--

In! Arch

Occup Environ Health (1982) 50:33-51

The New York City Fire Epidemic as a Toxic Phenomenon

Rodrick Wallace
Public Interest Scientific Consulting Service Incorporated,
549 W. 123 St.. New York, NY 10027. USA

Summary. Reductions in the fire service in New York City from 1972 to 1976
appear to have caused a disproportionate increase in fire-fighter work load
through several unexpected mechanisms of fire contagion. In turn, the work
load increase has itself had a disproportionate physiologic impact: A classic
dose-response relation has been observed between a composite measure of per
capita structural fire work load and the percentage of the fire-fighting work
force retiring under conditions of disability. After 1974, the increase in work
load seems to have caused entry t q t h e 'linear' portion of the dose-response
curve.
Implications of this synergism are explored for both New York City and
other American urban areas now suffering 'fiscal crises' or planning fire service
reductions.
Key words: Fire-fighter retirements - Fire-fighter work load - New York City
fire crisis

Under the best of circumstances, fire fighting is very difficult work, especially in
densely populated urban areas like New York City: In 1963, an actuarialstudy was
performed for the New York City Uniformed Fire Officers' Association (UFOA)
suggesting just how difficult [I]. That study examined all 18,069 New York City fire
fighters born after January 1, 1898 and covered the period from the time of their
appointment to the New York Fire Department (NYFD) until January 1.1963.
Their average age at death was found to be 45.9 years, 8.7 years younger than the
expected average of 54.6.
A comparison of injury frequency and severity rates for New York City fire
fighting and other occupations in the years 1968 and 1976, given in Table 1, is also
instructive [2, 3].
From 1968 to 1976, the injury severity of underground coal mining had
decreased markedly, although still very high when compared with the average for

.-

34

Wallace

Table I. Injury frequencyand severity rates for New York City fire fighting and other occupations
Occupation

Disabling injuries/
10' /man h
1968
1976

Days lost/
10' /man h
1968
1976

industries
fire fighting
NYC lire lighting
Underground coal mining

7.35
37.0
106.8
34.7

665
1,767
2.403
8.258

All

All

10.9
39.7
208.1
35.4

668
2.543
5.867
5.154

all industries. This appears to be consequent t o implementation of the Federal Coal

Mining Health and Safety Act o f 1969. The injury severity of New York City fire
fighting had by 1976 exceeded that of underground coal mining. The injury
frequency of New York City fire fighting, already excessive in 1968, had become
astronomic by 1976.
From 1960 t o 1972, between 0.5% and 2.2% of New York City's fire fighters
retired under conditions of explicit disability in any one year, as certified by an
adversary hearing procedure. In 1976, slightly over 10% of those fire fighters
retired under conditions of disability a s determined by that same procedure. T o
quote from the Annual Report of the New York City Firefighters' Pension Fund
for the fiscal year July 1, 1976 t o J u n e 30, 1977 [4]: "Ordinary a n d accident
disability retirements far exceeded the expected. Consequently, the overall
experience with respect t o disability retirement was very unfavorable.'' In the fiscal
year 1978, the N Y F D budget was about $388.8 million [3], $94.3 million of which
represented pension support; $54.2 million of this latter sum went t o disability
retirement pension payments [5]. In the fiscal year 1970, disability retirement
pension payments cost S6.7 million [6] a n d in the fiscal year l972 $ 10.1 million [7].
From 1972 t o 1980 the deficit of the New York City Firefighter's Pension Fund
increased from about $235 miIlion [7] to almost $ 1.2 billion [8]. These transformations were accompanied by an incrase in the average per capita fire fighter
structural fire work load- to be defined at some length later-of over 84% from
1972 t o 1976 and 183% from 1960 t o 1976.
In this paper we shall examine the relation between the percent of New York
'City fire fighters retiring under disability and the per capita structural fire work
load in the period 1960-1978. Structural fires are those which occur within
buildings. We consider disability retirements primarily a s an index of fire-fighter
occupational health, although the various fiscal aspects a r e of independent
interest. We shall find something very like a classicdose-response relation between
work load and disability retirements, s o that after a certain 'threshold' small
increase in structural fire work load begin t o have very grave impacts on fire-fighter
disability retirement patterns, and by inference. o n fire-fighter occupational
health.
Recent studies of the New York City fire crisis have shown that relatively small
cots in fire service provided to high-population-density, hi g h-fire-incidence areas
can have a nonlinear impact o n structural fire occurrence, a n d hence fire-fighter
work load. through the action of several mechanisms of fire contagion [9, 10]. We

Fire Work Load Toxicity

35

shall find considerable evidence that, through the convolution of these t w o

synergistic nonlinear processes, relatively small reductions in the fire service
provided to congested urban areas may well have extreme effects o n fire-fighter
health. This evidence is in view of a proliferating national pattern of extreme
reductions in fire service: Boston is contemplating a reduction from 1,784 men and
77 companies t o 1,250 and 55, respectively. Paterson, New Jersey plans t o reduce
its fire-fighting force from 300 to 220 men, and Trenton, New Jersey routinely runs
8 of its 13 fire companies with three men. T h e recommended minimum is five. The
list is almost endless. New York City was the first large American urban area t o
make fire-service reductions of these magnitudes, a n d its experience may well
provide a n unwelcome glimpse into the future of America's cities and the health of
its fire-fighters.
We begin with a brief discussion of the New York fire crisis, then examinedata
and methodology for both disability retirements and work load, and finally study
the relations between retirements and work load.
The New York City Fire Crisis
In the late 1960's, after the UFOA actuarial study described in the introduction,
fire-fighting in New York City underwent a transformation. Structural fire
changed from a destructive, but essentially contained and controlled phenomenon.
t o what appears now a s a virulent, contagious, geographically spreading, a n d
temporally recurrent epidemic process [9, 10].
Figure I shows the annual number of reported structural fires in New York City
from 1955 to 1980. It has several evident regions a n d can be interpreted as a n
'epidemic curve' showing the onset and proliferation of a contagious fire
phenomenon in New York City in which visible fire damage o n a block appears t o
'seed' it for subsequent fires [9, 10]. Other contagion mechanisms, operating o n
different time scales, are also thought to operate [9, 10]. The sudden increase in
structural fires from 1967 t o 1968 represents, in this view, the onset of extreme
epidemic proliferation following the exceeding of some epidemiologic threshold.
This acute epidemic phase is characterized by extreme spatial and temporal
clustering o f fires, seeing repeated fires in small areas over short timespans [I I].
The leveling from 1969 t o 1972 appears to be a direct result of theestablishment of
19 new fire companies and 'tactical units' in high-fire-incidence areas in 1969 and
1970. The mechanism of this stabilization will become evident shortly. These new
companies were opened after an adversary mediation process initiated by the fire
service unions, Previously, it had been standard practice t o establish new
companies in areas of new o r exacerbated fire occurrence.
In November, 1972, in spite of the apparent success of the newly opened
comoanies in stabilizing the pattern of structural fire, New York City began a
continuing program of fire-service withdrawal from high-fire-incidence areas,
including those in which companies had so recently been established. The principal
basis for these reductions was a series of simplistic and unverified 'operations
research' models developed by the Rand Corporation, and since spread nationally
hy the Office of Policy Development and Research of the U.S. Department o f
Housing and Urban Development [9, 12, 13].

R . Wallace
Fire Work Load Toxicity

d
,
60

65

70

75

Fig. 1. Annual number of structural fires in

New York City, 1955-1980

80

YEAR

The Rand cuts, exacerbated by the New York City 'fiscal crisis', saw 35 fire
companies eliminated or permanently relocated, one man removed from each
company and 'standard response' to fires reduced from three engines and two
ladders to two engines and two ladders, all in the short period 1972-1976. The
subsequent and consequent virulent epidemic proliferation of structural fires after
1973 was heavily concentrated, both in space and time, in existing high-fireincidence areas, and through that concentration devastating, producing the now
common 'bombed out' appearance of many New York City neighborhoods [l0.
11].
Apparently fire service acts a s a n 'immunization' procedure against epidemic
fire proliferation by limiting several contagion mechanisms identified as acting on
different time scales [9, 10]. The first mechanism, on the shortest scale. is simply
that the prompt containment of structural fires in a high-fire-incidence area
prevents the 'stripping' of fire companies from surrounding districts during the
peak demand periods common to both. Such 'stripping' would leave these
surrounding districts without sufficient resources to control their own fires. On a
longer time scale, the appearance of visible fire damage on a block appears to 'seed'
i t for further lires, for example, by triggering withdrawal of building maintenance
by absentee landlords preparatory to abandonment. Most structural fires, outside
of the kitchen. are directly related to the quality of such maintenance. Visible lire
damage may also trigger those with psychological tendencies toward fire setting.
Finally, on the longest time scale, the burning out of entire neighborhoods, as
the South Bronx, causes a mass forced migration of the poor into adjacent areas,

37

e.g., the West Bronx. Such migration brings with it the usual housingovercrowding
and overuse consequent on poverty and which has been found to be highly
correlated with both per capita f i n occurrence and size [14]. After a period of
'ripening' the newly overcrowded area becomes susceptible to fire.
Once such fire contagion is recognized, adaptation of the usual models of
mathematical,epidemiology produces a picture of a geographically spreading,
temporally recurrent fire epidemic, with a special instability introduced by the
spread of susceptibility consequent on infection (i.e.. by migration) [l0,11].
The fire company eliminations, permanent relocations, de-manning, and
lowered initial response appear to have acted much as would the elimination of
smallpox vaccination in the Lower East Side at the turn of the century. Thus. the
decline in structural fire after 1976 is seen to be a consequence of the 'removal' of
'susceptibles' from the population, i.e.. burning out of vast stands ofovercrowded,
undermaintained housing denied adequate fire-related municipal services [16].
Such declines are a feature of all epidemic phenomena and d o not indicate
abatement of the underlying causes of the epidemic[15, 17]. On the contrary, it is t o
be expected that areas Adjacent to those which burned have now 'ripened' through
the spread of housing overcrowding and will now become the sites of a new fire
epidemic outbreak in the early-mid 1980's. Again, this kind of epidemic recurfence
is the rule rather than the exception, requiringonly the replenishment of the pool of
susceptible individuals by any means [15].
The next fire outbreak, since nothing has changed with respect to fire-related
municipal services, and since New York began losing neighborhoods at the 1974
level of fire service, might well be moreserious than the last. Housing overcrowding
and undermaintenance have accelarated in New York City since 1975.
The process we have just described may well be expected to act in other
congested urban areas which suffer similar fire service cuts.
Dora and Merhodology: Retirements

Retirements in the New York City Fire Department are classified as 'service.'
'ordinary disability,' and 'accidental' (or 'line-ofduty') disability. Service retirements are those after a minimum service term of 20 years or so, but without explicit
disability. Ordinary disability retirements are presumed to result from nonservicerelated illness or injury which results in an inability to continue fire fighting. Lineof-duty disability retirements are presumed to result from on-the-job injury.
Typically, service o r ordinary disability retirements will be at approximately 50%
of pay, while line-ofduty disability retirements are at about 75% of pay. Needless
to say, certification as a line-ofduty disability retirement is an adversary
procedure.
New York City Fire Department retirement statistics were supplied to us by the
Office of the New York City Actuary, and are included in Table 2 for the years
1960-1978, as is the yearly roster, taken from the Annual Reports of the fire
department.
Since July, 1970, heart diseaseamong fire fighters has beenconsidered a line-ofduty injury on the basis of much evidence [18-20]. Thus the definition of what
constitutes fire fighters' occupational disability has changed as more medical data

R . Wallace
Table 2. Roster. retirement, and work load data, New York Fire Department
Calendar
year

Number of
fire fighters

1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974

1 1,765
11.578
12,301
12,817
12,953
13,228
13.231
13,059
13,764
14,031
14,325
13.896
13.558
13.394
13,096

1975
1976
1977
1978

1 1,548
10,215
10,895
10.986

Table 3. Work load data from New York Fire Department Annual Reports

Number of retirements
Service

488
31 1
289
260
169
114
98
224
132
153
68
101
142
39 1
279
206
392
21 1
22 1

Ordinary
Disability
70
109
77
42
40
28
44

l I0
72
97
70
58
37

64
85
151
22 1
44

55

Fire Work Load Toxicity

Year
Accidental
Disability

Total

137
108
100
83
80
39
84
77
69

695
528
466
385
289

90
166
253
148
254
252
465
804
335
209

No. of
structural fires

No. of
serious fires

No. of
extra alarm
assignments

Composite
damageindex
from PCA

181
226
41 1
273
340
304
412
327
709
616
822
1,417
590
485

have been uncovered a n d analyzed. As more is understood, we may find more

'ordinarv' fire-fighter disabilities in fact result from occupational activities. In a n y
event while the total percent retiring under disability remains a consistent index
over the entire period 1960-1978, the inclusion of heart disease as a line-of-duty
injury after July, 1970 has caused some relative shift in the retirement categoriesof
subsequent years.
Subsequent to 1978, union-management disputes a n d a pending court case
have virtually stalled the disability retirement procedure causing large numbers of
apparently disabled fire fighters to remain in the fire department o n 'light duty,'
i.e., in nonfire-fighting capacities [8].

Data ond Methodology: Fire-fighting Work Load

There are, perhaps, several possible ways t o define fire-fighting work load. We
choose only t o examine the number a n d seriousness of structural fires rather than
study total responses o r include such things a s nonstructural fires (e.g., outside
rubbish. automobile). emergencies, o r false alarms. The reason for this choice is
that it is in the confined environment of the structural fire that the fire fighter's
greatest exposure t o toxic substances under conditions of extreme temperature,

physical exertion, psychological stress, a n d injury takes place, as indeed d o the vast
majority of serious injuries.
For the period 1959-1978, we have constructed a composite structural fire
damage index using statistics culled from the Annual Reports of the NY F D for (1)
number of structural fires, (2) number of 'serious' fires (requiring five o r more
units for extingnishment), and (3) number of'extra alarm assignments.' These data
are given in Table 3. The number o f extra alarm assignments is calculated by
counting each two-alarm fire a s one extra alarm assignment, each three-alarm fire
as two extra assignments, and s o o n , a n d summing them for a given year.
Since the number of serious fires and extra alarm assignments, and indeed the
number of structural fires, are not independent, some further manipulation is
needed to create a n adequate composite measure. This is done by a standard
technique called 'principal component analysis' (PCA), as described below. The
main result of the technique is t o produce a series of statistically independent (i.e.,
uncorrelated) composite measures of the quantities of interest, here the factors (1)
through (3) above. These measures in turn account for differing percentages of the
total variability (i.e., variance) in the full d a t a sets. which here have been
'normalized' to zero mean and unit variance. See references [21,22] for details o f
the technique.

R . Wallace

Fire Work Load Toxicity

41

onto this vector (and shifting the valuesso that zerofires give a zero va1ue) gives the
annual structural damage index which we have adopted.
Correlation Matrix. X I = annual number of structural fires, XI =annual number of
serious fires, Xj = annual'number of extra alarm assignments.

The
Flg. 2. Example of the projection
of data onto a principal
component

Principal Component Analysis (PCA)

Figure 2 shows a n artificial two-dimensional example of principal component
analysis. Each point o n the graph represents a simultaneous observation of two
factors o r interest in a n individual sampling unit, for example, a year's number of
structural fires and a year's number of 'serious' fires. Obviously there is some
general relation between them in this artificial example, plotted a s respectively x
and y o n the graph, but it is not exact. The points d o not lie o n a perfect straight
line; the correlation is positive but not unity. Nonetheless, we may be able to
approximate the relation a s a simple linear one without losing too much
information by choosing two new perpendicular axes, x' and y', s o that most of the
variance in the d a t a lies along one of them. Forcing these new axes to be
perpendicular when one is chosen t o account for the maximal variance possible in a
linear configuration ensures the two new variables will be statistically uncorrelatcd
linear combinations of the old [21].
By projecting each (x. y) data point o n t o the new x'axis we obtain a simplified
onedimensional representation of what had been twodimensional data, still
retaining much of the original information. Mathematically one finds the so-called
eigenvalues a n d eigenvectors of the matrix of correlation coefficients between the
original variables. The eigenvalue then tells what fraction of the variance is
accounted for by each eigenvector. The variables are all initially standardized t o
zero mean a n d unit variance. T h u s a 2 x 2 correlation matrix has total variance 2,
etc. [21-23].
We have found the eigenvalues and eigenvectors for the correlation matrix of
annual numbers of ( I ) structural fires, (2) serious fires, a n d (3) extra alarm
assignments in the period 1959-1978. These are given in the correlation matrix
below.
The largest eigenvalue, 2.766, amounts for 92.2% of the total variance of 3.0.
Projecting the annual standardized variables
X (I) = ((X(t) - mean)/(standard deviation))

indicate symmetric entries. Data cover 1959-1978 inclusive.

Eigenvalues and Eigenvectors. Eigenvalue

Eigenvcctor

2.766 1

0.1854

0.0485

0.5815
0.5878
0.5641

0.4878
0.3013
-0.8193

0.651 1
-0.7508
0.1115

If one 'principal component' accounts for a very large percentage of the total
data variance, then we have successfully simplified the data s o that one composite
index contains virtually all the information of. in our case. the three original indices
of property damage. Although we have not needed to examine them, it is well
known that the principal components accounting for smaller percentages of
variance often are more sensitive indices of 'environmental' changes than the
largest component, which is often a generalized magnitude[23]. As is shown above
the largest principal component for the three damage measures accounts for 92%
of the total data variance over the period of study. 1959-1978; 70% would have
been acceptable for this analysis.
Figure 3 shows the projection of the normalized data o n t o the largest principal
component, shifted s o that zero fires gives a zero value. This we take a s o u r
composite damage index. The assumption that zero fires gives a zero index is a n
assumption of linearity over rather a large range. To obtain a (per capita) workload measure from thisdamage index we divide it by the number of men in the work
force each year a n d multiply by 10,000. Also shown in Fig.3 is this composite
structural fire damage index per 10,000 men, which we define here a s fire-fighter
work load. Another potentially useful work-load measure would have been the per
capita annual hours of structural fire work time for engines a n d ladders, weighted
for company manning. Unfortunately these d a t a were not made available to us for
the entire period of interest. Figure 4 shows thecorrelation between ourcomposite
damage index and the available annual structural fire work times for engines a n d
ladders as culled from the 'CD-14A' annual fire company reports for the years
1970 and 1972-1978. Structural fire worktime is defined as the time spent actually
fighting structural fire, rather than responding to incidents o r awaiting deployment.
The structural fire damage index of Fig. 2 differs significantly from the annual
structural fire graph of Fig. I in several respects. ( I ) The rise from 1959 t o 1967 in
Fig. 3, representing severity a s well a s number of fires, is much less uniform than
the graph of annual number of structural fires. (2) When severity is taken into

43

Fire Work Load Toxicity

account the transition between 1967 and 1968 is seen to be much sharper than
simply the increase in number of structural fires, sharp as that is. (3) The impact of
the new fire companies of 1969 and 1970 is much more evident when severity
measures are included: While the number of structural fires stabilized from 1968
through 1972, the composite damage measure actually decreased.
The work-load measure we have chosen, composite structural fire damage
index per 10,000 men, also shown in Fig.3, is a badly distorted version of the
damage index. Between 1970 and 1976 the New York Fire Department suffered a
29% decrease in manpower. Consequent on both the resulting fire epidemicand the
manpower reduction, the work load as we have defined it increased by 89% in the
same period. Between 1960 and 1976 the work load we have defined increased
183%.
For the sake of clarity the following text table summarizes the definitions of
several terms.

INDEX PER
10.000

Fig. 3. Annual composite structural fire

damage index and structural fire work
load index for New York City,
1959- 1978
YEAR

Term
Accidental disability
retirement
,
Ordinary disability
retirement
Structural fire
damage index
Fire fighter workload

Definition
Retirement as a direct result ofon-the-job injury o r illness,
as determined by a n adversary hearing procedure, generally at 3/4full pay.
Retirement as a result of a physical condition presumed
not job related as determined by a n adversary hearing
procedure. generally a t 1/2 full pay.
A composite measure of number and seriousness of structural fires, constructed from a principal component analysis of official fire department statistics.
Structural fire damage index per 10,000 men.

Relations Between Disability Retirement and Workload

1 ENGINES-

I'

75

Figure 5 shows the percent of fire fighters retiring under disability vs thestructural
lire work load (damage index per 10,000 men) for the years 1960-1978. The solid
line represents a 'best fit' logistic curve, displaying at very high work loads a
characteristic 'topping out' to 100%. Figure 6 shows the procedure used to
determine the 'best fit' equation. The mathematical details are discussed in the
section below. The correlation coefficient for the fitting procedure is 0.841 over the
entire 1960-1978 period. This covers a factor of three increase in work load and a
factor of ten increase in percent disability retirements. The reason for thechoiceof
a logistic form will be discussed further below.

o'i

10

STRUCTURAL F I R E DAMAGE INDEX

Fig.4. Relation between the composite damage index of Fig.3 and available annual structural
fire worktimes Tor engines and ladders

Fitting the Logistic Equation

The logistic equation has the form
ep. I

R . Wallace

Fire Work Load Toxicity

I-

0.5

WORKLOAD

Fig.5. Total percent of New York

City fire fighters retiring under
disability vs structural fire work
load (composite structural fire
damage index/l0.000 men).
1960-1978

Flg.7. Percent of New York City

fire fighters retiring under
'accidental' and 'ordinary' disability vs the structural fire work
load index, 1971-1978

lo

Fig.8. Percent of fire fighters

retiring under 'accidental' disability vs percent retiring under
'ordinary' disability in New York
City, 1971-1978
% "ORDINARY" DISABILITY

WORKLOAD (DAMAGE INDEX/10,OOO MEN)

Fig.6. 'Best fit' least squares logistic equation following the procedure of given under 'Fitting'
the logistic Equation

At x = O y = K / ( 1 +exp(-b)). If -b is appreciably greater than O then y(0) is

relatively small. As x becomes very large then y approaches the value K. This is
an s-shaped curve.
Some m a n i p u l a t i o n of equation I gives
eq. 2
= exp (- (mx + b))
Y

46

R . Wallace

or taking the natural log of both sides,

y' = ln(y/(K - y)) = mx + b.

eq. 3
In our case, K = 100% and a plot of y = l n (y/(k-y)) against x should be linear.
Another approach is to plot y/(K-y) vs x on semilog paper, a s is done in Fig. 6.
The line is a 'least squares' fit.
After July, 1970, heart disease among fire fighters was, through the 'heart bill,'
presumed t o be an 'accidental' o r on-the-job injury. Figure 7 shows the graphs of
both percent 'accidental' disability retirement and percent 'ordinary' disability vs
the work load index for the period 1971-1978. Wehavetreated 1970 as a transition
year. It is evident that these graphs are remarkably similar. Indeed, except for the
year 1977, the relation between percent disability retirement and per capita work
load is quite linear for both classifications over the work load regime 5.0-9.5. We
will treat this similarity and linearity in some detail in the Discussion.
Figure 8 is a graph ofpercent 'accidental'vs 'ordinary'disability retirements for
the period 1971-1978, including the year 1977. The very high correlation
coefficient, 0.96, implies very strongly that borh these population responses have a
similar underlying cause. Again this relation will be examined at some length
below.
Discussion
Figure 5 is remarkably like a classic dose-response curve. This is indeed the basis of
o u r choice o f a logisticcurve t o fit the data, although we have in no sense conducted
a 'pure' toxicologic study. In such a study. the dose-response curve is constructed
by exposing a series of relatively uniform populations of test subjects todifferent
per-body-weight doses of the substance under test and recording the percent of
each different population showing a particular index response. The upper limit of
dosage given is usually chosen that is sufficient to cause the index response in over
90% of a test population. Here we have the repeated (and possibly cumulative)
dosing of approximately the same population of fire fighters (over a short time)
having varying ages, service times, and exposures tostructural fire. In addition, our
maximum index response is seen in 'only' 10% of the population.
What we d o have, however, is approximately 10,000 test subjects and a
considerable interdeployment of fire companies from (relatively) low-fire- to highfire-incidence neighborhoods by a process called 'relocation' and, during the peak
fire years, by a program of systematic 'interchange' of low and high work load
companies designed deliberately t o equalize work loads [12]. We also have the
circumstance that 10% of a work force retiring under disability in a single
year-1976-is a somewhat notable index response.
Figure 6 shows that the data point for 1976, the year of both highest work load
and disability retirement, in particular, is nor an outlier in the procedure used to fit
the data to a logistic curve: 1976 is quite consistent with the pattern of the lower
work-load years, within statistical scatter. This consistency throws some doubt
upon assertions that: "Excessive disability retirement is encouraged as much by
liberal benefits and very relaxed interpretation of disability" (comment by an
M.D. on an early draft of this paper).

Fire Work Load Toxicity

47

A somewhat more direct hypothesis emerges, both from the apparent doseresponse relationship of Figs.5,6 and from what isotherwise known of fire-fighter
occupational disorders, in particular the frequency and severity of on-the-job
accidents and the observed shortening of fire-fighter life span with work loads less
than the lower rangeofthe period 1968-1978 in New York City. Figure8, showing
the relation between the percent of the work force retiring under 'accidental'and
'ordinary' disability after the transition year of 1970 is of some use in relining that
evident hypothesis.
As has been stated, after 1970 heart disorders among fire fighters were recognized as service-related disabilities in New York City. According t o Fig. 8 there
developed subsequently a rather surprisingly precise linear relation between the
two kinds of disability retirements: the correlation coefficient between the two in
Fig. 8 is 0.96. It appears that after 1970 both kinds of disability retirement have a
similar underlying cause.
No such precise relation exists between the two forms of disability retirement
prior to 1970, possibly because of the misclassification of occupationally caused
heart disease as an 'ordinary'disability in that period. It is also possible that the
relatively low per capita work loads prior t o 1970 may have permittedany relation
between the two classifications to be obscured by statistical fluctuations. In any
event we are led t o view the total percent of the work force retiring under disability
as a consistent index over the entire period of study, 1960-1978, and the two
separate classifications as meaningful after 1970.
In Figure 7 we have graphed separately the percent of the work force retiring
under 'accidental' and 'ordinary'disability a s functions of our per capita work load
index after 1970. As Fig. 5 indicates for total percent disability retirement, a work
load of 5.0 damage units per 10,000 men seems t o mark a transition to more
accelerated rates of disability retirement with work load. Examination of Fig. 7
indicates that this is so for both 'accidental' and 'ordinary'disability retirement in
the New York Fire Department.
The anomalously low percentages for both modes of disability retirement in
1977 appears to be the result of a 'hysteresis' o r memory effect: Since each year's
work load represents the repeated dosing of virtually the same population (over a
short time), a particularly high work-load dosage-as in 1976-may well 'crop'
what would ordinarily have been the next year's susceptible individuals. Thus, a s
the work load dropped from 1976 t o 1977 the percent retiring under disability
declined more than expected because the excessive work load of 1976 had
shortened the working life of those who might ordinarily have retired in 1977. This
kind of premature aging, one speculates, may well extend t o the onset of serious
disease.
Although the 'cropping' effect of the 1976 work load is much more pronounced
for 'ordinary' disability retirements, it is nonetheless quite marked for what are
supposed to be disability retirements resulting from essentially immediate on-thejob injury. Similarly, although the slope of the fitted line for the percent 'accidental'
disability retirement with work load is about three times greater than for 'ordinary'
disability, the latter shows clear evidence of a dependence on work load after 1970.
Such de p endence should not exist if 'ordinary' disabilities are not indeed jobrelated. It appears that many of what are classified as 'ordinary' disabilities in the

Fire Work Load Toxicity

New York Fire Department a r e in fact work-related. We arc led t o believe even
more strongly by Figs. 7, 8 that Fig. 5 in fact does represent a dose-response
relation between disability ,retirement a n d work load for New York City fire
fighters.
The standard policy in New York City. a n d indeed in most congested urban
areas, is one of aggressive internal attack on structural fires. This means urban fire
fighters routinely a n d repeatedly engage in prolonged periods of heavy physical
exertion under conditions of exposure to smoke, carbon monoxide, other toxic
gases, extreme heat, a n d psychological stress, often compounded by physical
injury. O u r evidence suggests this- probably synergistic- mixture is classically
toxic.
The possibility was explored that, in addition t o immediate effects, increases in
work load also have a delayed impact on disability retirement patterns. Such a
'latent period' is characteristic of, for example, exposure t o many carcinogens [24,
25]. Although it was not possible t o define such a latent period here, for example,
by examining serial cross correlations between the first differences of annual
percent disability retirements and work loads, this may reflect thecomplexity of the
relationships rather than indicating n o such latent periodexists. For example, with
many carcinogens the latent period is ifself dose-dependent [26]
In any event, while determination of the precise form of any dose- o r agedependent latent period is beyond out present data, it nonetheless remains possible
that the accumulated physiologic damage of the great work load peak of 1974-1978
(and probably the entire increase after 1967) could begin t o precipitate early
disability retirements in the period 1982-1987, especially if compounded by an
expected recurrence of the New York City fire epidemic in the same period. Such
compounding could perhaps cause a disability retirement problem equaling o r
exceeding that of 1974-1978.
Questions of latency aside for the moment. Fig.5 seems to show, in first
approximation, a dose-response relation. In particular, the point for 1976 appears
consistent with the overall pattern. Fire-fighter work loadsabove those oftheearly
1970's in New York City appear to cause an entry into the 'linear' portion of the
dose-response curve, where small increases in work load begin to have very great
immediate impacts. The long-term effect of work loads at the level of the late 1960's
t o early 1970's remains t o be seen, as does the long-term impact of the 1974-1978
peak. Entry into a linear regime of immediate effect implics an acute need for
standards limiting the exposure of fire fighters t o structural fire work load, just as
standards exist for occupational exposure t o many toxic conditions o r substances.
It is unlikely, however, that such standards, once written, could be met without
adressing standards of fire-service delivery a s well: T h e New York experience
clearly shows that in considerable measure level of fire service provided determines
level of demand.
It appears that an annual disability retirement rate much above 1% of the firefighting work force is a danger signal indicating a need for prompt intervention to
forestall both an occupational health catastrophe for fire figliters and a social a n d
fiscal calamity for municipalities. T h e need a n d direction for further empirical
study are evident. Separation of the work force into various cohorts, for example,
those manning engines and ladders, coupled with divisions according to age,

service time, and individual work-load history a n d a similar classification

according t o the nature of the disability, would probably show more clearly the
dose-response relations between disability retirement a n d work load. Similar
relations almost certainly exist between work load and the onset of serious disease
among fire fighters o r the observed shortening of life span. Fortunately. very
precise statistical records of structural fire a n d other kinds of unit work loads are
kept by most fire departments s o that reconstruction of individual fire-fighterwork
histories is likely t o be straightforward. The kinds of studies conducted on, for
example, asbestos workers [26] should be even more informative for fire fighters.

Summary and Conclusions

We have found that the percent of the fire-fighting work force retiring under
disability in New York City appears, at first approximation, to follow a classic
dose-response relation with per capita structural fire work load over the period
1960-1978, although we have been unable t o establish the precise nature of the
long-term impacts of the work load crisis of 1968-1978. W e have found that
increases in structural fire work load after 1972. largely consequent o n cuts in fire
service provided high-fire-incidence areas, caused disability retirements t o enter
the 'linear' section of the dose-response curve s o that small changes in work load
began t o have very great impacts.
We have shown that after 1970 the same kind of dose-response relation with per
capita structural fire work load exists for both 'ordinary' (and presumably
nonservice-related) and 'accidental' or service-related disability retirements.
Indeed, the high correlation between the two forms of disability retirement in this
period implies strongly that both have the same underlying cause: Per capita
structural fire work load. This wouldseem t o imply that many disabilities classified
as 'ordinary' in the New York Fire Department are in fact service-related. It is
additionally possible that structural fire work load rnaycauseprematureagingand
the onset of the diseases of aging. We suspect the existence of a dose- and agedependent 'latent period' between changes in work load and changes in disability
retirement patterns, and further suspect that the health impact of work load
increases in the 1980's will be sharply amplified by previous exposure to the
1968-1978 work load catastrophe. This is a common pattern.
If structural fire work load is classically toxic then standards may well be
needed to limit the occupational exposure of fire fighters under the various
occupational health laws.
We have further found the nonlinear impact of fire service cuts in fire-fighter
work load, a consequence of various fire contagion mechanisms, has coupled with
the no n linear dose-response relation between work load a n d disability retirement
to synergistically amplify the impact of fire service reductions o n fire-fighter
occupational health in New York City. The strong coupling offire-service demand
to supply seems t o imply that the only apparent solution to the disability retirement
crisis for New York City fire fighters is also the solution to the city's fire crisis: The
restoration of adequate fire-related municipal services t o high-fire-incidence
districts. This, a t minimum, requires the reopening of all 35 eliminated o r

50

K . Wallace

permanently relocated fire companies, the opening of perhaps 15 new units t o

compensate for the acceleration of urban decay consequent o n the cots. the
restoration of full manning on all companies, and a return to a 'three and two'
response t o first alarms: I t was at the 1974 level of fire service that New York City
began t o lose entire neighborhoods t o fire. Several of these same recommendations
have already been made by committees of the New York State Legislature[27,28].
A program of such service restoration might well cost less than the pension benefits
a new fire epidemic wave might drain from the already overstrained fire-fighter
pension system in New York, t o say nothing of saving many lives and much
property.
The modest improvements in fire-fighting technology since 1968 have in fact
been utterly overwhelmed by the consequences of political decisions to provide n o
longer adequate fire-related municipal services t o high-lire-incidence, highpopulation-density urban areas. This condition, in fact, constitutes an abandonment o f modern fire-fighting technology.
O u r results suggest that a s other American municipalities replicate New York
City's fire-service cufs, s o t o o will they replicate its fire crisisand the impact of that
crisis o n fire fighters. N o steps are now evident t o mitigate o r avert a possible
occupational health disaster a m o n g fire lighters unprecedented in the history of the
profession. Such steps might require an analog of the Federal Coal Mine Health
and Safety Act, mandating minimum levels of urban fire service: Professional
American fire service managers haveclearly abdicated their responsibilities t o both
their employees a n d the public.
Acknowledgements. The author thanks Dr. D. N. Wallace for many useful discussions and for
partial support of this work. Parts of this study were also funded by the Uniformed Firefighters
Association Local 94. IAFF, AFL-CIO whose aid is also gratefully acknowledged.

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Received August 24, 1981 / Accepted December 10, 1981