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An Ethnographic Perspective

Author(s): Dell Hymes


Source: New Literary History, Vol. 5, No. 1, What Is Literature? (Autumn, 1973), pp. 187-201
Published by: The Johns Hopkins University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/468416
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An EthnographicPerspective

Dell Hymes

HESE CONTRIBUTIONS are linked by the question "Is there a


universalbasis forthe notionof literature?"In varyingdegree,
theysuggeststrategiesforansweringthe question. These issues
are in principlepart of a generalinquiryinto the natureand organization of themeans of speechin human communities,and theirmeanings
to thosewho use them,an inquirybeing pursuedwith increasingvigor
by participantsof many disciplines.' The ethnographicapproach on
which I shall draw is not as richin knowncontentas literarycriticism,
but it has an indispensableplace, as I shall tryto show. At the end I
shall argue that literarycriticismhas in turnan indispensableplace in
ethnography.
I shall begin and end with articlesin alphabetical order of their
authors'names, because, as it happens,thesegive me the framewithin
whichI can considerthe rest.

I
The relevanceof Blake as a symbolistwould seem to lie in the implication that Blake dealt with the primal source of literature.Through
him one would find an implicitdefinitionof the nature and role of
literature.Not onlywould Blake be seen "as a morecompletesymbolist
than thosewho have gone under the 'symboliste'banner,if one means
by symbolista poet who regardsliteratureas a 'symbolicform'of experience,in the sense that has become common since Cassirer," but
literaturewould be seen as one of the cardinal activitiesconstitutive
of
human culture,even thoughCassirerhimselfdid not accord it a clear
place.2 Literature,mythology,and ultimatelylanguage, however,become intertwinedin Adams' interpretation
of Blake and his implicit
Cf. my "Editorial Introduction," Language in Society, I (1972), 1-14.
Not in his three volumes on the philosophy of symbolic formsor his Essay on
Man, nor indeed in The Logic of the Humanities (New Haven, 1961), where
language, art, and religion are the categories ready to hand (e.g., pp. 173-74).
I

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NEW LITERARY HISTORY

recommendationto criticaltheory. We have to do withtwo modes of


use of language, one a human energythat is artisticshaping, and in
which metaphor is constitutive,an unremittingsource of symbolic
forms,the otheran externalizationand devouringin which metaphor,
ifpresent,is a meredevice.
Adams' approach has many ramificationsfor a philosophyand
sociologyof culture,but it is hard to see wherewe are leftwith regard
to literatureitself. If we grantto Adams, and Blake, a fundamental
insightrelevantto the nature of literature,stillwe need more than a
referenceto Cassirer. We need indeed a critique and contemporary
reconstruction
of Cassirer'sproject.
Adams avoids the "trap" of temporal priorityfor "myth" (as a
mode of use of language), wiselyenough. No simpleuniversaldevelopmental or evolutionaryscheme can encompassthe complex record of
human culturalhistories.3But the kind of evidencethat comparative
ethnologycan provideremainsrelevant,and some modesofevolutionary
interpretationare not impossible. The crux is in the descriptive,or
analytic, foundations,as to what is compared. Cassirer sketched
developmentalprocesses,which retainpartial validity;but he treated
the organization,or underlyingfunctions,of human cultureas if given
in a fewconventionalcategories,e.g., language,mythology,
art,science.
This will not do. It leaves the categoriesat the mercyof conventional
notionsand disciplines,and is ad hoc and a prioriin relationto the
distinctionsand configurations
of symbolicformsto be foundin actual
cultures. The organizationof cultural formsis not given, but to be
validated. It is not that generalization,and a universalbasis, are impossible,but thata philosophyofsymbolicformsmustbe interdependent
with ethnographyand ethnologyof symbolicforms. We need to consider more scrupulouslywhat count as the definingfeaturesand relations of aestheticallyand imaginativelyshaped activityin a sufficient
range of cultures. This is an old, perhaps familiar,lesson of modern
anthropology,but one to which new point is given by the renewed
interestamong anthropologists,
in studyofthese
linguists,and folklorists
matters. To give one example: much myththat has been presented
as prosecan be shownto be structuredinternallyin lines in a way that
of poetry.4
answersto a generaldefinition
Given an adequately based theoryof symbolicforms,the human
3 Brought home to me in my firsteffortat scholarship,A Critique of Christopher
Caudwell's "Illusion and Reality" (Reed College dissertation,
i950).
4 See Dennis Tedlock, Finding the Center (New York, 1972); cf. Hymes, "ObUgric Metrics" (review of a book by R. Austerlitz), Anthropos,55 (196I), 574-76,
and "Louis Simpson's 'The desertedboy,' " Poetics (in press).

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energythatis artisticshapingforBlake and Adams will likelybe found


not to defineany one categoryat the level at which "literature"is
usuallyfound,but to be a fundamentalfunction,or quality,recurrently
pervasive. It seems inescapable that much which will have to be
classifiedas literaturewill be poor or lackingin it. If we are to have a
seriouscomparativeliterature,one whichcorrespondsto a worldsociety
by encompassingthe world's cultures,then all sonnets,say, good and
bad, will have to be qualified as literature,and so on. If a sonnetis
not literature,
what is it? Surelynot unshaped,not a sonata or a statue.
This is of course an old issue. It would seem to me that we have to
abandon strugglesover the honorificuse of termsforsymbolicforms,
and genres,and settlefordescriptiveuses. Are not "good" and "bad"
clear enough,when that is what one wants to say? How can we place
literatureamong symbolicforms,if what countsas literature,or poetry,
or the like,changeswiththe yearsand the critics? (See Robertson this
question.)
All this may appear to put me in disagreementwith Butler,where
descriptionis arguedto be inadequate, and evaluativeconcernsessential.
On one plausible readingof the contrast,as exemplifiedin some of the
notionspassed in review,I would indeed have to object. Thus, I do not
see a differenceon logical grounds between a theoryin literature,
biology,or any otherfield. Nothingwould deserveto be called a theory
of literaturethat could not be clear enough about its domain to make
possibleits application,and, in principle,its falsification(there are of
coursefuzzybordersin thesciencesas well as in thehumanities). Many
of thecriteriareviewedwould seemto have in commona desireto withhold the name of "literature"from other than a small set of most
inhighlyvalued works. But Butler himselfindicates the difficulties
I
and
that
he
is
in
think
that
volved,
profoundlyright concluding
recognitionof a work as literaryinvolvesa conventionalrelationship
to the values of an audience. The termsdescriptionand evaluation
are seen to take on a differentcharacter. By "description"is meant
descriptionof textsin isolation;by "evaluation" is meantthe evaluation
of acceptanceby an audience (community,society).
Here we are far from a prioriinsistenceon specificqualities. An
ethnographicand ethnologicalperspectiveis again implied,in which
one mustdiscoverthedefiningqualitiesof "literature"in thegivencase.
This is descriptionof texts,not in isolation, but in context." The
perspectiveincludes the dimensionsor qualities in terms of which
some partof "literature,"so defined,is preferred.We have two distinct
5 Cf. Towards New Perspectivesin Folklore,ed. Americo Paredes and Richard Bauman (Austin, 1971), and James Peacock, Rites of Modernization (Chicago, 1968).

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sensesof evaluation: countingas literatureat all, and rankingwithin


that category. The firstsense is in importantpart a cognitiveone, in
the sense of work to discoverthe culturalclassifications
of experience
in a community.6One might very well recognizesomethingas an
instanceof a category,whiledislikingit. It is thisfirstand fundamental
senseof evaluation,as classification,
which I take Butlerto address.
What we have, then, as startingpoint, is the assumptionthat in
everycommunitylanguage will be foundto be used in ways that show
featuresidentifiableas literary. The task is to discover,within the
range of functionsserved by language in a community,within the
repertoireof verbal means, the varietiesof language, stylesof speech,
and
genres,and events,in whichthesefeaturesoccur,theirrelationships,
their status in the community. The various qualities reviewed by
Butler,and others,will be found to be selectedand grouped together
in variousways,e.g., the balance betweenmimeticand autonomic (on
which point Butler is clearlyrightin a comparativeperspective),or
the place of originalityand uniqueness. In specificcommunitiesand
periods, certainly,the question of a theoryof what is and is not an
of the literarywill be
instance of the community'sinstitutionalization
answerable. The difficulty
in answeringthe questionwithinour own
societymaybe a specificand illuminatingfactabout it.
What is likelyto proveuniversalis nota specificselectionor configuration of literaryfeatures,but the presence,variouslyorganized,of most
or all of the relevantfeaturesthemselves,including the existenceof
some institutionalcontextin which some featuresat least are somewhat valued and ability in them encouraged or rewarded. Even
originalityand uniqueness,thoughtperhapsto be absentfrom"tribal"
or "primitive"societies,are to be found there. The variabilityof
traditionsamong neighboringcommunities,and indeed, among families and familymemberson occasion, is evidence of this.7 There is no
public claim to originality;one's own knowledgeis traced to those
fromwhom one has learnedit. But in selectionof incidentand emphasis, and in expressivefeatures,one can discern,if one has authentic
materialsand looks forit, personalreflectionand shaping. The tradi6 Cf. Harold Conklin, Folk Classification (New Haven, 1972), a comprehensive
bibliography.
7 For example, at Yakima Reservation,Washington,in 1905, when Louis Simpson
had told the Coyote myth cycle to Edward Sapir, Louis Simpson's brother,Tom,
insisted that one myth had a differentending, and told it. This version is in fact
one I recorded myselfabout 50 years later fromHiram Smith, of the Warm Springs
Reservation,Oregon.

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AN ETHNOGRAPHIC

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19I

tionalmaterials
are a modeofpersonalas wellas collective
expression.8
Here Kelloggis certainly
in
the
of
oralliterarelevance
right urging
tureto fundamental
The
one
his
fault
in
is that
argument
questions.
the bardictraditionis not sufficiently
the
western
(as
representative
AmericanIndian traditions
on which I draw also are not). It is
widelyreported(and knownto me fromfieldexperience)thatspecific
and typesof performance,
versions,
may be associatedwithspecific
and
their
versions
evaluated,not in termsof approximation
persons,
butin termsoftheselection
to an ideallycompleteversion,
theymake,
and theirabilityto maketheirversion"comealive." Thereis indeed
of incidentand detailthatgoesbeyondany
a community
knowledge
one performance;
of selection.A
just thismakespossiblethe effects
whichincludedit all mightbe judged as tedious.Not
performance
need be said or explained. (It is sometimes
a markof
everything
are given.) Thereis indeed
toldin Englishthatexplanations
versions
of completeness
below whicha performance
shouldnot
a threshold
and
dramatization
are
what
count.
but
This is
fall,
giventhis,point
can be considered
notto say thatsuchnarrators
authorsin the usual
in theirowneyesorin theeyesofothers.
sense;theyarenotoriginators,
combining,
reorienting,
freshly
They are, however,shapers,selecting,
But
all
materials
with
which
work.9
is
the
this
only
they
motivating
in
to agreewithKelloggthatoralliterature
opensup newpossibilities
ofsucha conceptas author.
theconsideration
8 Thus, with regard to narratives from Anna Nelson Harry, of the Eyak of
Alaska, recorded in 1932, and again in the 196os,
After being widowed and re-marryingamongst the Tlingits, Anna's stories
of intermarriage and displacement become much more meaningful. The
groundhog man and wolf woman are extremelypoignant, taking on several
more layersof meaning ....
As I have thought and thought in recent years about the way she tells these
stories,I come to an even greaterappreciation of the artisticand philosophical
of her own personal tragedy,and her understandmerit of Anna's storytelling,
ing of the tragedy of the Eyak people, and of the nature of human history,
as only an Eyak (or maybe an Irishman) could see it. [Michael Krauss,
personal communication,30 August I973]
Cf. also my "The 'Wife' Who 'Goes Out' Like a Man: Reinterpretationof a
Clackamas Chinook Myth," Structural Analysis of Oral Tradition, ed. P. and E.
Maranda (Philadelphia, 1971), pp. 49-80.
9 It may be that much of what is writtenin our own society,for magazines and
audiences of known or presumed preferences,is not "authored" in the sense of
strikingorigination,but is to be understoodas personal shaping of material essentially
commonlyknown. The apparatus of novelty (titles, names of characters, locales)
may be a differenceof degree, and not of kind, from the nature of tradition and
performancein a society such as that of the Wasco Chinook (originally living on
the Columbia River in the vicinityof what is now The Dalles).

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NEW LITERARY HISTORY

192

II
In analysisof the nature of literature,conceptionsof language, includingconceptionsheld by linguists,inevitablyplay a part. Both Fish
and Ricoeur take linguisticconceptionsfor a startingpoint,and seek
to extend them. Ricoeur seeks to extend by analogy, taking certain
linguisticconceptionsfor granted; Fish criticizescertain conceptions
as inadequate to thenatureoflanguage.
Fish seems to be close to agreementwith Butlerin concludingthat
literatureis characterizedby an attitudetoward propertiesthatbelong
by constitutive
rightto language. This conceptionimpliesthe necessity
the institutional
of determining
relationsthataffectthejudgment. And
Fish givesimportantcontentto the implicationby Adams that literary
theoryrequires a sufficiently
complex conception of language at its
base. I would only qualify that it is not always as easy as his conclusionsuggeststo decidethatsomethingbelongsin theliterarycategory.
Most important,Fish is entirelyrightin the formof his analysis of
deficienciesin concepts of language, but incompletein his suggested
enrichment.The formof his argument-that a gap betweenordinary
and literarylanguage leaves both impoverished,and that much that is
essentialand meaningfulis missed or distortedas a consequence-is
preciselythe formof argumentemployedsome ten yearsago to justify
an approach called the "ethnographyof speaking."'01 Fish makes
originalpoints,and I have profitedfromhis analysis. But it should be
noted that the issues in linguistictheorytoday are not only as to the
statusof semantics,but also as to the statusof stylistic
organizationand
features. In brief,I would argue that modern linguisticshas been
dominatedby an implicitdefinitionof language in termsof the "referential" (or, in a narrow sense, "semantic") function,whereas language is organized in termsof two elementaryfunctions,the other
11It is importantthatvalue and intenbeing "expressive"or "stylistic."
tion be broughtwithinthe scope of language, but in this respect,it is
not only kinds of semantic contentthat have been missed. So also
have featuresand modes of organizationessentialto the expressionof
value and intention.These "stylistic"aspectsof the designof language
are necessaryto the linguist'sown intentionof capturinggeneralizaio Cf. Hymes, "The Ethnography of Speaking," Anthropology and Human
Behavior, ed. T. Gladwin and W. C. Sturtevant (Washington, D. C., I962), pp.
13-53; Explorations in the Ethnography of Speaking, ed. R. Bauman and J. F.
Sherzer (Cambridge, forthcomingin I974).
I See Hymes, "Ways of Speaking," Explorations in the Ethnography of Speaking.

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tions and universals,12


and they are an essentialpart of what makes
utterancerecognizableas aesthetically
shaped.
At the same time,not everything
thatis requiredcan be packed into
an enrichedconceptionof language. Some of what is requiredexists
in the form of norms of interpretationand interactionthat are not
specificto language, but governverbal and nonverbalaspects of communicationjointly,or that are directlyfeaturesof social relationships
and situations,not of sentences. There is a tendencyin linguisticsto
importeverynewlyrecognizedrelevancyinto an underlyingsyntactic
as if linguists,no matterhow mentalistin princior semanticstructure,
ple, were loath to ascribeto the mind anythingthat could not be imputed to language. Linguists, committedto going behind surface
structurewithinlanguage, seem reluctantto recognizethat language
itselfis partlya "surface structure"to some of the aspects of social
meaning and interactionwith which they now wish to deal. The
developmentof conversationalpostulatesis valuable in thisregard,but
so farwoefullyinadequate and ethnocentric.A conversationin accord
withthose now invokedwould be tedious and indeed unlikely. When
any interestingexchange of speech, especially with indications of
aestheticplay and shaping,mustbe marked as deviant,it is clear that
the conceptionof conversationthat requiresthe markingis too narrow
forliteratureor ethnography.
I verymuch agree with Ricoeur's goal of findingcommoninterpretativeprinciplesfortextsand meaningfulaction,but the presentargumentseemsto me not the way to reach them,apart fromthe valuable
discussionstemmingfromhis own knowledgeof interpretation(in the
section "from understandingto explanation"). For one thing,there
is a directway to see the connectionin ethnography,and that stems
from the necessityof interpretingmuch meaningfulaction through
documentsof the ethnographer's
own making (see below in IV). With
from a conceptionof language and
drawn
the
to
arguments
regard
mistaken
to
it
is
accept the conventionalstructuralist
linguistics,first,
and
discourseas basis formethodological
between
language
dichotomy
is
That
dichotomy being overcome,and can now be seen
argument.
as an ideological expressionof the nascent discipline of linguistics,
Linguists
wishingto secureforitselfa privilegeddomain of structure.13
are findingorganizationbeyond the sentence,and ethnographersand
I2 Cf. Hymes, "Linguistic Theory and the Functions of Speech," Foundations of
Sociolinguistics: An Ethnographic Approach (Philadelphia, forthcomingin 1974),
Ch. viii.
13 Cf. Hymes, "The Ethnography of Speaking," and Part II in Foundations of
Sociolinguistics.

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NEW LITERARY HISTORY

linguistsare findingorganizationoflinguisticmeans in stylesand speech


eventsthattranscendstheold dichotomy.
Second, writingdoes not fixthe meaningof speech,but onlya portion of it; nor is it self-interpreting
any more than action; both are
mute. In general,it is not difference
of materialvehiclethatis decisive,
but modes of culturalinstitutionalization
of discourse,oral or written.
In traditionalIndia essentialdiscourses,such as the grammaticalsutras,
were not committedto writing,because paper, a material thing, is
easily destroyed.They were committedto memory,and transmitted
(and glossedand elaborated) orallyforcenturies.Again, what a discourse means may not at all be the same thing as what a speaker
means,ifthespeakeris mediumfora spirit,or anotherperson,or instrument of ritualspeech or prayer. Further,not only textsbut also oral
discoursesmay project a Welt, as in mythnarratives.And it is just
not the case that "virtuallyeverypiece of writing"is addressedto who
ever knowshow to read, as the Pentagon Papers remindus. In sum,
each channel of language use has been variouslyexploitedin various
cultures. One must approach these questions,and all questionsconcerningthe functioningof language, as problematicwithinan ethnographic and ethnologicalframe of reference.In the particularcase,
writing,speaking,singing,drumming,horn-calling,whistlingare part
of the organizationof communicativemeans in a society,and generalizations have to be based on analyzed cases. The period in which a
priorispeculationon linguisticfunctionswas possibleis past. Literary
scholarsand interpretive
shouldnotbe a priori
philosophersparticularly
technologicaldeterminists,
reasoning from the supposedly necessary
naturesof speech,writing,and print,ratherthan fromevidence.
Third, the dogma that "merelydistinctiveentitieswithinfinitesets
of such units definesthe notion of structurein linguistics"is false.
Chess pieces must not only differbut also be recognizable. Pike has
long insistedon the identificationalas well as contrastivenature of
linguisticfeatures,and currentconcernwithphoneticspecificationand
natural classesof sounds impliesgeneralrecognitionof the principle.14
Ricoeur himselfmakes just thiskind of argumentwhen he pointsout
thattheoppositionsmediatedin mythsare themselvesmeaningful.And
fourth,the sentenceis not the last kind of unit taken into account in
linguistics(as notedwithregardto Fish).
Finally, the wisdom of Ricoeur's final remarksis neverthelessincomplete. In interpretinga mythit may be essentialto situate the
14 Cf. Hymes, "Linguistic Models in Archeology," Archaeologie et calculateurs:
problamessemiologiques et mathematiques (Paris, 1970), pp. 91-118.

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source, and the enlargingof the horizon of the text may be better
but as bi- or even multi-temporaliunderstood,not as atemporalization,
zation. The Kathlamet Chinook "Myth of the Sun," forexample, can
be seen to speak of a traditionalcultural world, its values, and the
consequences thereinof a chief's hubris in insistingon possessinga
power properto the Sun, bringingdestructionon all his kin as a result.
It can be seen to speak of the world of its narrator,Charles Cultee, last
fluentuser of the language, conveyingthe mythwiththe supplemental
aid of Chinook Jargon to the ethnographer,Franz Boas, who had
sought him out, and reflecting,one cannot but sense, on his proud
people's initialacceptance of the marvelsof the whites,and subsequent
destructionthroughdiseasesbroughtby whites.It can be seen to speak
for us, perhaps,of a world in which the harnessedpower of the sun,
so eagerlysought,may yetbe our own destruction.
It is importantto develop a common descriptiveand interpretative
frame of referencefor language, and uses of language, among other
communicativemodalitiesand symbolicforms. But the directstrategy
would be to analyze, not language, then meaningfulaction, but language (speech) as partofmeaningfulaction.

III
I have argued foran ethnographicand ethnologicalbasis foranswering the question "What is literature?"on grounds of adequacy of
scope. Ethnologically,thereis the comparative,cross-culturaldimenthereis thedescriptive
sion,a matterofrangeof cases; ethnographically,
do
with
to
the
frame
of
reference
dimension,having
(especiallyas regards language) with which any case is approached. The argument
findsme seekingto defendand generalizethe concept "literature,"to
findforit a trulyuniversalbasis. This is in the traditionof the contributionsto analysisof language and culturegenerallyof Boas, Sapir,
and Kroeber earlierin this century. In that traditionone wants, like
Kernan and Roberts,to expose the historicaland social limitationsof a
received categoryin one's own culture,but one also wants to bring
withinthe pale of attentionand acceptance otherculturesand peoples.
Thus the apparentironyof a literaryscholarattacking,and an anthropologistdefending,the universalityof "literature." Let me say a little
more on the anthropologicalconcern,and then deal with the irony.
Recognitionof the value of other literaturesis one of the oldest
themes of an anthropologicalorientation,from at least the time of

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Blake in theworkof Herder on Hebraic and Greekliterature.(Herder


stood as a known precedentfor Boas, Sapir, Kroeber, and others,all
versedin the Germanicculturaltradition.) I feelsome warmthon this
point, for it has still to be fullyaccepted. A few years ago I sent a
paper to a very distinguishedcolleague in English; a littlelater he
somewhat apologeticallyexplained that he had sent it on to another
colleague concernedwithfolklore.My reasonforsendinganalysesand
freshtranslationsof Kwakiutl and Haida poems had been that their
natureas worksof artwas newlydisclosed,and so, I thought,of interest
to someoneprofessionally
concernedwithliterature.But no; American
Indian ==folklore,not literature.This sort of responseis probablyless
frequentnow, with the growthof interestamong poets in just such
poetry,as reflectedin the journal Alcheringa,and in the surge of
interestin coursesin nativeAmericanliterature.Use of "literature"as
equivalentto "ours" (vs. "theirs") may be fading. Reasons fornarrow
definitionin practicemay be inertiaand specialization,not principle.
In any case, it is necessaryto insiston the universality
of the concerns
and abilitiesthat give rise to what we call "literature,"and it seems
strangethatit shouldstillbe a difficulty.
in recognizingAfrican,
Considersculpture.There seemsno difficulty
NorthwestCoast Indian (pre- and post-Columbian),or New Guinean
shapingof materialobjectsall as instancesof "sculpture." Whyshould
the case be differentwith African,NorthwestCoast, New Guinean
shapingofwords? Levi-Straussonce observedthatwhenan object came
to Paris, it would be sentto the Louvre,ifthe code were known,and if
not, to the Mus6e de I'Homme. Perhaps then,in the degreethat the
code is not known,we will have literaturein anthropologyand folklore
and linguistics,as well as in departmentsof English and othermajor
not in kind,and
is in our understanding,
languages. But the difference
AmericanIndian poetry,likeOld Englishpoetry,can become accessible.
in categorizingas
Again, there seems to be no special difficulty
sculptureworkswhich are great, routine,or amateurishlybad. It is
not customaryto say that somethingis not an opera on the ground
that it is not great or good. Indeed, of what else except an "opera"
could it be a bad instance? There is no evidentreason to be different
with regard to "literature." One can (I) recognize all instancesas
belongingto the category,and (2) still be free to evaluate them as
great, good, ordinary,or bad. The alternativewould be to leave
"literature"somethingethnocentricand arbitrarilysubjective. Those
of us who workwithcommunitiesotherthan thosethat formthe usual
audience for literarycriticismcannot accept this,nor can those communities. We simplydo need a general,intelligibletermforthe verbal

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expressionsof aestheticand imaginativeimpulse that occur in these


communities.There is reallyno othertermin Englishthan literature,
and we will have to use it. We could perhaps agree always to use it
with a minuscule1,leavingthe majuscule forany who thinkwe should
have no rightto theterm.
What I have said is in agreementwith Kernan, despite a nominal
difference.To claim universalityfor "literature"is not to disputehis
analysisof "Literature"as a Westerncategory. I would onlyadd that
thislattercategoryis two stepsremovedfromthe universalone; toward
the end of his incisiveessay,Kernan himselfcommentson the interdependence between "fine" and "popular" literature.Recognitionof
thesetwo strandsmustqualifythe earliercharacterizationof Literature
as in adversaryrelationshipto society. Throughoutthe period there
has of course been a streamof novels,stories,and poems, considered
and consideringitselfas literature,that has supportedthe mainstream
of the cultureand implementeditsvalues. Kernan's concludingspeculation-also to be foundin manyof the otheressays-suggeststhatuniversal foundationshave importanceto the health of our own society.
To identifythe presentinternationalliterarycommunity,as Roberts
of Butler'spointabout instiproposes,can be seen as an implementation
tutionalization,with regard to a portionof our own society,and, if
pursued historically,of clarifyingthe social basis of the phenomenon
analyzed by Kernan. At the end Robertsenvisagesenlargementof the
community,but it is not clear that enlargementof the notion of
"Literature" is intended as well. For anthropologists,
and
folklorists,
here.
worth
there
a
related
as
is
such
task,
mentioning
linguists,
myself,
Having made much of the literatureof peoples of the world part of
our scholarlydomain, we must help to make it available to the larger
scholarlyand public worldconcernedwithliterature,and we musthelp
to make it available again to thecommunitiesfromwhichit came. The
firsttaskreceivesmoreattentionthanthesecond.
In this regard,I don't know if Seem is rightabout Proust,but his
appeal to a Dionysian principleseems of littleuse in understanding
literaturein most communitiesin the world,whereinsome satisfaction
in recurrenceis still possible. The cry seems a sign of the degree to
which apparentorderand rationalityhave been preemptedby bureaucratic structures,leading to an impulse to deny them altogether,to
etc.,withthe statusquo. He apcontinuity,
identifyorder,rationality,
to
to
do the workof the statusquo,
ask
would-be
revolutionaries
pears
which indeed wishesto be understoodas having a monopolyof rationality and order. Perhaps Seem's (and Foucault's) impulse is akin to
that of Adams (and Blake), or akin to that which motivatedSapir

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NEW LITERARY HISTORY

198

in his last years to a "psychiatric"view of culture,and a desire to


recastthe usual categoriesof grammarin termsof "living speech."15
If so, one doesn'tneed a freneticstyleto make the point,and one's task
is not endlesslyto exhibitdifference,
but to discoverpatternand regularityin speech from new vantage points, as a partial lever in the
ofsociety.
transformation

IV
For some,the argumentat the beginningof III amountsto flogging
a dead horse. Having flogged,I should admit that thereis fault on
the otherside as well. Many studentsof the literatureof minortraditions have themselvesperpetuateda dichotomy,calling theirsubject
by another name, such as "folklore"or verbal art. Some have even
maintained that their subject was of value because it did not show
features,such as personal creativityand aestheticshaping, that are
valued in literature.They were wrong. As indicated,such featuresare
present. But because theyhave not been much sought,our understanding of them is verylimited. I myselfhave been guiltyin this regard,
in that for some years I would refermaterialsto a purely collective
entity,a tribal name such as "Wasco" (or "Wishram"). Having discovered the factor of personal and situational shaping of narrative
performanceand consequenttextto be so important,I hope neverto
committhaterroragain.16
Let me admit furtherthatmuch of the materialavailable under the
folklore,and linguisticsis marredby a failure
auspicesof anthropology,
to take adequatelyinto account the second sense of evaluation. There
are of coursegood and bad performances,
strongand weak poems and
etc.
Those
who
such
material
do so in large part benarratives,
study
cause it is rewarding,just as studentsof fineEnglish literaturefindit
(we trust)rewarding.Characterizations,
expressivedetails,imaginative
worldsbecome part of our sense of the world. But it is clear thatsome
of the materialwe have does not representtrue performance,does not
have the qualities we value. Sometimesintimacyand motivationcan
be such thata field-worker
can be audience appropriateenoughto elicit
true performance,
but when thisis not the case, what is collectedis not
the literature,but a derivativeof it. (This is the sense in which Kel15 Cf. Hymes, "Linguistic Method of Ethnography," Method and Theory in
Linguistics,ed. P. L. Garvin (The Hague, 1970), p. 265.
16 Hence "Louis Simpson's 'The deserted boy,'" not "The Deserted Boy: A
WishramMyth," or the like, in n. 4.

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AN ETHNOGRAPHIC

PERSPECTIVE

199

the relevant
logg'snotionof an ideal normis universally
pertinent;
is notso muchcompleteness,
dimension
as fullnessof performance.)
We haveto realizehowmuchofwhatwe haveis an outline,an explanation,a resume,a sketchofhowa storygoes,but nota doingofthe
foritsquality.17
narrative
withthetakingoffullresponsibility
me
do
not
understand
as
Finally,please
arguingsimplythatthe
and ethnological
founusualstudyofLiterature
needsan ethnographic
alsoneedcontributions
dation.It does,butethnography
and ethnology
have in fact occurredindifromliterary
study. Such contributions
of
and
that
some
others,particularly
vidually(in my case,
through
much
theinfluence
ofKennethBurke); butthereis a generalrelation,
inneedofattention.
in thesensein
Much oftheworkofethnographers
is interpretation,
is discussed
withregardto literary
and otherworks
whichinterpretation
ofethnography
in ourownculturaltradition.The jointunderpinnings
havebeensporadically
notedin anthropology
and interpretation
(A. L.
Kroeber,forexample,remainedconsciousof Diltheyand Rickertin
ofhistory
and culture.);butin a contextin whichthe
hisconceptions
to be continuing
suchqueswas
assumed
ethnography,
typicalactivity
wereslighted.We are nowin a periodin which
tionsunderstandably
in ethnography
mustbe understood
muchofthematerialaccumulated
now irretrievably
or stagesof cultures,
as referring
to cultures,
gone.
If anthropology
abandonsthesematerials,in pursuitof perpetual
youth,it betraysits own hard-wonheritage.Other
ethnographic
ofsomeof
history,
maytakeup theinterpretation
especially
disciplines,
of thecommunities
fromwhichthey
and descendants
thesematerials,
comemaywishto repossess
them,but in bothrespectsanthropology
roleto play. Indeed,thisroleis beingtakenup by a
has a mediating
is becoming,
fairnumberofscholars,and partof anthropology
in the
the
sense
of
broad
term,philology.
old,
The anthropologist,
as ethnographer,
is an interpreter
of documents
are contemporary
and hisown. Fieldnotes,
evenwhenthedocuments
textsdo notspeakunivocally.18
andfilms,
photographs
in presenting
face
findings.What
questions
Anthropologists literary
factconvincing?
The impersonality
makesan accountofethnographic
ofincident?The rhetoric
ofstatistics
oftone? The selective
marshaling
how
much
of the
and tables? An acceptedterminology?
Again,
17 Cf. Hymes, "Breakthroughinto Performance,"Folklore: Communication and
Performance, ed. D. Ben Amos and K. Goldstein (The Hague, forthcomingin
1974).
18 On these issues, see CliffordGeertz, "Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture," The Interpretationof Cultures (New York, 1973), Ch. i.

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200

NEW LITERARY HISTORY

effective
sense anthropologists
have of the ethnographicworld is based
on personalanecdotes,narrativestransmitted
in conversation?
And what are we to make of the increasingly
frequentphenomenon
of ethnographers
publishingone book, to satisfytheirscientificobligation, and then a second book, to satisfythemselves,to tell what the
thefirstbook was reallylike?
experienceunderlying
What I wish to suggestis that in evaluating ethnographieswe are
influencedby considerationsthat influenceour interpretation
of works
of literature; that when ethnographicaccounts lack some of the
qualities to be found in novels, readers may miss them, and, even
more instructive,
the writersmay miss them. There is an inescapable
tensionin ethnographybetweenthe forms,the rhetoricaland literary
forms, considered necessary for presentation (and persuasion of
colleagues), and the narrativeformnatural to the experienceof the
work,and natural to the meaningfulreportof it in otherthan monographic contexts. I would even suggestthat the scientificstylesoften
imposed on ethnographicwritingmay produce, not objectivity,but
distortion.This is an old problem-I was told of a Berkeleyethnographerin the I930s who said, data in hand, "Now all I have to do is
to take the lifeout of it." It is a currentproblemtoo. A man writing
last yearwroteme thathe was beinginstructed
his doctoraldissertation
to omitall referenceto himself-"I am sure that yourreaderswant to
know about the people of X, not about you." He pointedout that his
own assessmentof the validityof his informationdepended crucially
on the circumstancesunder which it was obtained, including his
relationto those circumstances.By suppressinghis presence,he was
suppressingan opportunityfor anyone else to evaluate the validityof
his report. Moreover,therewere aspectsof the materialfromwhichhe
could hardlybe excised. When an electionwas held to send a representativesomewhere,the communityin which he workedelectedhim.
In sum, I am suggestingthat an ethnographicaccountis partlyto be
assessed in termsof attributesproperlyinvestigatedin literatureand
that a franklynarrativepresentation,
drawingupon literaryskills,is in
some cases the mostaccurate,or even the onlyway to conveyessential
qualitiesof communitiesand events. This is not to reduce ethnography
to literarycreation. The ethnographerhas othermeans available for
some purposes (statistics,questionnaires,etc.-though, now, novelists
are making use of any and all paraphernaliatoo) and is not freeto
inventincident,howeverapt it mightbe. But ethnographyand literaturedo have an inescapablecommonelement,such thatsome contributionsto literature(in termsoftheirinstitutional
audience) are valuable
to ethnographyin theiraccomplishment,and that some
contributions

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AN ETHNOGRAPHIC

201

PERSPECTIVE

ethnographiesare the worse for theirliteraryinadequacies, some the


fortheirliteraryskills.19
better,scientifically,
There is, then,a mutual contributionof literarystudyand ethnogand the production
raphyto each other,both as to the interpretation
of the kindsof workswith which each is principallyconcerned.

V
It should be clear that the point of view I have expressed,here as
elsewhere,is essentiallyin accord with Todorov's penetratinganalysis,
and proposal for a typologyof discourses. I have held to the term
literatureas a justificationforattentionand acceptance with regardto
Native Americanliteratureand the like, and because I anticipatethat
empirical and comparativestudieswill justifyit as designationfor a
major part, or set of dimensionsand features,of such a typology. I
thinkthat our presentcritical,dissolvingstage will lead eventuallyto a
stageofsynthesis.
UNIVERSITY

OF PENNSYLVANIA

19 Nothing of what I say here is new, except perhaps the effortto bring these
matters to focus in this way. I am deeply indebted to John Szwed for numerous
conversationsin this regard.

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