CYCLES OF VIOLENCE IN AFRICAN GEOLITICS: THE IMAGINED AND REAL

ROLE OF SOUTH AFRICA IN AFRICA FROM CASE ANALYSIS.

KHULEKANI SIBANDA
Research Department
Gaborone Institute of Professional Studies, Gaborone Campus, Botswana
Angelkaycee2000@gmail.com

Abstract
This study is based on a few cases and aims at trying to evaluate the foreign policy of South
Africa to try to find whether its behaviour on the foreign policy sphere is consistent with its
espoused and declared ideals at its independence. It puts to test South Africas capacity for
African and regional leadership on the political front. The cases used to arrive at tentative
conclusions are the Libyan crisis, the Ivory Coast Crisis, the Zimbabwe crises, the Central
African Republic crisis. Though there may be many other cases where South Africa is or was
involved in Africa these few were used just to open a small window through which the
foreign policy of South Africa might be viewed. The study concludes that South Africas
foreign policy in its current form does not assist civilians on the continent and it has
abdicated its protection based foreign policy legacy crafted and left by Nelson R. Mandela
the First South Africa President. Instead it props un undemocratic regimes on the continent.

1. Introduction
The coming of South African independence brought hope, trepidation and
uncertainty. There was hope because the South African problem especially
concerning the oppressive rule by the supremacist racist Afrikaner regime, which
had caused consternation throughout Africa and the world was finally over. There
was trepidation and uncertainty because the African countries which had supported
the liberation of South Africa did not know what to expect from the newly
independent Southern African economic behemoth with its vast resources. This was
more so because South Africa was considered way beyond its African peers in terms
of economic development and most did not know whether South Africa would
choose to play with the big brothers in the North or side with its African peers. South
Africa had already been playing a crucial economic role in Africa (before its
independence) especially as its economy employed Africans from virtually every
nation on the continent (Bond 2000; Alden and Le Pere 2010). Some definitely
looked forward to South Africa playing a key role in the African geo - political and
social landscape more like a big brother. However other African leaders may have
felt that South Africa would steal the limelight from them (as they saw themselves as
the fathers of African liberation). Indeed South Africa has been up to the task to an
extent as Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, a South African citizen has taken over from
Jean Ping as Head of the African Union (Fabricius 2014) and South Africa has
intervened in crises in several African nations with mixed results. This exploratory
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research tries to make a case analysis of South Africas successes and failures in its
quest to assert itself as the African leader to provoke further critical dialogue not only
on South Africas current role, but also its potential role. We can view the successes
and failures of the post apartheid South Africa from the lenses of several cases in
which she was involved in various ways. The cases are the DRC crisis, the Ivory
Coast crisis, the Libyan Crisis, the crisis in Central African Republic, the
Zimbabwean crisis and the creation and demolition of the SADC Tribunal.
1.2.

Background to the study

South Africa arguably the most developed country on the African continent with a
GDP of 12105.55 (. South Africa has access to the sea (on three sides) more than
any other African nation on mainland Africa, on the south, west and east. Most
landlocked nations of Southern Africa (Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi) have
historically depended on South Africa for routes to export their goods overseas.
Swaziland and Lesotho are almost wholly dependent on South Africa. South Africa is
endowed with rich terrestrial resources especially rich agricultural land, vast mineral
resources and great aquatic endowments. In terms of physical infrastructure South
Africa comes second to none in Africa. These factors emphasize South Africas
economic and hegemonic importance. With its independence in 1991 the
expectations from the new black government were more than before. However black
South Africans remain poor as in the apartheid era as whites still control land and
other key economic resources in South Africa. Nelson Mandela the South African
leader of the ANC who had been imprisoned 27 years on Robben Island became the
first president. Mandelas view was that South Africas foreign policy should be
based on ideals of human rights or ubuntu for the African continent (Dudley 2013).
Mandelas humanistic policy of reconciliation was seen as a great example in terms
of leadership and punctuated the great expectations of the African nations from this
iconic example of humanity. Though Robert Mugabe was the first one to come up
with the reconciliation model in 1980, the neophyte, Mandelas made him look like a
baby regarding that concept. However Mandela resigned leaving the country under
the new helmsman, Thabo Mbeki, the son of Govan Mbeki, a former friend of Nelson
Mandela in the struggle for the independence of South Africa. Thabo Mbeki himself
was a liberation war leader within the ANC party. The ANC had close ties with other
liberation movements such as Chama Chamapinduzi in Tanzania, FRELIMO in
Mozambique, ZANU PF and ZAPU in Zimbabwe, UNIP in Zambia and other African
states which supported ANC war efforts against the supremacist apartheid regime of
the Afrikaners. Long after independence South Africa still puts those relationships
first before ubuntu or human rights. This has seen South Africa propping
undemocratic regimes in Africa in the name of Pan-Africanism. As a result when they
came in from the cold they already had solid ties with most nations in Africa.
Countries such as Libya, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Tanzania, among others
supported ANC with war materiel, personnel training and putting pressure on the
United Nations to impose sanctions on South Africa during their anti-apartheid
struggle. This assistance increased the expectation Frontline States had on South
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Africa. Hence most countries watched expectantly to see the direction South Africa
would take. Since Mandela did not stay in the seat of power for long the clear
examples of issues with South African foreign policy start with Thabo Mbeki and on
to Jacob Zuma, the current president of South Africa. South Africa has been on the
forefront demanding the inclusion of the BRICS nations in the security council
(obviously on the basis of its own interests).
1.3.

Statement of the problem

The problem is that there are so many problems on the African continent and South
Africa has been expected to play a leadership role in their resolution. This is mainly
because of the hype with which South Africa came into world politics. The South
African foreign policy has been criticized for having caused problems or failed to
approach problems realistically on the continent. The question is Is South Africa
living up to the continents expectations of a big brother?
1.4.

Research objective

The objective this research is to find and analyse cases where South Africa got
involved on the African continent and whether it has been successful in its quest to
establish its position as a continental player and to deduce how far it has managed
to resolve problems in Africa. The other objective is to find why South Africa is
succeeding or failing in its African foreign policy.
2. Research methodology
The case study method was adopted to arrive at conclusions. Secondary data
including articles, Journals and newspaper article were used deduce findings. This
was a qualitative research and the researchers opinions and views influenced the
conclusions. Therefore other researchers who do not agree with the conclusions are
challenged to present alternative views. Six cases which are analysed for outcomes
(in which the South African government was involved) are Zimbabwe, Libya, Ivory
Coast, Central African Republic, and the SADC region (the case of the removal of
the SADC Tribunal)
Literature Review
The point of South Africas perceived position is emphasized by one of Mbekis
espoused goals for the South African government concerning Africa. According to
Bond (2000) Mbeki saw South Africa having to play the role of lending South African
prestige and concrete assistance to alleviating the plight of the African continent
(Bond 2000). This statement from Mbeki shows how South Africa perceived its
position and subsequent role on the African continent. This is especially seen in the
use of the phrase south African prestige. It shows that South Africa considers itself
superior than its peers on the continent. The good news in the agenda is the pledge
to offer concrete assistance to alleviating the plight of the African continent. This
purported largesse obviously satisfied those hoping that South Africa would come in
as Africas very own messiah especially the poor and downtrodden. Further the
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statement goes on to refer to offering assistance. This completes the big brother
picture alluded to above. The fact that South Africa also aspired to get a permanent
seat at the United Nations General Assembly also attests to her insatiable ambitions
over-spilling from the African shield. Pursuant to these goals South Africa was
involved in Libya (Rupiya, AFSAAP Conference 2011, Mabera and Dunne 2013;
Ebrahim 2011; BuaNews-Xinhua 2011; Mlevu 2013; Adams 2013; de Kok and
Snyman), Ivory Coast (Cooke 2010; Mabera and Dunne 2013; Dadson 2008;
Rupiya; Lynch 2011; Mlevu 2013), Central African Republic (Oliver 2013; Lustig
2013; Allison 2014; Dudley 2013; Vircoulon 2013; Arief 2014; Mabera and Dunne
2013; Plogreen and Sayare 2013) and Zimbabwe (Rupiya; Mabera and Dunne 2013;
Moyo 2002; Bell 2013; Bell 2014; Wild 2013; Matendere 2013;Hanso 2008; Kings
2002; Lee 2013; Scholtz and Ferreira 2011 )
3. Results
A search of the literature yielded the following information in areas where South
Africa was involved;
4.1. Zimbabwe
South Africas has played a key role in Zimbabwes political affairs but has failed to
provide a permanent solution to its northern neighbours perennial problems since
2002. SA has assumed the leadership role in SADC. It has been on the vanguard of
election monitoring in Zimbabwe. The opposition in Zimbabwe accepted SAs
mediation role as they saw it as neutral and looking at Mandelas policy of ubuntu
which Mbeki (and Zuma after him) professed to follow. In 2002 Mbeki sent two High
court judges Dikgang Moseneke and Sisi Kampepe to monitor an election in
Zimbabwe. Though the judges did what they were tasked to do the Mbeki
government refused to make the contents of the report public because it was not in
the public interest. Meanwhile the 2002 Zimbabwean election was marred by
violence and their fairness was disputed, but Mbeki went on to declare them free and
fair. However the Mail & Guardian, a South African newspaper in 2008 challenged
the SA govt to make public the Zimbabwe election report as it was a democratic right
of both Zimbabweans and the SADC region that the reports contents be known
(Mail& Guardian 2008). The SA governments of Both Mbeki and Zuma fought
spirited battles, both in court and in the diplomatic front for the contents of the report
to be kept secret by making successive appeals up to the SA Court of Appeal which
finally awarded the Mail and Guardian the right to access the report in February 2013
(Lee 2013). The contents of the report showed that the Zimbabwean 2002 election
was fundamentally flawed and thus could not be deemed free and fair but too late.
In 2008 after ZANU PF lost the election to the MDC there was a run-off with SA
involved in the monitoring of the run-off. There was widespread violence allegedly
perpetrated by ZANU PF and hundreds were murdered while many were tortured
and seriously maimed. While Botswana, the head of the observer mission declared
the run-off flawed due to violence, the South African government declared the result
free and fair. This was despite the fact that some members of the SA monitoring
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Mission had registered displeasure with the way the elections were handled. Mbeki
then forced a unity government to be formed between the losing ZANU PF and the
cowered MDC. The government failed to work and only produced mediocre results
due to policy inconsistencies between the two parties in government. Before 2008 a
cholera epidemic broke out in Zimbabwe and more than 4000 people died and yet
Mbeki and his SA representative to the United Nations Dumisani Khumalo assured
the UN that all was well in Zimbabwe when so many people were decimated by a
preventable disease. During the time Mbeki infamously said there is no crisis in
Zimbabwe. During this time many people fled to SA, Mbekis own country, but he
still insisted that there was no crisis in Zimbabwe.
The final nail on human rights coffin for the region was hammered home when the
SADC Tribunal which was dismantled at Harares behest. The SADC Tribunal was a
regional and international court created by SADC member states to settle any
disputes among member states and protect civilians rights in the region. When Ian
Campbell, a white farmer who was the target of farm expropriation won a case in
2007, the Zimbabwean government was incensed. Later on in 2008, a further 77
white farmers were granted leave by the Tribunal to intervene on the farm issue.
and demanded that the court be dismantled and the SADC regional leaders agreed
with this view. The beacon which had been created for the SADC region was
extinguished with one blow. Instead of invoking her right to protect mandate South
Africa did not lift a finger, but from their silence they may rightly be seen as complicit.
ANC self-interest could be seen in the whole scheme of things especially after
Thabos thesis on negating the Chiluba factor (Eddie cross 2009) whereby he
sought to protect ANC from a fate similar to one suffered by Kenneth Kaunda when
Frederick Chilubas Movement for Multi- Party Democracy took over from a liberation
movement (United National Independence Party, [UNIP]) in Zambia. So from this
scenario it seems it became Mbeki and ANC goal number one to protect ANC
continued hegemony in South Africa by adopting a foreign policy whose aims were
purporting to protect all the liberation movements in SADC especially Chama Chama
Pinduzi in Tanzania, SWAPO in Namibia, FRELIMO in Mozambique and ZANU PF
of Zimbabwe. Naturally in its new form the South African governments hands are
tied in as far as protecting civilians is concerned. Rather they stand to support the
oppressor because of one common interest survival in the political arena.
Therefore it appears that South Africa (especially the ANC government) is
encouraging more trouble for the region and beyond.
3.2.

Central African republic

South Africa intervened in the Central African Republic in 2012. The aims of the
intervention have been given but they were conflicting and confusing, leaving the
real motives to speculation something which has done irreparable damage to the
credibility of South Africas foreign policy in Africa. Zuma is said to have claimed that
SA intervened in CAR to fulfil bi-lateral agreements (not through African Union
structures) made with the then president, Mr Bozize circa 2007. According to Dudley
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(2013) the agreement was that SA would provide institutional capacity building to
train the CAR security forces to counter the invasion of Bangui by the Seleka rebels,
fighting against the government of Bozize. The explanation given by Maite Nkoana
Mashabane, the South African Minister for foreign affairs and international
cooperation was that SA had intervened in Bangui to safeguard democracy and
respect for human rights. Was this in line with ubuntu?
This confusion in explaining the rationale behind SA foreign policy dented the
credibility of the South African government at home and abroad. According to Dudley
some sectors in Africa suspected that the SA army had been deployed to Bangui to
defend commercial interests of certain high ranking officials in the South African
Government. Some analysts thought that South Africa did this as part of its big
brother strategy to forestall or prevent Frances hegemony in francophone Africa
(Arieff 2014, Dudley 2013). Some analysts point to SAs attempt to extend her
influence in francophone Africa vis-a vis Frances obvious interests in the region.
Arieff alludes to SAs intention to counter the presence of French forces in Bangui
leading to the French who manned the airport denying SA troops access to the
airport except for humanitarian reasons. Compared to South African troops, Frances
600 strong troops had a clear mandate to protect the airport and to safeguard
French citizens in CAR. There were speculations that SA was protecting its mining
interests in CAR. Others say SAs main aim was to whisk Bozize out of danger, just
like they tried to do in Libya and Ivory Coast (with no success). They consistently
want to save incumbent dictators. SAs institutional capacity building, which Dudley
(2013), refers to as top down shows a serious departure from Mandelas declared
foreign policy flagship protection of human rights in Africa. The point, however, is
that SA sided with Bozize (Vircoulon 2013) when every other nation in the region had
given up on the dictator who was flaunting an agreement with the Seleka rebels.
Other nations were present in CAR but chose not to take sides after weighing issues
surrounding the conflict. The fact that although Sudanese, Ugandan, French and
Chadian troops were also present SA failed to communicate with these nations so
that there could be a coordinated response to the crisis in Bangui, choosing to take a
very dangerous path of taking sides. This is explained by the fact that despite
claiming that SA would act in conjunction with AU and UN Zuma send SA troops
without AU go-ahead.
However all did not end well with the deployment as the 5000 strong Seleka rebels
advancing on Bangui killed 13 South African paratroopers and wounded 27 others,
of the 200 paratroopers deployed by South Africa to Bangui. This incident caused
people in South Africa and elsewhere to question the interests of the South African
Government in CAR. This caused a tail between the legs retreat of SA forces from
Bangui. This scenario led to the world, especially Africa questioning the credibili ty of
SA to solve Africas diplomatic and military issues. The SA troops mandate was
confusing as they were not in any position to resist the advancing Seleka rebels
sweeping towards Bangui. Dudley (2013) points out that if SA was concerned about
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defeating the Seleka rebels they should have deployed more troops and more
materiel to that effect. If they did not want that they should have withdrawn their
troops when it was evident all was lost, at least to save the lives of their paratroopers
and avoid having to answer questions from bereaved families of deceased soldiers.
This puts a serious question mark on SAs tactical capacity and responsiveness
capability in the face of a crisis pointing to serious ineptitude o the part of the
administration in Pretoria.
3.3.

Ivory Coast

South Africa also got involved in the Ivory Coast crisis pitting the incumbent
president Laurent Gbagbo and the opposition leader Allessane Ouattarra. Long
waited elections which had been continuously postponed by the incumbent Gbagbo
were finally held and Gbagbo who lost the election refused to give way, sparking a
crisis in which troops loyal to Outtarra stood their ground in another section of Abijan,
the capital city. The facts were that the international community led by the United
Nations, which had monitored the election was convinced Ouatarra had won clearly
and could not tolerate Gbagbos brinkmanship. A standoff ensued and France
increased its troops in Ivory Coast supporting Ouattara. ECOWAS led by Nigeria,
supported the position of the international community led by the USA and the EU.
Jean Ping the erstwhile chair of the AU supported Outtara as winner. Surprisingly,
again, in this case South Africa supported Gbagbo despite his unpopularity with the
international community and AU and his obvious recalcitrance. SA send its frigate
the Drakensberg to Ivorian territorial waters baffling Nigeria, the regional super
power and complicating things for the international community as it tried to
unscramble the crisis. Lynch (2011) argues that the action by SA (show of force) was
taken with no consultations with the regional body ECOWAS and was read as an
attempt to interfere and thwart ECOWASs popular move to remove Gbagbo seen
overwhelmingly as the culprit by ECOWAS. Lynch (2011) also pointed out that it
seemed SA was competing for influence with Nigeria (in Nigerias turf) especially
because of SAs ambitions for a permanent seat at the UN Security Council.
Mbeki and Zuma suggested a power sharing agreement like the fiasco Mbeki had
negotiated in Zimbabwe, but Outtarra, the international community and ECOWAS did
not see the Zimbabwean model as a solution here (Lynch 2011). As a result the
efforts by Mbeki were rejected (Cooke 2010, Lynch 2011). The problem was that
Mbeki had already squandered his credibility when SA, his country, had already
made questionable partisan manoeuvres. However this action by SA complicated
matters by encouraging Gbagbos unreasonable stubbornness thus making it harder
for the international community to persuade Gbagbo to leave the seat of power
peacefully. As a result of SAs actions Gbagbo was greatly encouraged to resist
handing over power to Alassanne Outtara.
3.4.

Libya

South Africas foreign policy in Libya was somewhat ambivalent and it exposed
serious weaknesses in the Foreign policy of South Africa. When the United Nations
Security council passed resolution 1973 authorizing the enforcement of a no-fly zone
in Libya by NATO, backed by United States logistical support South Africa went
against the usual African Union tendency to support dictators in Africa at all costs by
supporting resolution 1973. The ambivalence of South African foreign policy is
shown on how it later tried to retract its support for resolution 1973 by insisting that
the resolution was being abused to campaign for the ouster the dictator Colonel
Muammar al Gaddafi. South Africa was not supporting the National Transitional
Council and appeared to hope that Gaddafi would come to his senses and try to
reason to retain power. South Africa took too long to read the signs that Gaddafi wad
no longer a factor in Libyan politics. However the South African position was
overtaken by events as the West African powerhouse, Nigeria and about 17 other
nations announced their recognition of the National Transitional Council and removal
of any support for Gaddafi. SA was preoccupied with issues of territorial integrity
and propping up Gaddafi a policy to appease Gaddafi at the expense of the Libyan
peoples right to protection against the violence unleashed on the people by Gaddafi
loyalists As in Zimbabwe South Africa showed no concern for civilians. It acted
without concern for the right to protect as purported in Nelson Mandelas vision for
the South African foreign policy, South Africa was left with an egg in the face as a
result of its foreign policy debacle in Libya.
4. Implications of South African foreign policy
The four cases shown above provide a framework through which an analysis of the
weaknesses of South Africas foreign policy can be done. The first problem is South
Africas abject and consistent disregard for the sanctity of human life and of human
rights. Thousands of lives were lost as Gbagbo fought Outarra in Abidjan while
South Africas support made Gbagbo more recalcitrant. The whole thing was a mess
and most critics see SA in the milieu, probably as a catalyst fomenting trouble in the
Ivory Coast.
South Africa proved to have a tendency of protecting dictators on the continent at the
expense of civilians. As a result South Africa does not seem to follow Mandelas
foreign policy legacy of the right to protect but has consistently supported the
violations of civil rights with the attendant violence and loss of life as happened in
Libya, Zimbabwe, Ivory Coast and Central African Republic. South African watched
and declared that there was no crisis in Zimbabwe during Mbekis time when
thousands of civilians were being terrorised and hundreds were killed, maimed and
tortured by the unrepentant Zimbabwean government. The Zimbabwe issue clearly
shows the ANC governments duplicity and lack of credibility especially when
thousands of people died of cholera due to the governments lack of provision of
basic services. Further in Zimbabwe South Africa did not lift a finger as white farmers
were violently evicted from their farms with many losing their lives in the process.
The spirited legal battle the ANC government fought to protect the contents of the
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Kampempe report shows betrayal and untrustworthiness of the SA government and

a tendency to condone violence by the mighty. Tendencies of the South African
government to prop up violence were also shown in the South African ANC
governments support of renditions against Zimbabwean citizens who were
subsequently murdered by security agents in Zimbabwe. The ANC governments
support for Zimbabwes call for the SADC tribunal to be dismantled clearly
demonstrates that South Africa does not intend to use its power as a continental
powerhouse to protect civilians on the continent but wants to be popular with the
tyrants at the expense of Mandelas legacy of the right to protect. The case of Libya
and Ivory coast also reinforce the SA governments lack of appreciation of the violent
tendencies by certain governments in Africa.
In Zimbabwe South Africa is well known for its failure to safeguard free and fair
elections (just as in the Ivory Coast). In 2008 the violence in the run-off after ZANU
PF lost the elections proved the impotence of South Africa to show its fairness and
leadership as many people were murdered and the ballots were commandeered by
unknown known people only to reappear under unclear circumstances. South Africa
as the SADC leader endorsed the one man election after the MDC (opposition party)
boycotted the elections after the violence became too much.

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