Maternity Childrens Hospital vs. Secretary of Labor G.R. No.

78909June
30, 1989EN BANC: MEDIALDEA, J.:
Facts:
Petitioner is a semi-government hospital, managed by the Board of Directors of the
Cagayan deOro Women's Club and Puericulture Center, headed by Mrs. Antera
Dorado, as holdover President. The hospital derives its finances from the club itself
as well as from paying patients,averaging 130 per month. It is also partly subsidized
by the Philippine Charity SweepstakesOffice and the Cagayan De Oro City
government.Petitioner has forty-one (41) employees. Aside from salary and living
allowances, theemployees are given food, but the amount spent therefor is
deducted from their respectivesalariesOn May 23, 1986, ten (10) employees of the
petitioner employed in different capacities/positionsfiled a complaint with the Office
of the Regional Director of Labor and Employment, Region X,for underpayment of
their salaries and ECOLAS, which was docketed as ROX Case No. CW-71-86.On June
16, 1986, the Regional Director directed two of his Labor Standard and
WelfareOfficers to inspect the records of the petitioner to ascertain the truth of the
allegations in thecomplaints. Based on their inspection report and recommendation,
the Regional Director issuedan Order dated August 4, 1986, directing the payment
of P723,888.58, representingunderpayment of wages and ECOLAs to all the
petitioner's employees.Petitioner appealed from this Order to the Minister of Labor
and Employment, Hon. Augusto S.Sanchez, who rendered a Decision on September
24, 1986, modifying the said Order in thatdeficiency wages and ECOLAs should be
computed only from May 23, 1983 to May 23, 1986,On October 24, 1986, the
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by theSecretary of
Labor in his Order dated May 13, 1987, for lack of merit.
Issue:
Whether or not the Regional Director had jurisdiction over the case and if so, the
extent of coverage of any award that should be forthcoming, arising from his
visitorial and enforcementpowers under Article 128 of the Labor Code.
Held:
This is a labor standards case, and is governed by Art. 128-b of the Labor Code, as
amendedby E.O. No. 111. Under the present rules, a Regional Director exercises
both visitorial andenforcement power over labor standards cases, and is therefore
empowered to adjudicatemoney claims, provided there still exists an employeremployee relationship, and the findings of the regional office is not contested by the
employer concerned.
1
Labor standards refer to the minimum requirements prescribed by existing laws,
rules, andregulations relating to wages, hours of work, cost of living allowance and
other monetary andwelfare benefits, including occupational, safety, and health
standards (Section 7, Rule I, Ruleson the Disposition of Labor Standards Cases in the
Regional Office, dated September 16,1987).

Decision:
ACCORDINGLY, this petition should be dismissed, as it is hereby DISMISSED, as
regards allpersons still employed in the Hospital at the time of the filing of the
complaint, but GRANTED asregards those employees no longer employed at that
time. SO ORDERED

Calalang vs. WilliamsG.R. No. 478002 December 1940FIRST DIVISION,

LAUREL (J): 4 CONCUR

Facts:
A resolution by the National Traffice Commission that animal drawn vehicles be
prohibited frompassing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la
Barca to Dasmarias Street,from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30
p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue extendingfrom the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street
to Echague Street, from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m., for aperiod of one year from the date of
the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic was approvedand adopted by the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications upon indorsement by theDirector of
Public Works pursuant to Commonwealth Act 548 with modifications that
RosarioStreet and Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles,
between the points andduring the hours as indicated.The Mayor of Manila and the
Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to beenforced the rules
and regulations thus adopted. Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a privatecitizen
and as a taxpayer of Manila, brought before the Supreme Court the petition for a
writ of prohibition against A. D. Williams, as Chairman of the National Traffic
Commission; VicenteFragante, as Director of Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting
Secretary of Public Works andCommunications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of the
City of Manila; and Juan Dominguez, asActing Chief of Police of Manila.
Issue:
Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the Director of Public Works
infringe uponthe constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to
insure the well-being andeconomic security of all the people.
Held:
The promotion of social justice is to be achieved not through a mistaken sympathy
towards anygiven group.Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor
atomism, nor anarchy," but thehumanization of laws and the equalization of social
and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively
secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the
promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of
measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of
society,through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the
interrelations of themembers of the community, constitutionally, through the
adoption of measures legally justifiable,or extra-constitutionally, through the
exercise of powers underlying the existence of allgovernments on the time-honored
principle of salus populi est suprema lex.Social justice, therefore, must be founded
on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse
units of a society and of the protection that shouldbe equally and evenly extended

to all groups as a combined force in our social and economiclife, consistent with the
fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the
3
health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good
to thegreatest number."

Decision:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Writ of Prohibition Prayed for is hereby denied,
with costsagainst the petitioner. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Imperial, Diaz and Horrilleno, JJ., concur.

Philippine Association of Service Expporters, (PASEI) Inc. vs. DrilonG.R.

No. 81958June 30, 1988EN BANC, SARMIENTO, J:Facts:
The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI), a
firm"engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers for overseas
placement," challengesthe Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series
of 1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of
"GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARYSUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF
FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS,"and specifically assailed for
"discrimination against males or females;"
2
that it "does not applyto all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and
females with similar skills;"
3
and that it isviolative of the right to travel. It is held likewise to be an invalid
exercise of the lawmakingpower, police power being legislative, and not executive,
in character.On May 25, 1988, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondents
Secretary of Labor and Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration, filed a Commentinforming the Court that on March 8, 1988, the
respondent Labor Secretary lifted thedeployment ban in the states of Iraq, Jordan,
Qatar, Canada, Hongkong, United States, Italy,Norway, Austria, and Switzerland. In
submitting the validity of the challenged "guidelines," theSolicitor General invokes
the police power of the Philippine State.
Issue:
Whether the challenged Department Order is a valid regulation in the nature of a
police power measure under the Constitution.
Held:
The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been
defined as the"state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal
liberty or property in order topromote the general welfare."
5
As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint uponliberty or property, (2) in
order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact definitionbut has
been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive
embrace.Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to

anticipate the futurewhere it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient
and flexible response toconditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest
benefits.It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not
owe its origin to theCharter. Along with the taxing power and eminent domain, it is
inborn in the very fact of statehood and sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of
government that has enabled it toperform the most vital functions of governance.
The police power of the State ... is a power coextensive with self- protection. It may
be said to be that inherent and plenary power in theState which enables it to
prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.As a general
rule, official acts enjoy a presumed validity.
13
In the absence of clear andconvincing evidence to the contrary, the presumption
logically stands.
9

The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should
be nullified.There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to
"female contract workers,"
14
but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is wellsettled that"equality before the law" under the Constitution
15
does not import a perfect Identity of rightsamong all men and women."Protection to
labor" does not signify the promotion of employment alone. What concerns
theConstitution more paramountly is that such an employment be above all, decent,
just, andhumane. Under these circumstances, the Government is duty-bound to
insure that our toilingexpatriates have adequate protection, personally and
economically, while away from home. Inthis case, the Government has evidence, an
evidence the petitioner cannot seriously dispute, of the lack or inadequacy of such
protection, and as part of its duty, it has precisely ordered anindefinite ban on
deployment.This Court understands the grave implications the questioned Order
has on the business of recruitment. The concern of the Government, however, is not
necessarily to maintain profits of business firms. In the ordinary sequence of events,
it is profits that suffer as a result of Government regulation. The interest of the State
is to provide a decent living to its citizens.
Decision:
The Government has convinced the Court in this case that this is its intent. We do
not find theimpugned Order to be tainted with a grave abuse of discretion to
warrant the extraordinary relief prayed for.WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
No costs. SO ORDERED.

Yap, C.J., Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco,

Padilla,Bidin, Cortes and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.Gutierrez, Jr. and Medialdea, JJ., are
on leave

Brotherhood Labor Unity Movement of the Philippines vs. ZamoraG.R.

No. 48645, Jan. 7, 1987
Facts: Petitioners have been reporting as loaders for San Miguel Parola Glass Factory
under thesupervision of a certain Camahort. Job orders for work came from
Camahort and petitionerswere also supplied with tools and other equipment for the
fulfillment of their duties. With the joborders being dependent on the volume of
production of the factory, work was not necessarily 8hours but at times petitioners
would be asked to work more than 8 hours and at times also onSaturdays and
Sundays They were not paid for their overtime and rendered work duringSaturdays
and Sundays.Petitioners organized and held union activities to push management to
pay for their overtime and holiday compensation as well as other grievances. Some
members were thendismissed from work due to their membership with the union.
Due to this, Petitioners filed anotice of strike on the Bureau of Labor Relations and a
meeting was held between the partieswherein petitioners gave proposals for
recognition and collective bargaining.San Miguel refused to bargain with petitioners
alleging that there was no employer employee relationship.The NLRC heard the
dispute and the arbiter decided in favor of the Petitioners to receiveone year salary.
Upon appeal of SMC, the Secretary stressed upon the decision that there wasno
employer employee relationship.Thus the appeal of the petitoners.
Issue: Whether or not the employer employee relationship exists between the
BrotherhoodLabor Union Movement and San Miguel Corporation?
Ruling: The petition is granted. SMC was ordered to reinstate petitioners, with three
(3) yearsbackwages. However, if reinstatement is no longer possible, SMC is ordered
to pay separationpay equivalent to one (1) month pay for every year of
service.Ratio:The question of whether an employer employee relationship exists in
a certainsituation continues to bedevil the courts. Some businessmen try to avoid
the bringing about of an employer employee relationship in their enterprises
because that judicial relation spawnsobligations connected with workmens
compensation, social security, medicare, termination pay,and unionism.

ANTONIO M. SERRANO VS. GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES, INC. AND

MARLOW NAVIGATION CO., INC.
GR No. 167614 - March 24, 2009
En banc

FACTS:

Petitioner Antonio Serrano was hired by respondents Gallant Maritime Services, Inc.
and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., under a POEA-approved contract of employment
for 12 months, as Chief Officer, with the basic monthly salary of US$1,400, plus
$700/month overtime pay, and 7 days paid vacation leave per month.

On March 19, 1998, the date of his departure, Serrano was constrained to accept a
downgraded employment contract for the position of Second Officer with a monthly
salary of US$1,000 upon the assurance and representation of respondents that he
would be Chief Officer by the end of April 1998.

Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make Serrano Chief Officer. Hence,
Serrano refused to stay on as second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines
on May 26, 1998, serving only two (2) months and seven (7) days of his contract,
leaving an unexpired portion of nine (9) months and twenty-three (23) days.

Serrano filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint against respondents for
constructive dismissal and for payment of his money claims in the total amount of
US$26,442.73 (based on the computation of $2590/month from June 1998 to
February 199, $413.90 for March 1998, and $1640 for March 1999) as well as moral
and exemplary damages.

The LA declared the petitioner's dismissal illegal and awarded him US$8,770,
representing his salaray for three (3) months of the unexpired portion of the
aforesaid contract of employment, plus $45 for salary differential and for attorney's
fees equivalent to 10% of the total amount; however, no compensation for damages
as prayed was awarded.

On appeal, the NLRC modified the LA decision and awarded Serrano $4669.50,
representing three (3) months salary at $1400/month, plus 445 salary differential
and 10% for attorney's fees. This decision was based on the provision of RA 8042,
which was made into law on July 15, 1995.

Serrano filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he questioned the
constitutionality of the last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of RA 8042,
which reads:
Sec. 10. Money Claims. - x x x In case of termination of overseas employment
without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the workers
shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of
twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his
employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less.

The NLRC denied the Motion; hence, Serrano filed a Petition for Certiorari with the
Court of Appeals (CA), reiterating the constitutional challenge against the subject
clause. The CA affirmed the NLRC ruling on the reduction of the applicable salary
rate, but skirted the constitutional issue raised by herein petitioner Serrano.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the subject clause violates Section 10, Article III of the
Constitution on non-impairment of contracts;

2. Whether or not the subject clause violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution,
and Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII on labor as a protected sector.

HELD:

On the first issue.

The answer is in the negative. Petitioner's claim that the subject clause unduly
interferes with the stipulations in his contract on the term of his employment and
the fixed salary package he will receive is not tenable.
Section 10, Article III of the Constitution provides: No law impairing the obligation of
contracts shall be passed.

The prohibition is aligned with the general principle that laws newly enacted have
only a prospective operation, and cannot affect acts or contracts already perfected;
however, as to laws already in existence, their provisions are read into contracts
and deemed a part thereof. Thus, the non-impairment clause under Section 10,
Article II is limited in application to laws about to be enacted that would in any way
derogate from existing acts or contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any manner
changing the intention of the parties thereto.

As aptly observed by the OSG, the enactment of R.A. No. 8042 in 1995 preceded the
execution of the employment contract between petitioner and respondents in 1998.
Hence, it cannot be argued that R.A. No. 8042, particularly the subject clause,
impaired the employment contract of the parties. Rather, when the parties executed
their 1998 employment contract, they were deemed to have incorporated into it all
the provisions of R.A. No. 8042.

But even if the Court were to disregard the timeline, the subject clause may not be
declared unconstitutional on the ground that it impinges on the impairment clause,
for the law was enacted in the exercise of the police power of the State to regulate a
business, profession or calling, particularly the recruitment and deployment of
OFWs, with the noble end in view of ensuring respect for the dignity and well-being
of OFWs wherever they may be employed. Police power legislations adopted by the
State to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and
general welfare of the people are generally applicable not only to future contracts
but even to those already in existence, for all private contracts must yield to the
superior and legitimate measures taken by the State to promote public welfare.

On the second issue.

The answer is in the affirmative.

Section 1, Article III of the Constitution guarantees: No person shall be deprived of

life, liberty, or property without due process of law nor shall any person be denied
the equal protection of the law.

Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII accord all members of the labor
sector, without distinction as to place of deployment, full protection of their rights
and welfare.

To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional

provisions translate to economic security and parity: all monetary benefits should
be equally enjoyed by workers of similar category, while all monetary obligations
should be borne by them in equal degree; none should be denied the protection of
the laws which is enjoyed by, or spared the burden imposed on, others in like
circumstances.

Such rights are not absolute but subject to the inherent power of Congress to
incorporate, when it sees fit, a system of classification into its legislation; however,
to be valid, the classification must comply with these requirements: 1) it is based on
substantial distinctions; 2) it is germane to the purposes of the law; 3) it is not
limited to existing conditions only; and 4) it applies equally to all members of the
class.

There are three levels of scrutiny at which the Court reviews the constitutionality of
a classification embodied in a law: a) the deferential or rational basis scrutiny in
which the challenged classification needs only be shown to be rationally related to
serving a legitimate state interest; b) the middle-tier or intermediate scrutiny in
which the government must show that the challenged classification serves an
important state interest and that the classification is at least substantially related to
serving that interest; and c) strict judicial scrutiny in which a legislative
classification which impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental
right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed

unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the government to prove that the
classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the
least restrictive means to protect such interest.

Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it applies to all
OFWs. However, a closer examination reveals that the subject clause has a
discriminatory intent against, and an invidious impact on, OFWs at two levels:
First, OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis--vis OFWs with
employment contracts of one year or more;
Second, among OFWs with employment contracts of more than one year; and
Third, OFWs vis--vis local workers with fixed-period employment;

In sum, prior to R.A. No. 8042, OFWs and local workers with fixed-term employment
who were illegally discharged were treated alike in terms of the computation of their
money claims: they were uniformly entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired
portions of their contracts. But with the enactment of R.A. No. 8042, specifically the
adoption of the subject clause, illegally dismissed OFWs with an unexpired portion
of one year or more in their employment contract have since been differently
treated in that their money claims are subject to a 3-month cap, whereas no such
limitation is imposed on local workers with fixed-term employment.

The Court concludes that the subject clause contains a suspect classification in that,
in the computation of the monetary benefits of fixed-term employees who are
illegally discharged, it imposes a 3-month cap on the claim of OFWs with an
unexpired portion of one year or more in their contracts, but none on the claims of
other OFWs or local workers with fixed-term employment. The subject clause singles
out one classification of OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage.

There being a suspect classification involving a vulnerable sector protected by the

Constitution, the Court now subjects the classification to a strict judicial scrutiny,
and determines whether it serves a compelling state interest through the least
restrictive means.

What constitutes compelling state interest is measured by the scale of rights and
powers arrayed in the Constitution and calibrated by history. It is akin to the
paramount interest of the state for which some individual liberties must give way,
such as the public interest in safeguarding health or maintaining medical standards,
or in maintaining access to information on matters of public concern.

In the present case, the Court dug deep into the records but found no compelling
state interest that the subject clause may possibly serve.

In fine, the Government has failed to discharge its burden of proving the existence
of a compelling state interest that would justify the perpetuation of the
discrimination against OFWs under the subject clause.

Assuming that, as advanced by the OSG, the purpose of the subject clause is to
protect the employment of OFWs by mitigating the solidary liability of placement
agencies, such callous and cavalier rationale will have to be rejected. There can
never be a justification for any form of government action that alleviates the burden
of one sector, but imposes the same burden on another sector, especially when the
favored sector is composed of private businesses such as placement agencies, while
the disadvantaged sector is composed of OFWs whose protection no less than the
Constitution commands. The idea that private business interest can be elevated to
the level of a compelling state interest is odious.

Moreover, even if the purpose of the subject clause is to lessen the solidary liability
of placement agencies vis-a-vis their foreign principals, there are mechanisms
already in place that can be
employed to achieve that purpose without infringing on the constitutional rights of
OFWs.

The POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of
Land-Based Overseas Workers, dated February 4, 2002, imposes administrative
disciplinary measures on erring foreign employers who default on their contractual
obligations to migrant workers and/or their Philippine agents. These disciplinary
measures range from temporary disqualification to preventive suspension. The
POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of
Seafarers, dated May 23, 2003, contains similar administrative disciplinary
measures against erring foreign employers.

Resort to these administrative measures is undoubtedly the less restrictive means

of aiding local placement agencies in enforcing the solidary liability of their foreign
principals.

Thus, the subject clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is
violative of the right of petitioner and other OFWs to equal protection.

The subject clause or for three months for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is
DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL

Note:

When the Court is called upon to exercise its power of judicial review of the acts of
its co-equals, such as the Congress, it does so only when these conditions obtain:
(1) that there is an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of rights
susceptible of judicial determination; (2) that the constitutional question is raised by
a proper party and at the earliest opportunity; and (3) that the constitutional
question is the very lis mota of the case, otherwise the Court will dismiss the case
or decide the same on some other ground.
---As discussed earlier, prior to R.A. No. 8042, a uniform system of computation of the
monetary awards of illegally dismissed OFWs was in place. This uniform system was
applicable even to local workers with fixed-term employment.

Article 605 of the Code of Commerce provides:

Article 605. If the contracts of the captain and members of the crew with the agent
should be for a definite period or voyage, they cannot be discharged until the
fulfillment of their contracts, except for reasons of insubordination in serious
matters, robbery, theft, habitual drunkenness, and damage caused to the vessel or
to its cargo by malice or manifest or proven negligence.

Article 605 was applied to Madrigal Shipping Company, Inc. v. Ogilvie, in which the
Court held the shipping company liable for the salaries and subsistence allowance
of its illegally dismissed employees for the entire unexpired portion of their
employment contracts.

While Article 605 has remained good law up to the present, Article 299 of the Code
of Commerce was replaced by Art. 1586 of the Civil Code of 1889, to wit:
Article 1586. Field hands, mechanics, artisans, and other laborers hired for a certain
time and for a certain work cannot leave or be dismissed without sufficient cause,
before the fulfillment of the contract.

G.R. No. L-46496

February 27, 1940

ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and proprietor,

and NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD, petitioners,

vs.

THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC.,

respondents.

Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Assistant Attorney Barcelona for the Court
of Industrial Relations.
Antonio D. Paguia for National Labor Unon.
Claro M. Recto for petitioner Ang Tibay.
Jose M. Casal for National Workers Brotherhood.

DECISION

LAUREL, J.:

The Solicitor-General in behalf of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the

above-entitled case has filed a motion for reconsideration and moves that, for the
reasons stated in his motion, we reconsider the following legal conclusions of the
majority opinion of this Court:

1. Que un contrato de trabajo, asi individual como colectivo, sin termino fijo de
duracion o que no sea para una determinada, termina o bien por voluntad de
cualquiera de las partes o cada vez que ilega el plazo fijado para el pago de los
salarios segun costumbre en la localidad o cunado se termine la obra;

2. Que los obreros de una empresa fabril, que han celebrado contrato, ya individual
ya colectivamente, con ell, sin tiempo fijo, y que se han visto obligados a cesar en
sus tarbajos por haberse declarando paro forzoso en la fabrica en la cual tarbajan,
dejan de ser empleados u obreros de la misma;

3. Que un patrono o sociedad que ha celebrado un contrato colectivo de trabajo con

sus osbreros sin tiempo fijo de duracion y sin ser para una obra determiminada y
que se niega a readmitir a dichos obreros que cesaron como consecuencia de un
paro forzoso, no es culpable de practica injusta in incurre en la sancion penal del
articulo 5 de la Ley No. 213 del Commonwealth, aunque su negativa a readmitir se
deba a que dichos obreros pertenecen a un determinado organismo obrero, puesto

que tales ya han dejado deser empleados suyos por terminacion del contrato en
virtud del paro.

The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other hand, prays for the vacation
of the judgment rendered by the majority of this Court and the remanding of the
case to the Court of Industrial Relations for a new trial, and avers:

1. That Toribio Teodoros claim that on September 26, 1938, there was shortage of
leather soles in ANG TIBAY making it necessary for him to temporarily lay off the
members of the National Labor Union Inc., is entirely false and unsupported by the
records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in
leather.

2. That the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a
scheme to systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of
his CONTRACT with the Philippine Army.

3. That Toribio Teodoros letter to the Philippine Army dated September 29, 1938, (re
supposed delay of leather soles from the States) was but a scheme to
systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his
CONTRACT with the Philippine Army.

4. That the National Workers Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a company or employer

union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal.
(281 U.S., 548, petitioners printed memorandum, p. 25.)

5. That in the exercise by the laborers of their rights to collective bargaining,

majority rule and elective representation are highly essential and indispensable.
(Sections 2 and 5, Commonwealth Act No. 213.)

6. That the century provisions of the Civil Code which had been (the) principal
source of dissensions and continuous civil war in Spain cannot and should not be
made applicable in interpreting and applying the salutary provisions of a modern
labor legislation of American origin where the industrial peace has always been the
rule.

7. That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for
discriminating against the National Labor Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring the
National Workers Brotherhood.

8. That the exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to the respondents that
even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained
them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations.

9. That the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance
and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and
reversal of the judgment rendered herein.

The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion for
reconsideration of the respondent National Labor Union, Inc.

In view of the conclusion reached by us and to be herein after stead with reference
to the motion for a new trial of the respondent National Labor Union, Inc., we are of
the opinion that it is not necessary to pass upon the motion for reconsideration of
the Solicitor-General. We shall proceed to dispose of the motion for new trial of the
respondent labor union. Before doing this, however, we deem it necessary, in the
interest of orderly procedure in cases of this nature to make several observations
regarding the nature of the powers of the Court of Industrial Relations and
emphasize certain guiding principles which should be observed in the trial of cases
brought before it. We have re-examined the entire record of the proceedings had
before the Court of Industrial Relations in this case, and we have found no
substantial evidence that the exclusion of the 89 laborers here was due to their
union affiliation or activity. The whole transcript taken contains what transpired
during the hearing and is more of a record of contradictory and conflicting
statements of opposing counsel, with sporadic conclusion drawn to suit their own
views. It is evident that these statements and expressions of views of counsel have
no evidentiary value.

The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are specifically
stated in the law of its creation (Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an
administrative than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not
intended to be a mere receptive organ of the Government. Unlike a court of justice
which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding
only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the Court
of Industrial Relations, as will appear from perusal of its organic law, is more active,
affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in
the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions

in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its

functions are far more comprehensive and expensive. It has jurisdiction over the
entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter
controversy or dispute arising between, and/or affecting employers and employees
or laborers, and regulate the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance
with, the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 103 (section 1). It shall take
cognizance or purposes of prevention, arbitration, decision and settlement, of any
industrial or agricultural dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout, arising
from differences as regards wages, shares or compensation, hours of labor or
conditions of tenancy or employment, between landlords and tenants or farmlaborers, provided that the number of employees, laborers or tenants of farmlaborers involved exceeds thirty, and such industrial or agricultural dispute is
submitted to the Court by the Secretary of Labor or by any or both of the parties to
the controversy and certified by the Secretary of labor as existing and proper to be
by the Secretary of Labor as existing and proper to be dealt with by the Court for
the sake of public interest. (Section 4,ibid.) It shall, before hearing the dispute and
in the course of such hearing, endeavor to reconcile the parties and induce them to
settle the dispute by amicable agreement. (Paragraph 2, section 4, ibid.) When
directed by the President of the Philippines, it shall investigate and study all
industries established in a designated locality, with a view to determining the
necessity and fairness of fixing and adopting for such industry or locality a minimum
wage or share of laborers or tenants, or a maximum canon or rental to be paid by
the inquilinos or tenants or less to landowners. (Section 5, ibid.) In fine, it may
appeal to voluntary arbitration in the settlement of industrial disputes; may employ
mediation or conciliation for that purpose, or recur to the more effective system of
official investigation and compulsory arbitration in order to determine specific
controversies between labor and capital industry and in agriculture. There is in
reality here a mingling of executive and judicial functions, which is a departure from
the rigid doctrine of the separation of governmental powers.

In the case of Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., G.R. No. 46673,
promulgated September 13, 1939, we had occasion to point out that the Court of
Industrial Relations et al., is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of
procedure, and the Act requires it to act according to justice and equity and
substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and
shall not be bound by any technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by
any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it
may deem just and equitable. (Section 20, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) It shall not
be restricted to the specific relief claimed or demands made by the parties to the
industrial or agricultural dispute, but may include in the award, order or decision
any matter or determination which may be deemed necessary or expedient for the
purpose of settling the dispute or of preventing further industrial or agricultural
disputes. (section 13, ibid.) And in the light of this legislative policy, appeals to this
Court have been especially regulated by the rules recently promulgated by the rules
recently promulgated by this Court to carry into the effect the avowed legislative
purpose. The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be

free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can,
in justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and
essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an
administrative character. There are primary rights which must be respected even in
proceedings of this character:

(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the
party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support
thereof. In the language of Chief Hughes, in Morgan v. U.S., 304 U.S. 1, 58 S. Ct.
773, 999, 82 Law. ed. 1129, the liberty and property of the citizen shall be
protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play.

(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to
adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal
must consider the evidence presented. (Chief Justice Hughes in Morgan v. U.S. 298
U.S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 law. ed. 1288.) In the language of this court in Edwards
vs. McCoy, 22 Phil., 598, the right to adduce evidence, without the corresponding
duty on the part of the board to consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously futile
if the person or persons to whom the evidence is presented can thrust it aside
without notice or consideration.

(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it
does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having
something to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached. (Edwards vs.
McCoy, supra.) This principle emanates from the more fundamental is contrary to
the vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon
power.

(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion (City of
Manila vs. Agustin, G.R. No. 45844, promulgated November 29, 1937, XXXVI O. G.
1335), but the evidence must be substantial. (Washington, Virginia and Maryland
Coach Co. v. National labor Relations Board, 301 U.S. 142, 147, 57 S. Ct. 648, 650,
81 Law. ed. 965.) It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. (Appalachian Electric Power v. National Labor
Relations Board, 4 Cir., 93 F. 2d 985, 989; National Labor Relations Board v.
Thompson Products, 6 Cir., 97 F. 2d 13, 15; Ballston-Stillwater Knitting Co. v.
National Labor Relations Board, 2 Cir., 98 F. 2d 758, 760.) . . . The statute provides
that the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be
controlling. The obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free
administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the mere
admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent inn judicial proceedings
would not invalidate the administrative order. (Interstate Commerce Commission v.

Baird, 194 U.S. 25, 44, 24 S. Ct. 563, 568, 48 Law. ed. 860; Interstate Commerce
Commission v. Louisville and Nashville R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 93 33 S. Ct. 185, 187, 57
Law. ed. 431; United States v. Abilene and Southern Ry. Co. S. Ct. 220, 225, 74 Law.
ed. 624.) But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure
does not go far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational
probative force. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute
substantial evidence. (Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 59
S. Ct. 206, 83 Law. ed. No. 4, Adv. Op., p. 131.)

(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at
least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. (Interstate
Commerce Commission vs. L. & N. R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law. ed.
431.) Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the
parties, can the latter be protected in their right to know and meet the case against
them. It should not, however, detract from their duty actively to see that the law is
enforced, and for that purpose, to use the authorized legal methods of securing
evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant to the controversy.
Boards of inquiry may be appointed for the purpose of investigating and
determining the facts in any given case, but their report and decision are only
advisory. (Section 9, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) The Court of Industrial Relations
may refer any industrial or agricultural dispute or any matter under its consideration
or advisement to a local board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal. a justice of the peace or
any public official in any part of the Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation, and may delegate to such board or public official such powers and
functions as the said Court of Industrial Relations may deem necessary, but such
delegation shall not affect the exercise of the Court itself of any of its powers.
(Section 10, ibid.)

(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or
his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not
simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. It may be that the
volume of work is such that it is literally Relations personally to decide all
controversies coming before them. In the United States the difficulty is solved with
the enactment of statutory authority authorizing examiners or other subordinates to
render final decision, with the right to appeal to board or commission, but in our
case there is no such statutory authority.

(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its
decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various
issues involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered. The performance of this
duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.

In the right of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is sufficient to observe here

that, except as to the alleged agreement between the Ang Tibay and the National
Workers Brotherhood (appendix A), the record is barren and does not satisfy the
thirst for a factual basis upon which to predicate, in a national way, a conclusion of
law.

This result, however, does not now preclude the concession of a new trial prayed for
the by respondent National Labor Union, Inc., it is alleged that the supposed lack of
material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to systematically
discharged all the members of the National Labor Union Inc., from work and this
averment is desired to be proved by the petitioner with the records of the Bureau
of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather; that the
National Workers Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or employer union
dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal.
Petitioner further alleges under oath that the exhibits attached to the petition to
prove his substantial averments are so inaccessible to the respondents that even
within the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained
them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations, and that the
documents attached to the petition are of such far reaching importance and effect
that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the
judgment rendered herein. We have considered the reply of Ang Tibay and its
arguments against the petition. By and large, after considerable discussions, we
have come to the conclusion that the interest of justice would be better served if
the movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to
in his motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue
involved. The legislation which created the Court of Industrial Relations and under
which it acts is new. The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not
entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result.

ACCORDINGLY, the motion for a new trial should be and the same is hereby
GRANTED, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the Court of
Industrial Relations, with instruction that it reopen the case, receive all such
evidence as may be relevant and otherwise proceed in accordance with the
requirements set forth hereinabove. SO ORDERED.

Avancea, C. J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, Concepcion and Moran, JJ., concur.

FEDERICO M. LEDESMA, JR.,

Petitioner,

- versus -

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC-SECOND DIVISION) HONS. RAUL T.

AQUINO, VICTORIANO R. CALAYCAY and ANGELITA A. GACUTAN ARE THE
COMMISSIONERS, PHILIPPINE NAUTICAL TRAINING INC., ATTY. HERNANI FABIA, RICKY
TY, PABLO MANOLO, C. DE LEON and TREENA CUEVA,
Respondents.

G.R. No. 174585

Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,

Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
NACHURA, JJ.

Promulgated:

October 19, 2007

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court,
filed by petitioner Federico Ledesma, Jr., seeking to reverse and set aside the
Decision,[1] dated 28 May 2005, and the Resolution,[2] dated 7 September 2006, of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79724. The appellate court, in its assailed
Decision and Resolution, affirmed the Decision dated 15 April 2003, and Resolution
dated 9 June 2003, of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), dismissing
petitioners complaint for illegal dismissal and ordering the private respondent
Philippine National Training Institute (PNTI) to reinstate petitioner to his former
position without loss of seniority rights.

The factual and procedural antecedents of the instant petition are as follows:

On 4 December 1998, petitioner was employed as a bus/service driver by the

private respondent on probationary basis, as evidenced by his appointment.[3] As
such, he was required to report at private respondents training site in Dasmarias,
Cavite, under the direct supervision of its site administrator, Pablo Manolo de Leon
(de Leon).[4]

On 11 November 2000, petitioner filed a complaint against de Leon for allegedly

abusing his authority as site administrator by using the private respondents vehicles
and other facilities for personal ends. In the same complaint, petitioner also accused
de Leon of immoral conduct allegedly carried out within the private respondents
premises. A copy of the complaint was duly received by private respondents Chief
Accountant, Nita Azarcon (Azarcon).[5]

On 27 November 2000, de Leon filed a written report against the petitioner

addressed to private respondents Vice-President for Administration, Ricky Ty (Ty),
citing his suspected drug use.

In view of de Leons report, private respondents Human Resource Manager, Trina

Cueva (HR Manager Cueva), on 29 November 2000, served a copy of a Notice to
petitioner requiring him to explain within 24 hours why no disciplinary action should
be imposed on him for allegedly violating Section 14, Article IV of the private
respondents Code of Conduct.[6]

On 3 December 2000, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against

private respondent before the Labor Arbiter.

In his Position Paper,[7] petitioner averred that in view of the complaint he filed
against de Leon for his abusive conduct as site administrator, the latter retaliated
by falsely accusing petitioner as a drug user. VP for Administration Ty, however,
instead of verifying the veracity of de Leons report, readily believed his allegations
and together with HR Manager Cueva, verbally dismissed petitioner from service on
29 November 2000.

Petitioner alleged that he was asked to report at private respondents main office in
Espaa, Manila, on 29 November 2000. There, petitioner was served by HR Manager

Cueva a copy of the Notice to Explain together with the copy of de Leons report
citing his suspected drug use. After he was made to receive the copies of the said
notice and report, HR Manager Cueva went inside the office of VP for Administration
Ty. After a while, HR Manager Cueva came out of the office with VP for
Administration Ty. To petitioners surprise, HR Manager Cueva took back the earlier
Notice to Explain given to him and flatly declared that there was no more need for
the petitioner to explain since his drug test result revealed that he was positive for
drugs. When petitioner, however, asked for a copy of the said drug test result, HR
Manager Cueva told him that it was with the companys president, but she would
also later claim that the drug test result was already with the proper authorities at
Camp Crame.[8]

Petitioner was then asked by HR Manager Cueva to sign a resignation letter and also
remarked that whether or not petitioner would resign willingly, he was no longer
considered an employee of private respondent. All these events transpired in the
presence of VP for Administration Ty, who even convinced petitioner to just
voluntarily resign with the assurance that he would still be given separation pay.
Petitioner did not yet sign the resignation letter replying that he needed time to
think over the offers. When petitioner went back to private respondents training site
in Dasmarias, Cavite, to get his bicycle, he was no longer allowed by the guard to
enter the premises.[9]

On the following day, petitioner immediately went to St. Dominic Medical Center for
a drug test and he was found negative for any drug substance. With his drug result
on hand, petitioner went back to private respondents main office in Manila to talk to
VP for Administration Ty and HR Manager Cueva and to show to them his drug test
result. Petitioner then told VP for Administration Ty and HR Manager Cueva that
since his drug test proved that he was not guilty of the drug use charge against him,
he decided to continue to work for the private respondent.[10]

On 2 December 2000, petitioner reported for work but he was no longer allowed to
enter the training site for he was allegedly banned therefrom according to the guard
on duty. This incident prompted the petitioner to file the complaint for illegal
dismissal against the private respondent before the Labor Arbiter.

For its part, private respondent countered that petitioner was never dismissed from
employment but merely served a Notice to Explain why no disciplinary action should
be filed against him in view of his superiors report that he was suspected of using
illegal drugs. Instead of filing an answer to the said notice, however, petitioner
prematurely lodged a complaint for illegal dismissal against private respondent
before the Labor Arbiter.[11]

Private respondent likewise denied petitioners allegations that it banned the latter
from entering private respondents premises. Rather, it was petitioner who failed or
refused to report to work after he was made to explain his alleged drug use. Indeed,
on 3 December 2000, petitioner was able to claim at the training site his salary for
the period of 16-30 November 2000, as evidenced by a copy of the pay voucher
bearing petitioners signature. Petitioners accusation that he was no longer allowed
to enter the training site was further belied by the fact that he was able to claim his
13th month pay thereat on 9 December 2000, supported by a copy of the pay
voucher signed by petitioner.[12]

On 26 July 2002, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision,[13] in favor of the petitioner
declaring illegal his separation from employment. The Labor Arbiter, however, did
not order petitioners reinstatement for the same was no longer practical, and only
directed private respondent to pay petitioner backwages. The dispositive portion of
the Labor Arbiters Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the dismissal of the [petitioner] is herein

declared to be illegal. [Private respondent] is directed to pay the complainant
backwages and separation pay in the total amount of One Hundred Eighty Four
Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty One Pesos and Fifty Three Centavos (P184, 861.53).
[14]

Both parties questioned the Labor Arbiters Decision before the NLRC. Petitioner
assailed the portion of the Labor Arbiters Decision denying his prayer for
reinstatement, and arguing that the doctrine of strained relations is applied only to
confidential employees and his position as a driver was not covered by such
prohibition.[15] On the other hand, private respondent controverted the Labor
Arbiters finding that petitioner was illegally dismissed from employment, and
insisted that petitioner was never dismissed from his job but failed to report to work
after he was asked to explain regarding his suspected drug use.[16]

On 15 April 2003, the NLRC granted the appeal raised by both parties and reversed
the Labor Arbiters Decision.[17] The NLRC declared that petitioner failed to establish
the fact of dismissal for his claim that he was banned from entering the training site
was rendered impossible by the fact that he was able to subsequently claim his
salary and 13th month pay. Petitioners claim for reinstatement was, however,
granted by the NLRC. The decretal part of the NLRC Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision under review is, hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE, and another entered, DISMISSING the complaint for lack of merit.

[Petitioner] is however, ordered REINSTATED to his former position without loss of

seniority rights, but WITHOUT BACKWAGES.[18]

The Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner was likewise denied by the NLRC
in its Resolution dated 29 August 2003.[19]

The Court of Appeals dismissed petitioners Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Revised Rules of Court, and affirmed the NLRC Decision giving more credence to
private respondents stance that petitioner was not dismissed from employment, as
it is more in accord with the evidence on record and the attendant circumstances of
the instant case.[20] Similarly ill-fated was petitioners Motion for Reconsideration,
which was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution issued on 7 September
2006. [21]

Hence, this instant Petition for Review on Certiorari[22] under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court, filed by petitioner assailing the foregoing Court of Appeals Decision
and Resolution on the following grounds:

I.

WHETHER, THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A MISAPPREHENSION OF

FACTS, AND THE ASSAILED DECISION IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON
RECORD. PETITIONERS DISMISSAL WAS ESTABLISHED BY THE UNCONTRADICTED
EVIDENCES ON RECORD, WHICH WERE MISAPPRECIATED BY PUBLIC RESPONDENT
NLRC, AND HAD THESE BEEN CONSIDERED THE INEVITABLE CONCLUSION WOULD
BE THE AFFIRMATION OF THE LABOR ARBITERS DECISION FINDING ILLEGAL
DISMISSAL

II.

WHETHER, THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS SUBVERTED DUE PROCESS OF LAW WHEN
IT DID NOT CONSIDER THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD SHOWING THAT THERE WAS NO
JUST CAUSE FOR DISMISSAL AS PETITIONER IS NOT A DRUG USER AND THERE IS NO
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THIS GROUND FOR DISMISSAL.

III.

WHETHER, THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW

IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS SUBVERTED PETITIONERS RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS OF THE LAW.[23]

Before we delve into the merits of this case, it is best to stress that the issues raised
by petitioner in this instant petition are factual in nature which is not within the
office of a Petition for Review.[24] The raison detre for this rule is that, this Court is
not a trier of facts and does not routinely undertake the re-examination of the
evidence presented by the contending parties for the factual findings of the labor
officials who have acquired expertise in their own fields are accorded not only
respect but even finality, and are binding upon this Court.[25]

However, when the findings of the Labor Arbiter contradict those of the NLRC,
departure from the general rule is warranted, and this Court must of necessity make
an infinitesimal scrunity and examine the records all over again including the
evidence presented by the opposing parties to determine which findings should be
preferred as more conformable with evidentiary facts.[26]

The primordial issue in the petition at bar is whether the petitioner was illegally
dismissed from employment.

The Labor Arbiter found that the petitioner was illegally dismissed from employment
warranting the payment of his backwages. The NLRC and the Court of Appeals found
otherwise.

In reversing the Labor Arbiters Decision, the NLRC underscored the settled
evidentiary rule that before the burden of proof shifts to the employer to prove the
validity of the employees dismissal, the employee must first sufficiently establish
that he was indeed dismissed from employment. The petitioner, in the present case,
failed to establish the fact of his dismissal. The NLRC did not give credence to
petitioners allegation that he was banned by the private respondent from entering
the workplace, opining that had it been true that petitioner was no longer allowed to
enter the training site when he reported for work thereat on 2 December 2000, it is
quite a wonder he was able to do so the very next day, on 3 December 2000, to
claim his salary.[27]

The Court of Appeals validated the above conclusion reached by the NLRC and
further rationated that petitioners positive allegations that he was dismissed from
service was negated by substantial evidence to the contrary. Petitioners averments
of what transpired inside private respondents main office on 29 November 2000,
when he was allegedly already dismissed from service, and his claim that he was
effectively banned from private respondents premises are belied by the fact that he
was able to claim his salary for the period of 16-30 November 2000 at private
respondents training site.

Petitioner, therefore, is now before this Court assailing the Decisions handed down
by the NLRC and the Court of Appeals, and insisting that he was illegally dismissed
from his employment. Petitioner argues that his receipt of his earned salary for the
period of 16-30 November 2000, and his 13th month pay, is neither inconsistent
with nor a negation of his allegation of illegal dismissal. Petitioner maintains that he
received his salary and benefit only from the guardhouse, for he was already
banned from the work premises.

We are not persuaded.

Well-entrenched is the principle that in order to establish a case before judicial and
quasi-administrative bodies, it is necessary that allegations must be supported by
substantial evidence.[28] Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It
means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.[29]

In the present case, there is hardly any evidence on record so as to meet the
quantum of evidence required, i.e., substantial evidence. Petitioners claim of illegal
dismissal is supported by no other than his own bare, uncorroborated and, thus,
self-serving allegations, which are also incoherent, inconsistent and contradictory.

Petitioner himself narrated that when his presence was requested on 29 November
2000 at the private respondents main office where he was served with the Notice to
Explain his superiors report on his suspected drug use, VP for Administration Ty
offered him separation pay if he will just voluntarily resign from employment. While
we do not condone such an offer, neither can we construe that petitioner was
dismissed at that instance. Petitioner was only being given the option to either
resign and receive his separation pay or not to resign but face the possible
disciplinary charges against him. The final decision, therefore, whether to
voluntarily resign or to continue working still, ultimately rests with the petitioner. In
fact, by petitoners own admission, he requested from VP for Administration Ty more
time to think over the offer.

Moreover, the petitioner alleged that he was not allowed to enter the training site
by the guard on duty who told him that he was already banned from the premises.
Subsequently, however, petitioner admitted in his Supplemental Affidavit that he
was able to return to the said site on 3 December 2000, to claim his 16-30
November 2000 salary, and again on 9 December 2000, to receive his 13th month
pay. The fact alone that he was able to return to the training site to claim his salary
and benefits raises doubt as to his purported ban from the premises.

Finally, petitioners stance that he was dismissed by private respondent was further
weakened with the presentation of private respondents payroll bearing petitioners
name proving that petitioner remained as private respondents employee up to
December 2000. Again, petitioners assertion that the payroll was merely fabricated
for the purpose of supporting private respondents case before the NLRC cannot be
given credence. Entries in the payroll, being entries in the course of business, enjoy
the presumption of regularity under Rule 130, Section 43 of the Rules of Court. It is
therefore incumbent upon the petitioner to adduce clear and convincing evidence in
support of his claim of fabrication and to overcome such presumption of regularity.
[30] Unfortunately, petitioner again failed in such endeavor.

On these scores, there is a dearth of evidence to establish the fact of petitioners

dismissal. We have scrupulously examined the records and we found no evidence
presented by petitioner, other than his own contentions that he was indeed
dismissed by private respondent.

While this Court is not unmindful of the rule that in cases of illegal dismissal, the
employer bears the burden of proof to prove that the termination was for a valid or
authorized cause in the case at bar, however, the facts and the evidence did not
establish a prima facie case that the petitioner was dismissed from employment.
[31] Before the private respondent must bear the burden of proving that the
dismissal was legal, petitioner must first establish by substantial evidence the fact
of his dismissal from service. Logically, if there is no dismissal, then there can be no
question as to the legality or illegality thereof.

In Machica v. Roosevelt Services Center, Inc.,[32] we had underscored that the

burden of proving the allegations rest upon the party alleging, to wit:

The rule is that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it; thus, petitioners
were burdened to prove their allegation that respondents dismissed them from their
employment. It must be stressed that the evidence to prove this fact must be clear,
positive and convincing. The rule that the employer bears the burden of proof in

illegal dismissal cases finds no application here because the respondents deny
having dismissed the petitioners.[33]

In Rufina Patis Factory v. Alusitain,[34] this Court took the occasion to emphasize:

It is a basic rule in evidence, however, that the burden of proof is on the part of the
party who makes the allegations ei incumbit probatio, qui dicit, non qui negat. If he
claims a right granted by law, he must prove his claim by competent evidence,
relying on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of that of
his opponent.[35]

It is true that the Constitution affords full protection to labor, and that in light of this
Constitutional mandate, we must be vigilant in striking down any attempt of the
management to exploit or oppress the working class. However, it does not mean
that we are bound to uphold the working class in every labor dispute brought before
this Court for our resolution.

The law in protecting the rights of the employees, authorizes neither oppression nor
self-destruction of the employer. It should be made clear that when the law tilts the
scales of justice in favor of labor, it is in recognition of the inherent economic
inequality between labor and management. The intent is to balance the scales of
justice; to put the two parties on relatively equal positions. There may be cases
where the circumstances warrant favoring labor over the interests of management
but never should the scale be so tilted if the result is an injustice to the employer.
Justitia nemini neganda est -- justice is to be denied to none.[36]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Court of

Appeals Decision dated 28 May 2005 and its Resolution dated 7 September 2006 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 79724 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.