Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
SOCIAL REALITIES:
Practical Solutions to
TYRRELL BURGESS*
Practical
Problems
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Et cetera
FALL 1985
children who cannot read. Very little of this is concerned with the question
of how children are to learn to read. The knowledge from these investigations may or may not help: if it does, it will be a lucky chance. These
investigations are not specially designed to ofFer practical help.
I would suggest that the way to solve the practical problem of teaching
children to read, whatever their circumstances, is to try a number of reading
methods until we fmd one that works. The kind of knowledge that is required for this is quite different from the kind of knowledge which is sought
by those who use the problem as an occasion for research. The usual outcome ofthe kind of investigation that I have just described is the assertion
by sociologists that improvement in reading is impossible until all the other
associated factors are mitigated-that we cannot change anything unless
we change everything.
Here is an example taken from David Donnison, then Director of the
Centre for Environmental Studies, introducing the longitudinal study of
child development undertaken by the National Children's Bureau. (1) Professor Donnison writes:
Living conditions for families with young children probably vary more
greatly-inequalities are sharper-than for any other type of household. Many
children live in the newest and leafiest suburbs within easy reach of well paid
jobs in expanding industries, new schools and shops, extensive parks, and
all the advantages of urban and rural life. But many others live in overcrowded
quarters where people are constantly on the move, social organisation is weak,
unemployment is rife, schools are old and under-staffed, and there is no open
space or legitimate playground.
Such patterns are the outcome of a long history of economic and social
development, reinforced or modified by the policies followed by central and
local authorities for family allowances, employment, housing, transport, and
land uses. Too often they are re-emphasised rather than corrected by the
deployment of educational resources. There is no time to be lost in setting
about the task of changing them.
Professor Donnison concludes:
How much do children learn? How far behind the others do the weaker
performers fall? . . . What can we do to improve the situation?
The patterns glimpsed in the National Child Development Study are so
deeply embedded in this country's economic and social structure that they
cannot be greatly changed by anything short of equally far-reaching changes
in that structure.
Professor Donnison is explicit that the performance ofthe weaker learners
cannot be greatly changed unless we change the country's economic and
social structure. Professor Donnison is a well-meaning man, but his mistaken
view of social science leads him to write absurdities and greatly demoralizes
those who might help children to learn.
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sciences bewilder and mislead professionals and public alike. I do not believe,
however, that this is inevitable. The bewilderment stems from mistaken
theory and practice, and both can be corrected.
II
The best hope of corrertion lies through developing the work of Karl Popper.
His epistemology, developed initially in relation to the physical sciences, (5)
is equally promising in the social sciences. (6) In particular his advocacy
of "piecemeal social engineering," his plea to "minimize misery," and his
understanding of the importance of institutions together offer a basis for
the harnessing of social science for social improvement. Unfortunately these
insights have been largely neglected. This is partly because his ideas are
scattered throughout what is now a very large volume of work.
Popper's most convenient short account of his view of the social sciences
is set out in a relatively recent symposium, (7) summarized as an appendix
to the present paper (Popper's "twenty-seven theses" on the logic of the
social sciences).
Popper's main thesis is one which he summarizes elsewhere in the schema
Pi^TT->EE->P2: scientific discussions start with a problem (Pi) to
which we offer a tentative solution, or theory (TT); this theory is then
criticized to eliminate error (EE); the theory and its critical revision lead
to new problems (P2). It seems to me a more fruitful explanation than
others of how knowledge advances, and in particular it avoids the problem
of the logical impossibility of induction. It is important to realize, however,
that it is a logical explanation, not a psychological one. It does not imply
a belief that that is what all individual scientists consciously do. Indeed
it accommodates the immense variety of practices of individual scientists,
including the random, accidental, and creative insights which are indispensable to human progress. Such strokes of genius can be readily dealt with
and made more fruitful if they are regarded as solutions to problems (TT).
There is indeed an implied lesson to be learned from Popper's schema,
though so far as I know he himself has not made this explicit. It is that
knowledge will be more quickly advanced if scientists are aware of the logic
of the process and if their practice is in tune with it. In particular it suggests
that as much care must be taken in formulating problems as in searching
for solutions, and that solutions must be capable of being tested. All three
steps require creative insight.
I believe that it is in the first step-the initial formulation of problemsthat the social sciences are at their weakest, and that this weakness is responsible for the social sciences' continuing ineffectiveness. Although Popper's
twenty-seven theses represent the strongest statement about what the social
sciences could be, the theses themselves contain echoes of this weakness
which diminish the force of Popper's concluding suggestion for the theses'
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in
I find this unsatisfactory. This is partly because serious practical problems demand better of us, and partly because the formulation glosses over
a crucial problem for the social sciences, that is the relationship between
knowledge and pratice. I do not think that Popper himself has ever explicitly worked out quite what this relationship should be. He is not, of course,
uninterested in practical matters. On the contrary, his plea to minimize
misery is as passionate as "ecrase rinfame"-and his concept of piecemeal
social engineering is the world's best hope of achieving it. But he himself
has confessed that he has not followed this through.
In the hands of most social scientists, however, the flaw in Popper's fifth
thesis becomes extremely damaging. It leads to the relegation of serious
problems to the status of mere occasions for research. It relieves the research
itself from the discipline of relevance. It encourages the endless elabora-
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which I have elsewhere characterized as the "autonomous" and the "service" traditions. (8)Those who work in the autonomous tradition speak of
the "preservation," "extension," and "dissemination" of knowledge, often
"for its own sake." They speak of pursuing the truth wherever it may lead,
regardless of the consequences. In its extreme version, as advanced for example by George Steiner, (9) it would place the pursuit of truth above the
existence of the human race. The service tradition starts from a different
place. Its activity is not self-justifying but explained and defended in terms
outside the pursuit of knowledge, usually in terms of a change that might
be accomplished in an individual or in society. Both these traditions are
of enormous value, and both ought to be protected. It is of paramount
importance, too, that they be distinguished, and that we should always be
clear, in any particular enquiry, which of them forms the basis for our work.
Teaching children to read is not a matter of pursuing the truth about
children, it is a matter of trying a number of reading methods. It is an
engineering, not a scientific problem.
We can similarly understand the nature of the difficulty about statistical
significance by recognizing that it is a matter of imagining that the solution to a formal problem is apt for a practical problem. The Greeks illustrated the confusion very well with their famous problem of Achilles and
the tortoise. Achilles ran twice as fast as the tortoise, so the tortoise had
a mile start; when Achilles had covered the mile, the tortoise had gone half
a mile; when Achilles had done that half mile, the tortoise had done a quarter
of a mile. . ., and so on, Achilles never passed the tortoise. There is nothing
wrong with the mathematics; it just has nothing to do with reality. A similar
misunderstanding lies at the heart of much of the quantitative work in the
social sciences.
Similarly, in the economic example given earlier, the distinction between
positive and normative statements in the social sciences is unhelpful. What
we have instead are different kinds of problems. There are scientific problems like "What is the incidence of unemployment and how does it arise?"
and there are problems of social engineering like "How do we get from
more imemployment to less?" There is nothing "normative" about the second
question: it is a matter of choosing a solution and testing whether or not
it is effective, in other words by an appeal to the facts. Similarly the question of whether unemployment is worse than inflation is clarified by identifying what problem (of social engineering) one is concerned to solve. If
our problem is to get from more human misery to less, we should test (by
reference to the facts) which of a number of policies (including reducing
unemployment or curbing inflation) are most apt. The determination to
reduce human misery itself may rest upon a value judgment. It may be
that a value judgment determines which of our infinity of possible problems we determine to tackle. But in this respect problems of (social) engineering are no different from problems of (social) science. What is more, our
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determination may not depend upon a value judgment at all but upon the
testable theory that a reduction in human misery will lead to the Government's re-election.
It is in this context-in the recognition that we have different kinds of
problems-that Popper's statements about values are of such importance.
Whether our problems are those of science or of engineering we must distinguish between scientific and extra-scientific values. In this there is no
distinction between "what is" and "what is to be done." The question of
whether we ought to do this or that remains for scientists as well as for
engineers. Both are under an equal obligation to be clear about such value
questions and about their answers to them. But in each case it is possible
to bring one's values into the realm of rational discussion by recasting them
in the form of problems which are amenable to testable solutions. It is in
this way that social science and social engineering can be advanced.
This brings us to Popper's "suggestion" that the fundamental problems
of a purely theoretical social science are the situational logic of and theory
of institutions and traditions. The task of this theoretical social science,
as Popper puts it elsewhere, (10) is "to try to anticipate the unintended
consequences of our actions."
The task of social engineering is different. It is to devise solutions to
social problems and to test these solutions. Indeed it may have to reformulate social problems so that solutions are possible. And the solutions will
always be institutions which are testable for their aptness and success.
The relationship between the two is like that between physical science
and engineering. Engineering problems may be solved with or without
the aid of theory. The engineer cannot fly in the face of the physical facts,
though he may propose ways of overcoming them. A developed social science
may not only improve understanding but also give grounds for a social
engineering that in tackling our urgent problems may be fruitful, apt, and
free from harm.
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Et cetera
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7. K.R. Popper, "The Logic of the Social Sciences," in Theodor W. Adorno et al,
The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology, Glyn Adey and David Frisby, eds.
(Heinemann, 1976).
8. Tyrrell Burgess, Education After School (Gollancz and Penguin, 1977).
9. George Steiner, "Has Truth a Future?," The Listener, January 12, 1978.
10. K.R. Popper, "Reason or Revolution," in Adorno, op.cit.
Appendix
Popper's "The Logic of the Social Sciences"
The "twenty seven theses" in which Popper sets out the logic ofthe social
sciences can be baldly summarized as follows (thesis numbers in brackets).
We know a great deal, yet our ignorance is boundless: with each problem
we solve we discover new problems and undermine previous certainties [1,2].
The logic of knowledge must accommodate this tension between knowledge
and ignorance [3]. Knowledge starts from problems, and our achievement
in advancing knowledge is proportionate to the significance ofthe problems
we tackle [4,5].
The main thesis is that the method of social science consists in trying tentative solutions to problems: these solutions are proposed and criticized, and
criticism consists of attempts at refutation. If the solution is refuted we
try again; if it survives we accept it temporarily, as worthy of being criticized. This is a consciously critical development of the process of "trial
and error." The objectivity of science lies in the objectivity of critical
method. [6]
The tension between knowledge and ignorance leads to problems and
tentative solutions, a thesis which contrasts strongly with the "misguided
naturalism" of induction [7]. The recent preeminence of anthropology, an
alleged descriptive, objective science, over theoretical sociology is a victory for misguided naturalism. Even though a "subject" is simply an artificially demarcated conglomerate of problems and solutions, the continuing
victory of anthropology, of misguided naturalism, woiild be a disaster. There
is no such thing as a purely observational science: there are only sciences
in which we theorize [8-10,21].
The objectivity of a science does not depend on the objectivity of the
scientist, but upon a critical tradition: not on individuals but on the social
results of mutual criticism. Objectivity is to be expressed in terms of social
ideas, like competition between individuals and "schools," tradition (especially the critical tradition), social institutions like publishers, and the power
ofthe state in tolerating debate [11-13].
In critical discussion we can distinguish the question ofthe truth of an
assertion, its relevance, interest, and significance to problems of interest;
and the question of its relevance, interest, and significance for various extrascientific problems [14].
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The most important function of purely deductive logic is that of an instrument of criticism. Deductive logic is the theory of the transmission
of truth from the premises to the conclusion, and it is also the theory of
the retransmission of falsity from the conclusion to at least one of the
premises. It is the theory of rational criticism, and deductive systemsthat is, what we work with in the sciences. The concept of truth is indispensable for this approach [15-20].
Sociology is autonomous in that it can and must make itself independent of psychology (which itself is a socal science) and in that we cannot
reduce the sociology of understanding to psychology [22-24].
There is a purely objective method in the social sciences, the method
of objective understanding or situational logic. The explanations of situational logic are rational, theoretical constructions and, in their oversimplification, are false-but with considerable truth content. Situational
logic assumed a physical world in which we act, including a social world
and social institutions [25-27].
These theses lead to a "suggestion" for the social sciences. This is:
We may, perhaps, accept provisionally, as the fundamental problems of a
purely theoretical sociology, the general situational logic of and the theory of
institutions and traditions. This would include such problems as the following:
1. Institutions do not act; rather, only individuals act, in or for or through
institutions. The general situations logic of these actions will be the theory
of the quasi-actions of institutions.
2. We might construct a theory of intended or unintended institutional consequences of purposive action. This could also lead to a theory ofthe creation and development of institutions.