Smith 1

Political Change in a Multifarious Region

POLS 3001-42926-201440: Research Methods

University of Louisiana Monroe
Dr. John W. Sutherlin
Dr. Joshua Stockley

Caleb Smith
November 20, 2013

Abstract

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Middle East politics tends to be much more complex than that of most
places in the world. While thousands of innocent civilians are being
slaughtered in one state, a long-awaited transition towards democracy may
be developing in the next. This type of scenario is not uncommon when
studying the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and serves as the basis for
this research design. Until recently, the Middle East was the only major area
of the world where authoritarianism had yet to be challenged. While various
Arab states have forced their rulers from power since the 2011 Arab
Spring, other authoritarian regimes have remained intact. This study
involves the Arab Spring as a means of political change in Tunisia, Libya and
Yemen. It also seeks to explain why Egypt and Syria have not been able to
make a transition towards democracy like many of their Arab neighbors. In
addition to providing an overview of the previous literature on the Arab
Spring, this paper examines the type of rule and the degree of stability of
the states.

Keywords: Arab Spring, Middle East, democratization, authoritarianism,

political factors

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Table of Contents
Introduction (page 4)
Thesis-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------4
Methodology----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------4
Literature Review (page 5)
Tunisia------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------6
Libya-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------7
Yemen-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------9
Egypt------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------11
Syria------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------12
References
Bibliography--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------15

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Introduction
This research design is set up in order to reveal what factors have led
to political transition in the Middle East during the Arab Spring. Additionally,
it addresses two Arab states that have not undergone transitions during the
Arab Spring and seeks to explain why. It asks the question What factors of
the Arab Spring led to political changes in Tunisia, Libya and Yemen but are
not present in Egypt and Syria? The hypothesis tested is that in Arab states
where the military sided with the people rather than the current regime, a
transition towards democracy was more likely to occur.
In order to test the hypothesis, a qualitative case study will be used to
examine different political factors of the Arab Spring. These factors will
ultimately determine whether a state will make a political transition towards
democracy or remain an authoritarian regime. To answer the original
research question What factors of the Arab Spring led to political changes in
Tunisia, Libya and Yemen but are not present in Egypt and Syria, each of the
five states will be examined through a comparative analysis of the events
that took place during the Arab Spring. A social science approach is to be
applied in order to analyze the political factors that have or have not led to
recent developments throughout the region. Four central factors should be
taken into account when analyzing the states: 1) the role the military played
within the state, 2) the economic condition of the state, 3) the role of the
international community post-Arab Spring, and 4) the states ability to form a
new legislature. Each of these factors can be applied to all five Arab states.
The states will be placed into one of two categories that determine the
degree of stability: 1) failed transition state or 2) stable transition state.
Degree of Stability

Authoritarian State

Stable transition

N/A

Transition State
Tunisia
Libya
Yemen

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Failed transition
(unstable)

Syria

Egypt

Egypt and Syria are considered the failed transition states of the study due
to their present situations characterized by civil unrest. Syrian President
Bashar al Assad still has complete control and his authoritarian regime
continues to murder thousands of civilians. In Egypt, the military has recently
overthrown the incumbent president and as of now holds all the power of the
state. In Tunisia, Libya and Yemen the authoritarian rulers have all been
overthrown, and each state has made a transition towards democracy since
2011. Therefore, they are categorized as the stable transition states. The
time frame of the study is to take place between 2011 and 2013,
representing pre, present and post Arab Spring.
Literature Review
Since December 2010, a series of mass demonstrations and rebellions
have echoed across the Arab world primarily in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and
Yemen where the population has stood up to their respective regime and
demanded an improvement in basic human needs and human rights (Friel,
2012). These rebellions that John Friel is referring to are known as the Arab
Spring. The Arab Spring and the subsequent political changes of the Middle
East and North Africa (MENA) region have become a center of global
attention. Before the Arab Spring took place, the Arab world was the only
major area where authoritarian rule could be established regionwide in the
twentieth century, and where regimes managed to defy global trends beyond
the threshold of the twentyfirst century (Beck & Hser, 5). However, this all
changed when internal mass protests in Tunisia forced the leadership to
resign within weeks. Across the broader region, beyond Tunisia, Egypt,
Yemen and Libya, the wave of protests emboldened by North African success
were driven by similar demographic realities, failures of state policies and
demands for greater representation (Dodge, 64). In Friels The Arab Spring
and Political Change: A Comparison of Revolutions he states that the protests
called for regime changes where citizens would see an increase in political
freedom, and a hope for new government leadership that would tackle issues
like poverty and corruption (Friel, 2012). After decades of authoritarian rule
and political stagnation, popular movements were finally able to destabilize
or overthrow a number of authoritarian regimes in the Arab world (Beck &
Hser, 5).

Smith 6

Most of the Arab Spring revolutions started with a common goal of

ousting the current ruling regime of the state. However, recent works have
shown that the outcome of the revolutions varied amongst different nationstates. Beck and Hser stated While in various countries of the Arab world
mass protests in 2011 forced rulers to resign, other authoritarian regimes
have despite political and economic pressure so far been able to remain
in power, or have even been only insignificantly affected (Beck & Hser, 3).
The Arab Spring has dismantled regimes in several Arab countries, sparked
mass violence in others, while some governments managed to delay the
trouble with a mix of repression, promise of reform, and state largesse
(Isaksen, 2013). So, despite the fact that the rebellions were all focused
towards a common goal, there has been no recurring theme for their
outcomes. There has been obvious political change in some nation-states
throughout the MENA region such as Tunisia, Libya, and Yemen. In Libya, the
uprisings against Moammar Gaddafis regime triggered a military
intervention by NATO that drove the Libyan leader from power. Ali Abdullah
Saleh finally relinquished his grip on power in Yemen. Tunisian President Ben
Ali fled the country and is currently enjoying the dubious pleasures of exile in
Saudi Arabia (Dodge, 64). By the end of 2011, the governments in Tunisia,
Egypt, Libya and Yemen were swept away by popular revolts, in an
unprecedented show of people power (Manfreda, 2013). Since then the
Middle East has witnessed an explosion of political activity, particularly in the
states where the revolts successfully removed the long-serving leaders.
Hundreds of political parties, civil society groups, newspapers, TV stations
and online media have been launched, as Arabs scramble to reclaim their
country from ossified ruling elites (Manfreda, 2013). The political transitions
taking place in Tunisia, Libya and Yemen, though fragile, continue to offer
hope for stable outcomes; so what explains the ongoing civil war in Syria and
the present civil unrest in Egypt?
Tunisia
The first state to undergo a political change in the Arab world was
Tunisia. Although being considered the most democratized regime in the
region, Tunisia was also known for strict control and oversight of political
activities through the secret police network (Suzuki, 7). For 23 years, a
combination of harsh repression and impressive socio-economic
development in Tunisia ensured a certain level of stability of President Ben
Alis regime. However, on 14 January 2011, after several weeks of antigovernment protests, the President fled the country, revealing the fallacy of
the Tunisian model (Paciello, 2011). Following the overthrow of Ben Ali, the

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Tunisian government quickly collapsed and the state entered an ongoing

period of political transition. Tunisia embarked upon a complex reform
process led by consultative bodies formed of technocrats and well-known
Tunisian figures (El-Issawi, 18). These consultative bodies were tasked with
reforming the Tunisian State through a process of legislative change. They
were to draft a new constitution and appoint a new government. On October
23 The Constituent Assembly election was held and ended with the victory of
the moderate Islamic party Ennahda. The Tunisian elections have been
widely acclaimed for the apparently high turnout, with some early estimates
suggesting a participation of up to 90% (ChatamHouse, 4). Tunisias high
voter turnout can certainly be accredited as a factor that has led to their
political change. Apart from protests in February 2011, which called for the
dismissal of Ben Alis supporters in government positions, there have been
no destabilizing demonstrations or police suppression (Schraeder & Redissi
1417).
The development of Tunisias transition has been fraught and at times
precarious, but at critical moments the countrys political evolution has
displayed a self-correcting character (Dworkin, 2013). Tunisia has been
confronted with multiple challenges that have run the risk of political
breakdown, but every time it has been successful at maintaining a political
transition towards democracy. The political and social groups of the state
have managed to keep tensions within the political system rather than
letting them dismantle the system as a whole. Compared to other Arab
states, Tunisia has strong potential for a successful transition due to the
political, economic, and social structures of the country (Beck & Hser, 17).
In most authoritarian states throughout the MENA region, political institutions
and civil society organizations tend to be underdeveloped. This can be
accredited to the depoliticization policies stemming from authoritarian rule.
However, according to Beck and Hser, Tunisia has had relatively well
developed civil society structures for a long time. They attribute this to the
Tunisian General Labor Union being well established in the state. Dr. Clement
Henry attests to this in his Countries at the Crossroads 2011: In the period
from 1988 to 2009, the number of civil society organizations increased from
nearly 2,000 to over 9,000 (Henry, 5). Although the institutional structures
for the development of a free civil society seem to have been established
pre-Arab Spring, it can certainly be argued that this has acted as a factor in
Tunisias political transition. In Matt Gordners article Comparing Egypt and
Tunisia: Democratic Transition vs. Democratic Consolidation, he also argues
that Tunisia presents a more promising transition to democracy than other

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MENA states. Gordner attributes this to three factors as well: 1) the method
by which political parties and activists prepared for political transformation in
a post-authoritarian setting, 2) the function of the military within these
states, and 3) the role of the international community in post-revolutionary
democratic transition (Gordner, 2012). After three interim governments and
amid a vast on-going legal and institutional reform process, Tunisia can be
considered as a positive example of a non-violent and functional transitional
phase from dictatorship towards democracy (El-Issawi, 18). In sum, Tunisia
has good prerequisites for democratization therefore it can be categorized as
a stable transformation state during the Arab Spring.
Libya
The Libyan revolution, inspired by the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt,
began as protestors took to the streets in al-Bayda and Benghazi in February
2011. Demonstrators demanded similar requests, as those who took to the
streets in Cairo and Tunis, of job opportunities, political freedom and reform
from Muammar Gaddafis regime of 42 years (Friel, 10). What the citizens of
Libya encountered over the next eight months, however, was very different
from the revolutions of Egypt, Yemen, and Tunisia (Friel, 33). Gaddafi was
backed by the military and in an effort to hold onto power, he began a
campaign that quickly developed into a civil war and threw the country into
complete turmoil. In March 2011 NATO forces intervened against Gaddafi's
army, eventually helping the opposition rebel movement to capture most of
the state. The resulting conflict continued until October 2011, when following the death of Gaddafi and defeat of his supporters - the National
Transitional Council (NTC) set in place a roadmap for political transition (NDI,
2012). Oliver Holmes defines the NTC as an interim government that is
unelected and slow to restore basic public services and is suspected of
employing members that are tarnished by ties to the former regime
(Holmes, 2012). On July 7, 2012, Libyan citizens voted in elections for a
General National Congress, which would be tasked with overseeing the work
of a new government. In the following year, amid the euphoria of historic
elections, Libyas future seemed brighter than ever. The polls were Libyas
first democratic elections in more than 52 years, and the promise of Libyas
Arab Spring seemed closer at hand (Lawrence, 2013).
In their paper Political Change in the Middle East: An Attempt to
Analyze the Arab Spring, Beck & Hser use transition theory in order to
analyze Libyas political transition during the Arab Spring. Transition theory
can help to describe the complex, and sometimes contradictory,

Smith 9

developments in the Middle Eastern countries particularly in those that

have been strongly affected by the Arab Spring. They start by putting much
emphasis on the NATO intervention. In the case of Libya, much evidence
indicates that Muammar Gaddafis regime would not have been overthrown
without the intervention of NATO, as the military capabilities of the
opposition were too weak to prevail against the forces of the regime (Beck &
Hser, 14). Obviously the fall of Gadaffi set the stage for Libyas political
transition. There was no scenario where Libya could have become
democratized as long as he was in power. Although it was Libyan rebels who
brought Gadaffi down, as previously mentioned, they could not have done it
without NATO. Therefore, the function of the military and the nations
interests have been prominent factors in Libyas political transition, just as
they have been in Tunisias.
While there is hope for democratization in Libya, there are still many
skeptics. Wolfram Lacher, a researcher on northern Africa at German Institute
for International and Security Affairs, argues For a society that did not have
any civic culture and state structures over decades, the transition towards
democratic structures appears to be a particularly difficult and long process
in which setbacks are to be expected (Lacher, 2011). One issue that has
caused much skepticism is the NTCs new law that was drafted in January
2012; which explained the procedures for establishing a constitutional
assembly in Libya. David Kirkpatrick identifies an issue within the NTCs law
that may present future challenges to Libyas transition in his article Libya
Begins Plan to Elect Assembly. In his article he writes: As written, the law
will ban former Gaddafi regime members from serving on the constitutional
committee, but former regime members would not be removed from any
current position with the interim government or be prohibited from holding
positions with the Libyan government in the future (Kirkpatrick, 2012). The
point Kirkpatrick is trying to make is that although Gadaffi has been removed
from power, remnants of the Gadaffi regime still remain within the Libyan
government. Having remnants from an authoritarian regime still in power
may very well pose a threat as Libya transitions to a new style of governing.
Theda Skocpol, Victor S. Thomas Professor of Government and Sociology at
Harvard, provides an excellent quote in her book States and Social
Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China that
advocates Kirkpatricks argument. A key finding of the revolution research is
that revolutionary movements can only succeed when the ruling regime
becomes substantially weakened both externally and internally (Skocpol,
1979). The NTC itself has already seen some dissention among the governing

Smith 10

members, as the deputy head of the NTC Abdel Hafiz Ghoga resigned in
January 2012, in an attempt to draw criticism (Aljazeera, 2012). In regards to
the NTC, Akram Al-Turk, of the Brookings Institute, states How well it leads
the transition and begins to address the challenges facing the country will, in
all likelihood, determine the fate of post-Gaddafi Libya (Al-Turk, 117-118).
Yemen
After also becoming inspired by the uprising in Tunisia that ousted its
long-time leader, thousands of Yemeni protestors gathered in streets in the
capital city of Sanaa, calling on Ali Abdullah Saleh, president for more than
30 years, to step down. Unlike the Arab uprisings of Tunisia and Egypt, where
the heads of state resigned rather quickly to please the population, Yemens
President Saleh held onto his power and made false promises of resigning.
Salehs defiance nearly threw the country into civil war, as Hashid Tribesmen
sided with protestors in an effort to bring down the regime (Friel, 24). Ali
Abdullah Saleh eventually resigned at the end of January 2012, one year
after the outbreak of protests. He announced he would not run for reelection
in 2013 nor would he pass power to his son. A month later, the former vice
president, Abed Rabbo Mansur Hadi, was elected to a two-year term in office
and was tasked with initiating constitutional reform. Although President Ali
Abdullah Saleh finally ceded power after his administrations violent reprisals
failed to deter protesters, the country remains at a crossroads. As its political
future continues to evolve, the new government must also address a range
of deep-seated economic and social challenges (Madsen, 2012).
Beck & Hser see Yemen as a transitional state; however, they are
skeptical about Yemens outcome and if it will be able to maintain its process
of political change. At first glance, this appears to be a prime example of a
transition process. A closer look reveals that the country is indeed
undergoing a process of political change; however, this process goes hand in
hand with significant uncertainties due to a multitude of conflicting forces
(Beck & Hser, 19.) They note that due to the precarious political and
economical situation of Yemen and the risks posed by al-Qaeda, many
regional and international players are skeptical of regime change. According
to The World Bank data, Yemen is currently the poorest state in the MENA
region. Nearly half of the states population of 23 million people lives on
$2.00 per day or less, and chronic hunger has stricken one-third of the
population (Finn, 2012). Because of this, most of the literature on Yemens
Arab Spring tends to be skeptic of a major transition towards democracy. Dr.

Smith 11

Nora Ann Colton states in her article Yemen: A Collapsed Economy The
economy in Yemen is extremely underdeveloped and could collapse entirely
due to a failing regime and the burden of unemployment, poverty, and a
growing population (Colton, 410). Although Yemens crippled economy
seems to be the most prominent challenge to political transition, John Friel
argues that the core of Yemens problems is the level of corruption within the
state. In his case study he states that the corruption in Yemen continues to
send the country into a downward spiral, hindering any hope for economic
growth (Friel, 29). Alkebsi and Boucek assist Friels argument, explaining
just how widespread corruption has become in the state. Running rampant in
Yemen from high ranking government officials to the military, corruption is
threatening the legitimacy of the state and can serve to fund terrorism.
Corruption only adds fuel to the many problems Yemen is currently facing,
and it is corruption that will eventually cause Yemen to crumble well before
the terrorist threat (Alkebsi & Boucek, 2010). Elizabeth Madsen points out
another challenge to democracy that Yemen must face in her article Yemen:
Revisiting Demography After the Arab Spring; which is the challenge of
demographics. She argues that Yemens population trajectory is one of the
underlying factors shaping its prospects for stability and the success of the
movement towards democracy. Countries with a very young age structure
face higher vulnerability to civil conflict and lower chances of democratic
governance. Among the countries where a push for democracy took root
during the Arab Spring, Yemen has the youngest age structure (Madsen,
2012). Political demographer, Richard Cincotta, notes that Yemen was more
likely than either Egypt or Tunisia to experience ongoing political violence
when evaluated in demographic terms.
Amidst all the skepticism, Jens Heibach does try to shed some light on
Yemens situation. He argues that due to Yemens experience with political
institutions, a politicized civil society and the existence of a culture of
dialogue, hope for a successful transition exists (Heibach, 132). However,
he does note that it is crucial that political change in Yemen is accompanied
by an economic boom. The process of political transition in Yemen is broadly
on track but still remains delicate and complex. An essential part of Yemens
transition is the sixth-month National Dialogue Conference (NDC) that
started on March 18, which should pave the way for a new constitution. The
NDC is the closest any of the 2011 Arab revolutions has approached to a
peaceful, broad-based transition from despotism to democracy. It is the only
negotiated transition that exists in the context of the Arab Spring, stated
Jamal Benomar, the UN special adviser on Yemen (MacFarquhar, 2013).

Smith 12

Yemen has also planned for full Presidential and Parliamentary elections in
2014. Although these positive developments on the political side of Yemen
provide some hope for a full political transition, the states critical
humanitarian situation cannot be ignored. The role of the international
community in post-revolutionary democratic transition, as Gordner
describes it, has been the most prominent factor leading to political change
in Yemen. The UK has taken a leading role in coordinating international
political support for President Hadi as he works to implement reform in
Yemen. Using its membership of the UN Security Council and Human Rights
Council, the UK has raised the profile of the challenges Yemen faces, to
encourage urgent implementation of reform and to demonstrate
international support for the states transition. At the Donor Conference in
Saudi Arabia in September 2012, representatives from Gulf Cooperation
Council countries, the World Bank and others pledged $6.4 billion of aid to
Yemen (United Kingdom, 2013). The UK continues to contribute millions to
Yemen to help support successful constitutional and electoral reform and to
provide short-term humanitarian assistance to the citizens of the state.
Egypt
In Egypt, thousands of demonstrators took to the streets in Cairo in
January 2011, demanding the resignation of Hosni Mubarak. Just seventeen
days later, Mubarak resigned his position and handed power over to the
Egyptian military. The demonstrations were successful in removing Mubarak
quickly, but Mubaraks regime held onto power through the head of Egypts
Higher Military Council, Field Marshall Mohamad Hussein Tantawi. Although
the Egyptian military was praised for allowing large demonstrations to occur
that eventually persuaded Mubarak to step down, Tantawi was not viewed as
a replacement that would promise fresh hope. Tantawi is a long-time trusted
aid to the Mubarak regime and has served as Egyptian minister of defense
and military production since 1991 (Knell, 2011). On May 28, 2012 the first
round of presidential elections were held, and after a run-off in June,
Mohamed Morsi was elected president. This meant that the first democratic
election in Egypts history ended with a candidate from an Islamic party
becoming new president (Suzuki, 8).
Similarly to Tunisia, Egypt has been in transition since the resignation
of President Hosni Mubarak in February 2011. Egypts transition, however,
appears to be less consolidated than that of Tunisia. Since the fall of 2011,
the country has been shaken by massive riots, and the states reactions have

Smith 13

led to substantial political and economic instability (Beck & Hser, 11). These
riots have been primarily directed against Egypts transitional military
government, due to the fact that it has delayed or blocked the transition of
power to any form of civilian government. This suggests that despite the
resignation of Mubarak, the regimes forces are still strong. As they did for
Libya, Beck and Hser also analyze Egypt through the use of transition
theory. In their research they pose two questions: 1) What causes the
collapse of authoritarian regimes that appeared to be stable for decades? 2)
Which actors play a role in the transition processes? Their paper Political
Change in the Middle East: An Attempt to Analyze the Arab Spring
emphasizes that there is a need to explain the reasons why a significant
number of regimes endured the Arab Spring without the destabilization of
authoritarian rule. This can be applied to the original research question of
this paper as well: What factors of the Arab Spring led to political changes in
Tunisia, Libya and Yemen but are not present in Egypt and Syria? Thomas
Carothers states in his article The End of the Transition Paradigm The
distinction between transition countries that show potential for regime
change and those that are at risk of falling back into old or new patterns of
authoritarianism is a subject of great importance. Transition processes are
complex, and there is no guarantee for the establishment of a consolidated
democracy (Carothers 2002).
Beck & Hser label Egypt as an unstable transition system, however,
it is debatable whether Egypt is undergoing a progressive transition or not.
There are some skeptics who go one step further and already consider Egypt
to be making its way back toward an Arab Winter. Thus, it is assumed that
Egypt is in the state of an unstable authoritarian system (Byman, 2011).
These assumptions can be accredited to one factor; the role of the Egyptian
military. The Egyptian military has revealed little or no willingness to support
a transition towards democracy up to this point. Egypt is entrenched in an
early phase of democratic transition and has yet to undergo a full transfer of
power from the military to the people (Gordner, 2012). In Gordners
Democratic Transition in Egypt and Tunisia: Lessons for Arab Spring States
he compares the military functions of Egypt and Tunisia. He states The
reason why the militarys role in siding with the people is so instrumental as
a sufficient condition for successful revolution is because the military and
police retain a monopoly on violence, and with it, a means to quash
opposition. In a healthy democratic system, the people are in charge of
state functions through direct or indirect means. In Tunisia, Ben Ali
maintained the military on the periphery, granting it a minimal role, if any, in

Smith 14

the political affairs of the state was unable to reap the benefits of revolution
even if it wanted to. In any case, however, Tunisias military was amenable to
the labor unions, and it played a decisive role in toppling the successor
Government after Ben Alis flight and overseeing the installation of an
interim Government that was supportive of the people (Anderson, 2011). As
for Egypt, their military runs more than the means to quash rebellion: the
Egyptian military also manages approximately one-fifth of the Egyptian
economy. Therefore it is literally invested in maintaining its stronghold over a
number of key industries and political positions within Egypt (Gordner, 2012).
The fact that President Morsi was overthrown by a staged military coup is a
sure sign that the Egyptian military has no interest in giving power to the
people anytime soon. The future of Egypt appears to lie heavily in the hands
of former regime members. The amount of influence these former regime
members will have on the country remains to be seen.
Syria
The Arab Spring activism in Egypt and Tunisia inspired Syria just as it
did the other Arab Spring states. Protesters took to the streets in
demonstrations against President Bashar al Assad's regime, advocating for
democratic reform. However, unlike the other Arab Spring states, for Syria,
even a road map to regime change is nowhere in sight. Dr. John W. Sutherlin
states While other Arab regimes in the MENA have crumbled due to popular
pressure without massive amounts of blood being spilled, the Syrian
government continues to oppress and kill oppositional forces and its citizens
at an increasingly alarming rate (Sutherlin, 2013). Since March 25, 2011,
Anti-government protests have been staged in rural cities all throughout the
state, only to be quashed by President Bashar al-Assad time and time again.
This movement began when protesters called for the Friday of Dignity and
Syrians initiated their first serious challenge against their own government
(Dughman, 2012). Unlike the Libyans before them, the Syrian protesters did
not want outside intervention and were intent on fighting the Assad regime
alone. When it gradually dawned on the Syrian rebels that overthrowing
Bashar al-Assads regime was not as feasible as they had imagined, they
little by little started to have second thoughts concerning the idea of
requesting external armed involvement. Civilian rebel forces began
organizing and arming themselves to combat government violence, which
led to government military powers destroying entire neighborhoods and
towns (Wiersema, 2013). After multiple battles between government forces
and Syrian rebels, on June 26, President Assad finally announced that his

Smith 15

country was in a state of war (Suzuki, 10). Recent allegations of the

government's chemical weapon use on civilians have prompted the
international community to contemplate serious intervention, but that
doesn't mean the conflict has been limited to the Syrian population
exclusively.
The difficulty of political change in the Middle East and Arab World
since 2011 has typically been seen in Libya and Syria. Two years later, Syria
now represents the most tragic consequence of the Arab Spring, due to the
escalation of the governments suppression. A civil war is still ongoing and
has caused a grave humanitarian crisis with hundreds of thousands of
internal and external refugees, and increasing social tensions in neighboring
countries (Masetti, Krner, Forster & Friedman, 2013). Nevertheless, the
international community has yet to present any effective solutions, and this
holds especially true for the UN; which has totally failed to function (Suzuki,
11). Parts of Syria have been in open rebellion for over two years and yet,
unlike the dictators of Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Libya, Assad remains in
place. So, what sets Syrias Arab Spring apart from the rest? Why has Assad
been able to maintain complete authoritarian control while other states are
experiencing transitions towards democratization? In Christopher Phillips
Syrias Bloody Arab Spring, he describes the reasons for Assads survival
thus far as multi-fold. Firstly, key pillars of the regime remain in place.
Multiple coups following independence in 1946 led Hafez to design his
regime to be coup-proof, with four over-lapping intelligence agencies to spy
on the population, the army and one another. This has thus far prevented the
kind of internal moves by the military that toppled the Egyptian and Tunisian
presidents (Phillips, 39). Phillips also notes that Syrias military has proven
fiercely loyal to the regime: willing to slaughter their countrymen in a
manner that Egypts army refused. Dr. Joshua Landis provides an extensive
journal essay on the topic of the Assad regime survival titled The Syrian
Uprising of 2011: Why the Assad Regime is Likely to Survive 2013. He
provides six different reasons as to why Assads regime will most likely
continue into 2014: 1) Assad remains strong militarily, 2) The opposition is
weak, 3) The international community is unlikely to intervene, 4) The
economy is problematic, 5) Growing poverty and income gap, 6) Economic
effects of revolution (Landis, 2012). In their paper, Beck and Hser use
revolution theory to define stable authoritarian regimes and to explain how
they maintain their power, as Assad has done. They state Furthermore, the
findings of revolution theory should be utilized in order to understand why
some Middle Eastern regimes have been able to control the corridors of

Smith 16

power despite continued massive mobilization by the opposition (Beck &

Hser, 15). They argue that Syria has slipped into a state of authoritarian
instability. In the eyes of many Syrians the Assad regime has completely lost
its legitimacy (Beck and Hser, 15). However, the reason it is still able to
hold on to power is that it can rely on the support of elites and a largely
intact security apparatus. They attribute the regimes inability to restore
stability to the fact that the state does not have adequate rent income to buy
full legitimacy among the majority of the population.

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Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. Foreign Affairs, May/June.

Smith 17
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America and the
Transformation of the Middle East, et al. (Washington DC:
Brookings Institute, 2011), 117-118.
Alkebsi Abdulwahab and Christopher Boucek. Corruption in Yemen: Screening of
Destructive Beast.
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September
20, 2010, accessed October 19, 2013.
Beck, Martin, and Simone Hser. Political Change in the Middle East: An Attempt to
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