EN BANC

[G.R. No. 149311. February 11, 2005]

THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, through SECRETARY
HERNANDO
PEREZ, THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
through
DIRECTOR REYNALDO WYCOCO, STATE PROSECUTORS
LEO
B. DACERA III, MISAEL M. LADAGA AND MARY JOSEPHINE
P.
LAZARO, petitioners, vs. HON. HERMOGENES R. LIWAG,
in his
capacity as Presiding Judge Branch 55, Regional Trial
Court,
Manila, PANFILO M. LACSON, MICHAEL RAY B.
AQUINO, respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) under it, seeking to challenge the Order
dated June 22, 2001 and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction
dated June 25, 2001 issued by the late Judge Hermogenes R.
Liwag of Branch 55 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil
Case No. 01-100934.
The facts are as follows:
Alleging that she was a former undercover agent of the
Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) and the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Narcotics Group, Mary Ong filed
a complaint-affidavit on January 8, 2001 before the
Ombudsman against PNP General Panfilo M. Lacson, PNP
Colonel Michael Ray B. Aquino, other highranking officials of
the PNP, and several private individuals. Her complaintaffidavit gave rise to separate cases involving different
offenses imputed to respondents Lacson and Aquino. The cases
were docketed as OMB Case Nos. 4-01-00-76, 4-01-00-77, 4-0100- 80, 4-01-00-81, 4-01-00-82, and 4-01-00-84. The
Ombudsman found the complaint affidavit of Mary Ong
sufficient in form and substance and thus required the
respondents therein to file their counter-affidavits on the
charges. On February 28, 2001, said respondents submitted
their counter-affidavits and prayed that the charges against
them be dismissed. Subsequently, on March 9, 2001, Mary Ong
and other witnesses executed sworn statements before the
NBI, alleging the same facts and circumstances revealed by
Mary
Ong in her complaint-affidavit before the Ombudsman.[1] NBI
Director Reynaldo Wycoco, in a letter dated May 4, 2001
addressed to then Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez,
recommended the investigation of Lacson, Aquino, other PNP
officials, and private
individuals for the following alleged crimes:
a.) kidnapping for ransom of Zeng Jia Xuan, Hong Zhen Quiao,
Zeng Kang
Pang, James Wong and Wong Kam Chong;
b.) murder of Wong Kam Chong; and
c.) kidnapping for ransom and murder of Chong Hiu Ming.[2]
In the said letter, Director Wycoco likewise manifested that this
recommendation
was made after taking the sworn statements of Mary Ong and
other witnesses such as

Chong Kam Fai, Zeng Kang Pang, and Quenna Yuet Yuet. The
sworn statements of
these witnesses were attached to the letter.[3]
On May 7, 2001, a panel of prosecutors from the DOJ sent a
subpoena to Lacson,
Aquino and the other persons named in the witnesses sworn
statements. Lacson and
Aquino received the subpoena on May 8, 2001. The subpoena
directed them to submit
their counter-affidavits and controverting evidence at the
scheduled preliminary
investigation on the complaint filed by the NBI on May 18, 2001
at the DOJ MultiPurpose Hall. However, Lacson and Aquino, through their
counsel, manifested in a
letter dated May 18, 2001, that the DOJ panel of prosecutors
should dismiss the
complaint filed therewith by Mary Ong since there are
complaints pending before the
Ombudsman alleging a similar set of facts against the same
respondents. Furthermore,
they claimed that according to the Courts ruling in Uy v.
Sandiganbayan,[4] the
Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction over criminal cases
cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction,
he may take over, at any
stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the
investigation of such cases
involving public officials, including police and military officials
such as private
respondents.[5]
The DOJ construed the aforesaid letter as a motion to dismiss
and, on May 28,
2001, denied the dismissal of the cases before it through an
Order that stated the
following as basis of the denial:
It appearing that the subject letter is essentially a motion to
dismiss which is not
allowed under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure[;]
It appearing further that respondents rank and/or civil service
classification has no
bearing in the determination of jurisdiction as the crimes
charged herein do not
involve violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Unlawfully Acquired
Property [or] Bribery, nor are they related to respondents
discharge of their official
duties;
It appearing finally that paragraph 2 of the Joint Circular of the
Office of the
Ombudsman and the Department of Justice No. 95-001 dated
October 5, 1995,
provides that offenses committed not in relation to office and
cognizable by the
regular courts shall be investigated and prosecuted by the
Office of the Provincial/City
Prosecutor which shall rule thereon with finality;[6]
On the very same day that the DOJ issued the aforesaid Order,
the Solicitor

General received a copy of a petition for prohibition filed by

Lacson and Aquino before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. In the said petition for
prohibition, Lacson and
Aquino maintained that the DOJ has no jurisdiction to conduct a
preliminary
investigation on the complaints submitted by Mary Ong and the
other witnesses. They
argued that by conducting a preliminary investigation, the DOJ
was violating the
Ombudsmans mandate of having the primary and exclusive
jurisdiction to investigate
criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. Again, they
relied on Uy v.
Sandiganbayan to bolster their claim.
On June 22, 2001, Judge Liwag issued the Order herein assailed
prohibiting the
Department of Justice from conducting the preliminary
investigation against Lacson and
Aquino. A Writ of Preliminary Injunction was likewise issued by
the trial court. The
dispositive portion of the Order reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Prohibition
is
hereby GRANTED, and accordingly a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction is
hereby ISSUED, enjoining the respondents and their
subordinates, agents[,] and other
persons acting in their behalf, individually and collectively,
from conducting a
preliminary investigation in IS No. 2001-402, insofar as
petitioners here are
concerned, and directing the petitioners to file their counteraffidavits in said case
until such time that the Office of the Ombudsman shall have
disclaimed jurisdiction
over the offenses subject matter of the investigations before it,
or until such Office
shall have categorized the said offenses as being committed by
the petitioners not in
relation to their respective offices.
Let the corresponding Writ of Preliminary Injunction, therefore,
issue without bond,
as there is no showing whatsoever in the pleadings of the
parties that the respondents
will suffer any injury by reason of the issuance of the writ
prayed for, in accordance
with Section 4(b), Rule 58 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
SO ORDERED. [7]
Hence, this petition was filed before this Court by the DOJ,
through then Secretary
Hernando Perez, the NBI, through Director Reynaldo Wycoco,
and the panel of
prosecutors designated by the DOJ to conduct the preliminary
investigation of I.S. No.
2001-402. In their petition, they raise the following issues:
I
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN
DISREGARDING THE CRYSTAL CLEAR AUTHORITY OF
PETITIONERS DOJ

AND THE PANEL OF STATE PROSECUTORS TO CONDUCT

PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION PURSUANT TO ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 08,
SERIES
OF 1990 OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN AND SECTION 4
OF RULE
112 OF THE RULES OF COURT.
II
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN
RULING THAT THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN HAS TAKEN
OVER THE
NBI COMPLAINT FILED WITH THE DOJ; AND IN IGNORING THE
FACT
THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FAILED TO AVAIL OF AN
ADEQUATE
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY BEFORE THE FILING OF A PETITION
FOR
PROHIBITION.
III
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN
CONSIDERING THE NBI COMPLAINT FILED WITH THE DOJ AND
THE
COMPLAINT-AFFIDAVIT FILED BY MARY ONG BEFORE THE
OFFICE OF
THE OMBUDSMAN AS INVOLVING ABSOLUTELY THE SAME
OFFENSES,
RESPONDENTS AND ALLEGED VICTIMS.
IV
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN
GRANTING RELIEF TO RESPONDENT MICHAEL RAY B. AQUINO
DESPITE
THE GLARING FACT THAT HE IS CHARGED WITH SEPARATE AND
DISTINCT OFFENSES BEFORE THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
AND
THE DOJ.
V
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN
PREJUDGING THE MAIN CASE FOR PROHIBITION BY GRANTING
THE
SAME DESPITE THE FACT THAT HEARINGS IN THE CASE WERE
ONLY
HELD FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING THE MERIT OF THE
PRAYER
FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION.[8]
A perusal of the issues raised reveals that the present petition
puts forth one central
question to be resolved: whether or not the DOJ has jurisdiction
to conduct a
preliminary investigation despite the pendency before the
Ombudsman of a complaint
involving the same accused, facts, and circumstances. The
addition of other names in
the second proceedings does not alter the nature thereof as
being principally directed
against the respondents herein in connection with substantially
the same set of facts
alleged.

First, however, a threshold question has to be resolved.

Petitioners came to this Court without filing a motion before the
trial court to
reconsider the assailed Order. They maintain that it was
imperative for them to do so for
the sake of the speedy administration of justice and that this is
all the more compelling,
in this case, considering that this involves the high-ranking
officers of the PNP and the
crimes being charged have already attracted nationwide
attention.
Indeed, this Court finds that time is of the essence in this case.
At stake here may
not only be the safety of witnesses who risked life and limb to
give their statements to
the authorities, but also the rights of the respondents, who
may need to clear their
names and reputations of the accusations against them.
Procedural laws are adopted
not as ends in themselves but as means conducive to the
realization of justice. The
rules of procedure are not to be applied when such application
would clearly defeat the
very rationale for their conception and existence.[9]
Now, to the merits.
The authority of the DOJ to conduct a preliminary investigation
is based on the
provisions of the 1987 Administrative Code under Chapter I,
Title III, Book IV, governing
the DOJ, which states:
Section 1. Declaration of policy. It is the declared policy of the
State to provide the
government with a principal law agency which shall be both its
legal counsel and
prosecution arm; administer the criminal justice system in
accordance with the
accepted processes thereof consisting in the investigation of
the crimes, prosecution of
offenders and administration of the correctional system; . . .
Section 3. Powers and Functions. To accomplish its mandate,
the Department shall
have the following powers and functions:
...
(2) Investigate the commission of crimes, prosecute offenders
and administer the
probation and correction system;
...
Furthermore, Section 1 of the Presidential Decree 1275,
effective April 11, 1978,
provides:
Section 1. Creation of the National Prosecution Service;
Supervision and Control of
the Secretary of Justice. There is hereby created and
established a National
Prosecution Service under the supervision and control of the
Secretary of Justice, to
be composed of the Prosecution Staff in the Office of the
Secretary of Justice and
such number of Regional State Prosecution Offices, and
Provincial and City Fiscals

Offices as are hereinafter provided, which shall be primarily

responsible for the
investigation and prosecution of all cases involving violations of
penal laws.
Respondents Lacson and Aquino claim that the Ombudsman
has primary
jurisdiction over the cases filed against them, to the exclusion
of any other investigatory
agency of Government pursuant to law and existing
jurisprudence. They rely on the
doctrine in Uy v. Sandiganbayanaforementioned, and contend
that the Ombudsman, in
the exercise of the said primary jurisdiction, may take over, at
any stage, from any
investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of cases
involving public officials,
including police and military officials. They likewise claim that it
should be deemed that
the Ombudsman has already taken over the investigation of
these cases, considering
that there are already pending complaints filed therewith
involving the same accused,
facts and circumstances.
Section 15, Republic Act No. 6640, known as the Ombudsman
Act of 1989,
provides:
Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the
Ombudsman shall have the
following powers, functions and duties:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by
any person, any
act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or
agency,
when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper or
inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by
the
Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction,
it may
take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of
Government,
the investigation of such cases; .[10]
The question is whether or not the Ombudsman has in effect
taken over the
investigation of the case or cases in question to the exclusion
of other investigatory
agencies, including the DOJ. In granting the petition for
prohibition, RTC Judge Liwag
gave the following rationale:
Since the Ombudsman has taken hold of the situation of the
parties in the exercise of
its primary jurisdiction over the matter, it is the feeling of this
Court that the
respondents cannot insist on conducting a preliminary
investigation on the same
matter under the pretext of a shared and concurrent authority.
In the final analysis, the
resolution on the matter by the Ombudsman is final. In the
preliminary investigation
conducted by the Ombudsman itself, the other investigative
agencies of the

Government have no power and right to add an input into the

Ombudsmans
investigation. Only in matters where the other investigative
agencies are expressly
allowed by the Ombudsman to make preliminary investigation
may such agencies
conduct the investigation, subject to the final decision of the
Ombudsman. That is the
situation. It is not otherwise. To allow the respondents to
meddle with the
investigation of similar cases being investigated by the
Ombudsman would put them
to a higher plane than the source of their powers with respect
to such cases. This is, of
course, anathema to orderly judicial procedures. This is
contrary to ordinary common
sense. It would certainly be presumpt[u]ous, if not ridiculous,
for the Department of
Justice to be making recommendation as to its preliminary
investigation to the
Ombudsman in matters being handled by such Office itself.
Such recommendation
would be pre-emptive of the actions of the said Office. Such a
situation must thus be
disallowed.
The public respondents capitalized on the fact that the
Ombudsman may take over, at
any stage, from any investigative agency of the Government,
the investigation of
cases involving public officials, including police and military
officials such as the
petitioners. It is the feeling of this Court that the respondents
cannot find comfort in
that provision of the law. That situation presupposes the
conduct by other Government
agencies of preliminary investigations involving public officials
in cases not
theretofore being taken cognizance of by the Ombudsman. If
the Ombudsman, as in
the case, has already taken hold of the situation of the parties,
it cannot take over, at
any stage of the proceedings, the investigation being
conducted by another agency. It
has the case before it. Rudimentary common sense and
becoming respect for power
and authority would thus require the respondents to desist
from interfering with the
case already handled by the Ombudsman. Indeed, as conceded
by the respondents,
they are deputized prosecutors by the Ombudsman. If that is
so, and that is the truth,
the exercise by the principal of the powers negates absolutely
the exercise by the
agents of a particular power and authority. The hierarchy of
powers must be
remembered. The principle of agency must be recalled.[11]
Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution specifically vests in
the Office of the
Ombudsman the plenary power to investigate any
malfeasance, misfeasance or nonfeasance

of public officers or employees.[12] To discharge its duty

effectively, the
Constitution endowed the Office of the Ombudsman
with special features which
puts it a notch above other grievance-handling,
investigate bodies. First and
foremost, it extended independence to the Ombudsman
and insulated it from the
intrusions of partisan politics. Thus, the Constitution
provided for stringent
qualification requirements for the selection of the Ombudsman
and his deputies, i.e.,
they should be natural-born citizens, of recognized probity
and independence and
must not have been candidates for any elective office in the
immediately preceding
election.[13]The Ombudsman and his deputies were given the
rank and salary equal to
that of the Chairman and Members, respectively, of the
Constitutional Commissions,
with a prohibition for any decrease in their salary during their
term of office.[14] They were
given a fixed term of seven years, without reappointment.[15]
Upon their cessation from
office, they are prohibited from running for any elective office
in the immediately
succeeding election.[16] Finally, unlike other investigative
bodies, the Constitution granted
the Office of the Ombudsman fiscal autonomy.[17] Clearly, all
these measures are
intended to enhance the independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman.
The Office of the Ombudsman was likewise envisioned by the
Constitution to serve
as the principal and primary complaints and action center
for the aggrieved layman
baffled by the bureaucratic maze of procedures. For this
purpose, it was granted more
than the usual powers given to prosecutors. It was vested
with the power to
investigate complaints against a public office or officer on its
own initiative, even without
a formal complaint lodged before it.[18] It can inquire into acts
of government agencies
and public servants based on reports in the media and those
which come to his
attention through sources other than a complaint. The method
of filing a complaint with
the Ombudsman is direct, informal, speedy and inexpensive. All
that may be required
from a complainant is sufficient information detailing the illegal
or improper acts
complained of. The ordinary citizen, who has become
increasingly dependent on public
agencies, is put to minimal expense and difficulty in getting his
complaint acted on by
the Office of the Ombudsman. Vis--vis other prosecutors, the
exercise by the
Ombudsman of its power to investigate public officials is given
preference over other
bodies.

As aforementioned, Congress itself acknowledged the

significant role played by the
Office of Ombudsman when it enacted Republic Act No. 6770.
Section 15 (1) of said
law gives the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan and authorizes him to take over, at
any stage, from any
investigatory agency, the investigation of such cases.
This power to take over a
case at any time is not given to other investigative bodies. All
this means that the power
of the Ombudsman to investigate cases cognizable by
theSandiganbayan is not coequal
with other investigative bodies, such as the DOJ. The
Ombudsman can delegate
the power but the delegate cannot claim equal power.
Clearly, therefore, while the DOJ has general jurisdiction to
conduct preliminary
investigation of cases involving violations of the
Revised Penal Code, this general
jurisdiction cannot diminish the plenary power and primary
jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman to investigate complaints specifically
directed against public
officers and employees. The Office of the Ombudsman is a
constitutional creation. In
contrast, the DOJ is an extension of the executive
department, bereft of the
constitutional independence granted to the
Ombudsman.
Petitioners cannot seek sanctuary in the doctrine of concurrent
jurisdiction. While
the doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction means equal
jurisdiction to deal with the same
subject matter,[19] the settled rule is that the body or
agency that first takes
cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction
to the exclusion of the
others.[20] Thus, assuming there is concurrent jurisdiction
between the Ombudsman and
the DOJ in the conduct of preliminary investigation, this
concurrence is not to be
taken as an unrestrained freedom to file the same case
before both bodies or be
viewed as a contest between these bodies as to which will first
complete the
investigation. In the present case, it is the Ombudsman before
whom the complaint was
initially filed. Hence, it has the authority to proceed with the
preliminary investigation to
the exclusion of the DOJ.
None of the cases previously decided by this Court involved a
factual situation
similar to that of the present case. In Cojuangco, Jr. v.
Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG),[21] the Court upheld the special
authority of the PCGG to
conduct the preliminary investigation of ill-gotten wealth cases
pursuant to Executive

Order No. 1, issued by then President Aquino, creating the

PCGG. While the Court
emphasized in Cojuangco that the power of the Ombudsman to
conduct a preliminary
investigation over said cases is not exclusive but a shared
authority, the complaints
for the alleged misuse of coconut levy funds were filed
directly with the PCGG.
No complaint was filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman. Moreover, a close
scrutiny of said case will disclose that the Court recognized
the primary, albeit
shared, jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate all
ill-gotten wealth
cases.[22] In fact, it ordered the PCGG to desist from
proceeding with the preliminary
investigation as it doubted the impartiality of the PCGG to
conduct the investigation after
it had previously caused the issuance of sequestration orders
against petitioners assets.
In Sanchez v. Demetriou,[23] the Presidential Anti-Crime
Commission filed a
complaint with the DOJ against petitioner Mayor Sanchez for
the rape-slay of
Sarmenta and the killing of Gomez. After the DOJ panel
prosecutors conducted the
preliminary investigation, a warrant of arrest was issued and
the corresponding
Informations were filed in court by the DOJ prosecutors.
Petitioner claimed that it is only
the Ombudsman who has the power to conduct investigation of
cases involving public
officers like him. The Court reiterated its previous ruling that
the authority to investigate
and prosecute illegal acts of public officers is not an exclusive
authority of the
Ombudsman but a shared authority. However, it will be noted
that the complaint for
preliminary investigation in that case was filed solely
with the DOJ.
In Aguinaldo v. Domagas,[24] a letter-complaint charging
petitioners with
sedition was filed with the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor in Cagayan. After
investigation by the DOJ panel of prosecutors, the
corresponding Information was filed
in court. The pertinent issue raised by petitioners was whether
the prosecutors can file
the said Information without previous authority from the
Ombudsman. The Court ruled in
the affirmative and reiterated its ruling regarding the shared
authority of the DOJ to
investigate the case. Again, it should be noted thatthe
complaint in that case was
addressed solely to the provincial prosecutor.
The same factual scenario obtains in the cases of Natividad v.
Felix[25] and Honasan
v. Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the DOJ[26]where the
letter-complaint against
petitioners public officers were brought alone to the DOJ
prosecutors for investigation.

In sum, in none of the aforecited cases was the

complaint filed ahead with the
Office of the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation.
Hence, there was no
simultaneous exercise of power between two coordinate
bodies and no risk of
conflicting findings or orders. In stark contrast with the
present case, Mary Ong filed
a complaint against respondents initially with the Office of
the Ombudsman for
preliminary investigation which was immediately acted on by
said Office. For reasons
not readily apparent on the records, she thereafter refiled
substantially the same
complaint with the NBI and the DOJ.
Not only this.
The subsequent assumption of jurisdiction by the DOJ in
the conduct of
preliminary investigation over the cases filed against the
respondents would not
promote an orderly administration of justice. Although a
preliminary investigation is
not a trial, it is not a casual affair either. A preliminary
investigation is an inquiry or
proceeding for the purpose of determining whether there is
sufficient ground to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and the respondent is
probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.[27] When
one is hailed before an
investigative body on specific charges, the very act of filing
said complaint for
preliminary investigation immediately exposes the respondent
and his family to anxiety,
humiliation and expense. To allow the same complaint to
be filed successively
before two or more investigative bodies would promote
multiplicity of
proceedings. It would also cause undue difficulties to
the respondent who would
have to appear and defend his position before every
agency or body where the
same complaint was filed. This would leave hapless litigants
at a loss as to where to
appear and plead their cause or defense.
There is yet another undesirable consequence. There is the
distinct possibility
that the two bodies exercising jurisdiction at the same
time would come up with
conflicting resolutions regarding the guilt of the
respondents.
Finally, the second investigation would entail an
unnecessary expenditure of
public funds, and the use of valuable and limited resources of
Government, in a duplication of proceedings already
started with the Ombudsman.
From all the foregoing, it is clear that petitioners have not
shown any grave abuse of
discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction
committed by the respondent
Judge.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, YnaresSantiago, SandovalGutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales,
Callejo, Sr., Tinga, ChicoNazario and Garcia, JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 137237. September 17, 2002]
ANTONIO PROSPERO ESQUIVEL and MARK ANTHONY
ESQUIVEL, petitioners, vs. THE HON. OMBUDSMAN, THE
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and HERMINIGILDO EDUARDO,
respondents.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This special civil action for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus[1] with
prayer for preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining
order seeks to
annul and set aside: (1) the Ombudsman resolution[2] dated
June 15, 1998
finding prima facie case against herein petitioners, and (2) the
order[3] denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration. Further, in their
supplemental
petition,[4] petitioners assail the Sandiganbayan for taking
cognizance of cases
without or beyond its jurisdiction. They impleaded that court
and the People of
the Philippines as additional parties in this case.
The factual antecedents of this case are as follows:
PO2 Herminigildo C. Eduardo and SPO1 Modesto P. Catacutan
are both
residents of Barangay Dampulan, Jaen, Nueva Ecija, but
assigned with the
Regional Intelligence and Investigation Division (RIID), Police
Regional Office
3, Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga. In their respective
complaintaffidavits,[
5] filed before the Philippine National Police Criminal
Investigation
and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG), Third Regional Office, Camp
Olivas, San
Fernando, Pampanga, Eduardo and Catacutan charged herein
petitioners
Antonio Prospero Esquivel,[6]municipal mayor of Jaen and his
brother, Mark
Anthony Eboy Esquivel, barangay captain of barangay Apo,
Jaen, with
alleged illegal arrest, arbitrary detention, maltreatment,
attempted murder, and
grave threats. Also included in the charges were SPO1
Reynaldo Espiritu,
SPO2 Nestor Villa Almayda, and LTO Officer Aurelio Diaz. PO2
Eduardo and
SPO1 Catacutan likewise accused P/S Insp. Bienvenido C. Padua
and SPO3

Inocencio P. Bautista of the Jaen Municipal Police Force of

dereliction of duty.
The initial investigation conducted by the PNP-CIDG showed
that at about
12:30 p.m. of March 14, 1998, PO2 Eduardo was about to eat
lunch at his
parents house at Sta. Monica Village, Dampulan, Jaen, Nueva
Ecija, when
petitioners arrived. SPO1 Espiritu, SPO2 Almayda, LTO Officer
Diaz, and
several unidentified persons accompanied them. Without
further ado,
petitioners disarmed PO2 Eduardo of his Cal. 45 service pistol,
which was
covered by a Memorandum Receipt and COMELEC Gun Ban
Exemption. They then forced him to board petitioners vehicle
and brought him
to the Jaen Municipal Hall.
PO2 Eduardo also stated that while they were on their way to
the town
hall, Mayor Esquivel mauled him with the use of a firearm and
threatened to
kill him. Mayor Esquivel pointed a gun at PO2 Eduardo and
said, Putang-ina
mo, papatayin kita, aaksidentihin kita dito, bakit mo ako
kinakalaban! (You son
of a bitch! I will kill you, I will create an accident for you. Why
are you against
me?) Upon reaching the municipal hall,Barangay Captain Mark
Anthony Eboy
Esquivel shoved PO2 Eduardo inside an adjacent hut. Mayor
Esquivel then
ordered SPO1 Espiritu to kill him, saying Patayin mo na iyan at
gawan ng
senaryo at report. (Kill him, then create a scenario and make a
report.)
At this point, according to SPO1 Catacutan, he arrived to verify
what
happened to his teammate, PO2 Eduardo, but Mayor Esquivel
likewise
threatened him. Mayor Esquivel then ordered P/S Insp.
Bienvenido Padua of
the Jaen Police Station to file charges against PO2 Eduardo.
Then, the mayor
once again struck PO2 Eduardo in the nape with a handgun,
while Mark
Anthony Eboy Esquivel was holding the latter. PO2 Eduardo
then fell and lost
consciousness. When he regained his consciousness, he was
told that he
would be released. Prior to his release, however, he was forced
to sign a
statement in the police blotter that he was in good physical
condition.
PO2 Eduardo told the PNP-CIDG investigators that he was most
likely
maltreated and threatened because of jueteng and tupada. He
said the mayor
believed he was among the law enforcers who raided a jueteng
den in Jaen

that same day. He surmised that the mayor disliked the fact
that he arrested
members of crime syndicates with connections to the mayor.
[7]
In support of his sworn statement, PO2 Eduardo presented a
medical
certificate showing the injuries he suffered and other
documentary evidence.[8]
After the initial investigation, the PNP-CIDG Third Regional
Office
forwarded the pertinent records to the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for
Luzon for appropriate action.[9]
The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon conducted a
preliminary
investigation and required petitioners and their companions to
file their
respective counter-affidavits. In their joint counter-affidavit,[10]
petitioners and
their companions denied the charges against them. Instead,
they alleged that
PO2 Eduardo is a fugitive from justice with an outstanding
warrant of arrest for
malversation. They further alleged that the gun confiscated
from PO2 Eduardo
was the subject of an illegal possession of firearm complaint.
On June 15, 1998, the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon issued
the
impugned resolution[11] recommending that both Mayor
Esquivel
andBarangay Captain Mark Anthony Eboy Esquivel be indicted
for the crime
of less serious physical injuries, and Mayor Esquivel alone for
grave threats.
The charges against the other respondents below were
dismissed, either
provisionally or with finality.
On August 14, 1998, Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto approved
the
aforesaid resolution.
Thereafter, separate informations docketed as Criminal Case
No.
24777[12] for less serious physical injuries against Mayor
Esquivel and Mark
Anthony Eboy Esquivel, and Criminal Case No. 24778[13] for
grave threats
against petitioner mayor, were filed with the Sandiganbayan.
On August 26, 1998, petitioners moved for reconsideration of
the August
14, 1998 resolution of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. As
directed by the
Sandiganbayan, they likewise filed a motion for
reconsideration/reinvestigation[14] with the Office of the
Special Prosecutor
(OSP). That motion was, however, denied by the OSP in the
assailed
order[15] dated December 7, 1998. On December 11, 1998,
the Ombudsman
approved the OSPs order of denial.
On February 8, 1999, petitioners were arraigned in both cases,
and they

pleaded not guilty to the charges.

With their failure to extend the suspension of proceedings
previously
granted by the Sandiganbayan by virtue of their motion for
reconsideration,
petitioners elevated the matter to this Court alleging grave
abuse of discretion
on the part of public respondents in rendering the resolution
and the order.
On June 9, 1999, we denied for lack of merit petitioners
motion[16] reiterating their plea for the issuance of a TRO
directing public
respondents to refrain from prosecuting Criminal Cases Nos.
24777 and
24778.[17]
Petitioners now submit the following issues for our resolution:
1. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT OMBUDSMAN GRAVELY
ABUSED HIS
DISCRETION IN DISREGARDING THE ADMISSION OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENT
THAT HE WAS IN GOOD PHYSICAL CONDITION WHEN HE WAS
RELEASED
FROM THE POLICE HEADQUARTERS OF JAEN, NUEVA ECIJA;
2. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT OMBUDSMAN GRAVELY
ABUSED HIS
DISCRETION IN FINDING PROBABLE CAUSE FOR GRAVE
THREATS WHEN
PETITIONERS WERE LEGALLY EFFECTING THE ARREST OF THE
PRIVATE
RESPONDENT BY VIRTUE OF THE WARRANT OF ARREST ISSUED
BY THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF GAPAN, NUEVA ECIJA UNDER CRIM.
CASE NO.
4925 FOR MALVERSATION OF GOVERNMENT PROPERTY; and
3. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN HAS
JURISDICTION
OVER THE OFFENSES FILED AGAINST PETITIONERS.
Petitioners formulation of the issues may be reduced to the
following:
(1) Did the Ombudsman commit grave abuse of discretion in
directing the filing of
the informations against petitioners?
(2) Did the Sandiganbayan commit grave abuse of discretion in
assuming jurisdiction
over Criminal Cases Nos. 24777 and 24778?
Petitioners argue that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse
of
discretion when he failed to consider the exculpatory evidence
in their favor,
namely, the admission of PO2 Eduardo that he was in good
physical condition
when he left the police station in Jaen, Nueva Ecija.[18] With
such admission,
PO2 Eduardo is now estopped from claiming that he was
injured since it is
conclusive evidence against him and need not be proven in any
other
proceeding.[19]
Public respondents, represented by the Office of the
Ombudsman through

the OSP, counter that petitioners raise a factual issue which is

not a proper
subject of a certiorari action. They further postulate that this is
the very same
defense advanced by petitioners in the charges against them
and being
evidentiary in nature, its resolution can only be threshed out in
a full-blown
trial.[20]
We find the present petition without merit.
The Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there
exists
reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed
and that the
accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the
corresponding
information with the appropriate courts.[21] Settled is the rule
that the Supreme
Court will not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsmans
exercise of his
investigatory and prosecutory powers without good and
compelling reasons to
indicate otherwise.[22] Said exercise of powers is based upon
his constitutional
mandate[23] and the courts will not interfere in its exercise.
The rule is based not
only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers
granted by the
Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman, but upon
practicality as well.
Otherwise, innumerable petitions seeking dismissal of
investigatory
proceedings conducted by the Ombudsman will grievously
hamper the
functions of the office and the courts, in much the same way
that courts will be
swamped if they had to review the exercise of discretion on the
part of public
prosecutors each time they decided to file an information or
dismiss a
complaint by a private complainant.[24] Thus, in Rodrigo, Jr. vs.
Sandiganbayan,[25] we held that:
This Court, moreover, has maintained a consistent policy of
non-interference in the
determination of the Ombudsman regarding the existence of
probable cause, provided
there is no grave abuse in the exercise of such discretion.
In this case, petitioners utterly failed to establish that the
Ombudsman
acted with grave abuse of discretion in rendering the disputed
resolution and
order.
There was no abuse of discretion on the part of the
Ombudsman, much
less grave abuse in disregarding PO2 Eduardos admission that
he was in
good physical condition when he was released from the police
headquarters.[26] Such admission was never brought up
during the preliminary
investigation. The records show that no such averment was
made in

petitioners counter-affidavit[27] nor was there any document

purporting to be the
exculpatory statement attached therein as an annex or exhibit.
Petitioners
only raised this issue in their motion for reconsideration.[28] In
his opposition to
said motion, PO2 Eduardo did admit signing a document to the
effect that he
was in good physical condition when he left the police station.
However, the
admission merely applied to the execution of said document
and not to the
truthfulness of its contents. Consequently, the admission that
petitioners
brand as incontrovertible is but a matter of evidence best
addressed to the
public respondents appreciation. It is evidentiary in nature and
its probative
value can be best passed upon after a full-blown trial on the
merits.
Given these circumstances, certiorari is not the proper remedy.
As
previously held, but now bears stressing:
. . . [t]his Court is not a trier of facts and it is not its function to
examine and evaluate
the probative value of all evidence presented to the concerned
tribunal which formed
the basis of its impugned decision, resolution or order.[29]
Petitioners would have this Court review the Sandiganbayans
exercise of
jurisdiction over Criminal Cases Nos. 24777-78. Petitioners
theorize that the
latter has no jurisdiction over their persons as they hold
positions excluded in
Republic Act No. 7975.[30] As the positions of municipal
mayors
and barangay captains are not mentioned therein, they claim
they are not
covered by said law under the principle of expressio unius est
exclusio
alterius.[31]
Petitioners claim lacks merit. In Rodrigo, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan,
[32] Binay
vs. Sandiganbayan,[33] and Layus vs. Sandiganbayan,[34] we
already held that
municipal mayors fall under the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. Nor can Barangay Captain Mark Anthony
Esquivel claim that
since he is not a municipal mayor, he is outside the
Sandiganbayans
jurisdiction. R.A. 7975, as amended by R.A. No. 8249,[35]
provides that it is only
in cases where none of the accused (underscoring supplied)
are occupying
positions corresponding to salary grade 27 or higher[36] that
exclusive original
jurisdiction shall be vested in the proper regional trial court,
metropolitan trial
court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit court, as the
case may be,

pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas

Pambansa Blg.
129, as amended.[37] Note that under the 1991 Local
Government Code, Mayor
Esquivel has a salary grade of 27.[38] Since Barangay Captain
Esquivel is the
co-accused in Criminal Case No. 24777 of Mayor Esquivel,
whose position
falls under salary grade 27, the Sandiganbayan committed no
grave abuse of
discretion in assuming jurisdiction over said criminal case, as
well as over
Criminal Case No. 24778, involving both of them.Hence, the
writ of certiorari
cannot issue in petitioners favor.
For the same reason, petitioners prayer for a writ of prohibition
must also
be denied.
First, note that a writ of prohibition is directed to the court
itself,
commanding it to cease from the exercise of a jurisdiction to
which it has no
legal claim.[39] As earlier discussed, the Sandiganbayans
jurisdiction over
Criminal Cases Nos. 24777-78 is clearly founded on law.
Second, being an extraordinary remedy, prohibition cannot be
resorted to
when the ordinary and usual remedies provided by law are
adequate and
available.[40] Prohibition is granted only where no other
remedy is available or
sufficient to afford redress. That the petitioners have another
and complete
remedy at law, through an appeal or otherwise, is generally
held sufficient
reason for denying the issuance of the writ.[41] In this case,
petitioners were not
devoid of a remedy in the ordinary course of law. They could
have filed a
motion to quash the informations at the first instance but they
did not. They
have only themselves to blame for this procedural lapse as
they have not
shown any adequate excuse for their failure to do so.
Petitioners did make a
belated oral motion for time to file a motion to quash the
informations, during
their much delayed arraignment,[42] but its denial is not a
proper subject for
certiorari or prohibition as said denial is merely an interlocutory
order. [43]
Third, a writ of prohibition will not be issued against an inferior
court unless
the attention of the court whose proceedings are sought to be
stayed has
been called to the alleged lack or excess of jurisdiction.[44]
The foundation of
this rule is the respect and consideration due to the lower court
and the
expediency of preventing unnecessary litigation;[45] it cannot
be presumed that

the lower court would not properly rule on a jurisdictional

objection if it were
properly presented to it.[46] The records show that petitioners
only raised the
issue of the alleged lack of jurisdiction by the Sandiganbayan
before this
Court.
Nor can petitioners claim entitlement to a writ of mandamus.
Mandamus is
employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a
ministerial duty, this
being its chief use and not a discretionary duty.[47] The duty is
ministerial only
when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise
of official
discretion nor judgment.[48] Hence, this Court cannot issue a
writ of mandamus
to control or review the exercise of discretion by the
Ombudsman, for it is his
discretion and judgment that is to be exercised and not that of
the Court.
When a decision has been reached in a matter involving
discretion, a writ of
mandamus may not be availed of to review or correct it,
however erroneous it
may be.[49]Moreover, as earlier discussed, petitioners had
another remedy
available in the ordinary course of law. Where such remedy is
available in the
ordinary course of law, mandamus will not lie.[50]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of
merit. Costs
against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Austria-Martinez, and Callejo,
Sr.,
JJ., concur.
THIRD DIVISION
CARMELO F. LAZATIN, MARINO
A. MORALES, TEODORO L. DAVID
and ANGELITO A. PELAYO,
Petitioner,
- versus HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO as
OMBUDSMAN, and
SANDIGANBAYAN, THIRD
DIVISION,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 147097
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
CARPIO,

CORONA,

NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.
Promulgated:
June 5, 2009

x--------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This resolves the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules
of Court, praying that the Ombudsman's disapproval of the
Office of the Special
Prosecutor's (OSP) Resolution[1] dated September 18, 2000,
recommending
dismissal of the criminal cases filed against herein petitioners,
be reversed and
set aside.
The antecedent facts are as follows.
On July 22, 1998, the Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau of
the Office of the
Ombudsman filed a Complaint-Affidavit docketed as OMB-0-981500, charging
herein petitioners with Illegal Use of Public Funds as defined
and penalized
under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code and violation of
Section 3,
paragraphs (a) and (e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as
amended.
The complaint alleged that there were irregularities in the use
by then
Congressman Carmello F. Lazatin of his Countrywide
Development Fund
(CDF) for the calendar year 1996, i.e., he was both proponent
and implementer
of the projects funded from his CDF; he signed vouchers and
supporting papers
pertinent to the disbursement as Disbursing Officer; and he
received, as
claimant, eighteen (18) checks amounting to P4,868,277.08.
Thus, petitioner
Lazatin, with the help of petitioners Marino A. Morales, Angelito
A. Pelayo and
Teodoro L. David, was allegedly able to convert his CDF into
cash.
A preliminary investigation was conducted and, thereafter, the
Evaluation and
Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB) issued a Resolution[2]
dated May 29,
2000 recommending the filing against herein petitioners of
fourteen (14) counts
each of Malversation of Public Funds and violation of Section 3
(e) of R.A. No.
3019. Said Resolution was approved by the Ombudsman;
hence, twenty-eight
(28) Informations docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 26087 to
26114 were filed
against herein petitioners before the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner Lazatin and his co-petitioners then filed their
respective Motions for
Reconsideration/Reinvestigation, which motionswere granted
by the
Sandiganbayan (Third Division). The Sandiganbayan also
ordered the
prosecution to re-evaluate the cases against petitioners.

Subsequently, the OSP submitted to the Ombudsman its

Resolution[3] dated September 18, 2000. It recommended the
dismissal of the
cases against petitioners for lack or insufficiency of evidence.
The Ombudsman, however, ordered the Office of the Legal
Affairs (OLA) to
review the OSP Resolution. In a Memorandum[4]dated October
24, 2000, the
OLA recommended that the OSP Resolution be disapproved and
the OSP be
directed to proceed with the trial of the cases against
petitioners. On October 27,
2000, the Ombudsman adopted the OLA Memorandum,
thereby disapproving
the OSP Resolution dated September 18, 2000 and ordering the
aggressive
prosecution of the subject cases. The cases were then returned
to the
Sandiganbayan for continuation of criminal proceedings.
Thus, petitioners filed the instant petition.
Petitioners allege that:
I.
THE OMBUDSMAN ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION OR ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF HIS
JURISDICTION.
II.
THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTION WAS BASED ON
MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS, SPECULATIONS, SURMISES
AND CONJECTURES.[5]
Amplifying their arguments, petitioners asseverate that the
Ombudsman had no
authority to overturn the OSP's Resolution dismissing the cases
against
petitioners because, under Section 13, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution, the
Ombudsman is clothed only with the power to watch,
investigate and
recommend the filing of proper cases against erring officials,
but it was not
granted the power to prosecute. They point out that under the
Constitution, the
power to prosecute belongs to the OSP (formerly the
Tanodbayan), which was
intended by the framers to be a separate and distinct entity
from the Office of the
Ombudsman.Petitioners conclude that, as provided by the
Constitution, the OSP
being a separate and distinct entity, the Ombudsman should
have no power and
authority over the OSP. Thus, petitioners maintain that R.A. No.
6770 (The
Ombudsman Act of 1989), which made the OSP an organic
component of the
Office of the Ombudsman, should be struck down for being
unconstitutional.
Next, petitioners insist that they should be absolved from any
liability because
the checks were issued to petitioner Lazatin allegedly as
reimbursement for the
advances he made from his personal funds for expenses
incurred to ensure the

immediate implementation of projects that are badly needed

by the Pinatubo
victims.
The Court finds the petition unmeritorious.
Petitioners' attack against the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6770
is stale. It has
long been settled that the provisions of R.A. No. 6770 granting
the Office of the
Ombudsman prosecutorial powers and placing the OSP under
said office have
no constitutional infirmity. The issue of whether said provisions
of R.A. No.
6770 violated the Constitution had been fully dissected as far
back as 1995
in Acop v. Office of the Ombudsman.[6]
Therein, the Court held that giving prosecutorial powers to the
Ombudsman is in
accordance with the Constitution as paragraph 8, Section 13,
Article XI provides
that the Ombudsman shall exercise such other functions or
duties as may be
provided by law.Elucidating on this matter, the Court stated:
x x x While the intention to withhold prosecutorial powers from
the
Ombudsman was indeed present, the Commission [referring to
the
Constitutional Commission of 1986] did not hesitate to
recommend
that the Legislature could, through statute, prescribe such
other
powers, functions, and duties to the Ombudsman. x x x As
finally
approved by the Commission after several amendments, this is
now
embodied in paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI (Accountability
of
Public Officers) of the Constitution, which provides:
Sec.13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the
following powers, functions, and duties:
xxxx
Promulgate its rules and procedure and exercise such
other functions or duties as may be provided by law.
Expounding on this power of Congress to prescribe other
powers,
functions, and duties to the Ombudsman, we quote
Commissioners
Colayco and Monsod during interpellation by Commissioner
Rodrigo:
xxxx
MR. RODRIGO:
Precisely, I am coming to that. The last of the
enumerated functions of the Ombudsman is: to
exercise such powers or perform such functions or
duties as may be provided by law. So, the legislature
may vest him with powers taken away from the
Tanodbayan, may it not?
MR. COLAYCO:
Yes.
MR. MONSOD:
Yes.
xxxx

MR. RODRIGO:
Madam President. Section 5 reads: The Tanodbayan
shall continue to function and exercise its powers as
provided by law.
MR. COLAYCO:
That is correct, because it is under P.D. No. 1630.
MR. RODRIGO:
So, if it is provided by law, it can be taken away by
law, I suppose.
MR. COLAYCO:
That is correct.
MR. RODRIGO:
And precisely, Section 12(6) says that among the
functions that can be performed by the Ombudsman
are such functions or duties as may be provided by
law. The sponsors admitted that the legislature later on
might remove some powers from the Tanodbayan and
transfer these to the Ombudsman.
MR. COLAYCO:
Madam President, that is correct.
xxxx
MR. RODRIGO:
Madam President, what I am worried about is, if we
create a constitutional body which has neither punitive
nor prosecutory powers but only persuasive powers,
we might be raising the hopes of our people too much
and then disappoint them.
MR. MONSOD:
I agree with the Commissioner.
MR. RODRIGO:
Anyway, since we state that the powers of the
Ombudsman can later on be implemented by the
legislature, why not leave this to the legislature?
xxxx
MR. MONSOD: (reacting to statements of
Commissioner Blas Ople):
xxxx
With respect to the argument that he is a
toothless animal, we would like to say that we are
promoting the concept in its form at the present, but
we are also saying that he can exercise such powers
and functions as may be provided by law in
accordance with the direction of the thinking of
Commissioner Rodrigo. We do not think that at this
time we should prescribe this, but we leave it up to
Congress at some future time if it feels that it may
need to designate what powers the Ombudsman need
in order that he be more effective. This is not
foreclosed.
So, this is a reversible disability, unlike that of a
eunuch; it is not an irreversible disability.[7]
The constitutionality of Section 3 of R.A. No. 6770, which
subsumed the
OSP under the Office of the Ombudsman, was likewise upheld
by the Court
in Acop. It was explained, thus:
x x x the petitioners conclude that the inclusion of the Office of
the
Special Prosecutor as among the offices under the Office of the
Ombudsman in Section 3 of R.A. No. 6770 (An Act Providing for
the Functional and Structural Organization of the Office of the

Ombudsman and for Other Purposes) is unconstitutional and

void.
The contention is not impressed with merit. x x x
xxxx
x x x Section 7 of Article XI expressly provides that the then
existing Tanodbayan, to be henceforth known as the Office of
the
Special Prosecutor, shall continue to function and exercise its
powers as now or hereafter may be provided by law, except
those
conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman created under this
Constitution. The underscored phrase evidently refers to the
Tanodbayan's powers under P.D. No. 1630 or subsequent
amendatory legislation. It follows then that Congress may
remove
any of the Tanodbayan's/Special Prosecutor's powers under P.D.
No. 1630 or grant it other powers, except those powers
conferred by
the Constitution on the Office of the Ombudsman.
Pursuing the present line of reasoning, when one considers that
by
express mandate of paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI of the
Constitution, the Ombudsman may exercise such other powers
or
perform functions or duties as may be provided by law, it is
indubitable then that Congress has the power to place the
Office of
the Special Prosecutor under the Office of the Ombudsman. In
the
same vein, Congress may remove some of the powers granted
to the
Tanodbayan by P.D. No. 1630 and transfer them to the
Ombudsman; or grant the Office of the Special Prosecutor such
other powers and functions and duties as Congress may deem
fit
and wise. This Congress did through the passage of R.A. No.
6770.[8]
The foregoing ruling of the Court has been reiterated in
Camanag v.
Guerrero.[9] More recently, in Office of the Ombudsman v.
Valera,[10] the Court,
basing its ratio decidendi on its ruling in Acop and Camanag,
declared that the
OSP is merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman
and may only act
under the supervision and control, and upon authority of the
Ombudsman and
ruled that under R.A. No. 6770, the power to preventively
suspend is lodged
only with the Ombudsman and Deputy Ombudsman.[11] The
Court's ruling
in Acop that the authority of the Ombudsman to prosecute
based on R.A. No.
6770 was authorized by the Constitution was also made the
foundation for the
decision in Perez v. Sandiganbayan,[12] where it was held that
the power to
prosecute carries with it the power to authorize the filing of
informations, which
power had not been delegated to the OSP. It is, therefore,
beyond cavil that

under the Constitution, Congress was not proscribed from

legislating the grant
of additional powers to the Ombudsman or placing the OSP
under the Office of
the Ombudsman.
Petitioners now assert that the Court's ruling on the
constitutionality of the
provisions of R.A. No. 6770 should be revisited and the
principle of stare
decisis set aside. Again, this contention deserves scant
consideration.
The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere
to precedents and
not to unsettle things which are established) is embodied in
Article 8 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines which provides, thus:
ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws
or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of
the Philippines.
It was further explained in Fermin v. People[13] as follows:
The doctrine of stare decisis enjoins adherence to judicial
precedents. It requires courts in a country to follow the
rule
established in a decision of the Supreme Court thereof.
That
decision becomes a judicial precedent to be followed in
subsequent
cases by all courts in the land. The doctrine of stare decisis is
based
on the principle that once a question of law has been examined
and
decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further
argument.[14]
In Chinese Young Men's Christian Association of the Philippine
Islands v.
Remington Steel Corporation,[15] the Court expounded on the
importance of the
foregoing doctrine, stating that:
The doctrine of stare decisis is one of policy grounded on the
necessity
for securing certainty and stability of judicial decisions, thus:
Time and again, the court has held that it is a very desirable
and
necessary judicial practice that when a court has laid down
a
principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will
adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases in which
the
facts are substantially the same. Stare decisis et non quieta
movere. Stand by the decisions and disturb not what is
settled.Stare decisis simply means that for the sake of
certainty,
a conclusion reached in one case should be applied to
those
that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even
though
the parties may be different. It proceeds from the first principle
of
justice that, absent any powerful countervailing
considerations,
like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same

questions relating to the same event have been put forward by

the
parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and
decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a
bar to
any attempt to relitigate the same issue.[16]
The doctrine has assumed such value in our judicial system
that the Court has ruled
that [a]bandonment thereof must be based only on
strong and compelling
reasons, otherwise, the becoming virtue of predictability
which is expected from
this Court would be immeasurably affected and the public's
confidence in the
stability of the solemn pronouncements diminished.[17] Verily,
only upon showing
that circumstances attendant in a particular case override the
great benefits derived
by our judicial system from the doctrine of stare decisis, can
the courts be justified
in setting aside the same.
In this case, petitioners have not shown any strong, compelling
reason to convince
the Court that the doctrine of stare decisis should not be
applied to this case. They
have not successfully demonstrated how or why it would be
grave abuse of
discretion for the Ombudsman, who has been validly conferred
by law with the
power of control and supervision over the OSP, to disapprove
or overturn any
resolution issued by the latter.
The second issue advanced by petitioners is that the
Ombudsman's disapproval of
the OSP Resolution recommending dismissal of the cases is
based on
misapprehension of facts, speculations, surmises and
conjectures. The question is
really whether the Ombudsman correctly ruled that there was
enough evidence to
support a finding of probable cause. That issue, however,
pertains to a mere error
of judgment. It must be stressed that certiorari is a remedy
meant to correct only
errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. This has been
emphasized in First
Corporation v. Former Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals,
[18] to wit:
It is a fundamental aphorism in law that a review of facts and
evidence
is not the province of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari,
which
is extra ordinem - beyond the ambit of
appeal. In certiorari proceedings, judicial review does
not go as far
as to examine and assess the evidence of the parties
and to weigh
the probative value thereof. It does not include an
inquiry as to the
correctness of the evaluation of evidence. Any error
committed in

the evaluation of evidence is merely an error of

judgment that
cannot be remedied by certiorari.An error of judgment is
one which
the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. An
error of
jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by
the court
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion,
which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction and
which error
is correctible only by the extraordinary writ
of certiorari. Certiorari will not be issued to cure errors of
the trial
court in its appreciation of the evidence of the parties,
or its
conclusions anchored on the said findings and its
conclusions of
law. It is not for this Court to re-examine conflicting
evidence, reevaluate
the credibility of the witnesses or substitute the
findings of
fact of the court a quo.[19]
Evidently, the issue of whether the evidence indeed supports a
finding of
probable cause would necessitate an examination and reevaluation of the
evidence upon which the Ombudsman based its disapproval of
the OSP
Resolution. Hence, the Petition forCertiorari should not be given
due course.
Likewise noteworthy is the holding of the Court in Presidential
Ad Hoc FactFinding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto,[20] imparting
the value of the
Ombudsman's independence, stating thus:
Under Sections 12 and 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution
and RA
6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989), the Ombudsman has the
power
to investigate and prosecute any act or omission of a public
officer or
employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust,
improper or inefficient. It has been the consistent ruling of
the
Court not to interfere with the Ombudsman's exercise of
his
investigatory and prosecutory powers as long as his
rulings are
supported by substantial evidence. Envisioned as the
champion of
the people and preserver of the integrity of public service, he
has
wide latitude in exercising his powers and is free from
intervention from the three branches of government.
This is to
ensure that his Office is insulated from any outside
pressure and
improper influence.[21]

Indeed, for the Court to overturn the Ombudsman's finding of

probable cause, it
is imperative for petitioners to clearly prove that said public
official acted with
grave abuse of discretion. In Presidential Commission on Good
Government v.
Desierto,[22] the Court elaborated on what constitutes such
abuse, to wit:
Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The
Ombudsman's exercise of power must have been done in an
arbitrary
or despotic manner which must be so patent and gross as to
amount
to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform
the
duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. x x x[23]
In this case, petitioners failed to demonstrate that the
Ombudsman acted in a
manner described above. Clearly, the Ombudsman was acting
in accordance
with R.A. No. 6770 and properly exercised its power of control
and supervision
over the OSP when it disapproved the Resolution dated
September 18, 2000.
It should also be noted that the petition does not question any
order or action of
the Sandiganbayan Third Division; hence, it should not have
been included as a
respondent in this petition.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED for
lack of
merit. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Third Division, Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the
Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of
the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT- G.R. NO. 135687
FINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST
LOANS, represented by: PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT
(PCGG),
Petitioner,
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
NACHURA, JJ.
HON. OMBUDSMAN ANIANO
DESIERTO, WENCESLAO PASCUAL,
GAUDENCIO VIDUYA, JULIA M.
MACUJA, PLACIDO MAPA, JR., JOSE
TEVES, ALEJANDRO MELCHOR, RECIO
M. GARCIA, DBP BOARD OF DIRECTORS
LORENZA N. SALCEDO, JOSEPHINE S.
GARCIA, STOCKHOLDERS OF P.R.
GARCIA & SONS DEVELOPMENT and
INVESTMENT CORPORATION,
Respondents.
(Re: OMB-0-96-2643)
x-----------------------------x
PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT-FINDING
COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS,
represented by: PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT
(PCGG),
Petitioner,
- versus PLACIDO MAPA Board of Director/
Chairman DBP,
RECIO GARCIA Member,
JOSE TENGCO, JR. Member,
RAFAEL SISON Chairman,
JOSE R. TENGCO Member,
ALICE L. REYES Member,
CESAR SALAMEA Chairman,
DON PERRY Vice Chairman,
ROLANDO M. SOZA Member,
RICARDO SILVERIO, SR.,
RICARDO SILVERIO, JR.
RICARDO S. TANGCO, Stockholders/
Directors of Golden River Mining Corp.,
Respondents.
(Re: OMB-0-96-2644)
x---------------------------x
PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT-FINDING
COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS,
represented by: PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT
(PCGG),
Petitioner,
- versus -

PANFILO O. DOMINGO Former PNB President,

CONRADO S. REYES Former NIDC General
Manager,
CONRADO T. CALALANG,
ANTONIO M. GONZALES,
NORBERTO L. VILLARAMA,
SENEN B. DE LA COSTA,
ANTONIO O. MENDOZA, JR.,
IGNACIO C. BERTUMEN,
Stockholders/Officers of Filipino Carbon and
Mining Corporation,
Respondents.
(Re: OMB-0-96-2645) Promulgated:
July 24, 2007
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -----x
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to
annul and
set aside the Order[1] of the Ombudsman datedJuly 6, 1998
dismissing three
complaints filed by petitioner docketed as OMB-0-96-2643,
OMB-0-96-2644 and
OMB-0-96-2645, and its Order[2] of August 31, 1998, denying
petitioner's motion
for reconsideration.
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as
follows:
On October 8, 1992, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued
Administrative
Order No. 13, which created herein petitioner Presidential Ad
Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans (Committee).
On March 6, 1996 and June 28, 1996, Orlando S. Salvador
(Salvador), in his
capacity as PCGG consultant, executed three separate Sworn
Statements stating
that among the loan accounts referred by the Assets
Privatization Trust to the
Committee for investigation, report and recommendation are
those of the following
corporations: P.R. Garcia and Sons Development and
Investment Corporation
(PRGS), Golden River Mining Corporation (Golden River), and
Filipinas Carbon
and Mining Corporation (Filcarbon).
With respect to the loan account of PRGS, Salvador alleged that
the said
corporation obtained from the Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP) an
initial loan guarantee of P26,726,774.72 and a straight
industrial loan amounting
to P29,226,774.72 on October 26, 1967 for the purpose of
redeeming mortgaged
properties, rehabilitating buildings and equipment and
defraying its operational
expenses.
Anent the loan account of Golden River, Salvador claimed that
the

corporation obtained loan accommodations from DBP

beginning from 1975 until
1982 and that as of October 31, 1986, it had a total obligation
of P43,193,000.00;
that out of its five loan accounts, only the first two loans of
Golden River obtained
in 1975 and 1977 were sufficiently collateralized, leaving three
other loans without
any sufficient collateral, to wit: refinancing loan obtained in
1980 for the amount
of P14,724,430.00; refinancing loan obtained on March 13,
1982 for the amount
of P5,551,000.00; and refinancing loan obtained on December
1, 1982 for the
amount ofP7,118,656.52.
As to the loan account of Filcarbon, Salvador averred that the
said
corporation applied with the National Investment Development
Corporation
(NIDC) a loan guarantee of P27.4 Million on January 17, 1977;
that the loan
application was favorably recommended by the President of
the Philippine
National Bank (PNB); that the application was subsequently
approved
by PNB'sBoard of Directors on August 17, 1977.
Salvador alleged that, based on the evidence submitted to the
Committee,
these three corporations did not have sufficient collaterals for
the loans they
obtained, except with respect to the loans obtained by Golden
River in 1975 and
1977. Salvador also alleged that the above-mentioned
corporations did not have
adequate capital to ensure not only the viability of their
operations but also their
ability to repay all their loans. Accordingly, the Committee
found the loan accounts
of the above-mentioned three corporations as behest loans.
The Committee submitted its report to President Ramos who
instructed then
PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo, sitting as the
Committee's ex-officio
Chairman, to file the necessary charges against the DBP
Chairman and members of
the Board of Directors, the former PNB President and former
NIDC General
Manager, together with the respective stockholders/officers of
the three
corporations.
Subsequently, the Sworn Statements of Salvador were used by
the
Committee as its bases in filing separate complaints with the
Office of the
Ombudsman against herein private respondents for alleged
violation of the
provisions of Sections 3 (e)[3] and (g)[4]of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The complaint against respondents Lorenzo N. Salcedo and
Josephine S.

Garcia, stockholders of PRGS; and WenceslaoPascual,

Gaudencio Viduya, Julia
D. Macuja, Placido L. Mapa, Jr., Jose Teves, Alejandro Melchor,
Recio Garcia,
Rafael Sison, Cesar Zalamea, Don M. Perry and Rolando Soza,
then officers and
members of the Board of Directors of DBP, is docketed as OMB0-96-2643.
The complaint against Ricardo Silverio, Sr., Ricardo Silverio, Jr.,
and
Ricardo S. Tangco, stockholders of Golden River; andPlacido
Mapa, Jose
de Ocampo, Recio Garcia, Jose Tengco, Jr., Rafael Sison, Jose de
Ocampo, Jose
R. Tengco, Alice L. Reyes, Cesar Zalamea, Don Perry and
Rolando M. Soza, then
officers and members of the Board of Directors of DBP, is
docketed as OMB-0-962644.
The complaint against Panfilo O. Domingo, then PNB President;
Conrado S.
Reyes, then NIDC General Manager; andConrado Calalang,
Antonio M. Gonzales,
Norberto L. Villarama, Sene B. dela Costa, Antonio O. Mendoza,
Jr. and Ignacio
C.Bertumen, officers and stockholders of Filcarbon, is docketed
as OMB-0-962645.
Subsequently, the three aforementioned cases were
consolidated by the
Office of the Ombudsman.
In his assailed Order of July 6, 1998, the Ombudsman, upon the
recommendation of the Evaluation and Preliminary
Investigation
Bureau, dismissed the complaints against herein respondents.
The Ombudsman
ruled that, except with respect to the two loan transactions
entered into by Golden
River in 1982, all the offenses alleged by the Committee as
having been committed
by herein respondents had already prescribed under the
provisions of Section 11 of
R.A. No. 3019. As to the two 1982 transactions ofGolden River,
the Ombudsman
found that, contrary to the claims of herein petitioner, the loan
accounts obtained
by the said corporation have sufficient collaterals.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the
Ombudsman denied it
in its Order dated August 31, 1998.
Hence, herein petition.
Petitioner contends that the Ombudsman erred in dismissing,
motu proprio,
the three complaints without first requiring respondents to
submit their counteraffidavits
and petitioner to file its reply thereto. Such dismissal, petitioner
avers, is
premature. Petitioner further argues that even granting that
the Ombudsman feels
that petitioner's evidence is insufficient, the Ombudsman
should have first required

petitioner to clarify said evidence or to adduce additional

evidence, in accordance
with due process.
Petitioner also asserts that the Ombudsman erred in dismissing
petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that it was filed out
of time as evidence
shows that the said motion was timely filed.
Petitioner contends that the consolidation of the three
complaints and the
subsequent issuance of a single Order dismissing them is
erroneous. Petitioner
argues that the three complaints cannot be lumped together
and a single order
issued for their resolution as these complaints involve different
sets of facts and are
based on different loan transactions.
Petitioner further avers that the pieces of evidence submitted
as part of the
complaints were not considered by the Ombudsman when it
issued the assailed
Orders; that the findings of the Committee that the subject
loans are behest loans
prevail; and, that the right of the State to recover behest loans
as ill-gotten wealth is
not barred by prescription.
In his Comment, the Ombudsman, citing the proceedings of the
1986
Constitutional Commission as authority, contends that the
provisions of Section 15,
Article XI of the Constitution, which provides for the
imprescriptibility of the right
of the State to recover ill-gotten wealth, applies only to civil
actions and not to
criminal cases. The Ombudsman further avers that prior to its
amendment, Section
11 of R.A. No. 3019 provided that the period for the
prescription or extinguishment
of a violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act was
ten years.
Subsequently, the said provision was amended in 1982
increasing the prescriptive
period to fifteen years. Applying the Constitution and the law to
the present case,
the Ombudsman argues that, except with respect to the two
loan transactions
entered into by Golden River in 1982, all the other alleged
criminal acts of herein
private respondents in connection with the loan transactions
they entered into in the
years 1967 until 1980 had already prescribed in 1995. Hence,
private respondents
can no longer be prosecuted with respect to these transactions.
The Ombudsman also avers that under Section 2, Rule II of
Administrative
Order No. 7 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman), the
Ombudsman is authorized to dismiss, motu proprio, a
complaint even without
requiring the respondents to file their counter-affidavits and
even without

conducting a preliminary investigation.

As to the loan accounts of Golden River obtained on March 13,
1982 and
December 1, 1982, the Ombusman contends that based on
pieces of evidence
presented by the complainant, the said loans had more than
sufficient collateral.
The Ombudsman asserts that his findings of fact and his
application of
pertinent laws as well as rules of evidence deserve great
weight and respect and
even accorded full faith and credit in the absence of any
showing of any error or
grave abuse of discretion.
Respondents Panfilo O. Domingo, Jose R. Tengco, Jr., Alicia Ll.
Reyes,
Cesar Zalamea, Placido L. Mapa, Jr., Conrado T.Calalang,
Norberto Villarama and
Ricardo C. Silverio filed their respective Comments. While the
present petition is
pending in this Court, respondents Conrado Reyes and Jose
Teves died.[5] In a
Resolution[6] issued by this Court dated February 22, 2006,
respondents Wenceslao Pascual, Senen dela Costa, Lorenzo
Salcedo and Antonio
Mendoza were dropped as respondents for an earlier resolution
of the case after all
efforts of petitioner to ascertain their correct and present
addresses proved to be in
vain.
With respect to the other respondents who failed to file their
respective
comments, the Court dispenses with the comments in order
that the present petition
may be resolved.
The Court shall first deal with the issue of prescription as this
was the main
basis of the Ombudsman in dismissing petitioner's complaints.
Section 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
The right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired
by public
officials or employees, from them or from their nominees or
transferees, shall not
be barred by prescription, laches, or estoppel.
In Presidential Ad Hoc Committee v. Hon. Desierto[7], the
Court held that
the imprescriptibility of the right of the State to recover illgotten wealth applies
only to civil actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth, and not to
criminal cases. In
other words, the prosecution of offenses arising from, relating
or incident to, or
involving ill-gotten wealth contemplated in the abovementioned provision of the
Constitution may be barred by prescription.[8]
Under Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended
by Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 195, which took effect on March
16, 1982, the
prescriptive period for offenses punishable under the said Act
was increased from
ten to fifteen years.

As to whether or not the subject complaints filed against herein

respondents
had already prescribed, the Court's disquisition on an identical
issue in Salvador
v. Desierto[9] is instructive, to wit:
The applicable laws on prescription of criminal offenses defined
and
penalized under the Revised Penal Code are found in Articles
90 and 91 of the
same Code. For those penalized by special laws, Act No. 3326,
as amended,
applies. Here, since R.A. 3019, the law alleged to have been
violated, is a special
law, the applicable law in the computation of the prescriptive
period is Section 2
of Act No. 3326, as amended, which provides:
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the
commission of
the violation of the law, and if the same not be known at the
time, from
the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial
proceedings for its
investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are
instituted
against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the
proceedings
are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
The above provisions are clear and need no interpretation. In
Presidential Ad Hoc
Committee vs. Hon. Desierto*, we held:
x x x it was well-nigh impossible for the State, the aggrieved
party, to
have known the violations of R.A. No. 3019 at the time the
questioned
transactions were made because, as alleged, the public
officials
concerned connived or conspired with the beneficiaries of the
loans.
Thus, we agree with the COMMITTEE that the prescriptive
period for
the offenses with which respondents in OMB-0-96-0968 were
charged
should be computed from the discovery of the commission
thereof and
not from the day of such commission.
The assertion by the Ombudsman that the phrase if the same
not be
known in Section 2 of Act No. 3326 does not mean lack of
knowledge
but that the crime is not reasonably knowable is unacceptable,
as it
provides an interpretation that defeats or negates the intent of
the law,
which is written in a clear and unambiguous language and thus
provides
no room for interpretation but only application.
We reiterated the above ruling in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact
Finding Committee on
Behest Loans vs. Desierto** thus:

In cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019 committed prior

to the
February 1986 Edsa Revolution that ousted President Ferdinand
E.
Marcos, we ruled that the government as the aggrieved party
could not
have known of the violations at the time the questioned
transactions were
made (PCGG vs. Desierto, G.R. No. 140232, January 19, 2001,
349
SCRA 767; Domingo vs. Sandiganbayan, supra, Note 14;
Presidential
Ad Hoc Fact Finding Committee on Behest Loans vs. Desierto,
supra, Note 16). Moreover, no person would have dared to
question the
legality of those transactions. Thus, the counting of the
prescriptive
period commenced from the date of discovery of the offense in
1992
after an exhaustive investigation by the Presidential Ad Hoc
Committee
on Behest Loans.
As to when the period of prescription was interrupted, the
second
paragraph of Section 2, Act No. 3326, as amended, provides
thatprescription is interrupted when proceedings are instituted
against
the guilty person.[10]
The complaints filed against respondents did not specify the
exact dates
when the alleged offenses were discovered. However, it is not
disputed that it was
the Committee that discovered the same. As such, the
discovery could not have
been made earlier thanOctober 13, 1992, the date when the
Committee was created.
It is clear, therefore, that the alleged criminal offenses against
herein respondents
had not yet prescribed when the complaints were filed in 1996.
Thus, the
Ombudsman seriously erred in dismissing the three complaints
filed by petitioner
on the ground of prescription.
As to petitioner's claim that it is error on the part of the
Ombudsman to
deny petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that
the same was filed
out of time:
The Ombudsman is presumed to have regularly performed its
official duty in
the determination of whether or not the said Motion was really
filed beyond
the reglementary period as provided under the pertinent rules
of the Office of the
Ombudsman. However, this presumption is disputable. In the
present case,
petitioner contends that the subject Motion was sent by
registered mail on July 29,
1998, which was the last day allowed for filing of the same. As
proof of such

mailing, petitioner presented a Certification[11] issued by the

Central Post Office in
Manila stating therein that Registered Letter No. 74220 was
sent by the PCGG on
July 29, 1998, addressed to the Office of the Ombudsman in
Manila, and that said
letter was duly delivered to and received on August 5, 1998 by
an authorized
representative of the Office of the Ombudsman. The
Ombudsman failed to
controvert petitioner's submission in any of the pleadings filed
in the present
petition. A simple referral to the date that appears on the front
page of the Motion
for Reconsideration, indicating the date when the Office of the
Ombudsman
received the Motion, would have easily disputed the allegation
of petitioners. In the
absence thereof, the Court finds that the presumption of
regularity of the
Ombudsman's performance of his official duties must yield to
the evidence
presented by petitioner. As such, petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration of the
Order of the Ombudsman dated July 6, 1998 should be
considered as timely filed.
Nonetheless, a perusal of the assailed Order dated August 31,
1998 of the
Ombudsman shows that there are grounds other than late filing
upon which the
Ombudsman denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, to
wit:
xxxx
All the foregoing notwithstanding, and bearing in mind the
peculiar
circumstances of this case, particularly the fact that the subject
loans are now
alleged as ill-gotten wealth and behest loans, the same
remains to be bare
allegations with no new evidence tendered to thwart the Order
in question.
The complaints herein are plain and simple. There is no
allegation even that
the questioned loans were granted at the behest of respondent
officials in these
cases x x x.
x x x x[12]
It, thus, appears that the Ombudsman's basis for dismissing
the complaints was not
merely the prescription of the complaints, but also the lack of
any allegation
therein that the questioned loans are behest loans.
However, while there was no specific or particular mention that
the questioned
loan accounts were behest loans, the complaints contain
allegations consistent with
the criteria laid down by Memorandum Order No. 61 issued by
President Ramos
on November 9, 1992.
The said Memorandum provides for the following as a frame of
reference in

determining whether a loan, which is under scrutiny, is behest:

(a) It is under-collateralized;
(b) The borrower corporation is undercapitalized;
(c) Direct or indirect endorsement by high government officials,
like the
presence of marginal notes;
(d) Stockholders, officers or agents of the borrower corporation
are
identified as cronies;
(e) Deviation of use of loan proceeds from the purpose
intended;
(f) Use of corporate layering;
(g) Non-feasibility of the project for which financing is being
sought; and
(h) Extraordinary speed with which the loan release was made.
[13] (Emphasis
supplied).
In Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Hon.
Desierto,[14] the
Ombudsman adopted the position that to qualify as abehest
loan, two or more of
the criteria enumerated in Memorandum Order No. 61 must be
present.
It is therefore erroneous for the Ombudsman to conclude in the
present case that
the complaints against PRGS and Filcarbon were bereft of any
allegations that their
questioned loans are behest, considering that said complaints
explicitly alleged the
presence of two of the criteria: that the subject loans are
under-collateralized and
that the borrower corporations are undercapitalized.
Section 2, Rule II of Administrative Order No. 7 of the Office of
the Ombudsman,
otherwise known as the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman,
provides:
SEC. 2. Evaluation. - Upon evaluating the complaint, the
investigating officer shall
recommend whether it may be:
a) dismissed outright for want of palpable merit;
b) referred to respondent for comment;
c) indorsed to the proper government office or agency which
has
jurisdiction over the case;
d) forwarded to the appropriate officer or official for fact-finding
investigation;
e) referred for administrative adjudication; or
f) subjected to a preliminary investigation.
While under this Rule, the Ombudsman may dismiss a
complaint outright for want
of palpable merit, but a sense of justice and fairness demands
that the Ombudsman
must set forth in a Resolution the reasons for such dismissal.
It is a requirement of due process that the parties to a litigation
be informed of how
it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal
reasons that led to the
conclusions of the court.[15] This Court has held that the
constitutional and statutory

mandate that no decision shall be rendered by any court of

record without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law
on which it is based
applies as well to dispositions by quasi-judicial and
administrative bodies.[16] In
fact, Section 18 of R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known as the
Ombudsman Act of
1989, makes the Rules of Court applicable, in a suppletory
manner, to its own rules
of procedure. One of the requirements provided under Section
1, Rule 36 of the
Rules of Court is that a judgment or final order determining the
merits of the case
should state the facts and the law on which it is based.
A careful reading of the questioned Orders of the Ombudsman
shows that there is
no express finding that the complaints filed by petitioner were
manifestly without
merit. There is no explanation or discussion, whatsoever, as to
how it reached its
conclusion that the disputed loans are not behest insofar as
PRGS and Filcarbon are
concerned.
Thus, for a proper disposition of the complaints against PRGS
and Filcarbon, the
Court finds it necessary to refer them back to the Ombudsman
for proper
evaluation based on their merits.
As to Golden River, the Ombudsman did not err in dismissing
the complaint
against it with respect to its loan transactions obtained on
March 13,
1982 and December 1, 1982. The Court finds no cogent reason
to deviate from the
findings of the Ombudsman, to wit:
Discussing these two loans, we find that in 1980, Golden River
Corporation was granted a refinance in the amount of
P14,724,430 pesos. Such
grant in 1982 for P5,551,000.00 is less than 50% of the said
P14,724,430 pesos,
hence, this cannot be said to be granted with insufficient
collateral, taking the
same as reference point alone without the previous collaterals
and assets which
were admittedly sufficient as admitted by complainant in
paragraph b, p. 2 of the
Sworn Statement of Orlando L. Salvador (p. 10, Records, OMB0-96-2644)
xxx
Likewise, the loans for P7,118,656.52 on December 1, 1982 is
not more
than 50% of the additional assets alone which is the money
equivalent of the two
refinanced loans of P14,724,430.00 and P5,551,000.00 the
total of which is
P20,275,430.00 pesos. Considering that the refinancing ratio
has a maximum of
70% of the total assets/collaterals, even the last two loans
which were within the
prescriptive period are not without sufficient collaterals.

In other words, collaterals were sufficient in accordance with

Sec. 78, R.A.
337, as amended (General Banking Act) x x x[17]
This Court has consistently held that the Ombudsman has
discretion to
determine whether a criminal case, given its facts and
circumstances, should be
filed or not. It is basically his call. He may dismiss the
complaint forthwith should
he find it to be insufficient in form and substance or, should he
find it otherwise, to
continue with the inquiry; or he may proceed with the
investigation if, in his view,
the complaint is in due and proper form and substance. Quite
relevant is the Court's
ruling in Espinosa v. Office of the Ombudsman[18] and
reiterated in the case of The
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact- Finding Committee on Behest Loans
v.
Hon. Desierto,[19] to wit:
The prosecution of offenses committed by public officers is
vested in the Office
of the Ombudsman. To insulate the Office from outside
pressure and improper
influence, the Constitution as well as R.A. 6770 has endowed it
with a wide
latitude of investigatory and prosecutory powers virtually free
from legislative,
executive or judicial intervention. This court consistently
refrains from interfering
with the exercise of its powers, and respects the initiative and
independence
inherent in the Ombudsman who, beholden to no one, acts as
the champion of the
people and the preserver of the integrity of the public service.
[20]
As a rule, the Court shall not unduly interfere in the
Ombudsmans exercise of his
investigatory and prosecutory powers, as provided in the
Constitution, without
good and compelling reasons to indicate otherwise.[21] The
basis for this rule was
provided in the case of Ocampo IV v. Ombudsman[22] where
the Court held as
follows:
The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory
and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the
Office of the
Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the
functions of the courts
will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing
the dismissal of
investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the
Ombudsman with regard
to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the
courts would be
extremely swamped if they would be compelled to review the
exercise of
discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys
each time they decide

to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a

private complainant.[23]
While the Court has previously held that it may interfere with
the discretion of the
Ombudsman in case of clear abuse of discretion,[24] the
Ombudsman is not guilty
of abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint against
Golden River insofar
as the two 1982 loan transactions are concerned.
However, the complaint against Golden River had not been
completely disposed of
by the Ombudsman as it failed to discuss the refinancing loan
obtained by the said
corporation in 1980 for the amount of P14,724,430.00. Hence,
the complaint
against Golden River should also be referred back to the
Ombudsman for proper
evaluation of its merits with respect to the aforementioned
loan.
Petitioner contended that the Ombudsman erred in dismissing
the complaints
without requiring respondents to file their counter-affidavits
and petitioner its
reply, or to further require petitioner to clarify its evidence or
adduce additional
evidence.
It is quite clear under Section 2(a), Rule II of the Rules of
Procedure of the Office
of the Ombudsman, that it may dismiss a complaint outright for
want of palpable
merit. At that point, the Ombudsman does not have to conduct
a preliminary
investigation upon receipt of a complaint.[25] Should the
investigating officer find
the complaint devoid of merit, then he may recommend its
outright
dismissal.[26] The Ombudsman has discretion to determine
whether a preliminary
investigation is proper.[27] It is only when the Ombudsman
opts not to dismiss the
complaint outright for lack of palpable merit would the
Ombudsman be expected
to require the respondents to file their counter-affidavit and
petitioner, its reply.
Lastly, the Court finds nothing erroneous in the Ombudsman's
act of consolidating
the three complaints and of issuing a single order for their
dismissal considering
that, with the exception of the complaint regarding the two
1982 loan accounts of
Golden River which was separately discussed by the
Ombudsman on their merits,
the dismissal of all the other complaints was based on a
common ground, which is
prescription.
However, in the remand of the complaints against respondents,
orderly
administration of justice behooves the Ombudsman not to
consolidate the three
complaints, as the respective respondents therein would
inevitably raise different

defenses which would require separate presentation of

evidence by the parties
involved.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED.
Except with
respect to the complaints relative to the loan accounts of
Golden River obtained on
March 13, 1982, and December 1, 1982, the assailed Orders of
the Ombudsman
dated July 6, 1998 and August 31, 1998 in OMB-0-96-2643,
OMB-0-96-2644 and
OMB-0-96-2645 are SET ASIDE.
The Office of the Ombudsman is directed to conduct with
dispatch an evaluation
on the respective merits of the complaints against herein
respondents pursuant to
the provisions of Section 2, Rule II of its Rules of Procedure.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO ANTONIO EDUARDO B.
NACHURA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the
Division
Chairpersons attestation, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
SHARON CASTRO, G.R. No. 163586
Petitioner,
Present:
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.,
Acting Chairperson,
TINGA,

HON. MERLIN DELORIA, as CHICO-NAZARIO,

Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, NACHURA, and
Branch 65, Guimaras; the COA- DE CASTRO,

JJ.

Region VI, represented by its Director;

and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Promulgated:
Respondents. January 27, 2009
x---------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court
filed by Sharon Castro (petitioner) to assail the July 22, 2003
Decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) which dismissed CA-G.R. SP No. 69350;
and the March
26, 2004 CA Resolution[2] which denied the motion for
reconsideration.
The facts are of record.
On May 31, 2000, petitioner was charged by the Ombudsman
before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 65, Guimaras, with Malversation of
Public Funds,
under an Information which reads, as follows:
That on or about the 17th day of August 1998, and for
sometime prior thereto, in
the Municipality of Buenavista, Province of Guimaras,
Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of the this Honorable Court, abovenamed accused,
a public officer,
being the Revenue Officer I of the Bureau of Internal Revenue,
Buenavista,
Guimaras and as such, was in the custody and possession of
public funds in the
amount of P556,681.53, Philippine Currency, representing the
value of her
collections and other accountabilities, for which she is
accountable by reason of
the duties of her office, in such capacity and committing the
offense in relation to
office, taking advantage of her public position, with deliberate
intent, and with
intent to gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously appropriate,
take, misappropriate, embezzle and convert to her own
personal use and benefit
said amount of P556,681.53, and despite notice and demands
made upon her
account for said public funds, she has failed to do so, to the
damage and prejudice
of the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
Petitioner pleaded NOT GUILTY when arraigned on February 16,
2001.
On August 31, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash on the
grounds of lack of
jurisdiction and lack of authority of the Ombudsman to conduct
the preliminary
investigation and file the Information. Petitioner argued that
the Information failed
to allege her salary grade -- a material fact upon which
depends the jurisdiction of
the RTC. Citing Uy v. Sandiganbayan,[4] petitioner further
argued that as she was a

public employee with salary grade 27, the case filed against
her was cognizable by
the RTC and may be investigated and prosecuted only by the
public prosecutor,
and not by the Ombudsman whose prosecutorial power was
limited to cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.[5]
The RTC denied the Motion to Quash in an Order[6] dated
September 7,
2001. It held that the jurisdiction of the RTC over the case did
not depend on the
salary grade of petitioner, but on the penalty imposable upon
the latter for the
offense charged.[7]Moreover, it sustained the prosecutorial
authority of the
Ombudsman in the case, pointing out that in Uy, upon motion
for clarification filed
by the Ombudsman, the Court set aside its August 9, 1999
Decision and issued a
March 20, 2001 Resolution expressly recognizing the
prosecutorial and
investigatory authority of the Ombudsman in cases cognizable
by the RTC.
The RTC further held that the Motion to Quash was contrary to
Sec. 1, Rule
117, for it was filed after petitioner pleaded not guilty under
the Information.[8]
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[9] which the RTC
denied in
its December 18, 2001 Order.[10]
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari[11] with the CA, but the
latter
dismissed the petition in the Decision under review.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration[12] was also denied.
Hence, the present petition, confining the issues to the
following:
1. Whether or not the Ombudsman, as of May 31, 2000, when
the Information
for Malvesation of Public Funds was instituted against the
Petitioner, had the
authority to file the same in light of this Supreme Courts ruling
in the First Uy
vs. Sandiganbayan case, which declared that the prosecutorial
powers of the
Ombudsman is limited to cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan.
2. Whether or not the clarificatory Resolution issued by the
Supreme Court
dated February 22, 2001 in the Uy vs. Sandiganbayan case can
be made
applicable to the Petitioner-Accused, without violating the
constitutional
provision on ex-post facto laws and denial of the accused to
due process.[13]
Petitioner contends that from the time of the promulgation on
August 9,
1999 of the Decision of the Court in Uy up to the time of
issuance on March 20,
2001 of the Resolution of the Court in the same case, the
prevailing jurisprudence

was that the Ombudsman had no prosecutorial powers over

cases cognizable by the
RTC. As the investigation and prosecution against petitioner
was conducted by the
Ombudsman beginning April 26, 2000, then the August 9, 1999
Decision
in Uy was applicable, notwithstanding that the said decision
was set aside in the
March 20, 2001 Resolution of the Court in said case. Hence, the
Information that
was filed against petitioner was void for at that time the
Ombudsman had no
investigatory and prosecutorial powers over the case.
The petition lacks merit.
The petition calls to mind Office of the Ombudsman v. Enoc,
[14] wherein
accused Ruben Enoc, et al. invoked the August 9, 1999
Decision of the Court
in Uy[15] in a motion to dismiss the 11 counts of malversation
that were filed
against them by the Ombudsman before the RTC. The RTC
granted the motion but
upon petition filed by the Ombudsman, the Court reversed the
RTC and held:
In turn, petitioner filed a Manifestation invoking the very same
resolution
promulgated on March 20, 2001 in Uy v. Sandiganbayan
reconsidering the ruling
that the prosecutory power of the Ombudsman extended only
to cases cognizable
by the Sandiganbayan.
Indeed, this Court has reconsidered the said ruling and
held that the
Ombudsman has powers to prosecute not only graft
cases within the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan but also those cognizable by the
regular courts. It held:
The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to
the
Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. It pertains to any act
or omission
of any public officer or employee when such act or omission
appears to
be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The law does not
make a
distinction between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan
and those
cognizable by regular courts. It has been held that the clause
any illegal
act or omission of any public official is broad enough to
embrace any
crime committed by a public officer or employee.
The reference made by RA 6770 to cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, particularly in Section 15(1) giving the
Ombudsman
primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, and
Section 11(4) granting the Special Prosecutor the power to
conduct
preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within
the

jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, should not be construed as

confining
the scope of the investigatory and prosecutory power of the
Ombudsman
to such cases.
Section 15 of RA 6770 gives the Ombudsman primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. The
law
defines such primary jurisdiction as authorizing the
Ombudsman to take
over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of the
government, the
investigation of such cases. The grant of this authority does not
necessarily imply the exclusion from its jurisdiction of cases
involving
public officers and employees cognizable by other courts. The
exercise
by the Ombudsman of his primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan is not incompatible with the discharge of
his duty to
investigate and prosecute other offenses committed by public
officers
and employees. Indeed, it must be stressed that the powers
granted by the
legislature to the Ombudsman are very broad and encompass
all kinds of
malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance committed by
public officers
and employees during their tenure of office.
Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman
should not be equated with the limited authority of the Special
Prosecutor under Section 11 of RA 6770. The Office of the
Special
Prosecutor is merely a component of the Office of the
Ombudsman and
may only act under the supervision and control and upon
authority of the
Ombudsman. Its power to conduct preliminary investigation
and to
prosecute is limited to criminal cases within the jurisdiction of
the
Sandiganbayan. Certainly, the lawmakers did not intend to
confine the
investigatory and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to
these types of
cases. The Ombudsman is mandated by law to act on all
complaints
against officers and employees of the government and to
enforce their
administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where
the
evidence warrants. To carry out this duty, the law allows him to
utilize
the personnel of his office and/or designate any fiscal, state
prosecutor or
lawyer in the government service to act as special investigator
or
prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of
certain

cases. Those designated or deputized to assist him work under

his
supervision and control. The law likewise allows him to direct
the
Special prosecutor to prosecute cases outside the
Sandiganbayans
jurisdiction in accordance with Section 11(4c) of RA 6770.
We, therefore, hold that the Ombudsman has authority
to investigate
and prosecute Criminal Case Nos. 374(97) to 385(97)
against respondents in
the RTC, Branch 19 of Digos, Davao Del Sur even as this
authority is not
exclusive and is shared by him with the regular prosecutors.
WHEREFORE, the order, dated October 7, 2000, of the Regional
Trial
Court, branch 19 of Digos, Davao del Sur is SET ASIDE and
Criminal Case Nos.
374(97) to 385(97) are hereby REINSTATED and the Regional
Trial Court is
ORDERED to try and decide the same. (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly relevant is the case of Office of Ombudsman v. Hon.
Breva,[16] in
which, citing the August 9, 1999 Decision in Uy,the RTC
dismissed a criminal
complaint that was filed before it by the Ombudsman. The
Court reversed the
RTC, for, given the Courts Uy ruling under its March 20, 2001
Resolution, the trial
courts assailed Orders x x x are, in hindsight, without legal
support and must,
therefore, be set aside.
It is settled, therefore, that the March 20, 2001 Resolution in
Uy, that the
Ombudsman has prosecutorial powers in cases cognizable by
the RTC, extends
even to criminal information filed or pending at the time when
its August 9, 1999
Decision was theoperative ruling on the issue.
Petitioner would argue, however, that the March 20, 2001
Resolution
in Uy cannot have retroactive effect, for otherwise it would
amount to an ex-post
facto law, which is constitutionally proscribed.[17]
Petitioner is grasping at straws.
A judicial interpretation of a statute, such as the Ombudsman
Act, constitutes part
of that law as of the date of its original passage. Such
interpretation does not create
a new law but construes a pre-existing one; it merely casts
light upon the
contemporaneous legislative intent of that law.[18] Hence, the
March 20, 2001
Resolution of the Court in Uy interpreting the Ombudsman Act
is deemed part of
the law as of the date of its effectivity on December 7, 1989.
Where a judicial interpretation declares a law unconstitutional
or abandons a
doctrinal interpretation of such law, the Court, recognizing that
acts may have been

performed under the impression of the constitutionality of the

law or the validity of
its interpretation, has consistently held that such operative fact
cannot be undone
by the mere subsequent declaration of the nullity of the law or
its interpretation;
thus, the declaration can only have a prospective application.
[19] But where no law
is invalidated nor doctrine abandoned, a judicial interpretation
of the law should be
deemed incorporated at the moment of its legislation.[20]
In the present case, the March 20, 2001 Resolution in Uy made
no
declaration of unconstitutionality of any law nor did it vacate a
doctrine long held
by the Court and relied upon by the public. Rather, it set aside
an erroneous
pubescent interpretation of the Ombudsman Act as expressed
in the August 9,
1999 Decision in the same case. Its effect has therefore been
held by the Court to
reach back to validate investigatory and prosecutorial
processes conducted by the
Ombudsman, such as the filing of the Information against
petitioner.
With the foregoing disquisition, the second issue is rendered
moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
WE CONCUR:
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the
Division Acting
Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion
of the Courts Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice
THIRD DIVISION

LUWALHATI R. ANTONINO,
Petitioner,
- versus HON. OMBUDSMAN ANIANO A.
DESIERTO, ROSALITA T. NUEZ,
AUGUSTUS L. MOMONGAN, JUDGE
ABEDNEGO O. ADRE, PEDRO G.
NALANGAN, ASTERIA E. CRUZABRA,
JULIO C. DIAZ and AGAPITO
BORINAGA,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 144492
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.
Promulgated:
December 18, 2008
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari[1] under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Civil
Procedure filed by petitioner, former Congresswoman Luwalhati
R. Antonino
(petitioner) of the First Congressional District of South Cotabato
which includes
General Santos City (city), assailing that portion of the
Resolution[2] dated January
20, 1999 of the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman)
dismissing the case
against private respondents, former city Mayor Rosalita T. Nuez
(Mayor
Nuez), Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) Regional
Executive Director for Region XI Augustus L. Momongan
(Momongan), Regional
Trial Court (RTC) Judge Abednego O. Adre (Judge Adre), former
City Legal
Officer Pedro G. Nalangan III (Nalangan), Register of Deeds
Asteria E. Cruzabra
(Cruzabra), Land Management Officer III of the Provincial
Environment and
Natural Resources Office (PENRO) of South Cotabato Julio C.
Diaz (Diaz) and
Regional Technical Director of the DENR for Region XI Agapito
Borinaga
(Borinaga) (respondents).
The facts, as narrated by the Ombudsman, are as follows:
Presidential Proclamation No. 168 was issued by then President
Diosdado Macapagal on October 3, 1963 (Record, pp. 23-24).
The
pertinent provision of which states that:
do hereby withdraw from sale or settlement and reserve for
recreational
and health resort site purposes, under the administration of the
municipality of General Santos, subject to private rights, if any
there be,

a certain parcel of land of the public domain situated in the

said
municipality and more particularly described as follows:
Mr-1160-D Municipal Reservation
The Municipal Government of General Santos Magsaysay Park
A parcel of land (as shown on plan Mr-1160-D) situated in the
barrio of
Dadiangas, Municipality of General Santos, province of
Cotabato. x x x
containing an area of 52,678 square meters.
On January 22, 1968, Republic Act No. 5412 (Record, pp. 2526),
known as the Charter of the City of General Santos was
enacted creating
the City of General Santos where it is provided that The
National
Government hereby cedes to the City of General Santos the
ownership
and possession to all lands of the public domain within the city.
Later,
said Act was amended by Republic Act No. 6386 on August 16,
1971
(Record, pp. 27-28) wherein it read that The disposition of all
lands of
the public domain within the city shall be in accordance with
the
provisions of Commonwealth Act Numbered One hundred fortyone, as
amended: Provided, That all incomes and receipts derived from
such
disposition shall accrue exclusively to the city as provided in
this Act.
On the other hand, the property subject of Presidential
Proclamation No.
168 was thereafter subdivided into three lots, namely: Lot Y-1
with an
area of 18,695 square meters, Lot X containing 15,020 square
meters and
Lot Y-2 with 18,963 square meters, or a total of 52,678 square
meters
which is still equivalent to the original area.
However, on February 25, 1983, former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos
issued Proclamation No. 2273 amending Proclamation No. 168
(Record,
pp. 29-31), which provides that:
do hereby exclude from the operation of Proclamation No.
168 dated October 3, 1963, which established the
recreational and health resort reservation situated in the
Municipality of General Santos, now General Santos City,
Island of Mindanao, certain portions of the land embraced
therein and declare the same open to disposition under the
provisions of the Public Land Act, which parcels of land
are more particularly described as follows:
Lot Y-1, MR-1160-D
(Magsaysay Park)
A PARCEL OF LAND (Lot Y-1, MR-1160D, Magsaysay Park) situated in the Municipality of General
Santos, now GeneralSantos City, Island of Mindanao. x x x
containing an area of EIGHTEEN THOUSAND SIX
HUNDRED NINETY-FIVE (18,695) SQUARE

METERS. x x x
Lot Y-2, MR-1160-D
(Magsaysay Park)
A PARCEL OF LAND (Lot Y-2, MR-1160D, Magsaysay Park) situated in the Municipality of General
Santos, now GeneralSantos City, Island of Mindanao. x x x
containing an area of EIGHTEEN THOUSAND NINE
HUNDRED SIXTY-THREE (18,963) SQUARE
METERS. x x x
Thus, leaving only Lot X as that covered by Presidential
Proclamation
No. 168 and is therefore reserved for recreational and health
resort site
purposes.
As a result of such exclusion, the Heirs of Cabalo Kusop applied
for Free
Patent with the District Land Office and consequently
Certificates of
Title were issued sometime in 1983. In 1984, two cases were
filed by the
local government of General Santos City against the said Heirs
of Kusop
for Declaration of Nullity of Titles and, on the other hand, the
Heirs of
Kusop filed a case against the said local government for
Injunction and
Damages.The said three cases were consolidated before
the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City, Branch 22,
presided by
respondent Judge Abednego Adre.
On May 23, 1991, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of General
Santos City
passed Resolution No. 87, Series of 1991, entitled Resolution
Approving
the Compromise Agreement to be entered into by and between
the City
Government of General Santos represented by the City Mayor
and the
Heirs of Cabalo Kusop, re: Magsaysay Park (Record, pp. 15061507). Significant provisions of the said Compromise
Agreement
(Record, pp. 33-39) state that:
1. The subject matter of this agreement are Lots Y-1, MR1160-D and Y-2, MR-1160-D with combined area of
THIRTY-SEVEN THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FIFTYEIGHT
(37,658) SQUARE METERS, and from this the
HEIRS AND BENEFICIARIES shall receive a total net
area of TWENTY THOUSAND (20,000) SQUARE
METERS and to the CITY shall pertain the remainder of
SEVENTEEN THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FIFTYEIGHT
(17,658) SQUARE METERS which if added to
Lot X, MR-1160-D, previously donated to the CITY as
stated in par. 7 of the WHEREAS clause, with an area of
FIFTEEN THOUSAND AND TWENTY (15,020)
SQUARE METERS (located in between Lots Y-1 and Y2), the CITY shall retain a total area of THIRTY TWO
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVENTY-EIGHT
(32,678) SQUARE METERS.
Said Compromise Agreement was signed by respondent City
Mayor

Rosalita Nuez, assisted by respondent Pepito Nalangan III, and

the heirs
and beneficiaries of Cabalo Kusop.
As a consequence of the said Compromise Agreement,
respondent Judge
Abednego Adre issued an Order (Record, pp. 40-52), covering
the three
pending cases, on May 6, 1992, the dispositive portion of which
states:
ACCORDINGLY, finding the foregoing Compromise
Agreement in conformity with Article 6 in correlation with
Article 1306 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the same
is hereby APPROVED and ADOPTED as judgment in
these cases. The parties are enjoined to faithfully comply
therewith.
A Writ of Execution was accordingly issued on November 28,
1995.
However, on July 22, 1997, acting upon the Motion for
Exclusion of an
Extraneous Subject from the Coverage of the Judgment thereof
and the
Motion for Issuance of Clarificatory Order submitted by the
Heirs of
Cabalo Kusop and jointly by CENR Officer and Regional
Technical
Director of DENR, respectively, respondent Judge issued
another Order
[assailed RTC Order] (Record, pp. 53-59) in the above-cited
three cases,
stating that:
ACCORDINGLY, based on all the foregoing facts, law and
jurisprudence, the motion for exclusion of Lot X, MR-1160-D
comprising an area of 15,020 SQUARE METERS is GRANTED.
The
movants heirs of Kusop are, however, enjoined to
donate to the City
of General Santos in keeping with the intent and spirit
of the
compromise agreement.
On July 23, 1997, the following private respondents applied for
Miscellaneous Sales Patent over portions of Lot X, to be divided
as
follows (refer to affidavits, Record, pp. 60-75):
Applicants
Area applied
1. Mad Guaybar
- 999 sq. m.;
2. Oliver Guaybar
- 999 sq. m.;
3. Jonathan Guaybar
- 999 sq. m.;
4. Alex Guaybar
- 999 sq. m.;
5. Jack Guiwan
- 999 sq. m.;
6. Nicolas Ynot
- 999 sq. m.;
7. Carlito Flaviano III
- 999 sq. m.;
8. Jolito Poralan
- 999 sq. m.;

9. Miguela Cabi-ao
- 999 sq. m.;
10. Jose Rommel Saludar
- 999 sq. m.;
11. Joel Teves
- 999 sq. m.;
12. Rico Altizo
- 999 sq. m.;
13. Johnny Medillo
- 999 sq. m.;
14. Martin Saycon
- 999 sq. m.;
15. Arsenio delos Reyes, Jr.
- 510 sq. m.; and,
16. Jose Bomez - 524 sq. m.
The following day, July 24, 1997, public respondent Cesar
Jonillo, as
Deputy Land Management Inspector, recommended for the
approval of
the survey authority requested by the above-named private
respondents
for Lot X (Record, p. 418).
Within the same day, the Survey Authority was issued to
private
respondents by public respondent CENR Officer Renato Rivera
(Record,
p. 419).As a result of which, Lot X was subdivided into 16 lots
(refer to
subdivision plan, Record, p. 32).
On August 2, 1997, respondent City Mayor Rosalita T. Nuez,
assisted by
respondent City Legal Officer Pedro Nalangan III issued
1stIndorsements
(refer to application documents, Record, pp. 421-500)
addressed to
CENRO, DENR for portions of Lot X applied by private
respondents
and stated therein that this office interposes no objection to
whatever
legal proceedings your office may pursue on application
covering
portions thereof after the Regional Trial Court, General Santos
City,
Branch 22 excluded Lot X, MR-1160-D from the coverage of the
Compromise Judgment dated May 6, 1992 per said courts order
dated
July 22, 1997.
Thereupon, public respondents Cesar Jonillo and City Assessor
Leonardo Dinopol, together with recommendation for approval
from
respondent Rivera, submitted an appraisal of lots X-1 to X-16
stating
therein the appraisal amount of P100.00 per square meter and
existing
improvements of residential light house per lot with an
appraised value
ranging from P20,000.00 to P50,000.00 (refer to application
papers,
Record, pp. 421-500).
Subsequently, on August 4, 1997, respondent Cesar Jonillo
prepared a

letter-report addressed to the Regional Executive Director of

DENR for
each of the sixteen (16) applicants recommending for the
private sale of
the subject lots to the above-named applicants-respondents,
without
public auction (refer to sample letter-report of recommendation
in favor
of Rico Altizo, Record, p. 77). Respondent CENR Officer, Renato
Rivera, also issued recommendation letters for each of the
sixteen
applicants addressed to the PENR Officer for the approval of
the
appraisal of the subject lots and of the private sale (please
refer to
sample recommendation letter in favor of Rico Altiz[o], Record,
p. 78).
A notice of sale was issued by respondent Julio Diaz also on the
same
date stating therein that on September 5, 1997 the subject
lot/s will be
sold (Record, p. 79).
On September 18, 1997, the following Certificates of Titles
were issued
by the Register of Deeds of General Santos City, respondent
Asteria
Cruzabra, which titles were also signed by respondent
Augustus
Momongan, as DENR Regional Executive Director, to wit:
Name of Owner
OCT No.
Lot No.
Record
Page No.
1. Mad Guaybar P-6393-A X-1 80-82;
2. Oliver Guaybar P-6392 X-2 83-85;
3. Jonathan Guaybar P-6389-A X-3 86-88;
4. Alex Guaybar P-6393 X-4 89-91;
5. Jack Guiwan P-6399 X-5 92-94;
6. Nicolas Ynot P-6388-A X-6 95-97;
7. Carlito Flaviano III P-6389 X-7 98-100;
8. Jolito Poralan P-6391 X-8 101-103;
9. Miguela Cabi-ao P-6392-A X-9 104-106;
10. Jose Rommel Saludar P-6388 X-10 107-109;
11. Joel Teves P-6396 X-11 110-112;
12. Rico Altizo P-6395 X-12 113-115;
13. Johnny Medillo P-6390 X-13 116-117;
14. Martin Saycon P-6394-A X-14 118-120;
15. Arsenio delos Reyes P-6395-A X-15 121-123;
16. Jose Bomez P-6394 X-16 124-127.
Sometime on September 24 and 25, 1997, except for lots X-6,
X-7, X-15
and X-16, the above-named registered owners sold their lots,
through
their attorney-in-fact, respondent Atty. Nilo Flaviano, to the
AFPRetirement
and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS) in the amount
of Two Million Nine Hundred Ninety-Seven Thousand Pesos
(P2,997,000.00) per 999 sq. m. lot (Record, pp. 127-150). Then,
Transfer

Certificate of Title Nos. T-81051 to 81062 were issued in the

name of
the vendee on September 25, 1997 (Record, pp. 151-173).
On the other hand, the registered owners of lot numbers X-6
and X-7
executed a Deed of Exchange with AFP-RSBS, represented by
respondent Jose Ramiscal, Jr., consenting to the exchange of
lots X-6
and X-7 with lots Y-1-A-1 and Y-1-A-2, respectively, the latter
two lots
being owned by AFP-RSBS (Record, pp. 175-178). While lots X15 and
X-16 were exchanged with one office unit or condo unit to be
given or
ceded to respondent Nilo Flaviano (Record, pp. 179-182).[3]
Based on the foregoing, petitioner filed a verified complaintaffidavit[4] before the
Ombudsman against the respondents together with Cesar
Jonillo (Jonillo), Renato
Rivera (Rivera), Mad Guaybar, Oliver Guaybar, Jonathan
Guaybar, Alex Guaybar,
Jack Guiwan, Carlito Flaviano III, Nicolas Ynot, Jolito Poralan,
Miguela Cabi-ao,
Jose Rommel Saludar, Joel Teves, Rico Altizo, Johnny Medillo,
Martin Saycon,
Arsenio de los Reyes, and Jose Bomez (Mad Guaybar and his
companions), Gen.
Jose Ramiscal, Jr. (Gen. Ramiscal), Wilfredo Pabalan (Pabalan),
and Atty. Nilo
Flaviano (Atty. Flaviano) (indicted) for violation of Paragraphs
(e), (g) and (j),
Section 3 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019,[5] as amended, and
for malversation of
public funds or property through falsification of public
documents.
The Ombudsman's Ruling
In the assailed Resolution dated January 20, 1999, the
Ombudsman held that
Mayor Nuez and Nalangan, among others, entered into the
Compromise
Agreement on behalf of the city and pursuant to the authority
granted to them by
the Sangguniang Panlungsod by virtue of Resolution No. 87;
hence, it is not the
sole responsibility of Mayor Nuez and Nalangan but of the
entire Sangguniang
Panlungsod. Moreover, the Ombudsman opined that the
validity of the
Compromise Agreement had been settled when the Office of
the Solicitor General
(OSG) and the RTC found it to be in order. The Ombudsman also
ruled that the
Order of Judge Adre was made in accordance with the facts of
the case, while
Diaz, Borinaga, Momongan and Cruzabra were found to have
regularly performed
their official functions. Accordingly, the charges against the
respondents were
dismissed. Thus, the case was disposed in this wise:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Office finds and so

holds that the following crimes were committed and that

respondents,
whose names appear below, are probably guilty thereof:
1. CESAR JONILLO sixteen (16) counts of Falsification of public
document to the sixteen (16) recommendation reports
submitted;
2. RENATO RIVERA sixteen (16) counts of Falsification of public
document relative to the sixteen (16) reports submitted, all
dated August
4, 1997;
3. MAD GUAYBAR, OLIVER GUAYBAR, JONATHAN GUAYBAR,
ALEX GUAYBAR, JACK GUIWAN, CARLITO FLAVIANO III,
NICOLAS YNOT, JOLITO PORALAN, MIGUELA CABI-AO, JOSE
ROMMEL SALUDAR, JOEL TEVES, RICO ALTIZO, JOHNNY
MED[I]LLO, MARTIN SAYCON, ARSENIO DE LOS REYES, and
JOSE BOMEZ in conspiracy with public respondents CESAR
JONILLO
and RENATO RIVERA one (1) count each for private
respondents and
sixteen (16) counts each for public respondents for violation of
Section
3(e) of RA 3019;
4. JOSE RAMISCAL, JR., WILFREDO PABALAN, NILO
FLAVIANO as conspirators for twelve (12) counts of falsification
of
public documents relative to the twelve (12) unilateral Deeds
of Sale;
5. MAD GUAYBAR, OLIVER GUAYBAR, JONATHAN GUAYBAR,
ALEX GUAYBAR, JACK GUIWAN, JOLITO PORALAN, MIGUELA
CABI-AO, JOSE ROMMEL SALUDAR, [J]OEL TEVES, RICO
ALTIZO, JOHNNY MEDILLO, MARTIN SAYSON one (1) count each
as conspirator in the falsification of public document relative to
the
corresponding unilateral Deed of Sale executed by their agent
in their
behalf;
6. JOSE RAMISCAL, JR., WILFREDO PABALAN and NILO
FLAVIANO twelve (12) counts of violation of section 3(e) of RA
3019
for short-changing the government inn the correct amount of
taxes due
for the sale of Lot-X to AFP-RSBS; and
7. MAD GUAYBAR, OLIVER GUAYBAR, JONATHAN GUAYBAR,
ALEX GUAYBAR, JACK GUIWAN, JOLITO PORALAN, MIGUELA
CABI-AO, JOSE ROMMEL SALUDAR, [J]OEL TEVES, RICO
ALTIZO, JOHNNY MEDILLO, MARTIN SAYSON one (1) count each
of violation of section 3(e) of RA 3019 as conspirator in shortchanging
the government in the payment of taxes for the sale of Lot-X to
AFPRSBS.
Let the herein attached Informations against aforementioned
respondents
be filed with the proper courts.
Charges against respondents ROSALITA NUEZ,
AUGUSTUS
MOMONGAN, ABEDNEGO ADRE, ASTERIA CRUZABRA,
PEDRO NALANGAN III, JULIO DIAZ and AGAPITO
BORINAGA are hereby DISMISSED, without prejudice to
the filing
of criminal cases against private respondents, for
offenses

committed not in conspiracy with the herein public

respondents, by
the proper parties-in-interest.
SO RESOLVED.[6]
On February 4, 2000, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was,
however, denied by the Ombudsman in his Order[7]dated April
26, 2000. The
Ombudsman held that since the criminal Informations were
already filed against
the aforementioned indicted and the cases were already
pending before the
Sandiganbayan and the regular courts of General Santos City,
the Ombudsman had
lost jurisdiction over the said case.
The Sole Issue
Hence, this Petition, on the sole ground that:
THE OMBUDSMAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN THE EXERCISE OF HIS PROSECUTORY
FUNCTIONS, BY DISMISSING THE CHARGES AGAINST THE
RESPONDENTS DESPITE CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE
OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION AND INVOLVEMENT IN THE
CONSPIRACY TO CHEAT AND DEFRAUD THE CITY
GOVERNMENT OF GENERAL SANTOS CITY THROUGH THE
ILLEGAL DISPOSITION OF LOT X OF THE MAGSAYSAY PARK
IN VIOLATION OF LAW AND ITS CHARTER.[8]
Petitioner avers that the Ombudsman ignored substantial
evidence pointing to the
existence of a conspiracy among all the respondents and those
indicted, which led
to the illegal and fraudulent disposition of Lot X of the
Magsaysay Park. To prove
her claim of a grand conspiracy, petitioner outlines the
individual participation,
cooperation and involvement of each respondent, as follows:
1. The assailed RTC Order issued by Judge Adre on July 22,
1997 was part of
the grand scheme and was made the basis for the filing of the
miscellaneous
sales applications of Mad Guaybar and his companions. The
same Order was
likewise used by Mayor Nuez and Nalangan as the reason for
interposing no
objection to the said applications. The assailed RTC Order was
issued by
Judge Adre almost five (5) years after his Judgment based on
the
Compromise Agreement had long become final; thus, it was
issued with
grave abuse of discretion and in gross ignorance of the law.
Judge Adre,
therefore, violated Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
2. Mayor Nuez and Nalangan knew or ought to have known, by
reason of their
respective offices and as administrators of the properties of the
city, that Lot
X of the Magsaysay Park is owned by the city and reserved as
health and
recreation site. Yet, Nalangan's Comment, filed before Judge
Adre issued

the assailed RTC Order, stated that per verification, there was
no existing
donation from the Heirs of Cabalo Kusop to the city. Likewise, in
their
1st Indorsement dated August 2, 1997, instead of opposing the
applications
of Mad Guaybar and his companions, Mayor Nuez and
Nalangan endorsed
the same and interposed no objection thereto. Said
Indorsement was part of
the grand conspiracy and was utilized as a front for the resale
of the said
property to AFP-RSBS, to the injury of the city. Petitioner
submits that
Mayor Nuez and Nalangan also violated Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019.
3. After Mayor Nuez and Nalangan issued their 1st Indorsement
on August 2,
1997 and after Jonillo submitted his falsified report on August
4, 1997, Diaz,
on the same date, scheduled the sale of Lot X to Mad Guaybar
and his
companions on September 5, 1997. Thus, Diaz issued notices
of sale of the
subdivided lots of Lot X on September 5, 1997 without public
auction and at
the disadvantageous price recommended by Rivera. Therefore,
Diaz, as a coconspirator,
should be similarly charged with Jonillo and Rivera for
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and for falsification of
public
documents.
4. Borinaga, conspiring with Rivera, filed on June 9, 1997 the
Motion for
Issuance of a Clarificatory Order before Judge Adre, which led
to the
issuance by the latter of the assailed RTC Order. Borinaga and
Rivera
likewise represented to the RTC that upon verification, they did
not find in
the records any deed of donation executed by the Heirs of
Cabalo Kusop.
Borinaga should be held liable as an active participant in a
grand scheme to
defraud the city.
5. Momongan, by the nature of his office, knew that Lot X is not
disposable
and alienable and is, therefore, not a proper subject of a sales
patent
application. Despite such knowledge and based on the falsified
reports of
Jonillo and Rivera, Momongan allowed Lot X to be subdivided
and sold to
Mad Guaybar and his companions by approving their
miscellaneous sales
application and issuing the Original Certificates of Title (OCTs)
covering
the subdivided lots of Lot X. In sum, Momongan adopted as his
own the
false reports, and granted unwarranted benefit and advantage
to Mad

Guaybar and his companions, to the injury of the city.

6. While the function of Cruzabra in the registration of
documents and titles
may be considered as ministerial, the circumstances under
which the titles
were issued in the names of Mad Guaybar and his companions
and
eventually, in the name of AFP-RSBS, indicate that Cruzabra
was aware and
was part of the grand conspiracy to defraud the city. Each of
the sixteen (16)
OCTs was transcribed and signed by Cruzabra on September
22, 1997. On
the same date, Atty. Flaviano claimed and received the owners'
copies of the
OCTs; Mad Guaybar and his companions executed a Joint
Special Power of
Attorney (SPA) authorizing Atty. Flaviano to be their attorney-infact, for
the purpose of selling their respective lots; and Cruzabra
registered and
annotated said SPA in their respective titles. On September 25,
1997, Atty.
Flaviano registered with Cruzabra twelve (12) Deeds of
Absolute Sale in
favor of AFP-RSBS, after paying the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR) on
the same day the capital gains tax and documentary stamp tax
due thereon.
On the same day, Cruzabra canceled the OCTs and issued, in
lieu thereof,
twelve (12) Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) in favor of AFPRSBS.
The remaining four (4) lots were transferred and registered in
the name of
AFP-RSBS on October 10, 1997 by virtue of deeds of exchange
executed by
the registered owners in favor of the former. Petitioner submits
that
Cruzabra could not have been unaware of the restrictions;
instead, she
allowed the transfer and registration of the said lots to AFPRSBS so
swiftly, that it could only be interpreted as part of the scheme
to defraud the
city.[9]
In sum, petitioner ascribes to the Ombudsman grave abuse of
discretion in the
exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory functions, by
completely ignoring and
disregarding the pieces of substantial evidence which clearly
establish the
existence of a common design among the respondents and
those indicted in the
fraudulent sale and disposition of Lot X of the Magsaysay Park.
On the other hand, respondents separately raise their
respective
defenses against petitioner's claims, as follows:
1. The Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special
Prosecutor (OSP),

contends that, in effect, petitioner is asking this Court to review

the pieces of
evidence gathered by the Ombudsman during the preliminary
investigation.
This is not proper. InEspinosa v. Office of the Ombudsman[10]
and Young v.
Office of the Ombudsman,[11] this Court accorded highest
respect for the
factual findings of the Ombudsman, absent a clear case of
grave abuse of
discretion. The OSP claims that the Ombudsman did not
commit grave
abuse of discretion because the respondents, based on their
counteraffidavits,
have valid and legal justifications, sufficient for the
Ombudsman
to exculpate them from the charges.[12]
2. Cruzabra avers that there is no showing that conspiracy
exists between her
and other respondents charged before the Ombudsman.
Petitioner's
allegations with respect to Cruzabra refer to recorded
transactions which are
legal acts. Such allegations did not discuss how the alleged
conspiracy was
committed; they are merely conjectures and bare allegations.
Inasmuch as
conspiracy cannot be presumed, and there is no convincing
evidence to
support such allegations, the Ombudsman did not commit
grave abuse of
discretion. Lastly, Cruzabra claims that the canceled OCTs do
not contain
any restriction to transfer the respective lots to AFP-RSBS. As
such,
Cruzabra submits that it would be most unfair if she would be
made a part of
the alleged conspiracy simply because she exercised her
ministerial
functions as Register of Deeds.[13]
3. Momongan alleges, among others, that as Regional
Executive Director of
the DENR, he is duly authorized to sign patents and
reconstituted patents.
Since the standard procedure and processes were complied
with, Momongan
simply relied on his subordinates and on their good faith. He
argues that he
acted in accordance with law, department guidelines, rules and
regulations,
and that to require him to scrutinize every phase of a report of
a subordinate
is a very tall order.[14]
4. Judge Adre manifests that in the Joint Resolution[15] of the
Senate
Committees on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigation (Blue
Ribbon) and National Defense and Security, dated December
23, 1998, not
one of the respondents was recommended for prosecution in
connection with

the irregularity involving the Magsaysay Park. Judge Adre

claims that he
acted properly, and even sought the opinion of the OSG before
the
Compromise Agreement was approved. However, Judge Adre
narrated that
due to the vagaries of politics, the judgment lay dormant, as no
motion for
execution was filed by then Mayor Adelbert Antonino, husband
of
petitioner, after Mayor Nuez lost in the elections. Subsequently,
the writ was
not issued as the Heirs of Cabalo Kusop did not execute any
deed of
donation in favor of the city. He declared that the RTC did not
lose
jurisdiction over the case when the Motions for Clarification and
Exclusion
were filed; thus, the issuance of the assailed RTC Order
excluding Lot X
and enjoining the Heirs of Cabalo Kusop from donating the
same to the city
in keeping with the intent and spirit of the compromise
agreement, was
proper.[16]
5. Borinaga posits that the Ombudsman's factual findings need
not be
disturbed, as they are not attended by grave abuse of
discretion. He
maintains that he acted in accordance with law; that as the
Regional
Technical Director is not required to go to the premises of the
land subject of
miscellaneous applications, and he may rely on the data
submitted by the
CENRO and reviewed by the PENRO.[17] Moreover, Borinaga
argues that
the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner assailing the
Ombudsman's
Resolution was filed out of time.[18] The Certification[19] dated
October 1,
2003, issued by Severo A. Sotto, Records Officer IV of the Office
of the
Ombudsman, shows that petitioner was personally served with
a copy of the
assailed Resolution on February 24, 1999 by Jose Ruel Bermejo,
Process
Server, and she filed her Motion for Reconsideration only on
February 4,
2000.
6. Diaz opines that there is no substantial evidence to prove
that he
participated in a grand scheme to unlawfully dispose of the lots
covered by
Lot X. He vouches that when he issued the notice of sale, he
did so on the
basis of the requisite documents submitted to his office.[20]
7. Mayor Nuez and Nalangan contend that Mayor Nuez did not
violate the
Charter of the City, because when she entered into the
Compromise

Agreement with the Heirs of Cabalo Kusop, she was authorized

by
the Sangguniang Panlungsod under Resolution No. 87, series of
1991, after
almost one (1) year of committee and public hearings. The
same was also
referred to the OSG, which recommended its approval. When
the Heirs of
Cabalo Kusop filed a Motion for Exclusion of Lot X, Nalangan
had no
recourse but to tell the truth that, indeed, he found no deed of
donation made
in favor of the city. While they admit to have issued
Indorsements, they
made it clear that the DENR shall undertake only what is legally
feasible. Mayor Nuez and Nalangan asseverate that they had
no intention of
giving up the claim of the city over Lot X, as they even filed a
case against
Mad Guaybar and his companions.[21]
Our Ruling
The instant Petition lacks merit.
Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989)[22]
provides:
SEC. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. (1) All
provisionary
orders of the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately
effective and
executory.
A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision
of the
Office of the Ombudsman must be filed within five (5) days
after receipt
of written notice and shall be entertained only on any of the
following
grounds:
(1) New evidence has been discovered which materially affects
the
order, directive or decision;
(2) Errors of law or irregularities have been committed
prejudicial to the
interest of the movant. The motion for reconsideration shall be
resolved
within three (3) days from filing: Provided, That only one
motion for
reconsideration shall be entertained.
Other than the statement of material dates wherein petitioner
claimed that she
received through counsel the assailed Resolution of the
Ombudsman on January
21, 2000, she failed to establish that her Motion for
Reconsideration was indeed
filed on time, and thus, failed to refute the assertion of the
respondents based on
the aforementioned Certification that petitioner was personally
served a copy of the
assailed Resolution on February 24, 1999. There are a number
of instances when
rules of procedure are relaxed in the interest of justice.
However, in this case,

petitioner did not proffer any explanation at all for the late
filing of the motion for
reconsideration. After the respondents made such allegation,
petitioner did not
bother to respond and meet the issue head-on. We find no
justification why the
Ombudsman entertained the motion for reconsideration, when,
at the time of the
filing of the motion for reconsideration the assailed Resolution
was already final.
Even only on the basis of this fatal procedural infirmity, the
instant Petition ought
to be dismissed. And on the substantive issue raised, the
petition is likewise bereft
of merit.
Under Sections 12 and 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution,
and pursuant to
R.A. No. 6770, the Ombudsman has the power to investigate
and prosecute any act
or omission of a public officer or employee when such act or
omission appears to
be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.[23] Well-settled is the
rule that this
Court will not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsman's
exercise of his
investigatory and prosecutory powers without good and
compelling reasons that
indicate otherwise. The rule is based not only upon respect for
the investigatory
and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the
Office of the
Ombudsman, but upon practicality as well. A contrary rule
would encourage
innumerable petitions seeking dismissal of investigatory
proceedings conducted by
the Ombudsman, which would grievously hamper the functions
of the office and
the courts, in much the same way that courts would be
swamped by a deluge of
cases if they have to review the exercise of discretion on the
part of public
prosecutors each time they decide to file an information or
dismiss a complaint by
a private complainant.[24]
Of course, this rule is not absolute. The aggrieved party may
file a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court when the
finding of the
Ombudsman is tainted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, as what the petitioner did in this case,
consistent with our ruling
in Collantes v. Marcelo,[25] where we laid down the following
exceptions to the
rule:
1. When necessary to afford adequate protection to the
constitutional
rights of the accused;
2. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or
to avoid
oppression or multiplicity of actions;

3. When there is a prejudicial question that is sub judice;

4. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of
authority;
5. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or
regulation;
6. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
7. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
8. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;
9. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by
the lust for
vengeance;
10. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the
accused and a
motion to quash on that ground has been denied.
Grave abuse of discretion exists where a power is exercised in
an arbitrary,
capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion
or personal hostility
so patent and gross as to amount to evasion of positive duty or
virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by, or in contemplation of law.[26]
The alleged grave abuse of discretion imputed to the
Ombudsman is found wanting
in this case. Thus, this Court finds no reason to deviate from
the general rule. We
concur with the disquisition of GIO I Rubillar-Arao in dismissing
the charges
against respondents, as approved by Ombudsman Desierto,
thus:
Hence, without ruling on the validity of the titles, this Office is
constrained to limit its evaluation of the issue on the
participation of
each respondent in the titling of Lot X, whether the same would
constitute a violation of RA 3019 and/or other illegal acts.
1. Respondent Abednego Adre His participation extends only to
his
issuance of an Order excluding Lot-X from the coverage of the
Compromise Agreement.
A review of the terms and conditions of the subject
Compromise
Agreement confirms the Order of the respondent that indeed
Lot X was
excluded.The Order of respondent judge was made in
accordance with
the facts of the case. It is even noteworthy that respondent
judge assisted
in preserving the claim of the government of General Santos
City over
Lot X by enjoining the donation of said property by the private
respondents.
2. Respondents Nuez and Nalangan Said respondents
participation in the
titling of Lot-X was when they issued or caused the issuance of
Indorsements stating therein that this office (Office of the
Mayor)
interposes no objection to whatever legal proceedings your
(CENRO)
office may pursue on the application covering portions thereof
(Lot-X).
The contents of the Indorsements, as quoted above, cannot be
construed

as a waiver on the part of General Santos City on its claim over

LotX. On the contrary, it has given DENR the authority to take the
necessary legal proceedings relative to the titling of the
property. Moreover, it should be taken into account that DENR
has the
responsibility, authority and the power to grant alienable and
disposable
lands to deserving claimants.
Based on these circumstances, there is no evidence to prove
that
respondents Nuez and Nalangan gave unwarranted benefit to
the
claimants by issuing said Indorsements. In fact, they protected
the
interest of the government over Lot-X by immediately filing a
case for
nullification of titles upon knowing of the issuances thereof.
xxxx
[5.] Public respondents Julio C. Diaz, Agapito Borinaga,
Augustus L.
Momongan, Asteria E. Cruzabra Based on the evidences on
record, these
respondents were in the regular performance of their official
functions. Their participation in the titling of Lot-X was due to
the fact
that the documents for titling were submitted to their
respective offices
as a matter of course, and there is nothing that they can do but
to follow
the established procedure upon finding that all the documents
for titling
were submitted.[27]
Indeed, while the Ombudsman's discretion in determining the
existence of probable
cause is not absolute, nonetheless, petitioner must prove that
such discretion was
gravely abused in order to warrant the reversal of the
Ombudsman's findings by
this Court. In this respect, petitioner fails.[28]
Moreover, the elements of the offense, essential for the
conviction of an accused
under Section 3(e), R. A. No. 3019, are as follows:
(1) The accused is a public officer or a private person charged
in
conspiracy with the former;
(2) The said public officer commits the prohibited acts during
the
performance of his or her official duties, or in relation to his or
her
public functions;
(3) That he or she causes undue injury to any party, whether
the
government or a private party;
(4) Such undue injury is caused by giving unwarranted
benefits,
advantage or preference to such parties; and
(5) That the public officer has acted with manifest partiality,
evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable neglect.[29]

Thus, in order to be held guilty of violating Section 3(e), R. A.

No. 3019, the act of
the accused that caused undue injury must have been done
with evident bad faith
or with gross inexcusable negligence. Bad faith per se is not
enough for one to be
held liable under the law; bad faith must be evident. Bad faith
does not simply
connote bad moral judgment or negligence. There must be
some dishonest purpose
or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a
breach of a sworn duty
through some motive or intent or ill will. It partakes of the
nature of fraud. It
contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with
furtive design or some
motive of self-interest, or ill will for ulterior purposes. On the
other hand, gross
negligence is characterized by the want of even slight care,
acting or omitting to
act in a willful or intentional manner displaying a conscious
indifference to
consequences as far as other persons may be affected.[30]
As found by the Ombudsman and based on the records, there
is no showing of
evident bad faith and/or gross negligence in the respective acts
of the respondents.
It must be stressed that it is good faith, not bad faith, which is
presumed, as the
chapter on Human Relations of the Civil Code directs every
person, inter alia, to
observe good faith, which springs from the fountain of good
conscience.[31]
Finally, petitioner speaks of conspiracy among the respondents
and those indicted.
However, as found by the Ombudsman, such conspiracy
alleged in the complaint
was not supported by ample evidence. At best, the evidence
adduced was not clear
as to respondents' participation in the acts in question. Actori
incumbit onus
probandi- the burden of proof rests with the plaintiff or the
prosecution. The
inherent weakness of complainant's case is not a ground for
the Ombudsman to
conduct preliminary investigation.[32] For it is fundamental
that conspiracy cannot
be presumed. Conspiracy must be proved by direct evidence or
by proof of the
overt acts of the accused, before, during and after the
commission of the crime
charged indicative of a common design.[33] This, the petitioner
sadly failed to
establish.
All told, the Ombudsman did not act with grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing
the criminal complaint against respondents.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were
reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the

Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice