The Georgian - South Ossetian Conflict

1 Methodological Considerations and Formulation of the Problem

This thesis is the story of the so-called Georgian - South Ossetian ethnonationalist conflict. In this thesis I will cast some theoretical light on the
conflict, trying to reach an understanding of the specific features, roots and
processes of the conflict. By the experienced conflict I will try to demystify
and decipher the so commonly used an accepted notion of ethnic conflict.
Among journalists but also some academics, the most conventional
explanations for the ethnic conflicts that arose in Eastern Europe after the
collapse of the communist regimes are the ones that can be called the "pot-lidtheories" or the "refrigerator-theories" (Sampson 1992, p.395, Brown 1993,
p.5-6 and Suny 1993, p.3). The communist regimes, especially the Soviet
Union, are said to have repressed national and ethnic sentiments and
differences and frozen down national identity. The ethnic/national differences,
grievances and/or conflicts that existed were repressed, and have now reemerged, hence the metaphor of the pot-lid that has been lifted.
These explanations generally see communism as a parenthesis, something that
has interrupted a natural historical course. In this light ethnic conflict is seen
as something almost natural, logically diverted by differences and as
something which was frozen down by communist repression. Now that
communism, and with that repression, have ended and the lid removed, nature
can evolve as it should, and the eternal historical hatred will be expressed
freely.
In this explanation lies two main assumptions. One is that ethnic conflict is
more or less natural, that when you have different ethnic groups in one setting
conflict is inevitable. Hence that heterogeneous areas are unnatural. The
multi-national states, such as Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, are in this
light seen as artificial constructions. The homogeneous nation-state is
generally seen as the natural state - as things should be. Hence the titles of
numerous articles and books on the Balkans or the Caucasus using the words
ethnic powderkeg, mosaic, or puzzle. The other assumption is that the
communist regimes of Eastern Europe and especially the Soviet Union did not
tolerate expression of national or ethnic identity and hence suppressed it and
instead tried to create an artificial Homo Sovieticus. In this view the recent
conflicts are seen as a reaction to this artificial situation. The nations and the
ethnic groups are now moving towards the natural situation of one state - one
nation.
1.1 The Problems of the Thesis

The overarching aim of the thesis will be to demystify and decipher the notion
of ethnic conflict. Understanding specific features and processes of ethnic
conflicts. The thesis will however be two-stringed in the way that it will
consist of a theoretical and empirical understanding of ethnic conflict. The
emphasis will be put on an understanding of the experienced Georgian - South
Ossetian conflict. The theoretical part should thus be seen as developing
concepts in order to shed some theoretical light on the experienced ethnic
conflict. In the urge to understand the phenomenon of nationalism and ethnic
conflict in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union as such I thus put
strong emphasis on an understanding of the actual experienced conflict and
this in its Soviet context.
The aim of this report is exactly to question the above mentioned conventional
explanations for the rise of ethnic conflict in Eastern Europe and the former
Soviet Union, using the experienced example of the Georgian - South
Ossetian conflict. To try to question the inevitability of ethnic conflict and to
show that national and ethnic identities are constructions in themselves. That
nations and ethnic groups do not, with Benedict Anderson's words, loom out
of an immemorial past. That we are dealing with a socio-political and cultural
phenomenon rather than a nature given. And in fact that we are dealing with a
phenomenon that is multidimensional and only be can fully grasped if
analysed contextually. In this respect I will try to show that the policies of the
Soviet Union played an active part in the developing of national and ethnic
identities and furthermore elaborated a system, which was inherently
conflictual in respect to these identities. That in fact one even might say that
the Soviet political system nursed and cultivated ethnic/national differences
and inherent conflictual structures and identities rather than putting a lid on
them or freezing them down.
Furthermore it has been shown that wars defined as ethnic conflicts on an
avarage have a significant longer duration than other types of war; that they
are more vicious of nature and uncontrollable, and that more frequently than
other forms of conflict, ethnic conflicts do not end by negotiated solutions but
by outright military victory by either side (King 1997, p.13 and Scherrer 1997,
p.42). The common explanations for this intractability and protracted nature of
ethnic conflict are often ascribed to the uncontrollable irrational behaviour
motivated by deeply rooted ancient hatreds and incompatible deeply felt
values and identities of the belligerents in ethnic conflict (King 1997, p.13 and
52). An explanation not only found in journalistic writings but also in
arguments by the so-called international community for not intervening in
these kind of conflicts (Snyder 1993, p.79 and King 1997, p.26).
I shall look for alternative explanations to the nature of ethnic conflict.
Looking specifically on the structure of conflict or armed conflict/warfare to
be more precise; determining structural factors that can help explain the

protracted nature and intractability of ethnic conflict in another light than the
above mentioned explanations.
Summing up this thesis will be about the Georgian - South Ossetian conflict.
A conflict with the label of an ethno-nationalist conflict. Determining what it
is that makes this conflict an ethno-nationalist conflict. Looking specifically
on theories of nationalism and ethnicity, the dynamics of armed ethnic intrastate conflict and on the specific roots and processes in the Georgian - South
Ossetian conflict. But let us turn to some methodological considerations
where I also will argue for the choice of theories and empirical material.
1.2 Methodological Considerations
The first theoretical part of this thesis, nationalism and ethnicity, is more an
attempt to give an overview and an interpretation of the theoretical approaches
to the phenomenon of nationalism and ethnicity, rather than lining up a couple
of different theories and use them on the experienced conflict. In doing so I
am aware of the fact that I may reduce the complexity of the different theories
and thus a previous knowledge on the subject of nationalism may be required.
At the same time it should be mentioned that my purpose is not to give an
exhaustive typology or genealogy of the theories of ethnicity and nationalism
but rather to show that nationalism is a contested and heterogeneous
phenomenon. Though extensive enough to serve the purpose of this thesis, not
to say that nationalism is really... but to show that nationalism can have
several meanings, depending on space and time and is changeable depending
on context and purpose. Therefore the purpose of this chapter should be seen
as that of elaborating an applicable theoretical framework for the analysis.
The second theoretical part of the thesis, the dynamics of armed ethnic intrastate conflicts, is an attempt to theorise on the more structural and inherent
components of conflict as a counterweight to the more socio-political and
cultural explanations of ethnic conflict, which should be given by the first
theoretical part. To try and grasp the basic nature and extract the
particularities of this kind of conflicts, but also to compare it to other forms of
intra-state conflicts in order to demystify and decipher the notion of ethnic
conflict.
The empirical part also consists of two parts. The first part will deal with the
actual experienced ethnic conflict, the so-called Georgian - South Ossetian
conflict. Here I will line up the actual course of events based on interviews,
first hand experience and written material. This will in effect be an attempt
expose and describe the circumstances in which this conflict evolved, but also
at the same time to line up the different perceptions on behalf of the involved
parties.

The second part will so to speak focus a level back and up, looking on the
Soviet setting in which you also will have to analyse the conflict. As written
above one of my hypotheses is that the Soviet Union by its intended policies
played an active role in the developing of national and ethnic identities and
furthermore elaborated a system, which was inherently conflictual in respect
to these identities. In this chapter I will thus look on both Marxist-Leninist
theory on the nationalities question and the principle of national selfdetermination on the one hand, and the actual way the system functioned in
practice on the other hand. In this putting more emphasis on how the system
was implemented on the ground rather than putting emphasis on the
theoretical aspects and historical developments in these discussions. This of
course with an emphasis on the experienced conflict. Hence the part on
Marxist-Leninist theory will be least studied, the principle of national selfdetermination more and the actual implementation and functioning most.
As mentioned above this thesis is a linking of theory on nationalism and
conflict dynamics to the specific experienced conflict. Linking theory and
empirical material is however not just something you do without further
methodological considerations. Without entering the apparently never-ending
discussion within social sciences on the relation between theory and empirical
material I will still try to argue for my chosen method.
The theoretical parts will first of all be a rewriting or reconstruction of the
theories to a form that makes these applicable as steering-tools in the analysis
of the empirical material. The aim of the project is not to confirm the
existence of nationalism or its prominent role in the conflict, but to use
theories on nationalism and internal conflict to shed some theoretical light on
the conflict and to determine what role ethnicity and nationalism play in this
conflict.
It is not a verification or falsification, of the theories I will make, which would
be methodological inappropriate as you would, so to speak, operate within the
realm of the theories themselves, and as the saying goes in Danish som man
rber i skoven fr man svar. But still it is to use the theories (or the rewritten
theories) to shed an explaining and interpreting light on the conflict. In other
words to use the theories to decipher the notion of ethnic conflict and in this
way extract from the theories some analytical tools to be used in analysis of
the phenomena and the case. But on the other hand also to look for the
possibility of the empirical material to provide background for possible
critique of the theoretical apparatus.
The theoretical part on nationalism and ethnicity consists of an overview of
the landscape of theories of nationalism, were I will try to reach my
understanding of nationalism. Of course it has been impossible for me to get
acquainted with all contributions to the theoretical debate on nationalism over

the years. The chosen theorists represent what others and I call, the modern
classics, and these theories are building on previous contributions and cover
the vast part of the theoretical space. It should however, also be mentioned
that I draw on additional theoretical material where I find it necessary.
Although most of these theoreticians deal with the subject in order to seek and
understand the historical roots of nationalism, they also describe the nature of
nationalism and its conflictual aspects, which is the main focus of this project,
and thus what I will focus on.
The first theoretical part is mainly based on more general theories of
nationalism, namely Benedict Anderson "Imagined Communities", Eric J.
Hobsbawm Nations and Nationalism Since 1780, Anthony D. Smith
"National Identity", Ernest Gellner "Nations and Nationalism", and last but
not least Paul R. Brass Ethnicity and Nationalism from 1991, who more
specifically deals with ethnicity.
I have made use of the chosen theories because they say something about
nationalism and ethnicity. But one could easily ask the question, why use
theories about nationalism and ethnicity to shed light on an ethnic conflict,
why not use theories on class struggle, modernisation, state theory, theories on
international politics etc.?
On the one hand the point is exactly to look at ethnic conflict as a specific
theoretical problem. One can choose to look at ethnic conflict or ethnic
politics as just another form of politics where other theoretical approaches can
be used to explain the phenomenon. But one can also choose, as I do, to look
at ethnic conflict, or ethnic mobilisation, as a special form of politics, where
exactly the culture, or more specifically ethnicity, functions as the mobilising
basis. Then it is interesting to use theories on ethnicity and nationalism as
something different from other more general theories of social sciences, which
probably can explain a deal, but not the processes and dynamics in the
conflicts, which are specific because they are articulated in ethnic terms. Here
it is not a question of taking the arguments of the participants in ethnic
conflicts for granted, but to accept that it leads to specific conflict patterns,
which theories dealing exactly with nationalism can shed light on.
On the other hand I should also state that one of the aims of this thesis, as
mentioned initially, is to demystify and decipher the notion of ethnic conflict.
Therefore I have chosen to use theories of nationalism and ethnicity to so to
speak play their ballgame in order to see what this framework offers. I exactly
want to study the specifities of ethno-national conflict, demystifying and
deciphering the ethno-national elements, and therefor I have to study ethnicity
and nationalism.

At the same time I have felt the necessity of drawing on another theoretical
approach. Besides making use of theories of nationalism I have decided to use
theoretical work on what you could call the dynamics and nature of armed
ethnic intra-state conflicts. This I have chosen to do not from the start but as I
went deeper into the jungle of this study. This need appeared because of the
fact that several questions surfaced as I went along. The question of what
makes an ethnic conflict different from other internal conflicts and the
questions of the possible presence of inherent structural factors in intra-state
conflict situations that makes ethnic conflicts more protracted and severe.
Hence looking at other explanations than culture and identity which is offered
by the theories of nationalism. Trying to find something rational or logical
in a seemingly or at least depicted irrational phenomenon.
The fact that there does not, to my knowledge, exist comprehensive
theoretical works on this[1] have made this chapter a bit of a puzzle, taking
bits and parts mainly from working papers, articles and journalistic writings.
Comprehensive literature retrieval has made this chapter possible and
hopefully not puzzle-like to read.
The main sources of this part is based on Charles King Ending Civil Wars,
Michael Ignatieff Blood and Belonging, several working papers from the
Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI), and literature from
international relations theory and peace research theory that in a more indirect
manner deals with intra-state/ethnic conflicts.
1.3 Method of Gathering Empirical Material
The second empirical part of this thesis - the Soviet Setting - is mainly written
on a documentary style of method. Gathering information on the Soviet
setting from books and articles written by scholars focused on the Soviet
Union and its policies on the national question and not least area specialists of
the region. Furthermore I have made use of Soviet and Georgian/South
Ossetian empirical data on population figures and ethnic compositions in
different arenas. This of course raises certain questions as to the validity of
such empirical data, since some of it can be interpreted as biased.
First of all most, if not all, scholars dealing with the nationality question of the
former Soviet Union agrees to the fact that the Soviet Union had fairly reliable
census data at least when it comes to the recognised nationalities as the ones I
am dealing with (see for example Gurr 1993, p.12-13). Secondly this data I
shared and discussed with the parties and others on location, and found no
mayor discrepancies or objections.
This part of the thesis has on my part been carefully written, knowing that
ethnic composition figures often are at the hart of the matter in ethnic conflict.

Comparing and double-checking all statistical data where possible. Where this
has not been possible or there has been a high danger of apparent biased data I
have used it as an indication rather than as fixed and precise figures. However,
I should also state that as I had most of the empirical data gathered when I was
in the area I confronted the different parties with the data and found no mayor
objections. At the same time I should also mention that incorrect' statistical
material is also of relevance since ethnic conflict is not necessarily about facts
but more important about perceived facts.
As for the first part of the empirical material, the actual conflict, it is first of
all important to state that I was in Georgia to fulfil a certain job position not to
do research on Georgia and the specific Georgian - South Ossetian conflict.
This in itself laid down some restrictions on my other role as a student of
ethnic conflict. However I came to Georgia as well with the agenda to study
ethnic conflict and my job created certain opportunities to study this conflict
not as an observer but rather as a participant, as you must include international
organisations and NGOs on this side[2].
However in late 1995 I was asked by my organisation to write a small paper
on the history and course of conflict (which is also the basis of these two
sections in this thesis), to be published as background material for the
international community (international organisations and embassies). This
gave me a change to study the conflict a bit closer and to learn how sensitive it
is put such events and perceptions of history down on paper. I made an effort
not to present this as the objective truth, as this of cause is impossible, but as
the perceptions of both the Georgian and South Ossetian side. This was one of
the first times, if not the first, that the South Ossetians had their perspective on
the history of the conflict presented on paper in English. This I state to
emphasise that this, regardless of its obvious small scope, was a kind of
pioneer work. Not only did I get the label of professor of history I also
experienced how history change according to present circumstances as I on
several occasions was asked to change certain previously stated facts.
The restrictions and dangers of the position of an employee of a foreign NGO
were that the conflicting parties of course could become more cautious as to
how close they would let me in into their worlds so to speak, as I through this
position became a small part of the overall political game. However, at the
same time this got me into a position where I could operate with more
authority and generally they were very forthcoming. This has also something
to do with the fact that very little international attention was directed towards
the South Ossetian issue. In this way I had weekly meetings with senior
officials and other administrative personnel through my job position.
Arranging practical things like setting up meetings and conferences with
South Ossetian participation, which of course led to more opportunities of
informal talks on the overall issue of the Georgian - South Ossetian conflict.

I am making a clear distinction between my contact with the Georgians and

South Ossetians because there was a clear difference in the way of having
contact with them. First of all I lived in Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia, not in
Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia. They all saw me as an outsider, a
stranger, but at the same time the South Ossetians were conscious about the
fact that I lived on the other side. The South Ossetian authorities would at
first not let me stay for a period of time in South Ossetia as I requested. But as
they got used to my organisation intentions and me they asked me to stay for a
longer period of time, but unfortunately then I had run out of time to do so.
Hence my freedom of movement was restricted in South Ossetia, it was
simply not save to move around on your own without local escort and the
authorities preferred to control the situation. Therefore my contact was limited
to official and semi-official persons, but on the other hand my work with
youth organisations and journalists gave me a broader insight as well as the
writing of the small paper.
In Georgia proper I had no such restrictions, I lived there, and made contact
with all sorts of people, I felt the atmosphere of the place in a different way.
Having said this it is important to note that I made good contacts and
friendships on both sides. And in a way I got intimate in another way with the
South Ossetians because of their isolated position, especially as I at a couple
of occasions functioned as an international escort to Georgia proper at
meetings and conferences arranged by my organisation.
Writing this I have to say something about the way of getting close to the
people of the Caucasus, Georgian or South Ossetian. I had plenty of official
meetings and formal interview situations, but in Caucasus this is not the way
of getting close to the heart of the matter. To get to the heart of the matter
requires intimacy and in the Caucasus intimacy is inseparably connected to
food and drinking.
You can read methodological books about how to do an interview or how to
observe but in the Caucasus you must drink and eat your way to the core of
the matter. If you dont like Caucasian food or the smell and taste of Georgian
wine, South Ossetian beer or vodka and its local variants then dont bother
doing research in the Caucasus. It can sound very unscientific on paper but I
would not have been honest to my method and the truth if I had not written
this. On the other hand one could also see this as part of an anthropological
method where it precisely is about being in the centre and not on the side line.
Observing but also participating and thereby acquire the experience necessary
to reflect and understand.
Of course I got a lot of information and empirical material from written
sources from both sides and formal interviews, not to mention material written
by other scholars. The point is however that I had been no where if I had not

been there in the Caucasus, smelling the fresh air from the Caucasian
Mountain Range, the gasoline in the streets of Tbilisi, listening to the personal
stories told around the Caucasian Table after having been forced to eat a
lot of food and drink a lot of alcohol. These were the situations were I began
to see and understand the situation, this was the intimacy required, on the
behalf of the involved parties, if they were to let me into their understanding,
perceptions and views on the situation. This is part of my method, or maybe
should I say their required condition for doing research in the region.

[1] Christian P. Scherrer states in a working paper from COPRI that

this field is far from as advanced as for instance inter-state conflicts and
this especially concerning ethnic intra-state conflicts (Scherrer 1997,
p.4 and 34).
[2] This was however only one of the many tasks I had within the organisation.
See in appendix 2 for a description of my work at the organisation.

2 Nationalism and Ethnicity - A Theoretical Overview

A great deal of ambiguity and confusion surrounds the use of terms like ethnic group, nation,
state, and nationalism. The different terms are being used and understood in a variety of often
related, but different meanings by academics, nationalists, journalists and in everyday language.
The idea of this chapter is to shed an explaining light on these terms and concepts and to give an
overview of the theories of nationalism and my interpretation of the phenomenon.
What I would call the modern classics of theory of nationalism, have mostly dealt with the
subject from a historical point of view, explaining the emergence of nationalism and the nationstate. In this chapter I will try to focus on the nature of nationalism and on the conflictual aspects
of this. Nevertheless I will also draw on the historical angle because it shows, as we shall see, that
we are not dealing with one phenomenon but several forms and shapes formed by the last 200
years.
The different theories of nationalism evolves around certain focal points which are also the main
elements in an understanding of the phenomenon:
-

Nationalism as a political phenomenon legitimising actions or systems as opposed to

nationalism as a cultural phenomenon, providing meaning/raison dtre.

Nationalism as either a modern phenomenon inseparably connected to the emergence of the

modern centralising state or nationalism as a primordial phenomenon, something natural and
rooted in the past.
These two sets of opposing views are furthermore reflected by the angle of analysis either
primarily from a structural or an actor-oriented angle.

In order to understand these different aspects of nationalism better, I will start off with the
classical distinction of nationalism, as either a political or an organic phenomenon, which then
later hopefully should give us a better opportunity of understanding the conflictual aspects of
nationalism.

2.1 The Genealogy of Nationalism

The nation-state and democracy are so to speak twins born out of the French and American
revolutions. With the French Revolution the nation became the source of state sovereignty. Not
understood as if each nation is supposed to be granted the right to political self-determination, but
rather, in the way that the people living within the given territory of the state constitute the nation.
This is the so-called French or political-civic notion or principle of the nation. According to this
notion the nation of citizens does not derive its identity from some common ethnic or cultural
characteristics, but rather from the praxis of citizens who actively exercise their civil rights and
duties (Habermas 1992, p.2-3). Hence the primary meaning of nation was political, patriotism
was conceived as love to the nation (in the meaning of state and state-patriotism) expressed by the
wish to renew it by reform or revolution, and thereby breaking with former loyalties. In this way
their patrie, opposed to an existential, pre-existing unit, was a nation created by their free choice.
American are those who wish to be. French nationality was French citizenship and the nation
was un plbiscite de tous les jours. Ethnicity, language and history were irrelevant to the French
nation (Hobsbawm 1990, p.87-88). It was the ideals of the Age of Enlightenment that were
pronounced - universalism and rationality. It represented the common interests against particular
interests. This kind of nationalism is aimed to extend and unify, rather than to restrict and
separate (Hobsbawm 1992, p.23), or in the words of Mary Kaldor, to unify and centralise rather
than decentralise and fragmentize (Kaldor 1993, p.108). The Romantic Movement, mainly
German, reacted on the ideas of the Enlightenment, with its mechanical and rational view on
society and humanity.
The Romantic Movement stood for the defence of the national characters; what was unique had
value and with these ideas emerged a romantic worship and study of genuine volks-art, and
the notions of a Volk and its Volksgeist. In this way the so-called German notion of the nation,
or the organic-ethnic, is to be seen in opposition to the French, political-civic notion of the nation.
It is an objective ethnic definition of the nation which draws the conclusion that there should be a
congruency between the nation and the state (in ethnic terms), understood in the manner that
every nation (ethnic group) has the right to its own state. Hence the concept encompasses
collective self-determination and expression of national character. In conclusion nations are seen
as natural entities and with the development of national consciousness, nations, by the laws of
nature, have the right to express themselves in a national idiom.
Many of the authors I deal with in this chapter have developed typologies of nationalism evolving
around this distinction, calling it political/organic, French/German, official/vernacular,
revolutionary-democratic/ethnic etc. One of the first and, according to Smith, most influential
typologies was made by Hans Kohn, in which he distinguishes between a Western and an
Eastern version:
Fig 1.: Kohns Dichotomy[1]:
Western Nationalism
Great Britain, France, America.
Rational.

Eastern Nationalism
Eastern Europe (east of the Rhine).
Mystical.

A product of the middle classes (bourgeoisie),

whom came to power at the end of the 18th
century.
An association of human beings living on the
same territory, under the same government and
laws.

Eastern Europe had no developed middle class;

instead nationalism became a product of a few
intellectuals, which made it more authoritarian.
The nation as a seamless, organic unit with a
mystical 'soul' and 'mission'.

Smith has several reasons for criticising this typology. First of all because of its geopolitical
dimension which overlooks the influence of both kinds of nationalisms in different European
communities: the organic version in Ireland and later 19th century France, the rational ideal in
some versions of Czech, Hungarian and Zionist nationalism, as well as in early West African
nationalisms (Smith 1991, p.81). Furthermore the western nationalisms owe much to the earlier
monarchies (as seen as well in Andersons chapter on official nationalism, where the old
monarchies of Europe tried to legitimise themselves by naturalisation (Anderson 1983, p.8687)). Finally Smith states that there should be made a distinction between German and Italian
nationalisms opposed to the relatively underdeveloped Balkan and Eastern Europe. But despite
these criticisms, Smith finds Kohns distinction between a more rational and a more organic
version valid and useful. But it is important, he stresses, that both models can be found in the
East and in the West, in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and as a mixture with greater or
lesser emphasis on one or the other (Smith 1991, p.79-82).
Like Smith I also find it appropriate for analytical purposes to describe the two different (in a
Weberian understanding) ideal types of the nation, the cultural or organic and the political or the
civic. As seen in the figure below:
Fig. 2:[2]
Nation
The Political-Civic
The Organic-Cultural
A juridical-political community of laws and
Ethnic comprehension of the community as
institutions with a single political will.
common descent.
Political territory.
Homeland - Vaterland.
Social contract between citizen and state,
Volksgeist/descent, fictive super-family,
individual, subjective consciousness.
collective, objective consciousness.
Inclusive, in the way that it tries to unify and
Exclusive, in the way that it tries to restrict and
extend.
fragmentize.
Rational
Irrational
The individual is born into and organically
The nation is a choice; the nations are created connected to the nation, the will of the members
by the will of the members.
is determined by the belonging to the specific
nation.
In this way the organic-cultural notion of the nation has as its basic assertion that the nation
should be defined on the basis of ethnic criteria, and that every nation, ethnically defined, should
be gathered in their own state. Contrary to this, the political-civic notion of the nation has as its
basic assertion that everyone that lives within the boundaries of the state should become a part of
the nation, which is what lies in the concept of nation-building. Both principles then stress the
cultural similarity of their adherents but in fundamentally different manners. The political-civic in
an inclusive way and the organic-cultural in an exclusive way.

Let us now turn to look a little bit closer at the different aspects of the phenomenon, as they are
described by the different theories, and in this way see that this distinction is also reflected in the
different views of nationalism. The typology I will return to later.

2.2 Nationalism as a Political Doctrine

Some authors view nationalism as a political phenomenon legitimising actions or systems. In this
way nationalism is primarily viewed as a political principle, which holds that the political and
the national unit should be congruent (Gellner 1983, p.1 and Hobsbawm 1990, p.9). According
to this view the nation and nationalism can only be understood in relation to a certain kind of
modern territorial state; the nation-state. In this understanding the state plays a central role in the
process of building the nation. As Hobsbawm writes: It is the state which makes the nation and
not the nation the state (Hobsbawm 1990, p.44-45). Nations and nationalism are hence in this
perspective seen as something constructed mainly from above.
In this respect it is interesting to see that both Gellner and Hobsbawm, refuses a fixed definition
of the nation (Gellner 1983, p.6-7 and Hobsbawm 1990, p.7-10). According to Hobsbawm the
question ought not to be what is the nation? but rather what has the notion - the nation - meant
in different, often competitive, contexts, in different periods, for different groups with different
political strategies?
Hobsbawm generally sees the national question as situated at the point of intersection of
politics, technology and social transformation. He states that nationalism should be seen as
something essentially constructed from above but not only as that. According to Hobsbawm, it is
also necessary to analyse it from below. Thus he criticises Gellner for being to one-sided, making
it difficult to analyse nationalism from below, in terms of the assumptions and feelings of the
ordinary people. However, although Hobsbawm mentions this duality of nationalism, he is mostly
concerned with analysing nationalism from above and neglects to analyse it from below.
Anderson deals in his book with what he calls official nationalism. Originally it is something
that should be understood in connection to the decline of the monarchies of Western Europe,
during which nationalism could function as legitimising the continuation of dynastic rule. The
purpose was to unite dynasty and subjects. The king was no longer ruling as Gods representative
on earth, but now as a number one among his fellow countrymen. In this way official nationalism
was used to make the king a symbol of the nation. Furthermore the official nationalism developed
after, and in response to the national/popular movements, the aim of the official nationalism being
not only to legitimise the king, but also the empire, as Anderson writes: These official
nationalisms can best be understood as a means for combining naturalisation with retention of
dynastic power, in particular over the huge polyglot domains accumulated since Middle Ages, or,
to put it another way, for stretching the short, tight, skin of the nation over the gigantic body of
the empire (Anderson 1983, p.86).
What is important here is that Anderson have a layer upon layer conception of nationalism, so
that the different nationalisms that he speaks of (Creole nationalism, vernacular nationalism, etc.),
can be copied, refined and mixed and then be used differently, depending on time, place and the
concrete contents. In this way official nationalism can be seen as a model used for its
manipulating abilities by those who are in control of the political apparatus, as he writes: The
one persistent feature of this style of nationalism was, and is, that it is official - i.e. something
emanating from the state, and serving the interests of the state first and foremost (Anderson
1983, p.159). In this way you can state that Anderson also (but not only as we shall see) view

nationalism as a political doctrine, legitimising actions or systems.

An extreme, but nevertheless fruitful, version of viewing nationalism as something political we
find at Paul R. Brass. He understands basically nationalism as something political. As a social and
political creation by elites, whereby ethnic groups, or rather their elites, uses ethnic/national
identity when it comes to put forward demands on the political or economical level to obtain
political power or economic gains. A modern phenomenon inseparably connected to the activities
of the modern centralising state.
Brass sees two ways in which nations can be created. Either by the transformation of an ethnic
group to a self-consciousness political identity in a multi-ethnic state or by the fusion of different
ethnic groups creating a homogenous national culture by the modern state as promoter. An ethnic
group he defines as a subjective self-conscious community that establishes criteria for in- or
exclusion using cultural symbols in order to differentiate themselves from other groups (Brass
1991, p.18-20)[3].
Ethno-nationalism and state-centred or generated nationalism can therefore both be seen as
subtypes of a general identity creating process, defined as a process whereby the subjective
meaning of a number of symbols is intensified, and as a strive for obtaining a multisymbol
congruence among a group of people defined initially by one or more central symbols, whether
those symbols are ethnic attributes or loyalty to a particular state (Brass 1991, p.20).
Brass instrumental approach is made clear when he states that ethnicity can be activated in
special contexts or/and at specific times. The main point is that the formation or politicisation of
ethnicity is seen as a process created in the dynamics of lite competition. The elites make use of
the attributes of the ethnic groups as resources, intensifies them and thereby creates a political
identity, which is used in the competition for political power and economic gain (Brass 1991,
p.15-16). Basically he sees ethnic groups as mobilised by disgruntled elites to a growing sense of
group solidarity (Brass 1991, p.41). Hence ethnic groups, or rather their elites, are using the
ethnicity to put demands to the political system in order to improve their status, economic
situation, civil rights or educational/job possibilities.

2.3 Nationalism as a Modern Phenomenon

In continuation of the view of nationalism as a political doctrine it is easy to view nationalism as
a modern phenomenon, something understood in connection to the emergence of the modern
centralising state.
To illustrate what nationalism has meant in Europe, Gellner asks the reader to imagine two
ethnographic maps, one drawn up before the age of nationalism and one after. The first would be
a chaos of different colours, where no clear pattern would be found and where it would be
difficult to make out, where one colour stops and the other takes over. In the other the colours are
clearly separated, neat flat surfaces clearly separated from each other and there is little if any
ambiguity or overlap. If one shifts to reality, one will discover that the prevailing part of the
political authority has been placed in a certain kind of institution - the modern centralising nation
state. This always identifies itself with one kind of culture and one style of communication within
its boundaries. In order to exist, the state is dependent of a centralised educational system, the
content of which it dictates as well as finances.
If we look at the economy in a society with such a state, it will become clear why it has to be this

way. Its economy depends on communication between the individuals and their mobility at a
level it would not be capable of maintaining, if the individuals had not been socialised into the
culture of the concerned society (Gellner 1983, p.139-140).
In this way Gellner sees nationalism as the organisation of human groups into large, centrally
educated, culturally homogeneous units. Its roots should not be found in the human psyche but in
the distinctive structural requirements of industrial society and modes of production (Gellner
1983, p.34-35). The requirements of a mobile division of labour, and sustained, frequent and
precise communication between strangers involving a sharing of explicit meaning, transmitted in
a standard idiom and in writing when required (Gellner 1983, p.34).
Also Hobsbawm views nations as new phenomenon, invented and socially produced, it belongs
exclusively to a particular, and historically recent, period. It is a social entity only insofar as it
relates to a certain kind of modern territorial state, the nation-state, but it is not exclusively a
function of this. The emergence of nationalism should also be seen in the context of a particular
stage of technological and economic development (Hobsbawm 1990, p.9-10), whereby he is in
line with Gellners thesis.
Anderson however, as we shall see, holding a primarily cultural understanding of nationalism,
also relates the emergence of nationalism to the processes of modernisation and the emergence of
capitalism, but this he relates to the weakening of two cultural systems. That of the kings divine
right and the religious community. In this way the imagination of the nation was made possible
by changes of some fundamental cultural conceptions. Anderson puts special emphasis on the
role of print-capitalism, which made it possible for a rapidly growing numbers of people to think
about themselves, and to relate themselves to others. Although he speaks of cultural systems he
puts emphasis on some structural changes, in connection with the processes of modernisation,
which made it possible to imagine the new community.
Brass stresses specifically the relevance of the nature of the modern centralising nation-state in
explaining ethnic conflict. He writes that there is nothing natural or inevitable about ethnic
conflict, the answers should be found in the relations between the centralising state and the
regional ethnic elites (Brass 1991, p.242 and 244). Brass sees the state, especially in societies
undergoing secularisation, modernisation and industrialisation, as both a resource and as a
distributor of resources and at the same time as promoting new values. Therefore, the state and its
policies are described as a potential advantage for some groups and societies and a threat for
others, especially for local elites and societies whose values differ (Brass 1991, p.272).
The processes of modernisation in a society consists of a dual fight for control of resources and
values between bureaucracies and political organisations at the centre and between the elites of
the centre and local elites. The ethnic elites function as effective rivals to the civil and military
bureaucracies because of their ability to mobilise popular support, exactly because they control
symbolic resources and values on the grounds of their cultural fundament. In this way the
necessity for local collaborators arises - in the sense that the state makes alliances and coalitions
with local ethnic elites, both because of state intrusion by its centralising policies, but also
because of the fact that the ethnic groups pose a threat to the state due to their position as
competing systems.
As to the fight over resources Brass states that the objective existence of disparity is an
indispensable explanation of ethnic conflict but not an explanation in itself. The mere presence of
disparity is not enough to explain or produce a nationalistic movement, nor can it explain why

dominant groups develop a such (Brass 1991, p.41-42). In Brass understanding elites and
competition among elites and the relation to the state are the essential elements in ethnic group
conflict and political mobilisation. All other factors, including size and richness of available
cultural symbols, regional economic disparities or the like, are just background material for the
elites to draw from to their aims. Without the elites these differences or disparities will just vanish
or be accepted or maybe be the cause of sporadic or isolated incidents of conflict or disorder. In
this way Brass explains the rise of Croatian nationalism, not as a feeling of relative deprivation or
deprivation at all, but due to the fact that there existed advantages for the lite that could be
gained by emphasising Croatian distinctiveness (Brass 1991, p.44).
Basically Brass puts emphasis on the interaction between the state and the peripheral ethnic elites
in times of modernisation and drastic changes in the society, such as changes in the political
context and in the balance of the centre-periphery relations. Ethnic conflicts emerge especially
under three types of conditions: ...during transfer of power from colonial to post-colonial states,
during succession struggles, and at times when central power appears to be weakening or the
balance in centre-periphery relations appears to be changing (Brass 1991, p.244).

2.4 Nationalism as a Cultural Phenomenon

Other authors put more emphasis in explaining nationalism from the angle of fulfilling a basic
need in people, meaning from a more actor-oriented angle. Benedict Anderson, who takes the task
of explaining, what it is that make people love and die for nations - as well as hate and kill for it,
finds it necessary, like Gellner and Hobsbawm, to understand how nations have come into
historical being. In this sense you can say that he too holds a structuralistic historical approach.
Unlike the other theorists, Anderson looks closely at the emotional power nationalism holds, and
in this way he states that it would, I think, make things easier if one treated it (nationalism) as if
it belonged with kinship and religion, rather than with liberalism or fascism (Anderson 1983,
p.5).
Andersons definition of the nation as an imagined political community - imagined as both
inherently limited and sovereign (Anderson 1983, p.6) reveals that he as well puts emphasis on
the political aspect of nationalism and the importance of the emergence of the modern
centralising state. But unlike especially Gellner, he seeks to understand the emotional appeal and
cultural nature of nationalism, this is especially underlined in his descriptions on the effects of
print-capitalism, as a structural condition, but in the light of making it possible to imagine the
community in a different way.
Theories, like Gellners, are good for explaining the changes in linguistic and cultural
standardisation that happened during the transition from agrarian society to industrial society.
Gellners theoretical construction suffers however, from a very instrumentalist understanding of
nationalism as such. It is as if he has never known the feeling or felt the need to confront with
people that have felt it. Gellner lacks the ability to explain the emotional appeal nationalism
holds. Therefore, as much as you can agree with his definition of nationalism as a political
principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent as much you
can disagree with his definition of nationalist sentiment as the feeling of anger aroused by the
violation of this principle and a nationalist movement as one acurated by a sentiment of this
kind (Gellner 1983, p.1).
The imagination of the community plays a central role in Andersons understanding of
nationalism. The community of the nation reaches beyond social and religious layers in society.

In spite of inequality and exploitation, the community is always imagined as a deep horizontal
brotherhood. Thus Anderson looks at the strength of the community as a brotherhood, assuming a
common past and destiny, in the course of which enormous sacrifices in the name of the nation
was made in wars. Nationalism is strong as opposed to ideologies because these are not capable
of giving answer to human sufferings and basic questions such as the meaning of death, illness
and life in general.
In this way nationalism is viewed as a transverse, cultural phenomenon which offers a feeling of
community and identity in the nation which religion previously could offer (Anderson 1983,
p.12). The nation is eternal, it offers a feeling of common destiny - it is worth dying for.
Anderson points to the fact that nearly every West-European nation has a tomb for the Unknown
Soldier. A symbol of the continuance of the nation, in spite of the fact that the soldier is dead and
even not in the tomb. Because of the nature of the nation, the soldier is so to say still alive and the
sacrifice that he made for his country is not forgotten (Anderson 1983, p.9). This is also the case
when one refers to his homeland. This often happens in the style and vocabulary of kinship:
Motherland, Vaterland, Patria, etc. These terms refer to something natural that one is naturally by birth - tied to (Anderson 1983, p.143). In everything natural there is always something not
chosen, things are just as they are. You are a part of the above-mentioned community of destiny.
As a result, the nation can appeal for sacrifice and patriotism.
Anderson makes in this way a comparison between family and patriotism/nation-ness. The nation
calls for unselfish love and solidarity. This is what the family traditionally has been conceived as
being the domain of. His conclusion is that patriotism is the same form of unselfishness, and that
the nation therefore - via peoples patriotism - can make people sacrifice their life in war.
Another important exponent of viewing nationalism as a cultural phenomenon rather than as an
ideology or form of politics is Anthony D. Smith. According to him national identity provides for
the individual a satisfying answer to the problem of personal oblivion, through the creation of a
community of history and destiny which saves the individual from obliviation and restores
collective faith (Smith 1991, p.160-161).
He stresses the close relationship between the family, the ethnic community and the nation. He
sees nationalism as a collective cultural identity, a sense of continuity over generations of a given
cultural unit (the myth of common descent, rather than actual continuity of cultural patterns), as
shared memories of earlier events, and as the idea of a collective destiny entertained by each
generation. The pattern is the myths, symbols, collective memories and values which bind the
generations together and demarcates the outsiders (Smith 1991, p.25). In this way it is as to
become part of a political super-family, to realise the ideal of fraternity. Nations are in this way
understood simply as families writ large, a large sum of many interrelated families, brothers and
sisters all (Smith 1991, p.162).
However, Smith still terms nationalism as an ideological movement, but here it is important to
stress that he sees it as an ideology of the nation rather than the state. Smiths definition of the
nation, as a named human population sharing an historic, common myths and historical
memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all
members...sets it clearly apart from any conception of the state (Smith 1991, p.14). In this
connection it is also interesting that his definition of nationalism does not necessarily include the
wish for statehood but for maximal control of the homeland and its resources. But still this
definition makes it possible to see national identity and nationalism as multi-dimensional and
hence easily connected to political ideologies like liberalism, fascism, and communism.

Furthermore Smith does not deny the close historical relationship between the state and the
nation, but he sees them as two clearly separated concepts. Nationalism in this way is seen as a
sort of culture rather than a political doctrine and should not be mixed up with the fact that states
use nationalism for legitimising purposes, which they have done and still do. The main difference
then between Smith and Anderson is that Smith ascribes nationalism a cultural inner core while
Anderson consistently views nationalism as an abstract phenomenon.

2.5 Nationalism as a Primordial Phenomenon

As noted above most of the theoreticians of nationalism understand the phenomenon in
connection with the emergence of the modern centralising state and the related processes of
modernisation. However, some of the authors put, more or less, emphasis on the so-called
primordial aspects of nationalism in their understanding of the phenomenon. Primordialism
means that the modern nation is seen as a representation of age-old cultural patterns. A modern
form of group belonging formerly expressed in clans, kinship and ethnic groups. In this lies the
understanding that nationalism should be seen as an expression for the human need of group
belonging (which we also can recognise from Anderson).
The rhetoric of nationalists themselves is the closest we come a pure primordial understanding.
From this perspective nations are regarded as natural phenomena of great antiquity, to this picture
we can add the nationalist myths of the nation waiting, Sleeping Beauty-like, to be awaken from
its slumber, to fulfil its predestined goal of attaining freedom and autonomy (Anderson 1983,
p.195 and Gellner 1983, p.48). As we have seen, Gellner views nationalism and nations as
creations, and in describing them as such, he pictures the nationalist rhetorics and myths well.
The myth of the nation as nature-given and eternal is false, he states, and goes on by writing that
Nations as a natural, God-given way of classifying men, as an inherent though long-delayed
political destiny, are a myth; nationalism, which sometimes takes pre-existing cultures and turns
them into nations, sometimes invents them, and often obliterates pre-existing cultures: that is a
reality... (Gellner 1983, p.48-49).
In Smiths book National Identity he focuses exactly on the continuity between pre-modern
ethnic identity and the modern nations. This puts him within the primordial school, although, as
we shall see, he holds a more differentiated view. Contrary to the modernist, who claims that
nations are inventions, Smith stresses that nationalism is not more invented than other forms of
culture, ideology or social organisation (Smith 1991, p.71). Smith argues for a view in between
the primordialists and modernists, stating that an ethnie (the French word he uses for ethnic
communities) is formed, neither by actual ancestry nor by lines of physical descent (which is
irrelevant). But through a sense of continuity, shared memory and collective destiny. Ethnies are
so to speak formed by lines of cultural affinity, expressed in distinctive myths, memories,
symbols, and values which are maintained and retained by a given cultural unit of the population
(Smith 1991, p.29).
Collective cultural identity, he writes, refers not to a uniformity of elements over generations but
rather, to a sense of continuity on the part of successive generations of a given cultural unit of
population, to shared memories of earlier events and periods in the history of that unit and to
notions entertained by each generation about the collective destiny of that unit and its culture
(Smith 1991, p.25).
Smith is of the opinion that there is a relation between the modern nation and the premodern
ethnie; ...many nations have been formed in the first place around a dominant ethnie, which

annexed or attracted other ethnies or ethnic fragments into the state to which it gave a name and a
cultural charter (Smith 1991, p.39). But the connection is complex because of the fact that not all
modern nations are based on this, i.e. United States of America, Australia and most of the African
post-colonial states.
Despite this fact, Smith states that there are some reasons why, the origins of the nation should be
looked for in the pre-modern ethnic ties. First of all, the first nations were formed on the basis of
pre-modern ethnic cores, and because they were so powerful and culturally influential, they
became models for other cases of nation-formation. The second reason is that the ethnic model of
the nation became increasingly popular and widespread, because it fitted so well to the premodern
demotic kind of community that had survived into the modern era. The ethnic model was hence
sociologically fertile. Third, even in the cases where there were no ethnic antecedents of
importance, nations anyway need to create a certain coherent mythology and symbolism around a
historical-cultural community (Smith 1991, p.41-41).

2.6 Ethnicity
In this section I would like to expand on the issue of ethnicity. First of all the difference between
ethnicity and nationalism, an ethnic group and a nation. This mainly because of the fact that the
chosen theoretical writings I have used so far are not specifically focused on ethnicity. Secondly
from my point of view they also generally lack, what one might call, a social comprehension of
ethnicity and national identity. I have therefore allowed myself to seek some answers from an
anthropological perspective using mainly Thomas Hylland Eriksen Ethnicity and Nationalism.
Basically the difference between nations and ethnic groups is seen to be a question of size but that
the structural composition and functioning are of the same kind. Hylland Eriksen states that yes
they are kindred conceptions but a distinction is worthwhile because of the relationship to the
modern state (Eriksen 1993, p.98-99 and 105).
In this respect you can speak of the difference between the notions of nation and ethnic group
corresponding to the earlier mentioned distinction (section 2.1), between the nation seen as either
political-civic or organic-cultural. In the organic-cultural the nation is defined in ethnic terms. In
the political-civic the nation is defined in political terms inseparably connected to the notion of
the nation state.
But as we have seen, nations defined initially political-civic still are not to be understood
exclusively as political organisations. They also have had and have to draw on symbolic resources
in order to uphold a collective identity. Nations are thus seldom defined only by citizenship, but
also by culture. Nations can contain different ethnic groups or be defined mainly or only by the
dominant ethnic group. Both nationalism and ethnicity strives for and stresses the cultural
similarity of their adherents, but in different ways. When we speak of this in relation to the two
ideal types, the important difference is as mentioned, that the political-civic, is unifying and
expanding, striving for inclusion. So even though we are dealing with ideal types, in the way that
they are seldom found in a pure form, this does not make the distinction irrelevant. The
governments of Mandela and Yeltsin are not nationalistic in the same way, as the governments of
Tudjman or Landsbergis, who contrary to the first mentioned, have had an exclusive
understanding of the nation and thus have agitated for fragmentation and restriction.
The term ethno-nationalism should therefore be used to refer to the claim, of an ethnic group or a
state, to an ethnically homogenous state. The conflictual aspect lies thus in the fact that many

states or ethnic groups do strive towards this goal or behave as if it was the case. In this way
nationalism differentiate from ethnicity by its relation to the state, even though Smith have a point
in not including the state in his definition of the nation and speak of maximal control of the
homeland and its resources.
Smith is one of the few who include this in his definition of the nation, whereas most others have
it as the major difference between nation and ethnic group. In this way ethnicity is exactly not
necessarily about attaining statehood. The statistics of the former Soviet Union spoke of 104
nations comprising the union, they were in fact ethnic groups in as much as they didnt want full
independence (Eriksen 1993, p.119). On the other hand however, one could also state, as Hylland
Eriksen point out, that the phenomenon of ethnicity like nationalism is inseparable from the
notion of the modern centralising territorial nation state since this has meant a politicisation of
culture (Eriksen 1993, p.125). Ethnic groups become relevant because of the homogenising nature
of the modern centralising nation state.
Still we have to account for the differences between nation and ethnic group or what Anthony
Smith calls an ethnie, the latter, according to Smith, being a premodern basis on which most
nations are formed. Both Smith and Brass describes levels of ethnicity, from ethnic category
through ethnic community to nations, which imply a focus on consciousness but also more or less
on objective criteria. Objective criteria - since the starting point of this ladder is a set of criteria which separate the different groups from each other. Smiths starting point is the ethnic
category, which by others are seen to constitute a separate entity without any special selfconsciousness to ethnie defined by believed common cultural traits and a self-consciousness and
finally to the nation. Brass also operates with the difference between ethnic category and ethnic
community defined by ethnicity as self-consciousness and then finally the nation. The ethnic
category being defined by some more or less objective but chosen criteria, amongst many
possible, which through the ethnic community to the nation increases in number as well as
subjective meaning.
Hylland Eriksen also operates with different levels of ethnicity but with another agenda. That is
looking specifically on the relationship between groups and in this way showing that ethnicity can
have different social importance, be up- or downgraded according to the social context (Eriksen
1993, p.41).
Brass also states, as we have seen, that ethnicity can be activated in special context or/and at
specific times. The difference is however, that Hylland Eriksen has a more social angel than, as
Brass, a mere instrumental angel to this. Before entering this discussion I have to dwell a bit on
Hylland Eriksens overall position on ethnicity, which will shed some light on the subject.
Hylland Eriksen defines ethnicity as a special kind of consciously communicated and manifested
cultural identity. An identity building on the consciousness of being different. However, cultural
difference between two groups is not the decisive feature of ethnicity, only in so far as cultural
differences are perceived as being important, and are made socially relevant do relationships have
an ethnic element. Ethnicity is rather constituted through social interaction than cultural content
(Eriksen 1993, p.18 and p.36). Hence ethnic groups does necessarily emerge because of contacts
between groups. Ethnicity is therefore an aspect of a social relation between groups (Eriksen
1993, p.11-12). To speak of an isolated ethnic group is like to hear a sound from one hand
clapping as he writes (Eriksen 1993, p.1).
Hylland Eriksen also draws on the work of Frederik Barth from 1969, which can be characterised

as a watershed within the study of ethnicity. Barth precisely turned the focus from the cultural
content to looking at ethnicity as emerging in the borderland between groups. Therefore it is the
boundaries - as a social and not territorial phenomenon upon, which the focus should be put.
Ethnicity is always about culture - people or groups that subjectively maintain cultural
peculiarity. The problem is precisely that cultures, which subjectively differentiate from each
other, not always do so objectively. But when the mutual subjective understanding is such that the
groups do differ from each other, then it constitutes a social reality, which is manifested as ethnic
identity. The maintenance of ethnic boundary is therefore, from the point of view of Barth, a
social phenomenon, rather than a cultural, and therefore it is exactly the life and movements of
the boundary that must be studied and not the cultural content. Cultural variation is rather an
effect then a cause of boundaries. Hence a focus on the social relations, the way the borders are
maintained and changed over time and in that way also how the meaning changes.
This corresponds to the view on culture as complex, something fluid and dynamic. Culture is not
something that is, but something that takes place in a constant process of change and negotiation.
This also implies a view on persons as complex entities with several social identities, which are
created, undergo change and that is activated in different social situations. In this paradigm
ethnicity is defined as fluid and negotiable. The importance varies situational. The we category
can be expanded and contracted according to the situation and the individual can choose to
emphasise different social identities at different times (Eriksen 1993, p.20-35).
Although somewhat unfair to most of the theories, as their main focus rest upon other aspects, we
may use this discussion to criticise the body of theoretical work so far used. They have, I would
not say a too categorical view on nations and ethnic groups, but do exactly not stress this fluid,
situational and negotiable aspect of ethnicity and national identity. Most of them, as we have
seen, do emphasise the constructed aspect of ethnic and national identity but roughly speaking I
would still say that they treat nations in a too fixed and categorical manner.
Thus I find this anthropological approach by Hylland Eriksen and Barth very useful because they
turn the focus on boundaries rather than cultural content and by doing so particularly points to the
fluid or situational character of ethnicity. This opens up for a more complex view on these
collective categories. Not just as something that is not static but also not treated as a totality. This
point became very obvious to me in the field, working closely with the different UN agencies and
the OSCE. These organisations, as well as several NGOs, very often treated the different ethnic
groups almost as if they were singular actors. Thereby playing along in the continuos
entrenchment of the us and them dichotomy.
Of cause one could say to their defence that this is exactly what nationalism and ethnicity is
about, as the Croatian writer Slavenka Draculic so nicely puts it: The problem with this
nationalism is however, that where I previously was defined by my education, profession, my
thoughts, my personality - and yes also my nationality, - I now feel deprived from all of this. I am
nothing, no longer a person. I am one of 4.5 million Croats (Draculic 1993, p.49-50, my
translation).
But academically, and in the field for that sake, it is still important to have an eye for the fact that
...identities are never completed, never finished, that they are always as subjectivity itself is, in
process...all of us are composed of multiple social identities not of one (Stuart Hall 1991, p.47
and p.57). In this lies the assumption that identities can crosscut one another and sometimes even
be contradictory. This opens up for not just treating these aggregated groups as totalities, but to
look at the internal role-divisioning and the possibility for individuals to not only over- or under-

communicate their ethnic or national identity but to shift between different identities and in some
instances even change affiliation[4].

2.7 Summing Up and Conclusions

Nationalism as we have seen above has not one, but several meanings depending on space and
time and is changeable as well. Nationalism or rather nationalisms are multidimensional and
ambiguous phenomena. Most of the theoreticians not only emphasise one aspect of nationalism
but include several different aspects, although to a greater or lesser extend.
Nevertheless nationalism can broadly be understood as a socio-political phenomenon, as an
emotional affiliation to a country and/or a group of people, as a form of collective consciousness.
I.e. the nation-state can be understood as a territory where the population is united in a nation by
the bond of nationalism, that being mainly defined in a civic-political or in a mainly organicethnic manner. But nationalism can also be attached to people or ethnic groups across or within
the framework of the state and might be expressed in demands of grades of autonomy of own
affairs or in the more extreme cases, as ours, separatism.
Nationalism is a relatively modern phenomenon, but it is a mixture of old and new, politics and
culture. Nationalism would not possess the strength in emotional appeal if it couldnt draw on the
feelings of a shared community, cultural, historical memories and fulfil a need in the individual.
This is a very important fact to note in relation to ethnic conflict; ethnic mobilisation is only
possible where these symbolic resources have been continuously maintained and developed in
order to command its emotional strength and thus function as the basis of mobilisation. The
nation is imagined and a construction, but also a social reality, and it should not be treated as
something false and unreal.
The argument, that states such as the Soviet Union or Yugoslavia are artificial implies that there
are natural nations. As we have seen the nation is a modern phenomenon, all nation states are
artificial, i.e. social and political constructions. In fact only 10 per cent of states can claim to be
true nation-states, in the sense that the boundaries of the state coincide with the nation, defined
ethnically (Smith 1991, p.15). And then again ethnicity is, as we also have seen, no less imagined,
but also a social phenomenon. Culture is not something, which is but something we do.
Although I agree up to a point, that contrary to many nationalist ideologies, it is not nations that
make states, it is at the same time important not to reverse the argument and simply claim the
opposite like Hobsbawm does, when he writes that Nations do not make states and nationalisms
but the other way around (Hobsbawm 1990, p.10). Nations can be developed without the
agencies of the state and strive for statehood. One should not only see nations as creations, or
something made imaginable by the elites of the state-apparatus. This can also happen through
ethnic elites without a state-structure at hand. Here it is often intellectuals or academics that are
having an important role in shaping and maintaining the symbolic resources of the group. But it is
a point worth stressing, in the spirit of Brass that this is often happening exactly as a consequence
of the policies of the modern centralising nation state.
Already now we can thus draw some conclusions. Ethnic conflict does not steam from old ancient
hatreds. Ethno-national identities are a modern phenomenon. Multinational or heterogeneous
states are not artificial constructions. The idea of the nation is artificial - a construction or an
imagination - a social reality - yes - but the idea of the homogeneous nation-state is an illusion.
The fact is that 90 percent of present days states are ethnic heterogeneous makes homogeneity an

illusion. And this illusion or strive towards homogeneity is the conflictual aspect - not
heterogeneity.
Finally it should be mentioned that despite the acknowledged strength in the emotional appeal of
nationalism and its spread as a principle all over the world, most of the authors however, agree
with the point, that nationalism is theoretically and ideologically weak, especially due to its
abstract and multidimensional character.
In this way Anderson notes the philosophical poverty and incoherence of nationalism (Anderson
1983, p.5). But this emptiness also reflects the strength of nationalism (besides its emotional
appeal), which lies in its chameleon-like nature and its facility in combing with other issues and
ideologies (Smith 1991, p.144). Nationalism ...once created, they (different forms of early
nationalisms) became modular, capable of being transplanted, with varying degrees of selfconsciousness, to a great variety of social terrains, to merge and be merged with a
correspondingly wide variety of political and ideological constellations (Anderson 1983, p.4).
Because of the emptiness, it becomes possible to fill the void with other elements like ideologies
and political programmes. So the conclusion must be that in order for nationalism to have success
it needs more than cultural differences it must be attached to political questions. As Gellner
writes, nationalism is not as strong as it seems like, who for the simplicity of his argument
mentions language as the criteria for culture, and states that then we have 8000 potential
nationalisms but only around 200 states (Gellner 1983, p.44-45). Cultural, national, and linguistic
etc. differences are constituent parts of nationalism, but in themselves not enough to produce
nationalism. As even Smith writes ...national aspirations tend to combine with other nonnational economic, social or political issues, and the power of the movement often derives from
this combination (Smith 1991, p.145).
In further continuation of this it is a theoretical point that an analysis of ethno-national conflicts
must be contextual. The specificity of the individual ethnic conflict is thus interesting, i.e. socioeconomic, historic, political etc. conditions and relations. At the same time I want to stress that
one should not only focus on rational calculations in an understanding of ethnic conflict. The
power of nationalism lies in the combination of the rational with the irrational. You might see
the irrational as being the fuel of nationalism and the rational the catalyst. In this way the
imagination of the community, the feeling of belonging, the shared myths, collective memories of
earlier events in history, symbols etc. should be understood as the irrational fuel of nationalism in
order to give it or uphold its emotional strength.

[1] Based on Smith 1991, p.80-81.

[2] This figure is made on the basis of Smith 1991, Hobsbawm 1990 and Marlene Wind
1992, p.41-51.
[3] I will return to a closer definitional discussion of ethnic groups and ethnicity in section
2.6.
[4] The latter part of this section I owe a great deal from the article by Stuart Hall, Old
and New Identities, Old and New Ethnicities.

3 The Dynamics of Ethnic Conflict

t has been shown that wars defined as ethnic conflicts on an average have a
significant longer duration than other types of war; that more frequently ethnic
conflicts do not end by negotiated solutions but by outright military victory by
either side, and finally that ethnic civil war is of a more vicious nature (though
not necessarily more destructive) than other forms of conflict (King 1997,
p.13 and 24-25 and Scherrer 1997, p.42). The common explanations for this
intractability and protracted nature of ethnic conflict have often been ascribed
to the uncontrollable irrational behaviour motivated by deeply rooted ancient
hatreds and incompatible deeply felt values and identities of the belligerents in
ethnic conflict (King 1997, p.13 and 52).
In this chapter I shall look for alternative explanations to the nature of ethnic
conflict. Looking specifically on the structure of conflict or armed
conflict/warfare to be more precise; determining structural factors that can
help explain the protracted nature and intractability of ethnic conflict in
another light than the above mentioned. Some of these factors may be
applicable to inter-state conflicts and other intra-state conflicts as well. The
purpose of this chapter is however, not only to determine and characterise the
specific nature of ethnic conflicts but in fact mainly to focus on conflict
dynamics of ethnic conflict contrary to the previous theoretical chapter which
focused on ethnicity and nationalism. The specific characteristics or relevant
differences between ethnic conflict and other kinds of intra-state conflicts I
shall return to at the end of this chapter, for now I will use the different terms
for intra-state conflicts more or less indiscriminately.
A final opening remark should be made about the fact that despite that most of
the wars since 1945 has been intra-state conflicts there exist little, if any,
comprehensive theoretical research on the dynamics and even the causes of
intra-state conflicts (Scherrer 1997, p.50 and Nielsen 1997, p.2). This is
therefore based mainly upon working papers and articles and should therefore
be seen as theoretical reflections rather than as a coherent theoretical chapter
in comparison to the previous theoretical chapter on nationalism and
ethnicity.
3.1 The Scene of Conflict
One of the most distinguishing features of ethnic conflict is that it is typically
a non-state conflict wholly or partly (Hobsbawm 1993, p.41). The main
characteristic of intra-state conflict is the absence of a state structure or the
existence of a weak one. They are mainly taking place in either collapsing
states or emerging states in the process of state building. This is according to
all the authors I have encountered in this field the key to an understanding of
intra-state conflict (Brown 1993, p.6, Mller 1996, p.20, King 1997, p.50-51,

Vorkunova 1997, p.49, Hobsbawm 1993, p.41-42 and Snyder 1993, p.86).
This factor may not be sufficient for conflicts to break out, but definitely
makes them possible, and of interest for the present purpose, determine the
specific course of these conflicts (Brown 1993, p.12).
Hobsbawm writes in an article that almost everyone, who have experienced
both civil wars and ordinary inter-state wars, are likely to think that civil wars
are worse:
The major reason why this should be so lies precisely in the disappearance of
the accepted mechanisms of public order. The Hobbesian argument that,
however deficient and unjust the state, it is better than its absence, the
Hobbesian state of nature or public anarchy, carries substantial force, as
many people in ex-Yugoslavia and the ex- USSR will confirm (Hobsbawm
1993, p.42).
Eric Hobsbawm sees the existence of a functioning state as the most important
condition or perhaps as indispensable for the control of ethnic conflicts. Here
it is not so much the question whether the institutional anarchy is a cause of
ethnic conflict or a prerequisite, this I will return to later. But that it is in this
anarchical setting that ethnic conflict unfolds and this determine the dynamics
and nature of this form of conflict. As Michael Ignatieff writes:

Thomas Hobbes would have understood Yugoslavia...There is one type of

fear more devastating in its impact than any other: the systemic fear which
arises when a state begins to collapse. Ethnic hatred is the result of the terror
which arises when legitimate authority disintegrates (Ignatieff 1994, p.16).
Even though he implies the collapse of state-structure as a reason for conflict
(which we for now will keep in mind), the main point here is his emphasis on
terror - or in other words the brutal way this kind of conflict evolves - the way
anarchy prevails (Brown 1993, p.6).
This, which by some has been called the institutional anarchy of civil war
(King 1997, p.51), brings me to a description of the nature of conflict.
3.2 The Nature of Conflict
Inter-state wars can be characterised by more or less clear-formed parties, not
necessarily of same strength, but of same structure. It is fought between
recognised states and their respectively subordinated regular armed forces,
which usually are identifiable from each other and from the civilian
population (Wallensteen 1994, p.74). The application of the Geneva

Convention is unproblematic (Scherrer 1997, p.8, though not always followed

I would add), and the conflict is taking place in an overall international statesystem where certain rules are followed and observed.
In the institutional anarchy of intra-state war, which of course can be of
different degrees, there is a lack or absence of organisational or
institutionalised practises. No sharply defined borderlines, which simplify
inter-state confrontations, even when it comes to the uniforms or other
identifying marks which, distinguish combatant from non-combatant
(Hobsbawm 1993, p.41).
In intra-state wars we are not dealing with two or more national armies.
Combatants in civil wars are most often of a very non-traditional nature
without a traditional military line of command. This is again often
exacerbated by the fact that the communication network is in a bad shape or
even non-existing. Guerrilla fighters, child soldiers and soldier bandits can
moreover, in contrast to professional soldiers or conscripts, be very difficult to
control (King 1997, p.33-35 and Mller 1996, p.iv).
In short intra-state wars tend to be more messy and bloody, even just because
of the fact that at least one of belligerents is a non-state actor, operating under
more permissive rules than states tend to (Mller 1996, p.23). However, as
another author points out, its is not only, or in fact it is often, the states (read
weak states) rather than the insurgents, that are the main actors in a not
spontaneous but organised brutal warfare (Scherrer 1997, p.47).
Furthermore, in comparison to inter-state conflicts it is often more difficult or
sometimes made deliberately difficult to determine who the belligerent sides
are in intra-state conflicts. Who are the leaders in charge or spokespersons,
who represents the real interests at stake in the conflict and who are entitled to
negotiate, compromise and enforce of reached decisions (Mller 1996, p.39
and King 1997, p.33).
This may be further complicated by the fact that factionalism is likely to be
more intense in intra-state conflicts. The argument here is that intra-state
conflicts overall is about legitimacy and/or sovereignty and once this has been
questioned, factionalism can continue to the smallest nucleus (Rana 1995, p.9
and King 1997, p.34). Several parties and likely leaders can emerge and the
question is then who should and can sign a final peace-agreement. This of
course also deepens mutual suspicions and prolongs the way to peace (Mller
1996, p.39).
The above mentioned factors makes an assessment of military costs and
benefits with the overall political objectives extremely difficult. Superior
logistics is the hallmark of wars like the Gulfwar, lack of logistical

sophistication would be an appropriate characteristic of civil wars and the

kalashnikov its hallmark. These armies, or more likely groups, are often
poorly equipped and provisioned and rely on foraging and banditry rather than
supplies from the headquarters. A scenario like this can best be characterised
as being highly fluid and uncertain, weighing the short-term cost and benefits
rather than thinking on the overall political objectives (King 1997, p.36, Rana
1995, p.12 and Mller 1996, p. iv).
The inter-state war concepts of front and rear have often very little meaning in
intra-state conflicts (Mller 1996, p.iii). When frontlines exist they often run
through highly densely populated areas, cutting through cities, towns or even
neighbourhoods (Brown 1993, p.16). The distinction between combatants and
civilians has been blurred, the war is fought by recently formed or recently
augmented militias composed of ordinary civilians. The fighting can not only
be characterised as highly irregular but also sporadic and spasmodic. The war
becomes a permanent situation, which blend in with everyday life. The
division of labour between fighters and the productive segments of society has
broken down and the war tends to be fought by whoever is around, including
women and children (Mller 1996, p.i-ii). Hence it is not only the difficulties
in distinguishing combatants from non-combatants that makes intra-state wars
more messy but also the mere fact that everything and everyone is considered
a legitimate target - thus civilians are explicitly targeted.
3.3 The Asymmetry of Conflict
Fundamentally intra-state conflict are mainly characterised by an
asymmetrical relationship between the contesting parties which function as
structural obstacles to a negotiated settlement of conflict and help to explain
their intractability and protracted nature (King 1997, p.40 and Mller 1996,
p.17).
Commitment
Parties in a civil and ethnic conflict are mostly composed by an insurgent
force or part of the population against the government and/or the majority of
the population. The difference in commitment is best explained by the fact
that in most cases one part is representing the central state authority and
therefore holds a whole range of responsibilities or at least have a whole range
of other concerns (like economic development, social services, foreign
relations etc.) that have nothing to do with the insurgents. If the insurgents do
not pose an immediate threat to the stability and/or unity to the state then it
might be less of a priority to the government in comparison to other concerns.
For the insurgents this is however their chief raison dtre, most likely their
all-consuming goal. The level of commitment can thus be of quite different
dimensions. It is often the case that the very existence of the rebel group

itself, depends on its commitment, or in other words to rebelling (King 1997,

p.40-41).
However, it is not the level of commitment on either side that is the issue but
rather the asymmetry of commitment between the parties. The point is that if
the commitment of both sides were uniformly low, the parties would
presumably soon seek to end the hostilities and find common ground. On the
other hand if commitment were uniformly high a winner would soon be
found. So in either case the conflict will be settled quicker, one way or the
other, than in the instance were the commitment of the parties are relatively
unequal.
Organisation
Under favourable conditions both parties would be well structured with strong
and identifiable spokespersons, clear structures of command and clear
boundaries of group membership. This would reduce uncertainty and
suspicions and thus create a better environment for negotiations to take place.
In intra-state conflicts, the level of organisation often varies considerably
between the parties, creating confusion, uncertainty and increase suspicion.
The military forces on the government side are often well organised with a
clear chain of command, composed by conscripts, professional soldiers or
mercenaries. The insurgents are often composed by, what is called nontraditional combatants or irregulars, with no clear line of command and with
little or no logistical or institutional backup, making the combatants more
concerned about survival than long-term strategic objectives. It should
however be stated that this situation can be reverse, the insurgent forces being
better equipped and organised then the government forces (King 1997, p.4445).
As in the case of commitment it is stressed that it is not the absolute levels of
organisation on both sides that is the issue but rather the asymmetry of
organisation. Hence in a case where the military and political structures are
clear and well formed, identifiable and legitimate spokespersons are available
and there is little threat of intra-party rivalries, then both parties are likely to
be more prone to negotiations as a solution. In a situation where both parties
share relatively low levels of organisation a negotiated solution is also likely
to be the outcome. This if neither parts can field an effective fighting force,
get international support, decide on a single legitimate spokesperson or master
a united war-effort in order to win the conflict through military means. Then
moderate factions on both sides have an incentive to make contact and to seek
non-military solutions to the conflict (King 1997, p.47).
Status

Asymmetry of status refers to the way the parties to the conflict perceive each
other and how they are perceived by external powers. First of all incumbents
normally enjoy international recognition, a seat in the United Nations and
organisations like the OSCE and diplomatic and trade relationships with
foreign governments. Insurgents can of course also be supported by external
powers, openly or covertly, but lack the institutionalised relations.
Of most importance is the fact that the insurgents are not seen as legitimate
representatives of distinct group interests but rather seen as illegitimate
adversaries and their right to participate in the conflict is thus often
questioned, being characterised as bandits or foreign agents. In this way it will
be difficult for the government to approach the negotiating table as this will be
recognition of the insurgents. Overcoming this asymmetry of status can be a
very difficult hurdle to overcome even before getting to the heart of the
conflict, and can thus account for why most intra-state conflicts are so
protracted (King 1997, p.47-49 and Mller 1996, p.39).
A final comment to the above mentioned asymmetries is that it is often seen
that the weaker part in conflict situations may compensate their inferiority in
terms of status and organisation with that of commitment, hardening their
position, increasing solidarity and thus the will to fight. This may in turn
narrow the space for compromise and make the finding of common ground on
which to build a negotiated settlement all the more difficult. Hence the
asymmetry can work as a vicious circle (King 1997, p.49-50).
3.4 A Life and Logic of its Own
Once started a conflict often gains its own momentum. Here we are again
speaking of the conflicts inherent dynamics and not runaway irrationality
whatever that might be. The grievances experienced in the course of conflict
may put both leaders and individual fighters in a position where there is no
way back.
Leaders become prisoners of a growing dilemma in the face of unspeakable
suffering which makes compromising increasingly difficult (Mller 1996,
p.33 and King 1997, p.43-44) The fighting may be prolonged in order to
justify the costs, with little concern for the additional costs to come if fighting
continues. As Charles King puts it: The potential benefits of continuing to
fight tend to be analysed prospectively, while the potential costs are normally
viewed retrospectively (King 1997, p.43). Furthermore it is often seen that
the root causes to the conflict becomes subordinate to the grievances
experienced during the cause of conflict. Grievances committed by the other
part can become a major point of contention between the belligerents, either
side refusing to negotiate because of actions taken during the course of the
conflict (King 1997, p.43).

Leaders or elites are often under pressure from domestic constituencies and/or
opposition demanding military success or no or least compromising, pushing
the leaders for a tougher stand in the struggle. The stakes in civil wars are
frequently seen as all-or-nothing, leaders on both sides therefore have an
incentive to gamble on the chance of attaining a military victory, even if the
odds of winning are relatively low. This exactly because a military defeat or a
compromise can mean their removal from office at the least or at the most
exile or death, thus there exist a strong incentive to continue fighting even
with bad odds (King 1997, p.31-32 and Mller 1996, p.33)[1].
For the warrior, having lived the life of a warrior for some time, there may be
no normalcy to return to, having lost home, land, possessions, friends, family,
job, etc. Some may even have grown accustomed to the life of a warrior, with
all the excitement and male bonding it involves (Mller 1996, p.33). In
intra-state wars, with more or less autonomous bands of warriors, this has a
great saying in the difficulties of laying down weapons and enter negotiations.
Furthermore the fact that intra-state war is being fought between people that
used to co-exist, maybe even as neighbours, you often see it degenerate into
blood feud-like vicious circles of revenge (Mller 1996, p.v).
War can create a momentum of its own but also special interests. As Charles
King writes:
In many civil wars, the over-arching political objectives that prompted the
turn to violence can become lost amid the grievances and interests produced
by wars prosecution (King 1997, p.37)
The original political goals of the belligerents can thus recede into the
background by the actual experience of war making. An extreme may be that
the parties to the conflict actually may have an interest in continuing fighting
or at least in not reaching a final negotiated solution. Insurgents, or factions of
it or factions within the state/government, may benefit economically from a
war-like situation. Having gained control of resourceful areas, gaining wealth
from the lawlessness that rules in such a situation, or benefiting from
responses by international organisations to what they term complex human
emergencies in the form of aid (King 1997, p.37-39). Or to quote another
author:
Some wars has begun to live on itself and become a system of social
reproduction. In these cases war is costly for the population but profitable for
a small minority. With the collapse of the state, violence becomes the essential
resources to gain economic profits. Besides weapons and drugs, timber,
minerals and even human labour force are export goods of societies at war.
Even foreign aid has become an important source of income for war-waging
militias (Jung 1997, p.10).

Sometimes this can even lead to a point where the lines between belligerent
forces fade away and they end up co-operating in exploiting non-combatant
populations (King 1997, p.17).
The nature of intra-state conflicts has made some scholars describe these
conflicts as medieval wars fought with modern weapons[2] (Mller 1996, p.21
and Ignatieff 1994, p.28) bringing to the scene actors that have not been seen
in Europe since that time: the warlord.
They appear wherever nation states disintegrate: in the Lebanon, Somalia,
northern India, Armenia, Georgia, Ossetia, Cambodia, the former
Yugoslavia. With their carphones, faxes and exquisite weaponry, they look
post-modern, but the reality is pure early medieval (Ignatieff 1994, p.28).
In the anarchical setting of intra-state conflict a privatisation of security
occurs and the warlord will be in clover, for he can provide security,
vengeance and wealth (Ignatieff 1994, p.30 and Mller 1996, p.i). In this way
Ignatieff describes the phenomenon of ethnic cleansing not as racial hatred
run wild but the Hobbesian setting taken to its logical conclusion. In this way
the warlord not only offers protection but a solution. If you cannot trust your
neighbours, drive them out. Ethnic cleansing is the rational solution to the
war of all against all. Live among your own, and you can live in peace. With
me and my boys to protect you (Ignatieff 1994, p.26-30).
3.5 The Security Dilemma
Some scholars have driven the argument of the Hobbesian state of nature a
step further using the notion of the security dilemma. This notion is a basic
concept from the realist tradition of international relations theory used to
describe the relationship between states in the international environment
characterised structurally by anarchy, meaning absence of a sovereign or
central authority, contributing to an environment of distrust/uncertainty and
thus the likelihood of non-intended conflict (Viotti 1993, p.48 and 582).
The main point in a discussion of the security dilemma, in international
relations, is the existence of complete anarchy, meaning the absence of a
central authority. In intra-state relations this is first of all never completely the
case. Contending groups rarely find themselves in a situation of complete
anarchy in this sense. Anarchy can however be approximated. From the
complete collapse of central government to the challenge by certain groups of
the governments legitimacy and its control over territory (Kaufman 1996,
p.151). A special case is represented by the collapse of imperial/colonial
regimes or federations which profitably can be viewed as a problem of
emerging anarchy (Posen 1993, p.103-104). Furthermore, as will be discussed
later, intra-state conflicts are seldom completely internal conflicts therefore

different degrees of regional/international anarchy should also be taken into

account, especially if the government or different groups within the state are
dependent on outside support, be it moral, financial or military support
(Brown 1993, p.6).
The security dilemma occurs in this environment of declining authority or
collapse of central authority (anarchy) when individual groups will start to
look for ways of securing/defend themselves (self-help), which in turn can
threaten and/or diminish the security of other individual groups (Posen 1993,
p.103-105 and Brown 1993, p.6). Ethnic conflict can change the nature of the
political system, making it resemble that of international relations. This when
anarchy reaches the point where the government cannot control its territory
enough to protect its citizens or is challenged by groups of citizens that seek
this protection via ethnic organisation, thus attaining attributes of
sovereignty (Kaufman 1996, p.150-151).
Once fighting has erupted the anarchical situation and security dilemma helps
to explain the protracted nature of these conflicts. First of all there are no
impartial institutions to enforce the commitment of warring sides to desist
from fighting and enter negotiations (King 1997, p.50). The security dilemma
is set in motion and can become self-sustaining; every action taken by the
other side to defend itself is seen as a threat and justifies further escalation
(Kaufman 1996, p.170). There are no overarching institutions to guarantee
security and thus to provide credible security guarantees, hence the
unwillingness to lay down arms and proceed to the negotiating table (King
1997, p.51).
There has been raised certain criticism towards the usage of the notion of
security dilemma on intra-state conflict. First of all it can be theoretical
questioned if you can talk of a structural security dilemma after the outbreak
of violence. Then it is not in itself the cause of conflict but merely explains
escalation (Roe 1997, p.15). Furthermore debate has also evolved around the
question if anarchy is a cause or a necessary condition for the security
dilemma to occur. The bottom line here will be, as many have concluded, that
whether it is a cause or a necessary condition it is clear that its role is
important (Roe 1997, p.5).
Criticism has also been raised about the fact that the notion of the security
dilemma is used to describe a situation of unintended conflict. When there is
talk of malign intentions you cannot talk of a real security dilemma. Several of
the quoted scholars (Posen and Kaufman) have used the anarchical situation
of the collapsing Yugoslavia, and the thus inherent security dilemma, as an
explanation for the eruption of violent conflict there. Criticism has been raised
as to the fact that in the Yugoslav case there were plenty signals of malign
intend, and you can therefore not talk of a real security dilemma but of either

an intended activated security dilemma or simply of a security problem/spiral

(Roe 1997, p.6-11).
The purpose of this section is not to get caught up in the theoretical discussion
if we can talk about a real security dilemma or not. That is if were talking
about malign intent or conflict as a tragedy, that would require if not another
thesis then a separate paper. My purpose is here to show that the anarchical
setting provides an inherently problematic security situation whether it is that
of a dilemma or a problem, which creates a certain dynamic of intra-state
conflict. In the analysis I will try to see what this concept can tell us about the
Georgian - South Ossetian conflict taking the above-mentioned criticism into
account.
However, a final critique, that will be useful in the coming analysis should be
mentioned here. Realist theory of international relations have always been
criticised for putting too much, or rather only, emphasis on the state and too
much emphasis on military aspects of these relationships. Especially in the
article of Barry R. Posen, and less in the article by Stuart J. Kaufman, I am
inclined to state the same. First of all you can almost hear the counting of if
not the warheads then kalashnikovs. Secondly the usage of the security
dilemma, with all reservations in mind, on intra-state conflicts, should make it
possible to open up for a more differentiated understanding of both security
and actors, instead of returning to the traditional focus on military security and
jump to the one-sided conclusion that ethnic groups rebelling makes them
equivalent to state actors.
Here it will be appropriate to introduce the notion of societal security as
something different from state security. The basic argument is that the
existence of states depends on its sovereignty, the existence of an ethnic group
on the other hand largely on its identity (Roe 1997, p.16 and Wver 1993,
p.25). Ole Wver, looking mainly at ethnic groups and nations, defines
societal security as:
...the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing
conditions and possible or actual threats. More specifically, it is about the
sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional
patterns of language, culture, association, and religious and national identity
and custom (Wver 1993, p.23)[3].
If these are threatened then it would be appropriate not only to look at military
means for the defence of the community. Non-military means of defence such
as the strengthening of identity will be of particular interest (Roe 1997, p.18).
In this way an action-reaction process on identity can unfold whereby we can
talk, if not of a societal security dilemma, then of a societal security problem.
Before getting too entangled in this discussion, which I of course will return to

as I commence, let me round off this chapter with the difference between
ethnic conflicts and intra-state conflicts.
3.6 Ethnic Conflicts and Intra-State Conflicts
In this chapter I have so far not made any distinctions between the notions
civil war, intra-state war, internal war or (armed) ethnic conflict. This I have
done on purpose since the structural inherent dynamics, I so far have
described, more or less are the same. There are however certain differences
that are important to mention.
First of all one have to be careful in using the term internal conflict since no
conflict is ever completely without either external interference or influence
nor does conflicts necessarily stop at borders. The question of (forced)
migration, ecology, natural reserves and the world economy as such are all
issues that makes this notion questionable and the notion intra-state conflict
more useful (Scherrer 1997, p.7).
The term intra-state conflict is however also not a straightforward notion. A
distinction in two main types of intra-state conflicts may be profitable. One
being conflicts over the state/government, its policies and political
programmes or simply the office. The other conflicts about state building or
the structure of the state, constitutionally or specifically territorial.
Conflicts about state-power are mainly of political/ideological character and
thus a territorial borderline between the belligerents cannot be drawn since
that would mean that the state would be divided. Domination, access to
influence or power-sharing seems to be solutions to this kind of conflicts. In
conflicts about state-building power-sharing seems out of the question since
the opposition does exactly not strive for a piece of the cake but its own
cake, i.e. its own state-structure. Thus more complex constitutional
arrangements or secession seems to be the answer (Wallensteen 1994, p.7677)
Armed intra-state ethnic conflict can both be about state-power or state
building and of cause have a varying degree of external interference or
develop into an inter-state conflict or vice versa. An important thing to make
clear is that ethnic conflicts are special because of the fact that ethnic groups
constitute whole societies and potential political units. Speaking about
primarily ethnic groups and nations Ole Wver phrase it in the following
way:
...a societal identity is one that is not only robust enough in construction, and
comprehensive enough in its following, but also broad enough in the quality
of identity it carries, to enable it to compete with the territorial state as a

political organizing principle. A societal identity is able to reproduce itself

independently of the state and even in opposition to the states organisational
principle (Wver 1993, p.23).
What sets ethnic intra-state conflicts apart from ideological/(political) intrastate conflicts is thus primarily the fact that ethnic groups constitute potential
whole societies. The war in Peru, between Sendero Luminoso and the
Peruvian government is primarily political and ideological in nature. Conflicts
like these are about the state or more specifically about the office of
government and/or its policies and political programmes (Wallensteen 1994,
p.145 and Brown 1993, p.5). Ethnic intra-state conflicts can also be about the
seizure of state power, but because they can and often want their own
governance, these conflicts are unique. If the parties to an intra-state conflict
are political parties or classes, territory does not matter; if the parties on the
other hand are ethnic groups, territory is very important since it stands as the
optimal solution in accordance to the previous treated theories of
nationalism (Forsberg 1997, p.24). Some ethnic conflicts may not have
territorial solutions if the populations are too intertwined and the conflict may
go on till some sort of balance have been found - an extreme solution may
be that of genocide, mass population exchanges or ethnic cleansing, as we
unfortunately have experienced.
3.7 Summing Up and Conclusions
In this chapter we have identified certain inherent structural factors, which
helps to account for the intractability and protracted nature of armed ethnic
intra-state conflict. Factors quite apart from the usually ascribed, such as
irrationality, deeply felt values/identities and deeply rooted ancient hatreds by
the belligerents.
Ethnic intra-state conflicts are typically non-state conflicts wholly or partly. It
is played out in an institutional anarchy characterised by the absence of a state
structure or the existence of a weak one. There is a lack or absence of
organisational and/or institutionalised practises, they are fought with less
permissive rules and without sharply defined borderlines.
They are characterised by an asymmetrical relationship, in commitment,
organisation and status between the contesting parties, which function as
structural obstacles to a negotiated settlement of conflict. Internal factionalism
is also likely to be more intense in intra-state conflicts. Several parties and
likely leaders can emerge and the question is then who should and can sign a
final peace-agreement.
The combatants are often of very irregular nature without a traditional military
line of command, operating without much co-ordination or often on their own.

An assessment of military costs and benefits with the overall political

objectives is thus extremely difficult. The armies or groups, are often poorly
equipped and provisioned and rely on foraging and banditry rather than
supplies from the headquarters.
The fighting can not only be characterised as highly irregular but also sporadic
and spasmodic. When front lines exist they often run through densely
populated areas, cutting through cities, towns or even neighbourhoods. The
war often becomes a permanent situation, which blend in with everyday life.
Furthermore, once started a conflict often gains its own momentum. The
original political goals of the belligerents can recede into the background by
the actual experience of war making. Either by grievances experienced during
conflict, or simply because there is no normalcy to return to, or even because
the state of war/anarchy provides a profitable situation. Thus some wars begin
to live a life of themselves and become a system of social reproduction.
In short intra-state wars tend to be more messy and bloody, even just because
of the fact that at least one of belligerents is a non-state actor. By this I am not
saying that per definition the insurgents are to be blamed for the irregular
warfare and the brutalities, it might as well be the incumbent
group/government, or more likely both exactly because of the asymmetrical
structure of conflict. The conflicts evolves in an anarchical setting best
described by distrust, mutual suspicion and uncertainty, being highly fluid and
spasmodic, often weighing the short-term cost and benefits rather than
thinking on the overall political objectives and often developing a life of its
own.
These factors have a great saying in determining the specific course and
nature of armed ethnic intra-state conflict, and have to be considered in an
analysis of these conflicts. Not just jumping to the easy conclusion ascribing
the intractability and protracted nature to the irrationality, deeply felt
values/identities and deeply rooted ancient hatreds by the belligerents.
As for the security dilemma discussion, it is important to note that armed
ethnic intra-state conflict is special in the way that ethnic groups constitute
whole societies and that they are potentially able to compete with the
territorial state as a political organising principle. An ethnic community or
society within the state represents an alternative societal relationship. Either
only in terms of identity or if regionally based also in terms of territory. It
would thus be appropriate to make some linkages to the previous theoretical
chapter on nationalism and ethnicity.
Inherently nationalism is conflictual in a multiethnic setting. Nationalism can
generate security and insecurity in as much as it can both strengthen and

weaken societal identity. Nation building can be perceived by the minorities

of a state as a threat to their societal security - to their identity. This more so if
it is grounded on an ethnic interpretation of the nation, less if it is grounded on
a civic interpretation of the nation. On the other hand the ethnicity of the
minorities can also be perceived as a threat towards the nation-state and its
nation-building project as it, as mentioned, represent an alternative societal
relationship and if regional based it can even represent a threat to the
territorial integrity of the state.
Societies are constituted by identity; a society will not survive without its
identity. As we have seen in the chapter on nationalism and ethnicity, national
and ethnic identities are not objective entities, constructed or imagined yes,
but nevertheless social realities. They are defined subjectively around selected
objective elements. Elements like language, names, dress, religion and other
cultural practices. If what constitutes the collective identity is threatened, not
only by deportation or killing of members of ethnic minorities, but also by
e.i. forbidding the usage of language, religious practices, changing of names,
closure of places of education or the revoke of cultural or political autonomy,
then an obvious defensive response will be to strengthen the societal identity.
The state may response by a harsher assimilation policy and thus a societal
security spiral may be set in motion. One may also talk of a societal security
dilemma. This if the concern of an ethnic community only is to defend their
identity within the state via cultural rights and/or autonomy and not secession.
This can be interpreted by the state or majority group as a first step towards
secession and therefore a threat towards not only state security, in form of
violation of the territorial integrity, but also to their societal security as some
members of the majority group would become a minority in a new foreign
state.
In this way nationalism can function in the same way as arms in the classical
security dilemma. The emergence of an ethno-nationalist coalition coming to
power is a threat to the societal security of the other ethnic groups.
In continuation of the distinction between civic-nationalism and ethnonationalism (section 2.1), where the first is based on institutions and the latter
on culture/ethnicity you can further broaden the security discussion not only
speaking of arms, territory and identity but also social and economical
security.
When institutions collapse or do not fulfil peoples basic need they will look
for satisfactory alternative structures to provide social and economic security.
The ethnic community represents precisely such an alternative societal
relationship. Security should hence not only be understood in
physical/military terms or in terms of identity but also in less existentialist

terms such as social and economic security, which however of cause can
become a question of survival.

[1] The role of key leaders in conflicts can pose a mayor obstacle in reaching a
settlement in several ways. First of all their personal attitudes and preferences or
even devotion to the cause can make them incapable of compromise. The
leaders, or elites, can be so committed to the cause or the retaining of their
positions that this may make a lasting solution very difficult to reach.
Furthermore, the distinction between the leaders, their personalities and
preferences, and the aims of the struggle can as the conflict drags on, begin to
fade so that the two are seen as inseparable. The leaders can thereby be
identified with the struggle itself and both the leaders and their followers will
not accept any negotiated solution that would diminish the status of the wartime
leadership. In some instances the struggle itself has lead leaders to power and
without the struggle their power might diminish. This can also work in the
opposite direction in the way that the opposing side may see the enemy
leadership as the mayor obstacle to settlement and demand the removal of the
opposing elite or leader as a precondition for settlement or even negotiations
(King 1997, p.30-31).
[2] In some instances post-modern wars fought with premodern weapons
(Mller 1996, p.21).

[3] In relation to the theoretical chapter on nationalism and ethnicity

one might criticise Wver for approaching a rigid understanding of
these collective identities, it is however also important to acknowledge
the social reality and perceptions on behalf of the ethnic groups and in a
conflict situation where ones identity is threatened identity often
becomes non-negotiable.
4 The Georgian-South Ossetian Conflict
The disintegration of the Soviet Union plunged the former Soviet Republic of Georgia into
political chaos and civil war. One of the first areas of conflict was South Ossetia, an autonomous
region within Georgia during the Soviet period and the scene of a bloody conflict in the period
1989-92.
The conflict that ensued resulted in a death toll of around one thousand people and refugees
numbering tens of thousands. It has left South Ossetia separated from Georgia but still
unrecognised except as a part of the Georgian state according to international law. Soon eight
years will have past since the fighting stopped and a cease-fire was implemented. The situation
especially in Georgia, though also in the surrounding regions, has changed, but the GeorgianSouth Ossetian problem remains unsolved.

4.1 Basic Facts

South Ossetia covers an area of 3,900 square kilometres. It is situated on the southern foothills of

the Greater Caucasian Mountain range, surrounded by the rest of Georgia on its southern, western
and eastern sides, leaving only the northern side open through a tunnel towards the Russian
Federation, or to be more exact to the republic of North Ossetia within the Russian Federation.

According to the 1989 census, taken just before the first phase of the Georgian-South Ossetian
Conflict, around 98,000 people lived in South Ossetia. There seems to be agreement among both
Georgian and South Ossetian sources about the total distribution of Georgians and South
Ossetians in South Ossetia and Georgia proper. Both parties rely on the numbers given in the
1989 Soviet census, according to which there were 164,000 Ossetians (roughly 3% of the
population of Georgia). Of these, some 65,000 lived in the Autonomous Oblast of South Ossetia,
while some 99,000 lived in other parts of Georgia.
In South Ossetia, according to the 1989 census, Ossetians accounted for approximately two-thirds
(66.61%) of the population and Georgians the other third (29.44%). The remaining 4% are made
up of Russians, Armenians and Jews.
In Tskhinvali, the administrative centre of South Ossetia, Ossetians constituted about 74% of the
population, Georgians 16% and others around 9%.
Because of the conflict, these figures have changed drastically. It is estimated that about half of
the Ossetians who lived in Georgia proper moved to North Ossetia, while a less significant
number have gone to South Ossetia. Some who lived in South Ossetia also moved to North
Ossetia.
In South Ossetia, many Georgians have left for other parts of Georgia. In Tskhinvali Georgian
sources estimate that very few Georgians remain. Those who do are mostly elderly people.
According to Ossetian sources, most Georgians left Tskhinvali when the conflict started. Official
sources estimate that around 5,000 Georgians have returned to Tskhinvali now that the situation
has calmed. According to unofficial Ossetian sources, these figures are exaggerated, and in fact

there are only about 500 Georgians in Tskhinvali.

In other parts of South Ossetia the situation is different. Many Georgians have left, but there are
some Georgian villages (particularly in the north) around Tskhinvali city, which today are not
only inhabited by Georgians but are also still under Georgian jurisdiction. Hence, when the
parliamentary and presidential elections took place in Georgia on 5 November 1995, there were
also elections conducted in these parts of South Ossetia.
Generally speaking, Georgians and Ossetians have been living in peace with each other in recent
times, except for this conflict and the episode in 1920, which will be described later. The two
groups have had a high level of interaction. This can be seen in the high rate of intermarriages.
Ossetians and Georgians basically share orthodox Christianity[1], though some Georgians would
state that the Ossetians are not Christian but pagans. In fact, there are elements of paganism in
both groups, but nevertheless they both take pride in their religion, and both toast and venerate
Saint George as their patron Saint.
As languages, Ossetian and Georgian differ significantly, as they are from two different language
families. Georgian is a unique subgroup of the Caucasian group and has its own unique alphabet.
Ossetian belongs to the Indo-European group and is distinctly related to Iranian (Farsi) but uses
the Cyrillic alphabet with Ossetian modifications. According to some sources, only 14% of the
Ossetians in South Ossetia speak Georgian (Fuller 1991, p.21), and although their language is
Ossetian, Russian seems to be more commonly used (Weston 1994, p.14), this at least in official
structures although I personally have experienced a development toward an increased usage of
Ossetian language in the period 1995-1997.
When Georgia was part of the Soviet Union, Georgian was the official state language, with some
of the minority languages having equal status in minority areas. In South Ossetia, Russian
functioned more or less as the official language in the school system and in public administration.
Still, there were Ossetian and Georgian schools, where only one language was taught and the
other ignored[2] (Saakashvili 1992, p.4).

4.2 History
The history of the area, including the history of relations between Ossetians and Georgians, has
been made one of the key issues of the conflict. The central question is who came first and hence
to whom does the land historically belong? If every square meter of soil in the former Yugoslavia
is filled with history and legends, the same is true for every inch of the Caucasus. Several
historical publications have been written by both Georgian and Ossetian historians to attempt to
prove the other side wrong. As Eric Hobsbawm, a historian himself, writes: Historians are to
nationalism what poppy-growers in Pakistan are to heroin-addicts: we supply the essential raw
material for the market (Hobsbawm 1992, p.23).
The Georgian position is exemplified by the following quote: "...Ossetian settlements began
mostly in the last two or three centuries (which is very recent time for Georgians)..." (Nodia 1992.
p.39). This position was further sharpened during the period of nationalist leader Zviad
Gamsakhurdia, who called the Ossetians "ungrateful guests of Georgia", having their historical
homeland in North Ossetia (Jones 1993, p.294-295).
The Georgians see South Ossetia as one of the oldest centres of "the material and spiritual

culture" of the Georgian people that has been an indivisible part of Georgia for centuries
(Sakvarelidze 1993, p.25-26 and Zhorzholiani 1995, G., p.3).
They claim that the Ossetians are newcomers to this area, having their historical homeland in
North Ossetia and consequently that they have no right to territorial autonomy. This in contrast to
their position on Abkhazia (one of the other autonomies within the republic of Gerogia), which is
recognised by the Georgians as the historical homeland for the Abkhaz, together with the
Georgians, and a territory which the Abkhaz are entitled to have (Lomouri 1993, p.5).
The Ossetian standpoint is that they have been living in this area for centuries on both sides of the
Greater Caucasian Mountain Range. The South Ossetians consider themselves to be the southern
branch of the Ossetian nation. Furthermore they see the Ossetians as descendants of the Alans, a
Scythian tribe that came to the Caucasus in ancient times and merged with the local population
(Siukayev 1994, p.17-21).
Ossetians state that they and the Georgians have lived side by side for more than two thousand
years. In the wars against invading powers the Ossetians always fought by the Georgians' side.
They refer to the fact that the famous 12th Century Georgian Queen Tamara was married to an
Ossetian (Siukayev 1994, p.9). It is also claimed that Stalin was half Ossetian half Georgian.
Hence, during Khruschevs time, when Stalin fell into disfavour in Moscow, both Vladikavkas
(capital of North Ossetia) and Tbilisi made claims for his body.
Georgian sources agree that the Ossetians are the ancestors of the Alans, but they stress that this
merger happened in the North Caucasus. According to Georgian sources, Ossetians first started to
migrate across the mountains in the 17th and 18th Centuries, appearing first on the southern
slopes and then in the lowlands of what of the Georgians call Shida Kartli (meaning the inner and
unifying province of the country).
Georgian sources mention that after the Mongol-Tartar invasions in the 13th century, the
Ossetians (encouraged by the Mongols) attempted to occupy the territory south of the mountains
but were forced back by the Georgians. According to Georgian sources, the Ossetians began their
settlement in Georgia in the 1860s in the estates of Georgian feudal lords (hence one of the
Georgian names for South Ossetia is Samachablo, after the feudal Duke Machabeli). By 1880, the
number of Ossetians in the area amounted to 52,000 (Sakvarelidze 1993, p.26-27).
If one can talk about a collective memory or consciousness among the Georgians it is that they
see the Georgian nation as the eternal historical victim in relation to the surrounding powers, from
Persia and the Ottoman Empire to Russia. From this perspective, the minorities of Georgia are
often seen in the light of a possible fifth column. Furthermore the demographic conditions in
Georgia, with the minorities primarily situated in the periphery, have given reason to great
concern and insecurity in Georgia as to the territorial integrity of Georgia.
This perception collides with that of the Ossetians who also see themselves as victims. As the
Chairman of the Supreme Council of South Ossetia (now president), Ludwig Chibirov, puts it:
"...this is the second time in one generation that we have been the victims of genocide by the
Georgians; in that way our demand for independence should be seen not as idealism but as
pragmatism" (From conversation with Chibirov, July 1995).
Historically, as now, the Ossetians have seen themselves as having no other choice than to look

towards Moscow. As one Ossetian puts it:

"...this striving for survival as an ethno-historical entity - and identity - drove us "to side with
Soviet Russia" - not our genetic love for bolshevism, sovietism and other "isms"..." (Skurbaty
1991, p.4).
Both interpretations or perceptions of this contain some validity and in this way the conflict also
goes back to the first attempt of modern Georgian state-building in 1918-1922.
After the collapse of the Tsarist Empire in 1917 (of which Georgia had been part of since 1801)
Georgia declared its independence. Georgia formed the Democratic Republic of Georgia, led by
the Georgian social democrats - the so-called Menshevics. The country was recognised by several
Western states (Sakvarelidze 1993, p.27). On 7 May 1920, a treaty of friendship was signed
between Georgia and Russia in which, according to Georgian sources Russia recognised South
Ossetia as an integral part of Georgia. It was named as Tiflis Gubernia and included the district
Shida Kartli, therefore including what was to become the South Ossetian Autonomous Region
(Oblast) (Menteshashvili 1992, p.61-63).
The Ossetian historical experience and their interpretation of events in Georgia are markedly
different. The Ossetians joined Russia voluntarily in 1774, and they state that in the agreement
nothing was mentioned distinguishing North and South Ossetia. Therefore when Georgia left
Russia in 1918 it was natural for South Ossetia not to stay within the framework of Georgia.
Hence on 8 June 1920, South Ossetia declared independence as a Soviet Republic (Siukayev
1994, p.6).
Georgia sent its army to crush what they saw as a South Ossetian uprising challenging the
territorial integrity of Georgia. Russia protested this action as an intervention into South Ossetian
internal affairs.
The South Ossetians saw this as a denial of their right to self-determination. According to
Ossetian sources about 5000 Ossetians were killed, and 13,000 subsequently died from hunger
and epidemics. The South Ossetians consider this to be the first genocide committed by the
Georgians (Skurbaty 1991, p.2).
Conversely, the Georgians view this as the first attempt by Ossetians to seize Georgian territory
and the first attempt by Russia to destabilise Georgia by encouraging South Ossetia to secede. In
1921 the Red Army invaded Georgia and annexed it.
One year later, the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast within Georgia was declared[3]. Hence,
the Georgians see South Ossetia as a concept forcibly and artificially introduced when Georgia
was annexed by Soviet Russia following the old imperial principle of divide et impera
(Sakvarelidze 1993, p.27-28).
On the other hand, Ossetian historians dedicate much effort to show that the name South Ossetia
was not an invention by the Soviet Union, but used much earlier; this they demonstrate by using
Russian, Armenian, Western and Georgian sources. They state that the first written source
mentioning the name South Ossetia is in the early middle ages by Armenians (as for example in
Gagloiti).
When the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast was created, the city of Tskhinvali was chosen as

its capital. According to Georgian sources, it was an almost completely Georgian populated city
and the decision was taken despite local Georgian protests. The same Georgians remark that after
the establishment of the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast, the ethnic composition of the town
changed completely:
"It happened so that this oldest Georgian town on the bank of the Liakhvi river became Ossetian
(Totadze 1994, p.49).
Against this highly contentious historical background, or rather the perceptions of it, it has been
seen by some Georgians that the Ossetian issue inevitable would rise again (Nodia 1992, p.39).
The question was only when and how.
4.3 The Conflict
Georgia was one of the first republics of the Soviet Union to seize the opportunity of the glasnost
policy of Mikhail Gorbachev and call for independence.
The situation at the end of the eighties was characterised by a massive wave of nationalist
euphoria and political turmoil, leading to independence in April 1991. The leader of the
independence movement (eventually the first president of Georgia) Zviad Gamsakhurdia, based
his popularity on a nationalistic agenda. Primarily, it was directed against the imposed
Soviet/Russian communist rule, but it also manifested itself as Greater Georgian nationalism at
the expense of the minority groups of Georgia[4]. In this atmosphere of heightened and often
antagonistic Georgian nationalism, the South Ossetians felt threatened and began to organise
themselves. Looking towards the situation in Abkhazia, the South Ossetian nationalists formed a
popular front called Ademon Nykhas (Popular Shrine) and began to express their national
aspirations through solidarity with the Abkhazian nationalists.
However, already in early 1988 popular protest unfolded in South Ossetia due to the outbreak of a
typhoid epidemic, to which the citys water system and hence insufficient administrative
management were seen as the causes and at first the local Ossetian communist authorities were
held responsible (interview with Alexander Rusetski, chairman of Helsinki Citizens Assembly
Georgia, Tbilisi, June 1995 and Hansen 1998, p.15) This changed soon and became ammunition
in the rhetorics of the national movement and hence attention was shifted towards the Georgians
who were blamed.
In the spring of 1989, the leader of Ademon Nykhas, Alan Chochiev, published an open letter,
declaring his groups support for the Abkhazian campaign against the opening of a Georgian
branch of Tbilisi university in Sukhumi, Abkhazia. This triggered the first clashes between
Ossetians and Georgians in South Ossetia. Furthermore on 26 May, the anniversary of the
declaration of Georgian independence in 1918 clashes between irregular groups of Georgians
(encouraged by Zviad Gamsakhurdia) and local Ossetians took place. But full-scale fighting still
had to come. The entrenchment took the form of declarations and manifestations. Georgian
preparations for independence from the Soviet Union and nation-state restoration. South
Ossetians responding to this perceived threat by seeking greater autonomy, and eventually
separation from Georgia.
In August 1989, the Supreme Council of Georgia put forward a Georgian language programme.
Though Georgian at this time already was the state language of the republic, with some of the
minority languages having equal status in minority areas, this was a tightening stressing that

Georgian should be used in all public spheres of society. This programme involved not only
increased use of the Georgian language, but also, for example, a Georgian language test for entry
into higher education, programs for the promotion of Georgian history, the institutionalisation of
previously unofficial Georgian national holidays, creation of republican military units comprising
only Georgians, and the resettlement of Georgians in areas dominated by minorities (Jones 1993,
p.294-295). Some of these measures are understandable in the process of Georgian state building,
but in an atmosphere of nationalist euphoria and chauvinism it increased the insecurity felt by the
minorities.
The South Ossetians started formulating their own intentions in response to this. In September
1989, Ademon Nykhas addressed an appeal to the USSR Council of Ministers, the USSR
Supreme Soviet, and the CPSU Central Committee protesting that the Georgian language
programme was antidemocratic and unconstitutional and furthermore they asked for the question
of a unification of North and South Ossetia to be discussed at the CPSU Central Committee
plenum of nationalities. In November, the Supreme Council of South Ossetia passed a resolution
demanding that Ossetian should be the official language of the Autonomous Oblast. Moscow and
Tbilisi refused this both.
A group from the Supreme Council of South Ossetia demanded that its status should be changed
from autonomous Oblast to autonomous republic, changing the status to the same as that of
Abkhazia. The Supreme Council of Georgia reacted immediately, declaring the claim illegal and
stepped up the war of declarations by stating that the Supreme Council of Georgia had the right to
veto any Soviet law which went against Georgian interests[5]. Furthermore the Georgian
authorities responded by firing the First Party Secretary of the Oblast.
On November 23, 1989 Zviad Gamsakhurdia organised what he called "a peaceful meeting of
reconciliation". Thousands of Georgians, in buses and cars, left for Tskhinvali. This was naturally
perceived by the Ossetians as a clear power demonstration and a threat to the South Ossetians.
The Ossetians blocked the road and clashes took place, in which several people were wounded.
This episode clearly aggravated the situation - armed conflict seemed imminent. South Ossetians
started arming themselves and Georgians in South Ossetia started moving their belongings from
their homes, leaving only things they could carry with them. Now only the final declarations from
both sides would function as the starting signal for full scale fighting.
In August 1990, prior to the parliamentary election in Georgia, the Supreme Soviet of Georgia
passed an election law that banned any party whose activity was confined to specific areas of
Georgia from participating in the election. This law could only be interpreted by the South
Ossetians as a way of cutting them off from influence and a way of showing them what they
could expect in an independent Georgia.
On 20 September 1990, the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast declared independence as the
South Ossetian Democratic Soviet Republic, appealing to Moscow to recognise it as an
independent subject of the Soviet Union. When the election of the Georgian Supreme Council
took place in October 1990, it was boycotted by the South Ossetians. The election resulted in a
victory for the "Round Table - Free Georgia" coalition headed by the nationalist Zviad
Gamsakhurdia.
In response to this and as a manifestation of their independence from Tbilisi, the South Ossetians
held elections to their parliament in December 1990. According to Ossetian sources, 72% of the

population of the republic took part in the election, which exceeds the percentage of the Ossetian
population. The Georgian response was swift. Within days the Georgian Supreme Council
cancelled the results of the election and voted to abolish the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast
as a separate administrative unit within the Republic of Georgia.
Now the scene was set for direct confrontation. Following violent incidents in and around
Tskhinvali, a state of emergency was declared by the Georgian parliament in the Tskhinvali and
Java regions of South Ossetia on 12 December 1990. Troops from Russia's and Georgia's MVD
(Interior Ministry) were dispatched and the commander of the Georgian MVD troops was
appointed as the mayor of Tskhinvali. According to South Ossetian sources, the Georgian militia
started disarming the South Ossetian militia with the consent of Moscow.
In the first days of 1991, the Supreme Council of Georgia passed a law on the formation of the
National Guard of Georgia. A few days later, on the night of 5 January (in the days of the
Orthodox Christmas), several thousand Georgian troops entered Tskhinvali and committed
atrocities. According to the South Ossetians, this was apparently in agreement with the local
Russian troops.
The war took place mainly in and around Tskhinvali, around it the Georgian villages and north
along the road to North Ossetia, the lifeline of the South Ossetians[6]. The fighting in Tskhinvali
first resulted in a divided town - an Ossetian controlled western part and a Georgian controlled
eastern part. After some 20 days of fighting, the Georgians withdrew to the hills around the city.
The Ossetians say they forced the Georgians out, while the Georgians say that, after a cease-fire
agreement mediated by the Russian commander on the ground, they withdrew to the outskirts of
the city.
This uneasy situation lasted for the remainder of the war. The Georgians sat in the hills around
Tskhinvali, besieging the city, and other fighting took place around the city in the nearby villages
and along the road to North Ossetia. According to South Ossetian sources 115 villages and
settlements[7] were burnt down during the conflict (interview with President Chibirov, 4
September 1997, Tskhinvali).
In August 1991, in connection to the failed coup attempt in Moscow, the Soviet Union dissolves
but the Russian MVD (interior) troops leaves however, first in December 1991. In late December
the same year internal fighting erupts in Tbilisi between opposition and government forces.
Georgian military attention is shifted towards the capital. Gamsakhurdia is ousted from power
and an interim state council is created, which in March 1992 appoints Edward Shevardnadze as
its chairman.
In the spring of 1992 the fighting escalates, with sporadic Russian involvement. On 24 June 1992,
Shevardnadze and Russian President Boris Yeltsin meet to discuss the question of South Ossetia
and a cease-fire. A cease-fire is agreed upon and on 14 July 1992, a CIS peacekeeping operation
began, consisting of a Joint Control Commission and joint CIS -Georgian - South Ossetian
military patrols.
4.4 Combatants and the Nature of Warfare
Evidence of brutal atrocities committed by the other side has been produced n masse. Lists of
detailed descriptions of brutal assaults on individuals and groups, which I will spare the reader
from, have been published, and just mention that this includes decapitated infants, raped women

and execution in front of family members and so on. In the administrative centre of South
Ossetia, Tskhinvali, signs of destruction is still evident. There are bullet holes in almost every
building and several houses remain in ruins. According to Georgian sources, some of these
houses belonged to Georgian families, who fled or were driven out of Tskhinvali, their houses
subsequently burnt. Another monument of the war is School No. 5. Not being able to bury their
dead in the cemeteries because of the shelling and the snipers, the Ossetians used the school
playground instead.
In addition to this, in lack of a better word, front-line fighting, the Georgians carried out a
blockade by controlling the road south of the tunnel, which connects South Ossetia to North
Ossetia, using the Georgian villages along the road north of Tskhinvali as strongholds. Georgians
disconnected electricity supplies to Tskhinvali, and blocked the road by which the city received
food and other products. In February 1991, the central Russian television characterised the
situation in the city as "worse than Leningrad in 1942. The entire city is without heating and
electricity...there is no food" (Fuller 1991, p.22). On several occasions, the South Ossetians
blocked the Georgian villages north of Tskhinvali from the rest of Georgia as well (Helsinki
Watch 1992, p.16-17).
As mentioned, troops from Russia's MVD had been in Tskhinvali from the start of the conflict.
Their role was rather ambiguous and even contradictory. According to the Ossetians, they did not
try to stop the Georgians from taking Tskhinvali. Meanwhile the Soviet Union collapsed and in
December 1991, the Russian MVD troops left Tskhinvali. According to Georgian sources, the
Russian MVD gave their arms to the Ossetians. Incidents of more overt assistance given by the
Russian army were to follow.
In June 1992, the Chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet, Ruslan Khasbulatov, made a
statement in which he described the Georgian actions in South Ossetia as genocide which could
force Russia to consider the South Ossetians authorities' request to join the Russian Federation.
Shortly afterwards it was reported that heavy weaponry with Russian identification marks was
used against the Georgians. Edward Shevardnadze, having been appointed as the chairman of the
interim State Council of Georgia (March 1992), made a statement condemning the Russian armed
forces' open participation in the conflict on the South Ossetian side.
The Georgians claim that the Russian army helped and supplied the Ossetians several times
during the conflict. The Ossetians deny this, saying that they fought alone with no outside help.
Most independent observers agree that the Russian forces were not innocent on-lookers in the
conflict. Some argue that the actions of the Russian troops were a reflection of decisions made by
independent-minded generals rather than as a part of some sinister plan to destabilise Georgia.
Nevertheless, the defeats of Georgia, in both South Ossetia and Abkhazia, at that time, fitted
perfectly into Russian political and strategic interests in the region. Georgia subsequently crawled
to membership of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), accepted (though it has yet to
ratify) an agreement to allow Russian military bases for a period of 25 years and signed a treaty
of friendship with Russia.
In the end, Georgia changed, or rather had to change its strategy towards Russia to a more cooperative one. Some call it submissive - others realistic. Certainly, Shevardnadze made concerted
attempts to stop the fighting in South Ossetia after coming to power - approaching both the
Russians and the South Ossetians. The Ossetians contest this, stating that after he came to power,
some of the most severe shelling of Tskhinvali took place (Birch 1995, p.48).

It should however, be stated that the nature of this military mission can best be described as
confused and anarchic. The Georgian troops in the area were not a disciplined armed formation.
The commanders and soldiers were often acting in their own interests or giving in to the
emotional mood of the local civilian population. On the Ossetian side the situation was no less
complicated. Several political factions had armed formations of their own and their interests did
not always coincide. At one point the Minister of Information of South Ossetia, Stanislav
Kochiyev, was asked whether he was aware of the existence of forces on Ossetian-controlled
territory that were not obeying the Ossetian leadership; he did not deny this possibility (The
Current Digest 1992, p.15).
The aspirations of armed groups working outside the control of the recognised leaderships created
an atmosphere of tension throughout the first part of 1992. Cease-fires were violated, hostages
taken and civilian targets bombarded. In a particularly serious incident on 20th May 1992, 36
Ossetians, including women and children, were killed in lorries and cars on a secondary road
Northwest of Tskhinvali. The incident threatened to bring Russia even more directly into the
conflict on the side of the South Ossetians. Hard-liners in the Duma used the incident to accuse
Georgia of genocide; in retaliation, helicopters with Russian markings bombarded Georgiancontrolled villages.
Greg Hansen, a researcher for the American Humanitarianism and War Project & Local
Capacities for Peace Project, whom I have met on several occasions, has as part of this project
made a list, which describes the pattern of warfare in the Caucasus, which I find deserves to be
quoted in its full length:
The Nature of Warfare in the Caucasus
The following patterns have emerged that are common to the violent conflicts in the region:
Lack of accountability of military and paramilitary forces to political structures. Autonomous
military action by individual units, without consent or knowledge of legitimate authorities, and a
readiness to take hostile action in response to rumours (such as reports of atrocities);
Uncommonly poor command, control and communications, and unclear, weak, or nonexistent
chains of command within and between formations;
Extensive cross-fertilization of criminal and military activity, profiteering within and often
between armed formations at all levels, sometimes across the lines of conflict;
Employment of mercenaries, contract soldiers, poorly trained conscripts, and the proliferation of
undisciplined, untrained, and often uncontrollable militias and factions, sometimes under the
guise of civilian organizations;
Poor or non-existent logistics and supply capacities leading to looting for subsistence and other
abuses of the civilian population;
Prolific drunkenness often leading to unrestrained, arbitrary behaviour;
Indiscriminate artillery, rocket, and aerial bombardment of built up areas, including civilian
residential areas and infrastructure;

Intentional targeting or commandeering of civilian locations and infrastructure including schools,

hospitals, waterworks, religious symbols, historical archives, museums, etc.;
Soviet-style counterinsurgency strategy which places the onus for maintaining order and
nonbelligerency upon civilian heads of administration, elders, and others who are subsequently
perceived as partisan and drawn into conflict;
Intentional disruption of essential services including food distribution, electricity, water, and
natural gas supplies;
Intentional provocation of displacement of civilians through military action;
Indiscriminate mining with little or no record-keeping of mined areas;
Use of civilians, including women, children, the elderly, and those in flight from conflict, as
human shields to mask or protect combat operations;
Extensive hostage taking and arbitrary detention;
Systematic destruction or looting to render depopulated areas uninhabitable in the long term;
Physical and administrative obstruction of access for humanitarian organizations to civilian
populations before, during, and after military action;
General disregard for international humanitarian law and other recognized restraints on the
conduct of warfare.
(Hansen 1998, p.11).
I have fortunately not experienced any actual fighting as I came to the area after fighting had
ended and the cease-fire had functioned for several years, but I do recognise the description form
these above mentioned points. I have seen the destruction, spoken to refugees on both sides,
former combatants from each side and been in close contact to militias and Russian peacekeepers
at different checkpoints. I have often been temporary retained by Russian peacekeeping soldiers
looking like sixteen years old boys, not knowing what to do with a Danish guy saying he works
for an NGO, calling on their superior, completely drunk and angry about being disrupted from his
morning drinking session, at checkpoints in no-mans-land. In the other conflict-zone, Abkhazia, I
got, through several trips to the region acquainted with the commander of an Abkhaz checkpoint
in the Georgian populated area of Gali under Abkhaz de facto jurisdiction. On one occasion he
entrusted to me that him and his men had not been provisioned for weeks and soon would have to
find provision in the nearby Georgian village. This at a relative peaceful time of that conflict. In
times of actual warfare less co-ordination and impulsive behaviour on behalf of the combatants
will be the case.
In the Georgian South Ossetian conflict the armed formations on both sides, but most notably
on the Georgian side, consisted of independent armed formations or rather paramilitary groups.
As many as six groups are said to have participated in the conflict on Georgian side besides the
National Guard (which was just formed days before the actual invasion): the White Eagles,
White George, White Falcons, Black Panthers, the Kutaisi National Guard, and the Merab
Kostava Society. These groups consisted of between 50 and 200 men and did seldom co-ordinate

their activities. Some were loyal to the president, some belonging to the opposition, others were
mafia-affiliated groups. Besides these groups the villagers often had their own defence groups in
lack of governmental protection from a regular army (Helsinki Watch 1992, p.13-14).
The South Ossetian Republican Guard, established in November 1991, was about the time of the
conflict said to be consisting of about 2400 men (Helsinki Watch 1992, p.13). However, as in the
Georgian case, it is difficult to speak of a regular army as the Ossetians, as mentioned, also were
organised in equivalent small groups belonging to different political factions also with lack of coordination and accountability. Finally it should be mentioned that because of the degeneration of
the Soviet armed forces physically and in terms of morale and society as such, arms supplies have
been no problem on the contrary and this, not withstanding a permanent cease-fire, is still a
problem.
4.5 The Present Situation
You can say that the actual fighting ceased because the Georgian government and the different
forces were dragged into other conflicts. Georgia had to seek a cease-fire agreement with a
Russian presence. In December 1991 the political civil war in Tbilisi began between opposition
forces and the government of Zviad Gamsakhurdia, who was ousted. Shortly after proGamsakhurdia forces (the so-called Zviadists) started an armed rebellion in Western Georgia and
simultaneously the situation in Abkhazia worsened and war was expected. Isolated incidents took
place but the actual war in Abkhazia can be said to have started in August 1992. These other
events not only made what was left of a Georgian central government to seek a cease-fire
agreement but literally dragged the Georgian armed formations and militias out of the area to the
other hot spots of Georgia. At first Tbilisi, then western Georgia and finally Abkhazia.
After the cease-fire agreement in South Ossetia and the implementation of the peacekeeping
operation there were still a few isolated incidents of fighting. However, the cease-fire can be
characterised as a success, inasmuch as it separated the conflicting parties. From 1992 till mid
1995 the situation was rather frozen. The process effectively separated South Ossetia completely
from Georgia and contacts between the two sides were rare.
For these years the Georgian perception of the conflict was that Russia started it and therefore the
key to the conflict lay in Moscow. Hence negotiations with the South Ossetians were not taken
very seriously, and efforts were mainly directed towards changing the Russian position and the
situation in Abkhazia, which demanded political attention in the face of about 240.000 Georgian
refugees.
After Georgia's entry into the CIS and the agreement on Russian military bases (not ratified yet,
as Georgia holds it as a bargaining chip in order to regain Abkhazia and South Ossetia) and
Russia's own problems with the secessionist Chechnya the official position of Russia seems to
have changed. Hence at several summits of the leaders of the CIS countries there have been calls
for the support of the restoration of Georgian territorial integrity, with president Yeltsin making
strong statements against separatism.
On the Georgian side there have been made several statements acknowledging remorse and a
great deal of responsibility for the conflict. It is one of Shevardnadze's major achievements that
he has played down nationalistic politics and furthermore that the new constitution, adopted in
August 1995, provides solid guarantees for individual and minority rights.

So in some ways the parties moved a step towards each other, but at the same time the unclear
situation in Moscow for a long time made it difficult to move further. This was clearly reflected
in the different signals that came from Tskhinvali, from seeking co-operation with Georgia to an
uncompromising stand for independence. The North Ossetian leadership, within the Russian
Federation, has mainly followed the official Russian line. The South Ossetian position, feeling
isolated, has swung between claims for full independence, rather than unification with North
Ossetia through the Russian Federation, and a more open-minded view towards Georgia.
In this connection it is interesting to mention that in April 1995 I encountered a new version of
the formation of the South Ossetian nation as being divided ages ago from the North Ossetians
stressing the uniqueness of the South Ossetians rather than characterising the Ossetians as one
nation.
As the unclear situation in Moscow continued as a rather permanent situation both parties realised
that a solution should be found amongst themselves. Furthermore Georgia made great progress in
its state-building process. The civil turmoil, to say the least that characterised Georgia throughout
its first five years of independence came slowly but steady under control. The crime rate is still
high but the state structures have been strengthened and uncontrolled paramilitary groups have
been dissolved. Georgia has undertaken free and fair elections and has been characterised as one
of the most democratic states of the former Soviet republics. Of course there are still problems
and measures to be taken but compared to the situation even in 1995 one can easily say that
Georgia has undergone drastic changes.
In South Ossetia on the other hand the situation looks somewhat similar to the state of Georgia a
couple of years ago. You can hardly talk about an economy, and if you do it is of dubious
character. The political situation is also somewhat dubious, though the communists are in power
there are evidence of severe internal power struggles, each fraction with their armed formations.
However, the replacement of the wartime leadership with a new one has definitely made talks
with the Georgian side easier.
Refugees have begun to resettle in the zone of conflict but still only in small numbers, the major
obstacle being the economic situation in the region (based on interviews with representatives
from UNHCR-Tskhinvali and the Norwegian Refugee Council-Tskhinvali November 1997).
Until 1997 major donors such as the European Union and UN agencies tended to steer clear of
assistance to South Ossetia, fearing that their relations with the Georgian government would be
jeopardised and the regions claims to independence legitimised. Only most pressing
humanitarian needs were met by the ICRC and MSF.
As talks proceeded this changed and the UNHCR, UNDP and the European Union have now
initiate several programmes for physical rehabilitation of the conflict zone, though the South
Ossetian government still complains about its small scope.
The major break through in negotiation happened in May 1996 when the two sides signed a
Memorandum on measures for providing security and joint confidence in which the two sides
renounced the use of force. This has been followed up by several meetings between president of
Georgia Eduard Shevardnadze and president of South Ossetia Ludwig Chibirov and their
respective heads of governments (Cousens 1997, p.7).
Numerous small steps of co-operation between the bordering local Georgian authorities and

South Ossetian authorities had prepared this. Small practical steps such as electricity supplies,
irrigation programmes, law enforcement co-operation, reconstruction of the road system, etc. A
co-operation that is still ongoing and expanding its scope.
This relaxation in the atmosphere has also resulted in the removing of most the checkpoints of the
peacekeeping forces, which now has been replaced by ordinary police checkpoints by both South
Ossetian and Georgian police units. Even though most Georgians have not returned specifically to
Tskhinvali, Georgians and South Ossetians do increasingly interact, mainly in the field of small
trade. At first at a market in no-mans-land between the military checkpoints but later in
Tskhinvali itself.
Other forms of co-operation between Georgians and South Ossetians are also taking place. A sort
of co-operation that might postpone the prospects of reaching a final peace. First of all one have
to understand that both the collapse of the Soviet Union, specifically its economy, and the war
itself has left the economy of South Ossetia in ruins. Law and order collapsed and the region
degenerated into heavily armed banditry. The absence of central control over the region, the loose
authority of the South Ossetian government, and the regions contiguity to the Russian
Federation, through their kin's in North Ossetia, have made it a haven for organised criminal
activity, specifically smuggling (Hansen 1998, p.16 and MacFarlane 1996, p.8).
When I returned to the region in 1997, after one year of absence, I could not help notice the long
line of trucks on the border between South Ossetia and Georgia proper, and as I entered
Tskhinvali a conspicuous amount of Mercedes Benzs, BMWs, jeeps and newly erected houses. I
soon found out that the trucks were carrying ethyl alcohol for the production of vodka in North
Ossetia. An illegal alcohol trade, which conservative estimates tells amount to a figure about 2.5
million US$ (Cousens 1997, p.12).
The unsettled status of south Ossetia seems like a profitable situation for some groups and even
though it ironically represents a form of co-operation between Georgians and South Ossetian this
can prolong the way to a final political solution and determination of the status of South Ossetia.

[1] Amongst the North Ossetians there are a minority of Muslims but none in South
Ossetia.
[2] In contrast, in North Ossetia there were no schools with instruction in the Ossetian
language until 1988, (Zhorzholiani 1995, p.11, quoting Galazov, the Chairman of the
Supreme Soviet of North Ossetia, in the newspaper Pravda).
[3] This was two years before North Ossetia was granted autonomy within Russia. In
many ways South Ossetians have always been a step ahead of their northern brethren in
emphasising their national identity. This can also be seen in the use of the Ossetian
language as mentioned above, as well as in the use of the white, red and yellow Ossetian
flag which was used for the first time in South Ossetia.
[4] In this connection a Georgian academic has made a good observation: Since
encouraging ethnic conflicts was supposedly a "KGB policy", some of Gamsakhurdia's
adversaries used his anti-minority stand for charging him with being "KGB agent" (Nodia

1992, p.36).
[5] This was of course a part of the Georgian struggle for independence of the Soviet
Union more than aimed at the specific case of South Ossetia, but never the less the South
Ossetians felt threatened.
[6] Ossetians living in Georgia proper were also affected by the conflict. According to
Ossetians living in Georgia proper, 50% of the 100.000 Ossetian living there fled Georgia,
some for South Ossetia, most for North Ossetia. The cause was increasing nationalistic
rhetoric, discrimination and incidents of threats and violence, just before and during
Gamsakhurdia's period (conversation with the Ossetian organisation "Vsmaroni"
(brotherhood), October 1995, in Tbilisi and report from OSCE Mission to Georgia 1996).
[7] This figure is uncertain, as no exact figures are available. From contact with personnel
of UNHCR and the Norwegian Refugee Council in 1997 it is however, clear that the
devastation in the surrounding villages was quite substantial.

5 The Soviet Setting

In this chapter I will describe some of the distinctive characteristics of the

Soviet state construction and of the Soviet nationality policy. This in order to
obtain a better understanding of the present dilemmas and problems,
administratively and perception vice, which the region faces due to these
policies and their de facto implementation. As mentioned in section 1.1 I will
try to show that the policies of the Soviet Union played an active part in the
developing of national and ethnic identities and furthermore elaborated a
system, which was inherently conflictual in respect to these identities. That in
fact one even might say that the Soviet political system nursed and cultivated
ethnic/national differences and inherent conflictual structures and identities
rather than putting a lid on them or freezing them down.
Well aware of the differences between each republic and other sub-units
(socio-economic development, historical experience etc.) I am focusing on the
overall trends of the Soviet nationality policy and the specificities of the
Georgian Union Republic and its sub-units. Thus the focus will be put upon
the federal structure of the Soviet Union with its hierarchical ordered units and
the policy of korenizatsiia - what can be called Soviet affirmative action
towards the so-called titular nationalities. These fundamental principles have
despite changed practices remained largely the same (Zaslavsky 1993, p.30
and Lieven 1990, p.64).
But lets start with the basis of the Soviet nationality policy.
5.1 Marxist-Leninist Theory on the Nationalities Question

The founders of Marxism viewed the nation as a social unit, which arose as a
result of specific economic conditions during the transition from feudalism to
early capitalism. The nation was viewed as a structural phenomenon and
nationalism as a bourgeois device used to hinder the working class in realising
and achieving its objective interests (SNU 1990, p.27 and Bremmer 1993,
p.9).
As a result of the economic developments and requirements the nation-state
would eventually become an impediment and hence, having played its role, it
would vanish. The conflicts between nations were therefore seen as
transitional phenomena of minor importance. Already during capitalism an
internationalisation of the economy would begin and hence a weakening of
the national question occur. During communism this question would vanish,
as the Communist Manifesto states:
"When the conflicts between the classes within the nation disappear, the
hostility among the nations ceases" (SNU 1990, p.27).
Class affiliation was seen as far more important for a persons political
consciousness and identity than his/her nationality - national identity was
basically seen as false consciousness.
Marx and Engels wrote in the Communist Manifesto (1848) that "the workers
have no motherland" and according to the theory of 'proletarian
internationalism' objectively seen they have common interests no matter
which nation they belong to. There was an expectation of stronger solidarity
between the workers of different countries than of solidarity between different
classes within the same state (SNU 1990, p.27). Seen in the light of The
Second International and First World War this proved to be far from the case.
These considerations however, among other things not least the situation in
the Tsarist Empire, forced Lenin, as a practical revolutionary to develop a
different view on things. Although nationalism with its vertical classification
of humans and communism with its horizontal stratification of society, are
contradictions, the Bolsheviks made use of nationalism after their take-over.
Nationalism was viewed as a limited transitional phenomenon that was
instrumentally useful for intermediate political goals (Zaslavsky 1993, p.30).
Hence the right to national self-determination could be used to weaken
imperialism and promote revolution. After a revolution there was no need to
worry that nationalism would not disappear, as the populations would
acknowledge the need for bigger units and co-operation. The desired goal was
complete assimilation of all national groups, but it was deemed necessary to
erect a facade of equality and sovereignty.

In this way Lenins contribution to Marxist theory on nationalism was that he

managed to develop a theory, which at the same time rejected nationalism as a
transitory bourgeois phenomenon and as useful in the struggle for socialism.
National movements could both be progressive and regressive - and the right
to determine that belonged to the working class, which in effect meant the
Communist Party. As I will expand on later progressive nationalism would be
allowed to bloom under the auspices of local cadres of the officially
recognised nationalities in specific determined and designated homelands.
Only there and under guidance and control of the party. Lenin and Stalin was
thus opposed to link cultural minority rights to the individual - extra-territorial
so to speak - as suggested by the so-called Austro-Marxist theoreticians (SNU
1990, p.28-29 and Krag 1994, p.41).
5.2 The Soviet System of National self-determination
In order to consolidate socialism Lenin was dependent on the support of the
non-Russian nations. Thus the non-Russians were granted two major
concessions, which went in another direction than the Marxist ideal: A
constitutional recognition of the multinational character of the Soviet
population and the establishment of the national-territorial principle as the
basis of political administration, including the right to self-determination - to
secede, however only applying for the Union Republics (Duik 1990, p.27).
Before the revolution the Bolshevik ideal had been absolute unity and
centralisation of power but this new arrangement was an acknowledgement of
national sensibilities. Between 1918 and 1920 it was a fact that Bolshevik
support outside the ethnically Russian heartland was restricted to large urban
centres, while in the most parts of the non-Russian ethnic periphery antiSoviet forces predominated (Smith 1990, p.4). Furthermore after the
revolution many of the nations within the former Tsarist Russia had formed
independent states, such as Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Ukraine etc. Hence
federalism was an instrument for putting together the scattered parts of the
defunct Russian Empire (Bremmer 1993, p.9 and Zaslavsky 1993, p.31).
The logic behind the right to national self-determination was an
acknowledgement of the national sensibilities. Thus if the populations
involved, whose national consciousness was emerging as a political force,
were not given this right, it might encourage a combative nationalism which
would run counter to the establishment of socialism (Smith 1990, p.4). It thus
became the strategy of reaching socialist unity by a short transitory period
with national self-determination, whereby former suppressed communities
would be cleaned from tendencies of bourgeoisie nationalism (SNU 1990,
p.9) [1].

In order to use the emerging national movements in the transitional period

between the Russian Empire and creation of the Soviet Union the Bolsheviks
spoke of the Tsarist Empire as 'the prison of peoples' whereas they - the
Bolsheviks - would be the liberators and create 'equality of the peoples'
(d'Encausse 1992, p.87).
The concept of national self-determination was made an institutional reality
by the creation of a federation of ethno-territorial units with officially
recognised nationalities voluntarily joining it. However after the establishment
of the Soviet Union the concept of national self-determination was changed. It
was narrowed down to the idea that the nations were subordinated the
proletariat and the proletariat was subordinated the party (Besancon 1986, p.23). As Stalin noted already in 1918:
"Autonomy is a form. Soviet power is not against autonomy; it is for
autonomy, but only for an autonomy where all the power is in the hands of the
workers and the peasants..." (Besancon 1986, p.5).
And in the hands of the workers and the peasants meant in the hands of the
Communist Party (Connor 1984, p.48). In this way the annexation of e.g.
Georgia in 1921 was legitimised. That the Georgian Mensheviks represented
the vast majority of Georgians did not mean that they had the right to
represent their country; this right belonged to the little Bolshevik minority, put
in power by the Red Army (Besancon 1986, p.6).
The principle of national self-determination was based on Stalins definition
of a nation from 1913 according to which the nation is "a historical
constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common
language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a
common culture. In this way ethnicity, territory, and political administration
was linked (Zaslavsky 1993, p.31).
The number of officially recognised nationalities was gradually reduced from
190 in the 1926 census to 104 registered in the 1970 census, of which 53,
grouped into four ranks or categories, had a territory named after them as the
indigenous population (or in western terms - titular nationalities), each
representing a different level of statehood (Zaslavsky 1993, p.31).[2]
The structure was viewed as a temporary solution, only a transitional stage to
a completely centralised and supra-national Soviet state (Duik 1990, p.27).
The nation building of the officially recognised nationalities was seen as an
instrument in Sovietizising all the non-Russian peoples. According to Lenin
the nationalism of the non-Russians could be explained by lasting
discrimination during the Tsarist Empire. To withhold great-Russian
chauvinism and gain the support of the non-Russian for the new state, a

Sovietization in three phases was developed. First the blooming (rastsvet) of

the different peoples through a determined promotion of their respective
culture, their national conscience, and the creation of national elites which
eventually would lead to the second phase which was rapprochement
(sblizhenie) and finally to the third phase of merging (sliianie). In this way it
was thought that the ideology and policy of the Communist Party would have
a better chance of gaining footing with the non-Russians through their own
language and elites. The logic of the system was expressed in the phrase
national in form - socialist in content, as Stalin formulated it in 1928.
Differences were eventually thought to vanish and only harmless cultural
traits like folk culture would remain and a socialist Soviet People would be
created. Before going into details with this strategy let us look at the concrete
elaboration of the Soviet system and then in the next section at the policy of
korenizatsiia.
5.3 The Soviet Federal System
In 1918 the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic (RSFSR) was
established composed by several ethnic defined autonomous units. By the end
of 1922 the establishment of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics was a
fact composed by the RSFSR, Ukraine, Byelorussia and the Transcaucasian
Federation. The five Central Asian republics (Uzbekistan, Turkmenia,
Tadzhikistan, Kazakhstan, Kirgizia) acquired status of union republics in
respectively 1925, 1925, 1929, 1936 and 1936 after having been autonomous
areas within the RSFSR. The Transcaucasian Federation was divided into the
three union republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia in 1936 (SNU
1990, p.10-11).
According to the Soviet constitution, the Soviet Union was defined as a
federal state consisting of many nationalities, defined by equality of the
peoples. As mentioned it was divided into four levels of regional, ethnically
based administrative units. Although consisting of more than a hundred
nationalities only fifty-three were officially identified with a particular
territory, as their designated homeland becoming the so-called titular nations.
The criteria for being given national-territorial autonomies varied and were
somewhat arbitrary. The hierarchy of national-territorial formations was not
consequently according to population size. Hence there were population
groups quantitatively larger, which had lesser status or no territorial
autonomy. Several times throughout the Soviet period borders and position
were changed, so that Union Republics would be changed to Autonomous
Republics or further down to Autonomous Regions or replaced within the
jurisdiction of a different Union Republic.

From 1922 to 1936 the three Transcaucasian republics (Georgia, Armenia and
Azerbaijan) made up a Transcaucasian Republic. For less than a year in 1921
Abkhazia was a Union Republic, then linked to Georgia by a special treaty
and finally becoming an Autonomous Republic within Georgia in 1931 (Dale
1996, p.13). South and North Ossetia was first together then divided. Often
border changes were made not out of demographic concerns but rather
because of interest emanating from the centre or redistribution of populations
due to forced or voluntarily migration. Hence in nine out of twenty-seven
autonomous units and Union Republics the titular nation did not make up the
majority. In three instances the vast majority of the titular nation lived outside
the national territorial autonomy. In 1991 the titular nations in two out of
fifteen Union Republics made up less than half of the inhabitants. In average
the titular nations made up less than two thirds of the inhabitants in their unit
(Dehdashti 1997, p.10).
The Soviet Union was made up of fifteen so-called Union Republics. These
were defined as nation states, with the exception of the Russian Socialist
Federal Soviet Republic, which was defined as a multinational state. Under
this level there existed a hierarchic system of the likewise national defined
autonomous territorial units, in order of descending status: twenty
Autonomous Republics, eight Autonomous Regions (Oblasti) and ten
Autonomous Areas (Okruga). These were all placed within and directly
accountable to the Union Republics.
The Union Republics each had their own Supreme Soviet, Council of
Ministers, and Communist Party. Institutions were set up identically, with
replicas of not only the party and state apparatus, but also cultural, scientific,
and educational facilities. Hence in every Union Republic they had at their
disposal their own University, Academy of Sciences, Union of Writers and
artists and film studios (Besancon 1986, p.7 and Suny 1990, p.22).
In connection with the decision-making processes at Union level, the Union
Republics participated to a relatively great extent, in the sense that they were
represented in the Nationalities Soviet, in its economic commissions, in the
Council of Ministers, in the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, and in the
Supreme Court of the Soviet Union. The number of representatives in the
organs of the Union however, made it difficult to assert influence. Another
reason for the difficulty in asserting influence was that no real independence
in the voting existed. One of the reasons for this was, as I shall return to, the
monolith nature of the Communist Party. Another, which also is connected to
the issue of the Party, was the cadre policy of the Centre. The practice was,
that the First Secretary in every Republic was held by a member of the nonRussian titular nation, but the post of Second Party Secretary, who was
responsible for monitoring cadre policy on the local scene, was generally held

by a non-native/non-titular nation person - mostly a Russian - whose loyalty

primarily would be with the centre.
Not only the relationship between the Union and the Union Republics, but
also between the Union Republics and the autonomous units was formally
federal. Within the three autonomous units the Autonomous Republics had a
favourable position. They had their own constitution and a system somewhat
like the Union Republics in respect to state organs like the Supreme Soviet
and Council of Ministers. The Autonomous Regions had a simplified but
autonomous state system at their disposal, and the Autonomous Areas an even
more simplified system of political organs. The spheres of jurisdiction of these
lower units remained unclear and in many cases uncodified and it is thus
difficult to pinpoint the differences (Zaslavsky 1993, p.34 and Connor 1984,
p. 221).
However despite no clear constitutional demarcation of competence there was
a clear hierarchical power sharing between the different units. The political
organs of the Autonomous Regions and the Autonomous Areas were
subordinated to the corresponding organs of the Union Republics. Ultimately
all the areas of competence of the autonomous units were subordinated the
competence of the Union Republics. All decisions of the autonomous units
had to be recognised by the superior administration of the Union Republic.
Practically speaking the running of the autonomous units was therefore placed
under the leadership and control of the Union Republic. However the
Autonomous Republics had possibilities for influence by representation in the
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers of the Union
Republic this was not the case for an autonomous region like South Ossetia.
The cultural rights and conditions in the autonomous areas were first and
foremost oriented towards the use of their own language as language of
administration, teaching and printing of books, periodicals and newspapers.
The Autonomous Republics and Regions were also entitled to their own
national theatres and the Autonomous Areas to their own folklore groups
(Dehdashti 1997, p.6-7).
The Soviet Union was the first state in history to place the national principle at
the base of its federal structure (Zaslavsky, p.31). A federal structure on paper,
but in reality a pseudo-federal union that gave no real political sovereignty for
the nationalities (Suny 1990, p.22).
The Union Republics had relatively speaking little political and economical
powers in relation to the central power. The most important political matters
fell within the competence of the centre. The Union Republics dealt with
matters of less political significance like family legislation and other
administrative dispositions. They dealt with the concrete implementation of

the political objectives of the Centre and staff policy in connection to the
political, economic, and social system. The fiction of independent statehood
can only, if at all, be maintained through the extensive cultural rights and the
affirmative action policies towards the titular nations (Dehdashti 1997, p.8-9).
But it should be mentioned that the degree of autonomy changed over time,
least during Stalin, more during Krushchev, less during Brezhnev, and most
during Gorbachev.
In respect to the relation between the Union Republic and the autonomous
units the federal principle applies even less. Except from the staffing and
cultural precedence of the titular nations of the autonomous units (in
descending order), on the whole it was more like ordinary administrativeterritorial units. Structurally speaking the autonomous units were subordinated
the Union Republics.
When one speaks of Soviet nationality policy, it is often referred to as the
nationalities question both by foreign scholars but also from official Soviet
sources. The pattern of the different hierarchical federal units corresponds to
the different groups from nations, nationalities to small people. Outside this
pyramid of rights one find the groups without their own homeland or people
living outside their own designated homeland. These were the minorities and
it is important to state that they had no particular rights, in comparison with
the groups having their own homeland. They were seen as peoples without
rights[3]. According to Soviet, and ex.-Soviet, understanding, rights are to a
great extent confined to the designated territories. It was taken for granted that
e.g. Ossetians in South Ossetia had their specific rights, but Ossetians in
Georgia proper, outside the South Ossetian autonomy had none, even though
the majority of the Ossetians in Georgia lived outside the Ossetian autonomy
(Krag 1996, p.328-329)[4].
In fact the centre pursued a policy of assimilation towards the non-titular
nationalities. These were not as the first- or second-order titular nationalities
(those possessing a homeland) part of the soft process of blooming
(rastsvet) through rapprochement (sblizhenie) leading to the third phase of
merging (sliianie). They were meant to be an immediate part of the state
culture, which in effect meant russification. Having no or in some instances
little linguistic and cultural rights (Bremmer 1993, p.15). This with the
exception of the Russian minorities, outside the RSFSR, which in effect had
these rights in the form of clubs, theatres, educational institutions and media
in the Soviet lingua franca that being Russian (Connor 1984, p.314).
The principles of the soft process of assimilation via blooming through
rapprochement leading to the third phase of merging was more outspoken
in terms of the language policy of the Soviet Union. This was also
characterised by a three step process. First a phase of pluralism: development

of the languages of the nationalities possessing a homeland. Then

bilingualism: growing pressure to learn the states dominant language, making
the study of the Russian language compulsory (which happened in 1938).
Then monolingualism: making the dominant language the sole language of
instruction and the sole official language (Connor 1984, p.254-255).
As mentioned the non-titular nationalities were subject to immediate
assimilation or integration as it was preferred to be called. Schools and other
educational institutions offering instruction in non-Russian languages were
primarily restricted to the federal units (from union republics to national
areas). However, during the Soviet period from the forties and onwards
Russian became increasingly compulsory as the secondary language in the
autonomies.
The number of years of schooling available in the local tongue corresponded
to the place of the ethnic homeland in the federal hierarchy. Descending from
the union republics to the autonomous areas, which in effect meant an
assimilation process in three stages. In Georgia I experienced this clearly as
the non-titular nationalities in Georgia proper seemed to be more fluent in
Russian than their mother tongue. In the Autonomous Republic Abkhazia
within Georgia even the Georgians seemed to be more fluent in Russian as
also the Abkhaz did. In South Ossetia Russian also seemed to have made
Ossetian a secondary language compared to Russian, as mentioned in chapter
four.
Thus the Soviet federal structure was characterised by being an elaborate
administrative hierarchy based on a linkage of ethnicity, territory, and political
administration. However the centrally planned economy and the massive
Moscow-based bureaucracy hindered effective federalism (Zaslavsky 1993,
p.31-32). This especially since the Soviet Union was a one-party state. The
Communist Party's monopoly and its extremely centralist structure meant that
the Communist Party dominated all parts of the state. In theory a federal state,
but as the Communist Party was a monolithic centralised organisation, it
required absolute obedience to Moscow's orders from the members in the
republics and regions (Lieven 1990, p.64-65 and Zaslavsky 1993, p.32). It was
through the Party and the cadre policy of the centre, that the different
nationalities were meant to be tied to the centre and the Communist Party.
A final aspect of the Soviet federal structure that is important to mention here
is the system of internal passports. The Soviet State further institutionalised
ethnicity in 1932, when it inaugurated an internal passport system that
included an officially recognised ethnic affiliation for each Soviet citizen
(Saroyan 1988, p.221).

Initially the recorded nationality was defined as self-indication, but after a few
years the categorisation was unchangeable and nationality was registered
strictly on the basis of the corresponding entries in the parents, passports,
irrespective of culture, mother tongue, religion, or personal preferences. In
this way the Soviet State treated nationality as an ascriptive characteristic
determined by birth. Only in the case of mixed marriages there was a
possibility of choice between the nationalities of the parents' (Zaslavsky 1993,
p.33-34 and Krag 1996, p.327-328).
The registrations were justified, in principle, to secure persons belonging to
ethnic minorities rights in terms of education in mother tongue and other
representation.
In this way rigid boundaries between nationalities was established and served
as a main determinant of ethnic self-identification, and provided an objective
basis for the policy of preferential treatment of territorially-based nationalities
(Zaslavsky 1993, p.34).
5.4 The Policy of Korenizatsiia
The federal system of national units established not only the symbolic
trappings of modern nation-states but also the institutional basis for the
formation of indigenous ethnic leaderships. The policy of Korenizatsiia
(rooting or nativization), adopted at the Soviet communist Party's Tenth
Congress in 1921, promoted personnel from each unit's titular nationality into
a program of training and recruitment for service in the political, economic,
and cultural administration (Saroyan 1988, p.222).
The idea was to have a number of centrally recognised titular nationalities
with their own elites. The system was thought to tie the non-Russians to the
Soviet regime by drawing national cadres into the political and administrative
posts of the Party and administration, and thereby tying professional and
material rewards to membership of this elite (Roeder 1991, p.204).
The policy was also designed to allay the non-Russian fear of Russian
domination, allowing and developing national language and keeping the
expression of national culture on a folkloristic level. But of more importance
was the need to develop loyal and controlled local non-Russian elites clearly
not tolerating independence of the Communist parties of the republics
(Besancon 1986, p.6-7 and Duik 1990, p.26).
In this way the state tried to monopolise nationalism, into a form of statecontrolled national expression. The native or indigenous cadre was given an
institutionalised monopoly on the public expression of ethnic identity.
Expressed nationalism outside of the Party elite was not tolerated, there

existed a well-developed system of control which made attempts at

nationalism on the part of local political elites very risky and unlikely
(Zaslavsky 1993, p.37). If the local Party elite went to far, the central
authorities removed them from their posts. In 1972 the Georgian Party
secretary was for example removed for so-called national narrow-mindedness
(Roeder 1991, p.205-207). Not to mention the thousands that were sent to the
famous Gulags or the fact that in the period called the Great Terror of the late
1930s almost the entire cultural and political elite of the Soviet Union was
literally exterminated (Lieven 1990, p.66).
Even though the process of korenizatsiia was slowed down during Stalin and
despite political ups and downs of centralising and decentralising during
Soviet rule the result of the policy is clear. This affirmative action policy led
to the creation of ethnic administrative elites (Saroyan 1988, p. 222-223). The
policy of korenizatsiia can be said to have been uniformly in its intentions but
clearly there existed differences in the development of this process in relation
to the different units and their indigenous representation. Especially the
Transcaucasian republics were in forefront of this development and republics
like Moldavia and Tadzikistan lacking behind (Connor 1984, p.284-286).
The Centre protected the educational and occupational interest of the
indigenous elites and middle classes, in such a way, that the Soviet nationality
policy was extremely successful in integrating them into the political regime.
The Centre created employment for the representatives of the ethnic
intelligentsia, by expanding local bureaucracies, founding republican
Academies of science and research centres, and supporting ethnic unions of
writers, painters and film-makers (Zaslavsky 1993, p.37).
The policy was applied uniformly in the respect that the ideal was to create
elites which, like their culture, would be national in form, but with the same
content in all units: Soviet elites devoted to the system which had promoted
them (d'Encausse 1992, p.87).
So in this way korenizatsiia was a part of the Ratzvet (blooming) phase but in
the same time meant to lead to Slieniye (coming together) and eventually
Sblieniye (merging) into a common socialist Soviet culture.
The policy of korenizatsiia was in essence a massive state programme of
affirmative action of the official recognised titular nationalities An unofficial
nationalities contract formed as a package of economic benefits and
opportunities in exchange for compliance with Soviet rule (Bremmer 1993,
p.5 and 10-11). The Soviet nationality policy depended thus on the relative
strength of the economy, which provided the resources that made the Soviet
state attractive or at least tolerable to the crucial sectors of the ethnic
populations (Zaslavsky 1993, p.33). Given the increased seize of the elites and

their already high level of material rewards the stagnating Soviet economy
could simply not uphold this system due to the economic crisis of the Soviet
economy beginning in the seventies and worsening in the eighties (Roeder
1991, p.213-215).
Furthermore, the centres purpose with korenizatsiia, that the non-Russian
populations could be kept in check through local party elites, backslashed in
the way that sooner or later they created their own power base in their
respective republics, acquiring independent attitudes and practices with
nationalistic implications (Suny 1989, p.294).
In Transcaucasus local party elites created a corrupt system of favouritism of
the members of the titular nationality, which meant discrimination against
minority ethnic groups living within the homelands of other ethnic groups
(Suny 1990, p.24 and Roeder 1991, p.208); the seeds to inter-ethnic conflict
were sowed.
Ronald Suny goes as far as stating:
"Transcaucasia was governed by powerful ethnic Mafias that
both fostered local
nationalism and encouraged the rise of
'second economies'. Ethnic minorities within
Armenia,
Azerbaijan and Georgia, among them...the Abkhaz and Osetins
of
Georgia...(these).Have experienced a progressive
marginalization and discrimination
from the dominant so-called
'titular' nationalities that run the republics" (Suny 1990,
p.6).
Table 3 gives a clear picture of the effect of the policy of korenizatsiia
showing the ethnic composition of personnel in the political and economic
administration of the three Transcaucasian republics in 1989. The titular
nationalities are clearly overrepresentated in comparison to their share of the
population
at
large.
Table 3
Ethnic composition of populations at large and administrative-managerial personnel by
republics, 1989 (percent)(Zaslavsky 1993, p.38)
Proportion of the indigenous nationality in
the:
Union Republics

Titular nationality

Georgia
Armenia
Azerbaijan

Georgian
Armenian
Azeri

Population atlarge
70,1
93,3
92,7

Administrativemanagerial personnel
89,3
99,4
93,8

In the early Soviet period Georgian and non-Georgian cadres coexisted in the
party and government apparatus, but steadily the policy of korenizatsiia led to
a Georgianization of the local government. This happened in most spheres
(culture and education as well) and led to a consolidation of the Georgian hold
on the Georgian republic (Suny 1989, p.298).
Table 4 shows for example a clear precedence of Georgians in higher
education in relation to the other major ethnic groups of the republic.
Table 4
Distribution of students in higher education by nationality in 1969-70, (Suny 1980,
p.213-214).
Percent of the students in higher
Nationality
Per cent of total population
education
Georgian
67.0
82.6
Armenian
9.7
3.6
Russian
8.5
6.8
Others
14.8
7.0

In 1987, the tendency was even clearer, 94 per cent of all students at Tbilisi
University, the only major university in the republic, were Georgian (Jones
1992, p.79).
It is however important to stress that within the Union Republics in the
autonomous units the same policy was applied. Although subordinated the
Union Republic they were still titular nationalities or second-order
nationalities as Bremmer calls them (Bremmer 1993, p.14). For example in
the case of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia within the Georgian Union
Republic, the titular nation of the ASSR, the ethnic Abkhaz, had a
proportionate overrepresentation in the Party, the Supreme Soviet and
economic posts (Parsons 1990, p.192). Table 5 shows the example Abkhaz
representation in local party organs, bearing in mind that the Abkhaz only
constitute seventeen per cent of the population of the Abkhaz ASSR, it shows
a clear disproportionate overrepresentation.
Table 5
Abkhaz representation in local party organs (in per cent) (Slider 1985, p.54 , taken
form Georgian Central Committee material)
1949

1963

1978

Province committee

na

na

39.4

City and district first secretaries

4.0

30.0

37.5

Heads of party departments: province, city, and district

28.0

40.0

45.0

Also in the Autonomous Region of South Ossetia within Georgia, this seems
to have been the case. Ethnic Georgians clearly felt this being the case. Hence
in a speech by Gamsakhurdia, in late 1990, he claimed that 31 out of 37
people then working in the regional party committee apparatus were Ossetian,
as were 77 per cent of all employees in the South Ossetian cultural and
educational organisations (Jones 1992, p.87). This he stated on the basis of the
statistics on South Ossetia complied by a Georgian commission created by the
Supreme Soviet of Georgia before the first free election, which is shown in
table 6.
Table 6
Representation of Georgians and Ossetians in Political Administrative structures of
South Ossetia, 1990 (in per cent)(Slider 1991)

Party apparatus
State apparatus
Service sector
Trade sector
Cult. Nomenclature

Ossetians
60.7
77.5
62.3
77.0
77.5

Georgians
24.3
21,6
26,2
14,2
na

These two last statistical tables should however be taken as indications rather
than as exact figures, but it is also important to understand that they should be
taken for the general perception on behalf of most Georgians as facts of
life(see also Helsinki Watch 1992, p.51). Furthermore already in 1973 a
group of members of the Communist Party of Georgia complained about the
effects of korenizatsiia resulting in a disproportionate overrepresentation of
Abkhaz and thus a discrimination of ethnic Georgians in the Abkhaz ASSR
(Connor 1984, p.286).
Of cause there was a difference as there, as mentioned, was a hierarchy from
Union Republic, Autonomous Republic, Autonomous Region to Autonomous
Area, with the latter having least autonomy - that being power. But even
though, the tendency is clear, the titular nations, in the case of the Union
Republic of Georgia, Georgians, Abkhazians and South Ossetians, were in
their designated homelands subject to affirmative action programmes as firstorder or second-order titular nationalities, leading to a disproportionate
overrepresentation in the party organs, professional employment and higher
education.

The bottom line is that the policy of korenizatsiia created a system whereby
ethnicity became a criteria for success, since the positions of status within the
different units mainly were reserved for the titular nationalities (Roeder 1991,
p.208 and Suny 1989, p.315). In effect it was a fostering and entrenchment of
ethnicity.

[1] The principle of national self-determination also had external

purposes in regard to the colonial areas of the Third World. Proving the
Soviet Union as a role model in comparison with the imperialist and
capitalist countries of the west and also thus in a more direct manner
encouraging nationalist uprisings in the colonies of the western
countries (Connor 1984, p. 52 and 55).
[2] A few units, like the autonomous republic of Dagestan in the
northern Caucasus, were not named after the so-called titular
nationality, this was however an exception to the rule.
[3] Not in terms of Soviet individual civil rights but in respect to collective
minority rights. However, the right to education in ones mother tongue is
considered an individual right.
[4] The complexity of this sentence merely shows the complexity of the Soviet
system and not the poor mastery of the English language on behalf of the
author.

6 Discussion and Analysis

The Soviet nationality policy can easily be said to be a pragmatic compromise between
ideology and reality. But the Soviet nationality policy can also been seen as a
mobilisation of ethnic populations, via nation-building, to accomplish Soviet-style
modernisation, as it is prescribed in the Soviet strategy of development from rastsvet
(blooming), over sblizhenie (rapprochement) to sliianie (merging).
However, it becomes clear that we stand before a two-stringed policy going in opposite
directions. Suppression of nationalism and state-sponsored development of the very
same. I have concentrated on the over-all structure of this policy, but it is important to
stress that this policy of course was subject to different degrees and variations. It should
be mentioned that while the fundamental structures of this policy were laid out during
Stalin, his period of rule was also a period of severe repression of aspects of nationalism
and national identity that was not wished or unofficial. Furthermore, during Stalin most
of the non-Russian republics experienced a so-called period of Russification promotion of Russian language and culture. But in comparison to most other republics,
the Transcaucasian republics had a higher level of cultural autonomy, and far from as
high an emigration of Russians, as for example the Baltic states or Kazakhstan.

Therefore, on the one hand there were severe repression, varying degrees of
Sovietization/Russification and autonomy, and in Soviet parlance, nationalism was
equal to chauvinism, therefore calling for internationalism and for playing down ethnic
particularism and nationalist feelings. On the other hand there were state-sponsored
nation building and encouragement of the development of separate national and ethnic
identities. This contradiction went unresolved in official nationality policy and was
reflected in the formula 'national in form, socialist in content' (Hunter 1994, p.14 and
Suny 1989, p.300).
The policy of korenizatsiia (rooting/nativization) had immense consequences for the
development in the respective federal units. Combined with modernisation this policy
can be characterised as an incubator of nationalism. The policy meant an ethnic
consolidation of the titular nationalities, and the empowerment of their national
leaderships and intelligentias. In Georgia it meant a gradual re-establishment of
Georgian political control and ethnic dominance over their country, a process that
hardly had begun during the brief independence period of 1918-21 (Suny 1989, p.298).
Furthermore, Georgia, and the other official nationalities, experienced a cultural revival
(or in some instances what Hobsbawm and Ranger would call a process of invention of
tradition), a Soviet subsidised fostering of ethnicity through, as mentioned, national
theatre, opera, film, publishing, mass-media and higher education. Of course socialist in
content but national in form. In these ways Georgians became a cohesive nation, with a
growing national awareness and consciousness like it never had been before.
The territorialisation of ethnicity together with the strengthening of the titular
nationalities left the minorities within the different designated homelands with few
guaranties against discrimination. Ethnicity became a condition for success. These
developments increased the pressure on the minorities within the republics to assimilate
or migrate.
Furthermore the policy of korenizatsiia backslashed in the way that sooner or later the
indigenous elites created their own power base in their respective republics, acquiring
independent attitudes and practices with nationalistic implications.
But as we have seen, this was also the case in the autonomous republics and regions
within the Union Republics, taking the hierarchical structure of the entire Union into
consideration. The consolidation of Georgian ethnicity had produced an increasingly
potent nationalist mood in all parts of Georgian society - and counter-nationalism
among the ethnic minorities within the republic (Suny 1989, p.314).
Another aspect of importance here is the federal system which with its inherent
contradictions paved the way for conflict constellations between the three layers of the
Union: The Union centre on one side, the Union Republics on the other and the
autonomous units in between. The relationship of the centre of the entire Union,
Moscow, to the Union Republic was replicated in the Union Republics in relation to the
autonomous units, to the effect that these would have Moscow as a natural allied in
relation to the Union Republics. Ian Bremmer depictures the situation in this way:
Table 7 (Bremmer 1993, p.14)

Centre

Centre

First-order
titular
nationality

Second-order
titular
nationality

Non-titular
nationality

Integration

Integration

Assimilation

First-order
titular
nationality

Liberation

Competition

Domination

Domination

Second-order
titular
nationality

Collusion

Liberation

Competition

Domination

Non-titular
nationality

Collusion

Liberation

Liberation

Competition

The table shows the basic dynamics of the Soviet construction in relation to the
different units in the federal hierarchy, and is very important in the course of the
conflicts in e.g. Georgia as to the Georgian - South Ossetian and Georgian - Abkhazian
conflicts and the role of the Soviet centre and later Russia. The Soviet politicaladministrative system functioned as a crafty system of ethnic disparity. Conflicting
ethno-political power structures were an inherent part of the system, because of the
hierarchical system of units. This meant a continuos competition between
governments for status and legitimacy over a specific ethnic defined territory and a
competition of sovereignty, which was intensified in the transformation phase and the
eventual collapse of the Soviet Union. The South Ossetian leadership saw the all-union
leadership in Moscow as its natural ally, capable of controlling the union leadership of
Tbilisi, in respect to the limitation of the powers of the Georgian leadership towards
South Ossetian autonomy.
Furthermore, as we have seen, the policies of the centre, especially in terms of language
and education, exposed the second-order nationalities and the non-titular nationalities
more to the processes of Russification. Which also can be interpreted as tying these
groups more to the federal centre than the republican centre.
It is, however, important not only to see this conflicting structure as an administrative
problem of jurisdiction. The fault lines ran parallel to the ethnic and hence it was also a
problem of competing societal systems. In the light of the theories of nationalism, the
ethnic or cultural community of the South Ossetians poses a threat to the nationalism of
the dominant Georgian community. The South Ossetian community represents an
alternative cultural community that may choose to leave the larger Georgian
community, when they find it suitable. In this way the South Ossetian ethnic elite
functions as effective rivals to the Georgian State exactly because of their cultural
fundament. The elites are capable of mobilising popular support because they control
the symbolic resources of their community.

Finally, one can in a way view the Soviet understanding of nations as a mixture of the
political and the organic versions of the notion of the nation. The Soviet idea was
initially, that by fostering and cultivating the nations it would hasten the development of
a new Soviet nationality. The processes of modernisation would, together with a
uniform nationality policy, in respect to all the officially recognised nations, create, in
form, different nations but in content similar nations tied to the Soviet State. Hence the
Soviet definition of self-determination was meant as a right to integration rather than
as a right to secession, it was meant to unify rather than fragmentize, as we recognise
from the political notion of the nation.

One can speak of a social contract made between the state and the populations, or rather
the elites, in which the state would offer job security, price stability, absence of
inflation, a certain welfare and even progress. This did not happen. The recent rise of
nationalism can therefore be interpreted as a result of the fact that the state did not fulfil
its promises in respect to economic gain and welfare, and as a consequence of the
economic crises, in the 1980s, the Soviet Union collapsed. This view, I think, has some
explanatory value, but it is important also to see it in the light of the fact that the Soviet
type of understanding also contained the ethnic-organic understanding of the nation, and
that this understanding gained, as we have seen, influence.

Stalins definition of the nation was ethnic and objective, and this was the basis of the
federal system. The Soviet nation-builders had a too instrumental view on nationalism;
they underestimated the emotional and cultural understanding of nationalism.
Nationalism took root and was not a through-coming train between economic stages
of development[1]. Nationalism, or nation-ness as Anderson prefer to call it, seeped
down into the collective consciousness of the different populations. The way the system
evolved you clearly see that the Soviet communists did not anticipate the emotional
appeal, as well as the political potential of nationalism. The Soviet system was an
incubator of nationalisms, holding as an ideal the principle of congruity between statestructures/units and ethnic groups. Ethno-national elites were developed and with them
a consciousness of being potential nations with own statehood.

The ethno-territorial division of the Soviet Union and the policy of nativization meant a
politicisation of ethnicity, with its concept of titular nations, with special rights,
priorities and privileges and their homelands. This policy had consequences for the
inter-ethnic relations in the federal republics and later for the eventual dissolution of the
Soviet Union. When communism as an ideology and state faded away, what was left
was the ethnic notion of the nation.

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the obvious fall-back position became
ethnicity, exactly because of the territorialisation and politicisation of ethnicity, which
was based on the concept of titular nations and their homelands with special rights,

priorities, privileges leading back to Stalins definition of a nation as an ethno-nation.

The term fall-back position may not seem so appropriate to use in this connection as it
might suggest something inevitable or natural. The point, however, is precisely that
ethnicity and nationalism was fostered and cultivated by the Soviet system, but with the
decrease of and eventual lapse of Soviet power and communist ideology as the content,
the national form was the remainder.

The interesting fact is that the ethnic conflicts in Georgia, or for that in sake most of the
former Soviet Union, have almost only been fought in and around the autonomies:
Nagorna-Karabagh, Chechnya, North Ossetia (Prigorodnyi), Abkhazia, and South
Ossetia. In Georgia the Abkhaz and South Ossetians only constitute respectively 1.8 and
3.0 per cent of the population. The largest ethnic minorities the Armenians (8.1),
Russians (6.3), and Azeris (5.7) have been relatively quiescent[2]. The main difference
is their status of titular nationalities and the hence following rights and privileges. As
concluded in the previous section the Soviet nationality policy can be said to have been
an incubator of nations and nationalism. And it is important to stress that this was, as
mentioned, not only the case of the republics but also of the autonomies, which also
fostered an ethnic political identity.

The conflicts can therefore be said to be more about administratively political matters
rather than ethnic matters. The elites feared loosing the privileges, which the Soviet
nationality policy had guaranteed. Here I find Brass understanding of nationalism
useful as ethnic elites making use of the ethno-national identity to put forward demands
on the political or economical level to obtain, or maintain - as in this case- political
power or economic gains. Brass puts, as we have seen, special emphasis on the
interaction between the state and the peripheral ethnic elites in times of drastic changes
of society, that being changes in the political context and in the balance of the centreperiphery relations. The specific circumstances, he mentions - transfer of power from
colonial to post-colonial states, during succession struggles, and at times when central
power appears to be weakening - are as written for this case of ethnic conflict between
the peripheral South Ossetian ethnic elite and the Georgian state.

But it is, however, also important to stress that this mobilisation of ethnicity, was set in
system and institutionalised by the Soviet System, it was not something constructed
yesterday by the elites. Furthermore, ethnicity or national identity is malleable but
within limits and in continuation of this it takes time to create or shape the feeling of
community. But let us now turn to look closer at the Georgian and South Ossetian
national movements to see what the dynamics of the conflict can be said to be in the
light of theory of nationalism.

Georgian Nationalism

The Georgian national movement was partly initiated by dissident human rights
activists from the 1970s (like Zviad Gamzakhurdia), who in the atmosphere of
Gorbachevs Glasnost, once again entered the scene. But the strive was not for freedom
in the sense of political liberties enjoyed by individual citizens, within a country. It was
the strive for freedom in the sense of collective self-assertion vis--vis other nations. A
reflection of the Soviet notion of the nation and a consequence of the process of nation
building of the Soviet period, and though the content was no longer communism but
freedom and sovereignty, the form was still ethno-national.

This is also reflected in the way that a planned project of the Transcaucasian railway
system, criticised in 1987 by Georgian academics for the ecological consequences,
became a focal point for the Georgian national movement. Initially a question of
environmental issues but manifested within an ethno-national frame.

The Georgian national movement was first and foremost directed against the Soviet
system, which was interpreted as a continuation of Tsar-Russian imperialism. In the
euphoria of strive for independence from the Soviet state, the Georgian national
movement was arguing for Georgian independence on grounds of Georgian
distinctiveness. The entry of Georgia into the Soviet Union was seen as Soviet/Russian
occupation of Georgia, and the slogan of the national movement became Georgia for
Georgians, directed foremost against Russian influence and presence.
A worship of pre-Soviet and pre-Russian Georgia took form. A clearly primordial
understanding of the Georgian nation as eternal and great was manifested and
cultivated. A clear sign of this primordial approach of understanding the Georgian
nation is seen in an opinion poll made in 1990. In this most of the participants were of
the opinion that the Georgian monarchy before 1801 was of greater importance in the
national self-understanding than the Georgian Republic, that existed in 1918 to 1921
(Dehdashti 1997, p.27).
The Russian annexations of Georgia in 1801 and again in 1921 are conceived as end of
history points, and in this lies the primordial conception of what I in part 1.1, described
as the view on communism as a parenthesis, something that has interrupted a natural
historical course. But as we have seen in the part called the Soviet setting this is hardly
the case. Georgia mainly developed into a self-consciousness ethno-nation during and
due to Soviet rule and the general processes of modernisation in that period. But as we
have seen in the theories of nationalism, the sense of continuity, shared memories and
collective destiny are essential components in creating and imagining the community.
Therefore, the natural part in this phenomenon does not lie in the eternal natural
course and premodern history, but in the necessity of drawing on history and collective
memories in order to imagine the community and act as one distinctive cultural and
political unit. In this way it is symptomatic that the leaders of the Georgian national

movement, and its different fractions, were lead by academics like Zviad
Gamsakhurdia, a professor of literature, Merab Kostava, a professor of music, Djaba
Joseliani, a doctor in history of art etc.
The distinctiveness was especially emphasised through the Georgian language as unique
from the surrounding nations languages. Thus the Georgia for Georgians slogan was
initially expressed in the language laws (mentioned in the empirical part), which were
meant to strengthen the Georgian-ness and renounce Russian influence. It was meant to
function as a complete Georgianization of the educational system and public
institutions. In the strive for Georgian independence, the Georgian parliament, therefore
adopted the former Georgian constitution from 1921, before Soviet Rule.
The language laws and the laws on citizenship were meant as protection of the rights of
the Georgian majority, in this way citizenship was based on nationality, defined
ethnically. The minorities were seen as non-Georgians. However, they were not to be
denied citizenship, but still they were defined as second class citizens: Formally
recognised but basically seen as an anomaly, and thus treated as tolerated historical
guests. In this light the national movement explained the existence of national
minorities in Georgia, as an artificial situation created by the communist Soviet rule.
Following this argument the minorities, and especially those with autonomies, were
viewed upon as foreign elements and a Soviet installed threat against the realisation of
Georgian independence and hence the autonomies were regarded as unlawful.
This of course also plays a role in the Georgian understanding of the conflict as it is
connected to the Georgian self-perception of being the eternal historical victim
surrounded by hostile powers (especially Russia) and to the insecurity as to the border
regions, inhabited by minorities, which has given cause to perceive them as a possible
and likely 5th colon. Therefore, you often encounter a reluctance of the term ethnic
conflict, to describe this conflict, as the Georgians understand it as a political conflict
instigated by the Russians, exploiting the Ossetians and Abkhaz in order to, so to speak,
clip the wings of the Georgian aspiration for national self-determination. This view is
further strengthened by the fact that the former conflict in the 1920s also is perceived as
a Russian instigated Ossetian rebellion in order to seize Georgia.
This furthermore explains the Georgian insensitiveness towards the concerns of the
minorities, as it is largely not perceived to be a domestic problem but rather an
instrumentalized conflict instigated by Russia. The Georgian national movement could
thus only perceive the minorities reaction on the Georgian strive for independence as
treason and the minorities were thus seen as ungrateful guest.
In addition this view led to the fact that the expressed concerns and fears of the
minorities were mainly interpreted as a threat to the territorial integrity of Georgia.
Despite the fact that, as we have seen in the empirical part, Russia did play a negative
role, this have lead to a completely incomprehensibility as to the situation of the
minorities and a monopoly on Georgian interests and affairs and thereby excluded the
possibility of any cross-ethnic all-national/Georgian alliances.
South Ossetian Nationalism

The South Ossetian national movement came into existence later than the Georgian and
mainly in response to the developments in Georgia proper. The specific version of the
Georgian nationalism, as ethno-nationalism and, thereby, the diverted view on
minorities, had a strong influence on the development of the South Ossetian national
movement. Specifically it started to take form as a reaction to the proposed language
laws in Tbilisi.
However, as in Georgia proper it was environmental problems that, in the atmosphere of
the openness of perestroica, initiated popular protests in South Ossetia. The typhoid
epidemic in South Ossetia in early 1988, caused at first critique of the local South
Ossetian communist authorities. But in the light of the wave of nationalism and the
Georgia for Georgians euphoria in Georgia proper, these socio-economic condition
were soon connected to the situation of the South Ossetians as an unfairly treated nation
within the hierarchical structure of nationalities of the Soviet Union and especially
within the Union Republic of Georgia. The South Ossetian national movement stressed
the fact that the self-government of the South Ossetians was very limited and the
standard of living and the economic development were worse than in other parts of
Georgia. The underdevelopment of South Ossetia was interpreted as lack of subventions
and investments on behalf of the authorities in Tbilisi.
The general issues of democratisation and civil rights were surely a part of the
discussions within the South Ossetian national movement, but it did not dominate the
discussion. In this way the South Ossetian national movement was not especially antiCommunist, it dealt, as in Georgia proper, with the collective rights of the Ossetian
nation, and not with their individual civic rights within the state. Therefore as the
conflict with the Georgians took form a co-operation between the national movement
and the South Ossetian communists evolved.
The South Ossetians stress that the Georgian national movement worked for a state for
the Georgians with no place for the minorities. Hence it was the fear of future repression
and marginalisation in an independent Georgia that drove the South Ossetians to form a
national movement. The language laws, for example, were not just a question of
national pride or symbolism, they would have had severe consequences for the South
Ossetians in a material and social sense. As mentioned in the empirical part of the
project the Russian language functioned more or less as the official language of the
autonomous region, above the Ossetian language, and only 14 per cent of the Ossetians
master the Georgian language. If Georgian were to be strengthened and Russian
simultaneously weakened, it would mean an effective marginalisation of the South
Ossetian community in an independent Georgia.
Following this, the South Ossetian national movement referred to the Georgian
Republic of 1918-1921 (the last and only time Georgia was independent) to show how
the Georgians behaved when they were masters in their own house and the South
Ossetians faced the Georgians without the protection of the Russians. Therefore, when
the conflict escalated it became part of the collective South Ossetian self-consciousness
to refer to the incidents, during the first period of Georgian independence, as the first
genocide against the South Ossetians and this conflict as the second genocide.
As in Georgia proper, the national discourse in South Ossetia is quite primordial. The
past is glorified and the Ossetian descent from the ancient Scythian and Alanian warlike

tribes that ruled over vast parts Eurasia is emphasised in media and science. The South
Ossetians have thus lived on the southern slopes of the Caucasian Mountains in two
thousand years. Both the Georgian and South Ossetian national consciousness operate
within this time frame. However, it were the processes of modernisation of the South
Ossetian society in the Soviet period, together with the nation-building process, derived
by the Soviet nationality policies, that led to the development of a South Ossetian
intellectual ethno-national elite. The nationality policies of the Soviet Union, with its
concepts of titular nations, in the autonomous units as well, lead to the consciousness of
being a potential nation. Like in Georgia, it is symptomatic that the leaders of the South
Ossetian national movement, and for that sake the Communist elite, were lead by
academics like President Chibirov, a historian, the Foreign Minister also a historian, the
former Foreign Minister an archaeologist, his main assistant an ethnographer etc.
The South Ossetians argue with the same logic as the Georgian national movement, for
a writing-up of the political rights and territorial status of their unit. The logic of selfdetermination of nations, grounded on ethno-national distinctiveness and ancient
historical arguments.
When the process of democratisation began it was expected, in many of the autonomies,
that the de jure rights of the autonomies were to be taken seriously, respected and even
developed. In many cases, as in the Georgian - South Ossetian case, these rights were
questioned and disregarded as Soviet relics. At the same time the advent of democratic
elections threatened the (titular) minorities privileged position. Therefore, the
leaderships of the autonomies often raised their voice in the support of the centre in
Moscow and for the respect of the Leninist principles of equality of nationalities.
Hence, it was the elites and the national movements rather than the ethnic groups as
such, in the former Soviet republics and autonomies that were the primary internal
actors. But the fault-lines ran parallel to ethnic lines and the conflicts were therefore
articulated in ethnic terms. It is important to stress that the conflict was articulated
exactly in ethnic terms mainly because of the Soviet system and its territorialisation and
politicisation of ethnicity. In the light of Brass ideas, the South Ossetian elite played, so
to speak, the ethnic card or rather maintained the emphasis on South Ossetian
distinctiveness, in order to maintain their privileges and advantages.
The Georgia for Georgians atmosphere in the transformation period stimulated not
only the South Ossetians and the Abkhaz but also other minority groups. E.g. in the
Azeri populated areas of southern Georgia it came to violent clashes in the transition
period, but not in an organised way exactly because they lacked the ethnic elite, the
semi-state structures and a well-defined territory that the Soviet system had fostered in
South Ossetia and Abkhazia. So even though the autonomies, during Soviet times, had
little political competence, in the transition period they could quickly and with few
resources make an effective ethnic mobilisation. This argument follows Brass who
states, that without elites differences and/or disparities will just vanish or be accepted or
maybe be the cause of sporadic or isolated incidents of conflict or disorder.
While the national movements of most of the Union Republics, like Georgia, went for
the realisation of national self-determination through the dissolution of and secession
from the Soviet Union, the case of the autonomies was remarkably different. The
demand of the South Ossetian national movement for self-determination was directed
towards the political centre of Moscow. For the South Ossetians the preservation of the

Soviet Union was important in two ways; first of all it would prevent a cementation of
the division of North and South Ossetia, secondly Moscow would keep its position as
patron of the South Ossetians. This is also a reflection of the Soviet federal structure as
we have seen in the Soviet Setting. The Union Centre in Moscow was by the
autonomous units within the Union Republics, to a large extent seen as a protector or as
a potential allied.
The South Ossetian national movement together with the local Communist government,
therefore, expressed their national self-determination by the wish of hindering the
dissolution of the Soviet Union. In this way, from the point of view of Tskhinvali, it was
not the South Ossetians but the Georgians that should be seen as separatists. When the
Soviet Union dissolved the South Ossetian national movement turned its attention
towards the Russian Federation, aware of the fact that South Ossetian independence
with or without North Ossetia was unrealistic; instead they opted for joining the Russian
Federation.
Here it is interesting to note that nationalism as defined by Hobsbawm and Gellner, as a
political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be
congruent, would mean that the South Ossetians should opt for independence, this, as
we have seen, was not the case. In stead they chose the option which guaranteed
maximal control of the homeland and its resources in the given situation. Following
Smiths definition of nationalism, they wanted to join the Russian Federation where they
could maintain maximal control. Not untill this option failed, and North Ossetia backed
the Russian view, the South Ossetian national movement went for full independence. In
this situation the national movement changed the myths of the unity of the North and
South Ossetians, and claimed that they split several centuries ago. The North Ossetians
reaching the Caucasus north of the Caspian See and the South Ossetians south of the
sea, hence in this way, though related, their distinctive courses made it natural for them
to have separate political roof.
It now seems that we are ending up with the conclusion that the Georgian South
Ossetian conflict, was a political-administrative conflict rather than an ethnic conflict
and hence should be named the Georgia South Ossetia conflict instead. I think it
should be clear to the reader by now that this conflict was not about incompatible ethnic
identities but rather two competing societal structures. On one hand the South Ossetian
local government and the Georgian government and on the other hand in light of their
ethno-nationalist policies two competing societal structures. Hence a conflict of
sovereignty. But one of my points is exactly that since this conflict ran alongside an
ethnic faultline or to put it in another way, was played out in ethnic terms, it thus had a
specific dynamic.
The ethnic community of the South Ossetians represents an alternative societal
relationship able to compete with the Georgian territorial state as a political organising
principle. The survival of an ethnic society depends on its identity, but due to the Soviet
nationality policies, which meant a territorialisation and politicisation of ethnicity, also
in the South Ossetian case on its autonomy. The Soviet nationality policies linked
territory and ethnicity. With territory came status of being the titular nationality, which
meant privileges and precedence over the other minorities. Without territory no special
rights were provided.

The collapse of the communist state, or rather the Soviet federal structure, meant not
only a collapse of the economy and administrative institutions, but also of the fragile
and entangled Soviet federal system. Insecurity and uncertainty can best describe the
situation.
In the light of the security dilemma discussion I think we in this case can talk of a real
security dilemma in the sense that the Georgian national movement at first mainly was
directed against Soviet/Russian influence and presence cutting Georgia loose from
the Soviet Union. The South Ossetian national movement was at first concerned with its
status within Georgia and opted for an increase of their autonomy and not secession.
As the Soviet Union showed more signs of collapsing and the democratisation process
of Georgia turned into an outbidding of nationalist rhetorics the South Ossetians felt
increasingly threatened and increased their nationalistic rhetorics. The Soviet federal
system had made the centre the obvious allied of South Ossetia. With the imminent
collapse of the Soviet Union it was natural for South Ossetia to approach Moscow for
help. This only worsened the situation as this fitted perfectly into the Georgian
perception of the conflict as imposed by Moscow in order to subdue Georgia.
Only then you could talk of malign intend as the Georgian nationalists clearly directed
their rhetorics not only against the Soviet Union and Russia but also against the
minorities especially the South Ossetians. Stating that their autonomy was a Soviet
imposed one and had no place in an independent Georgia calling them ungrateful
guests. From then on we can speak of a security spiral, where both the Georgians and
South Ossetians strengthened their respective identities, making ethnic crosscut bonds
impossible. Starting, as has been described, a war of declarations, further worsening the
relationship. And finally starting arming themselves literately.
What made the fighting so fierce and brutal could be ascribed to the incompatible
deeply felt values and identities of the two parties but on the other hand, as we have
seen in the chapter on the dynamics of ethnic conflict, there do exist logical structural
explanations for this. This is in no way meant as an excuse for the atrocities committed
and in no way to say that they are an expression of rational behaviour. No - but anarchy,
be it understood in security or everyday language terms, do as we have seen, carry an
argument as does the argument of conflicts gaining their own life and logic.
One of Andersons points is that the nation and with that nationalism makes people kill
and die for it. I agree to the point that the nation or ethnic identification is very strong
and in certain circumstances take priority and re-arrange all other identities accordingly.
I however find to drastic to make the conclusion that people are ready to sacrifice
themselves in the name of the nation. As we have seen in the chapter on the dynamics
of ethnic conflict there are other circumstances and arguments that carries substantial
weight and I am thus inclined to state that these sacrifices often are interpreted
retrospectively rather than prospectively. I am not saying that there does not exist
examples of this but in the midst of warfare often even the root causes to a conflict
becomes subordinate to the actual warfare and grievances experienced.
] This view on ethnicity, as a momentarily phenomenon, disappearing with
modernisation, was until recently common in liberal theories as well.

[2] It can be stated that these groups are more widely dispersed throughout the
republic, which they are, but there are areas in southern Georgia with large
concentrated populations of Armenians and Azeris.

7 Conclusion
For Georgia, like other regions or countries that strive for secession from a
larger political unit, on the grounds of ethno-national distinctiveness the
question of how to deal with its own minorities emerges. The Georgia for
Georgians campaign or euphoria can be seen as a logical consequence of the
process of separation from Soviet/Russian influence. E.g. when the Georgian
parliament adopted the 1921 constitution, it was foremost meant as a
renunciation of Soviet/Russian influence and presence, and as a restoration of
Georgian statehood. However, this functioned effectively as a threat towards
the minorities and an alienation of the Georgian State. In the 1921 constitution
there is no mentioning of South Ossetian autonomy, and the historical
circumstances of the 1920s, where the Georgian army brutally crushed a
South Ossetian uprising, could effectively be used by the South Ossetian
national movement to build up a hostile attitude towards an independent
Georgian state.
The Georgian strive for independence was based on the grounds of Georgian
distinctiveness. It was a strive for collective national reassertion vis--vis the
Soviet state and the Russians. The Georgian nation was thus from the outset
defined in an ethnic manner. This was also, as we have seen, largely due to the
inherited Soviet conception of the nation as an ethno-national community. The
Soviet system had stressed the principle of congruity between statestructures/units and ethnic groups as an ideal, and laid down this conception
on the very heterogeneous area of Caucasus. The Georgians could therefore
only perceive the minorities as an anomaly or as guests. The autonomies were
to a large extend, especially South Ossetia, viewed as an artificial Soviet
installed provision supposed to prevent the Georgians realising independence.
The Georgian national movement viewed the autonomies as Russian installed
time bombs, and the minorities as tools or lackeys in the hands of the
authorities in Moscow, in which the incidents in the 1920s were effectively
used by the Georgian nationalists as well. This explains the insentiveness on
the behalf of the Georgian state towards the concerns of the minorities, as it
was largely perceived not to be a domestic problem, but an instrumentalised
conflict instigated by Moscow. Furthermore, the comprehension of the
Georgian nation as an ethno-nation, in the pursue of national reassertion
meant a monopoly on Georgian interests excluding the possibility of a civicpolitical understanding of the nation and hence cross-ethnic alliances. The
Georgian State thereby excluded the South Ossetians from the Georgian
community by defining it in ethno-national terms. The imagination of the

community was demarcative and exclusive, not inclusive and embracing. In

the euphoria of the perceived liberation from the Russian occupation, the
Georgians neglected the concerns of the minorities and in the process of
building an independent state, they refused to take into consideration the
problems of building new institutions and relating the composing ethnic
groups to these.
As we have seen this can also be derived from the Soviet nationality policies.
The policy created an ethnic understanding of the nation and furthermore a
development of ethno-national elites. An ethnic consolidation and
empowerment of the titular nationalities and their elites took form. Ethnicity
became a criterion for success, in the way that privileges and priorities were
tied to ethnic belonging and territory. The Soviet system and policies can be
characterised as a politicisation and territorialisation of ethnicity. Thus the
Soviet legacy prevented or made it difficult for both the Georgian majority
and the South Ossetian minority, to have a political-civic understanding of the
nation. One can best describe the Soviet system as entrenchment of ethnicity.
The same development occurred, to a certain extent, in the autonomies. In
South Ossetia an ethno-national elite was developed too, as well as a
consciousness of a collective ethnic identity. Both communities in this way
developed a consciousness of being potential nations, in Smiths sense a named
human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical
memories, a mass public culture, a common economy legal rights and duties
for all members (Smith 1991, p.14). Legally and economically within the
same frame but still divided in different administrative centres. The Soviet
Union in this way created antagonistic ethno-national societies/communities
and nationalisms within the boundaries of the Georgian State.
Furthermore it is important to see this in connection with the hierarchical
structure of the Soviet Union. The hierarchical structure of the Soviet federal
system produced inherent conflict constellations, between the three layers of
the Union. The Union Centre on one side, the Union Republics on the other
and the autonomous units in between. This meant a continuos competition
between governments for status and legitimacy over a specific ethnically
defined territory and a competition of sovereignty. It was furthermore an
institutionalisation of ethnic disparity, levelling the different ethnic groups in
terms of status and political power. Since the fault-lines ran parallel to the
ethnic ones it cannot simply be seen as a question of administrative problems.
In the light of the theories of nationalism, the ethnic or cultural community of
the South Ossetians poses a threat to the nationalism of the dominant
Georgian community. The South Ossetian community represents an
alternative ethno-cultural community that can choose to leave the larger
Georgian community, when they find it suitable. The South Ossetian ethnic

elite functions as effective rivals to the Georgian state exactly because of their
cultural fundament, which makes them able of mobilising popular support.
This meant first of all that Moscow became the perceived protector of the
South Ossetians in opposition to the Union centre of Tbilisi, which we have
seen was reflected throughout the entire course of the conflict. This pattern
caused a vicious spiral in which Georgia tried to liberate 'itself' from the
perceived Soviet/Russian repressor. Which then was perceived by the South
Ossetians, as they would loose their protector, which further stimulated them
to seek protection. Which then again gave cause to the Georgian perception of
the South Ossetians as lackeys of Moscow.
Secondly, this hierarchical system of disparity made Tbilisi, from the view of
Tskhinvali, responsible for the overall social and economic conditions in
South Ossetia. Discrimination is often said to give cause to ethnic conflict,
and as we have seen the Soviet system did foster a situation where ethnicity
became a criterion for success. But the political elite in South Ossetia, and the
South Ossetians as such, were in a much better position than the minorities
without autonomies. Even though they were in a defensive position in respect
to the Union Republic centre of Tbilisi, cultural or political discrimination
played a minor role, as they were the titular nation of South Ossetia. On the
other hand the economic conditions of the South Ossetian autonomous region
did play a part in the conflict, but rather in a reinforcing manner than as a
cause of conflict. What is of importance here is the fear of the elites of South
Ossetia of loosing their privileges, status and positions in an independent
Georgia than the actual discrimination before the conflict.
In continuation of this many ethnic conflicts, and other conflicts, can be
ascribed to the fact of loss of central power/authority. Surely this has a great
deal of saying in the described conflict. This especially due to the specific
nature of the Soviet system, with its hierarchical ranked units, and a special
system as to the relationship between the different centres. In this respect the
demising of central power has had a special significant importance for the
minorities.
It was the fear of domination - fears of future ill treatment along ethnic lines
after the collapse of the Soviet Union, that made the South Ossetians prefer a
continuation of Soviet rule where the ethno-national elite, fostered by the
Soviet nationality policies, could maintain maximal control. The Georgian
national movement questioned the autonomies and therefore the vicious spiral
started evolving.
In this way we could conclude that rather than describing this conflict as an
ethnic conflict we should describe it as an administratively political conflict.
However, the specific dynamics that have been described here also show that

without the ethno-cultural fundament of the elites this conflict might not have
taken place, at least not so persistently. As I concluded earlier, what made this
conflict a violent conflict and not the cause of sporadic riots, was the presence
of elites and a well-defined territory, in comparison with the Azeri minority.
But on the other hand it is important to stress that exactly the ethno-cultural
fundament of the elites makes them capable of mobilising the people. As
written in the theoretical part, ethnic mobilisation is only possible where the
symbolic resources of the community have been continuously maintained and
developed in order to command its emotional appeal. Nationalism, in an
ethnic-organic understanding, took during Soviet rule, root in the collective
consciousness, of both the Georgians and the South Ossetians; it was not only
an elite phenomenon.
Nationalism and ethnicity are both a principle for political organisation but
also a focus for personal identity. Ethnicity has on the same time a strong
emotional appeal and a strong political mobilisation potential. In a conflict
situation this combination is explosive.
When ethnic groups mobilise politically in order to challenge the state it is
often because of inequality of socio-economic conditions, access to political
influence or power, status and civil rights etc. But it is important not to deny
or underestimate the importance of the cultural fundament in this. The cultural
elements, which serves in symbolising the ethnic group in relation to the
surroundings are not just symbols but also function as an existential platform.
And precisely the cultural fundament does that ethnic conflicts have if not
such an intensity then a special dynamic compared to other conflicts.
What we have been able to conclude from this thesis is that contrary to
common believe, the Soviet Union not only nourished and developed ethnic
and national identities, their nationality policies and federal system was
inherently conflictual in respect to these identities. We cannot talk of old
ancient hatreds, when nationalism and the idea of the nation is a modern
phenomenon, precisely developed during Soviet rule.
Multinational or heterogeneous states are not artificial constructions. The idea
of the nation is artificial - a construction or an imagination - a social reality yes - but the idea of the homogeneous nation-state is an illusion. The fact is
that 90 percent of present days states are ethnic heterogeneous makes
homogeneity an illusion. And this illusion or strive towards homogeneity is
the conflictual aspect - not heterogeneity. Thus ethnic diversity is not
conflictual in itself. Even nationalism is in itself not enough to create conflict.
Ethno-nationalism is only inasmuch as it creates inequalities, economically or
socially etc. And even then it might not be enough.

It is not yet clear what conditions are necessary and sufficient for the initiation
of ethnic conflict, nor is there a rigorous understanding of why some conflicts
are more intense than others are. But I do hope that this thesis have brought
some more clarity to the notion of ethnic conflict and if not deciphered it then
at least demystified it and shown that the term ethnic conflict should be used
with extreme caution. One might even say that the labelling of a conflict as an
ethnic conflict should be seen as expression of our own ignorence or at least
lack of knowledge.
It should now be clear to the reader that the so-called ethnic conflict between
Georgians and South Ossetians cannot be explained by the mere fact of ethnic
differences or the renewal of runaway old ancient hatred after the repressive
lid of Communism have been removed. The conflict should rather be seen as a
product of a complex set of interacting circumstances. Both due to the Soviet
legacy, specifically the Soviet nationality policies and the hierarchical
structure of the Soviet Federal Union; to the collapse of this system and the
following decline and absence of central power and authority; to the Georgian
exclusionist ethno-nationalist policies in pursue of independence; and due to
the specific circumstances of the South Ossetian minority, possessing an
autonomous unit and an ethnic elite, and their fragmentive ethno-nationalist
response to the Georgian strive for independence.