
Hubble:
'
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
Hubble:
Hubble's law
Hubble:
geometry
Lemaitre
~- '
~ ................ !
..
Lemaitre:
expansion
.....
Lemaitre:
primae vel
atom
The fat arrows depict real influences, while the faint ones stand for supposed or
secondary influences (when they did not happen, they are crossed). The vertical
dotted line distinguishes practical astronomy from theoretical cosmology on the
right.
Einstein revised willingly his so-called blunder of 1916: the fact that
he had renounced the dynamical models in the first place.
For a while, the physicists did agree upon the hypothesis that the
universe originated out of a physical singularity-precisely the hypothesis of Lemaitre. However, they did not so regarding the future of the
universe: three possibilities remained. So, at this early stage in the development of modern cosmology, although an almost infinite amount
of models was (mathematically) provided, roughly three groups among
142
GUSTAAF C. CORNELIS
time
Ku111Hilr..<
The universe came into existence at time to; we are now at t 1 . These models
accorded respectively with an open, closed or flat universe. The tangent line
stands for the constant acceleration of the galaxies, which is seen as implausible.
The extension of the line until it intersects the time-line, results in the so-called
Rubble-time.
EFFECTIVE GEOMETRY
The question which one of the models to choose is equivalent to the question which overall geometry the universe has. In effect, it was Hubble's
original idea to determine the curvature of the universe by observation,
by determining the spreading of the galaxies. However, merely counting them won't suffice, simply because a lot of the existing galaxies are
barely if not visible.
Through the seventies and eighties several other astronomical techniques were developed to measure the curvature. The principle they all
had in common was the fact that there was an equivalence between
the curvature and the so-called deceleration-parameter qo. This quantity measures how fast the universe expansion diminishes. One way to
determine the deceleration is to determine the total mass of the universe
and to check whether it matches the critical mass, the theoretical mass
necessary to decelerate the expansion-rate, that much as to bring the
expansion to a standstill.
Two positions were and are still taken by cosmologists and astronomers
alike. The first one is to postulate that the universe is flat (so the ratio
mass j critical mass equals unity) and to search for enough mass to keep
143
144
GUSTAAF C. CORNELIS
,...
II
,..
"'
..............................,
...
',,1
,.'
,...
time
Everything said about the foregoing stages was uncertain on physical
grounds, and it was not clear whether an infinite or a finite series did
precede-although a finite series would suffice and an infinite amount
stated severe thermodynamical problems.
The oscillating universe model faded away since it was not falsifiable,
but the fundamentals (cyclism) are nowadays defended by some philosophers, theologians, and space-time theoreticians.
Some of those theoreticians (namely, Brans and Dicke) developed a
whole new relativity-theory, postulating the gravitational constant timedependent. They did so, because there was an inconsistency in the timedistance scaling of the universe, based on Hubble's law and Einsteinian
relativity. However, the proposal had no general impact, since the inconsistency could be wiped out within standard theory thinking.
During the eighties, cosmogonical theories based on extragalactic magnetism were developed. In the so-called plasma universe, the galaxies
came into being by a magnetic radiation-matter interference. Recently
it has been shown that a magnetic origin for galaxies is unlikely, although
the interstellar magnetic influence on stars and planets is indisputably
there. Some scientists have tried to match their theory of extragalactic
magnetism with the 'empirical proof' of standard theory, that is, the
existence of the 2.7 K cosmic background radiation. They succeeded.
They could also explain some structural features of the galaxy in Andromeda, although a straightforward dynamical approach does the same
145
thing. Since there are no means to confirm or falsify the existence of intergalactic magnetism, the group of adherents stays rather small and the
theories tend to disappear.
This application of magnetism-in science and pseudo-science taken
together, it is a frequently occurring 'deus-ex-machina'-was the only
real attempt to contest standard theory in recent times.
What about inflation-theory? The inflation-theories can hardly be seen
as alternatives at all to standard theory. And if one argues to do so, it
should be mentioned that only a few inflationary models were (consecutively) developed. This diagram shows the elaboration of the inflationconcept in cosmology.
The inflationary concept can give an account for the vastness of the
universe, although this anomaly was not the initial problem to the theories. They are undoubtedly very speculative, but approximately half
of the cosmologists regard them as quite reasonable and are willing to
accept them.
FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS
146
GUSTAAF C. CORNELIS
1967
1979
horizon-problem
flatness-pro olem
_l
monopole-pro olem
tll.rlnel.ing
I
"bubbles
( _____M
__re_ro,g_eM_r_ry____~)
1982
inflation: MW inflationtheory
--1
Heisenberg
uantum-in!1ation
Pee "bles-Zel'dovich
1983
CONCLUSION
147
basis. One can hardly speak of a consensus among the astrologers. Maybe
the concept of proliferation can shed new light on the demarcationproblem.
Though, if one considers quantum mechanics, it is also seen that there
are at least between twenty and thirty different more or less accepted
interpretations going. In fact, every quantum physicist has his own metaphysically induced view on the topic.
And if one considers particle physics, more than five different theories
are in competition with each other (ranging from the so-called standard
theory-and its derivatives-to string theory). They seem to be all in
mutual contradiction.
SST
FUM
What about cosmology? This last diagram shows clearly that, although several different cosmological theories undoubtedly existed (and
some still exist), the overall picture remains quite surveyable. SST stands
for: Steady State Theory, OUM for: Oscillating Universe Model, PUM
for: Plasma Universe Model-the magnetic alternative. The lines are
148
GUSTAAF C. CORNELIS
partly dotted, meaning that these theories are slowly disappearing out
of the picture. You have the inflation theory development, not in conflict with Standard Big Bang Cosmology, but not generally accepted as
a part of it
We can conclude that, in spite of the existence of an appropriate breeding ground and a suitable methodological tradition, there is no proliferation whatsoever appearing in the development of modern cosmological
thinking.
AFFILIATION
PAUL J. LEWI
1. RESONANCE
Resonance is most often associated with vibrating mechanical and electrical systems. Pendulums, strings, springs, membranes, sound boxes,
etc. are illustrations of simple mechanical resonating systems which we
encounter in daily life. The behavior of each of these can also be reproduced, although less visibly, by wiring suitable electrical and electronic
components together. More complex resonating systems are found on
all scales of physical dimension from the microworld to the macrocosmos, ranging from elementary particles, molecular assemblies, bridges,
planetary systems to galaxies.
In crude terms, one could state that resonance occurs whenever the
output of a system is returned to it as input, as in a classical feedback
loop. Each of the mechanical devices which we mentioned before, when
set in motion, will vibrate at a given frequency called the eigenfrequency
of the system. (The prefix 'eigen' is derived from the corresponding German adjective, which means proper, dedicated, specific etc., but which
is used here in the sense of principal, fundamental, canonical, etc.) In
what follows we distinguish between eigenvibration and eigenvariation
to indicate that the system supports sustained oscillations or not. The
distinction is not essential, as both are considered here as the result of
resonance in the system.
The concept of a feedback loop can be properly depicted by means
of the alchemist symbol and Jungian archetype of the Ouroburos (Fig.
1), the snake that bites its own tail, representing at the same time the
'materia prima' and eternity [1]. On the one hand, the static perception
of the symbol produces a snake that holds its tail between its teeth.
A dynamic vision of the symbol, on the other hand, is that of a snake
that once bit its tail, causing a sensation of pain, causing it to bite its
tail again, causing a sensation of pain again, and so on ad infinitum. Of
course, there is no way of telling which of the two visions, the static or
the dynamic one, is closest to reality. Possibly, both play a role in our
understanding of the world. The story goes that the Ouroburos symbol
led Kekule in 1866 to conceive a static six-carbon ring structure of ben-
149
@ 1999 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
150
PAUL J. LEWI
zene which is composed of three single and three double bonds [2]. Alternatively, the benzene molecule is also regarded as resonating between
two hexagonal configurations with different electronic distributions.
The phenomenon of resonance is so ubiquitous that most of the time
we are not aware of it. But whenever we look closer at what makes the
world tick, vibrating and interacting systems abound, often in surprising
disguise. Our approach may be likened to that of the Pythagoreans who,
once they discovered the link between sound vibrations and the physical
dimensions of the objects that produced them, attempted to extend the
principle to the whole of the universe. Kepler's harmony of the celestial
spheres is a typical testimony thereof. In this paper we will draw attention to instances of resonance in a field where it is hardly expected to
occur, namely in the statistical analysis of data.
2. D AT A AND IN F 0 R MAT I 0 N
Data analysis is a branch of statistics which attempts to extract information from tabulated data. For example, one may consider the chemical
elements and compile their macroscopic chemical and physical properties
in the form of a table. These properties include atomic weight, specific
heat, density, boiling point, acidity, etc. We refer to the rectangular arrangement of the numbers by objects and by properties as the data.
Information refers to relationships and structure in the data. For example, Mendeleev, through a long process that has not been (and perhaps
never will be) formalized, found his famous periodic arrangement of the
elements which has become a paradigm in chemistry ever since. While
the generation and compilation of data is often a highly codified scientific activity, the extraction of information from data draws from both
science and art.
151
3. FACTORS
In data analysis one may discern two basic approaches. Cluster analysis, on the one hand, aims at producing taxonomies or classifications
which show the similarities of things according to recorded measurements. It also may show the phylogenetic descent of the objects from
ancestors that are inferred from the data. This approach may be called
Aristotelian, as it accepts the complexity of the world as it is. It is exemplified by the work of Linnaeus and has produced the hierarchical division of the animal kingdom into classes, orders, families, genera, species,
etc. Factor analysis, on the other hand, attempts to find hidden factors
which may explain the variation in the data. The underlying assumption
here is that the number of factors is less than the number of observed
properties. This approach may be termed Platonic, as it attributes reality to the pure factors from which our imperfect observations emanate.
One is reminded here of Plato's tale of the cave in which projections are
made on a wall by forms that are invisible to the observers [3].
Factor analysis originated around 1930 in the context of the study
of intelligence by means of psychometric measurements by Spearman,
Holzinger, Thurstone and others [4]. These early factorists considered the
multitude of psychometric measurements as mixtures of a few primary
traits which included general intelligence (the famous IQ), abstraction,
language, music, visualisation, etc.
In order to explain the concept of factors, Thurstone reminded us
that any of the millions of colors that we can distinguish is reducible
to a mixture of only three primary colors (e.g., red, blue and green).
These can be regarded as the factors of color vision [5]. Their meaning
derives from the three types of cone cells in the human retina, which
possess specific photoreceptors with maximal absorption for red, blue
or green light, respectively. Note that absorption of photons at specific
wavelengths by molecules is intrinsically a resonance phenomenon.
When Mendeleev in 1869 arranged the chemical elements by groups
and periods, he identified atomic weight and chemical valence as the two
factors which explained most of the chemical and physical properties that
were known in his days. His approach allowed to correct some errors in
the data and successfully predicted the existence and the properties of
Gallium, Germanium and Scandium [6]. Much later, the physical meaning of the two factors became apparent when they were identified with
the first two quantum numbers [7]. Note that the latter are solutions of
a mathematical equation that describes the resonance properties of the
electron.
152
PAUL J. LEW!
4. EIGENVALUE DECOMPOSITION
Let's assume a table which describes the first 36 chemical elements (from
Hydrogen to Krypton) in terms of two properties, say atomic weight and
boiling point [9]. Such a table is called bivariate because it involves two
properties, each of which constitutes a different point of view. Conventionally, for practical and aesthetic reasons, we associate the rows of
the table with the chemical elements and we relate the columns to the
properties. In theory, however, the roles of rows and columns are interchangeable. A familiar geometrical interpretation of the table is the
Cartesian diagram in which atomic weight and boiling point are associated with the horizontal and vertical coordinate axes, and in which each
element is represented as a point in the plane of the diagram. Although
the geometrization of mathematics and physics is usually attributed to
Descartes, its origin has been traced back to the 14th century. Indeed,
153
The notion of conjugate data spaces may seem trivial in the case of a
bivariate table such as described above. Let's therefore consider the mul-
154
PAUL J. LEWI
tivariate case, in which the 36 elements are described by, say, 8 chemical
and physicochemical properties. The first two eigenvectors of columnspace may serve to construct a bivariate diagram in which the two coordinate axes represent the two factors, and in which each point defines
one of the 8 properties. Likewise, the first two eigenvectors of row-space
build another bivariate diagram in which the two coordinate axes represent the same two factors as above, and in which each point refers
to one of the 36 elements. We refer to these diagrams as factor plots.
Note that the factor plot for elements and the factor plot for properties
are conjugate. (They can be superimposed by making the origin and
the coordinate axes coincident.) One factor plot reproduces Mendeleev's
arrangement of the chemical elements by groups and periods [12]. The
other factor plot reveals the pattern of intercorrelations between the
properties. In particular, the latter shows that atomic weight and boiling point alone explain nearly as much of the variation in the data as
all 8 macroscopic properties together. It is not surprising therefore, that
the bivariate diagram of atomic weight and boiling point is capable of
revealing the periodic structure of the elements. It is well known, and
has been pointed out before, that the factors identified by Mendeleev
are associated with the first two quantum numbers. These, in turn, are
solutions of an eigenvalue problem which describes the resonant wave
characteristics of the electron. Since the macroscopic properties of the
elements can be related to the resonant states of the electrons in the outer
shells of the atoms, it is not surprising that factor analysis is capable
of unveiling the underlying quantum-mechanical structure. A surprising
fact, however, is that mathematical algorithms of factor analysis can be
likened to processes that occur in the resonating systems from which the
data themselves have been generated [13]. This will be discussed in more
detail below.
7. ALGORITHMS
155
X
...
\
'
'
f.
2 \\
''
~1
\
\
~\ ------'
'~
Figure 2. Cycle of the NIPALS algorithmic for the extraction of the dominant roweigenvector u and the conjugated column-eigenvector v from a data table X. The
diagram illustrates the analogy with a resonant system in which the output is fed
back as input.
156
PAUL J. LEWI
Figure 3. Coupled Ouroburos symbol. In our context, the symbol represents the occurrence of resonance in two coupled systems.
After extraction of the dominant eigenvector, one can deflate the data
table X for the variation that is accounted for by that eigenvector (u or
v). If the iterative procedure, which we described above, is now applied
again to the residual table, we obtain the next dominant eigenvector.
This can be repeated until the table is exhausted, which occurs when
all the eigenvectors have been extracted and when the residual values
in the table become zero. The mathematical definition of deflation is
presented in the appendix. Technically, the algorithm for extraction of
eigenvectors from a table of data, which we described above, is called
NIPALS (which is short for non-linear iterative partial least squares)
[14]. It is also related to the so-called powering method which is used for
the extraction of eigenvectors from a table of intercorrelations between
properties [15].
Frequently, a situation occurs when the same set of objects is described
by properties that were determined in different contexts. We have already discussed the example of the table which describes 36 chemical
elements by 8 macroscopic properties, such as atomic weight, specific
heat, boiling point, etc. Let's now consider an additional table in which
the same 36 elements are described by 6 quantum-mechanical properties, such as atomic volume, Pauling electronegativity, ionization energy,
etc. [9]. An interesting problem now is to find out whether the quantum
mechanical properties can be predicted with a reasonable degree of accuracy from the macroscopic ones. This is a classical problem of regression.
It can also be seen as the problem of finding common resonance modes
between the two coupled systems that are described by the two tables.
The Ouroburos archetype can be helpful again if we consider two snakes
which bite each other's tail (Fig. 3). This symbol exemplifies a system
of two coupled oscillators, which under certain conditions exhibit a common mode of eigenvibration.
To fix our ideas we refer to the two tables by means of the symbols
Xl and X2. (We assume that corresponding rows in the two tables refer
X1
"
___
T
V1
~/,,
.,
,.
..-'
/,t:r~r
X2
V2.
\.11
----
.....
------
', ...
157
''
___,.~-,.
I ,'
Figure 4. Cycle of the PLS algorithm for the extraction of the dominant common roweigenvectors ul, u2 and the conjugated column-eigenvectors vl, v2 from two coupled
data tables Xl, X2. It is assumed that corresponding rows in Xl and X2 refer to the
same objects. The diagram illustrates the analogy with two coupled resonant systems
in which the outputs are fed back as inputs.
[16].
158
PAUL J. LEWI
159
160
PAUL J. LEWI
World
Recons~roded
World S!jsrem
S!jstero
...
...
... ... ...
Figure 5. World view involving resonances in world systems which are encoded in data
by means of instruments. The world systems are reconstituted, in part, by decoding
the data in terms of the eigenvectors that can be extracted from them.
X:
161
Pa'ul J. Lewi
Center for Molecular Design
Janssen Research Foundation
Beerse, Belgium
REFERENCES
162
PAUL J. LEWI
[3] Plato, Republic, (428-347 BC); Oldroyd D., The Arch of Knowledge. An introductory study of the history and methodology of science,
Methuen, New York, 1986.
[4] Cattel, R.B., Factor analysis, An introduction and manual for the
psychologist and social scientist, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1952.
[5] Thurstone, L.L., Multiple-factor analysis. A development and expansion of the vectors of mind, University of Chicago Press, Chicago,
Ill., 1947.
[6] Kolodkine, P., Dmitri Mendeleiev et la loi periodique, Ed. Seghers,
Paris, 1963.
[7] Hund F., Linienspektren und periodisches System der Elemente,
Berlin, 1927; D'Abro, A., The rise of the new physics, Vol 2, Dover
Publ., New York, 1951.
[8] Jacobi, C.G.J., "Ueber ein leichtes Verfahren die in der Theorie der
Sekularstoerungen vorkommender Gleichungen numerisch aufzuloesen",
J. reine und angew. Math., 30, 1846, pp. 51-95.
[9] Table of periodic properties of the elements, Sargent-Welch Scientific
Cy., Skokie, Ill., 1968.
[10] Borchert, E., Die Lehre von der Bewegung bei Niclaus Oresme.
Beitraege zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters,
Aschendorffscher Verlagsbuchhandlung, Muenster, 1934.
[11 J Pearson, K., "On lines and planes of closest fit to systems of points
in space", Phil. Mag., 2 (6th series), 1901, pp. 559-572.
[12] Lewi, P.J., Multivariate data analysis in industrial practice, Research Studies Press (J. Wiley), Chichester, Eng., 1982.
[13] Lewi, P.J., "Pattern recognition. A chemometric point of view",
Chemometrics Intell. Lab. Syst., 28, 1995, pp. 23-33.
[14] Wold, H., "Soft modelling by latent variables: the non-linear iterative partial least squares (NIPALS) algorithm", In: Goni, J. (ed.),
Perspectives in probability and statistics, Academic Press, London, 1975,
pp. 117-142.
[15] Hotelling, H., "Analysis of a complex of statistical variables into
principal components", J. Educ. Psychol., 24, 1993, pp. 417-441.
[16] Wold, S., Albano, C., Dunn III, W.J., Esbensen, K., Hellberg, S., Johansson, E. and Sjostrom, M., "Pattern recognition:
finding and using patterns in multivariate data", In: Martens, H. and
Russwurm, H. Jr. (eds.), Food research and data analysis, Applied
Science Publ., London, 1983, p. 147.
1. INTRODUCTION
At the origin of our approach lay two encounters between Greek thought
and Quantum Mechanics, one of them deliberately conceived by its author, the other being a meeting between new QM-concepts and one of
the oldest problems of human thinking about the world. The first encounter has been presented in a short lecture by C. Piron [74, p. 169] in
which he attempted to develop a realistic QM-interpretation based on
two concepts fundamental to Aristotelian metaphysics, viz. potentiality
and actuality. The second one is the doctoral dissertation of D. Aerts [3].
It both by content and title dealt with the problem of the One and the
Many, the central theme Plato inherited from fifth century philosopher
Parmenides of Elea. In what follows we will attempt to make clear that
these encounters are not of a purely coincidential nature. We intend to
develop in this paper an analysis and re-evaluation of these old questions
and their solutions. Our contention is that this analysis might amount
into new perspectives on the interpretation of QM, since the enigmas
and paradoxes of early Greek thought, and the solutions presented to
them in the "classical period" are, more than we realize, bound to mark
our way of looking at and reasoning about the world 1 . The thought instruments developed by Plato and Aristotle, in order to solve the riddles
following out of so called "pre-Socratic" thought, which are epitomized
in the, according to both classical thinkers apparent, contradiction between the "world views" of Heraclitus of Ephesus and Parmenides of
Elea, are in use up to the present, be it in slightly modified forms 2 . Our
1
We find support for the relevance of this position in Schrodinger's fine little book
dedicated to the subject [87, p. 3ff, p. 159].
2
"Two great warring traditions regarding consistency originated in the days of the
Presocratics at the very dawn of philosophy. The one, going back to Heraclitus, insists
that the world is not a consistent system and that, accordingly, coherent knowledge of
it cannot be attained by man. (... ) The second tradition, going back to Parmenides,
holds that the world is a consistent system and that knowledge of it must correspondingly be coherent as well, so that all contradictions must be eschewed." [83]
163
1999
164
position will be that this classical contradiction has slipped through the
ages unimpaired, but in different forms, such as to make it hardly recognisable in our present epistemological and ontological concepts, both
in philosophy and in science. A revelation of this implicit presence by
reconstructing the outlines of its historical pathway then becomes the
necessary first step towards an approach for the tackling of problems
it eventually causes in to-day's science. The argument will lead us to
the conclusion that the paradoxes appearing in QM represent such a
problem. A sketch of some possible strategies will complete this attempt
at clarification. Methodologically therefore the arguments in this paper
will be based both on scientific and philosophical grounds; even more,
it can be considered our aim to show that, when it comes to a proper
understanding of the significance and implications of basic "scientific"
findings, both are inextricably intertwined, since science, seemingly so
different, follows a path of deep conceptions laid down much earlier in
the development of human consciousness. We are tempted to see the origins of the QM-paradoxes as consequences of the ontological "choices" of
Plato and Aristotle. Their effort concerned the stabilisation of the world
of constant change, thus saving the possibility of certain knowledge in order to escape the contradictions between stable and unstable, knowable
and unknowable that appear on the level of what happens in reality, as
expressed mainly by Heraclitus and Parmenides. This led to the conception of logic as a standardising rule for thinking and, much later, experiment as a standardising rule for experiencing [34, IV: 99, p. 381]. Both
originated out of needs felt in the context of the macroworld, and reach
now their limitations in the study of the microworld. At the moment
when the interactions between things become as important as the things
themselves, the separating intervention in reality, first conceptualised by
Plato and Aristotle, seems to reveal itself as an illusion. For this reason
in this paper no position will be taken in the debate between rationalists
and empiricists. From our point of view these philosophical stances come
down to the same on the level of the ontological question: all imply the
metaphysical world-structure put forward by Plato and Aristotle as a
solution for the ontological paradoxes raised by pre-Socratic thought.
2. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT
165
7to'taJ.lOl<; '!Ot<; auto'i<; EJ.l~atVOJ.lEV 't Kat OUK EJ.l~atVOJ.lEV, EtJ.lEV't Kat OUK EtJ.lEVln dieselben Fli.isse steigen wir und steigen wir nicht, wir sind und wir sind nicht. [33, DK
49a, p. 161]
4
The formula stems from Nicolaus Cusanus, a thinker on the edge of the Middle
Ages and early Renaissance. But compare, e.g., Cusanus's "circular theology" with
the meaning of the "Ouroburos", the circular snake of ancient alchemy. For Cusanus,
see [34, p. 248ff]; for the Ouroburos, see [59, pp. 367-368].
5
ouK EJ.lOU, una tou Myou aKm)cravta<; OJ.lOAoyEtv cro<p6v Ecrnv EV navm dvat
Raben sie
nicht mich, sondern den Sinn vernommen, so ist es weise, dem Sinne gemaB zu sagen,
alles sei eins. [33, DK 50, p. 161]
6
On the (ir)relevance of the flux-theory for Heraclitus's thought and possible interpretations of his concept of apJ.lovia, see [56, introduction]; also [57, p. 193].
166
to EOV EC!'tt Being is. (actually it says: The Being is). [84, p. 45].
Dijksterhuis remarks sharply: "( ... ) we don't know how gravity manages to give
velocity to the body, and very often the given explanation comes down to pretending
to understand on the microlevel what should be explained on the macrolevel. But we
know since Zeno of Elea, that here lurks an essential difficulty of the conceptualisation
of motion ... " [34, p. 203, our translation]. See also the comments on modern attempts
to explain Newton's laws of gravitation by means of different kinds of bizarre particles,
the latest one being the theory of the graviton, by C. Piron in the text of a conference
given November 8, 1996 for CLEA in Brussels [78, p. 2].
9
to KEv6v "void" fulfills the role of non-being. That you can grant for the possibility
of motion by the introduction of the void was discovered by Melissus, a follower of
Parmenides, and of whom Leucippus, founder of atomism, was a disciple according
to tradition [57, pp. 397-398]. Furthermore ihoJ.tos, i.e., without 'tOJ.l~, without cuts,
unseparated in itself, undivided. It is important to see that this originally meant that
there are no "parts" in this Being between which there can be "parts" of non-Being,
the non-Being having a different character than the all-pervading, homogeneous void
or empty space of later times.
10
KtvOUV'tClt 'tE cmvex&s at a'tOJ.lOt 'tOV ai&va (... ) ~ 'tE 'tOU KEVOU <pucns ~ lhopisoucra bca(j'tllV aut~v touto 1tapamceuaset (... ) Les atomes se meuvent continument durant l'eternite ( ... ) Car Ia nature du vide, qui separe chaque atome en lui-meme, produit cet
effet ( ... ). [29, in the 'lettre a Herodote', pp. 102-103]
167
possible to speak of something that is not in a way that makes sense. But,
as said before, the "contradiction" seen by classical philosophy between
Heraclitus and Parmenides is not necessarily a correct understanding of
the earlier "philosophies". One could as well infer that Heraclitus and
Parmenides do articulate the same world-experience, the former as the
experience of reality over a lapse of time, the latter as the experience
of the absolute reality of this moment (to understand better what this
means, try to deny by yourself you are experiencing yourself as existing
at this moment) 11 . This has nothing to do with the intellectual question
what it means to exist, or whether our existence is "real" or not. These
questions concern things "as such", objects, and their identity in past
and future. But this type of interpretation-which is the interpretation
of classical philosophy and of science, and which entails a representation
of reality outside of its actual and momentaneous experience doesn't
make sense, because for Heraclitus no things "as such" do exist, and for
Parmenides there is no motion, which implies that there is no time. It
is our conviction that, rather than revealing the contradiction between
the "thought systems" of the two pre-Socratic "philosophers", Plato's
interpretation reveals the difference between their world-experience and
what we think to be ours, constructed on the rational base laid down by
classical philosophy. The non-existence of metaphysical world views in
the pre-Socratic period is then due to a different kind of awareness of
one's being-in-the-world that characterized the transition from mythical
awareness to rational self-consciousness [54, pp. 67ff]. The hallmark of
this awareness is transparence for the stream of events that constitutes
the world [18, pp. 81ff]; there is no such thing as the separation between subject and object 12 . This separation precisely coincides with the
coming-to-be of rational self-consciousness. In philosophy, this change
will be codified in the metaphysical systems of Plato and Aristotle. The
process found its completion only in the early modern period, when rationalised self-consciousness developed the scientific way of observation
and explanation of the world. The problem of change (and motion as
a special case of change) and the problem of the existence of separable
objects in the world appear as two sides of the same coin. It is at the
origin of the principle of contradiction, formulated by both Plato
and Aristotle.
The contradicting conclusions deriving from pre-Socratic philosophy
11
Medieval thought knew this experiencing of experience as the nunc stans, the
"standing now". [10, p. 210]
12
"it is still the primary function of the noos to be in direct touch with ultimate
reality." [46, p. 52]
168
Plato explicitly refers to Protagoras's "man is the measure of all things, existing
and non-existing". ([45], Theaetetus, 160(d,e))
14
The necessary condition that made possible this construction of stabilising worldpictures or "world views", was the earlier coming-to-be of the "inner mind-space", in
which the non-present could be re-presented as present [54, p. 54ff].
169
Plato's elaboration for the Forms Being, Motion and Rest in ([45], Sophist, 388,
250(b,c)). A more general ontological formulation can be found, e.g., ([45], id., 392,
251(d); 413, 256(d, e)).
16
"Platonists who doubt that they are spectators of Being must settle for the knowledge that they are investigators of the verb "to be". [72, p. 223]
17
170
lows as a property of the way we can speak about the world directly out
of the participation theory. The principle of contradiction is the formulation on an epistemological level of the participation theory 18 .
Plato's epistemology contains, because of this principle, and therefore
because of the existence of the Forms, an implicit logical structure [20].
The fundamental (and unproven) axiom on which his system rests is the
existence of the Forms proper. The stability of things and their knowability is granted by an essence (the Forms) existing before and apart
from them. The problem of motion gets its solution by means of the
degrees of reality that exist between the Forms mutually. In this way
he gives a foundation to the stability of the world and to its knowability,
without excluding properties like change and motion out of it. Thus he
escapes the pre-Socratic enigma.
Aristotle solves the problem of stability and knowledge-of stability as a necessary condition for knowledge-in an at first glance totally different manner. But he starts from the same premiss: that the
world, experienced as external, should be knowable as such, knowable
objectively-i.e., in its quality as a collection of objects- by a subject.
As said before, this separation of the world and the knower causes the
falling apart of the world in the stable, knowable, Eleatic noumenon, and
the unstable Heraclitean phenomenon, thus yielding a representation, a
metaphysical "world view" problematic vis-a-vis the changing reality
open to experience. The reasons for the Stagiryte's rejection of Plato's
system are the difficulties that are raised-from his point of view-by
the Form-ontology. The difficulties are threefold: the Third Man, the
unlimited number of Forms, and motion ([90], I, 990b(15)- 991a(8);
there also footnote c, and 991a(9ff)). Aristotle's objections reduce to one
major theme: the rejection of the Forms as stabilising essentials existing
separatedly from the things they instantiate. How then does he guarantee the existence of stable things that can undergo change and motion
without allowing for the coincidence of opposites? And how does he
save the possibility to speak about them as being and non-being without falling into contradiction? With him, and contrary to Plato, the
Eleatic and Heraclitean layers coincide in one world. A thing (object of
experience) is an essential form, a substance which realizes itself in
an undifferentiated material receptacle 19 , which can be seen as a substratum for existence, not as existence itself. Matter in itself has neither
individuality, nor quality. A thing consists of Form and matter at the
same time. Things therefore are not reflections of idealised Forms in
18
19
Epistemological formulation: [45], Sophist, 414, 257(a, b, c); id. 418, 258(b,c).
The unoKetJ.lEvOv. See [90, VII, 1028b(84)-1029a(34)]
171
It will be noted that "substance" in the Aristotelian sense has nothing to do with
the material connotation that seems evident in our use of that concept. Aristotelian
reality on the level of matter is a continuum; it is the Form or substance that separates
Being from non-Being.
21
atno<;, cause, bears connotations different from the modern concept of causality.
Causal expressions in both the Platonic and Aristotelian sense would include (apart
from the 'strictly causal' ones): Why is this statue so heavy? Because it is made of
bronze. Why is he taking after-dinner walks? Because of his health. See [92, p. 134].
172
We bring to mind that his system was constructed this way to obtain
this result, to grant the possibility to deal with the apparent paradoxical
nature of 'real' reality: stability and motion should both be accounted
for. The world, thus stabilised ontologically, can now be made accessible
to thinking. How does he construct a framework for knowledge such that
a relation to this stabilised, but divided reality can be achieved? Here
we enter the vast area of Aristotelian logic. The principle of contradiction, based on the separation of being and non-being in the world,
can now be established as the basic axiom for correct thinking [90, IV,
1005b(8-34)]. Although Aristotle states explicitly its unprovability [90],
IV, 1005b(35)-1006a(16)], its introduction is justified in the framework
of his metaphysics, where the danger that it would cause the emergence
of a static, Eleatic world-picture, incompatible with our experience, had
been neutralised. The three fundamental principles of classical (Aristotelian) logic: the existence of objects of knowledge, the principle
of contradiction and the principle of identity, all correspond to
a fundamental aspect of his ontology. This is exemplified in the three
possible usages of the verb "to be": existential, predicative, and identical. The Aristotelian syllogism always starts with the affirmation of
existence: something is22 . The principle of contradiction then concerns
the way one can speak (predicate) validly about this existing object,
i.e., about the truth and falsehood of its having properties, not about
its being in existence. The principle of identity states that the entity
is identical to itself at any moment (a=a), thus granting the stability
necessary to name (identify) it. It will be clear that the principle of contradiction and the principle of identity are closely interconnected. In any
way, change and motion are intrinsically not provided for in this framework; therefore the ontology underlying the logical system of knowledge
is essentially static, and requires the introduction of a First Mover with
a proper ontological status beyond the phenomena for whose change and
motion he must account.
These different positions regarding the stable essence of things will
cause the Fight of the Universals, the question whether the substances
precede (ante re) or coincide with (in re) the things they instantiate.
During the Middle Ages this debate will give rise to a third possible
position: nominalism. It holds that substances (Universals) do not exist
except for our mental activity. But then the debate had already shifted
in a purely epistemological direction, while at its origin were mainly
ontological questions. That these questions even in the epistemological treatment of nominalism don't disappear, becomes clear when one
22
173
considers the difficulties each nominalist theory has to grant soundly for
the possibility to use general concepts, an indispensible tool for scientific
theory [19, p. 85].
4. RELATED C 0 N C E P T I 0 N S IN EARLY M 0 DE R NIT Y
174
given its inherent ontological nature, can be brought into agreement with
the changing world of our senses24 . This viewpoint also implies that the
metaphysical structure fundamental to the older philosophical systems
actually remains present in science, be it in a different and, in fact, less
clear way.
Our aim is not to describe all subtle differences between the alternative
conceptions of the "real world" advanced at the verge of modern science;
this has been done by others in a brilliant way; e.g., in [34] and [50]. Our
concern now is to see whether it is possible to bring at the surface the
essential characteristics of a common line of reasoning which would allow to place science back into the philosophical development sketched
above, and to check whether this clarification of its fundamental concepts sheds new light on present-day questions related to the enigma of
Quantum Mechanics. Our argument will lead us to the conclusion that
this is the case indeed: the ontological role of the Eleatic and Heraclitean
layers in the metaphysical reconstruction of reality is played in science
by the increasingly absolute conceptions of space and time, instead of
but necessarily correlated to the development of modern conceptions
of the nature of "matter". This becomes manifest in the "desubstantialisation" of space and in the increasing parallelism between "space"
and "time". We will briefly consider the role of "experimentation" as
an observational practice designed to apply the ontological rule present
in the scientific way of reasoning on our world-experience, by changing "perception" into "observation". The formalisation of the empirical
component of the cognitive, "objectified" world-experience made it possible to bring perception into agreement with the ontological structure
of logical reasoning, not the other way around. Therefore the "epistemological" revolution brought about by science can be described not
as the abandoning of metaphysics, but as the complete absorption of
the metaphysical structure into the procedures of its formalised "operational" components, cognitive and empirical, of this "objective" (i.e.,
objectified) world-experience. The obscured relation in science between
"act" and "perception" then allows for the conception of logical reasoning as a representation of the ontological structure of reality and for the
successful application of science to the natural world: reality is adapted
to the ontological structure of science, not vice versa25 . The certain base
24
This of course is by no means to say that the debate was considered this way by
those who where implied. A brilliant exposure of the backgrounds of the debate between Galilei and the Jesuit scientists can be found in [82]. On Newton's backgrounds,
see [35, p. 55ff]. A more general discussion in [89].
25
The Greeks, whose intuitions about the relation man-world seem to have been
175
for knowledge is thus granted for in the most absolute sense, the circle is
closed: ontology is not a "problem" anymore. In this context the problem of the validity of knowledge takes on a new shape. Epistemology,
the critical commentary of the process of science, becomes more and
more the philosophical discipline, and can be considered as a discipline
or theory of knowledge not separated from, but "without" metaphysics:
it nourishes itself ontologically on science. The apparently sole problematic point concerns the relation of the "subject" with the objective
world-the debate between empiricists and idealists-a "question" that
for evident reasons never can be "solved" inside its framework: the relation between knowledge and the real world that is implicitly supposed
here is replaced in science by the relation between knowledge and a reconstruction of the real world via an "empirical" procedure containing an
ontological rule that shapes the relation between the human "observer"
and reality on a much deeper level. The separation between subject and
object has by now been completed. Let us now see how early modern
science solved the problem of "refilling" logic with an ontology that allows for a world of change and motion, and therefore for the description
of the world of our sensual experience.
5. THE S 0 L UTI ON S OF EARLY MODERNITY
176
177
"A good reason for this is the fact that we cannot measure primary qualities at
all unless we can perceive secondary qualities. ( ... ) This is the point of Berkeley's
argument that a material thing as conceived by Locke is an impossibility", the Lockean
"primary qualities" of matter being nothing else than the specification of Descartes'
concept of extension. [80, p. 49]
28
The importance of whom for the development of key-ideas in early modern science
is until to-day heavily underestimated. It doesn't surprise us much, however, that
Schri:idinger's finetuned philosophical intuitions recognised this already decades ago.
See [87, p. 75], also [50, pp. 34, 92-94]; [16, p. 174].
29
In the Peripatetic sense, a quality that cannot exist apart from the substance to
which it belongs. We would say a "property", not from a chunk of matter, but from
an essential Form.
30
Gassendi's work presents us with one of the rare instances that reveals, both by
content and structure, explicitly the metaphysical nature of the basic categories of
modern natural science: "C'est !'idee qui nous parait ressortir de Ia presentation de
Ia premiere partie de Ia Physique dans le Syntagma, le De Rebus Naturae Universe.
Cette 'Physique' fait immediatement suite a Ia 'Logique' par quoi commence l'ouvrage
( ... ). II ne s'y trouve pas en effet de 'Metaphysique', et Gassendi s'en explique des le
debut: ce n'est pas que Ia metaphysique soit sans objet, ou inaccesible, c'est qu'il n'y
a pas de distinction entre physique et metaphysique ( ... ). Ce sont done bien
des categories physiques qui prennent ici Ia place de !'ontologie aristotelicienne, en
meme temps qu'elles re<;oivent un contenu oppose a celles de Ia physique d'Aristote.
L'atomisme sera la realisation adequate d'un tel projet, mais !'on a vu que
celui-ci apparait ( ... ) a partir de Ia critique des 'formes substantielles', apporter une
nouvelle conception du "mouvement nature!", ressusciter 'l'espace des Anciens' contre
178
did not content himself with the reformulation of the "void" of classical
atomism, as it leaves the fundamental question of the origin of motion
unanswered. The introduction of an atomistic explanation for the nature
of material bodies and their properties required a different conception
of space as well, for abolishing the categories "substance" and "quality"
causes the downfall of the ontology of "potentiality" and "actuality",
and therewith of the possibility to grant for change and motion. Space,
infinite, divisible at infinity and indifferent to its material content [16,
p. 179] is the seat of the stable individuality of things. Space constitutes the true Eleatic layer in the metaphysical set-up of
natural science: things take position in it while it remains immobile
and identical to itself. Space proceeds the material existence of things
and is a necessary condition for it, not vice versa; it fulfills the same role
as the substances with Aristotle. Atomism, Eleatic by nature, provides
a non-qualitative explanation of the composition and motion of material entities in it. Gassendi's real coup, however, is the establishment of
the rigorous parallelism between "absolute space" and "absolute time".
The conclusions arrived at concerning the ontological status of space will
now be applied to time. Time is not the "number of motion" as with
Aristotle. It is motion that depends on time, not vice versa. Time constitutes the true Heraclitean layer in the metaphysical set-up
of natural science. Gassendi thus reaches the completion of his quest
for sound metaphysical foundations for the new natural science: change
is motion, while space is the modus of existence of things permanent,
exactly the same way as time is the modus of existence of things successive31. Here we find another fundamental reason for his rejection of
the Cartesian substantiality of space: nobody would defend the substantiality of time. The reality of space and time is extra-substantial and
extra-accidential. They have dimensions and/or properties, but, being
incorporeal, no functions nor qualities [16, pp. 177-181]. Therefore the
dimensions of space can coincide with the dimensions of matter without
causing any interference. All this clears the road for the theoretical dele 'lieu Aristotelicien', retablir le 'vide' dans Ia Nature, proposer une nouvelle notion
du "Temps" etc." [16, pp. 172-173]. Our boldtype.
31
"II faut en effet, comme il le dira plus loin dans le Syntagma a propos du mouvement, faire une distinction radicale entre le mode d'existence des 'choses
permanentes' et celui des 'choses successives', distinction a laquelle correspondent respectivement l'espace et le temps. (... ) Espace et temps sont
infinis, l'un selon les dimensions, !'autre selon Ia succession (... ). Espace et temps
ont des 'parties inepuisables', d'ou Ia contingence de Ia situation du monde hie et
nunc. Espace et temps sont enfin inalterables et invariables quel qu'en soit le contenu:
... l'espace reste identique et immobile, comme le temps s'ecoule toujours
de meme maniere." [16, p.179ff], our boldtype.
179
32
He uses almost the same wording as Gassendi: "I. Tempus Absolutum, verurn,
aequalibiter ftuit, alioque nomine dicitur Duratio ( ... ) II. Spatium Absolutum,
natura sua sine relatione ad externum quodvis, semper manet similare &
immobile( ... )" in [71, p. 6] (Scholiurn to the Definitions). Our boldtypc. Reference
to this also in [78, p. 2]. "Tempus Relativum" and "Spatium Relativum" are the tools
that allow us to measure and describe motion in concreto, thence they are easily
confused with 'real'-i.e., absolute-space and time.
35
180
In the second edition of the Principia, which dates 1713: "Adjicere jam liceret
nonulla de Spiritu quodam subtillissimo corpora crassa pervadente, & in
iisdem latente; cujus vi & actionibus particulae corporum ad minimas distantias
se mutua attrahunt, & continguae factae cohaerent; ( ... ) Sed haec paucis exponi non
possunt; neque adest sufficiens copia Experimentorum, quibus leges actionum hujus
Spiritus accurate determinari & montrari debent. [71, pp. 173-174] Our boldtype.
38
"( ... ) it is possible to see Newton's ideas as the "fruition of a long tradition" extending from Aristotle through Newton, a tradition in which Aristotle's finite plenum
was slowly and by painful steps converted into the void, infinite, three-dimensional
framework of the physical world required by classical physics. Newton's God-filled
space was the penultimate development in the process by which concepts of space were
developed by attributing to space properties derived from the Deity; after Newton's
time, the properties remained with the space while the Deity disappeared
from consideration." [35, p. 60] Our boldtype.
181
etry [58, p. 13]. But this at first glance purely formal approach hides the
Cartesian-Leibnizian ontology of the unreality of space, with Descartes
because space coincides completely with matter as pure extension; with
Leibniz because space is nothing but the relations between the objects
'in' it. That the basic quantity describing with Leibniz the dynamical
behaviour of the system, the vis viva or living force 39 , is represented by
a scalar is clearly of more than merely formal importance, it is a consequence of his ontological position. This annihilation of non- Being~the
vacuum, empty space~from physics opens the possibility to treat space
as a merely "relativistic" phenomenon, a position fully adopted later by
Einstein in the context of his Special Relativity 40 . The problem of the
initial origin of forces or motions remains equally unsolved. Even worse,
analytical mechanics lacks a 'natural' way to provide for the stabilising frame of reference for experimental observation as is present in the
explicit ontology of the Newtonian treatment. Appearances are saved
by stating that the universe presents the same aspect from every point
(apart from "local irregularities") [50], but in the ontological setting of
the logical framework~i.e., the framework of the separation between
Being and non-Being, between system and environment, between cause
and effect~this can be upheld only by an act of Divine creation, as is
the case with Leibniz, but of course not with his followers in the later
school of analytical mechanics. Saying that the notion of absolute space
is redundant because the natural laws are invariant under coordinate
transformations [48] is turning upside down the chain of justifications.
As should be clear, the whole metaphysical set-up of natural science is
such that they should be so. That the role of "causal black box" played by
space is now fulfilled by the "environment" 41 , doesn't change anything
to the fundamental circularity of the reasoning.
39
Almost identical with our kinetic energy. Together with the "work of the force"
or potential energy the two fundamental scalar quantities on which the study of
equilibrium and motion of analytical mechanics rests [58, p. xxi].
40
182
The depth of the problem has been brought again to the fore by the
results obtained both theoretically and experimentally by QM. For not
only does the theory incorporate states for quantum entities that imply
non-local behaviour [8], but such effects have by now been established
incontrovertibly in various experimental settings, thus shortcutting for
once and for good eventual attempts to explain them away statistically42 .
Furthermore it was proved to be impossible to describe soundly two or
more separated systems within the present formalism [3]. As is sufficiently known, the state of a physical system in QM is described within
mathematical Hilbert space. For every physical entity the collection of
all its properties constitutes its state in Hilbert space. Exactly in the
same way as the state of a classical entity is represented in phase space,
the Hilbert space contains all possible states the system could have. In
this sense, both phase space and the Hilbert space represent the environment in which the dynamical transition of one state to another of the
entity will take place. To avoid that the individual state be blurred in the
statistical ensemble proper to the 'orthodox' interpretation, C. Piron introduces a new notion of physical state based on the concept of property
as related to experimental projects with well-defined certain results [75,
p. 398]. These results are called yes-results, while any other outcome is
considered to be a no-result. To this end, a test that could eventually be
performed is associated to a property of the system under consideration,
42
C. Piron in [76]: "... the orthodox QM (the 'new testament' as Pauli named it)
with its credo and its principles is dead and definitively dead." A lot of acrobatic
attempts were made to rescue the modernist picture, by extending the quantum picture with an underlying modernist kind of world (for example D. Bohm [17]), or by
rejecting it (for example A. Einstein [36] and J. Bell [13]). But at the same time,
every advance on an experimental level (in particular A. Aspect [11] and H. Rauch
[81]) confirmed that these attempts were bound to fail. The general community of
physicists reacted to this by a kind of ontological ignorance attitude which evolved
towards a pragmatic quasi botanic empiricism, or by some new age like mystification
tendencies (see for example 'The Tao of Physics' by F. Capra). Alternatively, a not
unimportant group of people saw the inadequate arsenal of mathematical (and in particular logical) tools as the origin of all these problems (especially J. von Neumann &
G. Birkhoff [15], J. Jauch [52], C. Piron [73], H. Neumann & G. Ludwig [60], [61] and
D. Foulis & C. Randall [42]). This gave rise to an enormous development of mathematical attributes and structures, of which quantum logic is the most known among
philosophers of science (see for example [14] and in particular [65]). Unfortunately,
the mathematical expertise required made the development and study of quantum
logic an essentially mathematical occupation such that the conceptual development
stagnated (a confirmation of this fact can be found in [66] and [77]).
183
in such a way that, once you are certain in advance to obtain the desired
result, you can assign to the system an element of reality [7 4, p. 170]
as conceived by Einstein [38, p. 137]. Introducing Aristotle's dynamical
terminology, a property is called "actual" when the result of the test
is certain; when uncertain it is said to be "potential" [7 4, p. 171]. A
property conceived this way is always potential or actual. It is, however,
possible that the property tested by an experimental project, and the
one tested by the experimental project obtained by exchanging the "yes"
and the "no" results of the former, are both potential. Whenever this situation appears we are dealing with quantum-like entities, contrary to
classical ones where this can never be the case. But it is not a priori obvious how to define a particular entity and thus how to assign properties
to it. All comes down to account for the set of tests which matches the
collection of its properties and thus the entity itself. This presupposes
the possibility to separate the phenomenon under consideration from the
rest of the universe [31]. But, although it is stated explicitly that the certainty of the experimental project is an objective feature of the system
without reference to our knowledge or beliefs [69, p. 5], we are supposed
to know in advance what to do with the system in order to get this certain result. Indeed, the system should be prepared in a precise way that
is related to our existing knowledge of its properties. This presents no
problem when we are dealing with phenomena that are accessible to our
daily experience, like with the breaking of a piece of chalk [76, p. 208].
The necessary assumptions about its properties are then given by our
daily experience. This enables us to drop the preparation procedure that
is essential to 'true' experimental observation. Experimental observation
is indeed more than the "contemplation of the astronomer" [69, p. 8], it
is an intervention that prepares the system in such a way that we obtain
an entity-separated from its environment-together with a set of properties determined by the possible yes-no experiments. Again, it is the
preparation of the system that moulds the 'real thing' so as to fit into a
definite metaphysical set-up, primarily by separating "the system" out
of its "environment". Whatever be the structure of the set of possible
answers, the modelisation of the set of possible yes-no experiments imposes on the set of possible properties the mathematical structure of a
complete lattice [53, p. 844]. This means, as indicated before, that the
"real thing" is forced to fit into the scheme of an intrinsically
Eleatic ontology. The preparation procedure is a 'black box'
generating that ontology. This does not imply that it is senseless
to perform experimental projects. Natural laws are verified by experimental observation, and experiments are performed in reality, so there
must be some kind of agreement with what happens in reality. But it is
184
precisely the kind of relationship that exists between reality and experimental observation that should be rendered more clear; this implies that
the consequences of the fact that each experimental project is an intervention in reality should be itself subject of investigation. By making explicit the structures underlying the sets of possible yes-no questions and
of possible answers, the Geneva School approach realises an important
progress in this respect, though until now the ontological aspect of the
problem has been left untouched. Embarking on an analysis of this aspect could nevertheless shed some light not only on the relation between
the "entity" and the "real-world phenomenon", but also on the status of
our conceptions of space and time, which form, as has been argued, the
ontological foundation for the metaphysical set-up present in scientific
theory. This provides the background against which Piron's attempts to
get hold of a "realistic" conception of space are to be seen. The inevitable
re-appearance of ontological circularity to which also these attempts are
subject can be clarified on a more theoreticallevel 43 . The tacit assumption underlying the position that a thing coincides with a collection of
properties is that "being" in the sense of "existence" is but a property
amongst the others. We discussed before at length why this assumption
is untenable in the context of an-implicit or explicit-Eleatic ontology
as the one present in the cognitive and empirical procedures of science.
The notions "object" or "entity" necessitate the introduction of Being
in some form, ontologically beyond the object's predicable properties, so
as to grant for its required stability and separability, as well as for an
origin for the dynamics governing the processes of change and motion
to which it is exposed. In this ontological setting to be is not a prop43
185
erty. It follows that existence is not a predicate [80, p. 36] and existence
"Every logician in the end divides propositions into those which are acceptable
and those which are not." [40, introduction]
45
186
Let us now concentrate on one of the words in the title which might
seem rather innocent and obvious, namely 'products'. In a first reading
of this title one could think that it might easily be replaced by 'result' or 'consequence'. We nevertheless attach a very definite meaning to
this word 'product' which is definitely not covered by 'result' nor 'consequence'. In contemporary mathematics, which deals with the study
of families of well-defined formal structures (or, in a more advanced
language, 'categories of mathematical objects' 46 ), products of two structures that belong to the same family (i.e., two mathematical objects that
belong to the same category) are usually defined as a third structure in
this same family which has the two given structures as 'faithful' substructures (in categorical language this means that there exist structure
preserving maps, called 'morphisms', from the two given objects into
the product object). In fact, this means that the product is larger than
the given structures, but essentially not different. This way of defining
products is an obvious consequence of the specific 'scientific method' in
the context of which mathematics is used: one only wants to deal with
objects that are well defined. Once one has defined such a well-defined
collection of objects, one sticks with it and studies it. Even more, an
object has only a meaning as an element of this well-defined collection.
As a consequence, if one wants to introduce operations on the objects in
46
187
this collection in order to study and characterize it, one remains faithful
to this collection, i.e., one does not leave it 47 . This situation in mathematics had a major influence on the way how people tend to describe
compound systems in physics: for a given description (i.e., structural
characterization) of individual physical entities one is still attached to
the idea that the compound system should be described within the same
family of structural characterizations. Within the context of Newtonian
mechanics, this does not pose a problem. Within the context of QM,
however, one is able to produce a description procedure for the joint
system, but looses completely the mathematical consistency48 required
for a 'good theory'. Unfortunately, by yielding the conclusion that the
'Hilbert space structure', the structure in which QM-entities are described, is not 'the good universal structure' for their description, these
results have only fostered the search for 'bigger' and 'bigger' structures
in which one could hope to find 'consistent products' for the description
of the compound system. Never the a priori idea of universality has been
put into question. According to our previous sections, we think that this
specific attachment to universality of a description points the finger at
the real problem at the source of this malaise concerning the description of compound entities in physics. The presence of a second entity in
a compound system definitely changes the context of the first one, and
as such, a description that incorporates a contextual ingredient should
take this presence into account in an explicit way 49 . Unfortunately, for
the QM formalism, this is not the case 50 based on ideas developed by
Aerts, Gisin and Piron in [4], [5] and [47], and yielding the framework
of [5] and [21], shows that in the traditional QM description, aspects
like the order in which one performs consecutive measurements on different individual pseudo-entities within the compound system are even
not a part of the context, but an ingredient of the formal representation of the entity itself.. Solving this problem comes down to starting
from correct collections of primitive notions in order to reconstruct the
47
We have to remark that quite recently, since the development of the mathematical
theory of categories, one became very interested in 'relating' the different well-defined
collections of mathematical objects. However, one is still attached to the same kind
of scientific method, but now on a meta-level.
48
For the reasons stated before, this could considerably enhance the coherence of
the theory.
so
An explicit construction in which one of the present authors tries to take the
context into account for a situation of 'the many' (see [22], [27]
188
This program, when consistently developed in the total framework of the theory,
could amount in an explicit Aristotelian ontological set-up, exactly in the sense Piron
[74] intended.
53
189
and in particular, cannot be a set. To quote Moore (private communication, 27-09-97): "... this boils down to a kind of object-subject dichotomy:
states and properties are about the exterior world and definite experimental projects are about the internal world. Building physical theories is a
fallible attempt to relate one to the other ... " Still, any operational theory attempts to remain unaware, by formal ignorance, of these possible
creative acts consisting of designing definite experimental projects. This
ignorance could be motivated by the ever ruling set theoretical basis for
mathematics. In order to understand the problems that arise, one could
consider entities like my past or the entity's past, also studied in [25].
It is obviously impossible to define a predicate that characterizes all
my possible pasts that I can have on a next instance of time, since this
would require Laplace's supreme intelligence: having all knowledge on
possible events that might be imposed by the context between now and
the considered next instance of time. Contrary to the existence of a set
of states as a criterion for the reality of an entity, the existence of properties as reference to the elements of reality in the Geneva approach [3],
[67], [69] can be the starting point for a more flexible setup: the entity
'my past' for example can be described by consecutive creations of properties, themselves not being part of a predefined set. This idea has been
generalized and taken as a starting point of a formal scheme referred to
as the Induction 54 formalism, which takes in an a priori (and not only
in an explanatory) way 'creation' into account, as well 'human' creation
(choice/invention) as 'material' creation (mutual Induction as interaction), and of which a complete technical development can be found in
[9], [25], [26], [27]. This approach succeeds in avoiding the aspects of
isolation in the definition of an entity: the 'particular physical system'
fuzziness to which Moore refers is explicitly not present. As such, this
strategy aims at the elaboration of the results of the Geneva school in
the direction of a formalism that is explicitly compatible with the results
of the foregoing ontological analysis. Formally as well as conceptually,
such a theory of creation, by constituting the description of the emerging
properties of the entities as possible parts of compound systems, treats
"interaction with the context of an entity as a part of a measurement
process [4], [5], [21], [23]" and "entanglement of individual entities [22],
[27]" on the same level, i.e., in terms of mutual Induction of properties
[9], [25], [27]. We finally want to remark that the idea of going beyond definedness, going beyond set-large collections of states, seems to be most
conveniently expressed through the use of so-called quasi-categories [1,
54
Here, 'induction' does not refer to any of its usual philosophical significances, but
rather refers to physical theories like electro-magnetism.
190
We thank Sonja Smets, Hubert Dethier, Wilfried Van Rengen and Rudolf
De Smet for discussing the content of this paper. We thank David Moore
for the indication of problems and references connected to the subject
of this paper. We thank Didier Durlinger for technical help while implementing the ancient Greek font. Bob Coecke is Post-Doctoral Researcher
at Flanders' Fund for Scientific Research.
AFFILIATION
Karin Verelst
Center Leo Apostel
Brussels Free University
Brussels, Belgium
Bob Goecke
Center Leo Apostel-FUND
Brussels Free University
Brussels, Belgium
REFERENCES
191
192
193
194
[55] Kaufman, L., "Virtual Logic", talk delivered at the Einstein Meets
Magritte Conference, June 1995.
[56] Kirk, G.S., Heraclitus. The Cosmic Fragments, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1975.
[57] Kirk, G.S., Raven, J.E., and Schofield, M., The Presocratic
Philosophers. A critical history with a selection of texts, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983.
[58] Lanczos, C., The variational principles of mechanics, fourth ed.,
Dover publications, New York, 1970.
[59] Luck, G., Arcana Mundi. Magic and the Occult in the Greek and
Roman Worlds. A collection of Ancient Texts, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1985.
195
196
ARKADY PLOTNITSKY
197
198
ARKADY PLOTNITSKY
phenomena. This efficacity, however, can neither be ascribed the status of independent physical reality nor be seen as a "wholeness" that
is only partially represented by complementarity descriptions. Quantum
physics, Bohr argues, does give us a sufficient amount of data in order to
build a comprehensive theoretical description, while disallowing classical
ontological or epistemological claims-either objectivist or, importantly,
subjectivist or positivist, which have been (in my view, mistakenly) ascribed to Bohr [1].
Bohr develops complementarity into a comprehensive framework, whose aim is to offer an interpretation of quantum mechanics fully consistent
both with the experimental data of quantum physics and (which is not
always sufficiently emphasized) with relativity. As such, complementarity also entails both an irreducible division (in terms of their description)
and an irreducible interaction between quantum micro-objects, described
by means of quantum-mechanical formalism, and a measuring macroapparatus, described the interaction by means of the formalism of classical physics. Both, thus, are capable of quantum interaction, through
which and only through which complementary configurations themselves
emerge in view of mutually exclusive experimental settings that one can
arrange. Bohr leaves open the question of the physics of transition from
the quantum (micro)world to the classical (macro)world, which remains
an outstanding problem of modern physics and the subject of continuing
research.
Complementarity is now primarily associated with wave-particle complementarity, which suspends unequivocal identification of two classes
of phenomena-particle-like, such as electrons; and wave-like, such as
light or other forms of radiation-found in classical physics. In quantum physics such unequivocal identification is no longer possible, since
depending on how we arrange our instruments we will observe either a
particle-like or a wave-like picture (although never both together), and
we must consider both in order to give a comprehensive description.
There are several reasons for the prominence of this particular complementarity, although complementarities connected to spin have become
equally important in the wake of Bohm's reformulation of the EPR argument, hidden variables, and Bell's theorem, if usually without invoking
the idiom of complementarity itself. For Bohr himself the most crucial
specific complementarity is that of coordination and causality. It dislocates the causal spatia-temporal description that defines classical systems and that allows one to know with certainty the state of a system
at any point, once it is known at a given point. According to Bohr:
199
"The very nature of the quantum theory ... forces us to regard the
space-time coordination and the claim of causality, the union of which
characterizes the classical theories, as complementary but exclusive
features of the description, symbolizing the idealization of observation and definition respectively" [2].
The complementarity of coordination and causality is, thus, linked
to another complementarity, conceived in more general philosophical
terms-the complementarity of (the idealizations of) observation and
definition. The latter is given less attention in Bohr's work subsequent
to the so-called Como lecture, which introduces complementarity and
which I cite here. In the lecture itself, however, it plays a central role, and
Bohr shows how other complementarities can be seen as its consequences
or correlatives. That includes wave-particle complementarity, or those of
position and momentum, or time and energy, most closely tied to Heisenberg's uncertainty relations. The latter express the irreducible limits on
the possibility and, in fact, preclude (this is crucial) simultaneous exact measurement of both variables within each pair. According to Bohr,
more radically, uncertainty relations preclude one even from considering
such variables as simultaneously applicable or unambiguously definable
at any point by virtue of always mutually exclusive experimental arrangements, which would allow one to measure and define each variable
without ambiguity. Therefore, Bohr argues, one cannot assign classicallike states to quantum systems. Uncertainty relations (along other complementarities) can be connected to wave-particle complementarity, in
particular via Max Born's interpretation of Schrodinger's wave-function
as "mapping" the probability-distribution defining the statistical prediction of quantum mechanics.
Here, I would like to explore implications of Bohr's framework for the
relationships between classical and quantum physics. The main conclusion is that, in Bohr's scheme, a violation of quantum mechanics by assigning physical states conceived, on the classical model, as independent
of observation and measurement ("independent physical reality") would
imply a violation of classical description for the measuring instruments
involved -unless, in view of the EPR argument and Bell's theorem, the
Lorentz invariance is violated and propagation of signals with infinite
speed is allowed. In Bohr's framework classical macrophysics and quantum microphysics are intertwined in a peculiar way: an assumption of
classical-like description at the microlevel would imply a breakdown of
classical description at the macrolevel (at least, in the case of measuring instruments), while non-classical microdescription is consistent with
classical macrodescription [3].
200
ARKADY PLOTNITSKY
201
202
ARKADY PLOTNITSKY
LANDSC AP ES 0 F SI BYLLINE ST R A NG E NE SS
203
It is crucial that quantum mechanics limits only the simultaneous measurement, applicability and definability of both conjugate variables and
only within the same experimental arrangement. Either variable by itself can be measured, at least in principle, with full precision and, thus,
be well-defined at any point. The latter fact may suggest that quantummechanical description is incomplete and that one can develop a more
complete classical-like account of the data at issue. According to Bohr,
however, instead of the incompleteness of quantum theory, uncertainty
relations signal the inapplicability to quantum physics of a classical, and
especially realist, picture-either strictly causal or classically statistical
(i.e., implying an underlying non-statistical configuration incompletely
represented by a statistical account). This does not mean that a single
variable can be attributed an existence independent of an experimental
arrangement through which it is defined as a variable. Such an attribution, in contrast to definition through observation or measurement, is
just as impossible for a single variable as for both variables. The latter
nuance figures significantly in Bohr's reply to the EPR argument, which
played a key role in sharpening his view [9].
According to Bohr, the EPR argument failed to demonstrate the incompleteness of quantum mechanics, which was the main stated aim
of the argument. According to both parties, however, it demonstrated
something that may be more important-namely, the profound connections, first, between quantum mechanics and relativity and, second, between quantum and classical physics. The EPR argument concerns a situation in which-in an apparent conflict with quantum mechanics-both
the position and momentum of a particle appear ascribed definitively,
without uncertainty, in view of the following considerations. Although
(due to uncertainty relations) in quantum mechanics one can never simultaneously measure both the momentum and position of any particle
with full precision, quantum mechanical formalism does allow one to
calculate without uncertainty the combined momentum of and the relative distance between two particles, since corresponding operators do
commute. If these particles are then allowed to interact, the possibility
of measuring either the position or momentum of one particle at any
given point (which is allowed by quantum mechanics) and the law of
momentum conservation allow one to predict with certainty (but not
simultaneously) either the position or the momentum of the other particle, and thus ascribe both to the other particle without interfering with
it. Since, EPR claim, in quantum mechanics such ascriptions are impossible, their argument shows the incompleteness of quantum mechanics.
204
ARKADY PLOTNITSKY
Bohr argued that the application of the EPR assumptions to quantum mechanics needed qualifications, beginning with what quantum mechanics allows as concerns predictions of the values of both conjugate
variables, such as position and momentum. Quantum mechanics claims
only that, due to uncertainty relations, the exact simultaneous measurement of both within the same experimental arrangement is never
possible. In the EPR situation, too, such simultaneous measurements,
or even simultaneous predictions, are impossible. It is the impossibility of simultaneous measurement and only this impossibility- rather
than impossibility of predicting either complementary variables on the
basis of other data and calculations-that defines quantum mechanics.
Predictions with certainty of either the momentum or the position of a
given particle are possible under certain conditions, such as those specified by the EPR argument; exact measurement of both simultaneously is
never possible under any conditions, for example, if one wants to simultaneously verify such predictions. EPR do introduce the question of the
simultaneous measurement and prediction of conjugate variables at the
end of their article and stress, correctly, that this is a crucial point, since
both separability (independence of physical processes and measurement
in spatially separated system) and locality (the impossibility of instantaneous propagation of signals and, hence, the Lorentz invariance and
relativity) are at stake [10]. The significance of this point transcends the
difference of the two positions, and remains a crucial issue in the debates
concerning quantum physics, especially in the wake of Bell's theorem,
which brought the questions at issue into a new and sharper focus and
gave them deeper physical and philosophical significance [11].
Bohr argued that the interactions between quantum objects and measuring instruments were not sufficiently taken into account by EPR,
while a rigorous analysis of these interactions disallows their key assumptions and exposes "an essential ambiguity" in the EPR argument.
He also argued that no physical disturbance and thus no physical action
at a distance and hence no violation of relativity takes place in the EPR
situation if treated by means of quantum mechanics, the point that Einstein partly contested later in terms of separability [12]. In view of Bell's
theorem, such a violation would in fact occur if one were to assign an
underlying classical-like picture (either in terms of standard or hidden
variables) to quantum data-and, in particular, if one sees these data as
reflecting reality existing independently of observation or measurement.
The EPR argument and, subsequently, Bell's theorem were crucial for establishing that point. For Bohr, the data of quantum-mechanics disallows
the possibility of ascribing a classical-like picture of states-states independent of observation and measurement-to quantum systems. Bohr
LANDSC AP E S 0 F SI BY LLINE ST R AN GE NE SS
205
concludes that "the apparent contradiction [argued by EPR] in fact discloses only an essential inadequacy of the customary viewpoint of natural
philosophy for a rational account of physical phenomena of the type with
which we are concerned in quantum mechanics ... [T]he interaction between object and measuring agencies ... entails ... the necessity of a final
renunciation of the classical ideal of causality and a radical revision of
our attitude towards the problem of physical reality" ( QTM, 145-46).
As I shall suggest here, however one pursues such a revision (closer to
Bohr or to Einstein), the latter issue may even be more crucial to EPR
(and especially to Einstein himself) than the question of causality [13].
The EPR argument was a major contribution to the debate concerning quantum theory, and it was given a further significance when Bohm
introduced his hidden variables interpretation of quantum-mechanical
data in 1952, and, then, in the wake of Bell's theorem, in 1964. Hidden variables theories seek to supplement quantum-mechanical statistical data by additional variables affecting physical states, unobtainable
by means of- "hidden" from-quantum mechanics, although operative
within a nonstatistical, causal configuration and possibly eventually experimentally obtainable or inferable. Quantum mechanics, then, would
be subsumed by a classically complete and causal framework. Such a
framework may or may not involve the concept of independent physical
reality, depending on how one locates hidden variables-in such an independent reality itself, apparatus, or more interactively. As will be seen,
one cannot, in principle, exclude the possibility of a hidden variables
theory which is, in a certain sense, causal, but does not entail classicallike states independent of observation or measurement. In contrast to
Bohm's, such a theory, if it exists, may even be local (i.e., Lorentz invariant).
Bell's theorem introduced a dramatic twist into the hidden variables
question by stating that Bohm's theory was no exception and that any
hidden variables theory compatible with the statistical predictions of
quantum mechanics would have to be, in Bell's phrase, as "grossly nonlocal" as Bohm's theory. Bell's theorem makes it impossible (or just
about) to maintain simultaneously the data of quantum mechanics and
relativity within a classical-like theory. This, once again, may be ascertained at least for hidden variables theories presupposing an independent
physical reality (conceivably described by means of hidden rather than
standard variables, which would arise only through a measuring process)
[14]. Insofar as quantum-mechanical and relativity data remain valid,
however, Bell's theorem places severe constraints upon the possibility
of classical-like theories accounting for quantum data-the data that
206
ARKADY PLOTNITSKY
21ri 8z1
This scheme is then argued to be correlative to the mutually exclusive character of experimental arrangements, through which (and only
through which) one can unambiguously establish and define either one
or another complementary variable, but never both together.
It appears to follow, given Bohr's logic, that if one assigns classical-like
states to quantum objects and, by implication, a realist interpretation
to the data described in a nonrealist way by quantum mechanics, one
is no longer able to maintain a classical description of the measuring
instruments. Here, I can only indicate the main logic of this argument
[15].
207
and (in view of Bell's theorem in the case of hidden variables) insofar as
the Lorentz invariance demanded by relativity is maintained, the possibility of such states would imply a breakdown of the classical description
of measuring instruments. For the classical describability of measuring
instruments becomes the only vulnerable link in Bohr's logical chains.
One needs to consider both standard and hidden variables because one
must examine all available situations in which classical-like states may,
in principle, be ascribed to quantum data, and establish that, if one
does so, the classical describability of measuring instruments would be
violated in each of these situations. Bell's theorem eliminates the case
of hidden variables, since it implies that any hidden variables framework consistent with the predictions of the standard quantum theory
would lead to violation of the Lorentz invariance. The EPR situation
as treated by means of non-relativistic quantum mechanics entails no
violation of relativity, in contrast to treating it by means of Bohm's
theory or, it appears, any theory that presupposes independent states.
Establishing fully rigorous connections between quantum mechanics and
relativity entails quantum electrodynamics. Thus theory leads to further
epistemological complexities, which cannot be considered here.
In view of some recent arguments, we may not be able, even by using
Bell's theorem, unconditionally to exclude the possibility of local (i.e.,
Lorentz invariant) and locally causal hidden variables theories of a nonrealist type-that is, theories that are causal but that (in contrast to
Bohm' s theory/ ies) would disallow an ascription to a quant urn system
of classical-like states independent of observation. The formulation of
Bell's theorem needs to be amended accordingly. Hidden variables in
this case would have to be seen as "located" in the interaction between
quantum objects and measuring instruments, an interaction that would
itself be seen as irreducible, just as in Bohr's interpretation. Hence, the
possibility of such theories would not undermine the present argument.
Such theories would offer the intriguing possibility of a picture of the
physical world that is both causal and local but that does not presuppose
an independent physical reality at the microlevel [16].
In Bohr's interpretation, classical macrophysics and quantum microphysics are intertwined in an asymmetrical way: attempts to introduce
a more classical or classical-like description at the microlevel appear to
break down classical description at the macrolevel, while non-classical
quantum microdescription is fully consistent and sustains classical macro-description, at least in the situation of quantum measurement. In
this scheme quantum (micro) physics, relativity, and classical (macro)
physics are irreducibly interlinked, and both modes of description, classi-
208
ARKADY PLOTNITSKY
L A N D S C A P E S 0 F S I B Y L L I N E S T R A N G EN E S S
209
micro aspects of the physical world. For the moment we can at best
only correlate or conjoin some of them and try to maintain their consistency with each other (and, of course, with experimental data) within
sufficiently workable limits. Whether physics can ever be fully brought
together remains an open question; and, as I have stressed here, the
problem of transition from quantum microphysics to classical macrophysics remains outstanding. It is conceivable that future theories (or
new data) will transform both classical and quantum theories and their
relations, perhaps by means of a more homogeneous single theory. It
is also conceivable that future developments will preserve the joint significance of classical and quantum physical and philosophical theories,
which has defined the century of physics that began with Planck's discovery of quantum physics in 1900 and that is now at its end-or will
produce landscapes of as yet unencountered or even as yet inconceivable
strangeness.
AFFILIATION
Arkady Plotnitsky
Department of English
Purdue University
West Lafayette, IN 47907-1356, USA
aplotnit@acpub. duke. edu
REFERENCES
210
ARKADY PLOTNITSKY
211
LARS LOFGREN
1. METALINGUISTIC VIEWS
214
LARS LOFGREN
METALINGUISTIC VIEWS OF QM
215
In several familiar languages we meet the question whether it is possible to comprehend the essence of certain holistic concepts in terms of
decidable syntactic criteria of well-formedness on its describing formulas. We will make a comparative review of such questions in set theory
language, in programming language, and in quantum mechanical measurement language. In the latter case, the question is whether decidable
syntactic criteria on the well-formed formulas for the basic measurement
sentences can be given, such that their interpretations will coincide with
the idea of quantum mechanical measurements.
Decisive for all three cases is the linguistic complementarity [5], [7]. We
find that for a full comprehension, an ultimate linguistic relativization
is unavoidable, which indicates shortcomings of pure syntactic criteria
of well-formedness.
In Set Languages, with the usual set-notation, S = { x : Px}, we
may look at the predicate Px as a description of the set S, or of the
set S as an interpretation of Px, in a set language L. If L is too rich,
allowing well-formed formulas like x ~ x, we know from the Russell
paradox that not all well-formed formulas can be interpreted as sets
(do not have extensions which are sets). The question is whether we
can give syntactic criteria on well-formedness for the formulas of L such
that the language becomes a proper set language. That is, where every
well-formed formula (set-formula) can be interpreted as a set, and where
every conceivable set can be described.
We meet such attempts at well-formedness in various proposals for
comprehension axioms.
Axiom of Typed Comprehension (used in Russell's theory of types; cf. [10]).
All variables are here typed, such that, if x E y, and x is of type n (an
integer), then y is of type n + 1. A well-formed predicate must here respect
this type condition. Thus, none of the predicates x E x, its negation x ~
216
LARS LOFGREN
n+ 1.
for y is 1 greater than the integer for x. For an individual, however, and
only for individuals, we have x = { x} (which is impossible in the theory of
types).
Axiom of Relative Comprehension. For any predicate Px which is wellformed in a set language without any type or stratification conditions, and
with any already established set y, there exists a set S that contains just
those elements x of y for which Px holds true, namely S = {x: Px & x E y}.
If y is not a set, neither is in general S.
METALINGUISTIC VIEWS OF QM
217
We are confronted with two modes of ascertainment, by physical measurement, and by linguistic syntactic inference. In general, the two modes
are kept apart by Cartesian or Heisenberg cuts, arguable in terms of
problems of complete self-reference. Forms of partial self-reference are,
however, legitimate. Which may also be expressed in terms of realizable degrees of self-reference in a language, degrees of introspection in a
language, etc.
We will look into the possibility of performing, not another cut, but a
tie, let be loose, between physical measurability and linguistic syntactic
inferribility. Namely, in asking if they can have in common a lowest level
of constructivity (realizability) in a hierarchy of such levels.
In von Neumann's formulation of quantum mechanics [11] the observables correspond to self-adjoint operators acting on a Hilbert state space.
If A is a self-adjoint operator corresponding to some observable, then its
spectral values are interpreted as the possible values which one may
218
LARS LOFGREN
A=
in
w E(dw) .
A=
in
E(dw),
F(A)
=in
F(w) E(dw).
METALINGUISTIC VIEWS OF QM
219
220
LARS LOFGREN
Anti
coincidence
Photon detection
L-T"""-1
Single
photon
pulse
counter
----1
Beam
spliuer
Photon detection
counter
METALINGUISTIC VIEWS OF QM
221
light. The prism gap is chosen such that if transmission along the tunnelling path occurs, which is indicated by a click in a photon detector
counter Dt in that path, then the transmitted phenomenon must have
wave-nature (not preventing a simultaneous particle nature). In the reflection path there is another photon detector counter Dr. Repeated
runs indicate strict anticoincidence (no coincidence) between the two
counters, supporting the hypothesis that the behaviour of the emitted
entities is particle like. Obviously, the experiment supports further hypotheses about a simultaneous wave and particle nature of the emitted
single photon states of light.
The inference of a wave-and-particle nature of the photons is suggested
(cf. [1]) as a falsification of the Bohr wave-particle complementarity.
However, as we have argued in [7], the inference of a wave-and-particle
nature is on a level which is above that of strict measurability. The wavenature of the entity which is transmitted along the tunnelling path is
never directly measured.
Therefore, the result of the experiment does not challenge Bohr's waveparticle complementarity in its constructivist understanding preventing
a simultaneous direct measurement of wave-like and particle-like properties.
Our argument in [7] is based on the injection of linguistic information
levels for inferences in quantum measurement theory. These levels can
also be referred to complexity classes of realizing automata. Thereby
the concept of automaton will occur as the (loose) tie between physical
measurability and linguistic inferribility.
This is how we think of the double-prism experiment as highly inter~
esting. It raises the quest of a levelled approach to quantum mechanics as
a theory of measurement. Not with some arbitrary introduction of levels. But with a hierarchy where, on a lowest level, physical constructivity
in terms of measurability will coincide with linguistic constructivity in
terms of metamathematical realizability.
5. C 0 N C L U S I 0 N S
Our central quest for wff's for basic measurement sentences may be
looked at as a modern realization of Bohr's plea for using natural language with parts of classical physics for describing measuring instruments and experimental findings-in the hope of reaching an unambiguous communication of experimental results.
Our conclusions are that this seemingly simple quest for wff's for basic
measurement sentences in fact is too complex to allow a positive solution
in terms of formalism. What is needed is a complementaristic resolution
222
LARS LOFGREN
[17].
AFFILIATION
Lars Lofgren
Department of Information Theory
University of Lund, Box 118, S~221 00 Lund, Sweden
lofgren@dit.lth. se
REFERENCES
METALINGUISTIC VIEWS OF QM
223
[6] Lofgren, L., "Linguistic Realism and Issues in Quantum Philosophy." In: Laurikainen, K., and Montonen, C. (eds.), Symposia on
the Foundations of Modern Physics: the Copenhagen Interpretation and
Wolfgang Pauli, Singapore-New Jersey-London-HongKong, World Scientific, 1993, pp. 297-318.
[7] Lofgren, L., "General Complementarity and the Double-Prism Experiment." in: Laurikainen, K., Montonen, C., Sunnarborg, K.
(eds.), Symposium on the Foundations of Modern Physics 199..4; 70 Years
of Matter Waves, Paris: Editions Frontieres, 1994, pp. 155-166.
[8] Lofgren, L., "Nonseparability of Inferribility and Measurability in
Quantum Mechanics as a Systema Magnum." in: Trappl, R. (ed.), Cybernetics and Systems '98, vol 1, Austrian Society for Cybernetic Studies, Vienna, 1998, pp. 113-118.
[9] Margenau, H., "The Philosophical Legacy of Contemporary Quantum Theory." In: Colodny, R. (ed.), Mind and Cosmos, University of
Pittsburgh Press, 1966, pp. 330-356.
[10] Mendelson, E., Introduction to Mathematical Logic, third edition.
Monterey, CA, Wadsworth and Brooks, 1987.
[11] von Neumann, J., Mathematische Grundlagen der Quantenmechanik, Berlin, Springer, 1932.
[12] Primas, H., Chemistry, Quantum Mechanics and Reductionism.
Berlin, Springer, 1983.
[13] Primas, H., "Endo- and Exo-Theories of Matter." in: Atmanspacher H. and Dalenoort G. (eds.), Inside Versus Outside, Berlin,
Springer. 1994, pp. 163-193.
[14] Quine, W., "New Foundations for Mathematical Logic." Amer.
Math. Monthly, 44, 1937, pp. 70-80.
[15] Scott, D., "A Different Kind of Model for Set Theory." Mimeographed (unpublished) paper read at the 1960 International Congress on
Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Stanford, 1960.
[16] Szilard, L., "Uber die Entropieverminderung in einen thermodynamischen System bei Eingriffen intelligenter Wesen." Z. Physik, 53,
1929, pp. 840-856.
[17] Zurek, W., "Thermodynamic Cost of Computation, Algorithmic
Complexity and the Information Metric." Nature, 341, 1989, pp. 119124.
ENRICO GIANNETTO
1. INTRODUCTION
226
ENRICO GIANNETTO
227
228
ENRICO GIANNETTO
229
230
ENRICO GIANNETTO
the point of view of the preservation of the Lorentz-Poincare fundamental symmetry of the theory [12]. Separate fields are non-physical, fictitious, mathematical constructions: they physically correspond to a whole
complex, non-elementary, non-separable "reality".
Thus, the relativistic analysis of EPR given by Rothstein must be
modified: the individual subsystems of the world are non-physical, just
because their definition imply a breakdown of Lorentz-Poincare symmetry; they are confined within the universe. At a quantum-relativistic level,
the reality of particles loses meaning: only the universe is physical; nonseparability is the non-particle-like structure of the universe, the nondivisibility by parts of the world. Is, however, a quantum-relativistic-field
theory (as well as a wave-function theory) of the universe possible? The
answer has to be negative because the universe as a whole is not observable, it is not measurable as long as there exists nothing outside: any
observer is always within it, and the world as a whole is completely indeterminate. The only viable description is by density-matrices, related to
the various chosen observers, which show the impossibility of a separate
description of the observer and of the remaining part of the universe.
As David Finkelstein said, a quantum universe does not exist, but only
a universal quantum, that is, we have to deal with an irreducible multiplicity of non-separable physical processes which can never be described
as a uni-verse or a totality [13].
4. C 0 N C L US I 0 N S
d2 /dt 2 ('E-imiri/'E-imi) = 0
Poincare, following this kind of argumentation has shown that the relativity principle for the universe is a non-separability principle and is like
a "gauge-invariance" principle whose transformations reduce to identity
when one considers only physical, invariant, relational- "universal" variables.
Moreover, Whitehead has given us a completely relational formulation
of special relativity and has further stressed that the relativity principle
is nothing else than a principle of universal relatedness, that is a prin-
231
232
ENRICO GIANNETTO
233
the illusory character of life world dominion over nature), whereas nature is even subjected to any seeming-even if non-effective -violent
dominion of the life world at the interspecific, intra-specific, ecological,
biological, social and political levels? In any case, physics, beyond any
ethical indication, shows us a physis of which, conscious or not, we are
parts belonging to that secret love which is the non-separability of the
world.
AFFILIATION
Enrico Giannetto
Dipartimento di Fisica "A. Volta"
Universita di Pavia
Pavia
It alia
REFERENCES
[1] For these issues, see for example: Giannetto, E., "La logica quantistica tra fondamenti della matematica e della fisica" in: Bartocci,
U. & Wesley, J.P., Blumberg (eds.), Foundations of Mathematics
3 Physics, 1990, pp. 107-127; Giannetto, E., "Toward a Quantum
Epistemology" in: Dalla Chiara, M. L. & Galavotti, M. C. (eds.),
Atti del Convegno S.I.L.F.S. Temi e Prospettive della Logica e della
Filosofia della Scienza, CLUEB, Bologna, 1988, pp. 121-124; Giannetto, E., "L'epistemologia quantistica come metafora antifondazionistica" in: Petruccioli, S. (ed.), Immagini Linguaggi Concetti, Theoria,
Roma, 1991, pp. 301-322; Giannetto, E., "On Truth: A Physical Inquiry" in: Cellucci, C. & Dalla Chiara, M., Atti del Congresso 'Nuovi
problemi della logica e della filosofia della scienza', CLUEB, Bologna,
1991, pp. 221-228; Giannetto, E., "Il crollo del concetto di spaziotempo negli sviluppi della fisica quantistica: l'impossibilita di una ricostruzione razionale nomologica del mondo" in: Boniolo, G. (ed.), Aspetti epistemologici della spazio e del tempo, Borla, Roma, 1987, pp. 169224.
[2] Heidegger, M., "Die Frage nach der Technik" in: Vortrage und
Aufsatze, Neske, Pflillingen, 1954; Heidegger, M., "Wissenschaft und
Besinnung" in: Vortrage und ... , op. cit.; Giannetto, E., "Heidegger
and the Question of Physics", in: Kiss, 0. & Ropolyi, L. (eds.), Proceedings of the "Conference on Science and Hermeneutics", Veszprem
1993, Reidel, Dordrecht (in press).
[3] Giannetto, E., "Note sulla complessita: Max Borne la nascita della
234
ENRICO GIANNETTO
nuova fisica del caos", in: Cellucci, C. and Dimaid, M.C. (eds.), Atti
del Congresso, ETS, Pisa, 1994, pp. 317-330.
[4] See [1], [2], [3].
[5] Rothstein, J ., "Physics of Selective Systems: Computation and Biology", International Journal of Theoretical Physics, 21, 1982, pp. 327350; Primas, H., in: Miller, A.l. (ed.), Sixty-Two Years of Uncertainty, Plenum Press, New York, 1990, p. 233; Primas, H., Chemistry, Quantum Mechanics and Reductionism, Springer Verlag, Berlin,
1983; Primas, H., Time-Asymmetric Phenomena in Biology: Complementary Exophysical Descriptions Arising from Deterministic Quantum
Endophysics, preprint, LFC-Zurich, 1988; for a general overview, see
also: D'Espagnat, B., Conceptual Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, Benjamin, Menlo Park, 1971; Bohm, Hiley, The Undivided Universe, Routledge, London, 1993; Kitchener, R. (ed.), The World View
of Contemporary Physics, State University of New York Press, Albany,
1988.
[6] Giannetto, E., "The Epistemological and Physical Importance of
Godel's Theorems" in: Walkowski, Z.W. (ed.),First International Symposium on Godel's Theorems, World Scientific, Singapore, 1993, pp. 136147.
[7] See references given in the paper quoted in [6].
[8] See papers quoted in [5].
[9] See also the demonstration of the impossibility to attribute a wave
function to a single (one-particle) well-defined physical system in quantum mechanics, given in the following paper: Preparata, G., What is
Quantum Physics? Back to the QFT of Planck, Einstein and Nernst, lecture given at the IX Winter School on Hadron Physics, Folgaria (Italy)
6-13 February 1994, MI-TH 94/3 preprint. However, in my opinion, it
is not enough to realize a many-particle theory to deal with the nonseparability problem.
[10] Caderni, Martellini, "Third Quantization Formalism for Hamiltonian Cosmologies", International Journal of Theoretical Physics, 23,
1984, p. 223.
[11] Giannetto, E., Teoria quanto-relativistica delle fasi macros co piche
della materia condensata: la transizione fiuido-solido, PhD thesis, University of Messina, Messina, 1992; Giannetto, G., "Towards a Quantum-Relativistic Understanding of the Phases of Matter: The Fluid Solid
Transition", Physics Essays, 6, 1993, pp. 98-109.
[12] See [11] and Kugo, Ojima, Supplement to Progress in Theoretical
Physics, 66, 1979, p. 1.
235
GEOFFREY HUNTER
Whether the physical world is composed of indivisible atoms, or alternatively is an infinitely divisible continuum, is a long standing question
in natural philosophy. The proposition that the world is composed of
atoms (the smallest particles) is a natural extension of the physics of
macroscopic solid bodies to a microscopic domain. Solid bodies are the
tangible constituents of the macroscopic world, whereas commonly observed waves (e.g., in water) occur as the concerted, oscillational motion
within a physical medium apparently consisting of material particles in
the liquid or gaseous state rather than as a solid. Thus waves have been
regarded as a phenomenon in physical systems rather than the fundamental basis of the physical world. Specifically Newton postulated that
light is composed of a stream of particles, and after the discovery of the
wave properties of light (diffraction and interference) it was thought to
be a wave motion within some underlying medium (the "ether").
The question of whether the elementary nature of the physical world
is composed of particles or of waves, became a paradox in the early part
of this century (1905-30) through the discoveries that:
- light exhibits both wave properties (diffraction and interference)
and particle properties (Compton and photo-electric effects),
- electrons exhibit the wave properties of diffraction and interference
as well as behaving as particles having mass and electric charge.
Orthodox ("Copenhagen") quantum theory accepts the paradox without attempting to explain it. That both light and electrons behave as
particles in some experiments and as waves in others is accepted as an
inexplicable phenomenon of quantum mechanics. This orthodox philosophy asserts that it is not possible to know the nature of the photon or
the electron, and that it is the act of measurement that causes the wave
or the particle to manifest itself.
The general thesis of this article is that both light and electrons are
localized ("soliton") waves; their wave properties are derived from their
intrinsic wave nature, and their particle properties are derived from the
237
@ 1999 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
238
GEOFFREY HUNTER
localized nature of the wave. Thus the paradox of the wave-particle duality is, in principle resolved because the electron or photon is a localized
wave whose centre behaves like a particle.
2. THE NON-ELEMENTARY NATURE OF PARTICLES
The concept of a Particle is that it is point-like, its size possibly being finite but small (on some scale). For the particle concept to be elementary
(i.e., without internal structure that must be described in terms of more
elementary concepts), the "particle" would have to exist at a point, or
it would have to be a rigid body-probably a rigid sphere. If the elementary particle existed at a point, and if it is something physical (as
distinct from mathematical), then the elementary physical object would
have to have an infinite energy density, which is physically untenable;
there is no physics at a mathematical point. The other possibility of
the particle being a rigid body would require the transfer of momentum
across the particle's finite size during a collision to imply either infinite
forces within it (which is also physically untenable), or alternatively an
infinite speed of transmission of the impact across its finite size, which
is inconsistent with the principle that the velocity of light is the upper
limit for the transmission of all material interactions. These arguments
are from Lucas and Hodgson [1]. Hence the concept of Particle is not
Elementary: the nature and structure of particles (such as electrons, protons, etc) must be described in terms other than "particle" -probably
as waves-the other principal paradigm of theoretical physics. The concept of elementarity is of something that is conceptually selfsufficient;
thus an elementary finite-sized particle would have to be a rigid body,
otherwise we would need some more elementary property to describe its
internal elasticity.
3. WAVES ARE ELEMENTARY
239
Einstein (1905) quantified the idea that mass is simply a form of energy
in his famous equation:
(1)
Scientists have tended to regard particles (especially the electron and
proton) as "elementary" constituents of nature, the mass of the particle
being one of its most distinctive properties. The idea that a particle is a
localized wave was introduced by de Broglie [3]. By combining Einstein's
equation (1) with Planck's equation:
E = hv
(2)
(3)
That is what we regard as the (inertial) mass of the particle is, according to de Broglie's proposal, simply a manifestation of a localized
oscillation of a field (most likely the electromagnetic field). From this
standpoint mass is not an elementary property of a particle, but rather
a property derived from the localized motion of the (electromagnetic)
field.
For an electron, the computed frequency of the wave is v = 1.2356 x
1020 sec- 1 (Hertz), corresponding to a wavelength of>.= cjv = 2.4263 x
10- 12 metre.
5. THE PART I C L E WAVE AND THE 0 B SERVER
(4)
1(t' + x'vjc 2 )
(5)
240
GEOFFREY HUNTER
where 1 = 1IJ1- (vlc)2 and the primed variables are the coordinates
(x', t') in the observer's frame of reference. Thus the wave (4) becomes
in the observer's frame (x', t'):
l/J = exp(i2nvlx'vlc2 ) x exp(i2nv1t')
(6)
(7)
The Photon has been modeled as a soliton wave [4]. The model is a
nonplane wave solution of Maxwell's equations that has the correct spinangular momentum of the photon (n), the two values corresponding
to right and left circularly polarized photons. Although the mathematical form of the electric and magnetic fields is obtained by solution of
the linear Maxwell equations, they are constrained by the relativistic
241
(8)
For example at 523 nm (middle of the visible spectrum) this intrinsic
intensity is 1 megawatt per square centimetre. At beam intensities higher
than the intrinsic intensity photons necessarily overlap; i.e., there are
two or more photons in the same place at the same time, which is the
required condition for multiphoton absorption to occur [4].
This prediction of the threshold beam intensity for multi photon absorption to occur correctly predicts the requisite experimental intensities
(typically produced in focussed laser beams). The predicted threshold
intensity has also been confirmed by multi-photon absorption experiments with radiation from a CW C02 laser (>.. = 10.5 micrometres, Ip
= 6 watts per square centimetre); thus the expression (8) scales with
wavelength (as A. 4 ) correctly.
242
GEOFFREY HUNTER
7. THE W A YE-P ARTICLE DUALITY PARADOX
G. Hunter
Department of Chemistry
York University, Canada
REFERENCES
[1] Lucas, J.R., and Hodgson, P.E., Spacetime and Electromagnetism, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990.
[2] Prosser, R.D., "The Interpretation of Diffraction and Interference
in terms of Energy Flow", International Journal of Theoretical Physics,
Vol. 15, 1976, pp. 169-180.
[3] Theses presentees par Louis de Broglie, premier these "Recherches
sur La Theorie des Quanta", Masson et Companie, Editeurs, Libraires
de l' Academie de Medecine, Paris, 1924.
A reconsideration and extension (in English) has been given by Mioara
Mugur-Schachter ("Quantum Mechanics and Relativity: Attempt as a
New Start", Found. of Physics Letters, Vol. 2, 3, 1989, pp. 261-286.
A translation of Chapter 1 of de Broglie's thesis entitled The Relationship Between the Quantum and Relativity was published (American
Journal of Physics, Vol. 40, Sept. 1972, pp. 1315-1319).
[4] Hunter, G., and Robert L.P., "Wadlinger Photons and Neutrinos
as Electromagnetic Solitons", Physics Essays, Vol. 2, 1989, pp. 158-172.
[5] Diner, S., Fargue, D., Lochak, G., and Selleri, F. (eds.), The
Wave-Particle Dualism, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1984.
DAN NESHER
244
DAN NESHER
Ch. 12]; [38, pp. 49-54]; [40, Ch. l]; [11]; [10]). I will attempt to analyze this problem in the framework of Spinoza's naturalism (as distinct
from physicalism) and Peirce's logic of cognition (semiotics). I believe
that Spinoza and Peirce reject both, Metaphysical Realism and Internal
Realism, and take a third, pragmatist, perspective, which I call Representational Realism (cf., [29], [30]). There are various ways to explicate
realism (and therefore anti-realism). I would like to give a wider definition for realism than Dummett's, and to suggest that it has two tenets
that only together explicate it: (1) the ontological tenet, that there is
reality which exists independently of its cognitive representation; and (2)
the epistemological tenet, that this reality is represented by our cognitive
minds: we know it. Dummett defines realism as accepting (1), but instead
of (2) has a stronger condition: "that reality renders each statement in
the class determinably true or false, again independently of whether we
know, or are even able to discover, its truth-value" ([11, p. 55]; cf., [38,
p. 49ff.]). The question is whether, under my explication of realism, the
"metaphysical realist" and the "internal realist" are realists at all. The
metaphysical realist accepts naively the existence of external reality (1)
but since the truth of a statement is determined by reality independently
of whether we know it or not, it is not clear whether humans can know
that there is such external reality (2). The internal realist, by rejecting the possibility of knowing reality outside of our cognitive states (1 ),
must also be skeptical, like Hume, or categorical, like Kant, about the
existence of this mysterious transcendental reality (2).
The question of realism is whether we humans can know that there
is reality external to our cognitive experience, and if so, what is its nature. This is Peirce's distinction in between the negative and the positive
knowledge of reality. The first is grasped in the way we learn that there
is something different from us; the second in the way we learn that there
is something which corresponds to our cognition. The negative knowledge of reality evolves already in the child's awareness of the real by
being in error or in ignorance, but we are aware of it in every surprising fact frustrating our expectation [36, 5.233-234, 5.311]. In this case
we are aware that by knowing that what we expected is an erroneous
subjective cognition, we also know that there is something independent
refuting our ideas, and "to this we give the name of the rear' [37, vol.3,
8]. Popper, with his celebrated theory of refutation actually accepted
only the negative concept of reality, while in his later writings he tried
in vain to show how we should leap from frustrated hypotheses into the
eternal truths.
According to Spinoza and Peirce we can achieve representational
knowledge of external reality only through our causal interaction with
245
246
DAN NESHER
24 7
248
DAN NESHER
[7, pp. 233-4], [5, p. 146ff.], [8, II, pp. 72-73]). Bohr's phenomenalism
(and instrumentalism) is expressed clearly in the following:
In our description of nature the purpose is not to disclose the real
essence of the phenomena but only to track down, so far as it is possible, relations between the manifold aspects of our experience ([8, I,
p. 18]; cf., [8, I, p. 4]).
On the line of objective description [i.e., the unambiguous communication-e.g. [8, III, p. 3], it is indeed more appropriate to use the
word phenomenon to refer only to observations obtained under circumstances whose description includes an account of the whole experimental arrangement. In such terminology, the observational problem in quantum physics is deprived of any special intricacy ... [8, II,
p. 73]; cf., [6, p. 24]; comp., [17, p. 58]).
Strictly speaking, the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics
and electrodynamics merely offers rules of calculation for the deduction of expectations about observations obtained under well defined
conditions specified by classical physical concepts [i.e., common-sense
communicable physical concepts-[8, II, p. 73] ([8, III, p. 60]; cf., [8,
II, pp. 3, 68, 71], [7, pp. 222-3, 233-34, 237-8]).
Bohr's philosophical position was such that while he took the effect of
the measuring instrument on the measured object (system), and even of
the human body on the former, as parts of the experimental perceptualobservational process, he despaired of the possibility of describing "unambiguously" their interactions in the physical realm (cf., [8, II, p. 39],
[8, III, p. 3]; [23, Ch. 3.5]). In order to avoid ambiguous (non-objective)
language in the description of this uncontrolled relation, he invented his
principle of "complementarity". This enabled him to apply the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics to different descriptions of
separated experimental arrangements without relating the different results to an independent reality of a particle; hence "an unambiguous
meaning can be attributed to such an expression as 'physical reality' "
([5, pp. 145, 151], cf., [8, II, pp. 1-2], [8, III, pp. 2-7]; [22, p. 179]).
According to Bohr, "the interaction between the measuring instruments and the objects forms an integral part of the phenomena" [8,
III, p. 4]. The phenomena are the "experimental arrangements", and
the "evidence about atomic objects obtained by different experimental
arrangements exhibits a novel kind of complementary relationship" [8,
III, p. 4]. Since in quantum physics evidence of different experimental
arrangements "appears contradictory when combination into a single
picture is attempted" Bohr concluded that even if there is such reality
that determines causally our phenomenal experience we cannot know it
249
250
DAN NESHER
251
252
DAN NESHER
Bohr's notion of objectivity differs from the classical account, however, in that he stresses that our descriptions of nature are not descriptions of independently existing realities, but descriptions of our
encounter with such realities ... Quantum physicists, restricted to
describing experiments in terms of the whole apparatus-system interaction, find themselves in the same position as people trying to
describe in detail the totality of their mental activity, "since the perceiving subject also belongs to our mental content" ([8, I, p. 96], [23,
pp. 146-147]; cf., [20, pp. 154-167]).
Thus for Bohr the "physical reality" is the "atomic observed phenomenal
object". Moreover, this observed atomic object itself is at best only the
phenomenal features of the measuring instrument which are interpreted
as the measured atomic object. The different conceptions of physical
reality of Bohr, Einstein and Spinoza can be shown in the following
scheme of the experimental arrangement: (1) The Experimental Situation- Observation-Measurement and Represented "Physical Reality" for
Einstein, Bohr, and Spinoza:
Person Observing
Measuring ~ ~ Phenomena
Measured
Instrument .: .: (Bohr's Reality)
Object
(Einstein's Objective Reality
II
Mind
Human Body
Hence Bohr is essentially phenomenalist claiming that scientific knowledge is only the "descriptions of our encounter with such [independently
existing] realities". Accordingly, the description of human phenomenological experience is the only reality available to humans and this is
exactly what Kant dubbed "empirical realism" (cf., [24, A370]; comp.
[34, II]; [23, Ch. 5.2]). It is interesting that in the above scheme Einstein's concept ion of physical reality is separated from Bohr's physical
reality, namely, what is outside or external to our experience. According
to Einstein we represent physical reality through our sensual encounter
with the Measuring Instrument but can describe this reality as being
independent and undisturbed by being measured. For Spinoza (if he
had lived to see the development of modern science) there is a continuous interaction between Human Body, Measuring Instrument and the
Measured Object and thus the Measured Object cannot be really independent and undisturbed, and yet, through this phenomenal encounter
253
In this context it is interesting to read Peirce's criticism of the phenomenalist-positivist position of Comte, Poincare, and Pearson, while
suggesting the pragmaticist alternative about scientific theories, verification and reality:
An explanatory hypothesis, that is to say, a conception which does
not limit its purpose to enabling the mind to grasp into one a variety
of facts, but which seeks to connect those facts with our general conception of the universe, ought, in one sense to be verifiable; that is to
say, it ought to be little more than a ligament of numberless possible
predictions concerning future experience ... But Comte's own notion
of a verifiable hypothesis was that it must not suppose anything that
you are not able directly to observe. From such a rule it would
be fair to infer that he would permit Mr. Schliemann to suppose he
was going to find arms and utensils at Hissarlik [according to his
hypothesis about the city of Troy], but would forbid him to suppose
that they were either made or used by any human being, since no
such being could ever be detected by direct perception ... Comte,
Poincare, and Karl Pearson take what they consider to be the first
impression of sense, ... and they separate these from all the intellectual part of our knowledge, and arbitrarily call the first real and the
second fictions. (Peirce, 5.597 [1903]; bold letters added).
In the same line Schrodinger argues against the doctrine of contemporary
quantum mechanics that holds that "models with determining parts that
uniquely determine each other, as do the classical ones, cannot do justice
to nature", and therefore, requires a rejection of realism [43, p. 153].
Schrodinger writes:
Reality resists imitation through a model. So one lets go naive realism
and leans directly on the indubitable proposition that actually (for
the physicist) after all is said and done there is only observation,
measurement. Then all our physical thinking thenceforth has as a
sole object the results of measurements, which can in principle be
carried out, for we must now explicitly not relate our thinking any
longer to any other kind of reality or to a model. [43, p. 157].
Thus the framework of complementarity as "a ligament" of contrasting
phenomena became a license for the phenomenological understanding of
physical reality: "a radical revision of our attitude ["the customary view
254
DAN NESHER
255
pp. 172, 197-211]; [25]). Einstein believed in the reality of things in themselves completely independent of human activity but that nevertheless
can (miraculously) be known (cf., [18, xix, 180]); and Bohr viewed physical reality as identical with the experiential phenomena, namely, dependent on human cognition (cf., [8, I, pp. 93, 103]; [18, p. 211]; [46, p. 59];
[4, pp. 16-19]; [45, pp. 65, 117-119]; [41, p. 51])]. Thus, Einstein and
Bohr were involved with "the so-called 'deep truths"', in Bohr's terms,
namely, "statements in which the opposite also contains deep truth" [7,
p. 240]. For example, when Einstein speaks of "incomplete description"
of physical reality by quantum theory he means the reality of things in
themselves, while Bohr by "complete description" means the formalism
of quantum theory as applied to the observed phenomena only (cf., [5,
p. 145ff., pp. 149-150], [7, pp. 222-224, 237-8]; [43, pp. 153-4, 157-160];
[14, p. 681ff.]). On the incompleteness of Quantum Theory from therealist (not the naive realist) perspective and its apparent completeness
from the phenomenological standpoint, Schri:idinger writes:
The rejection of realism also imposes obligations. From the standpoint of the classical model the momentary statement content of the
\If-function is far from complete; it comprises only about 50 per cent
of a complete description ["the other half then remains completely
indeterminate" - p. 132]. From the new standpoint it must be complete for reasons already touched upon at the end of sect. 6 [p. 157].
It must be impossible to add on to it additional correct statements,
without otherwise changing it; else one would not have the right to
call meaningless all questions extending beyond it [as Bohr does] ([43,
p. 159]; comp. [14, p. 668ff.]).
Thus, returning to Einstein's and Bohr's philosophical positions in their
1935 controversy about scientific theories, their completeness, and the
nature of physical reality, it seems to me that they are both somehow wrong. First, they are wrong because they hold uncritically a basic
"philosophical instinct" to believe in the completeness of scientific theories; but from Spinoza's and Peirce's pragmaticist point of view there
cannot be a complete (certain) description of external reality since human knowledge of it is limited and fallible. Moreover, Einstein's "criterion of reality" is too strong since there is no completely independent
"undisturbed" reality, and Bohr's "conception of reality" is too restricted
(devised to ensure complete knowledge) and thus his "phenomena" cannot describe external physical reality (cf., [43, pp. 153, 155, 157ff.]; [17,
p. 65ff.]). However, I suggest that when a pragmaticist epistemology is
adapted "we are nearing the goal where logical order to a large extent
allows us to avoid deep truth", where contradicting positions are both
256
DAN NESHER
true and false (Bohr's wording, [7, p. 240]). It is true that the representation of the atomic domain depends upon the cognitive mind but we
should not identify, as Kant and Bohr do, the phenomenal-representation
with the represented reality (cf., [33]). In order to differentiate these two
components, representation and physical reality, we should analyze the
observational-measurement situation.
In a theory of representation a distinction should be made between
the role of the perceiver-observer in measurement and the relation between the measuring instrument and the measured object (system). The
measuring instrument is what the experimentalist perceives and the measured system is what she observes through the perception of the former.
As Schrodinger expresses it:
The systematic arranged interaction of two systems (measured object
and measuring instrument) is called measurement on the first system,
if a directly-sensible variable feature of the second (pointer position)
is always produced within certain error limits when the process is
immediately repeated (on the same object, which in the meantime
must not be exposed to any additional influences) [43, p. 158].
We can measure an atomic system only mediately when perceiving a
middle-size measuring instrument interacting with this system. If we cannot perceive the measuring instrument we cannot experimentally measure and thus cannot observe an atomic System even where an interaction between them occurs (comp. [7, p. 209]). However, we should be
careful not to confound perception with measuring operation and understand that even perception and measuring operation are two components of observation. Hence, the measuring instrument can operate and
affect the measured system without being perceived; and also we can
perceive the measuring instrument when the latter is not in operation
and therefore does not affect the system to be measured. In perception
(as a part of the observational procedure) the relation of the mind to
the measuring instrument is not mediated as such. This, of course, leads
to a serious question as to whether "Schrodinger's cat", as an instrument measuring the decay of the radioactive substance, can be in an
indeterminate superposition if it is always to be perceived. It seems that
Schrodinger's intention in his famous thought experiment is to show that
according to the doctrine of contemporary quantum theory "an indeterminacy originally restricted to the atomic domain becomes transferred
into macroscopic indeterminacy, which can then be resolved by direct
observation"; but then if there is an indeterminacy in the measuring instrument itself (the cat), there cannot be any observation of the atomic
system. Hence, if this is the result of the quantum theory, it "prevents
257
us from accepting as valid a "blurred model" [quantum theory] for representing reality" [43, p. 157]. Here Schrodinger distinguishes between
the incomplete quantum theory which he metaphorizes as "a blurred or
poorly focused photograph" , and the complicated quantum reality itself
which he metaphorically describes as "clouds and fog patches" (cf., [43,
pp. 157, 155] [translated by [26, p. 197]]). Lockwood mistakenly ascribes
Schrodinger's second metaphor for a quantum "complete theory", i.e.,
"a picture of clouds and fog patches", to the incomplete quantum theory of wave functions which according Schrodinger is only "a blurred or
poorly focused photograph" (cf., [43, pp. 153, 157-8] and [26, p. 197]).
Therefore, the macroscopic cat as a measuring instrument and its health
condition as the pointer, cannot be indeterminate, uncertain, but always
"within certain error limits" [43, p. 158].
But serious misgivings arise if one notices that the uncertainty affects macroscopically tangible and visible things, for which the term
"blurring" seems simply wrong. [43, p. 156].
Here as elsewhere Schrodinger uses "blurring" for an incomplete theory,
and not for a cloudy and foggy reality as we have already seen above; but
the "macroscopically tangible and visible things" are neither "blurring"
nor "cloudy and foggy" things. Thus the apparent paradox is that if
the measuring instrument is an indeterminate quantum system then its
"pointer" (e.g., the eat's health condition) cannot possess a well-defined
position; but if its well-defined position is a necessary condition for experimental evaluation of quantum theory, then the quantum theory, which
predicts a not well-defined position of the pointer, is impossible; but
then the pointer can have a well-defined position and quantum theory
is possible, and so on. The way out of this paradox is to show that the
Measuring Instrument operates at the "quasi-classical" level and has
"quasi-locality" parts such that the prediction of their position by quantum theory are "always produced within certain error limits" (cf., [43,
pp. 156-158]; [8, III, p. 5]; [14, pp. 670ff.]). This is actually the argument
of Bohm and Hiley.
The immediate experience in this world is that which is described by
what is called common sense ... Within the domain of such experience it may be said that this [the overall atomic-e.g., [4, pp. 161,
178] world is manifest . ... it is what can be held in the hand, the eye,
and, of course, scientific instruments. Its [the quasi-classic manifestations] basic characteristic is that it contains certain relatively stable
structures that make the holding possible. These structures must not
only be relatively stable, but also essentially local. ... Without such
a [sub-]world we would not be able to make sense of our observations
258
DAN NESHER
The properties of the atomic system after the measurement are not altogether independent of the measurement interference but, according
to my analysis, are independent of their cognitive representation owing
to this measurement (cf., [33, IV]). However, regardless of how much
259
the properties of human body are entangled with the properties of the
perceived measuring instrument the epistemological distinction must be
between the representing Mind on one side, and the measuring instrument on the other. But the same argument is even stronger for the
representation of an atomic observed system, which physically cannot be
distinguished completely from the measuring instrument and the body of
the observer; they constitute together an extended continuous natural
system whose components are only modally (relatively) separated (the
essential non-separability of the physical domain). Therefore, any possible division among all three of them is only relative in respect of their
modes of being. Their modal interaction causes modifications, new real
magnitudes or even new particles with their specific properties, since the
idealization of the atomic systems cannot be like the classical idealized
objects (separated and localized) (cf., [7, pp. 201-2], [8, II, p. 71], [8,
III, p. 2]; [4, Ch. 8 & pp. 386-390]). And yet, the measuring process is
determined, like any natural process according to the laws of nature and
cannot "disturb" or "interrupt" these laws. (cf., Spinoza, Ethics IIIPr).
Schrodinger states rightly that,
... in the realism point of view observation is a natural process like
any other and cannot per sebring about an interruption of the orderly
flow of natural events [43, p. 158]; cf., [43, p. 160#10]).
This is the case since observation qua measurement is itself a natural
process, yet, as such it really changes the flow of some specific events, but
according the laws of nature and without interrupting them. Now, some
interpreters of quantum theory suggest that the observation-measuring
operation due to the intervention of consciousness "creates" new realities
that were not in the interacting modes of being before. That is to say,
consciousness brings about an interruption of the orderly flow of natural
events (cf., [9, pp. 20-26]; camp. [1, p. 54ff.]; [4, Ch. 2[pp. 16-19, 218]]).
But if the physical observation-measuring process is separated from the
mental process of perception, and if our minds have no causal effect upon
the represented physical objects, then why should this atomic process be
understood differently from other natural physical processes? It seems
to me that the problem with Bohr's approach to quantum theory is
that he continued to use the classical concepts of particles and waves
and thus had to adapt the Kantian phenomenology as his philosophical
epistemology of science in order to describe unambiguously the resulting
experimental phenomena. This was expressed clearly by Weizsacker:
Niels Bohr is the only physicist in our time who-as far as I know,
without having been influenced by Kant-proceeded from fundamental insight similar to Kant ... Only in this framework will physicists
260
DAN NESHER
261
NATURE
Person Perceiving
Mental Causality in Mind
Real Object
Cognitive Mind
,Sign------- ~E-----~0.----~L
Indirect Representation~
of the Physical Object
AI'"
I'
''
''
'
' "'"' .. "'"'"'"' "'"'"'""
"'T"'
''
'
''
'
Human
Mind
Union
of
Mind-Body
f--4--------Human Body
In the representational situation the actual connection between the causal process of perceptual sign interpretation, Sign- OI --+ E --+D--+L
(E, D, L are respectively, Peirce's Emotional, Dynamical and Logical
262
DAN NESHER
R 1 ((Sign----+ E
---+
D---+ L)
Physical Object)
(comp. [32, pp. 172-4], [33], [12]).
Following is the explanation of the relation between the mind and
the real object represented in respect of the three required components
above:
1. The two interacting objects, the physical object and the human
body, are relatively (modally) independent of each other since they
are not absolute parts of one another. (These are the relations
among all modally separated sub-systems of nature, the "modes" in
Spinoza's philosophy; cf. EthicsiiP13S-Postulates.)
2. For perception there must be a physical interaction of the relatively
independent human body (with its brain [and eyes]) and physical
object.
3. The modification {OR+ bp} occurs in the human body as well as
in the Physical Object, but differently (because they are different
objects), and the modification in the human body is united with the
mental modification in the mind. Yet, the human mind's perceiving
process is connected with the real (physical) object only through
this union with "its own" body and the causal interaction of these
two objects.
4. Therefore, the mental modification, the percept and its interpretation in signs, are dependent on the reality of the interacting physical
objects because the latter are relatively independent of the mental
processes.
5. Since the representation of the external physical object is based on
this combined modification {OR+ bp}, it will forever be only an indirect representation, and therefore, it will always be an incomplete
representation (comp. [4, Ch. 15.13]).
263
Dan Nesher
Department of Philosophy
University of Haifa
Israel
REFERENCES
264
DAN NESHER
[5] Bohr, N., "Can Quantum Mechanical Description of Physical Reality be Considered Complete?" Physical Review, 48, 1935, pp. 696-702.
Reprinted in: Weeler, J. A. & Zurek, W.H. (eds.), Quantum Theory
and Measurement, Princeton University Press, 1983, pp. 145-151.
[6] Bohr, N., "The Causality Problem in Atomic Physics," in: New
Theories in Physics, Paris, International Institute of Intellectual Collaboration, 1939, pp. 11-30.
[9] Davies P.C.W., & Brown, J.R., The Ghost in the Atom, Cambridge University Press, 1986.
[10] Devitt, M., Realism and Truth, Princeton University Press, 1984.
[11] Dummett, M., "Realism", Synthese, 52, 1982, pp. 55-112.
[12] Einstein, A., "Maxwell's Influence on the Development of the Conception of Physical Reality". In: James Clerk Maxwell: A Commemoration Volume, Cambridge University Press, 1931, pp. 66-73.
[13] Einstein, A., "Physics and Reality". Journal of the Franklin Institute, 221, 1936, pp. 349-82. Reprinted in: Einstein, Out of My Later
Life, 1956, A Citadel Press Book, 1991, pp. 59-97.
[14] Einstein, A., "Autobiographical Notes." In: Schilpp, P. A. (ed.),
Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist, The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Illinois, 1949.
[15] Einstein, A., "Letters to Max Born and Max Born-s Comments
(1950)". In: French, A. P. (ed.), Einstein: A Centenary Volume, Harvard University Press, 1979, pp. 275-7.
[16] Einstein, A., Podolsky, B. & Rosen, N., "Can QuantumMechanical Description of Physical Reality Be Considered Complete?"
Physical Review, 47, 1935, pp. 777-80. Reprinted in: Weeler, J.A. &
Zurek, W.H. (eds.), Quantum Theory and Measurement, Princeton
University Press, 1983, pp. 138-141.
[17] Espagnat, B. d', In Search of Reality, Springer-Verlag, 1983.
[18] Faye, J., Niels Bohr: His Heritage and Legacy-An Anti-Realist
View of Quantum Mechanics, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991.
265
266
DAN NESHER
STEVEN WEINSTEIN
1. INTRODUCTION
267
268
STEVEN WEINSTEIN
(1)
Thus we have a sort of relativistic generalization of Newton's theory
of gravity, in which the spatio-temporal distribution of mass and energy
determines the gravitational field, here represented by curved spacetime.
The language of general relativity is the language of tensors on a manifold, the language of differential geometry. Insofar as one regards the
points of the manifold as representing spacetime points, one must regard
the stress tensor Tab, the metric tensor gab, and the latter's associated
curvature tensors, as assignments of physical quantities (energy, momentum, spacetime curvature) to the various points. This language of
1
properties at points is suggestive of a field ontology, but the stress tensor need not be constructed purely out of fields. Bulk matter will do as
well-one simply assigns a matter density and velocity to each point in
spacetime occupied by the massive object.
The implicit assumption involved in construing tensors as fields in
spacetime is that the points of the differential manifold are points of
spacetime. But stripped of the metric, the bare manifold has very little of
the structure one associates with spacetime. Among other things, there
is no causal structure, no notion of whether two points are space-like or
time-like related. This suggests that it is only in the presence of a metric
tensor that it makes sense to refer to points as points in spacetime. In
that spirit, we would say that the statement that a tensor field such as
Tab represents a distribution of properties in spacetime makes sense only
in the presence of a metric tensor.
Now, the idea that the stress tensor Tab represents a spacetime property distribution only in the presence of a metric is not really problematic, since the metric is already built into the stress tensor. 2 However,
what are we to say about the metric itself-does it represent a spacetime distribution of properties? This is a tricky question. On the one
hand, once we have a metric, we have spacetime points, in the sense
that the metric defines spatial and temporal distances between points.
These points have definite physical properties attributed to them-the
derivatives of the metric describe the gravitational field. On the other
hand, from a strictly mathematical perspective, the metric is an attribution of properties to points on the manifold, and the manifold does not
in itself represent spacetime. From the former perspective, the metric
is a field like any other tensor field, and one might think it should be
treated as such. From the latter perspective, the metric plays a rather
special role, and it is not clear that it should be regarded as a conventional field, in the sense of a spacetime property distribution. Support
for the former view comes mainly from practical concerns-after all, one
can measure the gravitational field just as one can measure the electromagnetic field. 3 Support for the latter view comes primarily from formal
concerns, in particular the role the metric plays in the definition of other
fields and their stress tensors. We shall not settle this issue here! 4
2
For example, the stress tensor for a massless scalar field is given by Tab
It must be said, however, that the strength of the gravitational field at a point
is not well-defined, unlike the strength of the electromagnetic field. This despite the
fact that the Riemann tensor Rabcd is well-defined at a point.
4
The interested reader will find a lucid discussion of this issue in [2], which contains
270
STEVEN WEINSTEIN
3. QUANTUM THEORY
in which these objects persist over time. So far, so classical. What is unclassical, again, is that the objects do not have definite properties at a
given time (of position, momentum, spin, etc.) and do not have definite
trajectories over time. Furthermore, if the systems have interacted, these
properties will be "entangled", so that, e.g., the position of one object
will in general be correlated with the position of another.
The ontological situation in quantum field theory is somewhat different. Indeed, the formal apparatus of the theory was developed to
accommodate physical situations in which the number of particles can
change. The general treatment is thus one of systems with "infinite degrees of freedom." The idea of infinite degrees of freedom is suggestive of
classical fields, and indeed there are many cases in which quantum fields
are analogous to classical fields, in that at each point in spacetime, one
has operators (technically, operator-valued distributions) that represent
various field properties (such as the electric field in the x direction), and
that allow one to extract the probability of observing various values for
those properties at the various points in space. The possibility of describing such quantum systems either in terms of an indefinite number
of particles, or in terms of probabilistic values of a field, is the essence
of wave-particle duality. 5
So we have a situation in which there is a sort of wave-particle duality.
But because the number of particles is indefinite, it would seem odd to
say that the ontology is particles. One of the founders of quantum field
theory, P.A.M. Dirac, shared this view:
If one can create particles, then the question of which are the fundamental constituents of matter ceases to have a definite meaning.
Previously, one could say that one only had to analyze a piece of
matter as far as possible, and get at the ultimate constituents in
that way. But if one can create particles by atomic interactions, then
one cannot give a definite definition for an elementary particle. [3,
p. 19]
272
STEVEN WEINSTEIN
This is a mild abuse of language. Technically, the degrees of freedom of the quantum field are the various (classical) functions (x, uz, h, t), not the properties such
as position, spin, and isospin, that parametrize them.
field theory which is not in any sense a spacetime theory is absurd, the
argument being that because observations take place at points in space
at particular times, any theory must have spatial degrees of freedom in
order for it to yield predictions for observations. Though this argument
has some appeal, it is highly problematic, for it rather begs the question
of how to represent observations in quantum theory. In general, I would
suggest that we be wary of it, for one of the fundamental problems in
physics is the reconciliation of quantum theory and gravity, and it may
be just such prejudices regarding the nature of observation that obstruct
the way toward a reconciliation of the two theoretical frameworks.
4. GENERAL R E LA T IV IT Y AND QUANTUM THE 0 R Y
Let me briefly rehearse the conclusions regarding the ontologies associated with general relativity and with quantum theory. General relativity,
it will be recalled, accommodates both particles and fields as the material
constituents, though it describes both in a field-like way, ascribing properties to points of the spacetime manifold. Its classical nature consists in
the fact that all of these properties of the particles or fields are definite
properties-at any point in space at any time, the stress-energy tensor
takes on definite values. The primary ontological point of contention
in general relativity is whether one ought to characterize the spacetime
metric itself as some sort of field. If it is a field, then is it the same sort
of field as other fields? 7
Quantum theories, on the other hand, are characterized in part by the
indefiniteness of the properties they describe. In quantum mechanics,
the indefinite properties may be ascribed to underlying objects called
"particles," but a full relativistic treatment involves a progression to the
notion of quantum fields. Here a particle ontology is essentially untenable. Moreover, the internal (non-spatial) degrees of freedom which go
along with quantum field theories suggest that it may furthermore be inappropriate to characterize the theories as theories of fields, in the sense
of spacetime property distributions.
To begin to grasp the tension between general relativity and quantum
theory, consider again Einstein's equation Gab = 81rTab The stress tensor, on the right, invariably requires a specification of the properties of
matter such that the matter has well-defined values for various quantities at each point in spacetime, and this is simply not obtainable from
any quantum-theoretic treatment of matter. The four-momentum of a
particle, for example, is not well-defined, both because it is impossible
7
One argument against treating the gravitational field as "just another field" is
that it is difficult to provide a notion of local gravitational energy.
274
STEVEN WEINSTEIN
(2)
or
(3)
See [6] and [7] for excellent reviews of quantum gravity and discussions of the
:;orts of problem one encounters. See [8] and references therein for news of recent
progress in this area.
10
My quick dismissal notwithstanding, Rovelli (see [9], [10] ) has recently proposed
a way of dealing with some of the issues raised here.
276
STEVEN WEINSTEIN
expectation value of the stress tensor will be a simple function of the expectation value for the position). Now perform a position measurement.
One will find the object on one side of the room or the other. So at the
moment of measurement, when the object becomes localized, we must
say that the metric changes discontinuously. Besides the fact that this
seems intuitively unphysical, such a theory represents a major departure
from the framework of general relativity!
Now, this quick example by no means constitutes a refutation of the
semi-classical approach. For one thing, it could be that introducing measurement and reduction of the state vector is not playing the game
fairly, that one must deal only with closed systems when considering the
coupling of quantized matter to classical spacetime. However, there are
equally serious difficulties for a closed system treatment. The conceptual
problems are less obvious simply because the quantum theory of closed
systems is problematic. But consider what happens if one adopts the
many-worlds/decoherent histories approach to closed systems (see [13]
for a review), in which the system continuously "branches". If one were
to invoke the semi-classical equation (3) in this context, one would have
a situation in which an observer would in theory be able to detect the
branching, because the (classical) state of the gravitational field would
be a function of the (quantum) matter distribution in all the branches,
not just her own. The gravitational field would not, in general, have anything to do with the observed (within the branch) matter distribution.
This is of course in contradiction with what we observe, and so it seems
as if the closed system approach to semi-classical gravity fares no better
than the open system approach. In short, semi-classical gravity seems to
be a rather implausible halfway-house.
In the face of the apparent difficulties with putting together classical
general relativity and quantum theory in the ways sketched above, it
is notable that no one has yet come up with a formal argument that
the quantization of the sources of the gravitational field implies that the
field itself must be quantized, though such an argument does exist for the
quantization of the electromagnetic field [14], [15]. This is related to the
fact that in electromagnetism, the field strength couples to the charge of
the source, whereas in gravity, it couples to the mass. If one considers the
limit in which the mass goes to zero, the uncertainty principle predicts
an enormous indeterminacy in the position or momentum of the source
particle, and a correspondingly large indeterminacy in the value of the
field. However, for gravity, the field vanishes as the mass goes to zero
[16].
Steven Weinstein
Department of Philosophy
Northwestern University
Evanston, Illinois
USA
278
STEVEN WEINSTEIN
REFERENCES
[1] Geroch, R., "Einstein algebras", In: Communications in Mathematical Physics, volume 25, 1972, pp. 271-275.
[2] Stachel, J., "The meaning of general covariance: The hole story",
In: Earman, J., Janis, A., Massey, G., and Rescher, N. (eds.),
Philosophical Problems of the Internal and External Worlds, PittsburghKonstanz Series in the Philosophy and History of Science, Pittsburgh,
University of Pittsburgh, 1994, pp. 129-160.
[3] Dirac, P.A.M., Directions in Physics, New York, Wiley, 1978.
[4] Wald, R.M., Quantum Field Theory in Curved Spacetime and Black
Hole Thermodynamics, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1994.
[5] Ashtekar, A., Lectures on Non-Perturbative Canonical Gravity, Singapore, World Scientific, 1991.
[6] Isham, C.J., "Canonical quantum gravity and the problem of time",
In: Integrable Systems, Quantum Groups, and Quantum Field Theories,
London, Kluwer Academic, 1993, pp. 157-288.
[7] Kuchar, K., "Time and interpretations of quantum gravity", In:
Proceedings of the 4th Canadian Conference on General Relativity and
Relativistic Astrophysics, Singapore, World Scientific, 1992, pp. 211-314.
[8] Ashtekar, A., "Polymer geometry at Planck scale and quantum
Einstein equations", In: General Relativity and Gravitation: Proceedings
of the 14th International Conference on General Relativity and Gravitation, Singapore, World Scientific, 1997.
[9] Rovelli, C., "What is observable in classical and quantum gravity?",
In: Classical and Quantum Gravity, volume 8, 1991, pp. 297-316.
[10] Rovelli, C., "Quantum reference systems", In: Classical and Quantum Gravity, volume 8, 1991, pp. 317-331.
[11] Isham, C.J., "Structural issues in quantum gravity", In: General
Relativity and Gravitation: Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on General Relativity and Gravitation, Singapore, World Scientific,
1997.
[12] Kibble, T.W.B., "Is a semi-classical theory of gravity viable?",
In: Isham, C.J., Penrose, R., and Sciama, D. (eds.), Quantum
Gravity 2: A Second Oxford Symposium, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1981,
pp. 63-80.
[13] Halliwell, J.J., "A review of the decoherent histories approach to
quantum mechanics", In: Greenberger, D. (ed.), Fundamental Problems in Quantum Theory, New York, Annals of the New York Academy
of Sciences, 1995.
[14] Bohr, N. and Rosenfeld, L., "Zur Frage der Messbarkeit der
elektromagnetischen Feldgrossen", In: Kgl. Danek Vidensk. Selsk. Math.fys. Medd., volume 12, number 8, 1933.
[15] Bohr, N. and Rosenfeld, L., "On the question of the measurability of electromagnetic field quantities (English translation)", In: Cohen,
R.S., and Stachel, J. (eds.), Selected Papers by Leon Rosenfeld, Dordrecht, Reidel, 1978, pp. 357-400.
[16] Rosenfeld, L., In: DeWitt, B.S. (ed.), Conference on the Role
of Gravitation in Physics, Proceedings, W.A.D.C. Technical Report 57216; ASTIA Document No. AD118180, Wright Air Development Center,
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, 1957.
[17] Rovelli, C., "On quantum mechanics", LANL physics archive, hepth/9403015.
EMMANUEL HEMMERLIN
281
282
EMMANUEL HEMMERLIN
level where, in accordance with the rule "not the same level, not the
same properties", there is a priori no solidity, no definite shape, no
deterministic behaviour.
What has to be understood by that is made clear by the quantal
formalism of the wave function. For instance, what has to be understood
by 'no definite shape' for the entity is, according to that formalism:
- no precise boundary (therefore, a fuzzy shape),
- deformation of that fuzzy shape when moving. (Nothing to do with
fuzzy sets.)
With that new concept of extended and deforming shape it is clear that
we have neither precise position, nor precise speed, and that is what is
behind the Heisenberg inequalities. (Note: if we listen to Heisenberg [1],
the origin of what was not yet laid down as a rule-and not applied
to the word matter-may be found in the work of Democritus himself.
As to J.M. Levy-Leblond [2], he maintains the word 'matter' at the
fundamental level, but suggests to see it as "without qualities".)
2. CONSEQUENCE AS TO THE WRITING OF
THE FORMALISM
From what we have said it follows that an electron, for instance, is not
matter. That has an immediate and fundamental consequence as, if an
electron is not matter, the mass is a quantity of matter. Therefore an
electron must not be characterized by a mass!
How to proceed in order not to have the mass at the fundamental level
is simple. Let us take a relativistic form of the Schrodinger equation, that
of Dirac for instance, and just consider its mathematical structure: it is
a one-constant structure. Therefore only one constant must be used,
and, as we know nothing about the nature of reality at quantal level,
this constant will be primarily unknown. So, let us name it ko, thus
obtaining:
(i'"f 11 811
ko)w =
(1)
8
(i oxO
+ ia\l- f3ko)W = 0
(2)
Now, we write the conventional form, with mass mo of course, but also
with two other constants, n and c:
(3)
F R 0 M Q U ANTAL T 0
MATER I A L LEVEL
283
So, we have there three constants instead of one and, if one is enough,
why three? ... As we want to compare that conventional form with the
new expression, we multiply relation (2) by nc, thus obtaining:
(in 0 t
(4)
(5)
(6)
Thus, we see that koc is a pulsation (for non physicists let us say 'the
frequency of a vibration'), and therefore the final relationship is:
(7)
So, for non physicists, we have on the left side the expression of energy in
conventional Quantum Mechanics, and, on the right side, its expression
in conventional relativity. But, of course, we have done no physics at all.
We have just obtained the way that the relevant concept-the pulsation
wo-is related to the concept of mass, irrelevant at quantal level. And,
if we have obtained something 'already known', it is not really surprising (if not it would be wrong). But it was not (openly) postulated at
the beginning. In conclusion, ko is no longer an unknown constant: it is
the relativistic equivalent to the asymptotic pulsation of the wave function wo and therefore the pulsation (or frequency) replaces the mass at
quantal level. But if the mass is somehow 'something', the pulsation is a
characteristic of something, something that we do not know.
3. N OUMEN AL PHYSICS
Now, it is interesting to see what happens if-in accordance with relationship (5)-we replace in the conventional expressions mo by n":} We
cannot prove it in this short presentation-for that see references [3] and
[4]- but, just as in relationship (1), n disappears from every (testable)
equation, and c appears only under the form ct = x 0 , which means two
things:
i/ the mass is not the right characterization for a quantal entity (we
have seen why: an electron is not matter, it is a component of component of matter), and therefore disappears when the mass disappears;
284
EMMANUEL HEMMERLIN
FR0 M
285
that way. But, what is less known is that according to Kant, matterand mechanical causality-are also 'a prioris'. They are 'a prioris' of
our understanding. Therefore, at this point I must pay tribute to the
astonishing precocity of Kant's analysis, itself rooted in the old Greek
questioning.
4. F R 0 M
N0 U MEN A L T 0 0 R DIN A R Y PH Y S I C S
xo
(8)
t=-
Such a 'creation' is necessary to give us a framework for describing experiments: thus we can say that c is a natural creation constant.
If we stop there we have 'nearly fundamental' physics. But, of course,
we want to get classical physics in its conventional form. For that we
must continue to proceed by definitions:
(9)
and:
df
(10)
m=c2
thus creating two very useful, but artificial, concepts. Just as, in order
to deal with thermics, we must set:
(11)
according to which the quantity of heat Q is no longer a reality of its
own. Similarly, energy and mass are not to be considered as realities of
like J, is an artificial creation constant. And,
their own. Therefore
by doing that, in passing from pulsation to mass through energy, we
pass from the quantallevel to the material level. (Note: the relationship
between definition and post been pointed out by H. Poincare. For the
question of 'creation' constants, see also J.M. Levy-Leblond [5].)
n,
286
EMMANUEL HEMMERLIN
(12)
and, in accordance with what has been said above, we have to remove in
order to get back to the wave level. Asp= lik, this is very easy indeed.
We obtain:
(13)
which is, as you know if you are physicist or mathematician, something
not mysterious at all as it is just a mathematical theorem (on Fourier
transforms). Applied to free quantal entities it implies that the more
concentrated the fuzzy shape is, the more quickly it gets out of shape:
then nothing can be said about 'the' speed.
So, we have got a mathematical theorem, without li of course, and directly applicable at the wave level. It is only when you want to introduce
the corpuscle that you have to use li in order to create its momentum p
by
(14)
as a complement to equation (9) defining E. (Now we understand what is
behind that formal quantity, the momentum, as we understand what is
behind that other formal quantity, the energy, that we have got so accustomed to, and we also understand the 'relativistic' link between them as
k is the spatial equivalent to w). And then, by introducing the corpuscle
and its momentum-that we call its 'quantity of movement'- therefore
coming back to the Heisenberg inequalities, we create the interpretation
problem!
But at the wave level, indeed, we have no problem. More exactly, we
have only one problem: wave collapse, or wave reduction. Of course I
should perhaps say 'wave function' instead of just 'wave', but what I
have in mind should already be clear. I also think we should say 'mystery' instead of 'problem', because we must not have preconceived ideas
about noumenal physics. However, it seems to me that all the known interpretations of Quantum Mechanics are attempts at not to purely and
simply accepting the reduction, or at not accepting it as something physical: the reason is that it is viewed, by those who may let think that
they want the description of the whole universe by physics be total, as
an 'ugly scar'. (The G.R.W. theory [6], [7] may also be examined in such
287
288
EMMANUEL HEMMERLIN
Emmanuel Hemmerlin
50 place du Quebec
M ontpellier, France
REFERENCES
[1] Heisenberg, W., Physics and philosophy, Harper & Brothers, New
York, 1958.
= mc2 to trans-
289
1. INTRODUCTION
291
292
1. The measurements are not just observations but provoke a real change
of the state of the system.
2. There exists a lack of knowledge on what precisely happens during the
measurement process.
The first aspect, the change of state, can be interpreted as an 'act of
creation' on the entity under study. It is indeed the external device that
provokes the change of state during the interaction with the entity. If
there is not such a change of state, we can consider the measurement
as a discovery. The second aspect, the presence of the lack of knowledge
on the precise act of creation which results from an interaction with the
measurement context, lies at the origin of the so called indeterministic
nature of quantum measurements and can be formalized as a lack of
knowledge on the precise measurement that is actually performed [15,
16]. We can formalize the foregoing ideas somewhat more concretely in
the following way:
1. With each real measurement e corresponds a collection of deterministic measurements e>,, called 'hidden measurements'.
293
on which we introduce a lack of knowledge through a so called mathematical weight-representative for the relative frequency of occurrence
of the hidden measurements when the original measurement actually
takes place. These ideas have been further developed on a formal level
within an abstract mathematical setup called the hidden measurement
formalism for physical measurements [15, 16, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27]. For an
overview of other applications of the hidden measurement approach we
refer to [18, 19, 20, 21, 24, 25, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33].
In this paper we proceed as follows. First we briefly describe a classical
physical entity, and we explain the meaning of probabilities within the
framework of classical physics. Secondly, we explain in which way quantum entities and quantum probabilities differ from such classical ones.
In the following section we introduce aspects of creation, and we show
how they fit in our traditional picture. Finally we present a model within
macroscopic physical reality that generates exactly the quantum probabilities, and in which appear only probabilities that correspond with a
lack of knowledge.
2. P R 0 B A B I LIT IE S IN CLASSICAL SYSTEMS
More details on this specific notion of a property can be found in [9, 11, 34].
294
by the set of all properties of the entity (actual, or not, which is called
potential [9, 11, 34]), we are for every classical entity able to attach a
value true or false to every property respectively corresponding with the
property being actual or potential 2 Of course, in certain situations we
might not know exactly the value of every property of the physical entity
(although they really exist). This means in fact that we have a lack of
knowledge on the properties of the entity. The mathematical tool delivered to deal with such a situation of a lack of knowledge on a classical
entity is a probability measure [1, 3]. In such a probability representation, if something is true to our knowledge it requires that we attach a
value 1 to it, and if it is false to our knowledge it requires a value 0. In
a lack of knowledge situation, we are dealing with values lying between
(and not equal to) 0 and 1, representative for a lack of certainty. The
most important example where we encounter such a lack of knowledge
situation is the one of a statistical ensemble, i.e., a collection of entities
to which we attach only global parameters (for example temperature,
density, velocity distributions etc ... ). Consider for example a quantity
of a liquid within a barrel: For every individual molecule in this liquid,
we know that it is located within the barrel, but we don't know where
exactly in the barrel; as a consequence, the properties related to the
individual molecules are not exactly known; nonetheless, we do know
which ones are very probable and which aren't.
3. P R 0 B A B I LIT IE S IN QUANTUM SYSTEM S
For more than sixty years now, scientists have been trying to really understand quantum mechanics. This long period is at least partly due to
the fact that we are very attached to the classical picture of nature. According to Einstein and many others-who believed in what we can call
the classical picture of nature -the quantum description which should
represent an entity is incomplete. This has been a point of discussion for
many years, and we have now come to the conclusion that we believe that
it is indeed possible to give a complete realistic description of a quantum
entity. But what was the cause for this so called incompleteness? The fact
is that when the formalism of quantum mechanics had been constructed
around 1927 to describe microscopic systems, the only mathematical expression to describe an entity was an expression about possibilities or
2
At this point, the present reader might get a feeling of conceptual overkill. Therefore, we already mention that it will be here that the troubles start in the quantum
case: false will not be implied by potential. As such, this more evolved conceptual
picture will enable us to point at the differences between the classical and quantum
system in a scheme that hosts both of them [9, 11].
295
296
297
A variant of this model has first been introduced in [15, 16]. A similar modelization
is also applied in [12].
298
Figure 1. Illustration of a measurement eu on our model for a spin-~ entity when the
initial state is Pv.
Consider now a random variable ,\ defined on the segment [-u, u], and
suppose that the relative frequency of appearance of the possible ,\ is
uniformly distributed on [-u, u]. If,\ E [ -u, v'], the point corresponding
to the state of the entity moves to u along [v', u] and we obtain a state
Pu If ,\ E ]v', u], the point moves to -u along [v', -u] and we obtain
P-u As a consequence, there are two possible outcome states for this
measurement eu: Pu and P-u From a more mechanical point of view, the
segment [-u, u] can be seen as a uniform 'elastic', that can break in every
one of its points in [-u, u] with the same probability. Before we put the
machine on, there is no way to find out in which point the elastic will
break. In the case we push the start-button of the quantum machine, we
get the following image: the point particle falls from its original location
on the elastic such that its 'falling-direction' is orthogonal to the elastic,
and sticks to it. Then the elastic breaks and the particle is torn to one
of the two original endpoints of the elastic. If we decide to perform a
measurement in the u direction when we start with a particle located in
a point v on the unit sphere, it is easy to calculate probabilities for a
transition of the particle to u or -u:
P[v
--+
u] =
1+cos,B
2
,8
2
299
Diederik Aerts,
Senior Research Associate at the Fund for Scientific Research-Flanders,
Center Leo Apostel & FUND, Brussels Free University,
Belgium
300
Bob Goecke,
Post Doctoral Researcher at the Fund for Scientific Research-Flanders,
Center Leo Apostel f3 FUND, Brussels Free University,
Belgium
Sonja Smets,
Research Assistant at the Fund for Scientific Research-Flanders,
Center Leo Apostel f3 FUND, Brussels Free University,
Belgium
REFERENCES
301
[15] Aerts, D., "A possible explanation for the probabilities of quantum
mechanics", J. Math. Phys., 27, 1986, p. 202.
[16] Aerts, D., "The origin of the non-classical character of the quantum probability model", in: Blanquiere, A., Diner, S., and Lochak,
G. (eds.), Information, complexity, and control in quantum physics,
Springer-Verlag, Wien-New York, 1987, p. 77.
[17] Gudder, S.P., Quantum probability, Academic Press, 1988.
[18] Aerts, D., "A mechanistic classical laboratory situation violating
the Bell inequalities with 2J2, exactly 'in the same way' as its violations
by the EPR experiments", Helv. Phys. Acta, 64, 1991, p. 1.
[19] Aerts, D., "A macroscopical classical laboratory situation with
only macroscopical classical entities giving rise to a quantum mechanical probability model", in: Accardi, L. (ed.), Quantum Probability and
related topics, volume VI, World Scientific Publishing, Singapore, 1991,
p. 75.
[20] Aerts, D., De Muze van het leven, quantummechanica en de aard
van de werkelijkheid, Pelckmans-Kok Agora, 1993.
[21] Aerts, D., "Quantum structures due to fluctuations of the measurement situations", Int. J. Theor. Phys., 32, 1993, p. 2207.
[22] Aerts, D., "Quantum structures, separated physical entities and
probability", Found. Phys., 24, 1994, p. 1227.
[23] Coecke, B., "Generalization of the proof on the existence of hidden
measurements to experiments with an infinite set of outcomes", Found.
Phys. Lett., 8, 1995, p. 437.
[24] Coecke, B., Hidden measurement systems, Doctoral Dissertation,
Free University of Brussels, 1995.
[25] Aerts, D., and Aerts, S., "The hidden measurement approach to
quantum mechanics", in: Proceedings of the international conference on
the foundations of physics, Oviedo, Spain, Kluwer Academic, 1997.
[26] Coecke, B., "Classical representations for quantum-like systems
through an axiomatics for context dependence", Helv. Phys. Acta, 70,
1997, p. 442.
[27] Coecke, B., "A Classification of classical representations for quantum-like systems", Helv. Phys. Acta, 70, 1997, p. 462.
[28] Aerts, D., Coecke, B., D'Hooghe, B., and Valckenborgh,
F., "A Mechanistic macroscopic physical entity with a three dimensional
Hilbert space description", Helv. Phys. Acta, 70, 1997, p. 793.
[29] Aerts, D., and Coecke, B., "The creation-discovery-view: towards a possible explanation of quantum reality", in: Dalla Chiara,
302
M.L., Proceedings of the 1Oth international congress of logic, methodology and philosophy of science, Kluwer Academic, 1998.
[30] Aerts, D., "The hidden measurement formalism: what can be explained and where paradoxes remain?", Int. J. Theor. Phys., 37, 1998.
[31] Coecke, B., and Valckenborgh, F., "Hidden measurements, automorphisms and decompositions in context dependent components",
Int. J. Theor. Phys., 37, 1998, p. 311.
[32] Aerts, D., "The entity and modern physics", in: Castellani, E.
(ed.), Identity and individuality of physical objects, Princeton University
Press, 1998.
[33] Coecke, B., "A representation for compound quantum systems
as individual entities: hard acts of creation and Hidden Correlations",
Found. Phys., 28, to appear (1998).
[34] Moore, D.J., "On state spaces and property lattices", Stud. Hist.
Phil. Mod. Phys., to appear (1998).
INDEX
AO')'O<;,
232
303
304
INDEX
INDEX
305
induction, 189
Forms or Ideas, 169
Foucault, Michel, 64, 89
foundation(s)
basic categories, 185
chrono-chemistry, 114
cognitive science, 33, 34, 36, 39
epistemology, 39
General Relativity, 184
hypothetical, 7
knowledge, 173
logic, 32
magnetic fluids research, 119
mathematics, 186
morality, 18
natural science, 178
philosophy, 176
physics, 188
Fourier, Joseph, 158, 270, 272, 286
fractal structure, 93, 97
functionalism, 33-36, 171
Galilei, Ga!ileo, 174, 176, 179, 231
Gassendi, Pierre, 177-179
general relativity, 2, 140, 184, 208,
267, 268, 273-277, 287
Geneva School approach, 184, 185,
189
geophysics, 105
God, 17, 57, 66, 145, 171, 180
Godel, Kurt, 44-49, 51-53, 55, 59,
201, 227
incompleteness theorem, 44, 51, 227
Heidegger, Martin, 64, 225, 232
Heisenberg, Werner, 159, 199, 201,
217, 227, 254, 282, 286
Heraclitus of Ephesus, 163-168, 170,
171, 174, 175, 178
realism, 164, 167, 174
hermeneutics
physical, 232
hidden variables, 197, 198, 200, 204,
205, 207, 208, 227, 291
Hiley, Basil J., 254, 257, 258, 260
306
INDEX
INDEX
world, 254
Leucippus, 166
level
constructivity, 217, 219, 220, 222
interdisciplinarity, 121, 128
reality, 169
life, 27, 70, 82, 288
linguistic models for quantum theory, 219
linguistics, 19, 26, 31, 33, 38, 188,
213, 214
Linnaeus, 151
Lockwood, M., 257
logic
Aristotle, 172
classical, 172
logic as a standardising rule, 164
logical positivism, 2, 32, 41
logos, 175, 226
Lorenz, Edward N., 92-94
Lyotard, Jean-Fran<;ois, 63
Mach, Ernst, 2-4, 230, 249
magnetic discontinuity, 111
magnetic fluids, 119
magnetic solar cycle, 111
many-worlds, 276
mathematics, 10, 12, 17, 51-53, 5558, 62, 80, 99, 100, 152, 185-187,
189, 190, 201, 225
matter, 174, 281
dark, 143
Maxwell, James Clerk, 239, 240, 267
measurability, 213, 214, 217, 219, 221,
222, 229, 230
measurement, 17, 74, 93, 151, 158,
187, 197, 199-205, 207, 208, 213215, 217-219, 221, 226, 228, 232,
237, 246, 253, 256, 258, 260, 276,
292, 296, 298, 299
basic sentence, 213, 218, 219, 221,
222
context, 296
environment, 292
hidden, 292, 293, 295, 296, 299
process, 189, 297, 299
307
mechanics
classical, 179
Mendeleev, 150, 151, 153, 154
meta-language, 213
metamorphology, 71, 73-79, 81-84
metaphysics, 18, 43, 143, 163, 169,
171-178, 180, 181, 183, 184
realism, 1, 19, 243, 244, 250
Western, 226
world view, 167, 170
microbiology, 113, 125, 127
mind/matter problem, 288
modal causal relation, 246
model, 31-33, 35, 36, 38, 39, 41, 43,
46-48, 51, 52, 59, 80, 89, 91, 92,
94,96, 101,110,140-142,152,188,
197, 199, 202, 219, 227, 241, 253,
255, 257, 281, 292, 293, 295, 297,
299
oscillating universe, 144, 147
plasma universe, 144, 147
modern science, 31, 65, 80, 173-175,
177, 243, 246, 252
modes of ascertainment, 217
monads, 78
Moore, D.J., 188, 189
morality, 17-19, 22, 24-26, 28
motion of the sun, 107
neurophysiology, 31
neuroscience, 33
Newton, 5, 7, 53, 106, 152, 166, 174,
179-181, 184, 187, 192, 194, 195,
231, 237, 267, 268
Newton, 267
Nietzsche, 64
NIPALS, 156
nominalism, 153, 172, 173, 177, 247
non-linear equations, 79
non-local behaviour, 182
non-separability, 226, 228, 230, 231,
233
nondecomposability, 92
Northern-Southern dissymmetry, 108
noumenal physics, 283
308
INDEX
classical, 167
philosophy of science, 1, 2, 4, 7, 8, 10,
12, 13, 34, 78, 89, 97, 243
photons, 240
physical reality
elementary nature, 237
physics, 2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 12, 17, 47,
58, 71-73, 75, 78, 80-83, 105, 120,
123, 147, 152, 173, 181, 184, 186188, 197, 204
classical, 180, 197-203, 206-209,
221,225,226,228,230,231,245,
248, 249, 251, 285, 288, 293295
incompleteness, 226
phys~, 226, 231, 233
Piccardi, G., 101-104, 108, 111, 113,
114
Piron, Constantin, 163, 166, 182, 184,
187, 188, 287, 293, 295
plasma universe, 144, 147
Plato,31,53-55,58,59, 151,163-170
realism, 169
plenum, 180
PLS, 157
Poincare, Henri, 2, 3, 10, 12, 229, 230,
253, 285
Popper, Karl, 5, 12, 90, 95, 244
creative intuition, 53
positive feedback, 98
positivism, 1, 2, 32, 41
precipitation reaction, 102
principal axes, 153
Principia, 179
principle
coincidence of opposites, 165, 185
contradiction, 167, 169, 171-173,
185
identity, 172
probability, 8, 200, 247, 270, 271, 275,
291-296, 298
classical, 291, 295, 299
Proceedings of the International Conferences, 121
productivity data, 128
INDEX
proliferation, 139, 140, 143, 146, 147
proof, 45-48, 51-55, 144, 213, 227
properties, 270
property, 40, 43, 46, 114, 120, 150152, 154, 156, 158, 169, 170, 172,
176, 178, 180, 182-184, 189, 213,
220, 221, 229, 231, 237-239, 241,
245, 250, 251, 258, 267-274, 277,
281, 287, 288, 292, 293, 295
prophet, 20
psychology, 24, 31, 33, 83, 152
folk, 34, 36
quantum field theory, 208, 228, 270275
quantum gravity, 27 4, 275
quantum logic, 182
quantum machine, 297-299
quantum mechanics, 147, 163, 174,
197-201, 203-206, 208, 213, 218,
219, 221, 226-229, 237, 248, 253,
270, 273, 283, 285, 286, 288, 291,
294, 296
realism, 163
quantum probabilities, 291, 293, 295,
297, 299
quasi-categories, 189
quasi-classic manifestations, 257
quasi-classical, 257, 258
quasi-locality, 257
quasi-localized, 258
rationalism, 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 12, 79,
82, 90, 164
real, 253
real union of mind and body, 246
rcalims
Plato, 169
realism, 3, 11, 31, 54, 55, 78, 149, 164,
165, 167-170, 175, 188, 204, 208,
230, 244, 245, 252, 253, 255, 259,
292
absolute, 167
anti-realism, 244, 246
Aristotle, 171, 172
309
310
INDEX