Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
P on 18 September, 2006
(b) of Section 299 IPC and Clause (3) of Section 300 IPC is one of the degree of
probability of death resulting from the intended bodily injury. To put it more broadly, it is
the degree of probability of death which determines whether a culpable homicide is of the
gravest, medium of the lowest degree. The word 'likely' in Clause (b) of Section 299 IPC
conveys the sense of probable as distinguished from a mere possibility. The words
"bodily injury.....sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death" mean that
death will be the "most probable" result of the injury, having regard to the ordinary
course of nature.
Arun Nivalaji More vs State Of Maharashtra on 8 August, 2006
The mere fact that a dangerous or deadly weapon was not used or the injuries
were not caused on vital part of the body may not necessarily take out the offence from
the clutches of clause Thirdly of Section 300 IPC. Death may take place on account of
large number of blows given by a blunt weapon like lathi on hands and legs causing
fractures. Though the injuries may not be on a vital part of the body as the said term is
generally understood, but if the medical evidence shows that they were sufficient in the
ordinary course of nature to cause death, the offence would fall in clause Thirdly of
Section 300 IPC.
Siri Kishan & Ors vs State Of Haryana on 27 April, 2009
In Clause (3) of Section 300 IPC, instead of the words 'likely to cause death' occurring in
the corresponding Clause
(b) of Section 299 IPC, the words "sufficient in the ordinary course of nature" have been
used. Obviously, the distinction lies between a bodily injury likely to cause death and a
bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The distinction is
fine but real and if overlooked, may result in miscarriage of justice. The difference
between Clause (b) of Section 299 IPC and Clause (3) of Section 300 IPC is one of the
degree of probability of death resulting from the intended bodily injury. To put it more
broadly, it is the degree of probability of death which determines whether a culpable
homicide is of the gravest, medium of the lowest degree. The word 'likely' in Clause (b)
of Section 299 IPC conveys the sense of probable as distinguished from a mere
possibility. The words "bodily injury.....sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause
death" mean that death will be the "most probable" result of the injury, having regard to
the ordinary course of nature.
course of nature, the provisions of Section 300(3) I.P.C. are attracted. What is required to
be proved is that firstly it should be established that a bodily injury is present. Secondly
the nature of injury must be proved. These are purely objective investigations. It must be
proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular injury, that is to say that it was
not accidental or unintentional or that some other kind of injury was intended. Once these
three elements are proved to be present the inquiry proceeds further and fourthly it must
be proved that the injury of the type which is described made up of all the three elements
set out above were sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This fart of
the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of
the offender.
Since intention is always state of mind, it can be proved only by its external
manifestations. when injuries are inflicted on vital parts of the body with sharp edged
instruments then the intention to kill can be attributed to the offender.
case- Chahat Khan v state of haryana AIR1972SC 2574
in case of Badampalli venkateswarlu v state of andhara pradesh 1975 SCC 492
supreme court held that when an accused hit the deceased on a vital part of the body, the
chest , with the blade of a sword, two feet in length with such force as to impair the liver
and the aorta, it was held the offence was plainly one of murder.
the first part is subjective to the offender :'If it is done with the intention of causing
bodily injury to any person '. one this is established, the sufficiency of the injury is purely
an objective fact. It is a matter of inference or deduction from the proven facts about the
nature of injury and has nothing to do with intention. the term sufficiency used in this
clause is the high probability of death in the ordinary course of nature and if such
sufficiency exists and death is caused and the injury causing it is intentional, the case falls
under clause (3) of section 300 of Ipc {state of andhra pradesh v rayaavarapu punnyya
1976 4 SCC 382}. the injury caused should be the cause of the death. whether a particular
injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death or not, is obviously a
question of fact.
the accused who intentionally caused the injury, may not be aware that injury was
sufficient to cause death or likely to cause death. but, if his intention to cause injury was
established and the injury caused is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of