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Interag:ency

S(,~('urity

(]assification Appeals

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March 18~ 2014


Grant F. Snlith
Director
Institllte for Research: Middle Eastern Policy
Calvert Station
P. (). Box 32041
Wash.ington~

DC_' 20007

Dear Mr. Smith:


Please be advised that the Interagency SeCllrity lClassification Appeals Panel (ISCAP) has
concluded its consideration of the lllandatory declassification review appeal filed by yOll and that
the 60-day period during which an agency head m.ay appeal an ISCAP decision to the President
has expired. Enclosed is a copy of the dOCUlllent and a chart that outlines the ISCAP decision
\\lith the exception of any infom1ation thaT is ottlerwise authorized and vvarranted for withholding
under applicable la\\'" \ve are releasing aJI in~)rnnation declassified by the ISCAP to you. If you
have questions about this appeaL please contact 1\-eena Sachdeva or \Villiam C. Carpenter at
'"' S7 -)-;-0
--- -) -'.... ) .
C;O;'

Sincerely~

.
l

A/'- ~t1"~

IV~

//1;>~

t/ '.

.A
~"(~

JO~ZPATRICK

Executive Secretary

Enclosures

cc:

:Mr. Joseph IJambert [Letter and Chlart and I)ocument]


:Director~

Information Managen1erlt Services


Central Intelligence Agency Melnber to trle ISCAJ?

ISCAP D:E:CISION ON

l~HE MAN"DA'rO~~'{

IDENTIFYING

NUMBERS

Snlith~

dOCulnent No.1
IS(~AP No.

DE(:LASSIFICATION REVIEW APPEAL


MR G~]UN'r F. SMlrrH

D]~S(~RIP'l'ION

ACTION

D()C"Ul\'IENT

Nuclear Diversio11 in tJhe lJ.S.?


13 Years of C~ontradiction and
Confusion

2013-078

Decemlber 18, 1978

CIA

62 pages

EC)M-2009-0 1073

OF

f~II-JED

Secret

11

DECLASSIFIED SOME PORTIO"NS


AND AFFIRMED THE
CLASSIF'ICA l'ION OF OTI-IER
PORTI01~S

E.O. 13526 3.3(b)(1) as 25X1


Some information remains witW1eld
by the Central Intelligence Agency
under the statutory authority of the
Central Irltelligence Agency Act of
1949, 50 "U.S.C. 403(g).

BY

COl162251

. . _~~
w~_i_

_ --_
-

_1
III_ ~

1_ _- - : . - _ _ _ _ _

REPORT BYTI-lE

~,~,

ComptronE~r

General

.OF T~iE UNITED STATES


I

I~-:u~-.!
Un,

__

I-----~_-

Nuclear Diversiton In The U.Sa?


13 Years Of Co!ntradiction
And Confusior,
IINATIONIAL SECURIT~( IN FORMlj'Tf ON"
UNAUTHOFtlZED OfSCLOSUR:E SIJBJE~CT

TO

CRIM:JNJ~L

SAI'JCrr4JNS:

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_._ .. _-------/'

WARNING NOTICE--Sensitive

Intelligence Sources and

Methods Involved

c..

[)ECL.>\SSIIF' lED l;NDER AU1'HORITY OF TI-IE

INTI~RA~G;Er~CY SECURITY lCLASSIFICi\TIOl\f APPEALS PANEl."

1:.0. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)

~~~D Sl'~t~

~~

/~~~

.~

ISCfllP }\PPEAL NO. 2013-078, document

I1l0.

\~ ~:r~~~~U;~;~~0j ii~~u;_~E:~~~18'201~
1CCOl.Jt'\'-C\

~~l67107
EM0-79-8
DECEMBER 18. 1978

,~,,---

.... ,!'l;.;J~!.<J.

Classified by letter fI~cm :ffiI to Gr10 .dated Octobe~ 25, 1978 and a letter
fran CIA to GN) also' dcltai ()ctc~l:?er 25, 1978. .

~.

Cl
CO:L1622~J~~.,
f/':~(.

8i ~~~~"; '~.\.
'"1

~\;i :}~:: </~


;', ....

,. :/'~:'.....,

CC:';--,-!:\C!....LER

G:::."JS~:",L

WI\,SHfN~

OF Tf-: :..;~::7":::=~]

rON, O . C.

STr~TES

~o:,.w

I'~~,:

B-157767

The Honorable Johi1 D. [)ingell

Chairman, Subcommittee on

Enerav and Power

Comrnitt~E on Interst.atE~ and

Fa rei g n Comma r CE~

House of Representat.ives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

On .~~-gust 12,,: ,1977, you requE~sted. th~~~.t we~ init~ate an


investi.gation to deterrr,ine the ext:ent and cont:ents of intel
ligence and related nuclear safeguards infor~ation regarding
.a possi.ble diversion of nuclear fficlterial from a U.'S. facility
and the extent to which this information ,,~as disseminated
among those agencies haiing responsibilities in this area.
In response to your
discusses two questions

requ~st,

this report primarily

--what information has been developed abo~~ the alleged


diversion? and
--were the investigations done by the Federal Government
adequate?
As agreed ~rit.h your .office we plan to distribute the
report to certain other parties having an interest in it.
Specifically, we plan to provide the report to the Chai'rman
of the House CornrnittE~e on Interior and Insular Affairs and
the Chairman of the Subcomn~ittee" on Energy', Nu,clear Prolife~
ation and Federc:ll Services',r Senate Committ.ee on Governmental

IGr~~D BY (see inside front cover).


EXEMP~~ F~~AL ])ECLASS IF ICATION
SCHED~JLE OF. EXE~~'ER 11652
EXEMP,]~ION CAT'EGORY 2
~
.

.~
(This 1?age is UNCLASSIFIEI).)

/l

,CO:11622:)1
B- 15 7 ~I 6 ~.;
II !'ICLA SS I F I ~:~'D

Affairs.
Furthe:l::", we will alsq be providin'g the report to
the House and Senat.e Select Intelligence C()rnrnit:tees and the"
Federal agencies included in our revi~w.
The report has been classified as SECH.ET/~rational Secu
Info~matiQn by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and
the Central Inte11igenc 2 Agency.,. \'le mad~' E~very' attenpt to .
issue an unclassified repo~t on thi.s matter.
Hrowever, neither
the 'Federal BL1re~:iU of' Investigation n"or the~ 'Cen~tral Intelli
gency Agency was able to provide us with a declassified version
of the report.

rity

(~

s~ yo~,.rslJ

l-t..~ 01.4

/1..

Comptroller Genetal
of the United States

CiNCLASS 1F1E1),

II

~~17T
~[\.;~~

C011622~51

REPORT OF THE

NUCLE):~R DIVERSION' 1(\J T.~E

,::OMPrr~?GL~'::?

GENERAL OF THE' UNITEC

STA~ES

13 YEARS O?

UNITSP STATES?
CONTRl~DI C~rI O~;

hl'!D COt'JFUS I 0:':

DIG EST
PREFi\C:E

It is not. G,AO's function to conduct criminal


i nv e S ,t i 9 a: t ion san d t his. rev i e w s h 0 U 1 d not be
construed as one. Thi.s report is simply a
presentation of facts as we have examined
them regarding thE~ alleged diversion and its
accompanyin~g 13 YE:ars of contradiction and
confusion;.
GAO's efforts focused on the im
plications such an alleged incidE~n.t \lIould
have f()r imJ?rov in9 'the effecti,veness of the
Nation"s current nuclear safeguards program.
Inyestigations of the alleged inc:j..dent by
the FBI and the Department of EnE~rgyl s (DOE)
Office of I'nspector Gene'ral are stilI under~

way.
WHY GAO'S REVIEW ~AS ~ADE
Chairman 'John Din~~ell o.f the Hou~;e Subcom
mittee 'on Energy clnd Power requested GAO
to exarnine an allE?ged incident involving
over 200 pounds of unaccounted for u!'aniufO
235, the mate.rial used in the fabrication
of nuclear 've 3pons,' from' a nucleclr plant in
wester l'l Penns:ylvania. Also, Chairman John
Glenn of the Subcommittee on Energy, Nuclear
Prol if era t ion, and ,Feder,al Serv ices, Sena te
Committee on Governmental Affairs, and Chair
c

man Morris K.

Uda11 of the Subcon\rnitt.ee on

E~ergy

and )~nv ironmen,t, House COll1mi t tee on


Interior and Insula'r Affairs, eX:f>ressed in
terest in the review.

Chairman Ding 211 spec'if.icallY asked GAO to


l

examint:~

the ext.ent and content of. int.elli


gence and saf.2guards informatfon regardin'g

the all e 9 e din c i d E~ nt, a'n d the ext e n t to


wh ich t:: h'i s .L nfo r mel t ion wa s p r ov ided t.o DOE

and thE? Nuclear

RE~gulatory

Commis;sion (NRC)

for their use in assuring that nuclear ma


te ria 1 s we r E~ be in9 adequa te 1 y pr clte c t.ed in.
this country.
Cha'irman Dingell requested
that GJ:\O review rt * * * all neces:sary~ files

EMD-79-8

~..

C01162251

and reports

incl~dlna

CIA, and. the .FE!

CONSTRAINTS
_
...

.-it..

*.~

those of

*.

ERD~,

NRC,

It

ON GAOtS REVIEW

--------..._------~----------_.~

....,...

GAO attempted to satIsfy the Chairman~s re


quest by intl=rviewinq rE~;sponsible Fede[,(:ll
and private individu~ls a~d byexaminirig

pertirient.reports and

db~umentation.

While

DOE 1/ and NRC provided full access to all


theii records a~d docurnentat'ion, GAO was con
tin.ually. denied necessar:y :re~)orts and docu
men ta t io n on the a 11 eged i ric i.den t. by the:
Central. Intelligence Agency (CIA). and the
Federal, Bureau of ~nvestigation (FBI).

CIA provided GAO a written chronology of


contacts with other Federal ag~ncies, how~
ev;r, the CIA denied GAO ciccess tQ any
source documents on the case. According to
agency officials, this was a decision made
by the' Director of the C:~~I
4I

--J

- - - - -__J.

The CIA did subsequently


allow selected staff of Chairman Dingell's
Subcom~ittee access to CIA documents, how
ever, access to the documents was not ex
tended t.O include GAO.

,. - Withheld under 'statutory authority of the


~.e?traJ Int~lligence i\gency Act of 1949 (50
I L.S.C., sectIon 493g)

~/The

Atomic Energy Commiss'ion (AEC) was for


merly responsible for both regulating and
promotirig all nuclear activities in the
United States. In January 19, 1975, it
was.split into the 'Nucl~at Regulatory Com
mission ~nd the Energy Research and Devel
opment Administration (ERDA).
NRC becarn~
responsible for nuclear regulation and
ERDA became responsible for nuclear devel
opment and prorn;tion. Under Public Law
95-91 , ERDA's functions w'ere placed in the~
DepartmeDt of Energy effective 6ctober 1,
1977. NRC remained intact~ Throughout
the report, DOE i~ used to refer to the
Department 6f Energy, ERDA, and AEC.

ii

~,

COi162251

The FBI's rationale for CiE:r1yinCI acceBS was


that it did not want to jeoo2rdize an on
g 0 i ngin v est i gat i () n ' 0 f t: [~ ~~ c. 11 t~ d Ed d i v E~ r ,
sion incident.
GAQ 'was denied Iclccess t.o dOCL::mE~nta
tion, it had to rely, for the most part, on
oral evidence o'btained in interviews with
knowledgeable indi~idu~ls and staff.
The
lack of access to CIA and FBI documents
made it impossible for GAO to corroborate
or check all informati6n it obtained; When
ever possible, GAO a'tternoted' to corroborate
the inforrna t ion' with 0 the! knowledgeable i n
dividua1s. One must keep in mind, however,
that ,the alleged 'incident occurred more than
13 years ago.
These limitations impeded
GAOls efforts to fully collect and evaluate'
ali facts of possible relevance t~ th~ al
leged diversion incident.
Beca~se

\
, a

While GAO normally would not continue work


wher~ it was continually denied access tb
pertinent 'and. im:portant documentation" it,
did continue in this case because of the
significant nuclear safequards j.mplications

and th~ congressional interest. This re


report is focused on the' inlplications the
alleged incident has ,for iITlproving th~ E~f
fectiveness of the Nationls current nu.clear
safeg'uard~. program.

BACKGROUND
The alleged incident surfaced in 1965 at
the Nucl ea r Ma ter ial s' and Egu ipmen t~ CorF~o
ration (NUMEC).. Since .that time, many
allegations ,concerning the incident have
been made in newspa~er and magazine,arti
cles ~nd at corigres~ional hearings. These
allegations include:,

--The material was illegally diverted to


Israel by NUMEC's manag~m~nt for use in
nuclear weapons.

--The material was diverted to.

Isra~l

by

NUMEC's management with the assistance

of

the CIA.

C01162251

-~The

material'was diverted to Israel ~ith


the acquiescence of the United States
Government..

--There has been a cover-uo of the NUMEC'

incident by the United S~ates Government.

CIA officials prov'ided, 'L;lS with, their views


art the first all~gation and stated, th~t' they

had no inforlrnation, to 'SlJICtstantiate anY of


the o,thers.
Sa'sed 'on ,t.he totality of-GAO"s
inquiry, we beli~ve that the ~ll~gations
have not been fully or.adequately answered.

'/

Investigations of the incident were con


ducted by DOE' and the FBI. ~:he CIA " NE~C,
and',the Joint Committee, on Atomic Energy

also have some knowledge of the facts sur


ro~ndino the incident.
4~.ll investiqations 1/'
of the ~lleged incident'ended wit~ ~o definI~
tive an~wer and GAO, found no evidence that
the 200 pounds 6f n~cleai mat~r'ial has been
located. However, as a r'esult of the NUMEC
incident the safeguards programs in, the
Un i ted S ta tes hav~, under~~()ne 'suk)s tan t

ia1

'changes and have improved significantly.


This' report ,addresses' the t.wo major ques-'
tions still surrounding the incident and
their implications for thi~ country's can
t inu ing respons ib il i t'ies for safeguard ing
strategic nuclear materials. These are:
~-What information ,has been developed
the alle~ed NUMEC diversion?

about

--Were the investigations conducted by the


Federal Government into the alleged inci
dent adequate?

l/CIA officials informed GAO that they have


- no authoriti' to conduct, "'investigat.ions"
of unaccounted for nuclear materials in
the United States. As used in this report
the term Uinvest{gatioryl(s)," is used in the,
conte,xt o'f t.he entire FE~de~ral E~ffort'tlD re
solve 'the incident ..
iv

SECRElr,

COl162251
WHAT INFORMATION HASBEEN

DEVELOPED -AB()UT~TH,E- ALLf:~'GE,D


NUMECDI
VERS tON?----------
- - - - .......... _ ..... ....... ---._
..-.

Based crt its review of, available documents

held by DOE and discussioris with those in


volved in and knowledgeable about the NUMEC
incident, GAO cannot say whether or not
there was a d'iversion ot nlc::lter icll fronl thf:
NUMEC facility.
DOEh~s taken the position
that it is aware of no conclusive evidence
that a diversion of nuclear material ever
occurred at the NUMEC facility, although it
recogni~es that' 'the pos's'ibility cannot be
el imina te,d . Agents' f rom the FB,I invol vee
in the' current investigation told GAO ihat
while there exists, circumstanial information
which could lead.an individual to conclude
thgt a d ~ver,sion occurred, th~~re ~.s no'
su6stantlve proof bf a diverSIon.
Current.ly the FBI "is continuing its in
vestigation into the alleged NUMEC inci
dent.

. I 25Xl, E.O.13526

In an August'1977 meeting a former high


ranking CIA official 'informed GAO,' in the
presence of sev~ral current CIA officials,
that information was developed by the CIA
that. made it' appear that the NUMEC facilit~{
was the "most likely" source of the material
~_J GAO's

understandlng of the informatlon that was


presented at this meeting was subsequently
provided to CIA in, a memorandum of con~er-,
sation. A knowledgeabl~ CIA official who
r~viewed the memorandum ~xpressed rio oppo
sition to GAO's use 'of the 'tl2rn1 "most
likely ... ,

Later, in ~'No~~mb~r 1977 meeting with CIA


,o'f ic ial S, . GAO w,a's info rmed 1:ha, t ther e '-las
no data to specifically sup!?ort, such a con

clusi6n. Further, GAO was informed by CIA


officials that chara~terizinq NUMEC as the
Itmost likelyU source of thE~ ~lranilJm-235 held
by Israel was not the 'official position ~f
the Agency but,of ~erhaps on~ or two former
Agency of.ficials. The CIA offici~ls GAO
contacted informed us that the position ex
pressed in the August 1977 briefing should
v

~.

.C01162251

h3ve been changed to rE~fl,ect"a less conclusive

position.
~;Ul,~EC

The CIA officials suggested that

be recognized as ,only one of many pas-

sible sources of enriched uranium going to


Isr~el.
SUbsegu~ntly, however, two, former,
senior CIA officials res!)()nsible for' collect
ing and analyzing such data told GAO that
information does exist within the CIA I'ink
ing the ,unaccounted for NUMEC material to
Israel. One of these former officials was
one'of the five highest ranking employees
of. the,' CIA and reported directly to t.he'
Director of the CIA on this matter.

Current CIA ofticials.told GAO that these


two former offic'ials were drawing on memory
as they recalled' past eventsc,
The ,CIA o,f
ficials having current access to the files
ad~ised GAO that a search ~f the ijyailable
data reveals a "semant'ic !)roblem conGerning
the use of the term uevidE?nce,.1f In short,
CIA states there is no hard evidence on a
diversion from NUMEC to Israel. At the same
time, current CIA'officials recognize that
the available dat~; when coupled ~ith past
recollections'of event~, could lead former
officials t'o speak in te,rnls,of '"linking" the'
unaccounted mat~rial from NUMEC to nuclear
develop~ents in Israel.
GAO was unable to
determine whether the CIA changed its opin~
ions about any NUMEC/Is:rael link or whethe~r
U

the CIA inadver,tently failed to comment on


the inaccuracy of the "most likely" positi.,on

conveyed to'GAO in the Aug~st 197~ briefing.


The FBI agent' ~urrently in charge of the in
vestiaation told GAO that the FBI also re
ceive~ conflicting stories from the CIA.
Initially, the CIA told the FBI investiga
tors they had information supporting the
possibility'that the material missing from
the NUMEC facility' went to Israel.
ThE~ CIA
later reversed itself and told, the FBI it,
did not have this type of information.

In 1975, t~e entire regulatory 'function of


DOE was taken over by the newly created NRC,
which was made responsible for, the regula
tory oversight of ~ommercial nuclear facili
ties like NUMEt, and c.onsequently has become
involved in the incident.- In a FebI~uary
1978 report related to th~ NUMEC ,incident,

C01162251

NRC coricluded that their previous official


position of "no evidencE~" t.o" support a di
ve~sion may need to be reconsidered in light
of the ma~Y uncertainties surrounding the
'
Incid'ent.
WERE THE INVESTIGATIONS C'ON,DLlC'I'ED

BY THE 'FEDERAL GOVERNMENT INTO

THE ALLEGED INCIDENT ADEQUATE?

"If"a diversion or' theft of nuclear material


is suspected or '"actualljl occurs in this
country~ the rederal Government must be able
to quickly and def ini tiv,ely determine how .
and,why it happened so that the public can
be protected against the poten~ial hazaids
from such an occurrence. To do thi~, agen
'cies of the Governm~nt with capabilities
fo~

inves,tigating and reSI?ondinq

~.o

such

incidents must work together to assure that


all relevant information is "obtained and is
timely. This did not happen with the al
l eged NUMEC inc id'en t.
Feder al inves t iga t ions
of ~he alleged NUMEC incident were uncoordi
nated" limited in scope and timeliness, and,
in GAO's opinion, less than adequate~ There
was not a unified and coordinated investiga
tion of the incident by those agencies having
the capabilities to fully resdlve the matter
--DOE, the FBI, and the CIA.
During 1965 and 1966 DOE investigated NUMEC's
accountability and safeguards system focus
ing on the div~rsion possibility. Prior to .
the alleged 1965 incident, DOE conducted six
accountability inspections at NUMEC in'order
to assure that nuclear materials were "being
adequately protected. The inspections were
directed solely 'at the ma,t-:riall accounting
requirements of the time which were much
less vigorous th~n those in existence at
nuclear facilities today. Each inspection
revealed significant defi<:::lencies, but DOE
allowed the facility to continue nuclear
operations even though a key field investi

gator at one pOInt recommE~nded, that ,DOE stop


providing nuclear material., to thE~ facility.

The FBI,'which had the respo~sibility and


authority to investigate the"~lleged inci
den t, did n'o t

f ~ c U son t h E~ que :s t i. 0 n

.,

~'l'

C01162251
ObI e nuc 1 ear

., vers lon
U1

~OS.Sl

25Xl, E.O.13526 ]

--nearly 11 years later.


FBI declined .DOE

May 19-76
.

un t l

Initially, the

~eguest

tC),

c()nduct an

investigation of the divte:rsic)n possi.bility

even though they are required to conduct


such investigations u~der the Atomic Energy
Act.
TWO' sour~es familiar with the matter
gave GAO differing views o~ why the FBI de
clined to ~ndertake' the investi9at:ion.. Be
tween 1965 'and 1976 the FBI's efforts'w~re
directed at investigating the actioris and
associations' of NUMEC's president. FBI and
Department of Justice staff told GAO that
after a request by President Ford in April
1976 the FBI did begin to address th~ diver
sion .aspect. GAO was not furnished any
docu~ents regard'ing President Ford's re
quest and thus could not s;pecifical1y

determine .its nature and scope . . ~his

Inv~stigation., which is currentl:}' ongoing,

is ~bviously hampered by the II-year gap


since the alleged in6ident occurred. Also,
although it may not affect the investigative
outcome, GAO fo~nd that certain .key indivi
duals had not been' contacted by the FBI
almost 2 years into ihe FBI's current
investigation ..

According to the CIA, it did not conduct a

the' inc id ent be

domes tic ~nvest igat ion of


cause it had no autho'rit

_!O d(~~j

L--

Several current and fonner' FBI and DOE

officials indicated that

thE~

CIA.

,~ithheld

this information from them, at a time when

it could ha ve aff ec ted the scope and d irec

tion of the i r inves.tiga tions.


HO\lJever, cu.r

rent CIA officials we contact.ed stated that

,the full range of informat=~=~


was not available~during the FBI investiga

tion in 1968. Current CIA officials told

~s that during the FBIls investigation be

ginning in 1976 the FBI wasbriefed by CIA

in full and the FBI agerit-in-charge ,told

viii

---'--ill
E.O.13526

''mRU
.

--

25Xl~
------

.I

COl162251
.. '

..

~I; .~

the CI~ that he did nbt see any new informa


tion in the preserit~tion which~was germane
to the FBI investioation. CIA officials

also told us that '~~ abou~ the same time

....

'

:' :', :.,' .::

:~ ~\
~

. 'I

DOE officials, also briefed by CIA, said.'


that the information was consistent with
what had been krl'own 'previ()usly. GAO does
not know the exterit to which the CIA re
vealed to the FBr or DOE the information
it possessed.
Wh ile' . the CIA rna'}' have
alerted ~hese agencies, it does n6t appear
to us that 'it provided the:m. 'with all the in
formation it had. on this subjt~ct in ,:in ade
quate or timely m~nner. It appears to GAO
that the CIA ma~ have been reluctant to aid
thei,domestic investigation of t'he arlleged
diversion becau~e of its concern about pro
tecti ng its own sources and nlethods" of
obtaining information.
II

The failure of DOE,' the FB:r; a.nd the CIA to


coordinate their: efforts ()11 the suspected
divers ion when it occurre<] and as new infor~
mation developed and the limitation in the
scope and timeliness 'of the FBI efforts,
lead GAO to c'onclude that the FeCleral efforts
to resolve th~ mat'ter wer~ less t~an adequate.
"

Currently, there exists no, Calor-dina ted inter


upon plan' whi.c~ foc'uses on (1)
an adequate detection and investigative sys
t em and (2) c? reporting systeln to the appro
priate congressional committees and to the
President. As a result, if a similar inci
dent were to occur today, this country may
not be assured of any better investi9ation.
The United States needs to improve its ef
forts for effectively responding to artd in
vestigating incidents of missing or unac
counted for weapons-grade nuclear materials.
In view of increasing terrorist activities
t'hroughout the world, the labili t.y to respon~d
and investigate such incidents should be of
concern to national 'security and the public'
health and safety.

agency agreed

"

COl162251
~

.:

RECOI-l!"!E:':Dl~TICINS TO THE

HEADS OF

AGE~CIES

GAO reconmends that the heads of DOE, NRC,


the Department 0' Justice, and the CIA, 'as
part of thei~ responsibilities for the na
tional security of the 'country, establish
a plan for coordinated interagency action
which focuses on a nuclear safeguards
systelll that aej'equately, detectl5, investigates,
and reports to the con~ress and the President
on thefts or diverSions of nuclear materials.
The plaD' which should be submitted to the
Congress within 90 days or less of the issu
.ance of this repo~t, should include'
--a fOrMal means o:r- a ti.:m1el J, determination
olf \vhether a loss ,has occurred; ~.

--a clear 'and direct 'chan.n~~l c)f


tions between '~he ~gencies;

corn~mun:ica

--a tamal means for rapid ly focus ing the


abilities of these agencies on the resolu
tion of a diversiori i0cident; and
--a means for allowing any incident involving
the theft or diversion of nuclear material

to be definitely re~ol~ed' bo tte satisfac


tion of the Congr~ss and the ~resident.
GAO also recomrnen'ds that the .~ttc,rney
General, working with the FBI, take the lead
in establishing the interagency plan since
the FBI, under the 'Atomic. Energy'Act, of 1954,
is responsible for investigating incidents
involving the' 'diversion' or theft
nuclear
rna terials.,

of

RECOMMENDATION TO THE

CON~~ES:~

The committees of Congress having juri.sdic


tion for domestic nuclear' :safE~gua1~ds should

--review the nuclear safeguards plan to be


submitted by the Executive Branch to assure
that an' adequate s~rstem :is developed which.
deters and investigates-thefts or diver
sions of ~uclear materia15~

.~

C01162251

'

~':'T'

..

'u

.uI'---'

....

~"

.
.

the FaI and D()E IS C)ffice c)f


Inspector G2n~~al co~plete their investi
~ja t ions 'of the :~U~'lEC inc id E~n t as soon as
?ossible and submit their reports to the.

--l.Aequest that

c01:1mittee~.

These reports should be reviewed to deteDnine


the adequacy of the investigations and their
implications for developing a more effective
future system.

,l

'Even' with com~plete' infor3Tlation c>n alI Govern


ment investigations, given, the pas~age of
time, it'may be difficult to conclusively
determine what specifically happened at NUMEC.
GAO believes .the important thing is to use
the lessons learned from, the r~UMEC experience
~.ake certa~n.that

the Nation develops an


fc)llo"vv ..up srstern tOI
deter future nuclear thefts or diversions.

to

ade~'uatedetectlon and

AGENCY COf\lMEN'I'S

DOE's comments on the report' are contained


in, a letter dated July 25, 1978.
(See ap
pendix II).
DOE agreed with the thrust of
the r-eport.
Howeve.r"it< disagreE~ with oU'r

recommendation concerning the need to enter


into a' formal interag~ncy agreement with NRC,
the FBI, and the CIA for more timely and ef
fective action in investigating incidents of
suspected or real diversions of nuclear ma
terial.
DOE stated in its letter that a
comprehensive plan and a memorandum of under
standing with the FBI alrE~ady existed for
joint responses to nucle~r threat situations.
Further, DOE stated that it had open channels
of communication to other a'gencies, including
the CIA, for the exchange of information
pertinent to nuclear threat situations.
Thes~ factors w~re known to GAO ~nd

mendable.

The

tu~rent m~morandum

are com
of under

standing b~tween DOE and the FBI is the b~


ginning of an effective response plan to
incidents of nuclear d'ivers":Lon, but is in
adequate since it does not include CIA par
ticipation and 'cooperation.. W'ithc)ut. a for
mal in te ragency ag reement plac ing pes it i ve
reporting and investigative responsibilities
on DOE, NRC, the FBI, and the CIA along the
lines recommended by GAO, we believe the

'COl162251

.. , . .

1';' - ~E 2 ~

..

eXIsts to~ a repetItIon of the


i'oJ U~' ! EC i :l \ ~? S t: i s-: at i. c> n

~0S2lDl~lty

The conments received frc)P'1' th,e CIA are con-


t~ined. in a l(~tte'r- dated Sept,ember 1, 1978.
(See appendi~ III.) The l~tter takes no
issue with ~he facts or . recommendations in

cluded in the report.


It does, however,
point out some concerns about certain in
formation in the'report.
GAO believes that the concerns expressed by
the CIA have been adequately addressed in
the text 0. the reoort. 'H()wev'er., 'w,e did not
. spec i f icallv. add ress' the 'CIA I 5 c~)ncerns re'~
garding its - degree of cobI)E~rat ion ~,i th DOE
and the FBI ori th~ alleged NUMEC incident.
In its letter the CIA disa9reed vlith the
s tal.em~ n t in the report' inC! i eel ting . that
they fa~led to cooperate with DOE and the
FBI.
The. CIA basesthe d.isagr~eerr~ent IOn the
fact that its officials briefed a largenum
0

ber of officials in the ,executive and legis


lative branches' of Government on the NUMEC
matter in 1976 and 1977.
was a~are that such briefings were pro
vided. However, GAO believes that since the
briefing~ were prqvided 4 tb 6 years after
some of the key information was developed
t.heir utility in helping t.<) re~solve the
NUMEC matter was greatly, diminished. ,Fur
ther, according to two former CIA officials
familiar with the case, documents were
prepar.ed within the CIA lin}cing the unac
counted for NUMEC material to Israel. This
information was not passed on to DOE or the
FBI according to the officials we contacted
in those agencies. 'However, we believe it
must be pointed out thatthe current'CrA
officials GAO interviewed said that such
documents were not known to exist within
the CIA.
GAO

The Department of Justice ,and the FBI <lid


not fU,rnish 'fornlal written' COffilnents.
(:;AO

provided them more than 3, months to do so,


a ti~e period longer than that provided
DOE, the CIA, and NRC., While GAO did not
have the benefit df official written com
ments from the DepartInerit ()f Justice arld '

C01162251

1
~."

..

0L.:,~~~

.J

the FBI ,in pr-eparing the ::inal report, GAO


d i(l cons i(~eL the V'iE:\.i :.r:(~ CO:-.l!:lents of th~
FBI staff familiar Ylith the a.lleged t~U~lEC

incident during the course of-the rev~ew.

NRC had no comment on the ~ontent of the


report.

However", NRC did state that .the

recommendations to the Heads of Agencies


appears reasonable.

(See appendix IV.)

\C01162251
Con t e n
t s
..... -..-.....

...... -.. .......... - . -

~---._----

DIGEST

CHAPTER

INTRODUCTION'

Agencies involved in investigating NUMEC


Access to records difficulties
2

WHAT INFORMATION HAS BEEN DEVELOPED ABOUT

THE .. ALLEGED NUMEC DIVERSION?


Depar tmen. t of Enerqy s invol vemen ~ with

NUMEC incident

Federal Bureau of'Investigati6n's

~O

involvement with NUMEC incident


~

Central Int~lligence Agency:~ involvement

with NUMEC incident


15

WERE. THE INVESTIGATIONS BY THE FEDERAL

GOVERNMENT I~~TO .THE AI,LEG,ED INCI:OENT

AD,EQ,UAT.E?
'

19

Department of Energy
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Central. Intelli~ence Agency
4

19

22

23

OBSERVATIONS" CONCLUSIONS, AND

RECOMMENDATIONS
Whethei a diversion occurred at NUMEC

remains to be answered

25

25

Federal mechanisrns to coord inate in

vestigations of missing nuclear

material ate lacking


Recommendations to ~he heads of agencies
Recom~ehdation to the Congress
Agency com~ents
5

26

27

28

28

SCOPE OF REVIEW

31

Summary list of individuals contacted in

preparing report

32

APPENDIX

II

Letter dated July 25, 1978,


comm~nts

III

co~taining

DOE

on'this report

Letter ,dated September 1, 1978, containing

CIA comments on this report

34

36

C01162251

._

Paqe

APPENDIX

.-J.

IV

Letter dated July. i3, 1978, containfng ~,JRC


,co~ments on this repqrt

40

Letter dated February 8, 1978, from.


Attorney Gen~ral to GAO denying access
to Department of Justice records

41

ABBRE~I~~'IO~~~

AEC

Atomic Energy Co~rnisSion

CIA

Central

DOE

Department of Enetgy

ERDA

Energy Research and Development Administration

FBI

) .
Federal .Bureau of Investigiation

GAO

General Accounting Office

Int~lligence

Agency

,JCAE

.',

,"

..

'.

Joint Committee on Atomic Energy

NRC

Nuclear Reguiatoty' Corn:rnission

NUMEC

Nuclear Materials 'and Equipment Commission

'C01162251

cHAp~rER 1

INTRODUCTIO!:

In 1965 the Department of Energy' (DOE) 1/ found during


an inspection that about 206 pounds of uranium--235 could not
be acc6unted for a.t the Nuclear Materi~ls and Equipmen~ Cor
poration (NUMEC), a nuclear facility locatedin Apollo, Penn
sylvania. DOE estimated that1this much uranium could make at
least four or fiv'e nuclea'r weapons,. Although i.nvestigations
were conducted, the uranium was never ac~ounted for.
The Federal Government has generally remained silent
the inci~ent. Infotmation that has become known over
the years has been vague and inconsistent~ With the 6urrent
high interest in a.s5uring adequate safE~guards ov.~r nuclear'
materials, speculation about the incident has surfaced ~gain.
Many allegations concerning' the unaccounted for rnater ial and
the NUME~facility have been made in' newspaper and magazine
articles and at congressional hearings~ '~hese allegations
include:
'
abou~

--The material was illegally dtverted to Israel by


management for use in nuclear weapons.

~UMEC

--The material was ~iverted to Israel by NUMEC management


with the assistance of the Central Intelligenc~ Agency
(CI}~)

--The material was diverted to Israel with the'acquies


cence of the United states Government.
.
--There has been a cover-up of the NUMEC incident by
the United States Government.

--------liThe Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). was fo~merly responsible


- for both regulating and'promoting all nuclear activities in
the United States. On January 19, 1975, it was ,split into
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Energy Re
search and Development Administration (ERDA). NRC became
responsible for nuclear regulation and ERDA became respon-'
sible for'nuclear'development and promotion. Under Public
Law 95-91, ERDA's functions were pl~ced in the Department
of Energy effective October Ii 1977. NRC remai~ed intact.
Throughout the report, DOE.is used to refer to the Depart
ment of Energy, ERDA, and AEC.

.....

(~-

..

.....,.,.-._.

,~'~~ .......~I

C01162251

~. ;'._'

CIA officials, ~lrOVlcea us' ~~itr,l tht~ir TJ'iews on ~he' first

allegation and stated that they had no information to sub


stantiate any of the other:. 8ased on the totality of, our
inquiry, we believe that the allegations have not be~n fully

,or adequately answered.

Overall the nuclear s~feguards systems in this country


have been greatly improved as: a result of the alleged 'NUMEC
incident. Since the alleged incident occurr~d AEC and its
succeeding agencies have placed much greater levels of con- .
trol requirements on private nuclear facilit'ies like NUMEC.
There are many riew reauirements which include such measures
as bimon~hly inventori accounting, armed guards to protect
unauthorized aCgess to nuclear material and alarm systems de
signed to detect ~nauthorized'movernent of nuclear material.
Nevertheless, two repo,rt,s GAO recent:l:y issued 1/ cited major
clef ic ie'ncies in otir domestic nuclear' sa,Eeguards sys~ems.
These reports point' out tha't there alre thousands of pounds 'of
weapons-gr1 de material unaccounted for in this country today.
This being the case, it is critical 'that ne Government be
prepar,ed to quickly and' effe'ctiv,E~ly res!)ond to allegations of
loss of nuclear material to determine whether" when, where,
an~ how it'occurred.
The unresolve'd NUMEC incident raises questions on the
U.S. capability to deal with unaccoun~ted for nuc-lE:ar mate

rials. This report discu~5es, wi'thin the constraints of the


data available to,us, the scope, and effectiveness of U.S.
efforts to locate t'he' una'cco'unted for 'uranium, anc] the impli
cations the incident has for our current nuclear safeguards
programs.
This repor't addresse~ two basic questions arising from

the NUMEC incident.


--What information
NUMEC diversion?

h~s

been developed about the alleged

--Were the investigations by' th~ Federal. Government into


the a 11 e 9 e din q ide n t ad:e q u (~ t e ?l
Wit h the am 0 u,n' t 0 f n u c 1 ear mat e ria 1 sin t his c 0 un try i n
creasing rapidly, the o~portunities for diversion without

1/EMD-76-], uShor tcornings in the Syst~:ms Used to Protect and


- Control Highly Dangerous'Nuclear Materials," 'dated July 22,
197'6, and EMb-77-40,

"Com'mercial Nucleclr Fuel. Facilities

Need Better Security," dated May 2, 1977.


2

SteRu

;COl162251
- .. ...
~
also
,.,

..

.c

aaequa e saLeguaras can

'

to' :" . . ,;;.


~...

'"' ~ ~
lnc~~~se.

,
Conseguent~y"

-answers
to i'nsure that cur
rent Federal capabilities exist to respond to real or suspected
incidents of nuclear ciaterial.diversion.
to

these

C!~Jestions c~-~

ir~~)ort:Clnt i.n Ol."c~~r

AGENCl~S

INVdLVED I~
1/ NUMEC
. .

INVESTIGA~ING
(

, Orlglnally, there were three agencies involVed in gath


ering information on the incident.
These were DOE, the Fed

eral Bureau of Investi~ation (FBI), and the CIA. However,


pOE and t'he FBI' have begun new' investi.gations of the incident.
In' February 1978 DOE ,began an- invE~sti.9'ation t.o determine what
officials in the- agency knew about the alleged diversion inci
dent ..
In April of 1976, ,at the oral request of Prtesident' Ford,
the FBI opened an' investigation of the NUM~C incident aimedat
determining whether a diversion of nu~lear material ever oc
curred at the facility.
Both .of th~se later investigations
are still ~"!)going and, we have' not rev~ewed...these' rE~ports.
There are ai so other Federal' bod ies that 'have developed
a substantial amount of inforrn'atic.'n on 'the incident.' These
are the 'former Joint Committee dh Atomic Energy (JCAE), NRC
and GAO.
A staff mem'ber of the former JCAE c()mpilE~d a lengthy

record of the events and' incidents surrounding the alleged


diversion and wrote a repOlr't whictl was inconclusive about
,whether a diversion ever ~ccutred at the NUMEC, facility.
The
report was written in "about 1967 or 1968. NRC issued a report
on certain asp~ct5 of the NUMEC incident in March 1978. The
NRC r;epo~t, however, did' not fqcus on th~ diversion question,.
It was aimed at what s~ecific NRC officials knew about the al
leged divers,ion incident.' GA9 issued cl' report to the. former
JCAE in ~une 1967 which focused primarily on NUMEC's account
ability cant',t'ols over nuclear material.
In, that report GAO .
said it found no evidence of divers,ion an,) aft.er considering
informa tion ava i1 able had no r;eason tel qUE~stion AEC' s con
clusion that while it could not be sta.ted w.ith certcainty that
diversion didn1t take place, the survey team found no evidence
to support the possibility.
GAO's current report focuses on the allegations and infor
mation developed since th'a,t time in attempting to ,answer the

l/CIA officials infor~ed GAO that they have no ~uthority to


conduct " investigations" of unacC'ountl~d for, nucleclr ,mate
rials' in the United States. As used .in this report the
term "investigation(s)" i.s used in thE~ context of ,the en
tire Federal effortto resolve the incident.

'COl162251

gue5tlo~s of what information has been dev~loped about


alle~ed alverslo~, 3nd ~ere the investigations done by

the
the

Federal Government adeouate.


ACCESS TO RECORDS DIFFICtiLTIES
----------_._---_._----------..... _-- ......
.....-..
..-...-_

During our review, we w~re denied documents pertinent


to the NUMEC incIdent by the FBI and the CIA. We repeatedly
tried to ,obtain documents from these groups, but with no
Success. A written' chronology of contacts' with other Federal
ag~ncies was provided ,by the CIA, however, the CIA denied GAO
access to any source documents on the case. According to
'
Agency offIcials, this was a decision made by 'the Director of
the CIAI
~

The

CIA d ld sUbsequently a'l'low seltected staff of Chairman D,ingell's

Subcommittee to revie~ some CIA documents at CIA Headquarters.


Access to these or any 6the~ CIA 'documents was not extended to
include 6AO. Further, th~ CIA'did not cooperate with GAO in

arranging some interviews w,ith kno~ledgeable current and former


CIA officials.
This was significant since former CIA officials,
although not required, can be expected to inform CIA before
discussing their former, activities with others. The FBI's
rationale for denying GAO access to their documents was that
the Bureau did not want to jeopardize its ongoing investiga
tion of the alleged diversion incident.
.

These constraints made it irnoossible to obtain corrobor


ating evidence for some of the re~ort's contents. Nonetheless,
we made every attempt to do so a:nd, where it was not. possible','
we have so noted it in the report.

....

"C01162251

tJHAT' INFO';.::.;TICIl'.': HA~S BlSEN DEVELOPED

----------------~----_.-

ABOUT THE ALtEGED NUMEC DIVERSION?


~n~il the summer of '1977, the only publi~ized Government

view on the NUMEC incident was .that there was no evidence to

indicate 'that a diversion of nuclear material had occurred.

However,' incongr~ssional'he~ringsbefore the Ho~se Subcorn~

rnittee on Energy and Enviionment and the HoGse Subcommittee

on Energy and Power in July and August 1977, respectively,

it was revealed that the CIA might possess information which

did not support this concl~sion and, in fact, that a totally

.opposite posi~i9n ~ould be taken.

We attempted' to. obtain all the information developed by


the Government on this matter. We r~viewed documents, report~,
and stud ;es made ava ilable to us. We also in terv ie.wed those
individua\s most involved with the, incidant and the subsequent
investigations of it.
Based on our work, we cannot .say.whether or not there

was a diver sian of Ina ter ial from th4~ NUMEC fac il i ty. Fol

lowing is the informatioti and view~ which we obtained from

the three principal agencies involved in the alleged incident

--DOE, FBI, and CIA.

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S INVOLVEMENT

WITH NUMEC INCIDENT


DOE records show that in D,ecenlt)er 1957" the NUMEC facil
ity located in Apollo, Pennsylvania was licensed to possess
enr iched uranium for' manufactur ing nuclear fuel', recover ing
scrap, and conducting nuclear research and development. NUMEC
obtained various 'forms of enriched uranium and other nucl~ar
material from the United States Government and commercial
sources. During the period 1957 thr~u9h 1967, 'NUMEC received
over 22 tons of 'uraniurn-235--the material used in the fabri
cation of nuclear weapons.

Until 1975'DO~ wa~ responsible for insuring that licensed


commercial nuclear facilities iu~h 'as NUMEC provided adequate
safeguards and materi~l .control. DOE'S records show that un
til June 1967 the polic~ for safeguarding nuclear materials
relied pr irnar fly on the mo'n:etary value of the mater ial.
DOE
believed that the financial penalties imposed ~pon licensees
for the loss of or dam~ge to nuclear material, and the crimi
nal penalties provided b.y the 'Atomic: Energy Act of 1954, .would
be sufficiE~nt to motivate licensee.s to adequately protect the
material from loss', t'heft, or d'iversi.on. Material

COl162251
~ccountability

requitements,' while written int~ licerisee

contracts and the'.Code of 'F~deral Reaulations, wer~ more di

rected to health'and safeiy concerns~than in protecting nu~

clear material [rom theft or diversion.


Our review of DOE

records s~owed .that at the time (1) there were no limits

placed on the amo'unt of unaccountE:d for nucl,ear mater ials,

(2) facilities were required to inventory their nuclear mate~

rials only onc~ a year; and (3) estimati~g inventories was a

widespread practice at all nuclear 'facilities at that time.

The elaborate mater ial control and .ph:ysical secur i ty measures

in place at commercial nuclear facilities toda~ were developed

since 1967. Such m~asures were not present bef~re then. '

DOE officials told us that in the mid-1960s material ac

countability dapabilities'and methods were just being d~vel

oped. As a result, uncertainty existed on the part'of both

the agency and the industry abotit nucle~r material control

standards and criteria. DOE officials and NUMEC's president

told us that the situation at NUMEC was further complicate~

by the faJct tha,t NUMEC was involved in m"~ny uniclue fir'st-of

a-kind nuclear )projects.

DOE, pursuant to it~ ,r~gulatory responsibilities, con

ducted six accountability inspect~ons at NUMEC~-prior to the

alleged 1965 incident--to' assur,e thc:lt' nuclear rna.terials were

being adequately pr6tected. Each' inspection revealed major

deficiencies,.
'

In April 1961 DOE conducted its first material control

inspection and found "significant def.ic'ienc.ies in the mate- .

rial accoun t ing syst.ems,'. 'Dur in9 i t.s sE~corid inspection in

May 1962, DOE found that, although NUMEC had corrected some

accounting deficiencies, it still did not follow practices

necessary for the rnaintehance of adequate material control.

'During this inspection" the'agency discovered that NUMEC was


mixing nuclear material among various contracts--a practice
that was expressly prohibited. According to DOE inspectors,
s~ch commirigli.ng made it difficult, if not impos~;ible, to
trace discrete batches of material through the plant and to
~etermine how the material was being us~d.
DOE's next inspection in July and August of 1963 did

not show much improv'ernen t, and reveal~d add it ioncll ,problems

with the material accounting systems~ In early 1964 another

inspection was undertaken and more inadequacies were identi

fied. DOEls re~ords show that at ~his point, the agency be

came so concerned with. theinadelquat:E~' cont.rols at.. the facil

i ty tha t. i t began co.nsider ing whie thE~[, to preve.nt NUMEC from

receiving any additional nticl~ar materials. L~ter, in Se~

tember of 196.4, DOE attempted 'to take a physical ,inventory

,of the material held by NUMEC but cOuld not do so since, in


6

~T

COl162251

the opinion of DOE in\'Estigators, NUt-lEe's records were so


poor that. they \.'erE~ LJn~uditablj2 .lJ,s a result, the inventory
check was canceled.
In April of 1,965, DOE begc:in another' inspe'ction and, for
the sixth consecutive time, found f~ndamental problems with
NUr"lEC's ability to control rriatE~rial.
Th-= inspection report
concluded that "safeguards' control of [nuclear rnaterial] at
NUMEC is inadequate." 'It was durin.g this inspection that a
large, amount of highl~ enriched uranium was unaccounted for.
The loss, initiall~y ident'ified as 53 kilograms ("117 pounds)
was later adjusted to 61 kilograms (134 pounds). This was
about 2 to 3 .times higher than was exp,e'ri.enced t.y other simi
lar facilities operating at ,that time.

Although DOE h cid 'made f inane ial arrangements wi thNUMEC


t6 insure payment for the loss, the highly significant safe
guards il1}pl ications of the loss spc!rked a lengthy investiga
tion. T~ investigation which began,in early November 1965
was aimed at (1) determining the exact total cumulative lo~s
of highly enriched uranium at NUMEC since its startup 'in 1957
and (2) explaining the 134 pound loss'under its most. recent
contract inv~lving 93 percent enriched--weapons-grade--uranium.

The in~estigation lasted ~ntil,mid-Novernber 1965 and


revealed a cumulative loss of 178 kilograms (392 pounds) of
material. bOE was ,able to trace 186 pounds to waste and gas
filters leading from, the plant, but the remaining 206 pounds
could not be accounted for.
The November 196~ investigation did not provide DOE with'
a conclusive ~ns~er as to what,happened to the unaccounted
for mater ial. However, 'according to agency o,ffic:ials " enough
information existed to develop a nth_~ory'U on the probable
cause of the rni'ssin9 material. The IIth eory deve~loped by the
DOE staff and accepted by top DOE officials was that through"
April 1965 NUMEC consistently undeLestimated its material
losses ftom contract to contract. As each job was completed
and NUMEC lyad' to pay DOE for thE~ actual losses sustained,
,the differences between the estimated and actual losses were
passed on fr'om comple'ted jobs to ne\;w1 jobs.
The theory con
cluded that these actions continued over the 8 years of the
companyts operations until April 1965 when, str,ictly by chance,
only one contract was being processed at the facility, and it
was possible for DOE to i~olate the total cumulative material
unaccounted for.
'
lt

DOE documents showed that because of fhe poor condition


of NUMEC's material acco~nting records, it was not possible
to establish when the losses occurred or even whether the
mater ial was used to offset 'lossE~s on previously completed

'~T

"-( e.' __

'_~"._

,.- --~~_:

COl162251

contracts. NUMECs president c0nt~nded that the, nUcleai


mat e ria 1 \-j' a ~ not s tole nor d i v ~ :~ ted but u n c \.10 ida ~ 1 v .. los t" in
the processing syste~ itself through adherence to ~he equip
. ,ment and .piping and amounts discarded as waste.
Consequently,
the DOE investigators concluded that DOE could not say, une
quivocally, that the material was not stolen or diverted from
the ,f a c i 1 1. t Y
We learried from a discussion with a former DOE offic,ial,
that in February 1966, DOE asked the. FBI to determine whether'
a theft or diversion of the material had occurred. The DOE
files contain' a memorandum of discussion with the FBI. The
memorandum stated that
* * "Ie the. Bureau had decided not to
under ta~e an investigation a t this t:i.me * * * .. even though
they were required to investigate ,such incidents under the,
Atomic Energy Act o~ 1954. Consequently, DOE continued its
own.
After examin'ing' t'he facility records, cleaning out proc
essing equ.ipment" se,ar'ching some of the cornpany"s nuclear
waste buri~l ground, and interyiewin9,man~ key ~UMEC employees,
DOE was still unable to' conc1usi"eljl determine what happened
to the rna ter ial .'
If

In 1966 NUMEC' paid "DOE $1.1 million for the missing 206
pounds,'of enriched uranium as required by NUMEe's contract,
and the DOE inyestigation o~ the iricident was, for all prac
tical purposes, closed unresolVed. The, $1.1 million was '~aid
partly from a $2,500,000 'revolving c:rE~dit note'ac.count that
NUMEC ar ranged with th.e Mellon/ 'Ba'nk.
The bal ance was pa id
through the r etur'n to DOg of some' nu<::lear rna ter ial for which
NUMEC was credited. Atlantic Richfield Corporation later
purchased th~ facility in April 1967 clnd it is now owned. by
the Babcoc k and wilcox Carpor a tion .who bough t the' f ac il i ty
in 197'2.

Other inf6rmation relevant


to the NUMEC incident
. We identified sev~ral 'occur~ences from our review of DOE
, files and interviews with' DOE officials, which impact on the
NUMEC incident. We learned that:

--After the November 1965

inv~stigation, NUMEC management


hired one'of DOE's on-site in~estigators who was an ex
pert in rnateri~l control' and accountability. ,The in
vestigator had responsibility for condu6ting a major
part of the material control review at the facility.

--During a'period of rising concern wit~ unaccounted for


material at NUMEC, some material accounting records
were reported to bOE as being inad~ertently destroyed

~T.

oCOl162251

during' a labor disputeoat the facility in JanLr~r:.'


:ebruary i964. AoccoOrdir~g to a foorr71~=r head of DO:' s

nuclear omaterial management group, and inv~stigatois

fro~ the FBI, the recbrds miaht have affected DOE's


abilitY to trace theomateriai held by t~e facility.

--NUMEC mixed material among various contracts--a prac


tice that was explicitly prohibited by DOE. Acc6rding
to DOE investigators, ihis practice made it very dif
ficult, if not impossible, to tiack the material
through the facility.
Further, DOE was cooncernoeodoo with the foreign interests
~nd contact~

maintained bYoNUM~tSo president. DOE's records


show ~hat~ while president, this indoividual had various high
level contacts with officials of the G6vernment of Israel,
bqth in that country and in the United States. The records
also show 'that, for a ti.me, he a.cted as aH~aoles agent in, the
United States for theoDefense Ministry of Israel. o Also, while
president of NUMEC, he had a 50-percent interest in a nuclear
facility in Israel established for the purpose of r~diation
exper imen ta tion on vaorious' per ishable commod i ties .
0

or

. Several current and 'of mer off~lcials we interviewed at

DOE and theOFBI, and a form~r etA official told us that, in

view of the poor nuclear material control at NUMtC and the

general sloppiness of the operation, NUMEC management could

have divert~d material from the facility, if they wanted to.

A principal field investigatoi for DOE at the time, told us

that the sloppiness of NUMECoperations made it very condu~ive


to a diversion.
This invesotigator noted that on a visit to
the facility in 1963 or 1964 he saw nucl~ar maoterial deposited
in the crevices of the stairwells oand on tIle floor. However,
of all DOE officials we interviewed, including a former Chair
man and two ~ormer members of thE~ Atolnic Energy Commission,
only one, a former DOE security expert, actually believed that
a diversion of material occurred. Acc9rdlng to this individ
ual, who was nbt familiar with the material accounting prac
t i'ce 5 es tabl ished by DOE, his concl us .ion was based on inspec
tions he conducted a to NUMEC.
He told us he~ v is i ted NUMEC soev
eral times between 1962 and 1967 to conduct physical security
inspections for DOE. He said that in an inspection report
dated February 10 and II, 1966, he noted that a large ship
ment of highly enriched uranium was made to France roughly
eauivalent toO ~he mateIi~l identified a~ missing in DOE's
0

N~vember 1965 inspection~-lOO kilograms. According tQ him,


the circumstances at th.e- facility werE~ such that it would
have been relatively easy to shiF' hi 9hly enri.ched O(weapons
grade) uranium to another country instead of loow enriched ura~
o

ni"um sin'ce the enricheod uranium storageo system at NUMEC did

...

~-~T
Sff.~

COl162251
.~ :~ .;;' ~.
, ...~.. . ..

. '~~'.,: :'~~:'.'

"

:
I

':

not 'clearly 9istinguish bet~'een weapons-grade and nqn1,vea?on.s


grade material.
'

.,~ -t :.' . ''.--/

Current DOE offic-ials ~'nforme:d us, however, that while


the United States did not m"ak'e indepenoenl: verificat'ion of the
shipments being dispatch'E~d to a 'fbreign country,' at the time
of the NUMEC incident, it did conduct safE~guards . inspections,

,/?\;;:~:::~

as provided in bilateral agreements for cooperation with vari


ous countries. According to DOE, inspections in this partic~
ular foreign country were conducted to account for enriched
uranium shi~ped from the United 'St'ates. I)OE o'fficials told
us that two of these inspections were conducted which identi
fied rnateri,al in the form, enrichment leve~l, and appr'oximate
quantity shown in th'E~ D.S. (:NUMEC) transfe~r documents.

..

The former DOE security inspector also said that the


NUME~C was very baa andtha't, to a ,
large extent, ~ontribu~ed to his con6ern tha~ the missing
material a' NUMEC had been diverte~. Two,other former secu
rity officials at DOE concurred in this 1~1ter point. These
three individuals agreed'that, based on their knowledge and
experience with the NUMEC f~cility, 'it was very possible that

.en,tire security prograrl\ at

the rna ter ial unaccoun. ted

0'[

from l~UMEC could have been d i

verted.

One' of these seturity officials told us that NUMEC's


security program was wri.dely ndi'srespected" among the DOE
investigative staff., However, none of these individuals were
able to provide us with, any direct evidence that would ~upport
the view that' a divetsion,of ~ater,ial had occurred. Further,
DOE records show that of the 37 NdMEC emp1oyee~,ihteryiewed
by 'DOE in 1966, none believed that a diversion of nuclear mate
rial h~d occurred.
In 197:; NRC was made responsil:)le, for the regulatory over
sight of conlmercial nuclear facilities lik,= NUMEC, and conse
quently has become involved in the i.ncident. In a February
'1978 report related to the NUMEC, incident, NRC concluded that

their previous offici.al position of Uno evidence ll to support

a diversion may need t'o be reconsiclered, in light of the many

uncertaintie~s surroun.ding the~ incident.


-Included in that

report is a .letter fr,orn the Chairman, NRC 1:.0 the Chairman of

the Cornrnitte'e o'n Interior and Insu1ar Affairs, conclUding

that * * * for r'egul a tor y purposes we mus 1:assurne the c ircum

stances [surroundihg NUMEC] were such that a diversion could

have ~ccurred, and we must construct. our safeguaras require

ments accordingly."

It

. '. .

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION'S

.INVOEVEMENTWITHN(JME,oi: INCIDENT
The FBI is responsible for gathering domestic intelli

gence on activities affecting the national security of the

.~T

~'RET
~fL~

COlI 62 ~~ 5 1.
/;

, .. 'I'.

,~.I

United States.
It i"s also respons'ible for investigat'ing all
alleged or suspected cri:llinal violations of the .~.tomic Energy,
Act of 1954 including the theft or diversion of nuclear ma

terial. In this role the Bureau has initiated three investi


gations involving NUMEC with one still ongoing.

,.("

Our efforts to obtain and evaluate the information col


lected by t:he 'FBI on the NUlw1EC matter wer,e repeatedly denied
by thE~ Depclr trnent of JLJS t iCE~. ThE!' Depar tlnen t of Jus t ice told
us that since th~ir la.t:'est i.nvestiga~io,n 'flas still underway
they could not' give us -any documentation related to the NUMEC.
incidE~nt.
The denial inclucled inforrnatiOtl developed as part
of Justice's, pr ior t'\NO investicj:attons. This position was for
mally cornmun.ica.ted t() t.he Cc)mptroller Gen~~ral of the Uni ted
States front the Attolrn,ey General .i.n a letter. dated February 8,
1978.

(See Appendix V for a copy of this letter.)

The FBI did, however, brief us twice and responded to

We alIso conl~a.cted 1.2 former and


current officials of the Dep1artrnent. of. JUBtice. 'and the Bureau
including the current ~l\ttorney General and two former Attorneys
Geflera.l.
(Appendix I contains a summary ( ) f the individuals we
several fo\low-up inquir ies.

contacted during OUI review.)

C)ur first briefin9 by the FBI was provided by the agent


in-charge and two other FBI represent~tives on October 6, 1977.
The .br iefing covered all FBI 'investigatioI1S rel~ted to. NUMEC.
We rec'eived a follow""Ul? br iefing on Decemt)er 14, 1977, in order
to clarify some of the information we had obtained earliei.
This briefing was p~)vided by a new FBI agent-in-charge since
the former one was transferred off the case shQrtly after our
October 1977 briefing.

We we're informec:::1 a t these br ief ings that in' June of 1965,


the FBI was asked by DC)E to .investigate the possibility tha.t
NUMEC's president mi(:~;rh1:

need to register bis activities in

the United states unc:::ler t.he Foreign Agent Registration Act.

DOE's specific

con~ern

stemmed from the 'irldividual's associa

tionswith Israeli officials . Accotdingt:o information we


received at the October 1977 'briefing, NU~[EC's. president's
capacity as sales agc:::~nt: for the Ministry clf Defense of Israel
was 'of particUlar conCE~.rn to DOE.
At the October 1'977 br iefing, we were~ told that the FBI
the investigation in August of.1965.
In October of 1966,
'after 14 months of e:[fc):rt, it reported 'thalt NUMEC's president
did not havle to r'egi~:::;tE!:r as ,a forei9n ager~t since NUMEC's ac
tivities with Israel were conducted under appli~ab1e u.s. laws
and regulations.'
Fur thIer, accord ing to the Department of Jus
tice, the business ac~ti~Jities established between Israel a,no
beg~n

NUMEC were all found to be legiti~ate.

~ET

'"

,..-

:-~~l

C01162251
[ilil, E.O.1352:[]

In a let.ter to th~~ Dir~~ctor .of the FBI aa.ted Febr'uary 17,


1966, DOE asked the Burecu to invest'i'iat~ 'the suspected di
versiDn of nuclea~ :r:aterial from the iJU::E,: olan~.
FBI re
sponded on February 25, 1966', stating that it "decided not
to undertake this Investigation at: this time. I ' According to
the for rn e r FBI age n t. inc h a rg e 0 f t.h e cur ,r en t i n v est i gat i 0 ~ ,
the r~ason for the dec~Lsion was tffa.t in DlJE's' discussions with
the Bureau, DOE pre~::ented a ,c~onvi.tlcing ca~5e that there' was no
diversion a.t the facilLty.
Howeve~r, weWI~re informed by a for
mer E>:ecutive Di.rector' of the Joint. Comrni~:tee on Atomic Energy,
that the re~ason the Burea'u d:id not. want to get: involved was
twofold:
(I) the Bureclu did,'not t.hink that a d.iversion oc
curred based on the 'presentation t=~rovided. by DOE, and (2) it
simpl)' did not .like conducting inv'estigations invo.lving unac
counted for nuclear matetials.
We were infbrmed at the October 1977 briefing that the
FBI's next involvement in the NUMEC matt"er occurred' as a re
sult of a~ i;pr il' 196B letter from the DirE~ctor of CIA to the

c:en

Attorney General.
The FBI was asked to "~j~nitiate' a discreet
intell igence i.nvesti9ation 'of' the relationship' of NUMEC's
t

wi th the

G~)vernment of

Is:ael.

11

.-.r-,

----I

The former FBI ag'ent in charge of thE inves'tigation told

us that in September 1969, the FBI Director advised the CIA


Director that surveillance of NUMEC'spresident had been ter
minated because: the I:~BI did not believe further investigation
would develop a-'ny ne'\IV .inform4ation. The Associate Deputy Di
rector for Operations at the CIA.told us the CIA was not sat
isfied with the FBlrs termination ofthe c~se and ~equested
th~ Bureau to reinstitute its surveillance in a letter to the.
Director of the E~BI (]a,ted October 13, 1969. However, accord
ing to this CIA offi(:i(~l, no f.ormal request was ever made to
the Attorney 'General and no investigation was initiated as far
as he could determin(~. The former FBI agent in charge of the
investigation said hll::~ \I~as unable to corroborat;e this informa
tion.
CIA officials advised us th,at they have file cop~ies of
correspondence to th'l::~ FBI which sUJpport its position that re
quests were made to the FBIto.contihue acounterintell.igence
investigat'lon of NUMI:;C" s p'resident.
We, however,. did not see
this c()rresl?ondence'.,'
The CIl\ provide(::! u.s with' a chronology of their contacts
with the fBI.
It indlic4ated that in September 1970 the CIA
again asked the FBI to re'institute th~ inves~igation based on
inform,~ltion that NUME:C':s pre~sident was planning to I
r--) But, again, ..th l= CIA official said no furth'--e-r-w-o-r-k-.-w-a-s--l

~:~ken

by

the F B . . ! . .

. '

'12

~T,
[ 25Xl, E.O.13526 ]

co 1162~~ 51

~!-."

l':'~~ ~
At.. the, two FB I, .() r 1. e.Lc,':'
1 !19 S, '\'.'~

'" eo- ~..~ 1. tJ1\ .


prov l\.~
inforf."ldtion the FBI [I,ad d(;vt;;1opeu 0:-1 the' bc:cJ:~r.o~:-:~,. associa
~.'E: roe

tions, and business C1ctJ.viti-:~s 0':: l\UtlEC's ~r'2sident. \.;ith Israe


li govE~rnment officials, agent~, and citizens.
hccording to
the FBI a?ents giving the briefings,. the infornati'on ,deve'loped,
while circumstantial in- nature, raised serious auestions con-'
cernin9 the national' securit~z' ri~k~; 'posed ,Jy NUl:1EC S president.
1

In review'ing DOE: fil'es', we found that during the FBI's

surveillance activities, the FBI be~arne so concerned about

the security' risks po,sea by ~lU~tEC's' president that they asked

DOE whE~ther it planned to terminat~, his security clearance or

,s top the f lClw of nucl1ear m'a ter ials to NUl-lEe. Accord ing to
the FBI s liaison wit,ln GAO, the FBI recommE~nded that NUMEC's
operating license be taken away~
DelE files also s,ho'w' that in early 1969 the F'Bl, briefed
Pres ident Nixon on th~= laues,tionablE~ act i vi ties of NUMEC' s
pres idE~nt. ) The f il es f~r the'r show t.ha t tor~ leve 1 'Government
concern abol) t the secur i ty ri.sk's posed by the pres id ent of
NUMEC continued until 1'971.
We were told by a ,former Deputy'
Director of Security at DOE that in 1971 a former Comrnission~r
of AEC. aided the NUME{~ official in obtaining employment with
Westinghouse Electric Corpora,:tion, where hE~ would have no need
for access to national .security information. The former Depu
'ty Director of Securi ty sa id he helped the former Commissioner
i'n obta.in ing sueh e.mplo:yment for NU'MEC IS 'pres ident.
The for
mer Commissioner declined to comment to us on this matter.
We
believe this is parti(:ularly important since we were informed
by the president of N-:.JMEC that he m,ay attenlpt to obtain employ
ment in an area wh'ich will involve a top SE~cret clearance. If
this should occur, th~::~ ':juestion of his obtaining a security
clearance may surface again.

In the FBI briefing on December 14, 1977, we were told

by the current FBI. ag(~nt in charge of the investigation,

that
no additional surveillance act.ivities or ir.vestigations of
any kind werle underta:!o/:en by the FBI concerning ,NUMEC from
September 1969' until ~~~~pril of 1976, when ordered to do so by
President Ford..
A Der)artment of Justice st.aff attorney as
signed to the case la 't:e 1:- conf i rmed this.
He told us thci t the
FBI's c~rrent investigation was th~ direct result of a request
to the then ~~ttorney C;eneral by President Ford in April 1976.
According to the Justice staff attorney it was at th~t time
President Ford asked ~he FBI to investigate the 'possibility
that weapons--gr'ade materials :might have, been diverted from

the NUMEC facility to Israel. GAO was not furnished ~ny


documents reqard i og Px"es ident Ford' s request 'and thus could
not specifically determine its nature and'seop.e.

'~T

........... _;.... ;, ~

. [25Xl,

...

COIl 62 ~~ 5 1.

]~.O.13526

t ) () t h t .n e f 0 r rn era n a- cur r e n t F B 1 ..a .a e n t s


.involved i;~ ~:he invE~st..lgation that, durinq all the r3I's in
ve s t i 9 a t .i 0 !: ::: 1. ~ ton Lr ~1 EC f. i t did not 0 b t. c 1 nan :~ i !1 0 r :r. a t i 0 r:
con c 1 us 1 vel jt s h 0 'N i n SJ t hat a d i v e r s i a no f n u c 14a arm ate ria 1
occurred at ~U~EC.
I

.~...' ~

l,..: ~ r

1 _.0

COd

\l

i\s part of its recent investigation, the' former agent-in


charge told us the FBJ questioned the CIA regarding information
it mi9ht have devel'oped on the alleged ai'version.
According
to this agE:nt, the CIA initially told the, FBI they possessed
inforrnat'ion 1 inking th:E~ \Jnacc'ountE~d for N'uMEC mater ial to
Israel. The CIA later " how~ver,. informed the FBI that they
did not have such .inf.orma"tion. The CIA r~~presentatives told
the FB I thCl t th ~y kn1ew no rnore than the FBI did abou t the
matter.
The 'CIA .offici.als having current aCCE~SS to the files
have advised us ,that a search of the availabl.E~ data reveals a
"semantic problem concerning the use of the term "evidence."
In short, CIA. states t.here is no '''hard eV.laence n of a diver

1~. rom tor


I
s Ion
,.: ". .' L~ '.~.... t
0 I
,~s ral
e
ll

J Without access to the records showing


the exact nature of thle informatic,n excharlged betw.een these
two agencies, we were unable to determine what information ex
changE~ did occur.
H()w1ever, two fOlrmer offici211s of the CIA, a
former Deputy Director of Science and Technology--who was one,
of the five highest ranking officials in the C~IA and who re
ported directly to the Di.rector of the CIJ~ on this matter
--and another source, who asked, not to be identified, told us
that t.he CIA had pre:pared several internal ana:lyses discussing
this par,ticular

.Lncili~~ellhS

_ _~

b r r en t FBI agent in charge of the inv'es ti

never br iefed by tbe CIA, to'ld us that he was unaware of this

information.

A newspaper article on ,January 28, 1978, appeared .to fur


ther support the existe:1ce of such information.
The article
identified the existence of a special intelligence report pre
pared by the CIA in 1974.
The n'ewspaper article noted' that
the CIA had mistakenly :~eleased th,e "top--secret" report.
One
of the conclusions of t:he repor~t> w,a's, that Isr,ael had developed
nuclear weapons and that th'e sourc1e of the, nuclear material
.
for the weapons was o'btained partially through "clandestine
means. IF
The (:IA neVE:~lr denied the'validity of the newspaper
article. Subseauentlv" we o}jtained a copy ,of the report.

--=:J

1".L2

0.

L __,
'~--

StnRQ

I 25Xl, E.O.13526

~ .-1
("-

"COl162251

. r:'

~-;:--

..J ..:. ... ~

~~~~~).13526]

The CIA
officials W~? c~ntactE::~d told us that they did Inform the FBI
of this information in ,3 May 19-77 InE:eting on -the subject.
The previous FB"r investigator in charge of the investigation
attended the May 1977 meeting. The current one did not. The
CIA officials we interviewed b~li~ved that the May 1977 brief
ing constitute"d ,formal advice to the FBI on what was known by
the CIA -'about the situation concerning Israeli \,s acquisition
of a nuclear weapons cal}?ab il.i ty,.
.

' ...

The"F~I

is currE:~nt.ly preparinq a rep~~rt on' its most re

cent investigation. FBI agents involved in the current inves


tigation told us that:. w'r1ile: there" E~xists circ~ms.tantial infor
mation which could lead an 'individual to conclude that a
diversion had occurred, the~e is no substantive proof of a
diversion. The report w~s submitted to~ the Attorney General
on February "16, 1978. HowevE~r, a staff" lawyer in -the Internal
Security Section at the Department ,of Justice, informed us on
May 25,1978, that"there were 'still several items "the FBI had'
to cover in its r1epo,rt t)eforf:~ the ~rLtstice Department would
accept it. Currentl~{, th1e FBI' is still in-vestigating the

alleged NUMEC incident.


CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ,AGE~NCY 'S;

INVOLV~:MENT WITH NUME:"cl~NEIDENT

On August 29, 1977, we'met' with the CIA for a briefing


on their knowledge of and inV'olveme~nt in the alleged NUMEC
inc id en t. Subsequen t ly, we had sevrer al f a.llow-up discuss ions
"with CIA representati'ves on the matt.er. w~~ contacted 11 former
and current CIA employees. Howev~r," as we go~ further into
our review, the CIA blocked our efforts to continue.. While
the CIA did provide s~=lE'cted staff members of Ch~irman Dingell's
House Subcommittee on Energy and Power wit]) the opportunity to
rev iew a t CIA Headquar te r s some documenta t.lon on their knowledge

of the NUMEC inc iden_t, CIA off ic ial s refusHd to prov id e, us


with acc'ess to' any sour1ce documents. on -their intelligence ac
tiviti~s surrounding thle Israeli/NUMEC matter.
Furthermore,

the CIA did not cooperate with us in" arranging interviews with

I.e

knowledgeable cu'rrent..~~~ for~mer officials.~

_ _ _.

..

Withheld under statutory authority of the


Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.(:., section 403g)

~T

C01162251

~r'\ ,.~

~ L:~~i:

'25Xl, EJ).135261
L

-------~
A. t

the Au 9 u s t

1 ,~j 7 .~ b r i e..f i n 9 ,.

1--------

1briefing.

Additionally,

~e

later pro

vided the CIA with a melTIorandum 'on the information presented

to us at th,e briefinq to aSSIJre that our interpretation of


the information was ,alCCJrate.
The CIA official who reviewed
the 'memo r and urn s ugge:::; ted cer ta in chc3nges' r;,u t did not cornmen t
on the accuracy of G)~1.0.s stated position regarding the alleged
divers'ion incident which identified' the Nt:MEC facility as the
"most likely" spurce of Israel's nuclear ~'eapons material.

A formE~r high ranking CIA offi.cial at the briefing


provided us with the following additibnal information on the
incident. He cited the~;e items as further,SuPI?Ort for his
belief about the Isra'el/NtJMEC conn~ction.

--The ~ase with which riucle~r materials could have been


taken from the NCMEC facility.

~T

I 25Xl, E.O.13526]

~""'I.. r:T
\-~~ ~

'COl162251

... ,;,c.o.~

~--~

, ~~ E.().13~
.
. . . ' .
:.
-,'--;.-'rhe CIA also told us much of tne sarrie Informatlon tr,;~:
the FBI had provided us.
In an interviet.t. r with.a CI"i-\ .offici~l'
on Sept~mber 12, 1977, we ~ere infor~ed that the intellice~ce
information' develop~::~d on the matter was so strong that every
,one in the intell ig~:~lncl= comn1un i tv concur red with t,he CIA IS
op in ions, lexcep t one--;)OE.
HOl,aJeve r, 1 ike th e. FBI,' the CIh
emphasized that .they had no 'conclusive evidence tracin'g the
unaccounted for nuc1e ,a:r mat~er ial from NUMEC to Israel.'
den t

()ne f ()rmer of f ~rc ial ~ 's tla ted tha t the CIA 1Nas 50 conf i
in thf~' NUMEC 'infol::-ma t ion th'a t a forme r D ir ecto r' br iefed

Preside~t
'0

.'

"

F~',~,~"~
." '".

Lyndon'Johnsdn on the incidertt in 1968 or 1969.

,The former CIA Director


such a br it:f ing_

latlf~r

told us he could not rec.all

We were told b~I' a, CIA off ici,al on SeptemlJer 12, 1977,


that at least one intelligence estimate was p:cepared by CIA
staff on tl1is incidE~nt..~ HO'IJever,.in commenting on this re
port CIA o,~ficials advised us that the currentl'y available
files do not contain an esti'ma.te on the NUMEC incident and
it is their belief that this official was referring to an
overall in 1:ell igence~ estimate on nuclearproli fer a t ion. We
were also told by tbe i:orme.r CIA De.puty Direc'~or of Science
and Technology on' Oc:~tober l~r,' 1977 and .anoth.~r ~ource' for
merly employed by the CIA ~~ January 28, 1978, that a series
of papers
t-/ere wr i tten
,.-
_
___
,_
__-0_---'
I
,
1

WE~ asked the former CIA Director


ab~ut these papers and he told us that
he COt)ld not recall an~l such docurnE~nts. :~owe'7er, he qual if ied
th is sta tenlen t by il"lld iea t inf:J tha t he did :not intend to say
that the documents do not exist.

On January 16, 1978"

involve~

in the matter

In a nleeting wi. th seve]:~al CI~\ repres~=nta1:ives on


November 17,1977, t"he CIA (:ippea.rE~d to ch,ange.its views about
the~~ legeci diver s i~.~_.r

--l

we asked' the
CIA to explain its ai:ppalrent changE~ in v ie~Ns concerning NUMEC.
Specifically, we as'k.ed them to state, in '~[it~~ng, th.e CIA's
official position onl' the alleged diversio::1.
~~heir last sub
mission to us was thlei!' forrnal connnlents 0:1 th~l5 report, which
still did not adequaltely addres's 1:his point.'
_

,.

In sev'eral meet.ings with' C,rA officials who have current


access to ~:he files, it was explained to 1JS that a search of

~T

. [!SXl, E.O.13526

C01162251

'

I 25X-'1-,E~.O.13~26

, ....nr'~-l
~.
"i!_'J1 ~

the ava ilable da ta re\leals alt se:-:-Lantic" orcblem concern inc


the use of the term "11::~vidence.""
In short, CIA stated' ther~
is no "~hard evidenc~~_ of a: cii.ver'5i.on ro~:l NlJ~iECto Israel.

L __,_ _"

We were unabl etc) dIe t;erm ine whether the CIA changed' its
opinion about any NUME:C;lIsrael link l:>r whether the CIA inad
'verten"tly failed to C()mm'4=nt on the "inaccuracy of the "most
likely" position c'onv4::~yed tOo us in the A~gus,t 1977 briefing.
Further, we aske~ for any reports the CIA might" have prepared
on the 'rna t ter. We 'ha ~;le ::1ever rece ived any.
A January 28,
1978~ newspaper artic~e, however, alleged the existence of
[ a t leas -tone such repc)rt. 1r-.

MoreovelC, in Nov'E:~mt)4~r 1977 the CIA refus'ed to assist us


in contactinq form,er ,()r J?resent 'CIA employees having knowledge
of the incident. At~one point we attempted to discu~s a par
ticular CIA briefing \4ith a former Chairman of NRC who 'had
participated in the brie:Eing.
Howe~/erf, sin'ce the discussion
would have involved CIA infor:rnation, the former NRC Chairman
wanted pr ior approval fr()m th~~ CIA. ~ie attelnpted to obtain the
necessa.r"y approval' from 1:he CIA but were informed that this
request could not be honc)red due to the Dir1actor's decision
to work solely with Chairman '])ingell l s Subc,omrnittee on this

investigation,'

[ 2SX1, E.O.13526 I

18

-sfSRiL

j
.i
~

~-~:5T

co 11622:51

~~~\~

"

. '\

CHAPTE~~

WERE THE

INVEs:rrIGATIONS BY THE FE1)E?AL GOVERNlv]ENT

----

.-

INTO

~rH:E

ALLEGED INCIDENT

l~DEOUATE?

If a diversion or theft of nuclear material is suspected


or actually occur s in, this coun try, the 'Feder al GO,vernrnen t

:.,

must be able to quiclkly and definitivel~{ determine how and


why it happe'ned so that: the 'public can c)e protected against
the potential hazards of such an occurrE;~nce.' To do this,
agencies of the Federal Government w{th capabilities for in
vestigating and responding to suspected diversion incidents
must work togethe.r.,
Th'is did not happerl .w,ith NUMEC. Whether
a diversion(s) ever o~ctir~ed at NUMEC st.ill remains unanswered.
Wha t c an be said, howeve r" is t.ha t the Feder al i nves t ig a t i,?ns
of the matter were uncoordinated, limited in scope ~nd time- '
liness, and in'o~r opinion less than"ade~uate.
DEPARTMEtf:r OF'

ENER(:~,Y

We believe certain DOE a~tions prior to and after the


alleged NOMEC diversion( 5), rais',e questions on the adequacy
of DOE I S implementation of i ts r'~qulatory responsibili ties
and its investigation of NUMEC. DOE did not take corrective
action against the ~UMEC facility prior to the alleged inci
dent, even'thoughDOE inspections revealed'repeated NUMEC
rna ter ial accoun tab il i. ~:y and phys leal secur i ty def ic ienc ies.
DOE' 5 inVE~stigation o:E NUM.J~C orni'tted" one potentially signif

icant avenue of investigation, i.~. that the unaccounted foi'


material could have' been erroneously shipped to,another coun-'
try. Also, recognizing DOE' 5 dual ,role for promotional and
regulatory responsibilities' over nuclear activities, its in
vestigatic)n ,of :NU,MEC cannot be considered truly independent.
Prior to ,Janua r y19 7 5.~ DOE was rE~spons ible for regulating
nuclear rnclterials a.s \I'lell c;!s promoting the use and develop
ment af nuclear energy in' the United States. Consequently,
a discovery that la large an~ount ()f' weapons-grade material
could have been diverted from a u.s. facility would have been
embarrassing to DOE and detrimental'to its 'promotional respon
sibilities..
Congrels's recO~:Jnize.d these cl:)nflicting DOE roles
and split DOE's reg'ulclt"ory aspec,t:s' fr,om its promo,tional role
e f fee t i ve Jan II a r y 1 9, 19 7 5
II

'

From the time :NUtJlE(: was licensed in 1957 until the


missi.ng material was i.dentified in April 1965, every accounta
bility inspection conducted at NlJMEC by ])OE found significant'
weaknesses in NDMEC IS accountabili.ty ave::- nuclear mater ial.
In view of the problems DOE was experiencing with NUMEC
and investigations which were conducted, the FBI'S l~aison
19

C01162~~51

with GAO .and a former Executive Director of the. JCAE~ told us


tha t the FB I and the J'CAE recomlnE~ncled to DOE tha t 'NUl'lEe' s 1 i-
Cense be taken away and that it be' prohibited from receiving
additional nuclear materials. However, they could not recall

wben or how these recommendations were communicated to the


agency.
(~ve. wer e unclble to find any 'recor9 . of these communi~
cations.)
Furthet, i.n a letter to DOE. on JUly 26, 1965, a
DOE official who flla~led a key role in the investigation of
the NUMEC facility, w~ote
u* *. * if it: 'were withtn m~, province. to do so I would,
* * * ~top .all furthE~r deliveries 0' enriched uranium
to r\[UMEC until such time as they hl3d straightened out
the i r prQcedu.re s: and had sa tis fact~)r il y accoun ted for
all enriched 1l.lrani,:.lm entrusted to ':hem to date. 1I
We found no indications that DOE~ took corrective action

against

NUMEC

,based on

the~se.

recommendations.

DOE ~s reluctance to take action aga'inst the facility in


light of continuin9 rnateri.al control pr()blems is questionable.
In Some informal notes we obtained from DOE's files, a former
DOE official in charge of DOEls overall investigation of NUMEC,
admitted the agency (jid not know' whethe]~ the material had be'en
stolen or divertE~dj' Yet the facility was not ordered to cease
operations, and it continued to obtain nuclearrnaterial con
tr ac ts . ,Ac co r ding to th is 0 ff ic ial, who was a former DOE
Assistant General :~1anager, there was nne> good answer lf as to
wh~ these conditions were allowed. to persist over the years

of NUMEC's operation.
DOE',S handlin(:~r of physical securit~l inspection reports
on the NU1VlEC faci.lity by t~:>p DOE securit.y officials also
raises SOIne concern. Two .former DOE sec:.urity inspectors
told us on March 31 and April 3, 1978, t.hat during most of
the 1960s, including the p~~riod of the a,lleged NUMEC inci
dent t DOE's Division of Security 'would ~ot issue an "unsat
isfactoryl' se'cur:it~:t rl~port on a nuclear facility. According
to these ins pee to r s thesec:ur i tyreports. had to be wr i t"ten
in a certi3in manner i.n ord'f~r to be approved by the top secu
rity official at DOE,. the Director of Security. For example,
one security insp,ecti.on re:port on the 'NeMEC facility con.
ducted on February 10 and 11, 1966, noted two "principal"
and s eve r a 1 If min 0 r" 5 E~ cur i t Y de fie i e nc i e "s a t the f a.c iIi t Y
The deficiencies were significant enough to prompt the Di
rector of Security to visit the NUMEC'plant to discuss the
problems \ll/ith faci1it~r :management. The two form'er security
"inspectors told us ~Io h()wever, that the conclusion in the in
spect.ion report did not re]::>r:esent the actual findings.
The
report concl uded:
.. I)ur ing the course of the inspection
seve r a 1 de f ic ienc iE:~S" ~~e r: e d iscov.~red though not suf~ icien t

,,) 20

~~. T
.~

~T

COl162251
.

;: ~ ~~ ~ ;'::/~

.... ,,,,t

...:'.L .. I

to ser iously detr,act frorn the othE~!'w,ise s,atisfactory"aspects


of the secu:rity pro'granl ,~ '* *." However, 'three former DO'2
security in.vestigators, inc1.i.1,ding t:he forlner Deputy and A.ssist~
ant D ire c tor S 0 f Sec lJ r i ty, told u s t hat the en t ire NUME C :5 e c u
rity program was inadequate~
We were unable

to discuss t:hi.s

matteJ~

with the former

Director of Security due to his current ill pealth.

.... ::, ;'..~ !

:<~::}'::i
,.'j
I
~

'.:

We wer~ told by the f~I'mer DC)E secur.L ty inspector for the


NUMEC'facility that during t:he', Fer)ruary 1966 physical security
'inspection at NUMEC he identified some untlsual circumstances
regarding the control of'nuclear material held by NUME~. Al
.though th is indi v idual was not farntillar with the rna ter ial ac
counting practices, the circum~tances led him to believe that
an amount of highly lenr iched ur'an'i.um about equal to the amount
unaccounted for f rom the NU~[E'C fac iII ty mIgh t have been e r ro
neously. shipped to Fra11ce,. This former inspec'tor became so
concerned ~bolJt the' ]natter t.hat he atteinpt:~'d ,to report it to
the former Director ()f S:ecur 1 ty up10n returning f'rom the in
spection. However, ,i:lcco'rding to t.his indiv-idtial and his-former
supervisor,. the Directc)r o'f Secur ity told h~rn to "get o'ut of
his office" and not pursue the matter any further. According
to bot.h these individuiils,' the entire matter was suppressed
and was never consid~?rE~d by top DOE securi.ty ,officials. Ac
"cording to DOE officials, as it later dev'E!loped an authorized
shipment of highly enr iched uranium was se~nt to France and was
identified by DOE inSpE!ct.ors as being in that country.

Since "NUMEC, was 'both a DOE cont'ractoI' and a licensee,

the facility's nuclej::tr ,activities were split be.tween DOE's

confl icting regula't'oll:' y and promot ional re~lpons ibil it ies.

These confl icting r'e"spc>ns ibil i ties :may ha'\i~e affected DOE's

conclusion about the alleged diversion incident. DOE devel

oped a II the1ory" aboQt ...,:ha t happened to the~ rna ter ial, even

though DOE had no concl~sive information E,howing that a di

version did or did not occur at the NUMEC plant. Moreover,

at a top level staff meeting on ,February 14, 1966, a former

Assistant G1eneral Mana~Jler of AEC advised t.he members of th~

former AEC that:

11* * * it would bE~ theoretically possible' to ship mate


rial abroad in excess of the ambunts indicated in the
compan:y I s records II And tha t ,,* * * the AEC rna ter ial
accountability' sy~)tern might not reveal a deliberate
and systematic attempt to divert material ,* * *."
t,

Further,.3 days aftell: P~:E:C was advised of t.he possibility of

diversion, they bri~fed the FBI and, according to the former

agen t i n ch,arge 0 f the inves tiga t ion t- pres en ted a conv inc ing

~I:'T
,:) [. u

1Ni.,.

COl162:251
."

case that there was no

div~rsion

or" theft of

the NUMEC facility.

rnateri~l

from

'

FEDERAL BUREAU OF IN\7ESTIC;ATION

-----_._

Our evalui3tion e,f thE:~ FBI's investig,atio~ of ~(JMEC was


blocked by the FBI's denial to I;)[ovide 'us with supporting
documentation.
Hp'weve'r, based c)n our interview,s with FBI and
Department lof ~JusticE~ (),.fficials" we believe that:
(1) the
FBI's investigatiotlS of trlle inci.dent were untimelYi, and, (2)
the scope a f the inve st iga.tion ",ras 1 imi ted.
S:eptemt~er 1969 f the FBI developed
informat~ion on the actions and asso
NUM~G's president.
Accordinq to th~, FBI investiga

From Augus,t 1965 to


'j

a substantial amount of

ciates of
tors" this informa1ticn was developed in response .to reque'sts,
from DOE and the CIA. How'ever, it was not ,until Apr il o'f
1976 that the- FB'! .be9an to, investigate ",hether there was a
diversion.. of material at t.he NUM,EC plant--about 11 years
after DO~" s investiglation of the in'ciden't.

On February' 17, 1966, DOE staff met.with the FBI to dis


cuss the inciden't and requested them to investigate the matter.
The FBI is required by the- Atomic Energ~' Act of 19'54 to inves

tigate all alleged or suspected criminal violations of the act.


A diversion of nuclear material is a criminal violation of the
act; howev~r, on February 25, 1966, the FBI informed DOE that
it would not undertake an inv;e'stigation of the incident. The
question of diversion was not addressed by the Bureau again'
until 1976. The fdrmer agent-in charge cif the investigation
stated th4at since such "a 10.n9 p~r iod of time h~d, elapsed since
the alleged incid~nt occurred -it' was very doubtful wheth~r the
FBI would be able to develop any ~vidence' that would resolve
the incid-?nt.

During our .reviewwe fouhd.that the scope of the FBI's


current investigation appeared' limited si~ce the~ had not ~n
terviewed at least ei.ght key offi1c.ials about their knowledge
of the NOMEC incident. These included a' Chairman of the for
mer AEC during iheNUMEC incident: a former Deputy Director
of the CIA responsibl~ "for gathering and analyzing data on
nuclear activities in Israel during the tirn~ of the alleged'
incieJent; the loan oj:ficer at t.he Mellon Bank who approved
the .loan to NUMEC; a key D~OE staf.f member responsible for mate
rial control' inv'esti~J,ations at NUMECi' and. the chief DOE field
investiga1:or for NL1MEIC. 'These officials told us th"at the FBI
never int~~rviewed t~hE~:m about the 0JUMEC incident. Two individ
uals, the forme~ .Deputy Director of the CIA, and DOE'$ chief
field investigator, told us that the~ could not understand why
the FBI had never dis,:;ussed the ]nattet with them in light of
their exterisive and ditect involvem~nt.

~.

co 1162~~ 51

In t.h~ FBI briefing ~\,e recE~i.ve'd on Octoo'er 6, 197i,


le~rned

0: 5nother

l~.mitation "in

the scope

0:

the "FBI

\"le

cur
rent: inve~,stiga'tion. The former agent iJ1 charg'e of the FEIls
inVE~stiga.tion told us; t'hat the FBI did not investigate t h e '
source of funds for NUMEC's payment for the missing nuclear
matE~'r ial.
Al though he saV\7 this as ~n ilnportant aspect of the
inVE~sti'9a.tion'-~-since NUMEC's financial l?osition did not ap
pear to support such a loan--it was not pursued because the "
'FBI anticipated leqa.l difficult'i.es in g~~tting the appropriate
ban~~ records.
HOWE=ver I' WE:~ obtai.ned much of the data simply
by requesting, it from the responsible bank official over the
telephone. 'Although the information we obtained did not re-'
veal any peculiarities i,n NUMECts financial dealings, it did
serve .to furtqer dE~monstrate the~ limited 'scope of the FBlts
investigation of the incident.
I,S

The FBI's efforts to effect.ively ~nvestigate the incide'nt


have also been impE~aed by its la.ck of technical: exper,tise ~n
dealing ~ith nuclear 'facilities ,such as NUMEC. , This is par
ticularly significant since the Atomic I~~ergy Act requires
that the FBI inve,sti9at:e such occurrenCE~S. According to the
former agent in charge of the investigation at' the FBI', the
FBI is not competent to do the type of investigation ne,eded
to determine the c,auses of unaccounteq for nuclear'material
without expert assistance.
Consequentl~', ,he did not think
the FBI could, ever conduct effective di\'ersion-type investi
gations without relying! he'avily on DOE o'r NRC for technical
assistance and guidance.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY


From intervie1~lswi.th a former CIA official. and with for
mer and current officia.ls and staff of [)OE and the FBI we con
cluded that the CI4~~~ did ,not fU11y cooperate with DOE or the
FBI .in attempti.ng to resolve th:e NUMEC lltatter.
Altho.ugh CIA'
officials told us that 'th'ey bel.ieve the1' did f,ully cooperate
with DOE and the 'FBI, it appears to us t.hat the CIA was reluc
tant to provide infor:llation which coula nave been helpful to
the domestic inves":~igat.ion beca,use of it.s concern about pro
tecting its "sourcf:~s ,a'nd methods" of information.

r-:-----------]
~~:;X]:_, E.O.13~~

23

.~~

~~r:T
~:_'..:t~

[ 25~Xl, E.O.13526J

C01162:251

According to the'CIA, a briefing similar to that provided


to the FBI in May 1977 \-,'as :I?rovided .to ce~rtain key DOE offi
cials on July 29, 1977. Those present at the meeting are no
longer wi th DOE and. have not been interv.iewed by GAO.
However,
we interviewed sever-al formler offiGi~ls,' including a_ Chairman
of AEC and two other Commissioners at AEC during the time pe
riod 1965-1972, who told us that they were not aware that such
i~formation existed. ev~n though several individuals agreed
that it would have };)ee.n irnpprtant information to have at that

~:

..

.~
~
Further, we were told by two former CIA officials, a

former Deputy. Direct.or of S(:ience and Technology, and an. in

dividual who'did not: w.lsh t() be identified, of the existence

of internal reports discussing the alleged NUMEC diversion.

The Deputy Director wa.s one of thE: five highest ranking o'ffi

cials in the CIA at the time of the NUMEC incident and re

ported directly to the Director of the CIA on' the ~atter

I Off' , 1
currently handlihg the NUMEC matter at the CIA told us that

they have been unable t:o idE~nti,fy or find any such documents.
Yet. the two individuals who told us about the documents said
they assist:ed in preparing them.
DOE and FBI representatives
we questioned said the~r werE:~ not. aware of the existence of
the documents.
The appearance 'of the January 28, 1978, news
paper article discussed on pages 14, 17, I~nd 18 of this report,.
leads us to believe that the CIA was less than forthright in .

dea1ing with us and the FBI41

The CIA.dis. :lgrees with this

opinion.

I 25Xl, KO.13526J

C0116225:1

I,
i

I 25X1, E.O.13526]

CHAP'I'ER 4

2,~..ER~~TIO~~~~~:on~~tusION~S, AND I~ECOMMENDATIONS


~~ETHER

A DIVERSION OCCURRED AT NUMEC

RE~AINS-'TO

BE ANSWE:RED'

Al though larqe amoun'ts of' circumstantial informati.on have


been developed by 'D()E, tOle FBI., .and 'the C;IA on this incident,
these agericies did not'provide any inf6rmation, nor did we in
dep1endent.ly iaenti.f~' any",:.:that 'would conclusively show 'that a
diversion of material occurred at. the NUMEC faGility.
Conse~
guently, whether or not such an ..incident occurred is. still
dena tablE~.
DO'E has taken the position tha.t it has 'no conclusive
evidence that" a d:~vel:sion of nuclear material ever occurred

at the N~lMEC fac'iJ.it~', although it ,cann1ot deny such 'a ,possi

bility.

DOE supports thE~ theory that the n'Llclear mater ial' unac
coun~ed for from t\rUMEC wa~; c.ausE~d by inadequate inventory

management.

All Gurrent and former DOE officials we inter

viewed, e',xcept ,one, clgreed with thistheory., On the other


hand, many of thes,e E~ame off iciatls also agreed that the facil
ity was sUfficiently unable to control its nuclear materials
so that a diversion could have been carried out.
FB I agen t s 'in'Jo 1 ved i.n the Inves't i.~J a t ion bel ieve tha t
there is a substantial amount of informati9n which tends ,
to support the. diversion t.heory., HoweVE~r " it is circumstan
tial in nature..
The FBI is still investigating' the matter.

The

official

data wh ic~ was m,a:de'

ava~ilable

..

,t.o us by a former CIA


Ileft us with

the under stand ing that NUMEC was the ~'mclst '1 ikely" source of

some of the nucl'ear no'at.er icil that was diverted to, Israel. How
ever, dur ing tbe course 0' our work I CIA appeared to change
its opinions on the matter and tofd GAO that it ha~ no data to
specifically support such a conclusion.

c: : :

I-----Th~e-----I

newspaper article of ,January 28,1978, seemed to confirm this.


Current CIA officials told us that the former offie,ials were
drawing on memory as ~:hey recallE~d p'ast events. The CIA offi

cials who have current access to the files have advised us


that a secirch of the available 'dc3.t:a reve,als a "semant'ic" prob
lem concerning the USE~ lof the term lI ev id lence."
In s.hort,'CIA
statE~s ,thE~re is no "hcird e'.ridenCE~n of a (jiversion from N'OMEC
to Israel.
At' the' sanle tiIineicurrent CIA officials admit

'~ ...

StL~

125X1,E.O.135~6

~.~T
""" - ......

co 1162~2 51

..

8vai13hl,:;.

(~ct~a,

\-lh'en coupled \,tith past

reco11ecti~,n's" of

events,

1~,;~~: :orr:i~=r officials to speak 'in term,s ,of "linking','


unaC20U~tec: :7'lct~~r.Lal fre,in NV:,!EC to nuclear developments in

could

th-s

Israel.
NRC, in a February 1978 report related ,to the NUMEC inci
dent, concluded that their previous official 'position of "no
evi~ence" to support a diversio~ may ne~d to be reconsi~ered
in light of the many uncertainties surrounding the incident.
DOE stated that it had nb evidence to indicate that a
divE~rsion of nuclElar mat,erial had occurred.
We bel-ieve that
~he age'ncy could havE~been' much rnore te:ntativeih its conclu
sions an the matter, instE~ad of informir1g' th.e public and Gov
ernr:~lent

official'S

th~lt

possible diversi.on o,t:

there was no need for ,concern about a


mat~~rial from the NUMEC

WeaE)On~~9rade

facility.
~1or~~ver, we bel ieve, ~hat the FBI (~Qd CIA may have a1
,ready collected in:Eormation which, if added to'data he,ld by
DOE, could provide a more definitiye an~5wer to the question
of v,rhether a diversion did' occu!'. Unt'il all information held
by t.hese 'organization's can be cClnsolidated and ~eviewed in its
entirety, a complete evaluation providing authoritative answers

to the questions surrounding the NUMEC diversion cannbt be ob


tained.

FEDERAL MECHANISMS TO 'COORDINATE

INVES"TIGATI ONS-OFMI ~3SI NG-oNUCLEAR

MATE'RIALAR:E--LACKI:NG -------..- - - .-

_--.------------

I t 15 essE~ntial th.at the, nuclear sG~feguards systems em


ployed by the lJnitj:~d States be continually monitored and' im
pr'oved as weakness~::~s in it ~re identifie'd.
Overall, the
safeguards syst.e:ms in t.h'ts country have been greatly improved
as a result of the ~lleged NUMEC incident. 'Since the .alleged

incident occutred AEC and its succeeding agencies have placed


much greater levle1's of control, reg,uirements on private nuclear
lNUl1E(~.
Thl=re arE~ many n~w requirements which
inclUde such measures, as bimonthly inventory accounting, armed
guards. ta prevent unauthorized access to nuclear material and

facilities li,ke

alarm systems designed to detectunauthorized'movement of nu


NE~ve~l~thel"I~sS, t 1NO recent GAO re'ports pointed.
short~c::ominqs in the ability of Government and
commercial nuelear facilities to adequately monitor and control
nucl,ear rnateri.al~3 ,with current account~bility systems.
These
reports poin'ted out:, t.hat du'e to limita,tions in the state-of
the-art of measurement iristrumentation, diversions of n~clear
material from a' tJ.S. facility can'still 'occur and would prob
ably not, be d i.sc()vE~re'd in a timely manner;-.
clear matt:r ial.
out significant.

" 26

'

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.

, ' .,-.

C0116225~1

,f" "

'!"he >;:U:1EC. i.::ci(~ent and its a~;sociat,ed 13':'year in.vestigation


hi~h1.i?ht this c'Juntry'~; current in~bili,ty to 'effectively deal. .
wi:n ?ossi~le ;: l.~.~::,'r:~il:ns of nuclear mat~:~ial. The combined
capabilities of DerE, FBI, clnd Clf\ were n.~ver directed at all
the factors in\701vec) in the alleqed diversion.
The institu
tional barriers exi~;tin'g arnong these agencies, may haye pre
vented it..
Each agE?ncy did "its own thirlg," t'o the detriment'

of a unified, comprehensive investigation. A formal 'coordi


nated interagency plan agreed upon plan is needed to focus

the combined ca~)abilit.ies of these agenci.es in a more timely


The agreed upon plan should focus ,on
(I), an adequate det~:~c,1:ion and investigative system and (2) a
repor t ing sys t'errt to th,e appropr ia te congr ess ional carom it tees'
and to the President. As a result, if'a similar incident were
to occur today, 'thi~5 couritr:y may n'ot be assured of any better
investigation. The United states needs to improve its efforts
for effectively responding t6 and invest.igating incidents of
missing or unaccounted for weapons-grade nuclear materials.
In view of), incr'eas ing' terror i'st activities4 throughout the
war ld, the ab i 1 i t~, to r.,espond arid .inves t ig a te such inc iden ts
should be o~ conCE~rn to ':nat,Lonal sE~curity and the pUblic
health and safety. We believe a timely, concerted effort on
the part of these threE~ lage11cies \I/()uld' have greatly aided and
possibly solved the NUMEC diversi6n questions, if they desired
to do so.

and effective manner.

While incidents 'of unaccQuntE!d for mc:iterial have been


e}{perienced in the! past, thE~re has not be4~n another incident
involving public a.114=ga,tions such as thos.~ at NUMEC. We be
lieve this can possilJl}i' be, cllttributed to the. increased empha
sis the Government has pla,cE!d on protective measures against
diversions or thE:ft.s but it may als'o be dtle to a little good
luck in that people may h~ve not tried to db it.
.

RECOMMENDATIONS
-----

TO THE HEADS OF AGENCIES


- .

GAO recommends that the hea'ds of DOE, NRC, the Dep'art


ment of Justice, and the CIA, as part of their' respon.sibil
ities for the nation(:ll se'curity of the cOl:,ntry establish a

plan for coordinated interagency action which focuses on a


nuclear saf~eguard.s S~tst,em, that adequately detects, investi
gates, ana reports to the Congress and the President on thefts
or diversions of nuclea.r: niatleiials. The. plan which should be
subrni t ted to th e Con9 r ~ ISS wi ,th,in, 90 days or l'es 5 of th e issu
ance of this report, should includle
-'-a formal means for

a timely determination of wheth~r,

a loss has occurred;


---a' clear and'di.reet channel
the ag'e nc i e s ;
27

()f

communications between

~l

~r.T
.. ...

COl162251

~;

.'

--a formal nleelns for rapidl:/ focusing the abi~~"t"ies 0

these agencies on the res()lu'tion of a diversion inc


dent; and
--a rneans .for .allo\,;inSr a"ny incident involving the theft

or diversion of nuclear mate'rial to be, definitely re


solved to the satisfaction of the Congress and the
Pres ident.
We also recornm~~nd that the P~ttorney General, working wi.th
the FBI, take the lE~ad in e,stablishing tIle interagency pl,?-n
sin c e the FBI' " un de r t h E~ A t. 0 micE: n erg y Act 0 f 1 9 5 4, i s res po n
s'ible for investigating incidents involvJ.ng the' diversion or
theft of nucl~at materials.
.
RECOMMENDATION TO THE CONGRESS

The comm i t tees of .Congr ess hav ing j ur isd ic tion for
safE~guards should
' ...

dorries~

, tic nLlcleal

--review the' nuclt:ar safeguards plan to be submitted by


th~ Executive Branch to assure that an adequate system
is developled which d'eters 'and investigates ,thefts, or .
diversions of nlJclea'r materials.

--request that the FBI .and DOE's Office of Inspector


General cornplet:.~ their invte~tigations, of the NUMEC in
cident as soon as possible and s.ubmit their reports to'
the carom i t 1::ee~s
These reports sh'ould bE~ .reviewed, to determine the ,adequacy of

the inv~stigations"and their implications for developing a

more E~ffective future systern.

The committees should not~ that with the passage of time

it is difficult te> C'oncll~sively dE~terrnine what specificall'y

happened at NUMEC. However,. the important point to remember

is th a t we should us,e t.h is' lesson and mak4~ cer ta in that the

Na t ion develops an. adeqruC! te de teet: ion and follow-up sys ~em to

deter future nuclear. thefts or diveision.

AGENCY COMMENTS

DOE's comment.s on the report are con1:ained in a letter


dated July 25, 1978. (See appendix II.) DOE agreed with the
thrust of the rel?ort,1l However, it. disagrE~ed with .our recom
mendat.ion concerning the nee~d to enter into a formal intera
gency agreement with NRC, the; FBl, and thE~ CIA for more timely
and effective actionin i.nvestigating incidents of suspected
or real diversions ot nuclear materials. DOE states in its
letter that a comprehe'nsive plan and a menlorandum of

(,~'-~
f
. ":\.~

0~_

COl16225~1

understanding with thle FBI already existE~d .for .joint ..responses


to nuclear threat situations.
Further, DOE' stated' t'hat it .ha=:.
open channels of cO~[1m1Jnicati6n to otnerc~aencies, incl u<i .inc
the CIA, for the exchange of information ~ertinent to nucl~ar

threat situations.

These factors were known to us and are c6mmendable.

The

cur ren t memor andu:m o'f under stand in9 betwe en DOE and the FBI
is the beginning of an effectiv'e r"esponse pl.an to incidents
o f n u c 1 ear d i v e r s ion, :b u t i t ,i sin la de qua t e sin c e i t doe s not
include CIA part,ic'ipation and' cooperation. Without a formal

interagency agreement placing positive reporting and investi


gative responsibilities on DOE, NRC, FBI, and the tIA along
the lines recommended by GAO; we.t~lieve the possibility
exists for a re~etitio~ of' the I3-year NUMEC investigation.
The comments received. from thE~ CIA are contained in' a

letter dated September 1, 1978. (See appendix III.) The

letter tak~s no isslle \iith the facts or ~,ecommendations in-'

eluded. in ~he repc>rt:.


It does, however, :pbint out some CIA

concerns about certain information in the report.

We bel ieve trLa t. ttte


addressed in the ['e:p'Q'rt.

CIt~ IS

concerns hl:1ve been adequa tely

However',- we did not specifically

address the CIA's

conce~rns regardi.ng its degree of coopera

tion with DOE and the FBI on the alleged l~UM~C incident.

In its letter the crA disagreed. with the statement in


the report. indicat.in9. t.hat t~hey failed to cooperate w.ith DOE
and the FBI.
The CI~~ b'ased the dlsagreemE!nt on the. fact that
its officials briefed a, large numbter of oj:ficials in the exec
utive and legislative branctles .of Government on the NUMEC mat
ter in 1976 and 1977.

We were aware that such briefings were provided. How

ever, we believe tha~ sinc~ the' briefings'were provided 4 to"

6 years.after some of the key infdrmation was developed their

utility in h~...Q.-.t.~(e"SQIY:,e the NUME.C mG~tter was greatlY]

dirnini~

~~: E.O.13~_6_]

ThiS information was not passed on to DOE or the FBI accord


ing to the officials we' contacted in those ~gencies. However,
we believe it must be pDinted out t~at the current officials
we interviewed said that such. documents were not known to
exist within the CIA.
The Department'of .Justice and the FBI did nO.t furnish

formal written comments. We provided them more than 3 months

to do So, a time period longer than that provided DOE, CIA,

and NRC.. Wh i 1 e w'e did no t hi3:ve thlE~ .benef.i t 0 f off ic ial

29

..

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C01162251

\',

..,:.~::

written comments fronl the Departlnent of Justice and t'h'e FBI


in preparing thE~ fincil' re:I;)Ort, "r,7(~ did c:Jnside,r the view's 'ana
com~nent,s

of

th,e FBI staff famil.i.c:lr' with the alleged NU~LEC

incident.
NR'C had no co'~ment on the content of the report.

How

ever, the Commissi6n did 'state that the recommendations to


the Heads of

A~~enc ies

appear s r E~asqnablE~.

(See append ix , IV. ) ,

\.

,;

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COl162251

CHAPTER 5
SCOPE OF REVIEt\
I

. _. . . . _ _

We obtained the information c6ntained in this re~o.rt by


reviewing documents, reports, correspondence, and other re~~
ords of the former AEC and ERDA, and DOE and ~RC. We also

interviewed officials at
--DOE head.quarters, Washington, D.C., and Germantown, .
Maryland;

---CIA headquarters, Langley,. Vir.gin.iai


--FBI headquar ter s, Wash ington ~ D. C.I ;
--NRC headquar 'ter s, Bethesdal, Maryl,~nd; and

--many othe r

1()cl3 t

C()~..n try.

ions across t.he

Because we werE~ tinable' to obtain' SOllrce documents from


some of the organizations involved in the~ matter', we conducted
extens i ve in terv iews \ i th former ,2nd cur tent Gover nmen t agen.cy
employees about their knowledge of the incident. We' also in
terv iewed peopl e. outsi'de 0 f t'he Governmen t hav ing an invel ve
ment with the NUM.EC eI;)eratilon. Specifically, we contacted 42

former and currertt employees of DOE and NRC. We contacted. 12


former and current official,s of the Department of' Justice a.nd
the FBI, 11 from thE~' CIA, and 20 ()ther individuals ,. including
7 people that formerly worked at NUMEC. Our interviews were
with those most kno't~'ledgeable of the incident at all levels
of these org'anizations, including the for'mer Chairrn'an of AEe,
two former AttornE~Ys GE~ne'ral of ttJ1E~United States, the presi
dent of NUMEC, formE~r ,lnd current J;,reside:,tial aides, and
FBI/CIA/DOE i.nves ti~Ja t.()r s.
(See clppend ix ~ for a summary
listing of indiviciuclls contacted during our review.)
We believe we conducted the most thorough and complete
investigation Possible under the Severe limitations imposed
on us by several Federal agencies.

31

COl162251
I

"

.~ .J. , .~.;
,,,'."1

1;

~$Q

APPENDIX I

A?PE~:D!X

',','

SUMMj~RY

".,,;-.,,".-.1'''''

LIST OF INDIVIDUALS

(:O!'1T.A~CTED IN

PREPARING REPORT

AEC/_ERDAL~2Q~

former Crlairman, Age


2 former Commissioners~' AEC

14 former staff IYlembe'rs" ,AEC/ERDA


13 current staff rne~b~rs, DOE

.~/::?):\ij

CIA

Current.Director
General Counsel

. ,..

1 former Director
'2 former Deputy Directors
6 cur~~nt staff members

;.::".,

NRC

1 former Chairman
5 former staff member~
6 current staff members
DOJ

.;

Current Atto:rn.:~y l:;eneral


2 former Attorneys General
3 staff attorneys

..

FBI
3 former agents
3 current agE~nt:s

NUMEC
Former President c)f cornpany
Fa rmer Vice Pre~s iden t of com~pany
Former Treasure!r c>f cornpany
Former Secretary' of cornpany'

:3 former emp1oy'lees

JCAE
:2 former executivE' staff

dire~ctors

~
~

..

'

'C01162251

.~

APPENDIX I

Senate Select Intelliqen'ce


--_._--------_
....._._---_
..

APP:JGIX I.

Committee"

1 current staff lnember

Others
PresidE~ntial aides
Penns~rlvanici Depart;nent

6 former and current

2 staff Illembers
aneJ Taxa t ion

'of Revenue

1 staff member U' s. S~~cur it ies and~xchange Cornmiss ian


1 official ()f. Mellon Bank, Pittsburqh, Penns'ylvania
II

-.

33

SteR:tl

, C 0 11 ~) 2 2 5 1

~"""ET
~L:~-......
i\P? =::. J

APPENDIX I1:

:~.':

(.i~~~ --.:-._.

' ~~ ..~,.~

.~

~~

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l.~:'.":'.;.~.

~Ji;t.\....

Department of Ener!~IY .'

'J/ashington, D.IC. 2 D5,45

July 25, 1978

Mr. Monte Canfield, .Jr.,

D1r~ctor

Energy and ~1iner~l1s Division

U" s. General Acc:~ount~in.g Office

Washington~ D.C. 20548

..

Dear Mr. Canfield:


Thank you for the opportunity to revi.ew and cOtJunent on the GAO draft

rE!pOI-t enti t led "Nu,~ lear Dive'rsion it1L the U.s. - 13 Years of Con

tradiction and Confusic)':1. u

In. our July 21, 1978 met~ting '\"ith Mr'~' J. Howard', and ot:~er members of your
staff, we disc.ussed \Jur conmel1ts and conc.erns ~'ith the draft report as
written. As the result: of our meeting, we under~tand that certain changes
are to bE~ made which will point out that DOE ha.s made significant improve
merits in strength~~ning past: safeguard policies and pt:actices since 1965. .
We also understand that the report will be clarified in other 'respects
~onsis t en t wi th our (:e>Imnents furnished under separate cover.
However,
we are concerned that: t.he reade'rs of 'the report an~ its recoimnendation
might obtain an incorrect impression 01:' DOEf,s ability to respond to
threats or incide~ts of suspected or real theft or diversion of nuclear

material (SNM).
DOl~ responds in a very timely and eE!ctive'manner to terrorism threats
and incidents of s:uspected or real diversions O'C thefts of nuclear
materials in ~he' U.S'I 1Ne have a comprehensive plan and a'memorandum of
understanding with the FBI for joint responses 1:0 nucl'ear threat situations.
We also have cleat' and IJpen channels to other agencies such as the ,CIA and
NRG for the exchange of infonnation pe:rtinent to potential nuclear thef.t,
alleged black market incidents 'involvi.ng SNM, etc. Further t we .have an
arrangement with the:' FBI to pr()vide fonnal irt-sE~rvice tra1n,ing for' agents'
in the technical and sci,~ntifi(:: sophistications .relevant to nuclear in'"
vestigaticJns. NRC ha.s fully p',articipated in thi.s program. Also, we have
briefed Congress in somE~ detail on various aspec.ts of our emergency pr~'p'aredness and r~sp,orlse p~:"ogram4' Information on our emergency preparedness
and response program, :ineluding our fonnal policies and procedures, con
tinues to be ava:il,ablt~, for revtew by your representatives.

34

mKt

CO 116L:251

...

~.

APpr:nnr:{ I:

Mr. Honte Canfield, Jr.

~;./ ..: ~.~;~, -".~, ,

APPENDIX I I

July 25,1978

The thrust of the reccmunendations concerning investigation of threats was


clarified during our discussion to "Lpply to after-the-fact resolution of'
reasons for or eauses: of, threat 'ind:tc:ations. ,It is p~p.osed that these
recommendations' be, re:~lt'ated to'mak'e c:lear that they are directed to .agencies ,
other th~n DOE cind not 't:o DOE or it~s; ability to investigate' and respond to
threats or diversic)ns of: SNM in a t:i.1nely and effective manner.

Since'rely; .
t

Y:~~f/J4i.; .

Fred L.'Uiser, Director


Division of GAO Liaison
Office oj: the Controller

35

.~

"",

C01162251
~.:7i

~t,JO~~
~"~ ,t

:'\PPEll [' I ~.' I 1=

(U1ii:',

APPENDIX III.

''':on t,w

111tt:i.:I~,l'f'll'A~'l'11~\
. . .I t .

,10

'

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~~<"

Wd....,'~.O C 20505

S~ptember

1978

The Honorable Elmer Staats

Comptroller General of the United States

Washington, D.C. '

Dear Elmer.

In the period August 1977 to Augu~t 1978 CIA was iTI sustained con

tact with the General Ac:counting Office (GAO) concernin! its current

investigation of~nuclear' mat,er'ials unaccounted for from the facilities

of the Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corporc3.tion (NUMEC) "Of Apollo, .

Pennsylvania. We believe that this dialogue has contributed to GAO's

understanding of some of t~le kE~y issues that eire touched on, in the GAO

report titled, IINuclear Di Vl:lrS;lon in the UnitE!d 'States? Thirteen' Years'

of Contl"'adiction and Confusion." One needs tC) note, however, that the

issues that have been of pr'imaY'y intere.st to CiAO


its present investi-.

gation find their origins in a complex situation that first cam~.to the

attention of the United States Government in 1965. As a r~sult, while

it is a~~reed that the nu,clecir material that hals been unaccounted for

s ; nee 1965 is uran i um- 235, ;j t ; s 1ess cl ear~ d1espi'te 1en~thy ; nves ti ga

tions and inspections conducted at different t.imes over the past

thirteen years 'by GAO, the FBI and DOE, as to what actually happened

to this uranium. In view of these circumstances. CIA officers have

spent a subs tanti a1 numbE~r of' hours duri ng several di ffel"'ent meetings

in recent weeks in review;n9 with GAO personnel a number of factual

errors and m;sun'derstand~ings in the earlier versions of '~:he draft

report which were eventucll1y eliminated. We find, howevE~r, that the

tone of the GAO repo rt sug gE~S ts a 1ess than fo'rthr1 ght, approach to the

NUMEC i'ssue by CIA. Insc)far as this agencY"srole in thi's matter is

concerned, which is all tha~: 'we can address, this report creates' an

unfortunate and inaccurate ":mpr~~ssion 1~hich in our' view c:annot be sub- .

stantiated by the facts alS ~ie hlive been 'ab1e tlJ reconstruct them.

This jUdgment leads us , ther',e'fol"e, to corrrnent 'in ,the following para

graphs on our react; ons t.o the GAO report befol'-e it is JD(l,de fina 1.

in

The circumstances surrounding the identification ofnuclear

materials unaccounted for, when combined with media speculations on

what may have h.appened to th'i s materia'il, have Jenerated a number of

a11 egat; ons. It is; mpo rtant tel note, therefor'e t that 'e IA' 5 .,

knowledge of those events which could in any way impact on these

WA~N'NG

NQT1CE

II

OCltliTi.~~.,

srrrvr INTnUGfNCE' !OUJt:CU

------_.........

A~P,

5 i gne r

ft"l,' f,."~ "".,01

4.lotlirl.t~~I1".;;.;I ,. f.O. 11'.

_em"." ICt\~

"4flHOf)$ lNVOl Vf~

Ailtetn_ t ie-lly "~M ~."

36

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C011 52251
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lj

APPE;-'JDIX I I I

APPENDIX III

allegations stems from this clgency's pursui.t of foreign. intelligence

and counterintelligence objectives 'which deal with the issues of


worldwide nuclear proliferation. In short~ CIAls .interest in intelli

gence and counterintell igencie matters enab.les 1ft to comment on events


in overseas areas to include the making of estimates about the growing

capabil;ties of foreign countries in the nuclealr arena. This situation


has been explained to the GAO investigators on severa1 different
occasi ons The GAO repo rt imp 1 i es. however, th'at there w,as a CIA
estimate on the alleged NlJMEC diversion which was never admitted to

I;},(\:::.<::~
";

.;.

'.

~.,

'J

- .' .

I'.

by this agency.

o;n~

The GAO citE~s a newspaper article to buttress this

~ This
braf passage was \ontained iin an overall 'estimate on nuc'lear pro
liferation worldw;<!e.

Despite the availability of this background

information. the GAO report CIPts to leave this issue factually unclear.

In a policy sense the ke~)' alle'g"ations that 'continue to circulate'


relative to the material unacl:ourltedfor are:

a. The material was illegally diverted to Israel by


NUMEC's management for use in nuclear we~pons.
b.

The material was d1~erted to Israel by NUMEC's


with the a:ssistance .of the CIA.

management

c.' The material was diverted to Israel with the


acquiescence of the Uni~~d St~tes Government.
d.

There has been a cover-up of the NUMEC incident

by the United States Government involving a President

of the United States.

CIA.has no IIhard i'nteltligencl~'1t 'concerning .the allegat'ions outlined


in subparagraph a above. It ~~as CIA. however, w'hich reque~ited an FBI
investigation as early as 196f~!.r

rDeSpite this historical


. record, ft1s implied in the GIAO r"eport that CIA .failed to cooperate
with United'States officials . . ,!ho ~/ere concerned 'with the NUMEC case.
We believe the facts of the ma.tteY" argue otherwise. Of par'ticular note
in this regard is the reality thalt since the NUMEC case was reopened in
1976 by Presidential direction, a, large number of officials in the
executive and legislative branche's have been brilefed on NUfJ:EC-related.
developments by CIA. The DOE 'ind FBI officia--ls \~ho received these CIA
briefings as of 1976 stated thcit 'It'hile more infonnation was now

:17

~g

'1

I 25Xl, KO.13526

CO 1162:2 51

~~~r:"
~.[.t.r~
APPENDI:',

~~

? P. E:>'! DI :.: I I !

Israf~ll i DucJear developh'~ents than had bee~ th~ cas~ ~n

new ; nforma t ; On d'l d not change the thrust of thel r earl' er

avai lable on
1968, the

conclusions concerning the'previous

allega~ions

of a diversion.

\.,
~;

GAO has also beenladv;sed, repE~atedly, that CIA has no informa

ticn that would substantiate the allegations outlined in subpara

graphs b~ c and d.

Also of concern to us is the GAO ~llegation that CIA c~anged its


pas it; on on the a11 e g,ed di vers i on of nuc1ear mater.; a1s. Thi s 's; tuati on
1

resulted from GAO participation in Bln August 1977 meeting at which they
were given an oral briefing on Israeli nuclear developments and how
these might impact an GAOs NUMEC investigation. The participants at
~he briefing, were retired and active~ duty CIA 6fficers..
The retired ,
employee spoke f'r'om memory on past events WitJ10ut, the benefit. of access
to file~data. Thf~' current employees talked primarily from.data that
had bee~ retrieved frl)m the' fil~s. s'ince the princ.;pal briefer had not
been a firsthand participant in monitlJring Israeli ~uclear developments
in the 1~65 to 19]5 pf!riod. The GAO report tends to cooming1e the
re'su1ts of what was Stlid at that rrieet'ing by both the retired employee
and by the current e~)loyees'into one official CI~ position. Thi~. in
our view. is n()t cl proper ;nvestigat'tve technique, for it creates con
fusion where therE~ should be none. In short~ :he retired Official
ta 1ked fram memory ,and i'n so do; ng surfaced da~~a that 't:Ias not ,recorded
ei ther in our C'uryent fi 1 or in our institut'ional memory.' This new
material was not c:hal"'enged ,at the time' it was presented. but subse
quent checks reveallled that siome of it could ,not be confirmed by docu
mentary data.. Thi s does. n'ot mean thE~ infonnat~ion as ,stated was not
true. It simply r'leflE~cts, 'a 'situation in which file data on this topic
has proven to be less than' adequate. 'In' addition. the reti,red' employee
mentioned one or t'fi() items that subslequent chec:ks revealed were garbled.
Although this entire ~~tter 'has been explained to GAO investi9ato~s"
and we have made the pO;'nt thatthe lkey issue in this dialogue hinges
on the semanti c pr()b lem concerning the use of t.he tenn "evidence, the
reader of the CiAO l'-epart is 1eft wi th the imprE:ssion that GAO does not
ful'ly accept, this explanation. This in turn raises a question of con
tradictions when in fact there' is'none.

es

II

We are of the opini'on tha't part of the "confusion and contradicti.on u


refle~ts the results of investigators talking
to emp 1oyees 'of ot:rle,r agenci es whof\Cl.A di d not brief on ; ts knowl edge of
Israeli nuclear devell:)pments. If thE~ employee contacted by GAO did 'not
have access to hisor~~lan'ization's fil,e:s or did not recall, a past event
involving CIA acti,()n. the GAO report makes it appear that CIA was either
remiss in not brie4f'in9 the employeeol 'r is 'not r1ecounting past events
accurately. This is d distorti~n that rieeds to be corrected, for~hen

recorded in the GAO'report

38

~~I

C01162251
I....

~',

t _

~~.GI~~

...:

..:..:

. 1 ,

APPENDIX III

.... ! ." ..

APPE~,~DI::

25Xl, E.O.13526 ]
[--CiA briefed an individual FBI

Or'

'DOE

emp'l()yee~ we ~_,ere pass,ing infor

mation to the institution that w'as involvHd and not the individual.
If. in sUbsequent per'i ad:; ~ the i nstitutiofl s current emp 1oyees cannot
,retrieve ,this d,ata or th~~y do not have acc:ess to it within their
organi2ation this fa(:tor sho,uld in our view not bE~' stated or impl ied
as a shortfa 11 in CIA pr()l:edures or openrless in dea 1 i ng wi-th other
C

ag,encies.
.

~~

'

..

, The GAO report ac:cur-cltely states thclt its officers were denied

access to documents...c----

-'"

'

".,'''''.
:;".", ~/: ~

~_~_
~
I It shoul d
be stated in the repoT't ~,ith equal vigor that congressional staffers
directly engaged in the NUMEC case did subsequently review relevant CIA
files and others, includirlg GAO, were ver'bally briefed on CIA's knowl

edge of pert; nent e'ven ts .

"

..

'

The GAO report ma~~es a nu.mber of rec:onmendatiol1s.' We cannot fore


see how these will be acted on by those 'who have the 'responsibility to
consider these key points. CIA remains fully'awa,re, however. of the
need to cooperate with th,ose in the United States who have 'the legal
mandate to investigate nuclear material unaccounted for. We will ful
fill this respons"ibility l,fJhi')e simultaneously meeting our obligations
to protect sources and methods .
'As a final point, let me say that my staff is looking at the
qU'estion of what porti()n of the GAO report can be dE'classified. We
will be in touch wit~~ou~- associates on '!:hismatter' in' a rom t manner.

I,.,.

___-----'

~
'~%

Yours,.

~;

STANSFIELD TURNER

[ 25Xl, E.O.13526 ]

39

.SEGaq

I ZI

COl ~1 6 ~~ 2 5 1

APPENDIX IV

APPE~~DIX

...
~~...... ~l
~\'.

\,..~ IUCu~

"'0

..~~~I ~
-..

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY CC.MMrsslqN ..

If'',+

.WASHIN(;lON. O. C. 20!i55

.,r.

JUL I 3 1978

')

Mr. Monte tanfield, Jr~t Director


Energy and Minerals Division
U. S. General Accounting Office

Washington, DC 20548

J ..

..

Dea~ Mr. Canfield:


SUBdECT:

GAD DRAFT ,REPORT, "NUCLEAR DIVERSION IN THE US?

13 YEARS

OF CONTRADICTION AND CONFUSION" (SECRET/NSI)

The Nuclear ReJulatory Comniss;cln has no I:onments on the content


of the report. Th,e recormlendations to Hel:ids of 'Agencies appe~rs
reasonable.
Si ncerel~f t

._ .......
}

~
",

,~~V':. C,

'-"iee V. Gnssick

ExecutivE! Director

for
(30513)

of

I~.,7

'

40:

''Sltmq

OpE~rat;ons

t,1 ,~ I I 1rr

c () 11
6:2 2 5 1 :
, .

".~

p"

II

';

...

F \:a::
:
APP'NDI~; ,v..~t

P, ,.\' 't ~

,-,.-

-;~'~~~

1,

i" ....-1,. ~ ~ if T" n,t\~ t i_ ,

.~... ;...., l~....'


r'" ;, ~ ,., "" l' r" 1'"'
:"
~ 4 'II

~ ~

;~.:

i ,~1

~..

... - ' . ' ....

_.~

APPErJDIX V

,J

....... #

.. -.":.... 1

FE:Drua.r~~'

8, "19if

!!_/t .y./i~c=~ _r-

~}

t~

Honorable Elmer 13., Sta'at..s

Comptroller GeneJ:"al of t:he

, Uni ted States

Washington, D. c.,
:20548

..

.~ :' ~ ~

.. ,

.~.

. ::.:lt~:-rt

Dear Mr. Staats:


This'is in I.~es;l)onse to yo"Llr letter to, me, dated
December 16,. 1977, J:.aequesting .:l(~cess to records , reports
and files in the pc"ssession of this Department which relate
to the Niclear Ma~te]~ials and E(~\liprnent Q:lrporat'ion ' (NUMEC)
of Apollo, Penns)"lvcLnia. Your inquiry into this matter was
at the re~uest of: Crlairman Di~~E!ll of the House Subco~ittee
on Energy and PO~'ler. You also ,request1ed to be infonned of
th~ scope of our in\restigation clnd the estimated date of its
completion.

I ..

1.

As 'y.ou may kliO~~', in resporlse to a similar ,request from


Chainnan Dingell, ,tb,e Deputy Att:o~ney, c;eneral informed him,
by letter Idated S4~pt~ember 8,' 1977,' tha':'Depar'bnent policy'
has been to provicle oral briefings by' i:he FBI to Congressional
comrnittees which lla"V'e' inquired a.bout tl'lis matter. Such: a
briefing was of'feJred t:o Chai~a~:n DingeJ~l

...

... ;~I.

.The recent mE!e"t:ing of FBI ,represerltatives with Mr.


Canfield, DirectoJ:" c:Jf' the GAO Energy' aILd Minerals Division
and, members of hi:s) l,;taff, to which you refer in your letter,
was in ,fact, a brile~f;:in9 by the FBI as a resul t of the Acting
~omptroller Generi:ll 'l s lette'r to me of A.ugust 30, 1977.

.,

.,.

41

{'~I
.' . '

n (r ... n :: ~ r.
_

-:

.,

C()116L251

APPENDIX V
~ .

APPENDIX V

In

\rie\w

of

th~::' ::~:c::

t~.=.:, C)~:~

i:l've:::-:i'S=::' tic:"". i:-. ~=

.:.:.~s

a~ ~ct a~l~ 'to accede ~o ~o~~


req'uest 'lat this t:_rnt::;.
Co~siceration \:il1, at :::=~rsE,. .D=
'gi ven to your req:uE~st: . upon the conc1U5 ion of o'..:~ inves tiga

matter is

continuin~~ I

tion.
I am unable tC) estimate when . the:~nvestigation will be
concluded. You rna~r :oe', assured., howeveJ~, that it is being
carried out as eXF)E~{I.itiously as possibJ.e.

1,'

'.

,". ~ ,"

.. ,

YClurs sincerely,

.
.

'"

t~

.~,,,,,-

-...

..
42 '

.......

-_._--.-------

~.(~

Gr~ffin B. Bell.
Attorney General

~.~.

,~

;.,

.,
....
~.

,.,1\

~;

IIIII'__------~l:::S~ZG911 O~'

Intera~ency
(U

Int'()l'll1dt ion Security Ch(~rsight (Hlicc

7()(l f\:nn:')~ I\ an ia /\\el1ue. N, \\'" .Rnonl 100

.~\IB.!J~~
IrH~'\RI

Securit)' (]assitic;ation Appeals J>:anel

D.C', :204()8
Ickphone: (20:2) 357-5:~5()
la\: (202 357-)907
\\;.l~,hin~t()n.

\IE'\,I OF DFFF'''E

\1h..lta-:llllt:'~llh

IHP \lfl \H.\T OF .Jl SII( L


\1:11 k,.\ Hr;ldl-:\
IH P\KI \IF'\ I OF ~,IYI~.
\1ar~~Jld P (JI:lt-:I,1
OFFI( L OF TilE DIRF( '1 OR fH
\\110' \1. I\TEl.I.ICE'\CE

I>mail: i :o;cap(lnara.go\

L\F('I TI\t: SE( RE'l\R)


.1('11111 P htzp;llIlck
I )11".'Cl,1{
I\FOR\L\ no\ ~;E( IRIT'
O\TRSICHT OFFI< 'F

l ,'1'111 ")1,)JlC

\\'110'\ .\1. ARCHI \ES .\' D


RE(ORDS .\D\II'I~TR\TIO',
\hl'ryl.1 Slh:llhL'l~cl

''\.\ 1'10\.\1, SECt RIT\


( 01 'CII. S I\FF
.1,.111\ \\, fId,lIn. Ch;111

March

18~

2014

Grant I:'. Smith


Director
Institute for Research: 1\1iddle l~astern Policy
Calvert Station
P. O. Box 32041
Washington~ DC 20007
Dear Mr. Smith:
Please be advised that the Interagency Security Classification Appeals J:lanel (ISCAP) has
concluded its consideration of the I11andatory declassification revie\\r appeal filed by you and that
the 60-day period during which an agel1CY head may appeal an ]SCAP <.iecision to the P'resident
has expired. Enclosed are copies of the documents and a chart that outlines the ISCAP decisions
with the e~~ception of a:ny inforrnation that is otherwise aut110rized and "varranted for withholding
under applicable la\v~ \ve are releasillg all infor:mation declassified by tIle ISCAP to you.. If you
have questions about trlis appeal~ pllease contact Neena Sachdeva or 'William C. Carpenter at
" '-7 -,)-/-0
.... 'j.)
.... )
.
(..../0/)

Sincerely~

l.l.,I'"' 1;?/!,7.

L/'V /'t/C.<;t~~

I~

c/1..

-I.'.ut-

/~~~
e:.
... - ~

JOHN HITZPATI~JCI<~
.Executive Secretary

Enclosures

-2
cc:

Mr. Charles I>iercy [I~etter \\lith Chart]


E~xecutive for Bllsiness Support Services
l'~ational Archives and Records Adlllinistratio11
~v1r.

Joseph Lambert [Letter and C:hart arld Docun1ent]


I)irector, Information Management Services
<=entral Intelligence Agency rvIember to the ISC=A~P
Mr. David Stamlope [Letter v\i'ith Chart and I)ocumlent]
j\cting Director
Jim:my Carter Presidential Library and l\1useulm

ISCAP DECISION ON rrH:E

I)E(:LASSIF'ICATION :REVIEW APPEAL FILED BY

MR GRANT F. SMITH

MANDL~~rOR\r

IDENTIFYING
NUMBERS

DESC:RIPTION IOF
D()CUMENT

Smith,
doculnerlt No.1

Action Memorandum [for


Zbignie\vBrzezinski]

ISCAP l'~o.
2012-167

July

29~

ACTION

DECLASSIF'IED THE DOCUMENT


IN 11'S ENTI]{ETY

1977

1 page

Carter ljbrary
NSA Staff Files

lJnmarked

~JlJME(:

M:lJF

l~ uclear Materials and

E:quipment IC:orporation
~;faterial s Lr naccounted For]

Smit]l~
I

document No.2
ISCAP l'Jo.
2012-167

DECLASSII~IEDTHE

DOC'UMENT

IN II'S ENTLRETY

"t'Jovember 27, 1979

Carter L-ibrary
NSA Staff Files

1 page
C:onfidential
-_.

Smith,
document No.3

Israel and MUF [Materials


1JnacCouIlted For]

ISCAP ~No.
2012-167

July 28, 1977


3 pages

Carter l.library
NSA Staff Files

DECLASSI]~IED SOME PC>RTIONS


AND AFFIFlMED THE
CLASSI1~ICj\ TION OF OTHER
PORTIO-NS

E.O. 13526 3.3(b)(1) and 3.3(b)(6)

'rop Secret

as 25Xl and 25X6

Smith,
document No.4

Nuclear ~I1UF [Materials


UnacCouIlted For]

ISCi\P No.
2012-167

i\Ugust

DEC:LASSIFIED SOME PC)RTIONS


i\NI) AF'FI]~_MED THE
CLASSLFIC:~A. TION OF OTHER
PORTIONS

._

Carter Ljbrary
NSA Staff Files

2~,

1977

3 pages
Top Secret - Restricted I)ata

l_.

E.O. 13526 3.3(b)(1) and 3.3(b)(6)


as 25X1 and 25X6
Some infonnation remains \vithheld as
Restricted I)ata under the statutory
authority of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954, as arrlended and regulations
issued ullder the Act.

IDENTIFYING

DF:SCRIPTION OF

NUMBERS

DOCUMENTI

Smith~

ACTION

AEC l.icenses

doculnerlt No.5

DEC:LASSIF'IED THE DOCUl\1ENT


IN II'S ENTIRETY

ca. 197'7

ISCAP 1'~0.
2012-167

1 page
lJnmarked

Carter Library
NSA Staff Files

Smith~

Your I\;1eeting with [Carl]


Duckett

documellt No.6
ISCAP 1~0.
2012-167

Novenlber 3, 1978
3 pages

Carter Library
NSA Staff Files

l'op Secret - Restricted Data

IDECLASSII~IED

SOME PO,RTIONS
,AND AF]?IR~MED THE
,CLASSIF'ICATION OF OT1-!ER
PORTIONS
E.O. 13526 3.3(b)(1) and 3.3(b)(6)
as 25X1 and 25X6
Some inf()mlation remains \vithheld as
Restricted Data under the statutory
authority of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954, as amended and regulations
issued under the Act.

Smith~

Memorandum for the Attorney


(ienera.!

docume'nt No.7

20~

ISCAP ~\To.
2012-167

Novernber

Carter ljbrary
NSA Staff Files

'rop S,ecret

Smith~

Diversion. of Nuclear Material


to Israel

DECLASSI]~IED THE

IN

DOC:UMENT

rrs E'NTIRETY

1978

1 page~:

document No.8
ISC}\PNo.
2012-167

Novernber 6, 1978
1 page

Carter Ljbrary
KSA Staff Files

'Top Secret
-

DEC:LASSIFIED THE DOC:UMENT


IN rrSEN1'IRETY

-~o

....

0[-:- ~ l~~~~4~Ai~S:~~~~

I,

, 44Z--F.l , --c

1'HE 'Iv/HITE HOlJSE

;/

~?

WI\.SHiN'(iTON

,J--"'"

J ul y Z 9 ~

1 97 7

ACTION

'"

ME~40RA~DUM I~OR:

ZBiGNIEVl

FROM~

JERR y

.....

'"

'

BE{ZE~~INSKI

SCHE(:TE~R

CongrE~ssman John D. Dingell (D., Mich.) callc:d to !"eport

in very indigr:lant tones that he is ~ttrou.bled\1 about investigat~ons

of Materials Una(:counted For (MU}~).


He is insisting that two

of his staffers ClrL the :Ene::-gy and Power StLbcQm.m.ittee~ be

briefecl ana ~se'ries of matters relating to jMUF,particularly

the NlJME'C plan.t 'in Apollo,) Fennsylvania.


D~ngell saLid he

was told by .E:Br)~A that only GAO' .and ..l~E(; have inves1:igated

the ca:3e.
Howe~\,r'6r) he s aid he understan.ds both the FBI'

and tb.l~ CIA ~lave been involved.


H.e says line kno~rs" that

the F.EjI has been involved in investi.gations of special nQll

clea:raJ:lces, and tbat the CIA ~ras involved in passing on these

clea:r.anc es.

Dingell implied tb.a.t th1e CTA \vas In'vol~~ed in the Apollo c'ase.. .

He als 0 S a.id thE~! e is,a question of w'len the NRC learned

about the Apollo MUF.


He ha,s requested tha.t tw'O of the

Subco!'l:'lmittee sta,ers, Michael Ward and ])onna Levigne iTom

the G~~O be b:riefed by the NSC.


I tol(:1 hiIn I woulJ call'him

early ~~ext week~, but ~ade no comrnittnent whatsoever other

tha.n t~) get bctck to hin'1...

REC01\11v1ENI)A 1'ION:

A sk Ding ell for a lett::I'

on thi smatter
,

Agree to

hav~~ J~'lch-'"'Ilan

brief the stafferg


DE('L:\SSIIF1ED L~DER ..\LTHOIRITY ()F THE
I\TE R.A(; E:'~(~\' SE(~L RIT\' ('LASSI FI(~,.\TIO:\ .-\ P'PE.-\LS P.-\:\ EL~
F.(). 13526~ SEC1'I():\ 5.3(b)(3)

Other
./

cc: J es sica. Tuchman

l/'/

IS(':\P .\PPE:\L :\(). 2012-167~ dOC'Ulllcnt no. 1


DE('L:\SSI FI('.-\Tll():\ 0.-\ TE: 'larch 18~ 201 ~

--NO. 44Z-- F' .3

UC\ .l~.~~l~

/"

1~:~0PM

r)

802

OVL1Vlje~:~(

MEMOR.;\NDUM

NATI{)NAL SECURITY COUN'CIL

~ENTIAL
....

""I

~7

"- ,

1979

ACTION
.:1EMOPA1rDUM FOR:

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM:

JERRY CH?L!NGER

SUBJEC1: :

)IUMEC MUF~

',J

-z. $"""2- - ~ 7"6 ~

I have a Top Se(:ret rnemara.nd-J-'n fraIn you to the ?I~esident


August~ 1977} concerning the
above subject, i.e., missing ~uclear material from the
NUMEC F>lant in .~pollo, Pa.
It repc)rts. everyth~ng Jessica
was able to learn abou~ this matter in briefings by ERDA,
FEI, ar:~d the CI.~. ~

written by Jessica Mathews in

Senator Glenn has for some time been pressing John Deutch
of DOE for his views on this matter. Since John will be
speakir:~g for the Ad."ninistration, hE: and I believE~ i t is
importc~nt tha the should know the c;c)nt.ents of i:h~ memorandurr\
i~ order to avoid stepping into unknown pitfal~s in this

sensiti.ve mat.te.r. (~

~/OU

my

authori~~(e

me t.o all()w Deutch to

office. (tJ)

Appr'ove _ ,

Dis a.pprc1ve

./

~~

~
.

~
DEC~L:\SSIFIED l'~DER

_"\l'TI--()RJTY OF THE

I~TER;\.(;E:\C~\SE(~I'RIT\r 'CLASSIFIC:'A.TIO~A.PPE.-\I~S P:\~EL~

E.O.

lJ526~ SE(~TI()\

5.J(b)(J)

IS(' .-\ P .\ PPE:\ L \ (). 20 12-1 67 ~ doc II nl en t no. 2


DECLASSIFIC'.\TIO\ 0.-\ TE: \Ianch 18~ 2014

Review i 1/27 1185

q
"---

NO'lem.be~

RECO~1M:E:NDATIC'N:
Tha t
read tile merncrandurn in

GC~.10.20:2

NO.449

2:2S;::JI~

P.l

1? OF 8118 ftE'f /SE~~SITI'),'~ - XGDS

MEMOR.~NDUM

_.--'"'

N.~TIONAL SF,CURIT~(

COtJNCIL

'J\.lly 28, 1977'

ME:MC'RANDl}M

:E~()R:

JESSICA. T tJ(:HMAN .

FROM:

JOHN MARCTJMp.!-

SU:E~JE;CT ~

Is rael and 11UF

Tea Sc:hac'~le'Y c~i.J.led, tOI:lay on a s eCU.Te line andproviclea the following


res'.?orlSeS to (jur' inquiries of yesterday:

-----------J

E.0.. 13526
Q
25Xl~

------------

DEC'L..\SSIFIED l':\DER .-\LTHORIT\' OF THE


l:\rrEI~A.GE~C'\SECl'RIT\7 ('I~:\SSIFI(":\1'10':\ .\PPE.-\LS

1: 0 P Sl: G ptE T'; S}~:N SIT I~'IE _ XG !)8 E.(). 13526~ SIE(~TI()' 5.3( b )(3)
,

IS(' .\ PAP PE.-\ L ~ (). 20 12-1 67~ doc lun en t no. J


DE("L.~,SSI FIC':\TIO:\ DA.TE: \Iarch 18~ 201-t

P:\:\EL~

;/"
~
d

6PP'ON

OCT.:~.2~:2

2:25FM

;=,

NJ.449

TOP SBCM'fim~SITI':(E-, XGI)S

I also askec Sc'hackley to get \.1S a runco,wn on thepolitic:al aspects ~


e. g. :~when '1~e:rE= the I)resident and COJn.,gre,ssional officials briefed. otl
the 1:9 raeli v.1ea:pons 'program, on the N,(JME(~ connectioll, and wha.t
WE~re their react:ions.
In December, <:arter was briefed on the
NUMEC 'proble'nl as P,resident- elec.t b)r Busl} in Georgia,. I have alscl
heard s ketc:b.y a.ccounts of briefings for JohtlSon and !~~:on, but it
wou.ld be u5e:ful to get these de,tails in h,and. in case ther,e is a
Congressional i~lquiry later.
We should disCLlSS next steps on thi.s iSisue a.na. the MUF' release. At
this J?oint, cles'I)ite the FI~I clean. bill of health, I do n.ot think the
Presid ent ha.s I)lausible c1~niability., 1'b~e CIA Case is persuaeive,

t.~~rh not c()nclusiveJ


C
~
I

rrOI'

S~ C~y-fSE;NSIT1,VE~~

[.-.-..- .-.--------]

_~5X6. E.~~:l3~_~

XGDS

'I

..:J

OCT.la.2a12
-.

2:2SP'1

1'v1E~ORA~';Dt)M

....

'1

r: _, '-'

.',~W~.

"""n',),\

-~
'~ i :0 ~

,1

I.

~ J
(/b-

'''='/','
~'
I

r~~

~ '-Ui'~~~

()

THE 'tv'HITE HOIJSE

z.

SEGRE'"f-IS:~:\SI7rvE

Ton

J;,

-.

....

('Jt)

1"1

:..

\Vt'.SHINc...;.T'O~

d,p'J_
,;r
if)
I
~

i',!O.449

-1 -

5367

R/"-/7(

<
;.;.;z

-~~
-..,
-.

-.

...,....,.

-=N-

,'"

=ce

'-'

~~

=z
,yz

= ~

':;

"':2

-- -

::~

~'-";;;

~
~

r--: ..

"".,,y~

-N<

;: :

~;.,..::::::
~ ;...
~
'~

lJ'~

=~Z
z:~c

_Zr:

~;.;.;

;;..

'

-.

NZ:

. -.'-"

-.

z~

~~~
:-'7.
..

....;;<

PR~::SIDl~N T

r\liE}'{ORANDu~1 }"'CR ~

THE

FR.Olvf:

ZBIGN:E'W BRZEZINSKI

SUBJECT:

N\.:clea:- !\.{UF

1\

y~-,~ l

~-"~

o~

L-l L,

-,~

~~

t~

J\'
\j~

t<.. r-('.

ER.DJ~ r s

long- pla.nned. :re~lea s e of V. S,. 11'U'? (~1aterial ljnaccounted


For) data,\vill t.ake place on Th,ursday (~Augt.:Lst 4) ....A.s I mentioned
yOll ill a rece,nt ,,veekll Alert, the publi,:. releas,e wiL.. 1J.:~.doubtedly
focus 'intense: ?::-E~SS a~d Congres~ional a.tte:~tion on L1.e missing
ma.teria: :rC1TI trle N"J:tviEC ~pla!1.t in Apol10 F>ennsylvania.

tC)

<~
~::

~~~

J.

'-"

~z

~;$~ ~~
~ ~
. < '-'
~.
'-';"',-.,
'-' ,y.. .
,,..
~~~

--

....

- -

..

".....,

(J

.......-

r-

CL~.

The e s; sential conclusiol1S are tCL-ese:


In the 1~1505 and II.)OS, ,the AEC did. not require its li.censees to
mal,e annuc~J. physica1 i:r.~ventories of th~ir special !luclear
~naterial..

u-a

..=:

At yo'ur d~re~:tiol1. I h.a,re been t...~oroug'hl~r brief.ed by J~R.DA, FBI an.d

~rhis l~::ad :0 thE~ practic:e of a plant's borro~ing 01'1 a

contract in (~rd.er to CCI''\re-r c)peratioru~l 11~~/ses (the


rnajo:r
c(~nt:riblltar
to .M"UF) in n cU.!'rent contract. tr{e NUMEC
>'i ~ <
.'E c::cr. r
t:)lant was Fla.rtic\tlarly bad. in this re.spe:ct. No inventory was
~ ~-:::
~)eriorme.d c>etween 195'7'.anc. 1965 .. In',rnid 1965', t,h~ lack of an
~ ~
lr, -a
im.m@dic.t~ ~lubsequent contract forcec, J~UMEC to do'a material
C~
a.ccounting
',;I:l:llch ::revealed that 170 kg C)f.' highly f~n~~'iched u!'aztium
c:"--o
'S
0
l:nissing.
......
:::i

,...... ""0

C ~

(J

r"

......-J

~;

suboequ!~nt

r:""
()

(J

':...)

'J':

~ <.~

(Jpon~rel:eiving tb..::~s accoll.nting, t~LE~ AEC' immediately began a long

~ ~

~
~

"""':J

CJwc.s

2
2? c

of i-~:'l\lestig'l~t:ons whicf.l. continued. through.'l969, and which


t:Lltirnat~ly' conc.ludec. that all but ~6 ~' (~f the missi,ng r:naterial (:O\;lld
~~""3
..=: .;:: ;..;
be physica:~ly accountecl for. .ERr:~be1ieves no'w (l)ut b.as no
..=:
::: O-a
(~videnCE~) tbat even t!;_~S remaining' 56. l~.g can be acc:ounte.d for by
'"--
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s~cries

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operatiQnal1osge~:~>

but this \t,--ill be ~l ~J~ry hotly C::Jntested con,clt;..sion.


~rhe ER])A, report also 'reaches a 'l~ery i::ar-e:u11y g1.:.arded conclusion

that no evi(ience of tb.eft of ,sigr.ii(:ant amounts of


found. Th.~ k.ey paragr~aph is attal:hec3. i3.t Tab A,.
~rhe

FB1~h2~s

lnate~ial IJ.as belen

undertakell t~JlO lengtb:y in,restigatic:ls of fhis case.


i:-l 1965, looke,d a.t t.he questioI1 of Sh.api~ols
(the Presici~~nt of 'i'JU};~:C) :re:atio~n.9bip ~o the Isra(~li GoV'ernme!"_t.
~rhe first,

~OI)

S"""' GR'P~/
..J

J.

..oJ

beri~j,.ng

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...,}
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.... ...
.c.,. I::y~
_:\. '- ;1,0001
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0(,.:, . : d.

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I"~C.

~-~=ltj13 ~I

TOP o~E GRI~/I--"t-1''r~-;.~. ,~.r..J ... \iw_ 'r~1"';"


~

It conclud.ed that

S~. .;apiJ."o

F'.S

2
ind~~~d

hav'e !requsnt contacts "vi.th


:5 ra.eli officials ~b.eTe, pa l;:icular~y th~~ Science A tta che who m~ s
thoe.. g.ht to 'be an ir:tel~igence Oi<:E~r, They.a.Iso discovered th,a.t
S~.apiro got VIP 1~'1:"~at!T_ent on tri:?s to Israel for whic~ there
was no obvious explanation. 7his is the es sential sum of thei:r
finciing s. wnen 'I~:"le se re st:.lts were tr:a.nsmitted. to Helms ~ then
head 0:' the CIA (at whose request th~~ i:nvestigation had been
l.:.naert::Lken.), he responded with c;!. seri.es of lette:-s to Hoover
urging t!l.a~t: the FIBI take additional steps, incl~.di!lg ~retappir:~g
and surveillance o Shapir~. Ho,over refused.

;q

~
i
I.

I
~

cid.

The A:E:C 7 at the directior: of Attorney' General M.itchell, undertc)ok


its own, in.vss'tigatior.:. leading up tc a f1111,corr.mission inte:rvie'\;i; of
Shapiro i I l 1969. Si:::.-angely, all that Sb.apiro was. asked in that
intGrview ~~as whetb.er ~e llad ever di~TUlged any classified ir.f()rrnation
and not: wb.ether he had pa:-tici?a'tl~d i I l a' diversio:n of material. The
ABC iI:_ves'tigation was discontin.. .l~~d i~L September 1969.

[25XI, .0.13526
[

J.

J1~ot sUTpTisin.gly, Baker \~i'en_t to


,
'
Pre siden.t Ford ~,;vhc then ordere<i the ,A tto:rney GE~neral to undeTtake
an imnlediate in'vestigatioo.. Tb.i~> tittle the FB~ n~andate cove~red.
two qu~: st'lons: ~~as t11ere a dive:r sian:. and was the~e a covertJp of a
diversion. An intensive study.. iIlvol"\ring hundreds of -interviews,
a full.time team of 6 s enior ager.~ts, and millions of dollar s w,3. s
und.ertake:rl. It was concluded O!le welek ago. The investigation
was unable to uncover any evideJ:lce o:~ a theft altl~ough the
interviews included, many curre:nt: and ior~. . er NUMEG err.ployees.

-------------

[ 25X 1 ~nd 6,~ ]~.O.13526

..= Ic:ENSI~IVE/XGDS
T e ~ 0- E 6F
''Ud"7
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~
_

_ _ _ _ _ . , _ - .. -

445

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:L'.25Xl
and 6., E.(),,13526 i
--_._------------~

~
fA

'~

The conclusi.on fIom all this is that while a diversion might have occurred. ~l"
there is no eviCi~~n.ee - despite an inteIJ.si~re: search :Cot' some - to 1?rove
that .one did.. :F~()r every pie.ce of evidence tI:lat implies one concluslon' J . ther
is a.DI~theI piece that argue~: the opposite. C>ne is pretty much left ~with
rnal{i:n.g a peJ~scr:LaI judgm.ent
based Or} in~:;t:inct - as to '\vhether tJ:'le
diver sion di,i or did not OCCUI. SO faT' as v-;pe know h,o,-veveor, (and we bave made
sexious effo:::"t tel discover it) there is nothiJ:lg to indicate active CiA pa.rticipat:io.
in thE~. alleged theft.
. .".
' . _.. . .
,

:1 \

OIl.'

~.ere is a t:~er:nendous a.rnount, of inte:rest in, t~.i5 issue in C-ongress J t)ot~


beCa\lSe 0: t~~e existing intelligence as~pect ;a:nd. becallse of the implications
fo,: U'. S . saieg'la~ds standards (i. e.;r that s\:lch a thing could have ~.appened
over 2. peTiod c>f' years with':Jut being de:te~:ted).

We fci.ce tough sledding in the next few' wee1~s (partic:ularly in view oi \::yl s
Mid-East tl":Lp) i.n txyi,ng to 'kee,p"attention .focused CI:l ERDAl s technj,cal
al'"g"UJ~er.. ts and, if nec:::es:sarYJ on the :~~I lii"i/estigatj~oL.sJ and a"vay flC)m
the C:lA I s infcrrr:ation. vre :run an ob,,..iC?u.:s r'isk in releasing this info:r"mation
since~ it is q'lJ.it:e pos'sible that C:ongIes~iiona.l investigations and press probings
could 'lead to l~~aks of the s(~n5itive r:n~~teriall. However, with all the "t)ublic.
.
expectation of ,tb,e ERDA release, and t~... e !'\:lmor,s alre:ady floating arc~",;:,ndf
the ~Iolit:cal cc~s:ts in.volved in \\~ithhold.:ing the relea~ie would be unac:ce~ptab:e.

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MEMORANDU~'f

::J.8

'1

(CUTSIDt THE SYSIE.'1)

!~~[?E~~g]J~~ NA"rIC):'lAL SECURr~rY CCtlJNCIL


/

I~FOR..~TION

./

/f
JESSICA TUC~ MATHEWS

DAVID AARON

MEMORANDlTX FOR ~

FROM;

....

In the

Your

SUffitrcer

Me~iirig

,.-..... "

Ie'

'''',I,\,I

with Juckett

The essential c.onelusions


to the President) :

'Wants 'Co disctl.ss "\'lith you,


tra.nsrl1j~tted

~hich

~'er(~

Duckett

The. FBI ~LS un.de:-taken tT.JQ leIlgt:.hy investigations clf this case.
The first!! b(~E~innin~; iIl 1965, looked at the question of the
relationship of Zalrnar Shapiro, president of NUMECJ to 'the
Israeli GClvernment. I': concluded that Shapir-o did ind.eed have
fre.quent cont~3.cts ~:Lth Israeli officials llere, partic'u.larly, the
Science Att:.aeh.e ,.,ho wa~; thought to be an :intelligence office.r.
They also discove.red t'l"L8.t Shapiro got: VIP 'treatment: O"n trips to
Israel for which there "'~as no obvious e~planation. This is the
esse.ntial Sll1n of t.hf~ir findings. Wb.e'n thE~se results 'w-ere
transmittE~d t<:'J Helms, then head of the CI.A (at 'Whose request
the inves1:iga.. tion ha.d been undertaken) ~ h~:: respondE~d t.:ith a
series of let'ters t<, !1,;)over urging that the FBI ta.ke Q,ddit.ional
steps, includ'ing wi,~e~;3'Pping and surveil1allce.. of ShApiro. Hoover

refused.
The AEC, at t!ne dirl:=ction of A.ttorney Gen~~ral Mitc.l1ell, undertook
its own investigati"n leading up to a. full commission int:erview of
Sh.apiro i l l 1969. Strangely, a.11 tha. t Shapiro was ~lske,d in that
in.t.erview 'Was whethl~r he ha.d ever div'ulged any classif:ied informat:lon
not wheth~~r 'we had :?articipated in a. diversion of rna.t.e~rial. The
AE,e in.vestiga.tion ~,:=t5 discontinued i.n Septern.ber 1969,

:-'-X1
I-~O----]-3~ ~-"-6'-1
~
~
r

.-

..:

'....

II.

~~ _ _ ~ t su.rprisingly, Baker 1J'e.nt to

President Ford who the:n ordered the

!op

.Attornl~Y

SEORT/sE~rSITIVE.jXGDS

DECL.-\SSIFIED C:\DERAl'THOH.ll\ OF THE

I :\l;'ERAG E\C\' SEC~l' RIT\' ('LA.SSI FIC'.\-rl()~\ .APPEALS P.A\ El~~

F.e), 13526'1

SE(~TIO:\

5.3(b)(3)

IS(' .-\ P .:\ P PEA. L \ 0 20 12-167. doc U 01 e 11 t


D;\TE : 'larch 18~
n

[)E'C L,\SSI FIC'.-\TIOI:\

11 0"

20~1:-4

Genera.l to undertake

~
,....

~l ~

these

In 196.5, a.n j~rlventOYY at the mJMEC p:Llant.J~sn Apollo) ]?a", revealed


th,at 170 l<~g c)f highly ~:~nrichec. uranium C~was rni.ss:tng. Upon
receiving this accounting) the. AEC immed:i~Lt.ely begs.TI a long series
of inv,est:j.gat~j~ons which continued t:h:roug:~ 1969, and which ultimately
co~n.cluded th~i!: all but 56 kg of the In:iss:ing materia,l ,~ould be
physic ally accounted for. DOE belie"lJes now that: e~'en this
reInaining 56 lc.g can be. accounted for by loperationa.l llJ5SeS, but:
this c.annclt 1)E~ prOVE~n.

-- [

(,;-:;
,.... U
-:J
,....

of J.977 I wa~:: briefed by ElIDA (DOE),. FBI and CIA on

the purported diversion of nuclear material to Israel


(they 'N'ere

~
f:'~

,~~.. Ir
".\:

SUBJECT:

\_ . . . f-.

~,~.f\

November 3, . 1978

"5
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2: 2'3F:M

NC.443

P.s

TQP EBGRE'!! / SENS ITI'TF.

This time the ~FBI mandate c.overed two


a. di~~er,s::'onJ and uas there a eoverup of a
~::l intensive investigation, involving hundreds of inte.r-
views J a full-time team of 6 senior agents, and miilious of dollars
was: unable to 1.lncove::~ any evid.ence of a th~;ft although many c.urre.nt
and former 1'.1J::1:EC employees were irL "terviewed.,
k.r"l immedia1:e :investigati/:ln.

que.stions:
dive.rsicn.

was

thert~

' 25Xl
l _ _ _.

and 6'1 :E.0.13526


~

_.J

r"he C:O!lclusion frcllU all this; :Ls that "W'hilt~ a diversion might have occurred,
there is no evid~I'l.ce -- despite an intensive search for SC)lne - - to prove

that cn.e did. Fen:' every piec.e of e.videnc,e tha t implies Ol'l.e conclusion, there
is another piece that argues the opposite. One is pretty much left with
making a personal

judgm:~nt

-..- based on instinct -- as to

~o1hether

t.he

diversion did or did not occur.


So far as we. knO~7 (tr..oLlgh tj),ere are still linge.riug 9uspi(:ions) there :ts
nothing to indic~lt:e active CIA participation i~l the al1egl~d theft.

The information in ~his memo is one year old. After Lora told me about
this meeting I cO"!lsiderE:~d phoning the FBI to f:.nd out v.rhat had e"\1entually
happened to its iI1vestigati()n (which had. not be~en a.cc.e~pted. by Justice

~ ~ ~SENS I~~(VEJXGI:)S

C:": 1 2. ~ ~i1 ~ 2'

c~:

32::J1':

I'oO.4C,S

!OF S:E~U! I SE~:S IjJ~VE

at ~he time I ta:~ked to thE:~:n and was therlafo:::,e not offi.cia11y


cO"t""pleted) but; d(;c:ided t,~ot ~o stir up thl? ~oa15, until \.t;re ::ound out
~hat

Duckett had to say.

I should also mention

~hat

although

was

briefed in order to ?repare a full report for the President, and both
CIA a.nd FBI k'r~e\.l that., I arn not co-nfident that:: I got the ~~'Dmplete
story. I fou~0 C)t1t~ fOl:" e~:arnple, t:-tat a fe1;.l ~7eeks after I was briefed,
one of Schll?s:LngE~r'S tOl) aLoes was b!'ief4~d, artd got a s'to:~y differe.nt
in some respec:ts from what I was told, The t::u.th of '\.;t.at really
happeI'..ed may 'be

i.rret:riE~vably lost~.

Please also nCt'tel:he highlighted portions of t:he

~ef ~" eR:E'~ / SE}IS IIlVE}XG,DS

attacr~ed

article.

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CJ=~.

:0.

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2:

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'e
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IU, \

C~~

- \ ,,-

CI.~NC .445 -L FJ. 11


, . ~ ~ "-~

,j,/

-b J)a~\ U1-&1
~

THE: WHITE HQUS

1\-~O,-78

WASHINGTC)N

!DF

November 20/ 1978

9~CeRE'fj'SE;.\fSITIVJ:::

[)ECL.-\SSIFIED l'\DER ,-\l'TH()RIT'~' OF THE

I \TE R.-\G E\('" SECt' RIT\' (' L:'\.SS:I FI(',-\TI()'APPE.ALS P:\\ EL~

E .(). 1J 526~ S E(' T I0:\ 5.3 (b )( 3)

ISCAP A.PPEA.L \(). 2012-167. docurnent no. 7


[) EeL ASS 1F1(' ,-\T 10:\ 0.-\ T [: 'I arc h 18. 20 I-t
~1EMOR.p..NDUr~

I~OF~

THE

ATTORNE~{

G~:~r~~RAL

Last year, the President requested the Assistant to the

Presid.ent fc)r ~~atior'lal SecuritY,Affaj.I"s; to prepare a compl~~te


repor't for l1irn on trH~ 'matter of .tl1.e I)CL~;sible d.i~lersion of
nucle;ar rna te~ri..cil frc:)rn th'e NU!1EC plant in Apollo, Pennsylvania~.
It is r-eces~;ai:~~7' at' t::his tim~ to p:repal:~E~ an upejate on the

status of tllis 'matt~:~r and I therefore I~equestycrnr-cooperatic,n


in pr(')vidin~~ cl complete, briefing to DI~. Jessica" Tuchman
Mathews of the National Securiti Council staff, by the
appropriate officials of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
l

David ,Aa!:'"OIl
Deputy' Ass~istant 't.o the.

for

Nation~l

Presidt:~nt:

Security Affairs

~OP GEe~E~/SENSITIVE/XGD~

Autho:rity

o~E

i~l:)ignie:w

Brzezinski

..

.
.
:ri~~~~~!~~\1::;:}' ~. /.':: ir'~Yi

>.; .~;::~:;".~ ~~ ~".~ ~.. ,:. ~ .

II

:.

. ,' .0' . ; .

"..

, .

. '

~ ... ~t

_ _ _ GCI.l~.C:~lC:_

~::jl~r..

i\1C.44~p.la~--.

.[
\

669B-X

MEMOR.ANDU~

Tor

SEGF_El/SENSITIVE N.>\TIONAL

SECURIT~( CC)lJ~~CIL

ACTION
ME.'10~TDUM

",/

No"ember 6, 1978

FOR:

DAVID AARON

FROM:

JESSICA TUC;IY.iAN MATHEwsl1\

SUBJECT:

Diversion of Nuclear

~~terial

to Israel

I have! a.t.tempted t,o set tlp a. meeti.ng with the FBI to get brie~d
The
FBI has informed Je~rry Je::n.nings tha.t the :i~Ilvestigation is still on
going and since it :is a criminal investig~lt:iort' they cannot brie.f me
~ithout: instruc1:io~n.,s from the Attorney Geueral.
This is a little
surpr:isi.ng sinc~~ I don't 'remember having this trouble last tirn~,
but' Jexry thinks tllat it II:ould be handled I~elcLti'vely easily by your
signing the attached note.

on wha t has happened sinc,e' I last talked te) them in July 1977.

RECOMMENDATION:
'That you' sign the ,3.'ttached n10te to the Attc)rney General.
DE(~L.-\SSIFIED L:\DER .-\.LTHORIT\/OF THE

I:\TER:\(;E:\CV SECl'RIT'\, ('L.-\SSIFIIC,\TIO:\ .APPE.-\LS


E.O. 13526., SEClrIO:\ 5.3(b)(3)

ISCA.P A.PPE.-\L :\0. 2012-"l67., documenll: no. 8


DE (' L.-\ SSIFIC.-\T I0:\ )).-\ T E: :VI arc h 18" 2014

!OF !EC!!'!/SENSJ:!I'{J~/XGDS

Authority 6f Zbigniew Brzeziniki

PA.:\EL~

tift

J~

Intl~rag:en(~y S4~curity

._---_.._-------_._--_. __._---------------_.
~(l [nforrnatipfl Sl'cllrit) (hersighl ()fticc
70U Penn~> Ivan ia A \ enue. N. \\ .. R00t11 1Of)
\\asl:int~ton. D.C.204US
Il.'lephonc: (202) 357-5250
Fa\: (2()2) 3575907
I:-rn~li I: i:'~capanara.go\

~DJBF!i~

Dr P .\ R 1'1 E '\ r 0 F DEI- F , S F


\llCil:lc'l HI~~llh

I)FP\RT\I E \1' OF
\1:\1 ~:\ Hradk\

.Jl~TI(

C'lassification Appeals Panel

l.

EXE( '! '1'1\'[ SECREl\R'


.fohn P IIUp:llIlCI

r)lII.;CIi'1
I'\FOn\L\ riO, SECl Rl (,
OYERSIC lIT OFFH T

DLP\RT\IF'\T OF S L\Tf.
\lar~:lrd P (lr~lf('ld
OFFI( E OF TilE DIRECTOR
'\.\ II () '\ .\ L 1'\ TEL 1.1 C E'\(" r

()~

( "Illl "lone
\\110\\1. :\RCHI\ES .\\D
RE( ()RD~'; .'\[)'II'ISTR\TIO\
')hl'C\ 1.: "';,hl'llb(,J"I:!-(:1
\:"TIO\.\.I. SECl RIT"
COl\CU. ~T.\FF
.1(\111 \\ fl..:h.llll. Chall

March

18~2014

Grant F. Smith
Director
Institute for Research: Middle Easten1 :Policy
'Calvert Station
P. O. Box 32041
Washington~

])C= 20007

Dear Mr. Smith:


Please be advised that the Interagency Security ('lassification Appeals Panel (ISCAP) has
concluded its consideration of the n1andatory declassification review appeal filed by yOll and that
the 60-day period during whlich an age]1cy head may appeal an ISCAP decision to the President
has expired. Enclosed are copies of the docun1ents and a chart that outlines the ISCAP decisions
with the exception of any inforn1ation thal is otherwise authorized and vvarranted for withholding
under applicable lav/~ \ve are releasing all infonnatio11 declassified by the ISCAP to you. If you
have questions about this appeaL please contact Neena Sachdeva or William C. Carpenter at

(202) 357-5250.

Sincerely~

w-~a,~

JOHN P. FITZI)i\' T:RIC~l(


Executive Secretary

Enclosures

-2
cc:

Mr. Charles Piercy [Letter vvith C11art]


Executive for Business SlLpport Services
Natiollal .Archives alld B~"-ecords A<inlinistration
Mr. Joseph I-Jarrlbert [Letter and Cllart and Documents]

Director, Infoffilation MallagemerLt Serv'ices

Central Intelligerlce Agency Tv1ember to the ISCAl?

Ms. Elaine [)idier [L,etter \vith Chart and I)ocumellts]

Director

Gerald R. Ford Presidential Ljbrary

THI~ MANDA.l~OR'T DECLASSIFICATION

ISCAP DECISIO'N ON

REVIEW APPEAL FILED BY

}\fR (;RANT F. SMITH


-

D]~S(:ltlPTI ON

IDENTIFYING
NUMBERS

OF

ACTION

I)()(:UM 8:NT

Smith,
document ~o. 1

Richard Ileln1s t<) Ramsey


Clark

ISCAP No.
2013-062

f\pril 2, 1968
2 page

Ford Library
NL 12-031 no. 1

DECLASSIFIED SOME POl~TlONS


AND AFFIRMED THE
('LASSIFIC)\./TION OF OTHER
PORTIONS
I E.O. 13526 3.3(b)(1) as 25X1

Secret
.-

~-

~Edgar

Smith,
document ~o. 2

J.

ISCAP No.
2013-062

Septernber 3, 19 59

I-Ioover to Ric11ard

f-Ielms

2 pages

Ford Library
NL 12-032 no. 2

DECLASSIFIED SOME REMAINING


PORTIONS /\ND AFFIRME,D 'THE
CLASSIFIC)\.IION OF OTHER
REMAININ(J PORTIONS
E.O. 13526 3.3(b)(1) as 25X1

Secret
.

~-

Smith~

To

document No.3

D(~I [~v1ernorandum]

March II" 1976

ISCAP No.
2013-062

3 pages
Secret

Ford Library
NL 12-031 no. 3

DECLASSIFIED SOME POI(TIONS


AND AFFIRJ\t1ED THE
CLASSIFIC}\.IION OF OTHER
PORTIONS
I E.O. 13526 3.3(h)(1 )(A) as 50X1

HUM
Some information remains withheld by
the Central Intelligence Agency under
the statutory authority of the Central
Intelligence P~gency Act of 1949, 50
U.S.C. 403(g).
--

Smith,
document No.4
ISCAP No.
2013-062
Ford Library
NL 12-033 no. 4

~-

Memorandlln1 fe >r the R.ecord

7 pages

DECLASSIFIED SOME POl(TIONS


AND AFFIRJ\;1ED THE
CLASSIFIcp~rTIONOF OTH'ER
PORTIONS

Secret

E.O. 13526 3.3(b)(1) as 25X1

March 9, 1972

Some information remains withheld by


the Federal Bureau of Investigation

under the Freedom of Information Act,


5 U.S.C. 522(b)(7)(C)

Nl~F MR ICas~
r~

e:-'

.... ~ .... ~ .....__ -=,;.

-r

/s ~'/"~--}

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VJ)\~;}-!.INGTON,

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. ~~~---~- ..,.. 0/

() FF/ CE

DocL!~cmt No ~

/cJ- OBI
#" {.

(1 F

G EN C:E

~,

D. C. ;20305

l ;-J DI AEC TOR

?
_

The

~O~lia~Q
II
n.~ ~)~

I-Icrlora~ble R2..:x~sey. C:lark

rr !le. P... t t o:r Y1 e y Ge ~'~e 1:' al

o'.~

\\Tashin.gto:n, ]). C: .

r.IJ

<
~

Dear I(anisey,

~;z

::CO
Eo-

looool

.~

~<

You a,re vIe-II a\vare of the g:reat concern \,v}licIl exists at the
higb.e ,st lev",els of tllis, C;o'vernrr..Lent \-vitIl re ga.:;,:d to the proljieration
of ~nuclear' v/ecLpon.so ,~ritll the eA'})anding.use of l~ru.clear erlerg~~ for
power and tb.e greater Ci'lilian iD.volvement \vitl1 !luclear material
there is a real dcLll.gel" th~3.t clal~destirle traffic in these materi:us
migh.t OCCU1'o

~O

-=::::00~

~looool

.,-.~

CJ~

t:~

o<

8.::::
::l ~
~;

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E-U'-"N

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aa

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In thlS conrlectloll .1. "loulel lilce to brlng the followIng matte]."


.
~ B~: ~
to your atte!ltion. ~rh_c NllClea]~ l\1aterials an.d Equipment Corpo~ ~9 ~ ~
ration of Apollo, Pennsylvania, is one of the principal processors
Q >-u
~ ~
of nuc.lear rnaterialE; S'llCIl as plutc11iu:rn and U 235 \vhich if divertecl
~
- ~ W
~ z~; ~. ~
c01.lIel be l!~>ed for vvea.po~-'l::;", Altho'Llgrl'NUWC ma.cle periodic ]?}l}~si~~~~Q..'lJ\
t
\
. E
c 0 rn n).1.S S.~ () n
CF1 '-' fi~
~::n
c a 1"l:Q v e ):"1 tOT' 1,. e s a I1C..' Ith.e YJ
, ::-11 tea1(~
.:l t a e s I~ tom 1 c ,.... n e r gy
~ ~~: ~ 1 p.e:r:fornled a. n'urn'ber' ,of accoul1.tability survevs, a si.gnificant

~ ~

':

~ ~

t:

j'

.-c~
~_,~. ~. ~~J'
~
qU27utity of
Q~r-l iflQ
, u,'.',

~ ~

-r.---------------- ,
i -

J
(;nrich.ed 1J23.5, possibly represen.ting
a cumulati,re loss
over a period of ~rea.rsJ could n.ot be accounted for in the sprin.g of
1965. Tllese losses ca:rne to light in tlJe closing Ollt of a larg~
cantrae.to . E)eeatl.~)e .of the cond:~tiorJ. of NUME,Cts records and the
nature of tb.e ope:ration" .. the ~pecific dispositiol1 of this material
COllld not be identiJiecia
j\'t that tirne the AEC reF)orted th.at al,
thOUg}l it cOl~ld. not be st<lted \vith c:e:r;taint)r that a. di\Tersion of Lh.is
material h'(:u::i llot takerl pl~:ice, ~ T10 ey~idence had been found to Sl..lpport
the possibility of di"\'ersiorl and thaLt other i:nforrrlation did exist to
reduc e suc:h a. pos sibility.,

~=~ [_~E.O~352TI
-i:~; i~~" n :-~
from

p.ntd R. FGRILibraff

~"."H'

/ (~-_."

AG.Ef~J C~{

~~~

YX~T;;:',;c!:;L,"~)

\..) " J. i~. S

(:Er'Jl:~r~l\ Ld !~,JTEi_L.r

',f\~~~~i~~7
~~
It:, I-;~;'/r I.

~J

_,.~.~

No

r-- 1\ r).

'~

r r

--~F!
7.... '
I 1.'
I'

._~.~

--r,

. ~'4,..Jo .......... 't,,~ ~, ~'lJ...-

";:r:

[}5Xl, E~O.13526

It is c:ritica.l for us to establish wh,ether or not the Israelis


no'\v l1a've tIle cap' 3.bility c~f fabJ:"ica.ting: nuclear weapons \vhichrnight
be ernploy'ed in t:h.e I\rear :E:ast. F'urtllermore, irltrodu.ction by
Israel of 's\lch. ~J(:aF)ons iilto their arsen2.1 '\~/ould 'uncloubtedl-y affect
the N'on-Prolifer ation l'reaty \vhich has been pla.ced before tile
United :Nations by~ t1'le Un~itec1 States an.. d the USS}~c.

Giverl the a::torelnentioned circutnstances I urge tIlat th(~,


Federal Bu.reau c)f Ir;~vestigation be called upon to initiate a dis . . .
creet ir:~tel1igencl;~ irl"~re s!igatiorl oJ an. all source n.ature of Dr ..
Shapiro in ord.er to estat)lish the nature arld extent of his relation
'. Sllip "~vith tlle (Jo,\rernment of Israel.
J

Sincerely,

~L
Richay'd Helms

.J'~

'(.

.;f

:~

Phctocow

'-n~';-+

~ t iii
Q

'~
__

s...._

from

GaraId R. Ford lJbrmy

..:

t,~L~ ~J~R
r::](

r..rrr"~Ot~""
~
11.N 0

~ -.....; \..~ \ ... _ L ~

Clase No
II

~~

1].1\:

: J)

~) 'l'l\.t{' I~

/~ ~ ~ ~
.IF,;!.

~:: )~_-:_-::L({d_,~-;: __ ,!

- . - . . ...._ - - _ - - ... ... \.... _ .. 1

S J) J~ P 1 H. ~r) r E\' '}' ().F'


_.1

FE.DEH.AL Hl}IlEAU ()F

,srrICE

\ (f'~

I:'~\ES'llGArTIO:\

'W:\5H U';C;TO,:";. D.C. 20535

'.'~

D:EC:LASSIFIED UNDER. AU'rHOflITY OF"' Tf[E


IN'fERAGENCY SECIJRI~rY ICLASSIF'ICA,TI()l'[
E.<). 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)

IS(=i~P

Septerr11)er 3, 1969
APP]~i\LS

PANEL,

Bl- LIAISOl{

APPEAL NO. 2013-062, document no. 2

l__D}1:~:L~SSI~IC~!IO_~_I?~~!E_:
:Honorable

l\!la!:~_~_8, 20~~~

J:{ic1J.a!~d

I-Ielrus

Director

Central InteJ~li~~ence 11gerlcy

Washington~ D~

Dear l'1"r

CI

.He In\s :
l~s yOtl a'rl2 cl.~~"'are,

tl1is Bw::eau l1.as t,E~en conductitl.g


8.1.1 investi~~ati011' o:f In:- Z:almarl M()l'dE~Cai Shapiro:r head of
the 11UC].E~a1~ rrl:"'ocessirl~; fi~rmSt :N1J1'f8C 9 Apollo t Pennsyl\'''ania~
Sirle? I~k1.)",. 1968
lC()l)ies of rE:.port s cO"';le1.~ing our irJ.quiries ~
i11cludirl~~ Cl.. Sllmmar:y 1~E~port p'l---E~pared by'" our Pittsburgh O:Ffi:ce
tmderdate of~ FE~br1u(J:l~)r 18, 1969:r ha"\le been furnished to )lO,ur.
Agency o~n ct cc)nt in"Llirl~~ bas is ..
s .

...

.-:~ ~\:: ,

Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford UiJraC)'

..

I3GRJ;T

"

Groep 1

Excl~~lde.
. .,

."";;:'.:.'~'\
r -;.

...

-F1~C}r:1 O.utoTEatic

J ..

ao\,m,grclcL111g

d.ec'la. s s if i

rJu

CElt iOl

~:-

l:'~ "-,

<:

"r~ [iSX1, E.O.13526]

'Honora.1)le ',Richclrd

NeJqll P.l0=1

"(-1
WOJf

-&6~

PIeJaf.)

Adooo;04d

}Ielrn~':)

\~~

p1)yE)ical SlJr\Teil12~nCe .c~overag,e~ '\~e haye ,developecl infoTID.ation


~.,'~,.~a}:-ly poirltirlg to ShaI,i.ro- P s l)rOll0UTI:Ced pro-Israe'li syn1pathies'~.,-,
anq.,- close corlta~c-ts itritrl?::'~Isr-aeli_ offici.als, I
]
'C
~l It, is believed Inos~t unlikely
thart; further ir1vestigat:i.o,n wi 1.1, de\relop any .stron~~er facts, in
c()-hhection ,;vi.tll tl1e ~u1:)jecti s a'ssociat'io'n with Is'raeli official's
Tl1e basis of tf:le sec'uri ty "risl<: posed 'by the subj e(~t lies in
h:i's:." cant inuing acc,ess t:c, sensi ti ve inforrnation, an(l material
'an~r, ,it is bel.ie:ved~ t:he o,ril:y e:ffecti\te Til.ay to- covnter,' this risk
wo'0ld' be to preCl'llde SrLapi,ro :f~,?m su'ch access, specific?lly
.
-by'-::6erminating his classified c'ont'ract,s ,and l~ftirl'g his security',"
cp

clea~anceso

c~reful' conside~a~ion, i~clvding

However, after

an ihteJ:View 't\iith Sha.pir'o, AEC: has',advis'2d that it: pl8.J.J.s no


fu~ther

action at this timeo

Under these c, ir'Cl.1.TI1S'ta'nces,


'active irr'ves"~iga:t-ion of'.. t~h,e s1J.bj ect

c.

Vie

W~

discorltinuing our
1vill, of' course 7

c3.y'e

'continue to keep',intere,sted'agencies advised 'of

~ny p~~tinent

" inf61:""matiorl conCerniJlg th'3 su1Jj ect which may be' rec;eived, frOIn
01Jr

sources ~
".

Sirlcerely

yo~:rs,

\j.. .~~

- 2 -

/
4 q
i~

Q'l;,(tnr'T

W~)~\ ,~
... ... ...

PhotoCoPY
from

:Gerald ~ Ford Ubrasy .

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/~.

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::OJ

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r.~<-:-

~Xl, E.O.13526]

NL!:

MI~

Case fio

c;_

/d~"31

Doc;ument No'~~_~ 1:13

\ .! /
l)~

])ECLASSIFIED IJNDER AlrrllORrfY ()F l'HE


J~TEI{AGEl\CYSECURIT)( Cl~ASSIFI(=AT][C~NAlPP)~A.I~S PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)

j1

",

"; ()] r

L,

'D'j')~
(1
.~ f.'T'
"'.. ..t, ~1
....._ 7 _~
"-.40

0/ ~7j b";
I

----------._------

Withheld under statutory authority of the .

Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50

U.S.C., section 403g)


,

;....J. l.'UMt\.

ISCAP APPE.AL NO. 2013-062, d[ocuInent 110. 3


I)ECLASSIFICATION DA1'E: l\larch 18,2014

------------_._J
[

.,

./

[) CI Itfi/.:,,/f/:

L........---~..::.-----~-

'

;'I~;-:

~lE~,iOR/J~DtPr FOR:

Dir'ector"'of CerltT2.1. Intellig:errce

FR02\1

CaoT~]_ 'E" J)'uckett


DeJ=luty' Di'rector {O'l:" Science and. Te(:[I.rrolo~;;}-

SUBJ'ECT

NlJ~ C1 e ar I',,13. t erial s 2~nd


':l ,~ - 0
f ~: r )
( ' 0 T .1:. J 0 'r
, c.... '-l
n. r\, \~
~ \ r~P"~ ..--.....

Eqlliprne:rLt

14*
~rhe (lttclched :mernorandurn ,d2-tcd 9 0farcrL 1972
S'1~""T">0T1."ZC:J'::-t 1J. 1 c , '\lrIT?\l-cr
""":lSL~
It l~'Yc"'~(::
~1-"-l+~c:::0"'"
1o'Y
.. I,.-------,~
t..,.;. ) Co,..I ..
,-v.
.........
t
........
LL..lJ.

----

~~.;l'

2.vailable to

2"

tile

POiTlt

~.l.

.l.-o\..J

IoJ

_ _ _ _I\vJ1C) o~cigirtated
aJ1S\'ler

"

CIA' a.. ction on this C2.S2 ancl \{ho is


a:n:y Itlrth.el'" qlJestiol15 )r?u, rn.ay havc_

~)i}1Ce tl-le }\ge:nc)r l{aS lookirlg 2.. t this


of \riei,\' of ()'bt~liJling in.Eorv.2-tior.. 011

ca.se fro:r.1
the .nucle~lr

)rlteilig?.rlC(~-/c(11)abilit~y 0:[ a, fore'ign gO\'CTJlf;1ent 't\'C (lid 110t:


B2.ke a corlCE~nt~~ated e:f:fort to folloh" this case from the
, 5 tan d po :i n t 0 f i t 5 d o'm e 5 tic i n: p 1 i C 2. t ion S S Ll b sequ e:1 t t o t 11 e
t iT!~e of trle at ta che,d Int~mO roa'ndu:m ~

30
It is our 'u:nclerstandi'ng that ~~r~ Heln-:s brou'ght trr.e
intelligen.cc 2_spects 0:[ tJlis case to the atterltion of
Presi.dents Johnson and Nixon as \~ell as Attorney General Clark
Dil-ectol- of tile FBI, ~y!J~" }Ioover, Secretaries of Sta.te R1.1Sk:
2n.d Rogers, DelJLlty :SecI-etary 0: 'DefeT!se Rush, Gen.eral_ :01ctrtager
of the AEC 13ro1JD., t:he ~Toirtt COJnTT~ittee on_'Ato1?~ic EnerogY":r 2.~nd
tl'l-e Spec.ial _~ss.ista11t f'or Nat:icJlal $ecurit)J" A:ffair5~
A'lr. .t\ls5ln.ger"
"

Tr

..

..

4.
l'fle: r;1a~tteT 1v~tS agairl 1JYought up reCcIltly ill }"ollr
discussions \'lit.h Tll(~ ~Join.t ComI;li ttee on l\toni(: E118rg}- . .
1~he DDStrT also brie~feci tf1.f: COlnIi1i5SiQ~r..ers
of Th.e 0:"llclea-.r"

Regulator)', C:OfItITlissi<Jl1 C~}l l',fU'~IEC~


The J\DD/s~1 a.ner'l
~J
2Llso discl.lSSec1 the rnatter at 50me lengtl1 \..-it~l it lr .. ~rurph}'''~
)St2ff I)irectol- of,'Tl1c ~roin,t Cop:mitt2 2, on 5 i~a.lch 19760'
1

PhtJtoc:oAt

from
Gsra1d fl FOld ~ary;

~witlili,cl~~llHk;::~t;.tutory auth~rity of the


cen1..:r~lllrntellig. ei.n.cc Agency A(:t of 1949 (50
U.S.j~~~~tio~~~~~~L
,
_

-~~ba'~

S E~~S I~' I \'E

E2
Irl?DET
C L B'{ 1.7 0 :3 7 4::'

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COlpo:ratioJl

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I

......

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c~ 1 S 2. T1 d ~E Ci ~~. i
(~;'lJ01ECJ

P )~-l t:: 11 t.

~-..Ihe:-{:.cJ..ollol'rln
~' ~ CJ }_T.L.LOr.:l~3.L~Ol"
~. ,e. ' ' -' -j "':'l . ' OUl.~llJ.es
1 .'.

5..

A:.

.J.

to p~-rsl.lacle tIle
a-~d N'U;lEC an.d

to

A (Y

_~oency

F
~
e-,,--oTLS

..--:

FBI to lJYLCler,take 2.n irl\.restigation', of Shc=-piro


keep tI'-2.c:k o:E. l ts 2.cti v'i ties in tJ-tisregarc1 ..

1\'1r .. Helras sent a lett:21- to the.


AttoT~ey General urging that the .FBI initiate a discreet
~intelligerrce investigation of Dr. Sh2piroh'
Ni_ Hoover
a.

.!\-pril'~~968

On 2

had

sugg~sted thi~

~!r.

Hel'ms t<) sa.y th.at' :he. ]-lad directed tIle FBI.to

b.

course of 2ction.

On 23 April 1968 tte Attorney

Gen~ral

,called

i.nvestigate,.
c.
On 3- ~3eI)tembf=~'r 1969' ~rr~ Hbo\rer s'ent ~~fr,~ 'I-relm.s
a letter st<:ltil1g- that t-}lE~, AEC d.esn'.t contemp'I'?"t:e' any
further actioIl OIl the case 2.t' tllat, tilnep r~rr . 'l-rb'o~.rer
$,aid trlat tIle ])i~recto',rof ,Securit}~" .AEC~,.h$:d a$,'~e',d',
;' Shapiro \{}letheJ~ tie hacl passed 'classif'ied' ,i:not-rttat:ion

.,./ t,o an)r :foreign itovernIneTLt .., Sh;~piTO 'rep,li'e2L:t'11:#'t lie

"'had not. AI)pa1~erltl}r ]10 ,men'tiOJl ,,;a,s made ',0. t~he.. ,


,passage of rlucle2~Y ~mat'eTi'~Ll to. a foreign g,b:ve~r:.nTLten"to
~\l:r. F-IOO"lcr :fuyt tIer s ta. ted tl].at- the FBI' 't':as.. 'disc:ont inuin~~
arl)r fu'rttLer acti\re i:n. 1restigation of the case_

d.
On 13" Octo'beT' 1969 ~lr,. HelJll.:s sen't 'a In!}!orandl2J7t
to I-Ioo\rer, FBI" u.rg.i..Jl~~ ~hirrl:,to"cond.uct aLJdio sLi,~v"eill'an,ce
,,6f Shapiro since it a.I:>peai'ed t]~at Shapiro plarlned to,
e,m i g rat e t 0 I 5 l~ a e 1,.
e.

to

~9Iy.

On 17 Octol)e):"" 1969 :'It. I-Ioo\rer sent a-.,~~mor~ncIu..rrt


t{elms 5tatin~g 1:rlclt he, r.. (~d :r,evie\..~e'd the :S,ha.p,iro

matter and: Mr~ Helms should take the matter


the Attorney' Ge~neTa~l. T'his 1\~as not d~one . .
~.-."'----_.--

'

up'~ith

---._

f ..

On 4 C1ctobeT 1970 tr:.e CI.A asked the J::,B:I'if


any flJlTthe~r', irlf'or;Tl8. tion on ~;hapiTo.'t 5 activ-itie,$_
On 3 F~bruary 1971 the FBI sent a response to CIA based
on the 1970 req,lJest '.
(ine FBI ~report \';2.5 recei'\..-ed from
ttle Octobe,y 1970 ~cecille5t tr.. 2.t \,tas gernane to 1::he problen: . .
_1'he report indicatecl ~~ha'piro hc~d reql.lcsted frOIi1 an
~official ,of the Ka~;ec1:i Ber>~lco C()J'~parl)~ to be Q.rought up
to' elate' on a serls'iti\,re AEC proj'ect t\,;O l.;eeks clfter h.e
j oinccl the cdmpa~)'~. 1"herc ":2:5 Jto fllrl.her FBI 're'p.ortillg
the)~ hacl

on the case after that.


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Ou:r :ri'les in tJle ]\:ll1'-lEC case' consist

7.

fO,T"

i:hemo.st

~part':'.of dat'cL

recei\red. fJ~()nt the 'AE'C and,' t}Ye FBI",


j.\. number
of :F'BI repo'rt's 1rere received a.nd 1\~e p:(,es.1Jme.' these :reports
inc1'uq.edall t11e su.bstarlti'J'e d,ata cD~l;ected by thE~' FB.I
thr'otf'gh Feb-ruary' 197'1 tJl0U.g,11 1\~e h2.\~e n.G as.surance of tllat
EO-c.t:.
The )\EC inforrn.atiorl. consist.s o~f Olll)r a fe1 __' doc'uments
or:. t'h'e results' of tl'leir irl"/estig2~tj.on 'of- the N'U~tEC: case'~
~\O in\restiga.tive l-epoTts 2r'e iTt OU:C f.ileo
.

[---

;-;.'J-

/"

- - - - l

Carl E. Duckett

Attachment:
As stated

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c'J{r:~ed by' the' U~:tted States

\,;itrl ceJ:"'t~3.i11 exceptions 1{2S hE~'ld by the A1:'=C

Q..; < 8.110 it.s CO:jt 1~Yr)e COl:1t1:'c2.ctors op er2.,ting Goverrlm2n'~ o~)'Jn.c:d arid/or
~ ~-~
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u~ ~ 0 T': U~ cont ro:J.le ~1 f(:lel :'Li t J.es ~[I~ne P.. ct 01-- 19 5 ~~ ~{as cles igned t () \,':iderl
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sp~cial rlLlclec::.r mat.eJ:"Ila.l perm:iss.ible~ rfb.e 1954 l\.ct 21..l1t11C)ri~~ed
the IE(~ to rE~t;LLla.t~2 t:1E: llse o.f these ffis.teri2.l.s 2-rlQ to glLc1.rd
against loss or diverslon~ In setting ~p ~egulations to
el11.... 'Jl')CE? -the (:c)ntrto,l ,)j~ rnc~teria,l, the CO:7~-rnis:~ion conclu(lecl that
t!1e pl1~t s i cc~l f)l:"ote ctj~ o'r:~ clnd 2C cot.:~t 2.'0 i 11 ty cant ro Is T/1'hi Cfl.
1i ce n s E~ e S clS ~p r'L~ de J:l t () tJS }.[l"e s s r-ne;l. \,' otll d' ,~.2l :n. t 2..1!1 0 Ve r SIJ e ei al
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v~lue 2nd

nuclear material because of its intrinsic

their

. re'3portsl.biJ.i tj.r f'or :Lts lc)ss o:r dS~2.;e' and t~le S8-\l~'ere c2~itlirla.l
penalti.es pro\rj.d.ed 1)~l A.EC:'is g<J\J"err.i:ng legisl2..tion. ~rloulci'
adequately protect the D2tion21 interest fro~ the stand~oint .
of l).:l.lc~;\l[ul di.v'ers:Lorr.
In19:55 2. -policy. \1"25 "adcpted a]_o~l.?;
these J.it-.\.es b;y tl1e. j~t::C..
Irl ril(~:y~ 2.956', t~e A2G c.O:~~lllae(I that
a c}1ang;e tC".ti'8,r)d tlr;11ter' contrc)ls was in order,) and: the
CO;71;l1iss:!..on 2.men.ded tr:~eir' regulatio~s on 25 J:?-nu2.ry 196'l ~
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1957

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a Pi:,tsbl:rgh ir~du3triali,st:
I'lc:"flled rla~/id I~o) -LoT,~e~nthal . . a lon;:~-ti::!e, close, Der.sorlal trJj_errd
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in tile

f~tr'A.2-ncing

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. 3. Nt~'EC. ovmed and ope r'8.ted a ur2ni am pro~essing facii1.tY-


at.' '/~pollo) Penn.s:llvania,o" . It 1~:Erst x"2ceived mate1 iaJ_ under
.
7

lEi,:~i~e arrangc'm~~i1t iT1 D'ece:mbe:L~ 1957 2.t:l d re'ceived :i.tS rirst .


ITi:a:t&rial2.s an A1~C Gontracto1~. 'in Dec.ember .'1957..,. . From.. . ,the
s\~?:rt up' throUE;h ..31 'De c~~.x~JJer 1966 t'IU,~'~C rece',ived "2l~ 750 leg
C'f ',:tj 235 and sf1ipJ?ecl 19'~- '865 l<g U 23:5. re.porting los:ses of' about:
6 oo'ut
:"'~'A:"",,0""
0")-"') 2.bou1- l' 2\'
"""'~Co.-iD~s
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Co'~ptro~l.er Gerler~al or ti1e Urlit~.d St~te'S inefi~ective:t. 'Gampai~;n

<.::)

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..

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to:.:get

!~UrfI~C t ( ) irnplem,ent adequ2.te .control of the.. m-ater,tal


plant. Thts matte:ra eel-the too '2. ~e2.d in,1-ro.veirb~'r.196;5

rtI);en' the A1~C Ulclde. a deta~Lled .SU:CY2:V to.:.. deternirte tbtal-losse~; :

si.;:r:i:~te star.t' t~p 'anci to ;at tE~'inpt, t 6 .exp la-tn" the' uun~);p~.cteq.lyn.

.,'

1n~~~~1.ts

h~i;,~ U 235 'loss

Oll

the ldJ~r'!L eont.r.I~Gt... (.\!'2st1ng.rfa.us.~::~. ~.' Tll~'

s ~trvey es tab 11 s~he(l the ,l()s S' .from I9,5.7.ll'nt'i 1 3~'.. O.c9:oper, '1965

,,' :::"J~'78 r",u


1 ... ..-- 1'J 23t::
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s.ui:ye y' te arn t 0 ha \re b.eE~ 11' :Los t . th~o.ugfj. }:no)':h~ los:s.mechah:Lsms'

(l~t.0f) and the 'r~er;lainint~ cirnourlt br' '5Y3.~ 8 '.,}:g ti2S. cat;'~'6'orl;'i~~'d.as.

i'l(tr~ r,IUF is defirled a~3 t~s.:tl0-}.ly tl-1e:resillt of": u!1'certaltiti'es

1r(zneSisurernents, t:mkno;~r1 J~as;sesa!1d undE~tec.ted e.rr.ors "in'

'Ire~co.rds. In1964,Cl.fj'~rE:~__Q~~~EEc!'~}Linfhe vault c'ntai!iing;

~J nu,c1.~ar materialS.. ,a. t !llJt'LE:(:.~. ,~,.t;.hiCh ... ef~fect.ivelY,.'deSt.:r:o.yed records

"4-'

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of .t:ne

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~l.n.pltt $r1d .~~~~p.~l; .c)f~_~~~.teri';,l.

'

..

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.Tr1e fi:ce oc;~.~rred du:rirlg.

a' stri1<e'\,!rlen tIle plarit:---~~l2:S snlI~-clb~~.rf". The AEC i'epart on th.e'.

.'l\tov~~ber 1965 sur\I~Y p.!~ese.nted. the' v:Lew, that' \~;hl1.,~ it, cc?uld

D9:t be st ate d wi t'h cl~r.t; flin.. ty th~t di 'tler~)i,00'''iid rro.t t*.~ place. ~

the sur\'ey team found rlO evidence to' su~)port the p:Qsslb::;!;:lity .

d'.iversion\)
The Comf)tr'clll~:r" Ger~e>rCJ.l i~6und:t.hatb:-ec. a::u,?e
or

the condi ti 0:1 of ,L'JUr)'D~'C f ~. r~e cords, they ~rere' unab l'e t.o i,tate an

opinion on the disposit:~ton of the rl;uP b.Ltt had no *.~ason to

qlle.stion the ABC conelLIsion:"j:Lt'h.r~e:g2.rd to d:ivers'~t'onb The

'. Co'npt rolle r h ad b~2en as ke d to if) 'l,8Sti g2. te this slt'uat'ion' b~y'

alarrned Joint Corr.;nittee of the Corlgre~ss cn Atc)1nic. Ene,r~J

;:oY1
7 SeD~:::'lrl""'b~~'19b"'6
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to
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H l~ot~'{i t'h3 t a~. di ng e xtensi ve
revie\'ls of'
'~JUr'1ECls operations neither the AEC nqr :~rU~y=EC have be-en .ble

to iClentify ,{:Ltl1 3, 11:Lgh degrej~~ of'. cez"ltc.l.nty the: speciic

or

ran

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causes of

, .

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.

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II

Dqr~Lr1;s th.9 period j{ttgust 1958 to Octo'be!'" 1965 ~ }rD1IEC~


1-L_,') 5 iI!"r
to- ove
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H(~tl~?.r1t.itles .. in individual shipr:l.ents=t
do:-$.0;stic as ~'lel1 ~?;,~3. forelr;rl, c~r.e :not confirmed j_'nd.ependentJ~y
b~~:trleAEC.
Stlcl~l ~~cti'Otl~:i rlct~le 'been .outsIde t:he s'c:6pe or the.
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be 'asswned fClr.,
t0e. purpo~)e ai' U",S~ 'n.a.tlor12.1 secu.rity that' diversion of" spec~ial.',!'
rlu'clear Tnclteri.2.1s to :[~)r',ael ,by D1..... Sh2.IJi~o a.~d h'i$ associa.tes'
l::;V. a di st :i.n ct p o~, s 1 bi:lj~ ty .,
S neh' a d1 \r~~ :~si 0:1 ':mlgh:t b e ' ,
'
ev:oiutionaFj c1r r)e volt..l.t:1 ()nc-lr:r l'JU:IEC ~~las i"ormed Oy Dr. Sh2..piro.
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To the. best .of~ Ol.-lr k,:ncn'l-l.edg!~,: t11~, s.trllce :~:;I1-tch.. gave
s.\~':P~.'~:Yf~iS or:;l P e XIS cr:~ne 1 1~ J:"e e~ rU,:rl 0 fO' 'e:~ ~~ t'E1:ci 1:L t y. pi:~fp a.tnt s ~.

tlj~~e.:-.':time ,at which the .rna:te'ri'a:l co\.lld: h2.~.re been' Itrbst eEtsily

di:'v,e,i~ted to Is:c2el. and t:h,e' ti~ne at 'n'11ic'[1 evic1e'nce":of's,.uch a

djK~;e~"rsion could best be 'c:c;ve'r(~'d"


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af';~k:~i/rs at 1,IUr-,IEC frd:m 1957 on', ,.,a (i+ VE~rs;j~or:r. could:,'li.;five:: o,ccu"rred'".

a~:~';;.?J1y tin~e:; b.ut the PE~'l")i(>d J'(~.J1~2.-!?Y ', .._,' F.~~l)'i~uar:r> 1;9:p;:~.:.i's. 'ce~r't2J.:niy

t n~'~'/~:Jn 0 s t sus p e' c t .,


vri t:r~L . !l'c2'g a r ,j ~~.q.,.th ~: .. lif~lt'e ria 1, . i t'~':'e:'J- r.:J .i't

CO~u,+:,GJ.. have been' ship;pecI j~n l~ss t~h,'2n c'l"~~.ti.c2.1 lots.,' or s.ay

tW'.f~~~rr~y pounds !J.er lot..


l~e~d, (~oated ~)r' rLicl{el plaJ~,~'d~ l:t

~.'"o1J:~&l px"'esent no ;r2.d:~Lat.iQrl 'hazard ?-n.cl .c()uld: have",~:?'s-i"ly' gone

lJy,',~:;-~ti,1) lo~at i c P oU'ch' ()r 1 srae 11 m'e r~chc~r1-t ship' .or e~i~,:n. . 1, .t\l.'

J\l.r:ll~ne s .
Transp':ort a.ti.c,n 0~r di.ve t,t,e.,} m2.te rial. to' I:s rae--l

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In Septe'rnlJeJ~ 1969' CIlt' 1d23 irl,for~!7:ed by thE~' FBI t.h.at
Sh';~'fJi'ro h2.d beer~i~:1terv'ie~}"2d t>y ft:EC c>fficials C?n 1~4 August

Q.

19:!~:9...
O'n the ba.sis oJ' inf~orm~:~tion, o-e'veloped duri~}b' t'he

i nt.e;'r,view) .p art 1 cll-1a)~ly S:t12..P:~ J~O i. s s.te~tejnent th2.t [ie. had' never

i~u:~nished c.lcsslfied in'fo:r'J~12ti,bn to "u~nauthorized I:~":rS0l1S'3 tile

AEG 11as, adv~ised tll~lt i t d'l~es !~.ot contemnlate r'Urtrl'er a.c'tion

ont.. h is matter. ''li11e FBJ: ~LI1forlf\'.ed CIA, ttfat ~'ihl1eth:eY'h"_ad

de'le"loped illforn12tl~Lor.t clea.:rrlj-l' pointing to Sh2piro ~"s.' pronounce,!.


pro':-Israeli S;,rm~)atr1ies 2~ncl ,clcse cor~t2..cts \-;:ith . Israeli.

ofi~icials

thE~

to

r=

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FBI believeci tr1a.t


p~oduce 3Jl:,r

f~acts

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f'urtll'E~I~ investiGation would b:eunllke.ly

le;~d::Lrlg to con.-victi.orl andther2_fore

~e:r~ terrn_tna.tin~~ trl,eixl ~actt\re irive:3~iGa.t.ibn,__ It ,stl6uJ;d. be

:noted th2.t the ,AE'C n1eetl.11~~ 1'lith Shapiro ~({2..S Duot coo::?dir.ated

'"lit'h CIA althoug;h trle P.I~C \'123 t,;ell 2't 'lare of" CIAts :Lv.terest j~n

the

affair~

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F a,J~?'\,F; 1 tlX .Te s t ',FCtc~L~::Lty'. p.~~oJ'2,cf.;" 3h"i:-d b~ee~qle:rs::,,~ \i.it1:i spe'cia-l

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