PHENOMENOLOGY

ANDARTIFICIALINTELLIGENCE:
HUSSERLLEARNSCHINESE

ItistimetoputtheinsightsofthepreviousessaystoworkonacurrentproblemWecan
do so by considering John Searle's ingenious argument against the possibility of artificial
intelligence. Foroveradecade,ithasheldaprominentplaceincontemporarydiscussionsof
philosophyandcognitivescience.Thisisnotjustbecauseofitsstrikingcentralexampleandthe
apparentsimplicityofitsargument.AsitsappearanceinScientificAmericantestifies,itisalso
duetoitsimportancetothewiderscientificcommunity.IfSearleisright,artificialintelligence
inthestrictsense,thesensethatwouldclaimthatmindcanbeinstantiatedthroughaformal
programofsymbolmanipulation,isbasicallywrong.Nosetofformalconditionscanprovideus
with the characteristic feature of mind which is the intentionality of its mental contents.
Formallyregarded,suchintentionalityisanirreducibleprimitive. Itcannotbeanalyzedinto
nonintentional (purely syntactic, symbolic) components. This essay will argue that this
objectionisbasedonamisunderstanding.Intentionalityisnotsimplysomethinggivenwhichis
incapableoffurtheranalysis. Itonlyappearssowhenwemistakenlyabstractitfromtime.
Whenweregarditstemporalstructure,itshowsitselfasarulegoverned,syntheticprocess,one
capableofbeinginstantiatedbothbymachinesandmen.


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PhenomenologyandArtificialIntelligence:HusserlLearnsChinese
I.Searle'sDoubleThesis
Searle's position is actually twofold. The first part is that the semantics which
characterizementalcontentsareirreducibletosyntax.By"semantics"hemeanstheabilitythat
thoughtsandperceptionshave,throughtheirmentalcontents,"tobeaboutobjectsandstatesof
affairsintheworld."1Thisaboutnessistheirintentionality,theirbeingthoughtsorperceptions
of something. Thisfirstpartisbuttressedbyasecond. ForSearle,consciousnesswithits
mental states is a biological product. As such, computers can simulate it, but they cannot
reduplicateit. Thus,the computer simulationofthe digestivesystemdoes not itselfdigest
anything.Similarly,thesimulationoftheoxidationoffuelsinanautomobileenginedoesnot
itself power an auto. Given that consciousness is also a physically caused effect, Searle
concludes:"thecomputationalmodelofmetalprocessesisnomorerealthanthecomputational
modelofanyothernaturalphenomenon."2
Indefenseofhisfirstthesis,Searlehascontrivedaningeniousexample.Heinvitesusto
considerhimselfasacomputerspecificallyaChinesespeakingone. Althoughhedoesnot
knowChinese,hedoeshavearulebook"inEnglishformatchingChinesesymbolswithother
Chinesesymbols."3Identifyingthementirelybytheirshape,hefindsthecardswiththematches
tothesymbolshereceivesandpassesthemontohisinterlocutorwhohandsback"moresmall
bunchesofsymbols."AccordingtoSearle,"therulebookisthe'computerprogram.'Thepeople
whowroteitarethe'programmers.'"Andheisthe"computer." Unbeknowntohimself,heis
actuallycarryingonaconversationinChinese,successfullypassingtheTuringtestforartificial
intelligence. HisovertverbalbehaviorindicatesthatheknowsChinese,thatheisinfactan
intelligentChinesespeaker.Thatheis,onthecontrary,totallyignorantofthislanguagedoesn't
meanhefailsthetest,butratherthatthetestitselffails. 4Hisexample,then,ismeanttoshow
thegeneralfailureofalltestsbasedonsuchbehaviortoidentifyintelligence. 5Becausehefails
tounderstandChinese"solelyonthebasisofrunningacomputerprogram,"Searleclaimsthat
"anyotherdigitalcomputer[alsofails]solelyonthatbasis." 6Thebasisistheprocessofformal
symbolmanipulation. Giventhatcomputerprogramsareformal(or"syntactic")systemsand


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PhenomenologyandArtificialIntelligence:HusserlLearnsChinese
admittingthattheyfailtounderstandChineseinthesenseofgraspingthesemanticsorintrinsic
meaningofthesymbolstheymanipulate,thefirstpartofSearle'spositionfollows.Syntacticor
purelyformalrelationsareincapableofresultinginsemantics. Thismeansthat"programs"
whichoperateonthelevelofsuchrelations"areneitherconstitutiveofnorsufficientforminds"
whichdounderstandtheintrinsicmeanings(or"aboutness")ofthesymbolstheymanipulate.7
Ifsuchanunderstandingisnotbasedonanyrulegovernedprocedure,howdoesitcome
about?Searle'sanswerreturnsustothesecondpartofhispositionwhichisthatconsciousness,
asabiologicalproduct,isacausedfact.Inhiswords,"Mentalstatesareasrealasanyother
biologicalphenomena.Theyarebothcausedbyandrealizedinthebrain."8Thesameholdsfor
the intentionality of such states. "Intrinsic intentionality," he asserts, "is a biological
phenomenon,causedbybrainprocessesandrealizedinthestructureofthebrain." 9Giventhat
mentalprocessesarecausallydeterminedinSearle'swords,that"thebrainoperatescausally
bothattheleveloftheneuronsandatthelevelofthementalstates"suchprocessescanonlybe
simulatedbyacomputer.10Toactuallyduplicatethem,theformalelementswhichcomposethe
computerprogramwouldhavetohaveequivalentcausalpowers. Buttheironlypoweristo
movetheprogramforwardtothenextmanipulationofpurelyformalsymbols.11

II.ApplicabilityandValidity
This conception of consciousness as a caused fact ignores an important distinction.
Turingseemstohavehaditinmindwhenheadvocated"drawingafairlysharplinebetweenthe
physicalandtheintellectualcapacitiesofaman."Therewas,heremarked,"littlepointintrying
tomakea'thinkingmachine'morehumanbydressingitupin...artificialflesh."Thelatterwas
irrelevanttoitsintelligence.12Similarly,weshouldnot"penalizethemachineforitsinabilityto
shineinbeautycontests"since,whilesuccessinsuchcontestsisbiasedtowardsthehuman,itis
notclearthatintelligenceis.13Ifwegrantthis,thenthequestionfacingusisnot,canwemake
machines human, but only, can we make them think. In drawing this distinction, we are
separating thinking from any species specific function. We are also, at least implicitly,

AfterModernity:HusserlianReflectionsonaPhilosophicalTradition4
distinguishing the laws of thought from those governing their application in a specific
circumstance. The laws of arithmetic, for example, can be instantiated both in men and
machines. Both can "do" sums. Very different causal laws, however, are involved in the
process.Stickingjustwithmachines,afavoritepastimeofsystemsexpertsistodreamupnon
electronic computers. Perfectly good logical gates can, for example, be constructed by
channelingtheimpactsofbilliardballs.14 Here,thelawsgoverningtheapplicabilityofthe
programtothemachinearethoseofclassicalmechanics. Instandard,siliconchipmachines,
theyarethoseofelectronics.Giventhatthelawsgoverningtheinstantiation(orapplication)are
different,butthelawsactuallyinstantiated(e.g.,thoseofarithmetic)arethesame,thetwosetsof
lawscannotbeidentical.
Husserl puts this point in terms of the distinction between the validity and the
applicabilityofthelogicallaws. Forthelawofcontradictiontobeapplicabletoourmental
processes,wemustbesubjectivelycapableofmaintainingconstancyamongourconcepts.This
conditionfortheapplicabilityofthelawisnotthesameasitsvalidity.Thelatterdependsonly
oncertainrelationsobtainingoncemeaningsare,infact,heldstable. Ifwefailtomakethis
distinction,then,asHusserlnotesinthe LogischeUntersuchungen,wewouldhavetocallthe
lawofcontradiction invalid wheneverwedidnotfulfilltheconditionofkeepingconstantthe
meanings of the expressions we use (Logische Untersuchungen, Hua XVIII, 106f; Findlay's
trans.[LogicalInvestigations,NewYork,1970],p.127).Similarly,wewouldhavetoseethe
development of the conditions for the applicability of logic to our mental lifei.e., the
developmentofthepsychologicalabilitytoholdconceptsconstantasthedevelopmentofthe
validityofthelogicallaws.15 Theskepticismimplicitinthisbrandofpsychologismisreadily
apparent.Itmakeslogicalvalidityacontingentfact,amatteroftheobtainingofaspecificsetof
causal conditions. The same skepticism is also implicit in making thinking into a species
specific acte.g., something which is inseparable from the particular conditions in which it
occursinhumanbeings.Atthispointthoughtbecomes,asoneofSearle'sfollowersasserts,"a
naturalkind"ofentity.Ratherthanbeingafunction,itbecomessoidentifiedwithitsmaterial


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PhenomenologyandArtificialIntelligence:HusserlLearnsChinese
conditionsthatwehavetosaythatitis"matterofacertainsort." 16Thedifficultywiththiskind
ofreductionismisthatitleavesusalmostdefenselessagainsttheassertionthat"logicalterswith
thedevelopmentofthebrain"(LogischeUntersuchungen,HuaXVIII,152;Findlay'strans.p.
162).Ifintelligenceisatypeofmatterandifwefailtodistinguishitsmaterialfromitsformal
conditions,thenamaterialchangeisalsoatransformationinwhatcountsasintelligence.Here,
theskepticismregardingartificialintelligenceturnsintooneaboutintelligenceitself.Assuch,it
endsbyunderminingallclaimstoknowledge.

III.IntentionalityandMeaning
Searle'sfirstthesiscanbesimplystated.Itisthatsyntaxisnotsufficientforsemantics.
Wecannotgeneratesemanticsoutofnonsemanticelements.17 Behindthissimplicitythereis,
however,amystery."Semantics"signifiesbothmeaningandintentionality.Itthusembracesthe
phenomenonofxmeaningy,aswhenweaskaboutthemeaningofaword,anevent,oreven(at
times)anobject.Italsoincludesthephenomenonofx,asamentalstate,beingabouty.Hereit
istheabilityofthoughts,perceptions,etc.throughtheirmentalcontents"tobeaboutobjectsand
states of affairs in the world." The mystery is: how does it embrace both? How does
intentionalityinvolvemeaningandmeaninginvolveintentionality?Istheresomecommonroot
tothetwophenomena?
Husserlaskedhimselfsuchquestionsthroughouthiscareer.Hisanswertothembegins
withhisrefusaltofollowFregeinseparatingthesensefromthereferenceofanassertion.An
assertion,accordingtoHusserl,refersthroughits meaning. Conversely,inlanguage,inthe
sphereofsignsthatfunctionbyvirtueofaninherentsense,referencetoanobjectmustinvolve
sense.18Thesameinseparabilityalsooccursintherealmofthemeanings(orsenses)whichwe
findembodiedinourperceptualexperiences. Suchsenses(noematicSinne inHusserl'slater
terminology)involveareferencetotheobjectswhosesensestheyclaimtobe.Conceptually,we
candistinguishbetween"theobjectas(sowie)itisintendedandtheobject,simply,whichis
intended,"theformerbeingthesense,thelatterbeingthereferenceofourparticularpresentation

AfterModernity:HusserlianReflectionsonaPhilosophicalTradition6
(Logische Untersuchungen, Hua XIX/1, 414; Findlay's trans., p. 578). But in an actual
perception,wealwaysgrasptheintendedobjectwithaparticularsense. Indeed,ifwecannot
makesenseofourperceptualexperiences,ifwecannotmakethem"fittogether"soastosaythat
theyareperceptionsofsomedefiniteobject,thentheirreferentisalsolosttous.Inasuccessful
perceptualexperience,thereis,then,asimultaneityofthethesesofSinnandSein(ofsenseand
being). We grasp the object as being there at the same time as we grasp it as having a
determinablesense.Intentionality(orreferencetotheobject)thusalwaysappearsasaninherent
featureofthissense.
ThesefactshaveledsomecommentatorstodrawaparallelbetweenHusserlandSearle.
McIntyre,forexample,assertsthat"HusserlsaysofnoematicSinneessentiallywhatSearlesays
ofmentalstatesthemselves:theyhave'intrinsic',asopposedto'derived',intentionality." 19This
meansthatthey"areconceivedbyHusserlasintentional,notbecauseofanyrelationstheybear
toanythingelse(e.g.,notbecausetheyare'interpreted'bysomeoneorcausedinsomeparticular
way)butsimplybecausetheyareasortofentitywhoseverynatureistoberepresentational."20
Inotherwords,justasamentalstateisconceivedbySearleashavinganintentionalcharacterby
virtueofitsvery(material)being,asimilarthesisishereassertedaboutmeanings.Intentionality
isconsideredtobeoneoftheir"primitivefeatures"andassuch"cannotbereducedtocausal
roles,computations,ortoanythingelse."21Grantingthis,HusserlwouldalsoagreewithSearle
onafurtherpoint:theimpossibilityofartificialintelligenceinthestrictsense. InMcIntyre's
words,Husserl'spositionwouldbethat"artificialintelligenceis'artificial'preciselybecauseitis
onlyformalandsodevoidofwhatistruly'mental.'"22 Whatistrulymentalisamentalstate's
intentionalcharacter.Ithasthischaracter"byvirtueofitsrelationtoanoematicSinn."23Since,
however, intentionality is "an intrinsic and irreducible" feature of such Sinne, it cannot be
generatedbythepurelyformalmeansemployedbyartificialintelligence.
McIntyre'spositionbasesitselfontwounexplainedmysteries:therelationsofmental
statestomeanings(Sinne)andofmeaningstointentionality.Bothareassumedassimplygiven,
as somehow irreducible. If, however, we take such states as the immanent contents or


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PhenomenologyandArtificialIntelligence:HusserlLearnsChinese
experiencesofconsciousness,itispreciselytheirrelationtomeaningwhichexplainsmeaning's
intentionalcharacter.
Toseethis,wemustfirstnotethatforHusserlintentionalityandmeaningarerelatedby
havingacommon(constitutive)origin. Asweindicated,boththereferenceandsenseofthe
perceptually embodied meaning are the result of the fact that our individual perceptual
experiences fit,orare"harmonious,"withoneanother. Iftheydofit,thenwesaythatthe
appearingobject bears anintelligible sense. Wealsoassert thatweare notexperiencing a
hallucinationaswellwemightifaseriesofperspectivalviewsdidnotfittogether. Wesay,
rather,thatweareexperiencingtheobjectassomethingexistent.Now,asHusserlobserves,we
continuetoregarditasexistentaslongaswegraspitasoneandthesamethingshowingitselfin
differentaspectsorperspectives.Thisverysameprocessofgraspingaoneinmany,however,
alsoresultsinagraspoftheobject'ssense(itsnoematicSinn).24ForHusserl,then,theobjectis
notjustapprehendedassomethingreal,a"realunity."Itsconstitutivebasisalsomakesusgrasp
itasaunityofsense.Indeed,asheconstantlystresses,all"realunities"are"unitiesofsense"
(IdeenI,ed.R.Schuhmann,TheHague,1976,HuaIII/1,120).
Thenotionofsenseatworkhereisthatofbeingaoneinmany. TograspHusserl's
position,itisessentialtoobservethatheunderstandsnotjustkindsorspeciesasunitiesin
multiplicity. Thesameuniversality,heclaims,isalsotobefoundinthesensesattributedto
individuals (LogischeUntersuchungen,HuaXIX/2,564;Findlay'strans.,p.692). Theonly
differenceisinwhatconstitutesthe"many."Forakind,itistheindividualobjectsfallingunder
itsnotion;foranindividualexistent,themultiplicityofitssenseiscomposedoftheperceptual
experiencesthroughwhichwegraspit(ibid.,565,Findlay'strans.;pp.6934). Whensuch
experiences reveal an identical content, we grasp both the object and its "fulfilling sense"
(LogischeUntersuchungen,HuaXIX/1,56;Findlay'strans.,p.291). Insuchacontext,itis
almostatautologytosaythatthesensebearsaninherentreferencetotheobjectand,hence,has
somesortof"intrinsicintentionality."ForHusserl,thepresenceoftheobjectisthepresenceof
itsperceptuallyembodiedsense.Ashewritesofthewaytheobjectis"in"consciousness,"This

AfterModernity:HusserlianReflectionsonaPhilosophicalTradition8
inconsciousness is a completely unique beingin. It is not a beingin as a real, inherent
component;itisratherabeinginassomethingintentional...itisabeinginastheobject's
objectivesense"(CartesianischeMeditationen,HuaI,80).25
Onceweacceptthisequivalencebetweentheintentionalpresenceofanobject
andthatofitssense,thelocusofintentionalityfallswhereitshould. Theintentional
relationisnotprimarilybetweenanobjectanditssense,theobjectbeingconceivedofas
athing"initself"independentofanddistinctfromitssense.(Thepositingofsuchan"in
itself"wouldbea"metaphysical"thesisshutoffbythereduction).Therelationis,rather,
between consciousness with its immanent experiences or "mental states" and this
presenceofasense.Byvirtueofitstemporalstructure,consciousness,aswesawinour
third essay, retains the multiplicity of its past impressions. Thus, within it are the
multiplicitiesofthoseperceptualexperienceswhichprovidethematerialfor(andhence
correspondto)theunitiesofsensewhichitgrasps.Asembracingtherelationbetween
consciousness and its objectin Husserl's phrase, as designating the fact that
consciousnessis"consciousnessof"someobjecttheintentionalrelationisbetweensuch
experiencesandtheirobject.Itis,inotherwords,therelationbetweenmultiplicityand
unitywhichresultsinsense.Thismeansthattoconstitutethisrelationistoconstitutethe
intentionalityofconsciousness.Asweshallsee,suchintentionalityiscoconstitutedin
the same process which results in the presence of the object with its perceptually
embodied sense. By virtue of this process, the individual experience becomes an
experience of the object, the experiential content being a concrete example (or
instantiation) ofthe content of the object's noematic Sinn. The experience, in other
words,isconsideredtobeoftheobjectinsofarasitistakenasaninstanceofwhatthe
objectinitscontentcancontinuallyexhibitasitshowsitself.Itsbeing"of"theobjectis,
then,itsbeingpartoftheindefinitemultiplicitywhichiscorrelatedtotheobject'sbeing
asa"unityofsense."

IV.PerceptionasInterpretation
How, then, does an experience become part of this multiplicity? In the Logical
Investigations, Husserl's answer begins with the fact that "perception is interpretation." He
writes in explanation: "It belongs to perception that something appears within it, but
interpretation makes up what we term appearancebe it correct or not, anticipatory or
overdrawn. The house appearstomethroughnootherwaybutthatIinterpretinacertain
fashionactuallyexperiencedcontentsofsensation....Theyaretermed'appearances'or,better,
appearingcontentspreciselyforthereasonthattheyarecontentsofperceptiveinterpretation"
(Logische Untersuchungen, Hua XIX/2, 762). The doctrine, here, is that nonintentional


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PhenomenologyandArtificialIntelligence:HusserlLearnsChinese
elementse.g.,particular"contentsofsensation"becomeintentionalthroughourtakingthemas
appearancesofsomeobject.Totakethemassuchistoplacetheminaframeworkofidentityin
multiplicity.Wedosowhenwecontinuallytaketheminthesamesense.AsHusserlwritesin
describinghow"wesupposeourselvestoperceptuallygrasponeandthesameobjectthroughthe
change of experiential contents," "different perceptual contents are given, but they are
interpreted,apperceived'inthesamesense,'...theinterpretation(Auffassung)accordingtothis
'sense' is a character of experience which first constitutes 'the being of the object for me'"
(LogischeUntersuchungen,HuaXIX/1,397;Findlay'strans.566). Whatwehave,then,isa
threefoldstructure. Ontheobjectiveside,wehavetheobjectasanappearingsense. Onthe
subjectiveside,thesideofwhatis"trulyimmanent"inconsciousness,wehavethe"contentsof
perception."Onthesameside,wealsohavethe"perceptualactsinthesenseofinterpretative
intentions"(ibid.).Theactsmakethecontentsintentionalbytransformingthemfromsenseless
sensedatato"representingcontents"contentswhichpointunambiguouslytothecorresponding
featuresoftheobject (LogischeUntersuchungen,HuaXIX/2,609;Findlay'strans.,p.730).
They do this through assuming that the experiential contents have a single referent, i.e., fit
togethertoformtherecurringpatternofperceptionsthroughwhichanobjectexhibitsitsspecific
sense.26
Later on we shall have to review more closely the mechanisms by which this is
accomplished.Forthepresent,however,anumberofpointscanbemade.Thefirstisthatthe
intentionalrelationisnotacausalrelation,sinceitis arelationtoasenseratherthantoa
physicalreality(LogischeUntersuchungen,HuaXIX/1,384386;Findlay'strans.,pp.557558).
Furthermore,theexistenceoftherelationdoesnotguaranteetherealexistenceofitsobject.This
followsbecauseitisbaseduponaninterpretationandtheinterpretationmaybewrong.Iffurther
perceptualevidencefailstoconfirmourparticularinterpretation,thentheinterpretationwillbe
abandonedalongwiththereferencetotheobjectitembodies.
Ourthirdpointconcernsthefactthatthethesesofsenseandbeingcanbecome
separated.Thisoccurseachtimeweverballyreportwhatwehaveseen.Sodetached,the
thesisofsensecontinuestocarrywithitareferencetothethesisofbeingi.e,thebeing

AfterModernity:HusserlianReflectionsonaPhilosophicalTradition10
thereoftheobjectwereporthavingseen. Butthehearerofthereportcandirectly
confirmitonlywhenheexperiencestheintuitionswhichcanbesubsumedunderthe
sense'srange.Asaoneinmany,thesenseembodiesthethoughtofapossibleexistence
whichstandsasacorrelateofarangeofpossibleperceptions.Inthisway,itdoeshave
anintentionality(a"representationalcharacter"inMcIntyre'sphrase)totheobject.The
intentionality,however,isnot"primitive"inthesenseofbeingunanalyzable.Atitsbasis
are the perceptions which could fill up the sense's range. These perceptions, when
actually present, embody the intentional relation in the Husserlian sense of relating
consciousnesstoitsobject.Thisobjectisnotsomethingoutsideofthesense.Itisthe
perceptuallyembodiedsense;itis,inotherwords,theunitywhichisthecorrelateofthe
perceptionsagivenconsciousnesshasretainedandsynthesized. Thisimpliesthatthe
sensewhichbecomesseparatefromperceptioninaverbalreport(thenonperceptually
embodied sense) has only an indirect intentionality. It refers the object through the
perceptions (the "mental states" as defined above) which form the multiplicity ofits
range.
ImplicitintheaboveisapositiondirectlyopposedtoSearle's.Giventhatinterpretation
isessentialforthesettingupoftheoneinmanyrelationwhichembodiesintentionality,without
interpretationthereisnointentionality.Inotherwords,ifweadmitwithHusserlthatthrough
interpretation senseless sense data become "representing contents," then we also agree that
interpretation is the constructing of semantic or intentional structures out of nonintentional
elements. Thereis,wemaynote,animmediate,nontheoreticevidenceforthisposition. It
occurswheneverinterpretationfailsor,incasesoffatigueorstress,istemporarilywanting.For
example, the person suffering from certain forms of dissociation perceives and yet his
perceptionshavenoreferent. Hecannotputthemtogethertogetaworldofobjects,aworld
whichissomehow"outthere"beyondtheimmediatepresenceofthesensationswhichcrowdin
on him. Only when the interpretation does succeed does the world regain its depth. Our
perceptionsagainbecome of somethingbeyondthem. Objectsthenappearwhichexhibitthe
sensewemakeoftheexperientialflowofperceptualmultiplicities.Ifthisisatallaccurate,then
Husserl'spositionfollows: intentionalityisnotafact,butratherananalyzableperformance
(Leistung).Assuch,wecanuncoveritsnonintentionalcomponents.27

V.PerceptionandPassiveSynthesis


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PhenomenologyandArtificialIntelligence:HusserlLearnsChinese
Afterthe Investigations,Husserlexpressesthesamepointsintermsofsynthesis. He
writesintheCartesianMeditations:"Theobjectofconsciousness,initsselfidentitythroughout
theflowingofexperience,doesnotenterintothisflowingfromoutside.Itliesincludedwithinit
asasense;itisthis[sense]asaresultoftheintentionalperformance(Leistung)ofthesynthesis
ofconsciousness"(CartesianischeMeditationen,HuaI,80).Withoutthisperformance,thereis
no intentional object and hence no intentionality. Synthesis, in other words, is prior to
intentionality. Thus,theindividualelementsofanintentionalexperiencedonotthemselves
generally have "the basic character of intentionality, that is, the characteristic of being
'consciousnessofsomething'"(IdeenI,HuaIII/1,74).Theygainthisonlywhentheyarepartof
asuccessfulsynthesis,onewhichcanestablishanongoingobjectivesense.
On one level, synthesis can be described as simply a matter of putting together or
connectingourperceptions. Todescribetheobjectivesenseasaresultofthisprocessthus
impliesthatitcanbeestablishedbytheproperorderingorconnectingofourperceptions.If,for
example,ourperceptionscanbeconnectedtoformaperspectivalseries,aseriesshowingfirst
onesideandthananotherofanobject,thentheresultshouldbethesenseofaspatialtemporal
object.Now,generallyspeaking,wedonotconsciouslyconnectourexperiencesintime.They
aresimplygiventousinacertainorderwhichwerecognizeimmediately. Synthesis,unlike
interpretation,tendstodenotesomethinginvoluntary,somethingwhichcangoonwithoutany
active participation of the subject. In fact, the move to describe intentionality in terms of
synthesisoccursasHusserlbeginstoworkouthisdoctrineofthe"passiveconstitution"ofthe
intentionalrelationship.Inthis,bothitspoles,boththesubjectanditsobject,cometobeseenas
the results of the connections of experience. The same holds with regard to the subject's
interpretiveact.It,too,isseenasfoundedonagivenorderingofexperience.Theorderingof
experience which results in the intentional relation is, thus, seen as prior to, and hence as
occurringwithouttheactiveparticipationofthesubject.28
Itsgivennessisalsothegivennessofrules.AccordingtoHusserl,"anyobjectwhatever
(includinganyimmanentobject)pointstoaruleboundstructure(Regelstruktur)"(Cartesianische

AfterModernity:HusserlianReflectionsonaPhilosophicalTradition12
Meditationen,HuaI,90). Correlatedtothenotionofanexperiencingsubjectanditspossible
experiences,thereis"astrictruleofpossiblesyntheses"whichwouldprovidethesubjectwitha
coherentsurroundingworld(ibid.,24).Thus,theruleofperspectivalorderingprovidesuswitha
spatialtemporalworld.Thedissolutionofthisorderingisthedissolutionofthisworld.Itisalso
thedissolutionoftheego,orsubject,sinceit,too,isestablishedthroughsuchordering. 29 Ifwe
grantthis,thenwecanseewhyHusserlhasbeencalleda"fatherofcognitivescience." 30 For
Husserl, not just intentionality but also the intending subject, can be constructed from non
intentionalelements.TakingsuchelementsasHusserl'sabsolute,bothcanbeseenastheresults
offollowingrulesforordering(orprocessing)thedataofexperience.Thisimpliesthatthereis
nothingtopreventsuchrulesfrombeingimplementedbyamachine.

VI.SynthesisandIntelligence
ToreallyseeHusserlasafatherofcognitivescience,wemustspecifymoreprecisely
whatwemeanbysynthesis.Wehavetoask:whatarethegeneralfeaturesofitsrulegoverned
operationswhicharedirectlytransferabletomachines?Yet,beforeweconsiderthisquestion,a
wordofcautionisinorder.AsC.A.Fieldsobserves,"Itisnotatallclearthatintelligence(the
abilitytosolveantecedentlyspecifiedproblemsofcertaintypes)isorevenhasanythingtodo
withintentionality."31Machineswithtraditionallywrittenprogramscanperformalargenumber
of functions from game playing to medical counselling. These machines have not been
programed to be intentional, yet such functions have traditionally been considered to be
"intelligent."Toreversethis,alargenumberofanimals,obviouslyincapableofsuchfunctions,
seemtopossesstheabilitytobedirectedtowardsanexternalobject.Theypossessintentionality,
butnotintelligence.Thesamepointcanbeputslightlydifferentlybysuggestingthatwhenwe
saythatamachinedoesnot"understand"oractswithoutunderstanding(asinSearle'sChinese
roomtest),whatwearereallyclaimingisthatitisnotasubject.Bya"subject"ismeantsimply
somethingthathasaworld; has itratherthan is it,sincethe"aboutness"oftheintentional


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PhenomenologyandArtificialIntelligence:HusserlLearnsChinese
relationimpliesacertainnonidentity.Ifotheranimalscanalsobesubjects,wegrantthattobea
subjectdoesnotmeanthatonehastohaveintelligenceintheabovedefinedsense.
Two reflections follow from this. The first is that the rules which make machines
intentional need not as such make them intelligent. One can well imagine a machine that
processesdataaccordingtotherulesofintentionalsynthesisandsoseesaswedo,andyetfails
theTuringtest.Thisisnottosaythattherearenotadvantagestomakingmachinesintentional.
Torealizethem,however,weshouldfirstmakethemintentional,andthenworkonmakingthem
intelligent.ThesameinsightallowsustocounterDreyfus'sposition.Heattackstheconceptof
artificialintelligencebyfocusingonthe"infinitetask"itimplies. 32Admittingthatintentionality
isarulegovernedprocedure,suchrules,accordingtoDreyfus,becomeunimaginablycomplex
oncewerealizewithHusserlthat"intelligentbehavioralsopresupposesabackgroundofcultural
practicesandinstitutions."33Whilethismaybethecase,itdoesnotfollowthatsuchknowledge
isessentialforintentionalityperse. Ifitwere,wewouldhavetoexcludemostoftheanimal
worldfromit.Onceagain,whatweshoulddoisfirstattempttomakemachinesintentionaland
thenworkonmakingthemculturallyadept.

VII.IntentionalityandTranscendence
Whatthenarethefeaturesofintentionalsynthesis? Whatcharacterizesitquiteapart
fromtheskillsofproblemsolvingintelligenceorculturaladaptation?Tobeginwiththemost
obvious,itsaction,aswehavestressedthroughouttheseessays,istemporal.Itsunderlyinglevel
isthetemporalorderingofexperience.Thebasicfeatureofsuchorderingappearswheneverwe
regardaspatialtemporalobject.Asweturnit,oneappearancegiveswaytothenext.Anew
sideshowsitself,whiletheexperienceoftheprevioussidesinksintopastness.Theperceiving
subject,however,remainsconstantlynow.Itremainsakindofmarkerpointagainstwhichthe
departure into the past is measured. The basic feature, then, is the distinction between the
nownessofthesubjectandtheflowingintopastnessofwhatitperceives.InHusserl'swords,
whatweconfront"intheprimordialsphere"isacontinuousprocesswhere"worldlyperception

AfterModernity:HusserlianReflectionsonaPhilosophicalTradition14
(WahrnehmungvonWeltlichkeiten)andtheworldseparatethemselves."34 Thereisatwofold
necessityforsuchseparation. Giventhatallactionoccursinthepresent,ifthesubjectisto
continuetoact(tocontinue,forexample,toperceive),hemustremainpresent.If,however,the
objectistoshowmorethanonesidetothesubject,theappearancesitshowstohimmustdepart
intopastness.Thus,ontheonehand,ifthesubjectweretoremainfixedinthefleetingmoment
whenheperceivedaparticularappearance,hecouldnotapprehendanyothers. Ontheother
hand,iftheparticularappearanceremainedconstantlynowwiththesubject,itcouldnotgive
waytoanyothers. Whatisrequired,then,istheseparationoccasionedbythedepartureinto
pastness.
Suchdeparturebringsabouttranscendence.InHusserl'swords,"thenotnowtranscends
the now; in particular, it transcends the [present] consciousness of the not now... What is
transcended is always consciousness."35 With this, the original nonidentity required for
intentionalityopensup:consciousness,inremainingnow,istranscendedbywhatdepartsinto
pastness.Suchdepartureopensupanoriginaldistancebetweensubjectandobject.Theobject,
which is grasped as enduring, is more than my present, momentary experience of it. As
enduring,itisgraspedasincludingbothmypresentandmypastexperienceofit.Thus,tothe
transcendenceofthenowbythenotnow,thereisaddedasecondtranscendence:thatbetween
mypresentconsciousnessanditsobject.ThecontentwhichIpresentlyexperiencebecomes"of"
whatisbeyondthismomentaryexperience.Itbecomes,initsdeparture,thecontentofanobject
whichendures.

VIII.ThePastnessofanExperience
Thesecondfeatureofsynthesisisthatitinvolvesanontologicaldistinction.Thereisa
distinctioninbeingbetweentheindividualexperiencesandtheobjectthatappearsthroughtheir
synthesis(IdeenI,HuaIII/1,86).Thisdistinctionshowsitselfinacorrespondingdistinctionin
thetypesofallowablepredication.Thus,wecannotpredicateoftheobjectwhatwepredicateof
the experience. Theobjectshows itselfperspectivally. Itmanifests the sense ofaspatial


15
PhenomenologyandArtificialIntelligence:HusserlLearnsChinese
temporalentity,onesubjectatveryleasttothelawsofkinematics.Theexperience,however,
doesnotshowitselffirstfromonesideandthenanother(ibid.). Itcannot,accordingly,be
regardedassomesortofphysicalrealityorbeconsideredassubjecttothecorrespondinglaws.
Admittingthis,wecannotsaywithSearlethatmentalstatesareasrealasanyotherbiological
phenomena. Ratherthanbeinganinseparablepartofaphysicalprocess,theyhaveastatus
whichallowsthemtobeconsideredasinformationforprocessing.
Behindthisdistinctionbetweentheexperienceandthespatialtemporalobjectarevery
differenttemporal modes. Ifweare nottobe confrontedwith achaos ofsensations,each
individualexperience,onceobtained,mustremainunchanged.Yeteachmust,aswenoted,also
givewaytothenext.Itmustsinkbackintopastness.Therequirement,then,isthatitscontent
beretainedunchangedandyetpossessachangingtemporaltag,amarkershowingitsincreasing
distancefromthepresent.Theobject,bycontrast,hasthetemporalmodeofpersistingthrough
change.Appearingthroughasuccessionofdifferentsensuouscontents,itmustcontinuetoshow
itselfasthatofwhichsuchcontentsarecontents.
Kant, as we have seen, was the first to systematically consider these conditions for
synthesis. Let us take a moment to review them. When Kant defines the "synthesis of
apprehension"astheactbywhichwerunthroughamultiplicityofperceptionsandholdthem
together, he notes that the first requirement is simply that of grasping the multiplicity as a
multiplicity. This requires that the mind"distinguishtimeinthesuccessionofimpressions
followingoneanother."36 Eachimpressionmust,inotherwords,bedistinguishedthroughits
distincttime.Oncedistinguished,theimpressionsmustbepreserved.Iftheyaretobegrasped
together,thentheycannotvanishfromconsciousnessthemomentaftertheirapprehension.In
Kant's words, "... if I were to lose from my thought the preceding impressions ... and not
reproducethemwhenIadvancetothosewhichfollow,acompletepresentation[ofanenduring
object]wouldneverarise..."37Thus,notonlymusttheimpressionsbetemporallytagged(andso
distinguished), they must also be "reproduced"i.e., brought up, moment by moment, to the
present.Theresultistheirretentionwiththeirtemporaltag.AsKantimplies,thistagmustitself

AfterModernity:HusserlianReflectionsonaPhilosophicalTradition16
be preserved, for otherwise what is reproduced would be indistinguishable from "a new
presentation." Whatwerequire,then,is"theconsciousnessthatwhatwethinkis,infact,the
sameaswhatwethoughtamomentbefore."38
Theconsciousnessthattheretainedimpressionisnotsomethingnewistheconsciousness
thatitissomethingpast.Eachtimetheimpressionisreproduced,itmustthereforebebroughtup
tothepresentassomethingnotnew.Husserl,aswesaw,expressesthisconditionintermsofa
chainof"retentionsofretentions." Animpressionisretained,andthenthisretentionisitself
retained,andsoonserially:theresultbeinga"constantcontinuumofretentionssuchthateach
laterpointisaretentionofanearlier"(ZurPhnomenologiedesinnerenZeitbewusstseins,Hua
X,29).Eachretentionthusretainsthepreviousretention.Eachalsotagswhatitretainsasnot
new,i.e.,asoldorpast.Sincetheretentionthatisretainedisitselfnotnew,whatwehaveinits
retentionisamodificationwhichaddsafurtherdegreeofpastnesstoitscontent.39
Whenwesatisfytheseconditions,wehavethespecialtypeofbeingwhichcharacterizes
themomentaryexperience.Thisisabeingwhichdoesnotshowitselfperspectivally. Rather
than offeringus anythingnew,the experiencedeparts unchangedintoincreasingdegrees of
pastness.Suchdepartureis,aswesaid,theoccasionoftheoriginaltranscendencewhichmarks
the intentional relation. Now the conditions for such departure, those of reproduction or
retention,mayseemquitecomplexintheirverbalexpression. Mathematically,however,their
algorithmissimplicityitself. Itcanbeexpressedinaseriesofparentheses,eachfurtherset
representingaretentionofalatterset.Thus,intheseries,i,(i),((i))...,eachlatermembercanbe
takenasaretentionoftheearlier.Whatallowsustodosoistheoperationalvaluewegivetothe
parenthesis.Thisdemandsthatweproceedthroughtheparenthesis,goingfromtheoutertothe
inner, for all processing operations having to do with "i," the original impression or datum
suppliedbyatraducer. Inthiswaywereduplicatethefactthatinintentionalsynthesisthe
accesstoexpiredimpressionsisthroughtheretentionsofretentionswhichpreservethem.40

IX.ThePersistenceoftheObject


17
PhenomenologyandArtificialIntelligence:HusserlLearnsChinese
Indistinctiontothemomentaryexperience,theobjecthasabeingwhichenduresthrough
change. Persisting,itexhibitsitselfasthesameinanumberofdifferentappearances. This
exhibitionis,forKant,theresultofa"synthesisofrecognitioninaconcept." 41 Aconceptisa
oneinmany.Thus,torelatetoanobject,ourrepresentations"mustnecessarilyagreewithone
another, that is, must possess that unity which constitutes the concept of an object." 42 For
Husserl,thismeansthattherecognitionoftheobjectrequiresthegraspoftheelementsofthis
agreement. Theobjectisintentionallypresentasasense,asaoneinmany. Thegraspofits
contentthusdependsontherecognitionofidenticalelementswithinthemultitudeofourdistinct
impressions.
Suchrecognitionhappensmoreorlessautomatically. Itistheeffectoftheretentional
processwhichpreservesourexpiredexperiences.Sincetheexperiencesarenotthemselvesreal,
spatialtemporalobjects,theirretentiondoesnotresultinaheapofdisparateelements. The
effect is rather a "unity of coincidence." This coincidence does not affect their temporal
references; each experience remains, in the reference attached to its retention, something
encountered at a given point of time. The coincidence does, however, generate the
reinforcementofthequalitiesthatarethesame.Likeaseriesofoverlappingtransparencies,the
coincidenceofwhatweretainbringsaboutthereinforcedappearanceofwhatisthesame.As
Husserlwrites,thisoccasions"acertainrelatedness(Aufeinanderbezogenheit)which...priorto
all 'comparison' and 'thinking' stands as a presupposition for the intuitions of likeness and
difference" (Zur Phnomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins, Hua X, 44). In the C
Manuscripts,thesamepointisexpressedintermsof"acontinuousmerging(Verschmelzung)"of
likecontentsoccasionedbytheretentionalprocess.Byvirtueofit,themergedqualities"stand
out." They reinforce each other and,hence, distinguish themselves from the heterogeneous
qualitieswhoseuniondoesnotresultintheirmerging.43
Withthisprocess,wehaveacertainoverlayofsimultaneityonsuccession.Themerged
experiencesretaintheirsuccessivetemporalreferents,yeteach,initscontent,becomesonewith
others with the same content. The result, then, is the object which presents itself as

AfterModernity:HusserlianReflectionsonaPhilosophicalTradition18
simultaneouslypossessingallofthefeatureswhichwesuccessivelyexperience. Itisalsoa
furtherexpressionofthetranscendencethatcharacterizestheintentionalrelation.Anexperience
becomesanexperienceofaparticularobjectbyvirtueofthemergingofitscontent.Itdoesnot,
however,becomethisobjectinsofarasitkeepsitsdistincttemporaltag.Thetag,then,preserves
the"manyness"ofthetheobject'sappearing.Distincttemporaltagsgiveusthemultiplicityin
whichtheobjectappearsasoneandthesamething.Asfortheintentionalrelation,itisjustthis
manytoonerelation. Thecontinuous mergingwhichgrounds itthus explains theinherent
relationbetweenintentionalityandmeaning. Themergingmakesourexperiences(or"mental
states")relatetotheobject;italsoallowstheobjecttopresentitselfasasense.Thus,byvirtue
ofit,theintentionalrelationnecessarilyembodiesboth"ofness"andmeaning.

X.PatternRecognition
Thepointofthisreviewofthephenomenologicalaccountoftemporalsynthesisisto
applyitsinsightstomachineintelligence.Todosoistotalkaboutpatternrecognition.There
arethreemajordifficultieswhichconfrontamachinewhenitattemptstograspapattern.The
firstisthatofattentionfocusing.Howdoyougetamachinetoattendtoaparticularitemand
yetbeopentosomethingnew?Ifwedividethevisualfieldintoanattendedandnonattended
part,thelatterisprecludedfrominfluencingtheattendedsetofdataexceptatsomemechanically
setlevel.How,then,doweintroduceflexibilityintoattention? 44Oncewedoattendtoapartof
thevisualfield,wefacethedifficultyofdiscriminatingtheobjectfromitsbackground. As
Pylyshynnotes,ifwejustuse"contrastgradients,lightordarkregions,etc.,"then"thelines
defined in this manner do not correspond to figure boundaries." If we turn to the figure
boundaries in actual perception and attempt to capture them through such gradients, such
boundaries"moreoftenthannotdonotproducelines..."45 Sentientanimalshave,ofcourse,
alreadylearnedtosee.Theyhavealargestoreofresidualknowledgewhichhelpsthempickout
objectsagainsttheirbackgrounds.Onecouldcertainlyaddsuchknowledgetoamachineinthe
formofstoredpatternsandelementsofshapes,butthedifficultyofusingiteffectivelywould


19
PhenomenologyandArtificialIntelligence:HusserlLearnsChinese
stillremain.Blindsearchesandprocessbyeliminationaretoocumbersome.Whatweneed,in
Pylyshyn's words, are systems "designed to facilitate the use of all available knowledge in
workingtowardstheirgoalincludingknowledgegainedfromtheanalysisofinterimfailures." 46
Thepointistoproducesystemswhich"zeroin"ontheirgoals.
Themaininsightthatphenomenologycanbringtotheseproblemsisthethoughtthat
patternrecognitioncannotbestaticifitresultsfromsynthesis. Tosaythatthe"synthesisof
recognition"istemporalmeansthatitgraspsthefeaturesoftheobject,notinthemselvesbut
rather throughtheirrecurrence__. Wecanputthisintermsofthedoctrinewebeganwith:
Husserl's position that perception is interpretation. Such interpretation always implies
anticipation. When,forexample,IinterprettheshadowsIperceiveinthebushesasacat,I
anticipatethatfurtherperceptionswillconfirmthisinterpretation.Thismeansthatratherthan
attemptingatoncetodistinguishafigurethroughcontrastgradientsinmypresentperception,I
movetogetabetterlook.Ifitisacat,thenacertainpatternofperceptionswillunfolditself
over time. The recurrent elements of this perception will, I anticipate, become for me the
featuresoftheobject.
The common sense interpretation of this is that I always take my perceptions as
determinedbysomeobject"outthere."Becauseofthis,myperceivingismarkedbyaspecial,
teleologicalrelationship. Inthis,thewholewhichIamattemptingtograspi.e.,thewhole
which,inanticipation,standsasthetelosorgoalofmyperceivingdeterminestheinterpretation
whichIplaceuponmyindividualperceptions. Thisshadowisseenaspartofthecat'sear.
Anotherishiseye,andsoforth.Ifmyinterpretationsarecorrect,thenthedatashouldformpart
ofanemergingpatternwhichexhibitsthesefeatures.
Foramachinetoimitatethisbehavior,itmust,firstofall,processitsdataaccordingtoa
seriesofexpandingtemporalwholes.Thebrainscansitsdataforprocessingeveryfewseconds,
butthereisnoneedtorepeatthehumaninterval.Wecan,forexample,chooseasinglesecond
intervalforthemachine.Thefirstscanforanemergingpatternwouldthencovertheonesecond
wholeofw1,thesecondwouldcoverthewhole,w2(w1),foranevaluationofthedataofthepast

AfterModernity:HusserlianReflectionsonaPhilosophicalTradition20
twoseconds,andthethirdwouldexaminethethreesecondsofdataaccumulatedinthewhole,
w3(w2(w1)). Thefact,asindicatedbytheparentheses,thatthesearewholeswithinwholes
pointstothetemporaltagging(or"retention")ofthedataofeachsweep.Thisisrequiredifthe
machineistograspapatternwhichinvolvestherecurrenceofdatainthefixedrelationsof
beforeandafterwhichcharacterizetheperspectivalseries.
Thestrategy,then,fordistinguishinganobjectfromitsbackgroundistoturnthisintoa
temporal process, one which imitates our activity of moving to get a better look. We can
duplicatethisbymakingthemachineattentivenotjusttocontrastgradientsbuttotheirrelative
ratesofchange.Thesamegeneralstrategycanbeappliedtotheproblemofattention,i.e.,of
makingitflexible.Thekeyhereistonotethatinterpretationisnotjustanticipation.Itisalso
discrimination. As the machine scans its data, any emergent patterns could be given a
renforcementindexnumber.Asthepatternsrepeat,thenumberswouldbeincreased.Atany
giventime,theycouldbereadoutasthestrengthofthemachine'sobjectifyinginterpretationsof
whatitisseeing.Theycouldalsobeseenasadiscriminatoryfactor.Accordingtoitsstrength,
themachinecouldbeinstructedtodiscriminateagainst(orsetaside)acertainamountofthe
inharmoniousdataitisreceivingi.e.,thedatathatdoesnotfitintothepatternsithasthusfar
found. This is, in fact, what we do when we perceive. Generally, we only process the
informationweanticipatewewillreceive.Withincertainlimits,therestisnotattendedto.To
buildthisflexiblefocusintothemachine,wecouldhaveeachwholeinwhichanemergent
patternhasestablisheditselfthrowananticipatoryshadowwhichwouldbeequaltoitslength.
Thus,thewhole,w3(w2(w1)),whichrepeatedthesamepattern,wouldestablishadiscriminating
tendencyequaltoitslength.Duringthistime,thedatathatdidnotfitinwould,accordingtothe
strengthofthefactor,bestoredbutnotprocessed.
Withourlimitedcapacities,wewouldsufferbreakdownifwehadtoprocesseverything
we received. The same holds for any reasonably finite machine. Giving it the ability to
discriminateorfocusitsattentionavoidsthis. Italso,however,makesitcapableofmistakes.
Weareoftenmistakeninourperceptualinterpretations.Whatwetooktobeacatdissolvesinto


21
PhenomenologyandArtificialIntelligence:HusserlLearnsChinese
acollectionofshadowswhenwegetabetterlook.Ourcapacityformistakesis,wecansay,a
functionoftheteleologicaltemporalityofourperceptions.This,aswesaid,isatemporalityin
whichthe future (whatweanticipate)determinesour present interpretationofwhatwehave
experienced.47 Becauseouranticipationscanturnouttobeillfounded,theinterpretations
basedonthemmayturnouttobewrong.Wearemistaken,but,ontheotherhand,wearealso
capableofrealizingandrectifyingourmistakes.Thishappenswhenourdiscriminationfactor
startsmakingussetasidemoreandmoreofwhatwereceiveasthelatterincreasinglyfailstofit
intoananticipatedpattern.Atacertainpoint,wesnapbackandstartincreasingtheamountof
dataweattendtoandprocessthis,untilanewpatternisestablished.
Togivethemachinethesameflexibilityoffocus,itsdiscriminatoryfactormustvary
accordingasthesequence,w1,w2(w1),w3(w2(w1))...,confirmsorfailstoconfirmapattern.
Thus,whenapatternstopsbeingrenforcedthroughrepetition,thediscriminationfactorshould
progressivelydecreaseandthemachine'sacceptanceofnewdataforprocessingshouldincrease
untilanewpattern(anewinterpretation)isestablished. Withthis,wehaveananswertothe
difficultyofgettingthemachinetoattendandyetbeopentothenew.Whenachangingcontext
disruptsthepatternsithasestablished,itautomaticallyopensup. Similarly,whenapattern
beginstoemerge,it"zerosin"onit.
Husserldescribesourgraspofanobjectas"polythetic,"thatis,asbuiltupfromanumber
of syntheses. Individual syntheses give us the individual features of an object while an
overarchingsynthesisyieldstheobjectastheunityofitsparticularfeatures(IdeenI,HuaIII/1,
3034). Insofaraswedoattendtoanumberofobjectsandgrasptheirunitythroughsome
relation,anevenhigherlevelofsyntheticactivityispossible.Suchactivitiesgooninparallel.
Wesimultaneouslygraspthedifferentfeaturesofanobjectand,atthesametime,attemptto
unifythem. Theinsightheremaybeexpressedincontemporarylanguagebysayingthatthe
brainisamassivelyparallelprocessor.Toreduplicatethisinamachineitisprobablynecessary,
asChurchlandsuggests,togiveitthearchitectureofaneuralnetwork. 48Inthis,differentlevels

AfterModernity:HusserlianReflectionsonaPhilosophicalTradition22
of the nodes of the network would correspond to different levels of synthesis, with each
individualnodeperformingaparticularsyntheticfunction.49
Whatevertheultimatearchitecture,themovefromoneleveltothenextwouldhaveto
involvetheretentionoftheresultsoftheearlier.Thetemporalityoftheprocesswouldhaveto
berespectedwhichmeansthattheresultsmustbeprocessedaccordingtotheorderoftheir
temporaltags.Onlythencouldthebasicstructureofintentionalityberespected.Thisstructure
issynthetic;synthesis,asthegraspingofunityinmultiplicity,isaninherentlytemporalprocess.
If this is correct, then there is no theoretic difficulty in generating intentional or semantic
elementsoutofthenonintentional. Whatisrequiredformachines tohavetheintelligence
whichimpliesintentionalityispracticalwork.Wehavetomakethemprocesstheirinformation
according to the temporality which is determinative of synthesis. The work consists in
expressingtheprocessesofsynthesisintheappropriatealgorithms.
Asthenextessaywillshow,theresultofthissynthesisisnotjustthepresenceofthe
object.Thetemporaldeparturewhichoccasionsthelatteralsobringsaboutthepresenceofthe
self which grasps the object. Bothself andobjectare theoutcomeofthe samelaw based
syntheticprocesswhichresultsintheintentionalrelation. AsourcomparisonofHusserland
Sartremakesclear,thequestionofreason,ofitsnatureandextent,isforHusserlthequestionof
thissyntheticprocess.


23
PhenomenologyandArtificialIntelligence:HusserlLearnsChinese

1NOTES

JohnR.Searle,"IstheBrain'sMindaComputerProgram?",ScientificAmerican,vol.262,No.1
(January1990),p.27.
2Ibid.,p.29.
3Ibid.,p.26.

JohnR.Searle,"ReplytoJacquette,"PPR,vol.XLIX,no.4(June1989),702.

5Searle,"IstheBrain'sMindaComputerProgram?",p.31;"Minds,Brains,andPrograms,"The

BehavioralandBrainSciences(1980),pp.423and453.
6"IstheBrain'sMindaComputerProgram?",p.26.
7Ibid.,p.27.
8"Minds,Brains,andPrograms,"p.455.
9"ReplytoJacquette,"p.704
10"Minds,Brains,andPrograms,"p.445.
11"IstheBrain'sMindaComputerProgram?",p.30.
12A.M.Turing,"ComputingMachineryandIntelligence,"Mind,LIX,No.236(Oct.1950),p.434.
13Ibid.,p.435.
14A.K.,Dewdney,"ComputerRecreations,"ScientificAmerican,vol.261,No.12(Dec.1989),p.

140C140D.
15If,however,wedomakethisdistinction,thentheonlythingevolutionexplainsisthedevelopment
oftheconditionsoftheapplicabilityoflogictoourmentallife.SeeJamesR.Mensch,TheQuestionof
BeinginHusserl'sLogicalInvestigations.Phaenomenologica,No.81,theHague,1981,pp.1819.
16J.C.Maloney,"Therightstuff,"Synthese,vol.70(1987),p.3678.

17Searle,"ReplytoJacquette,"p.703;"IstheBrain'sMindaComputerProgram?",p.27

18SeeTheQuestionofBeinginHusserl'sLogicalInvestigations.Phaenomenologica,No.81,The

Hague,1981,pp.5355.
19R.McIntyre,"HusserlandtheRepresentationalTheoryofMind,"Topoi,vol.5(1986),p.109
20Ibid.
21Ibid.
22Ibid.,p.112.
23Ibid.,p.108.

24SuchasenseisverydifferentfromthepropositionalsenseMcIntyreimaginesittobe.Foracritique
ofMcIntyrespositiononthenoemaseeChapterIV,note1above.
25Husserl alsocalls it an"appearing idealbeingin(erscheinendes Ideelldarinsein)"(HuaI,80).
EssentiallythesamepositionispresentedinthefirsteditionoftheLogicalInvestigationswhenHusserl
bringsforwardthefundamentalfactofcognition:"thefact,namely,thatallthinkingandknowingis
directedtostatesofaffairswhoseunityrelativetoamultiplicityofactualorpossibleactsofthoughtis
a'unityinmultiplicity'andis,therefore,ofanidealcharacter"(HuaXIX/1,12).Grantingthis,wehave
toexplain"howthesame[perceptual]experiencecanhaveacontentinatwofoldmanner,hownextto
itsinherent,actualcontent,thereshouldandcandwellanideal,intentionalcontent(Ibid.,21),this
beingtheobject'scontentasasenseora"unityinmultiplicity."SeealsoHuaXIX/1,176,179f.,Hua
XIX/2,624f.
26McIntyretakesHusserl'sattackonthesensedatatheoriesofhistimeasevidenceforhisdenying

"thatthemeaningfulness,andhencetheintentionalcharacter,ofnoematicSinnecouldbereducedto
formal relations among [sensations] based solely on their shapes" (R. McIntyre, "Husserl and the
RepresentationalTheoryofMind,"Topoi,vol.5(1986),p.111).Accordingtosuchtheories,atleast
asHusserlreportsthem,perceptioncanbereducedtotheinfluxesofthedataofsensation,achangein
thelatterbeingimmediatelyreflectedinthechangeinperception.Giventhatwecontinuetoperceive
the"sameobjectthroughthechangeofexperientialcontents,"thereisanobviouserrorhere;and
McIntyrecorrectlyreportsHusserl'sinsistencethat"senselesssensedata"cannotbythemselvesyield
the senses embodied in perception. But this does not mean that such senses have a primitive
intentionality,oneunrelatedtothefactofinterpretation(Ibid.,109).Onthecontrary,whatiswrong
with such theories is, in Husserl's words, the refusal to take into account "the phenomenological
momentofinterpretation(Auffassung)"(HuaXIX/1,528,Findlay'strans.,p.658).Thisisarefusalto
acknowledgethatitisin"theanimatinginterpretation(beseelenderAuffassung)ofsensationthatwhat
wecalltheappearingoftheobjectconsists"(HuaXIX/1,361,Findlay'strans.,p.539).Thus,when

Husserl writes that the "truly immanent contents, which belong to the real components of the
intentionalexperience,arenotintentional,"heisreferringtothemapartfromtheinterpretiveact(Hua
XIX/1,387,Findlay'strans.,p.559).Theactiswhatmakesthesenonintentionalelementsintentional.
McIntyre'smentionofthe"shapes"ofthesesensationsishighlymisleadingasishisattempttobolster
hispositionbybringinginHusserl'sdistinctionbetweenphenomenologyandmathematics(thelatter
havingtodealwithpurelyformalelementslike"shape").ForHusserl,theinterpretative,objectifying
actinterpretsnotjustthe"shape"theorderandarrangementoftheexperiencesthatformitsbasis.It
alsointerpretstheirsensuouscontentse.g.,suchthingsascolor,tone,taste,etc.,inshortthewhole
rangeofwhatusedtobecalledanobject'ssecondaryqualities. Thus,thefactthatphenomenology
belongsthe"materialeideticsciences"initsconcernfortheobject'simmediatesensuouscontentdoes
notmeanthatitseesitselfasincapableofanalyzingintentionalityintoitsnonintentionalcomponents.
Itonlyimpliesthatsuchelementsincludetheimmediatesensuouscontentsthatformthe"realcom
ponents"oftheintentionalexperience.
27JacquettevitiateshisargumentagainstSearlebynotseeingthis. ForJacquette,asforMcIntyre,
intentionality remains something "primitive, ineliminable, and irreducible." This means that "the
primacyoftheintentionalprecludesanalysisofintentionality,sinceitimpliesthatnothingistobe
found below its conceptual rock bottom" (Dale Jacquette, "Adventures in the Chinese Room,"
PhenomenologyandPhilosophicalResearch,vol.XLIX,No.4(June1989),p.622).Bynum,ingiving
aversionofthe"robotreply"toSearle'sposition,doesgrasptheconnectionbetweenintentionalityand
interpretationwhenheinsiststhattherobot's"states are subjectiveinthesensethattheyinvolvea
specificpointofvieworinterpretationoftheworld"(TerrellWardBynum, "ArtificialIntelligence,
Biology, and Intentional States," Metaphilosophy, vol. 16, No. 4 (October 1985), p. 366).
Unfortunately,Bynum nevergoes beyondthemechanics ofcontemporary robotics to analyzethis
further.
28Husserlwritesinthisregard,"Whatiscalledconstitution,thisiswhatKantobviouslyhadinmind
undertherubric,'connectionasanoperationoftheunderstanding,'synthesis. Thisisthegenesisin
which the ego and, correlatively, the surrounding world of the ego are constituted. It is passive
genesisnotthe[active]categorialactionwhichproducescategorialformations"(Ms.BIV12,pp.23,
1920).SeealsoMs.AVI30,p.9b,Nov.1921;Ms.C17IV,pp.12,1930;Ms.BI32I,p.16,1931.
29Thus,forHusserl,"TheassertionthatIremainwhoIamasthesametranscendentalegoasthesame
personalegoisequivalenttotheassertionthatmyworldremainsaworld"(Ms.BI13VI,p.4,Dec.
15, 1931). Granting this, "One can also say: a complete dissolution of a world in a 'tumult' [of
experiences]isequivalenttoadissolutionoftheego..."(Ms.FIV3,p.57a,1925).Animportantpart
ofthisdoctrineisthenotionoftheegoasthe"centering"ofitsconstitutedenvironment.SeeJamesR.
Mensch,IntersubjectivityandTranscendentalIdealism.Albany:SUNYPress,1988,pp.9499foran

accountofthis.
30HubertDreyfus,"Introduction,"Husserl,IntentionalityandCognitiveScience,ed.Dryfus,

Cambridge,Mass.,1982,p.10.
31C.A.Fields,"DoubleonSearle'sChineseRoom,"NatureandSystem6(1984),p.51.
32HubertDreyfus,"Introduction,"Husserl,IntentionalityandCognitiveScience,ed.Dryfus,

Cambridge,Mass.,1982,p.20.
33Ibid.
34Ms.C7I,p.2,1932.
35Ms.C7I,p.5.
36KritikderreinenVernunft,A99.
37Ibid.,A102.
38Ibid.,A103.

39Thus,ifthesenseofpastnessissimplythatofnotnewness,thissenseisarelationalone. Itisa
senseofthestretchofretentionsofretentionswhichintervenebetweenthepresentretentionandthe
original impression. Regarding the impression's content through such retentions, each of which
presentsitselfasanotneworpastmoment, is graspingthiscontentthroughastretchofpasttime.
Similarly,ifinretainingtheimpression,wealsoretainthepastnesswhichispresentedbytheretentions
ofitscontent,thentheappearanceoftheretainedcontentisalsotheappearanceofthepastnessthrough
whichitisgiven.
40InLISPaverysimplewayofexpressingretentionwouldbe:(defunretention(impression)(list

impression)).Thevalueoftheexpression,(retention(retention(retention'i))),wouldbe:(((i))).This
pointstothefactthatretentionisinherentlyrecursiveordefinableintermsofitself.Theimplicationis
thatallthefunctionsgoverningthetemporalityofconsciousness,insofarasthisisbasedonretention,
aresimilarlyrecursive.
41KritikderreinenVernunft,A103.
42Ibid.,A1045.

43Ms.C15,pp.15,C131,pp.10ff.RichardLindseemstocomeclosetoHusserl'spositionwithhis
analysisof"focalattention"inparticular,itstwoopposingtendenciestofastenonwhatcontrastswith
the rest of the field and to "discriminate similar elements" (Lind, "The Priority of Attention:
IntentionalityforAutomata,"TheMonist,vol.69(1978),p.610).Unfortunately,hedoesnotseethe
rolethatretentionplaysintheprocess.Hesimplyconfineshimselftothementionofacertain"focal
inertia."
44Z.W.Pylyshyn,"Minds,machinesandphenomenology:SomereflectionsonDreyfus''What

computerscan'tdo'",Cognition,vol,3/1(19745),p.72.
45Ibid.,p.73.
46Ibid.,p.70.

47Onewaytopicturethistemporalityistotakethetimelinewhichrunsfrompasttopresenttothe
futureandbenditinacircle.Atthispoint,thelineofdeterminationisfromthefuturetothepasttothe
present.Thus,thepresentisseennotjustasdeterminedbythepast,butalsobythefuture(i.e.,bythe
goals)whichwestrivetorealize.Suchdeterminationofthepresentisthroughthepastsincethefuture
determines the past by making us take it as the material (the resources) for meeting our goals.
Differentfutures makeus interpretourpast indifferentways. This goal directed temporalityis
essentialtothewaywefulfilPylyshyn'sdemandforsystemsthat"useofallavailableknowledgein
workingtowardstheirgoalincludingknowledgegainedfromtheanalysisofinterimfailures"(Z.W.
Pylyshyn,"Minds,machinesandphenomenology:SomereflectionsonDreyfus''Whatcomputerscan't
do'",Cognition,vol,3/1(19745),p.70).Ourgraspofthegoalmakesusawarenotjustofourfailures
inreachingit,butofwhatcountsas"knowledge"(i.e.,aresource)foritsachievement.Foramachine
topossesstheequivalentability,itmustbeprogramedwiththealgorithmswhichwouldgiveitthe
equivalenttemporaldetermination.
48P.M.andP.S.Churchland,"CouldaMachineThink?",ScientificAmerican,vol.262,No.1,

(January1990),pp.3536.
49Theresultwiththusbeanetworkofneuralnetworks,eachnodeactingrecursivelytoprocessa
particularfeature.