Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
and
C. J. E. Beyers
Standards Division, Licensing Branch,
South African Atomic Energy Board, Pelindaba, South Africa
(Received: 17 February, 1982)
INTRODUCTION
Increasing costs and concern over safety have created a need to
demonstrate the failure probability of engineering structures in a
quantitative manner. In the case of large one-of-a-kind structures, such as
bridges and pressure vessels, it is not possible to use a statistical approach
based on direct observation of service failure rates for this purpose, and it
becomes necessary to infer failure probability from indirect sources.
In recent years there have been several major studies of pressure failure
probability, with special interest in the integrity of light water reactor
vessels. This work falls into two main categories.
(i)
64
D. L. Marriott, C. J. E. Beyers
fs(X) = p.d.f, of S
ir fL
f(x)
o.
65
fL
L(X)
s(X)
X = S (Strength) or L (Load)
a
x~
"6
._o
,,=
X = S (Strength) or L (Load)
Fig. 1.
Failure probability diagrams for variations (a) within controlled limits and (b)
outside controlled limits.
66
D. L. Marriott, C. J. E. Beyers
67
clearly show that the problem has not been eradicated by the imposition
of rigorous QA requirements.
It is apparent that gross errors, or QA failures, play an important role
in determining the reliability of mechanical components. Although the
problem has been recognised before no attempt has been made to date to
include its effect in any theoretical model of structural reliability, with the
result that existing models are likely to be limited in scope and, more
importantly, optimistic in their predictions. In view of the neglected state
of the problem a great deal of work needs to be done to develop
understanding to the same level as the rest of reliability theory. This paper
describes one starting attempt to define the problem of assessing the risk
of component failure caused by gross errors. It was recognised that failure
can be caused by errors in design, manufacture and operation, and that of
these operational errors are possibly the most frequent. However, in order
to make a start, it was decided to examine the manufacturing phase first.
The rationale for this decision was that there is more control over
manufacture and it is easier to observe. This offers a greater prospect of
providing a general methodology of failure assessment, which can be later
generalised to other aspects of plant operation.
The starting-point of the investigation was a pilot study based on the
construction of a small pressure vessel to be used in an experimental
chemical process plant. The main body of this paper is devoted to a
description of that pilot study, and the conclusions drawn from it.
68
D. L. Marriott, C. J. E. Beyers
4,57 mm
1520ram
~
Fig.
2.
./
150 mm
plant. This particular example was chosen for several reasons. Firstly, it
was a real problem involving a significant hazard in the event of failure.
Secondly, the operation was sufficiently small to be easily observable,
while retaining sufficient complexity to represent the type of problem
where this type of assessment might be applied in the future. Thirdly, the
workshop in question was accessible, and information on all aspects of
design and fabrication were readily available. This degree of accessibility
was undoubtedly greater than normally afforded in industry generally,
and made the task of problem identification considerably easier than
would have been the case otherwise.
The vessel dimensions are given in Fig. 2. Further details of materials
and construction methods are given in Table 1. The design procedure was
according to ASME VIII. Manufacturing control and material supply
requirements were based on ASME VIII practice, but with modifications
to allow for local problems of material availability and manufacturing
methods.
No specific QA programme was drawn up for the vessel, it being
considered that its size did not justify the expense. However, the
69
TABLE 1
Pressure Vessel Design Specifications
(A) Design requirements
(i) Loading: internal pressure on a 3 to 7 day load/unload cycle.
(ii) Temperature: ambient indoor to 80C. Full pressure loading only applied at
elevated end of temperature range.
(iii) Environment:
(a) Internal content: halogen compounds in all three states.
(b) External: normally clean and dry, but under frequent upset conditions
deposits of halogen compounds and moisture from leaking pipes.
(B) Material and manufacture
(i) Design and fabrication code: ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section
VIII (adapted to suit local supply and other restrictions).
(ii) Material: low carbon, semi-killed steel boiler plate to BS 1501:161:28A, local
supplier. Thickness = 12 mm.
(iii) Forming: all plate bending and pressing performed cold in one operation.
(iv) Welding: manual, argon shielded tungsten arc method (TIG).
(v) Inspection:
(a) All stages visually inspected by independent inspector.
(b) All weld runs subject to dye penetrant testing.
(c) Final welds subject to 100 per cent X-radiography.
(vi) Mechanical testing: final assembly hydrotested to 130 per cent ofdesign pressure.
D. L. Marriott, C. J. E. Beyers
70
Analysis of data
The first impression gained from the data was the very large number of
potential errors to be found in even a modest sized manufacturing
71
D. L. Marriott, C. J. E. Beyers
72
turned out not to be so, mainly because of the large number of sequences
of errors possible when human errors are taken into account. The number
of branches in an event tree has a m a x i m u m of 2 n, where n is the number of
events in a sequence. As will be shown in the welding consumable problem
examined later in this paper, the number of events in a sequence of human
actions can be large; in the example up to 18. The resulting number of
branches is too large to handle without some method of rejecting
meaningless branches at an early stage, and this in turn cannot be done
until the consequence of each sequence has been worked out in terms of its
effect on material condition. The only application for the event tree
approach was found to be in analysing sequences of events with well
defined starting and end points, e.g. the welding problem already
mentioned.
The alternative method of identifying failure sequences is the so-called
top-down approach, using fault tree analysis. 5.28 This approach starts at
the final failure, the 'top event', then traces the causes of this top event
down through progressively more detailed levels of the system until some
basic initiating events are reached. Fault tree construction has the
attribute that it does not lead to wasted effort in investigating large
numbers of spurious branches. The only drawback is that an exhaustive
set of top events must be known beforehand. This is an acceptable
situation in systems where undesirable events can be easily defined in
terms of the operation of the system, e.g. failure to start or failure to deliver
power. In the case of material failures however, it is not obvious which top
events are relevant until events at a lower level on the fault tree have been
defined. This statement will be more apparent following some explanation of the possible classes of failure to be observed in a mechanical
component. Observations from case studies 25'26 suggest that service
failures may be grouped into three classes:
(i)
73
D. L. Marriott, C. J. E. Beyers
74
I DISRUPTIVEFAILUREIN SERVICEJ
p = 5 x 10-3
I0"3[
P =5x
I BRITTLEFRACTUREI
I
P ~ 10-5
LDUCTILEFRACTURE'1
5 x 10-3
I
[ StrainAge ]
Embrittlement
Cracking
I--
l Envi. . . . ni I
p: 5 xlO-3
Material
Deterioration
n Serv ce
Deterioration1
in Service
p ~ i0-5
l
I WeldMetal l
Substitution
~ect I
~p:
5 x 10"3
[ Deterioration
Material I
in Service
()
DeformationI
p=l
befoNr HydrotestStrage
p = 5 x 10-3I _
- - I
p-" 1
Material
Substitute Material
Substitution
Sensitive to Strain Age
WrongMaterial Supplied
with False Certificate
Fig. 3.
WrongMaterial
I Issued from Store
b
Fault tree for disruptive failure: (a) main diagram, (b) supplementary diagram
for material deterioration.
75
76
D. L. Marriott, C. J. E. Beyers
Failure by any of the above mechanisms can occur in two ways. The
cause can be either stacking up of parameter variations within acceptable
control limits, or gross errors which result in major deviations. Only the
first of these has the characteristic of a smaller probability of occurrence
as the deviation from a mean condition increases. When failure is caused
by completely new factors being introduced due to gross errors, there is
no reason to believe that any relationship will exist between the degree of
structural degradation and the relative frequency of the error which
causes it. For instance the effect of performing a heat treatment
incorrectly, e.g. at the wrong temperature, can be more damaging to
fracture toughness than omitting the treatment altogether, in some cases.
The consequence of a gross error is therefore likely to be a completely
random change in material properties, with virtually unlimited range.
Not all such ranges will necessarily constitute a degradation--it is
possible even to achieve an improvement in properties by accident.
However, it can be assumed that a modern production process has been
reasonably well optimised, and that any serious deviations from it will
tend toward a loss of desirable properties in the end product. It seems
reasonable therefore to assume a simple binary model for the consequences of gross errors. If the error creates the conditions which allow a
mechanism to occur, the risk of failure by that mechanism will be
unacceptably high; otherwise the error is judged insignificant. It is
sufficient, in these circumstances, to limit the analysis to simple deterministic calculations. Since this paper is concerned primarily with the
gross error problem, the following assessments are approximate, in
keeping with the above arguments. It is believed that the level of
complexity is sufficient for the purpose of risk assessment, where it is not
the object of the exercise to recreate the original design analysis.
Strain age embrittlement. Strain age embrittlement (SAE) was identified as a potential failure mechanism because the specified material, a
semi-killed steel, is known to be marginally susceptible to this form of
embrittlement. 32 This fact does not, by itself, suggest that the risk of SAE
is a high one, but is simply the means of identifying it as a possibility for
further consideration. Before it can be judged a high risk other conditions
must be satisfied. These may be determined by studying the basic
phenomenon of SAE.
Rimmed, and to a certain extent semi-killed, steels contain free carbon
and nitrogen atoms in solid solution. According to some authorities 33'34
Rimming Steel
Sheering operation
1Plastic deformation
ModerateTemps.
No anneal ht.
T
77
Trlomf /___~
Plate of doubtful
pedigree
Residual stresses
caused by repeeted
repairs
Flame cutting of
slot near failure point
Welding tempereture
gredlents
Ambiguouscode
requirements
regerdlng need
of stress relief
after weld repelr.
Wrong decision due
to incomplete information supplied
to q.c. inspector
)Susceptibletiaterial I
l
Sensitisation
(Plastic Deformation I
[
I
Environment
T
No heat treatment l
t
PWRPiping /4__27
AIM 304
welding of safe end
Spun Head/__26~
AIM 304
brazing of head
to cylinder
residuel stresses
cold forming
BWRwater chemistry
low Cl content
componenttoo cheep
to justify expense
b
Fig. 4.
78
D. L. Marriott, C. J. E. Beyers
Low cyclefatigue. If the code design route was followed correctly, the
peak strain in the vessel, due to the pressure cycle alone, is limited to
approximately twice the yield strain. For the specified material, this value
is of the order of 0-23 per cent. According to design curves given in ASME
III, 37 the corresponding design life would be about 104 cycles, with a
79
da/dN = C(AK) n
where a is crack depth (edge crack), or !2 crack depth (subsurface), N is the
number of cycles and AK is the stress intensity range.
The modified equation is due to El Haddad. a9 It replaces the stress
range in the stress intensity term of Paris's equation with an equivalent
stress range as follows:
da/dN = C(EAe~/(rra) ) n
where EAe is 'stress intensity range', according to the A S M E definition,
i.e. the pseudo-elastic stress range assuming linear elastic behaviour.
Crack growth data for low carbon steels are given in Reference 39. A
close fit to the experimental points is obtained with the following
expression:
da/dN = 10- 9 (EAe~/(rca))2
D. L. Marriott, C. J. E. Beyers
80
At the peak strain range for the material the prediction of crack growth is
Aa/a = O. 15
(i)
81
(ii) The presence of stainless steel in various forms and grades in the
bonded store.
It was postulated that stress corrosion cracking was feasible if it was
possible to have an inadvertent material substitution. Investigation of the
material procurement and issuing procedures revealed that stainless steel
welding wire was kept in the same store as the specified ferritic wire.
Although both rolls were carefully marked, and the issuing procedure
subject to surveillance by the inspection department, no physical barrier
was placed between the two materials to positively prevent a mix-up. While
the two materials look different, and can be readily differentiated during
welding by their distinctive handling characteristics, it was not uncommon, in this workshop, to use the stainless wire to weld ferritic-toaustenitic transitions. The unusual feel of welding ferritic plate with
austenitic consumable would not therefore be a natural check. On the
basis of these findings it was judged that stress corrosion of substituted
welding wire was a potential failure mechanism. It became necessary to
evaluate both the consequences and probability of such a substitution.
If stainless welding wire is used by mistake two failure mechanisms are
possible. The first of these is a transgranular crack in the austenitic weld
deposit caused by the normal vessel contents, combined with residual
tensile stresses in the weldment. The second is an intergranular crack in
the fusion zone where the Cr content of the austenitic phase is diluted by
contact with the parent material. In this case the electrolyte would be
chemical deposits on the outside surface combined with condensation
from leaks. In either case a likely form of cracking would be a fairly
uniform attack along a sizeable length of weld, e.g. as experienced in some
of the US boiling water reactor piping. 42 On reaching a depth of 2/3 to 3/4
of the wall thickness, ductile tearing could lead to a disruptive failure.
It was considered by the authors, and confirmed by discussion with
metallurgists connected with the project, that welding wire substitution
would introduce a high, multiple risk of failure. This is one example where
the risk is almost entirely dependent on the probability of errors in
procedure. For this reason a detailed analysis was made of the welding
wire issuing procedure.
Risk quantification
Assuming that the failure mechanisms identified in the previous section
are the most important contributions to overall risk, the fault tree shown
in Fig. 3 represents the failure logic for the system. If probabilities can be
D. L. Marriott. C. J. E. Beyers
82
Parent plate substitution. Two opportunities exist for material substitution. Firstly, an error in the issuing procedure from the bonded store
can occur. Secondly, the incorrect material can be delivered with a false
test certificate attached. In the workshop under review it is not the normal
practice to perform independent chemical analyses on every plate
received when the material is supplied with a mill certificate.
The probability of the incorrect material being issued from the bonded
store is a function of the control procedures in force. The procedure used
to estimate the error probability is essentially the same as that used to
estimate the probability of welding wire substitution in 'Probability of
weld consumable substitution' in this section. No analysis will be
reproduced here because the probability of incorrect issuing procedure is
many times less than the probability of an error in supply, and can t~e
ignored.
The major source of parent plate substitution is a supply error. This
fact was not recognised initially, otherwise an independent chemical
analysis would have been specified as part of the surveillance system. At
the time of the investigation no statistics were available on the incidence
83
D. L. Marriott, C. J. E. Beyers
84
exists or not. The actual probability of failure by SAE is unknown, but the
uncertainty, i.e. the probability of making a wrong decision, given the
available information, is high and approaches unity. The probability that
SAE could occur, given the available data, is therefore taken as 1 in the
analysis described here. The risk eventually calculated is a subjective one
related to the quality of the information supplied. The suitability of this
measure for assessing the failure risk of one-of-a-kind components will be
discussed in more detail at a later stage of this paper.
Porosity and inclusions of all types can form initiation sites for both
fatigue and brittle fracture. It is considered that, in the event of
embrittlement, it is virtually certain that a discontinuity of sufficient
severity will be present somewhere in the degraded area, in the form of
surface irregularities, or scratches incurred in service, to initiate fracture.
Three-dimensional defects are unlikely to add significantly to the existent
risk due to these other, inevitable features, and can be ignored as an
independent hazard. This assertion is supported by the quoted examples
of SAE induced failure, 18,35,36 none of which displayed any macroscopic
initiating defect. As far as fatigue is concerned, the stress concentrations
caused by three-dimensional defects will be less severe than the postulated
cracklike defect used in the analysis reported earlier in this paper, and are
therefore judged not to be critical.
The major sources of risk are the cracklike defects formed by root
cracks and lack-of-fusion (1.o.f.) defects. In order to detect such defects
every weld run was inspected by dye penetrant testing, and the completed
welds subjected to 100 per cent radiography. No defects were found by
either test method, but this does not necessarily mean that none was
present, because it is well known that inspection techniques are not
reliable. Data on the reliability of non-destructive test methods are
sparse, but the available information, for instance obtained from
Packman 46 and Yang, 47 indicate that radiography may be as little as 10
85
P(/)I0) = ~
n=l
(1 -PD)n(6L)"exp(
-OL)n!
86
D. L. Marriott, C. J. E. Beyers
P(DIO)P(O)
f(OI/))
-
P(/))
P(D) =
f0
P(DIO)P(O)dO
87
88
D. L. Marriott, C. J. E. Beyers
TABLE 2
(8) Wear
(a) Adhesive wear
(b) Abrasive wear
(c) Corrosive wear
(d) Surface fatigue wear
(e) Deformation wear
(f) Impact wear
(g) Fretting
(9) Impact
(a) Impact fracture
(b) Impact deformation
(c) Impact wear
(d) Impact fretting
(10) Fretting
(a) Fretting fatigue
(b) Fretting wear
(c) Fretting corrosion
(11) Creep
(a) Deformation
(b) Fracture
(c) Buckling
(d) Stress relaxation
(12) Thermal shock
(13) Galling and seizure
(14) Spalling
(15) Radiation damage
(16) Combined effects
(a) Creep fatigue
(b) Stress corrosion
(c) Corrosion fatigue
(d) Creep oxidation
89
Critical Failure
Path I
fllf
Ps:0.O1 ~24
PF-:105~
:l ra"
~8/"~6of
_.
22222,2 . . . .
%:o.i
Pe fl-i
P:a%.. ->IP.:l
%o.oo~
.~0.SxlO "4
12f
#---~----o/"-~"--'~-----'~
13d
"
i5c
18
\13~
--
~b--"
P13:l~
'
15f
\Critical Failure
P --0.1
Pf =]..5xlC ~Fail
Fig. 5. Event tree (THERP diagram) for welding consumable issue and use. c denotes
correct action while fdenotes wrong action in relation to previous events. (Numbers relate
to steps in Task Analysis; see Table 3.)
90
D. L. Marriott. C. J. E. Beyers
D I S C U S S I O N OF R E S U L T S
F r o m Fig. 3 it can be seen that the estimate of failure probability is
dictated mainly by the single event of plate substitution. The overall
probability is therefore approximately 5 x 10- 3. This is a high figure for a
pressure vessel, and is probably unacceptable. However, if it were possible
to make a large number of identical vessels, and put them into service
under identical conditions, it is unlikely that the observed failure rate
would be as high as the estimated value. The reason for this is that it was
necessary to make conservative assumptions at a number of stages in the
analysis, in order to quantify the problem at all. For instance, only a small
proportion of vessels suffering strain-age embrittlement would be
affected beyond a critical level in practice. Unfortunately the current state
of knowledge on this phenomenon, and others, is insufficient to make any
finer distinction than the rough go/no-go criterion adopted in this study.
In fact, the probability figure calculated is a measure of the uncertainty of
the available information and, as such, is a valid measure of risk in its own
right, but a different one from the more conventional population failure
rate and its estimators. If more information is made available about either
the failure mechanisms involved or the procedures for material processing, it is possible to evaluate the risk of failure with greater precision until,
when all relevant knowledge has been provided, it should be possible to
state with absolute certainty whether the component will fail in service or
not. The alternative use of information uncertainty as a measure of risk
will be discussed in more detail in the section of this paper titled 'General
Discussion'.
On a more qualitative level the failure mode identification has value
even without postulating any error rates. F r o m the structure of the
feasible failure mechanisms identified, and the errors required to cause
them as illustrated in Fig. 3, it is possible to make recommendations for
modifying the process so as to eliminate these failures, or at least reduce
their likelihood. In the case of the stress corrosion mechanism, for
instance, a physical barrier between the stocks of ferritic and austenitic
consumables in the bonded store would be an effective move, as would a
91
G E N E R A L DISCUSSION
The broad objective of this study was, firstly, to investigate the feasibility
of performing a risk assessment of the errors of manufacture, and
secondly, to formulate a general strategy for assessment. Although the
problem addressed in the study was a very simple one, it is believed that
the question of feasibility has been answered satisfactorily. In fact, it is
D. L. Marriott, C. J. E. Beyers
92
A.
Process as Specified
1.
__
Process I
Description I
93
.~
Failure R a t e ~
Checklist ] I
Initial Screening.
Search for partial
correspondence
2. Detailed Matching.
r
correspondenceof
in
all elements
Process
Initial Screening.
Repeat Step No. l
with deviations in
process steps
included
Im-
4. Detailed Matching.
Complete matching
of all elements of
mechanisms
found in
Step No. 3
Failures
by
caused
gross
deviations
Risk Quantification
Error Rate]
Estimates ]
5. Failure Probability ] [
Calculate Probability~9-~
of failure from error] J
rates and mechanism
6. Recommendations.
Revise process,
add extra inspections, etc
Fig. 6.
]~ [
~
94
D. L. Marriott, C. J. E. Beyers
95
This first step is done at a relatively superficial level, and serves only to
eliminate the most obviously inappropriate mechanisms from further
consideration. The second step takes the remaining subset of failure
mechanisms and compares their event sequences in detail with the actual
manufacturing processes and operating conditions for the component. At
this stage the degree of matching which can be achieved depends on how
much information is available about the process, and the current state of
understanding of the failure mechanism. Where any uncertainty remains
it is always possible to retain the mechanism as feasible until further
information is forthcoming. _Within the bounds of known failure
mechanisms, therefore, this search technique is inherently conservative.
The two steps described above might suggest that an inordinate
amount of work is involved. In practice it is believed that this is not so.
The multiple requirements which must be satisfied before a failure
mechanism is finally judged feasible are so restricting that the allowable
subset reduces very rapidly. In a well designed component and its
accompanying manufacturing process it is expected that all possible
failure modes will be eliminated by this search procedure.
So far only the materials and processes as specified have been considered: The real problem of failure mode identification is associated with
errors which cause fundamental changes under which the component is
made or operated (errors of kind). To identify these errors it is necessary
to return to step one and, taking each listed failure mechanism in turn,
examine each manufacturing or operating stage to determine whether any
D. L. Marriott, C. J. E. Beyers
96
Risk quantification
With the feasible failure mechanisms identified it is a relatively simple
task, in principle, to evaluate the probability of occurrence, and hence the
risk of failure. Since each mechanism defines a logical combination of
elementary events, the overall failure probability can be calculated
without difficulty if the event probabilities are known. It is convenient, but
not necessary, to represent the failure events in a logic diagram, such as
the fault tree shown in Fig. 3. This representation helps to identify
97
98
D. L. Marriott C. J. E. Beyers
99
100
D. L. Marriott, C. J. E. Beyers
I Supplies J
!
l Specificationl
.aterial ' _ r.
Plate
~BondStore
_"o.z,e
~
Procrement
BondStore
Weld Rods ~
BondStore
~-~
CylindricalPlate--ColdBond ~
EllipticalEnd--ColdDish
Cut Holes
Tack
Root
Filler
~nr 9
f i ServiceEnvironment--HalideCompoundsi
t_._.] Temperature = 0 to BOC
i
[ Load= 1000cycles O to 100%
J
Fig. 8. Material processing flow diagram for pressure vessel manufacture. NDE l,
check mill certificate against specification; NDE 2, 100 ~o dye penetrant inspection; NDE
3, surface visual and 100 ~ dye penetrant on all welds, NDE 4, 100 ~o radiography on all
welds.
F
I
1
i
Material E l
ISp~:ificatio, p.
l
I..-/
"
B D'
B.D'
--'-~ _ _~_~_--.
l!
B,D'
l~t ~ _
=L4
L__l
. . . . .
L~----t
~ I
L-[
r-~
C--2--~-[
~J
t_j
- -
EllipticalEnd--Cold Dish
)-J
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
--!
-------
L
.I-
211~,I CylindricalPlate--ColdBend
- -----
L___.'r---~
-L____J - L
L ....
F { _ . LI _- _- ~I I~
|
Pl. . . . .
S,O". . . .
_r-~n
J
~--
. . . . . . . . .
_r-~
I
I
----7-----I. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
~,b-'----
',---7.... -,. ~
, m
J t
101
I~
L___"
Ii
....
IIil
/-t
. . . . . . .
i. . . . . . .
_ _ . . r --j
~_,
f
1 i-'--7~'~----~
I
~I
~-- -- ---I-~-- -L~'L -- J - -lq
Weld Rod i
~--~ Bond Store L I I
_1
f---l_r
1
'
~_._.[--- . . . . . .
,
.
r---L~_l---~
I L _ _ A
_
L___J
r--l~__~
"--"
"
- '
102
D. L. Marriott, C. J. E. Beyers
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
103
104
D. L. Marriott, C. J. E. Beyers
27. USNRC, Summary of licence event reports, Annual publ. of USNRC Office
of Operations Evaluation.
28. Hassl, D. F., Advanced concepts in fault tree analysis, Proc. Systems Safety
Symposium, Washington University and Boeing Co., Glencoe, Illinois,
1965.
29. USNRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region II, Report on TVA
Brown's Ferry units I and II, No. 50-259/75/1, 50-260/75/1, 25 July 1975.
30. British Engine Technical Reports, 10 Volumes, British Engine, Boiler and
Electrical Insurance Co. Ltd, Manchester, England.
31. IIW, Fatigue fractures in welded constructions, International Institute of
Welding, 1967.
32. ASM Metals Handbook, Vol. 1, Material Selection, 8th edn, ASM.
33. Baird, J. D., Strain aging of steel--a critical review, Iron and Steel, Pts. I, II,
III (May, June, July, August, September 1963).
34. Cottrell, A. H., Discontinuous yielding, NPL Symposium no. 15, 456,
HMSO, London, 1963.
35. Hutchings, F. R., Failures of jib tie-bar components of tower cranes
manufactured from rimming steel, British Engine Tech. Report Vol. VIII,
British Engine, Manchester, England.
36. Robinson, P., unpublished failure investigations, University of
Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa.
37. ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, 1971, Appendix I,
Stress Tables.
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pressurised water reactor vessels, ASTM STP 513, 1972.
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