Reading and Writing Ethics in English

Prof. Dr. Zachary Goldberg

Universitt Regensburg
(18.05.2015)

The challenge of moral universalism:

An assessment of James Rachels logical approach
(By Moiss Medrano)
Dealing with ethical and moral issues is not an easy thing. There are many and different
positions, opinions and arguments when one of those issues are raised, particularly at the
scholarly level and regarding to cultural practices and values.1 James Rachel is one of those
who deals with ethical-moral issues at that level, from the standpoint of moral universalism.
Here, I will discuss the logic argument used by Rachel to prove the invalidity of
cultural relativism and the existence of (universal) moral rules that all societies have in
common, limiting myself to the analysis of his article The challenge of cultural relativism.2
My allegation is that the logic argumentation of Rachels is not necessarily true in its
conclusion, and is epistemologically confusing.3
The way to proceed is as it follows: Firstly, I will present Rachels views on cultural
relativism and moral universalism. Secondly, I will show why the argument of Rachels (the
logic argument) is unsatisfactory and epistemologically confusing. Finally, I will conclude
affirming that the moral universal values are nevertheless a challenge we must take seriously.
I now begin with the first point.
1. James Rachels views on cultural relativism and universal moral
James Rachels article deals with cultural relativism, which it is understood by him
as a theory about the nature of morality, and makes an evaluation of it in the form of rational
analysis.4 In his view, cultural relativism is not so plausible as it first appears to be when
analysed in the proposed way. He defends the idea of the existence of some common moral
rules in all societies.
1

To know some arguments on universal or relatives cultural practices and values cf. Matthew Thomas
Johnson, Towards the Development of Objective, Universal Criteria of Cultural Evaluation: The Challenges
Posed by Anti-Foundationalism, Culturalism and Romanticism, Soc Indic Res (2011) 102:275296. Available
online in http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11205-010-9680-x/fulltext.html. See also Elizabeth M.
Zechenter, In the name of culture: cultural relativism and the abuse of the individual, Journal of
Anthropological Research 53 (1997), 319-347.
2 James Rachels, The Challenge of cultural relativism, 10. Available online in
http://rintintin.colorado.edu/~vancecd/phil1100/Rachels1.pdf.
3
In modern times, Epistemology, in general terms, is the theory of true knowledge. It asks the question on
how we know things in general; to what extent our knowledge is (or not) real or valid. For a comprehension
of the concept see: Walter Brugger and Harald Schndorf (eds.). Diccionario de Filosofa. 2 Translated from
German by Ral Gabas. Friburgo de Brisgovia, Herder Editorial, 2014, 103-104. A similar conception of
epistemology affirms that Epistemology is the study of how human knowledge is obtained: its bases, forms
and criteria. Cf. Donald K. McKim. Westminster Dictionary of Theological Terms. Louisville, Westminster John
Knox Press, 1996, 91.
4
James Rachels, The challenge, 3.

For cultural relativist universal truth in ethics is a myth, according to Rachels

understanding of cultural relativism. They find this idea the key for the understanding of
morality, and sustain the existence of just various cultural codes. The strategy of cultural
relativist, affirms Rachels, is to argue from facts about the differences between cultural
outlooks to a conclusion about the status of morality.5 This strategy is an invitation to accept
the Cultural Differences Argument.
The Cultural Differences Argument, as Rachels calls it, seems to be persuasive for
some but is not sound from a logical point of view. To make his point, he uses two specific
examples of reasoning, which in turn leads to the more general one (the Cultural Differences
Argument). The two examples are invalid in their conclusion, according to Rachels. These are
the examples used by the author:6
Reasoning 1:
a. The Greeks believed it was wrong to eat the dead, whereas the Callatians believed it
was right to eat dead.
b. Therefore, eating the dead is neither objectively fight nor objectively wrong. It is merely
a matter of opinin, which varies from culture to culture.
Reasoning 2:
a. The Eskimos see nothing wrong with infanticide, whereas Americans believe
infanticide is immoral.
b. Therefore, infanticide is neither objectively right nor objectively wrong. It is merely a
matter of opinin, which varies from culture of culture.
These two specific examples are a variation of the more fundamental and general one which
says:
a. Different cultures have different moral codes
b. Therefore, there is no objective truth in morality. Right and wrong are only matters
of opinin, and opinions vary from culture to culture.
On the one hand, the problem with this argument, affirms Rachels, is that its conclusion
does not follow from the premise. The premise is concerned with what people belief whereas
the conclusion concerns with what really is the case. Thus, logically speaking, the conclusion
is fallacious and invalid. Even more, it does not follow from mere facts, as in the above given
specific examples, that there is not objective truth in the matter.

5
6

Ibd., 3 4.
The examples are to be found in Ibd., 4.

On the other hand, there would be some (negative) consequences if we take this
argument seriously. The consequences, basically, have to do with the impossibility to make
any judgment, in regard to either ones own cultural practices or others.7
In any case, cultural relativism seems to overestimate the extent of differences between
cultures, concerning their views of right and wrong. However, as Rachel says it, the cultures
does not differ nearly as much as it appears.8 As in the case of the specific examples, the
differences lie on the belief system, not in values. As he puts it:
The point is that many factors work together to produce the customs of a
society. The societys values are only one of them. Other matters, such as the
religions and factual beliefs held by its members, and the physical
circumstances in which they must live, are also important. We cannot conclude,
then, merely because customs differ, that there is a disagreement about values.
The difference in custom may be attributable to some other aspect of social
life.9
Thus, Rachels differentiates customs from values, and also values from belief. The
latter two (values and belief), between others, produce customs, which also imply that they are
more fundamental than customs.
To support the affirmation that cultures does not differ in values, he uses the Eskimos
example to prove it. For him, Eskimos are protective of their children despite appearances,
and it is logically demonstrable. The logic, according to the author, goes in this way:10
a. Human infants are helpless and cannot survive if they are not given extensive care for
a period of years.
b. Therefore, if a group did not care for its Young, the Young would not survive, and the
older members of the group would not be replaced. After a while the group would die
out.
c. Therefore, any cultural group that continues to exist must care for its Young. Infants
that are not cared must be the exception rather than the rule.
In this kind of reasoning, affirms Rachels, others values must be more or less universal.
And the general theoretical point, related to it, is that
there are some moral rules that all societies will have in common, because
those rules are necessary for society to exist Cultures may differ in what they
regard as legitimate exceptions to the rules, but this disagreement exist against
a background of agreement on the larger issues.

Ibd., 5 7.
Ibd., 7.
9
Ibd., 7.
10
Ibd., 9.
8

All the before shows how James Rachels deals with cultural relativism. He uses
logic argumentation related to some specific examples to make his points, and show the
invalidity of the cultural relativist theory. He also argues that there is a universal morality
based on rules that all cultures shares. Here I finish this part of my exposition. I turn now to
my second point.
2. The no satisfactory logic argument and its confusing epistemology
It has been shown that Rachels find cultural relativism to be invalid. According to
him, the conclusion of the Cultural Differences Argument does not follow from the premise.
This imply that the strategy of arguing from facts does not guaranty a logical conclusion.
Furthermore, there are some moral rules which are common to all societies, and the moral
differences between cultures regards to (legitimate) exceptions to the rule, which also support
the invalidity of cultural relativism.
I consider Rachels logic argumentation not to be logical satisfactory, and
epistemologically confusing. In first place, it is necessary to look closer at the logical
construction of Rachels examples. One of Rachel examples is constructed as it follows:
a. The Eskimos see nothing wrong with infanticide, whereas Americans believe
infanticide is immoral.
b. Therefore, infanticide is neither objectively right nor objectively wrong. It is merely a
matter of opinin, which varies from culture of culture
In this example seems to be true that the conclusion does not follow from the premise.
This is right, but the question is, why? Is it because the conclusion does not merely follow from
the premise or because the argument itself is not inferred and constructed in an appropriate
manner by the author? Even more, does the argument reflect objectively the point of cultural
relativists?
In the revised example, the premise concern to judgment (the Eskimos see nothing
wrong with) and belief (American believe), but the conclusion, as inferred and
constructed by Rachels, refers only to judgment. This kind of (logical) construction lead us to
think that, cultural relativism propones not only moral differences between cultures, but also
wrong and invalid argumentation. And, it seems right since there is not a relation of
consequence between the propositions in the example.
As we know, all (deductive) arguments consist of two propositions which are given in
a relation of consequence between them. Thus, an argument have a premise (s) and the
conclusion. If the premise (s) is (are) true, and the conclusion is obtained according the
corresponding rules, then the conclusion would be necessarily true. This means that the
4

conclusion preserves the true of the premise. To know whether or not an argument of this type
is valid, the negation of the conclusion would give a logical contradiction between the
conclusion and its premises.11

But in the way Rachels puts the cultural relativisms

arguments the latter is not (logical) possible and therefore is invalid. Nevertheless, in the last
example, the argument really says nothing about being objectively right or wrong. The
argument actually says this:
a. Infanticide is judged not to be wrong by Eskimos
b. Infanticide is believed to be immoral by Americans
c. Therefore, infanticide is dealt differently by Americans and Eskimos.
Does this cultural relativisms argument necessarily lead to the idea of moral
relativity? Does says anything about universal truth in ethic? I think that it neither lead to
moral relativity nor says something about universal truth in ethic, necessarily. However, putting
the argument as it has been done here, shows the validity of the argument of cultural
relativists.
In any case, does this means that Rachels logic, still is right and valid in its universal
ethical truths claim? Well, assuming that it is possible to have an absolute understanding and
definition of what is moral, we cannot sustain Rachels argumentation at this point. According
to the author, there are some rules that all societies have in common and moral rules are
necessary for society to exist, therefore, there are universal moral rules.
The problem with this argument is twofold. On the one hand, the conclusion does not
preserve necessarily the truth of the premises. It could be the case that there are some societies
that we do not know yet, be it either past, present or future societies, and therefore we cannot
support the conclusion of universal moral rules present in all societies. Even more, there need
to be someone who would decide in every single case what a necessary moral rule for the
society to exist is. On the other hand, there is an epistemological confusion in this argument:
Rachel also constructed his argument using examples from experience which, as he pointed
out at the beginning of his article, they do not guaranty the logical conclusion of a proposition.
And this is so true for his own arguments.
3. Conclusion
Rachel is right by pointing out that it is not possible to guarantee a logical conclusion of a
proposition by the strategy of arguing from facts. However, it seems to be true that Cultural

11

On this see Rafael Ferber. Conceptos fundamentales de la filosofa. Barcelona, Herder, 1995, 49 86.

relativism is valid in its argumentation of the different ways cultures deal with problems
(religious, moral?).
Rachel tries to show the existence and importance of universal truth in ethic, and the existence
of universal values. He does it though by using some specific facts. The problem with his
argumentation and the way of doing it is twofold: the conclusion is not necessarily derived
from the premise, and its epistemology confuses experience with logic. In both cases, it is
not easy to support universal values or moral.
Nevertheless, I find very plausible and important the looking for universal values in our todays
world. But here, it is important to use another epistemology and logical framework.