China DA

China DA
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China is increasing investment in Mexican oil to sustain its
economy China wants to crowd the US out of the market
Knowland 6/10/13 [Don, writer for The World Socialist Web Site, published by
the International Committee of the Fourth International, the leadership of the world
socialist movement, Chinas president visits Mexico and Central America seeking
economic ties]
Chinas new president, Xi Jinping, traveled to Trinidad and Tobago, Costa

Rica and then Mexico last week, on the eve of his weekend meeting in California with US
President Barack Obama. Xis trip comes just a month after Obamas own visit in early May to Mexico
and to Central America. Xi arrived in Trinidad just as US Vice President Joe Biden finished a six-day trip
Xis trip is
part of a stiffening response by China to US attempts to undercut
Chinese efforts to assure itself worldwide access to critical mineral
resources, and to encircle China under the guise of its pivot to Asia
policy. There the US has stoked Japan, the Philippines and Vietnam into increasingly abrasive relations
to Colombia, Trinidad and Brazil aimed at shoring up US economic interests in the region.
with China over competing claims to various islands in the oil and gas-rich East China and South China
Seas. China
wants to remind the US that just as the US has influence in

regions close to China, China too has rising influence in the Americas,
Past
Chinese presidents were deferential to the US, making reference to Latin
America as Washingtons backyard, as US Secretary of State John Kerry himself recently
called it in testimony in April before the US Congress. But Xis Latin America trip, coming early
in his presidency, shows little concern for American reaction, Evan Ellis, a professor at
the National Defense University in Washington, told Bloomberg News. China had already invested
according to Matt Ferchen, a scholar at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy in Beijing.
heavily in South America in recent years, striking major trade deals with the regions governments.
Beginning in 2009, it
supplanted the US as the number one trading partner of
Brazil, Latin Americas foremost economy , as well as its number one source of foreign direct
investment. In the decade spanning 2000 to 2010, trade between China and Latin America as a whole
increased 1,500 percent. By 2010, it had risen to $261.2 billion, gaining steadily on US-Latin American
trade, which amounted to $351 billion last year. Between 2002 and 2011, Chinese foreign direct
The areas where US

capitalism has retained clear dominance, Mexico and Central America, were
the focus of Xis trip. Relations between China and Mexico have been tepid in the past, and they
investment in the region rose 100-fold from $22.6 million to $22.7 billion.
worsened after former President Felipe Calderon hosted the Dalai Lama in 2011. More fundamentally,
their economic relations have been unbalanced. In 2012 the value of Chinas exports to Mexico were ten
times those of Mexico to China, $57 billion to $5.7 billion.
Mexico exported to China copper and
other minerals, oil, cotton and car parts, and imported electronics, toys, plastics and furniture. Mexico
and China also have been direct competitors in supplying the US market with manufactured goods.
Mexican businessmen have long felt threatened by China undercutting them as a cheap labor platform,
particularly in electronic and consumer products industries. A decade ago Mexicos average labor costs
were nearly three times higher than Chinas. Recently that labor-cost differential has narrowed sharply,
eating into Chinese cost advantage, so Mexico has regained some US market share. According to at least
one report this year, hourly wages in Mexico are now lower than in China. Mexican companies still
complain that Chinese workplace rules on flexibility, lower quality control and lack of respect for
Mexicos new president,

visited China two months ago, seeking to change this state of affairs.
The reciprocal visit by Xi this week was an unusually quick diplomatic
follow-up. Upon his arrival, Xi said that he wanted to help with Mexicos huge
trade deficit. This means oil, which China needs to fuel its economy and
the cars of its middle class. Access to strategic raw materials is key to
understanding the dynamic of relations with China, said Hugo Beteta,
intellectual property rights continue to permit unfair competition.
Enrique Pea Nieto,
director for Mexico and Central America of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America
and the Caribbean. Clearly
there is an interest by China in Mexican oil .
China is the principal consumer of coal, gas, oil, of secondary industries like cement, steel,
concrete, said Juan Carlos Rivera, director of Mexicos Center for Business with Asia at the private
Monterrey Technological Institute. Evidently
(China) is looking to satisfy their market

needs. Not coincidentally, Xis visit to Mexico comes just as the Mexican
government is bent on opening up the state oil company Petroleos Mexicanos, or
Pemex, to private and foreign investment in order to stem decreasing
production by funding deepwater drilling. Pea Nieto will soon present an energy reform
bill to the Mexican Congress allowing that. Of the roughly 2.5 million barrels of crude a
day that Pemex presently produces, about 1.2 million are exported. Some 75 percent of
those exports go to the US, but only 7 percent to the Far East, including China .
China is looking for much more. During Pea Nietos April visit to China,
Pemex signed its first long-term contract with a Chinese company, agreeing
to ship 30,000 barrels a day to the state oil company Sinopec. This week Pemex said
the Export-Import Bank of China would provide it with a $1 billion credit line
to buy ships and offshore equipment . It also signed a memorandum of understanding with
state-owned Xinxing Cathay International Group to explore ways to work together on pipelines. For its
Mexico is looking to diversify its trade and investment, which have long
been dominated by the US. It also recognizes Chinas rise as a geopolitical
player far beyond Asia. In the new global geopolitical and economic map, China is, and I think it has
part,
arrived to stay, the worlds second economic power," Mexican vice minister of foreign affairs Carlos De
Mexico has to understand and strengthen relations with a nation

that has such great strategic value. In a speech before the Mexican Senate, Xi said the
Sino-Mexican relationship stands before unprecedented opportunities.
China is willing to work alongside Mexico to improve the strategic
association between the two countries, Xi added. Xi also called on the two countries to
Icaza said.
oppose protectionism and try to resolve trade disagreements through consultation. He and Pea Nieto
agreed to end a dispute over Chinese textiles that had led to litigation. The Chinese sought to sign at
least a dozen agreements in the fields of trade, energy, tourism (a huge Mexican industry), science and
technology during Xis visit. All that was accomplished, however, were agreements to cooperate on
commercial defense, and on access for Mexican tequila and Mexican pork to the Chinese market.
Mexican Foreign Minister Jose Antonio Meade said it was too soon for a free-trade agreement between
the two countries, perhaps reflecting caution as to the effect of courting China on Mexicos neighbor to
the north. Mexico, along with the US and other Pacific Rim countries, but not China, is party to the TransPacific Partnership negotiations, an effort to increase trade among the Americas, Asia and Australasia.
Mexico is keen not to jeopardize those talks. Xi also visited Trinidad and Tobago, with which China has
had diplomatic ties for almost 40 years. Trinidad is also a major trading partner in the Caribbean for
China. Xis meetings in Trinidad were aimed at buying up liquified natural gas (LNG). Chinas LNG
purchases rose 20 percent last year; it is eying Trinidads surplus now that the United States is shifting
from Caribbean LNG imports to greater reliance on domestic shale gas extracts. During this phase of Xis
trip, China utilized the checkbook diplomacy it has pursued in Africa. It promised $3 billion in
concessionary loans for 10 Caribbean countries, whose leaders flew in to meet with Xi. Costa Rica is the
only Central American country with diplomatic relations with China; the other Central American
countries recognize Taiwan, a legacy of US dominance of the region. Xi ended his trip with a visit there
with Costa Rican President Laura Chinchilla. The Chinese announced $2 billion in deals with Costa Rica,
including $1.3 billion for joint construction of a refinery on the Caribbean coast, and hundreds of millions
for a new highway. Chinchilla said her country was pursuing additional agreements on investment in
In contrast to Chinas Xi, Obama, accomplished

nothing concrete on the economic front during his May trip to the same
region, and brought no investment dollars . Similarly, Bidens trip garnered only a vague
clean energy and student exchanges.
accord to boost investment and economic cooperation with 15 Caribbean nations, and a one-year free
In
contrast, according to a report published last year by Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington-based
think tank, China has made $75 billion in loan commitments in Latin America
trade agreement with Colombia. The US offered no concrete plans for investment or economic aid.
over the last six years, topping total lending by the World Bank and the Inter-American Development
China is increasing its funding in the region just as the US

has been pressured by its dwindling economic position to cut aid and
Bank combined.
investment. Confronted with a rising challenge to its longstanding

economic hegemony, the US inevitably leans more heavily on military and
intelligence pacts and training to assert its influence in the region.
US threats to Chinese oil acquisition in Latin America causes a

new cold war
Fergusson 12 [Robbie Murray, MS in China In The International Arena, The
Chinese Challenge to the Monroe Doctrine, http://www.e-ir.info/2012/07/23/doeschinese-growth-in-latin-america-threaten-american-interests/, 7/23]
The U.S has some reason to be concerned by the economic implications of

Chinas resource drive in Latin America because while the United States
has traditionally looked to Latin America as its source of numerous
raw materials and a market for its finished products, China is fast replacing the
United States in these roles. [37] The United States has no intention of
being usurped in its role as chief beneficiary of the regions energy
resources, but for every barrel of oil that China purchases from Latin
America, there is potentially one less barrel available for the U. S [38] It is of
course extremely premature to be using words such as usurped as Chinas involvement in the region is at
a very early stage and its energy interests are not overly well defined, but already, Chinas
total
consumption of the five basic commodities grain, meat, oil, coal and steel
has already surpassed that of the USA in all but oil , [39] leading many
analysts such as Hutton to wonder how the global supply of energy can cope with
the emergence of such a hungry economy without conflict over
increasingly scarce resources. [40] The development of China and its interests in the
region is therefore key. Roett & Paz argue that what matters most for Sino-Latin
American energy relations is not where China is today but how it compares
with its position in the world at the start of the twenty-first century and
where it is likely to be in 2030. [41] Due to the triangular relationship
between China, the U.S, and Latin America, any shift of the equilibrium
towards China cannot fail to impact upon the United States . Bajpaee moots the
idea: While not a zero-sum game, growing inter-linkages and interdependence between China and Latin
America is likely to come at the cost of the United States relations with its neighbours, which will only
undermine U.S ability to access the regions energy resources. This will force the U.S to rely on energy
resources from more remote and less stable regions, such as West Africa, the Caspian and the Middle
the future of Sino-American relations with regard to energy

relations is not purely Chinas responsibility America has a part to play too.
Zweig suggests that if the U.S responds negatively to Chinese efforts to
secure resources or improve Chinas energy security, the U.S will not
be creating incentives that encourage China to behave responsibly. Energy
disagreements, then, may indeed become a source of a new cold war.
East. [42] However,
[43] It must surely be in both sides best interests to avoid such a scenario.
China has established an energy sphere of influence in Latin

America US infringement makes military conflict likely
Malik 6 (Dr. Mohan, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies professor, "CHINA'S
GROWING INVOLVEMENT IN LATIN AMERICA," PINR is an independent
organization that utilizes open source intelligence to provide conflict analysis
services in the context of international relations, 6-12-06,
http://www.uyghuramerican.org/articles/300/1/Chinas-Growing-Involvement-inLatin-America/Chinas-Growing-Involvement-in-Latin-America.html)
With the United States preoccupied with Iraq and Afghanistan, Beijing has
obviously been busy carving out a large sphere of influence for itself
in Asia, Africa and Latin America. With the presence of China being felt everywhere, from the
backwaters of the Amazon to mines in the Andes, U.S. dominance in its own backyard is
no longer unquestioned or unrivaled. Opinion is divided on whether China's economic
engagement is guided only by commercial interests or is a ruse to divert attention from Beijing's
geostrategic goals in the region. Some contend that the Chinese presence in Latin America marks the
end of the Monroe Doctrine, while others are more skeptical. Over the long term, Chinese intentions in
Latin America may not be as benign as some China-watchers suggest. Nor can China's expansion be
equated with Japan's or Spain's interest in Latin America because of the highly competitive nature of the
U.S.-China relationship. Beijing calculates that one of the consequences of the burgeoning Sino-Latin
American trade and resource dependency will be a widening of the gap between U.S. and Latin American
interests. As U.S. Deputy Assistant Defense Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs Roger PardoMaurer points out: "China has its own set of political, economic and military interests, requiring us to
carefully distinguish between legitimate commercial initiatives and the possibility of political or
diplomatic efforts to weaken the democratic alliances we have forged." While Beijing's forays do not
indicate a seismic change in the balance of power within Latin America, the very presence of China does
"the China option" affords Latin American

countries greater room for maneuver and an additional source of leverage
vis--vis Washington. While the Chinese may not want to be drawn into
Venezuela, Brazil or Cuba's problems with the United States , that does not mean
make U.S. diplomacy difficult. Increasingly,
that these countries will not play "the China card" in their relations with the United States. Likewise, the
revival of the old ideological debate over which political system -- Chinese authoritarianism or Western
democracy -- delivers more people from poverty, and whether wealth or elections are a greater measure
of freedom does not bode well for Washington's efforts to promote transparency and democracy. Beijing's
strategic interests and unconditional investments prop up many authoritarian regimes, thereby
undercutting Washington's ability to persuade them to change their behavior. Just as the United States
can no longer take the Latin American countries' allegiances for granted, its access to the region's
Washington is increasingly concerned over

Beijing's efforts to "lock up" oil and mineral supplies with new ventures in
Latin America, Africa, Central Asia and Russia, and the Middle East. Hong Kong-based
Takungpao News recently quoted General Xiong Guangkai, the former PLA
deputy chief of staff, as saying that "in the long term, the strategic race for the
world's energy may result in regional tension and even trigger a
military clash." In particular, Beijing's newly cultivated energy alliances with
populist left-wing leaders in Latin America have caused alarm in Washington and
prompted the dispatch in May 2006 of Thomas A. Shannon, Jr., assistant
secretary of state for Western Hemisphere affairs, to hold first-ever talks
with his Chinese counterpart on China's role in a region that some analysts
fear could become a site for great power rivalry.
resources is also far from assured.
Oil war goes nuclear

RT News 11 [US-China conflict: worldwide competition for oil?,
http://rt.com/news/us-china-conflict-oil/]
Chinese jets have headed off an American spy plane over Taiwan, raising
tensions between Beijing and Washington . But Conn Hallinan says the conflict is a
worldwide competition, and both the US and China are out to secure oil
resources. China has warned that relations with the US might become tense after two Chinese
fighter jets intercepted a U2 reconnaissance plane over Taiwan, which China claims as its territory. In
response, Beijing's Defense Ministry said the US must end such flights, as they have severely undermined
mutual trust and remain a major obstacle to the development of military ties. However, US Admiral
Michael Mullen, chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, has announced that America will continue to
Hallinan, of
Foreign Policy in Focus says that this conflict is part of the worldwide
competition for energy resources between the number one and the number
two energy users in the world. I think their [Chinese] anger is justified," Conn Hallinan told
RT. The danger here is that people make mistakes and when
mistakes get made between nuclear powers, that is something we all
run reconnaissance missions near Chinas coastline despite the objections. But Conn
need to worry about. Mainly China is worried that the US could put its
thumb on their energy resources. The South China Sea contains rich oil and gas reserves
and some of the worlds most geo-strategically vital naval routes. " This is part of a worldwide
competition. Right now the US is the number one user of energy in the
world and China is number two. 80 per cent of Chinese energy supplies
move by sea. They either move through the Straits of Hormuz, which is controlled by the American
Fifth Fleet, or they move through the Straits of Malacca, which is controlled by the American Seventh
Fleet, Hallinan said. They
are concerned with keeping their sea lanes open. That

is why they are so pushy about the South China Sea, he concluded.
Extinction
The Straits Times, June 25, 2k (Regional Fallout: No One Gains in War Over
Taiwan. Straits Times. Lexis)
THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale
war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better
serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would
embroil other countries far and near and -- horror of horrors -- raise the possibility of a nuclear
war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases
and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In
the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China
were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as
opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted,
Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in
the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between
India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and
dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General
Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean
War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military
defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict
and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two
choices in Korea -- truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the
US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability,
there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US
estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities.
Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer
disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear
weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies,
told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although
the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it.
He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked
dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass,
we would see the destruction of civilization.
Uniqueness - mexico
China is prioritizing engagement with Latin America especially with Mexico
AP 6/5/13 [Associated Press, Xi visits US, Latin America as leader of more
confident China after decade of explosive growth,
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-06-05/world/39748386_1_trade-growthbeijing-china-s]
BEIJING President Xi Jinping meets his American counterpart, Barack Obama, this week after stops in
the Caribbean and Latin America as the leader of a more confident China following a decade of explosive
From Trinidad to Mexico City, Xi presented Beijing as

an important partner for developing countries and a source of markets and
finance, handing out nearly $4 billion in loans and promising to boost
imports. Chinas newfound self-assurance stems from an economic expansion that saw annual growth
economic and trade growth.
top 10 percent in six of the past 10 years. It passed Japan as the worlds second-biggest economy and
By 2012,
China was a bigger trading partner than the United States for 128 countries,
rebounded quickly from the 2008 global crisis, which still has Western countries limping.
while the U.S. was ahead in just 72, according to an Associated Press tally of export and import data
gathered by the International Monetary Fund. That is a reversal from six years ago, when the U.S. led in
Chinas quick rebound from the 2008 crisis on

the strength of a multibillion-dollar stimulus helped to reassure its own
leaders about the strength of its system. There really were questions about whether the
127 countries, versus just 70 for China.
Chinese system worked well, said Steve Tsang, director of the China Policy Institute at the University of
Nottingham. But the financial crisis and the sense that the Chinese were able to deal with it more
One
sign of Chinas confidence may be Xis itinerary: He meets Obama on Friday
and Saturday only after stops in Trinidad, Costa Rica and Mexico and does it
in California, rather than pushing for a ceremony-laden White House
encounter as previous Chinese leaders did. That suggests Beijing feels it no
longer needs American help to burnish its image and wants to focus on
practical matters, Tsang said. Xi Jinping is sending a clear signal that, Ive got
other priorities that I want to attend to first , he said. Xis predecessors faced a more
effectively, at least until now, suggests to the Chinese leadership that Chinas system worked.
uncertain diplomatic outlook. Jiang Zemin spent the 1990s guiding Beijing out of its diplomatic isolation
following the 1989 crackdown on pro-democracy protesters in Tiananmen Square. Hu Jintao, who
succeeded Jiang in 2002, oversaw efforts to win China a bigger role in the World Bank and other global
bodies. Beijing also stepped up its presence in U.N. peacekeeping work after spending the 1980s and 90s
Xis visit
to the Caribbean and Latin America highlights Chinas growing presence in a
region on the U.S. doorstep. Trade with China is smaller than that with the United States
for much of the region, but is expanding faster an important element for
governments that want to find future sources of growth. Over time, that might
prompt emerging economies to see their interests more aligned with Beijing
following the late supreme leader Deng Xiaopings doctrine of keeping a low profile abroad.
on trade, climate change and other global issues. The voices of emerging powers are getting louder,
said Chen Yuanting, a Latin America specialist at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, an official
think tank. Since
the region is an important part of the emerging powers,

China is attaching importance to developing relations with the region . In
Trinidad, Xi met leaders of nine Caribbean countries and showed off Chinas growing financial muscle,
promising them loans totaling some $3 billion. We really welcomed that generosity, said Trinidadian
Prime Minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar. The money kept flowing at Xis next stop in Costa Rica, where he
Moving
on to Mexico, Xi and President Enrique Pena Nieto said they would take
steps to move toward more balance in their trade. Mexico imported $57 billion in
goods from China last year, while exporting only $5.7 billion back. With new leadership in
China and in Mexico, I think this trip represents an effort on both sides to
promised a $900 million line of credit to finance the possible modernization of an oil refinery.
put the relationship on a new and more positive path , said Matt Ferchen, a Latin
America specialist at Tsinghua University in Beijing, in an email. Other Latin American countries such as
Chile and Brazil have profited from selling iron ore, soybeans and copper to China, but Mexico competes
with China as a manufacturer and, like the United States, runs a large trade deficit with Beijing. In a joint
Beijing had committed to open its markets to

Mexican pork and tequila. Mexico, an oil producer, also could benefit
from booming Chinese energy demand.
statement, Xi and Pena Nieto said
Uniqueness - mexico
China is increasing its influence in Mexico in an attempt to get
oil and as a signal of strength to the US
NYT 6/4/13 [Chinese President Makes Bridge-Building Trip to Mexico]
President Xi Jinping of China arrived in
Mexico City on Tuesday for a three-day visit intended to smooth over
relations that have long been prickly. China has moved forcefully to secure oil and
SAN CRISTOBAL DE LAS CASAS, Mexico
other commodities in South America over the past decade. Mexico Latin Americas second-largest
economy has played a different role though, not supplying China but competing with it to export
manufactured goods like electronics and clothing to the United States. President Xis visit to Mexico,
coming only two months after President Enrique Pea Nieto of Mexico traveled to China, is an effort to
The trip underscores Chinas growing ties

in the hemisphere. Before arriving in Mexico, President Xi visited Central America and the
recast the relationship under two new leaders.
Caribbean, further securing his nations foothold there. In Trinidad and Tobago, he met with 10
Caribbean leaders and promised $3 billion in loans for projects in the region, according to Bloomberg
News. Among the loans was one for $250 million to build a childrens hospital in Trinidad, the
Caribbeans largest energy supplier. China has given billions in loans and aid to Caribbean nations to
build stadiums, roads, ports and tourist resorts, and Mr. Xis visit came days after Vice President Joseph
R. Biden Jr. met with 15 regional leaders in Trinidad, drawing a sharp contrast about what the two
countries had to offer the areas tiny economies. Mr. Biden announced no new initiatives, though he
spoke about providing help for clean energy research and education and promised to dismantle
remaining trade and investment barriers. On Sunday, Mr. Xi traveled to Costa Rica which has no
diplomatic ties with Taiwan and promised almost $300 million in loans to finish building a highway. The
trip sent a clear message to other Central American countries that by withdrawing their recognition of
Taiwan they could get goodies too, Kevin P. Gallagher, a professor at Boston University, wrote in an e-
Latin American leaders have long complained that Washington pays too
little attention to the rest of the hemispheres concerns, and China has
begun to take advantage of that perception . As Latin America and the
Caribbean become less dependent on the United States, they have another
economic ally, and that economic ally is a superpow er, said S. Lynne Walker, the
mail.
director of the China-Americas program at the Institute of the Americas in California. Matt Ferchen, a
Xis
itinerary may also be intended as a message to the United States .
China wants to remind the U.S. that just as the U.S. has influence in regions
close to China, China too has rising influence in the Americas , he wrote in an escholar at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy in Beijing, suggested that President
mail. Analysts will be watching the trip closely for signs that Mexico and China are taking steps toward
changing their frosty relationship.
trade gap with China.
Mexicos government would like to narrow its large
Last year, Mexico imported $57 billion in goods from China and sent back
The two countries

announced a series of agreements late Tuesday covering energy , trade and
only $5.7 billion in products, according to Mexicos Ministry of Economy.
education. We agree on the importance of balancing our trade and investment relationship, Mr. Pea
China
could also send a strong message by announcing investments in Mexican
manufacturing, experts said, perhaps in the automobile industry. At least having the possibility of
Nieto said, noting promises from China to start by accepting more tequila and pork imports.
greater Chinese investment on the table might allow China and Mexico to move beyond their up-till-now
Chinas interest in
natural resources leaves little doubt that it is looking at future oil deals in
Mexico. In a symbolic move, Mexicos state-owned oil monopoly, Pemex,
signed an agreement during Mr. Pea Nietos visit to China in April to ship
30,000 barrels a day to Sinopec, a state-owned company there.
quite dysfunctional and competitive relationship, Mr. Ferchen wrote. Still,
Uniqueness - mexico
China and US are competing for influence in Mexico and
China is ahead
Ellis 6/6/13 [R. Evan Ellis is associate professor with the William J. Perry Center
for Hemispheric Defense Studies, China's New Backyard,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/06/06/china_s_new_backyard_latin_ameri
ca]
Washington has looked with discomfort at China's growing

interest in Latin America. But while Beijing's diplomats bulked up on their Spanish and
For the past decade,
Portuguese, most U.S. policymakers slept soundly, confident that the United States still held a dominant
In April 2005, the U.S. House of

Representatives Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere held a hearing
on China's influence in the hemisphere and concluded that the U.S. position
in the Western Hemisphere was much stronger than China's and, moreover,
that Beijing's economic engagement in the region did not present a security
threat. But that was 2005. In late May of this year, when U.S. Vice President Joe
Biden went to Latin America for a three-day, three-country tour, Beijing was
hot on his heels. Chinese President Xi Jinping arrived in Trinidad and Tobago just days after Biden
position in the minds of its southern neighbors.
left: Whereas Trinidad and Tobago's prime minister, Kamla Persad-Bissessar, characterized her
discussions with Biden as "at times brutal," Xi's stop in Trinidad and Tobago included the unveiling of a
children's hospital funded with $150 million from the Chinese government, discussion of energy projects,
Xi's itinerary took him to Costa Rica

and Mexico on June 4 to 6, but his shadow followed Biden all the way to
Brazil. In Rio de Janeiro, Biden referred to a new "strategic partnership" between
the United States and Brazil, yet his words' impact was undercut by the
strategic partnership that Brazil has had with China since 1993 and the muchand meetings with seven Caribbean heads of state.
publicized fact that China overtook the United States as Brazil's largest trading partner in 2009 (trade
between China and Brazil exceeded $75 billion in 2012). It's not an accident that Brazilian President
Dilma Rousseff made a state visit to China in April 2011, prior to paying one to the United States. Make
no mistake: China is now a presence in the region. Xi's trip to Trinidad and Tobago is only
the second visit by a Chinese president to the Caribbean -- his predecessor, Hu Jintao, visited communist
Cuba in November 2008 -- but China and the Caribbean's economic and political ties have been growing
rapidly. On this trip, Xi promised more than $3 billion in loans to 10 Caribbean countries and Costa Rica.
Xi's choice of three destinations near the United States, followed by a "shirtsleeves" summit with U.S. President Barack Obama on June 7 and 8 at the Sunnylands resort
in California, sends a subtle message that the new Chinese leadership seeks to
engage the United States globally as an equal -- without the deference
shown in the past to the United States in countries close to its borders .
Ironically, it's the Latin American country closest to the United States where Xi
might be able to make up the most ground . Mexican President Enrique Pea Nieto's
engagement with the Chinese president, both at the April summit in Boao,
China, and this week in Mexico City, allow him to differentiate himself
from his pro-U.S. predecessor, Felipe Caldern. Similarly, Mexico's role in forming
the Pacific Alliance, a new subregional organization built around a group of four pro-market, pro-trade
countries (Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru) allows Mexico to reassert a leadership role in the
Americas, relatively independent of the United States.
uniqueness
US is decreasing investment China filling in
Munoz 6/9/13 [Heraldo, UN Assistant Secretary-General and UN Development
Program Director for Latin America and the Caribbean, The United States turns to
an emerged Latin America,
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/06/20136984021498867.html]
The United States is still the region's top foreign investor . In 2012, US exports to
South and Central America plus the Caribbean totaled $205bn, compared with $110bn in exports to
But US exports to Latin

America and the Caribbean have receded during the last decade. This vacuum is
being filled by China, while India's trade with the region is also growing substantially. The
China. US exports to Mexico alone reached $216bn last year.
United States has become Brazil's second commercial partner after China. Bilateral trade between the
countries stood at about $100bn but Vice President Biden said there is "no reason" why that number
could not be $400-500bn.
China is edging out the US for economic influence in Latin

America
Global Post 6/4/13 [Xi flies to Mexico as China battles US for influence in Latin
America]
When it comes to economic influence, China may be gaining the upper

hand in Latin America. China is increasing its funding to the region just as
the US has been coming under pressure to cut aid and investment. "If Im a
Latin American leader, Im very happy because I now have more chips to play with," Kevin Gallagher,
author of the 2010 book "The Dragon in the Room," about Chinas inroads in Latin America, told
Bloomberg. "The
onus is on the US to come up with a more flexible, attractive

offer but thats not so easy because it doesnt have the deep pockets like it
used to." Latin America's growing economy makes for an attractive investment. The International
Monetary Fund forecasts the regions economies will expand 3.4 percent this year, almost three times the
Xi's tour of Trinidad, Costa Rica and Mexico are

setting the stage for his visit to California later this week, which will be his first face-toface talks with Obama since taking office. That Xi's Latin America trip came so early
into his presidency is a confident approach that shows little concern for
American reaction, Evan Ellis, a professor at the National Defense University in Washington told
Bloomberg. "In the past Chinese presidents were very deferential to the US.,
always making reference to Washingtons backyard," Ellis said. "You dont hear
any of that from Xis team, though you dont find any threatening rhetoric either."
pace of growth in the developed world.
Uniqueness/link
Chinas influence is growing in Latin America and competes
with US interests
Cerna 11 [Michael, graduate student in International Policy Management at
Kennesaw State University, China's Growing Presence in Latin America:
Implications for U.S. and Chinese Presence in the Region, China Research Center, a
think-tank providing peer reviewed research on US-China relations]
Is China the preferred partner for Latin America? At this point, the definitive answer is no. However, the
There is clear evidence of an

increasingly symbiotic relationship with China throughout Latin America .
While the U.S. is the most dominant trade partner to the region as a whole,
it is losing ground in key countries, namely Brazil, which is blossoming on the world stage
and is emerging as the clear leader in the region. Increasing trade and investment can be
beneficial for all, but the power that China can derive from its growing
economic influence could bring increased political and ideological influence
that the U.S. might find unnerving. China already has replaced the U.S. as the largest
United States should not take its place in the region for granted.
trading partner for Brazil and Chile, and is on pace to do the same in Peru and Venezuela. At the very
this should cause the U.S. to pay more attention to its southern
neighbors and take steps to make sure that China only benefits economically
and not politically at the expense of the U.S. The world will be watching.
least,
link unconditional engagement

China can only get an edge in Latin American markets because
US investment is conditional
Gallagher 6/11/13 [Kevin Gallagher is a professor of international relations at
Boston University and a research fellow at the Global Development and
Environment Institute , US cannot take Latin America for granted,
http://www.iol.co.za/business/opinion/columnists/us-cannot-take-latin-america-forgranted-1.1530220#.UbdmJ2TwJOg]
The administration of President Barack Obama and US media have made much ado about the US pivot
that China has been lining up

economic allies in the erstwhile backyard of the US. Well, just as serious
competition ought to awaken ones creative juices in business, it is time for the US to step up
a suitable economic policy for Latin America before it is too lat e. The
difference in approaches by the US and China were brought into focus last
week when US Vice-President Joseph Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping made
tours of Latin America. The USs principal offer to its Latin American
neighbours is the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which offers Latin American and
Asian nations access to the US market on the basis of three conditions: they
to Asia. What has largely escaped their attention, however, is
must deregulate their financial markets, adopt intellectual property provisions that give preference to US
firms, and allow private US firms to directly sue governments of countries that sign up to the TPP for
Talk about a heavily conditioned offering . So what

is the Chinese approach? On his visit to the region, Chinas president offered more
than $5.3 billion (R53bn) in financing, with few conditions attached, to its
violating any of its conditions.
new-found Latin American friends. These offers will need to be confirmed, but according to press reports
the Chinese have signed deals on this trip for: n $3bn in commitments to eight
Caribbean countries for infrastructure and energy; n $1.3bn to Costa Rica in loans and lines of credit;
A $1bn credit line from the Export-Import Bank of China to Mexico for
its state-owned oil company. This financing comes on top of $86bn in financing already
and n
provided by China to Latin American governments since 2003. To put it into proper perspective, consider
Chinas policy banks have provided more finance to Latin

America than their counterparts at the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank
and the US Export-Import Bank. If anything ought to awaken the US from its past slumber, that
comparison ought to do it. Simply put, the US and the array of largely Westerndominated international financial institutions have been outgunned by
Chinas financial muscle. Welcome to the brave new world! But its not just a
matter of sheer numbers. Unlike US trade treaties or the finance
from the international institutions largely under US control , China
offers its loans with few strings attached. In a region that is
understandably very sensitive to any notions of conditionality due to
painful past experiences with the International Monetary Fund and the
World Bank, China makes sure that its policy is not based on
conditionalities. That said, the Chinese do not lack a strong commercial focus. Often, the offer
this. Since 2003,
requires that Chinese firms are hired to conduct the bulk of the envisioned project work. In just a few
years, China has become the number one (in the case of Brazil and Chile) or number two (for Peru and
Mexico) trading partner. These are not just any countries. They are the most important economies in
Latin America. Of course, the US is still the most important economic partner for the region overall.
the US has relied on a

rather imperial mechanism just telling Latin America what it needs.
Compare that with Chinas approach: it offers Latin America what it wants (in
the form of financing and trade from China). When Obama took office, he and his team
pledged to hit the reset button with the region and rethink its trade regime with Latin
However, it cannot continue to take the region for granted. For too long,
America. It has not worked out that way. So far, reset has essentially meant making
the same old offer, but via new faces.
China is more appealing to Latin America because they dont

condition trade deals
Johnson 5 [Stephen, Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America in the Douglas and
Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby
Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation,
Balancing China's Growing Influence in Latin America,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2005/10/balancing-chinas-growinginfluence-in-latin-america]
Deals with few requirements. China can bargain on the spot without a lot of
caveats. Its transactions are based on simple exchanges. Their leaders have
broad authority to negotiate foreign deals without worrying about legislative
oversight, the rule of law, or altruistic objectives. Unlike Western leaders, Chinese
leaders represent state monopolies-which mesh well with Latin American
government ownership or management of telecommunications, mining, and energy
industries. They do not need to build up Latin American trade capacity to deal with diverse
businesses.
US unconditional engagement is key to out compete China in

the region
Johnson 5 [Stephen, Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America in the Douglas and
Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby
Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation,
Balancing China's Growing Influence in Latin America,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2005/10/balancing-chinas-growinginfluence-in-latin-america]
The United States and China have competing inter ests in Latin America.
Washington would like to see its hemispheric neighbors develop into stable,
democratic, prosperous trade partners that embrace the rule of law. Beijing sees the
region as a source of raw materials, a market for manufactured goods, and a platform
for power projection. U.S. interests probably coincide more with Latin American needs. In contrast, China represents an opportunity to temper American dominance with broader alliances.
Regrettably, Chinese aid and commodity imports may buy time for state industries, powerful presidents,
and influential oligarchs. Most of all, such commerce could delay needed reforms and industrialization
America's strength is
competition, and it should influence the rules of the game in that direction .
As a good neighbor and in its own and Latin America's interests, the United States
should: Accelerate free trade agreements. Free trade agreements have been the hallmark of U.S. polthat might lift Latin America's near majority underclass out of poverty.
icies toward the region since the 1990s. As an inducement, America should drop its agricultural and steel
subsidies that dissuade potential partners and cost taxpayers money. Improved U.S. trade relations with
Andean neighbors (and eventually Southern Cone countries) will open market access for both U.S. and
Latin American enterprises and provide an outlet for industrial growth. Adopt more comprehensive
relationships. Single-issue diplomacy that emphasizes U.S. interests, such as counternarcotics, leaves
vacuums in other areas such as security assistance and trade capacity development that other powers
can fill. Plan Colombia is working because the United States is helping Colombia to combat terrorism,
expand public safety zones, strengthen institutions, reactivate the economy, and promote rural peace.[11]
Cut red tape on assistance. This policy should be followed to the greatest
extent possible. Performance requirements are blunt instruments that do not cover every situation.
Constraints such as annual certifications on counternarcotics cooperation and Article 98 letters that
withhold security assistance occasionally backfire by withdrawing support for allies
in areas of mutual interest. If Congress considers such restrictions
absolutely necessary, it should tailor them to suspend only economic aid that
is not crucial to immediate U.S. interests.
Link unconditional engagement

Latin American countries prefer Chinese investment because
its unconditional
China has many carrots to dangle in its pursuit of international influence ,

such as access to the worlds largest emerging market. A Congress report
portrayed China as trying to project soft power by portraying its own
system as an alternative model for economic development, one based on
authoritarian governance and elite rule without the restrictions and
demands that come with political liberalization, [80] but the inference that
China has any interest in the internal economic workings of its trading partners is ignorant of the depth
of the peaceful rise, Chinas non interference policy and its new found ambivalence towards ideology as a
A truer characterisation is that China has attempted to

exploit its no strings attached foreign aid stance and its ability to
deploy state-owned assets to reap soft power advantages, [81] but even this
source of kinship.
ignores the fact that every nation-state attempts to reap soft power advantages, it is intrinsic to the
nature of international politics. Political and cultural elements in Chinas burgeoning relationship with
China has also emerged as a favoured political partner for Latin

American countries, mostly because (as mentioned above) it has a no-strings
approach to doing business. Its holistic approach has become an
attractive alternative to traditional Western companies, which do not have a
similar integrated package of carrots to offer a Chinese deal literally can
mean an alternative economic lifeline , [82] because it offers a less
bureaucratic alternative to American aid and political assistance .
Latin America
Link latin america

US engagement with Latin America trades-off with Chinese
influence nations fear backlash from the US
Ellis 12 [R. Evan, a professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and
simulation with the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, with a research focus
on Latin Americas relationships with external actors, including China, Russia, and
Iran, The United States, Latin America and China: A Triangular Relationship?,
Inter-American Dialogue, May]
The ability of the United States to serve as a market and a source of

investment for Latin America has influenced the regions receptivity toward
the PRC. The initial openness of the region to promises of investment and
trade by Chinese President Hu Jintao came just after Latin America reached a
historic low with regard to flows of investment from the United States and
other sources.25 The 2007-2009 global financial crisis, which significantly
impaired US purchases of Latin American exports and US credit to the region,
strengthened the perceived importance of the PRC for Latin American
governments, and Chinese commodity purchases and investments emerged as one of the key factors
helping these governments weather the crisis. Nonetheless, as noted earlier, while the PRC has occupied
an important symbolic role as the largest and most visible source of new capital and markets, it has not
been the only player to which Latin America has looked as the region seeks to engage globally. Attention
also has been given to India and other emerging markets of Asia, as well as traditional players, such as
US engagement
with Latin American countries has impacted the ability of the PRC to
develop military and other ties in the region. Although journalistic and academic
accounts often suggest that the 19th century Monroe Doctrine continues to
be pursued by contemporary US policymakers, with a presumed desire to
keep China out of the region,26 official US policy has repeatedly met Chinese initiatives in the
hemisphere with a cautiously welcoming tone.27 Nonetheless, Latin Americas own
leadership has responded to Chinese initiatives with a view of how
engagement with China could damage its relationship with the United
States. Colombias close relationship with the United States, for example, made the military leadership
of the country reluctant to procure major military items from the PRC.28 The same logic has also
applied to countries such as Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia, for whom
embracing the PRC politically and economically signaled displeasure with
the United States. The degree to which a bad relationship with the United
States has propelled a positive relationship with China has increasingly
gone beyond symbolism. The desire of Venezuelan President Hugo Chvez to diversify away
the European Union, and actors such as Russia and Iran. At the political level,
from Venezuelan dependence on the United States as the nations primary oil export market, for example,
opened the door for massive loan-backed Chinese construction projects, the purchase of Chinese
US refusal to
sell F-16 fighter aircraft and components to Venezuela in 2006 prompted
Venezuela to engage with China, and other countries, to procure military
hardware. Similarly, Bolivia purchased Chinese K-8s after the United States
blocked it from acquiring a comparable aircraft from the Czech Republic. 30
commercial goods and greatly expanded participation by Chinese oil companies.29
Link Latin America

US trade engagement with Latin America trades-off with
Chinese influence
Farnsworth 12 [Eric, vice-president of the Council of the Americas in
WashingtonDC and from 1995 to 1998 was senior adviser to the White House
special envoy for the Americas, Memo to Washington: China's Growing Presence in
Latin America, American Quarterly]
All of this lends itself to several policy options that require active consideration. For the first time in
years, the U.S. faces a multifaceted rival in the region that requires a rethink of priorities, and the
The U.S. must

now contend for Latin America, recapturing the initiative in a region that,
with Chinas engagement if not instigation, has begun to dismantle the
previous U.S.-led consensus. In the near term the U.S. should ramp up education and peopleimplementation of a true foreign policy (rather than development policy) agenda.
to-people exchanges, with private sector support. The administration should develop a common agenda
with Brazil on issues like Chinese currency and global trade in agriculture that triangulates the
The U.S. should also intensify public efforts to

support democratic ideals, working with hemispheric allies including
Mexico, Canada, Colombia, and others to reinforce democracy consistent with the 10-year-old Interdeveloping BeijingBrasilia relationship.
American Democratic Charter. Freedom of speech, freedom of the press and freedom of assembly are all
increasingly at risk; open, universal access to the Internet could help support each of these, though more
must be done to promote collective action in their defense. The U.S. should also promote the
Organization of American States and work toward fundamental reforms to make it a more effective
instrument to promote the broader agenda, including human rights. Current efforts by Brasilia, Caracas
and others to build a new hemispheric architecture, insofar as they seek to undermine democratic and
human rights norms and protections and seek to exclude the U.S. and Canada, should be resisted and
the trade
agenda remains one of the best tools that the U.S. has to promote a broader
strategic agenda. By organizing existing free-trade partners into a more coherent group, and then
denounced, by civil society, member governments and the United States. In this regard,
working to build their economies through greater integration, for example, in the Asia-Pacific region,
the U.S. would simultaneously be able to promote a trade and investment regime
consistent with economic competitiveness while also building a broader
hemispheric consensus around democratic ideals that would implicitly
highlight differences between the U.S. and China . Despite conventional wisdom, trade
is not a dirty word in the hemisphere. In fact, recent scholarship has found that positive attitudes
toward the U.S. are correlated with increased trade with the United States.
One way for the U.S. to improve its regional standing would be to again promote the idea of a
Given Chinas growing regional footprint,

now is the time to promote such an initiative.6 The contrast is real. The
hemisphere has a choice. Its time to acknowledge the stakes and get on with
the important work of fighting for the soul of the hemisphere .
hemispheric trade area among willing partners.
Link latin america

Chinese and US influence in Latin America is zero-sum
Ellis 6/7/13 [Dr. Evan Ellis is a professor at the Center for Hemispheric Defense
Studies in Washington, D.C. U.S.-China Competition Heats Up as Chinese President
Xi Tours Latin America]
The coincidence between this weeks Latin American trips by U.S. Vice
President Joseph Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping highlight the
undeclared competition between the U.S. and China in Latin America , and
across the globe. The new competition is a struggle over the economic, legal, and
political norms that will prevail as the global center of gravity shifts from the
Atlantic to the Pacific in the course of the twenty-first century. The U.S.-China
competition is not a resurrection of the cold war, where the U.S. and Soviet Union actively promoted their
respective concepts for a global order. Rather, it is an unintentional, yet inevitable struggle. Consistent
with Chinas millennial history, the principal goal of PRC is to advance Chinese national power, wealth
and security. Although the PRC does not seek to impose a new ideology on the world, the mercantilist
way that it is promoting its economic development, combined with its lack of commitment to international
norms that it did not create means that Chinas rise is wreaking havoc on the international system.
In Latin America, while many

governments and private interests have benefitted from the PRCs entry into
the region, that same engagement has indirectly undermined a range of U.S.
policy objectives there, including the promotion of democracy, human rights, free trade, and the
Chinas rise is wreaking havoc on the international system.
respect for contracts and rule of law.
Link latin america

China perceives US aid to Latin America as a threat
Ellis 10 [R. Evan Ellis is an Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the
Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense University,
Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study, National Defense University,
http://www.ndu.edu/press/chinese-soft-power-latin-america.html]
The rise of China is

intimately tied to the global economy through trade , financial, and information flows,
each of which is highly dependent on global institutions and cooperation. Because of this, some
within the PRC leadership see the country's sustained growth and
development, and thus the stability of the regime, threatened if an actor
such as the United States is able to limit that cooperation or block global
institutions from supporting Chinese interests. In Latin America, China's attainment of
Blocking the Consolidation of U.S. Influence in the Region and Its Institutions.
observer status in the OAS in 2004 and its acceptance into the IADB in 2009 were efforts to obtain a seat
at the table in key regional institutions, and to keep them from being used "against" Chinese interests. In
the PRC has leveraged hopes of access to Chinese markets by Chile, Peru,
to secure bilateral free trade agreements, whose practical effect
is to move Latin America away from a U.S.-dominated trading block (the Free
addition,
and Costa Rica
Trade Area of the Americas) in which the PRC would have been disadvantaged.
Link latin American oil

China is suspicious of US attempts at challenging its economic
engagement with Latin America they are in direct competition
The U.S is still the most important economic partner for Latin America, but
recently many in the region have felt neglected by Washington , whose focus on
terrorism and the middle east and rigid U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America has
left regional leaders with no option but to look for other patrons . Net foreign
direct investment in Latin America has fallen from $78 billion in 2000 to $36 billion in
2003. [71] This economic neglect is exacerbating the political grievances of the likes of Hugo Chavez,
but the more moderate social democratic governments of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, recently extended
the designation of Market Economy Status (MES) to China, something the U.S and the E.U have still
denied. MES substantially diminishes the effect of anti-dumping legislation under World Trade
Given the preponderance of non-market factors in the P.R.C.s

economy there can be little doubt that the three countries made their
decision almost exclusively on the basis of Chinas growing political and
economic influence. [72] This highlights the politico-economic independence
of the U.S that Latin America is exerting. This is also symptomatic of a deep
paradox in the American thinking about how to deal with China. On one
hand, tying the nominally communist state to the world economy is expected to bring about economic
maturity and gradual political change, but on the other, China is still a U.S rival whose
influence China is competing against. The situation is reciprocal, as China views
the U.S as [using] its economic leverage to exert political pressure
on China, which is one reason that China seeks to diversify its economic
relationships. [73] In this respect, the U.S has what it wants China is intrinsically tied to the ideals
Organization rules.
of the open market as a lower cost, less politicized alternative to the United States.
Link latin American oil

Close oil linkages to Latin America are necessary for Chinese
energy security
Economic Observer 13 [IN AMERICA'S BACKYARD: CHINA'S RISING
INFLUENCE IN LATIN AMERICA, http://worldcrunch.com/china-2.0/in-america039-s-backyard-china-039-s-rising-influence-in-latin-america/foreign-policy-tradeeconomy-investments-energy/c9s11647/, May 6]
Among the numerous needs of China, the demand for oil has always been
the most powerful driving force. In the past 30 years, China has consumed onethird of the world's new oil production and become the world's secondlargest oil importer. More than half of China's oil demand depends on
imports, which increases the instability of its energy security . Diversification is
inevitable. In this context, Latin America and its huge reserves and production
capacity naturally became a destination for China . China must better protect
its energy supply, and can't just play the simple role of consumer . It must
also help solidify the important links of the petroleum industry supply chain.
Indeed, the China National Petroleum Corporation frequently appears in Latin American countries, and
Chinas investment and trade in the Latin American countries are also
focused on its energy sector.
link latin American oil

Oil partnerships in Latin America counter Chinese involvement
Vega 5 [Juan, 2006 J.D. candidate at the University of Minnesota Law School;
M.B.A 2002, University of Florida; B.A., 1994, Virginia Tech, China's Economic and
Political Clout Grows in Latin America at the Expense of U.S. Interests, 14 Minn. J.
Global Trade 377]
Trade relations between China and Latin America are growing. China is
forming solid economic alliances and providing an attractive alternative to
dealing with the United States. The United States cannot afford to lose economic or political
clout to China or it may lose Latin American support for important [*413] interests such as human rights,
The United States must act to counter China's

involvement by opting for bilateral trade agreements with sound social policies rather
democracy, and a reliable oil supply.
than by aggressively pursuing the FTAA. The United States should not hide behind the legal framework of
the WTO Agreement on Agriculture because this increases Latin American resentment and encourages
these countries to seek other trading partners like China .
Instead, the United States should

form partnerships in key
understand and address the needs of each Latin American country and
sectors such as the oil industry. It must also work with Latin American governments to build
the infrastructure necessary to support future, mutually-beneficial free-trade agreements. Due to the
factors outlined in this Note, such as increasing anti-U.S. sentiment, the growing popularity of leftist
the emergence of China as an economic alternative to dealing with the

United States, and a trend towards the nationalization of oil industries, the
more aggressively the United States pushes for the FTAA without taking into account
social policies in Latin America, the more precarious its future supply of regional oil
becomes. More than economic trade is at stake for the United States.
leaders,
link mexico oil

China is investing heavily in Mexican oil
Global Trade 377]
China's
high demand for commodities has driven up the price of metals, agricultural
products, and oil. n74 China is a major importer of raw materials, a plentiful
commodity in Latin America. n75 This makes doing business with China very
attractive to Latin American countries, especially Brazil. n76 For example, China's top
2. China's Investments in Key Sectors in Latin America: Oil, Commodities, and Infrastructures
steel maker, Baosteel, is considering a joint venture with Brazil's Companhia Vale de Rio Doce, the
world's top iron ore miner. n77 Latin America and the Caribbean provide over thirty percent of U.S.
n78 But China is

not just securing oil and commodities from Latin American countries, it is
becoming intimately involved in its extraction, transportation and
infrastructure construction. n79 China's approach has been to show Latin
American countries that, unlike the United States, it will treat them as
sovereigns and as partners. In 2003, trade between China and Brazil totaled eight billion
imported oil, which is more than all of the Middle Eastern countries combined.
dollars, making China Brazil's second-largest trading partner [*388] after the United States. n80 Brazil is
China's largest trading partner in Latin America and annual bilateral trade has tripled since 2000. n81
Both countries recently took part in a workshop entitled "Brazil and China in the 21st Century," at which
Chinese entrepreneurs sought Brazilian partners in economic sectors such as oil and agriculture. n82
China seeks to invest directly in Brazil's infrastructure, n83 where it has agreed to invest between $ 3
billion and $ 4 billion in railways and refineries. n84 With Argentina, China seeks not only bilateral trade
agreements but also to become an investment partner, particularly in the infrastructure and
transportation sectors. n85 To this end, Argentine President, Nestor Kirchner, and Chinese President, Hu
Jintao, signed an agreement on June 28, 2004, which enables both countries to jointly begin construction
Realizing that it must

work with China because it cannot compete against it, Mexico has decided
to increase its exploration and production of oil to satisfy China's demand .
n87 In February 2004, Mexico held a conference entitled "China's Influence on
Mexico's Future," at which Mexico's ambassador to China [*389] announced
that Mexico will increase its oil output to meet China's demands . n88
of a railway and allows Argentina to export its citrus fruit to China. n86
link - mexico oil

The US consumes all of Mexican oil and China is moving in
Global Trade 377]
The United States should build on its existing relationships with oilproducing countries in Latin America. Like China, it should establish
partnerships in order to secure oil for its future consumption beyond
maximum current output. For example, the United States currently consumes all
of the oil that Mexico exports. Given the energy shortages in the United States since [*399]
2000, U.S. companies should have partnered with Mexican firms to increase
Mexico's oil production. Instead, China and Mexico are taking steps to jointly
develop Mexico's oil industry so that Mexico can expand its production and
export capacity. n148 Like China, the United States must invest in the
infrastructure that will allow for successful joint exploration for oil and other
commodities. Infrastructure projects provide a large incentive for Latin
American countries to trade with China since these projects will improve their
infrastructure, employ thousands of workers throughout their countries, and bring economic
By partnering with Latin American private and public

oil firms, the United States could increase regional oil production and secure
added capacity for itself. Moreover, by addressing Latin American infrastructure needs, the
opportunities to small towns.
United States will bring jobs and other economic opportunities to the region and in the process dissipate
anti-U.S. sentiment in Latin America.
link mexico
Mexico is super important to China
Dominguez 6 [Jorge, Professor at Harvard University, Chinas Relations With
Latin America: Shared Gains, Asymmetric Hopes, Inter-American Dialogue,
http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/china.pdf]
Mexico is one of Chinas strategic partners in Latin America. Its overall

trade importance for China is second only to Brazils in this region. It is Chinas principal
export market in Latin America. Compared to the four South American countries under
discussion, China runs a substantial bilateral trade surplus with Mexico (see Tables
3 and 4). From 2000 to 2004, Chinas exports to Mexico nearly quadrupled while its imports from Mexico
quintupled. The dynamic of Sino-Mexican trade since 2000 is thus closest to that of Sino-Brazilian trade,
except that Chinas bilateral trade surplus with Mexico also tripled in those years.
China is also a
significant foreign direct investor in Mexico; in 2004, the stock of accumulated Chinese
direct investment in Mexico exceeded $28 billion, with clothing manufacturing accounting for a third and
Mexico is the most important Latin

American economy for Chinese investment, much of which is geared for sales throughout
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) area. China has good reasons to call
Mexico a strategic partner.
plastic products nearly a fourth of the total.52
Link - oil
Competition over access to oil markets is zero sumif the U.S. increases its
influence in Latin America, this directly limits Chinese market access
Markman, 06 (Jon, editor of the independent investment newsletters Strategic
Advantage and Trader's Advantage , How China is winning the oil race, 4/26,
http://moneycentral.msn.com/content/P149330.asp)
The United States is the world's greatest consumer of energy at present, but China is
the world's fastest-growing consumer. That puts us in direct competition for any
new sources of crude oil, natural gas, coal and uranium that materialize through exploration and
discovery, not to mention any current sources that profit-seeking producers decide to
put up for grabs. Increasingly, new energy sources that China is acquiring are in
countries that Americans find distasteful . Many of them are in Africa, in countries with
horrific human-rights records such as Sudan, Chad and the Republic of the Congo. And much of the
energy is controlled by rapacious despots in the Central Asian republic of Kazakhstan and in Southeast
Asia's Myanmar. Energy acquisition is a zero-sum game in which there are winners and
losers. Any new energy that China obtains for its fast-growing economy is
unavailable to us forever. So you just have to wonder whether the United States' antipathy for
dealing with the worst of the world's rogue states has led inexorably to $4-a-gallon gasoline this spring.
link magnifier perception

Chinese perception of access to Latin America determines its
actions
In general, the bases of Chinese soft power differ from those of the United States, leading analysts to
underestimate that power when they compare the PRC to the United States on those factors that are the
sources of U.S. influence, such as the affinity of the world's youth for American music, media, and
lifestyle, the widespread use of the English language in business and technology, or the number of elites
soft power
is based on perceptions and emotion (that is, inferences), and not necessarily on
objective reality. Although China's current trade with and investment
position in Latin America are still limited compared to those of the United
States,3 its influence in the region is based not so much on the current size
of those activities, but rather on hopes or fears in the region of what it could
be in the future. Because perception drives soft power, the nature of the PRC
impact on each country in Latin America is shaped by its particular
situation, hopes, fears, and prevailing ideology . The "Bolivarian socialist" regime of
who have learned their professions in U.S. institutions. It is also important to clarify that
Hugo Chvez in Venezuela sees China as a powerful ally in its crusade against Western "imperialism,"
countries such as Peru, Chile, and Colombia view the PRC in more traditional
terms as an important investor and trading partner within the context of
global free market capitalism. The core of Chinese soft power in Latin
America, as in the rest of the world, is the widespread perception that the PRC,
because of its sustained high rates of economic growth and technology
development, will present tremendous business opportunities in the future,
and will be a power to be reckoned with globally . In general, this perception can be
while
divided into seven areas:
Link/internal link - mexico

The balance of power in Latin America is shifting towards
China especially in Mexico and conflict could cause war
Ellis 6/7/13 [Dr. Evan Ellis is a professor at the Center for Hemispheric Defense
Studies in Washington, D.C. U.S.-China Competition Heats Up as Chinese President
Xi Tours Latin America]
Chinas presence in the region also has a strategic significance beyond economics and policy objectives.
The critical posture by the U.S. Department of Defense regarding Chinese

cyberattacks is a reminder that hostilities between the U.S. and China , while
highly improbable and undesirable, are not unthinkable. In such a conflict, PRCoperated ports, airports, telecommunications infrastructure, and other parts
of the Chinese commercial presence in Latin America represent potential
assets in a global asymmetric warfare campaign against the United States.
The comparison between the current trip to Latin America by Chinese president Xi, and that of U.S. Vice-
Biden highlights how much has changed in the 8 years since the April
2004 U.S. Congressional hearings on China and Latin America, when U.S.
administration officials took comfort in the degree to which the U.S.
dominated China in terms of influence in the region . In Rio de Janeiro, Biden talked
president
about a U.S. strategic partnership with a Brazil that had already had one with the PRC since 1993, with
China-Brazil trade exceeding U.S.-Brazil trade by an expanding margin. Nor could it be overlooked that
Brazilian President Rousseff had traveled to China before her first visit to the U.S. T he
Latin
America agenda of Chinese President Xi Jinping also illustrates the
confidence of Chinas new 5th generation of leadership, with the choice of three
destinations in close proximity to the United States illustrating how quickly
the PRC has moved beyond the discourse of the previous administration
respect for the U.S. backyard. The trip to Trinidad and Tobago is the first visit by a Chinese
President to the Caribbean, excepting his predecessors November 2008 trip to Cuba. The soft power of
China in the Caribbean also was on display, as seven full heads of state from across the region made the
pilgrimage to Trinidad for an audience with President Xi, as he held court in the Marriott Hotel in Port of
Mexico highlights how the Chinese and U.S.

positions in the region are interdependent . For Mexican President Pea
Nieto, engagement with the PRC is a way to differentiate his regime from
the policies of his predecessor Felipe Calderon, including not only the war against
criminal organizations, but also Calderons closeness to the United States . Similarly,
engagement with China through the Pacific alliance, Latin Americas
hottest new sub-regional organization, shows Mexico progressively engaging
with the new economy of the Pacific, while re-asserting a regional
leadership role for Mexico, long a cornerstone of his Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI).
Spain. Of Xis three destinations,
Link/internal link energy zero

sum*
US-China energy acquisition is zero-sum and causes
competition and conflict
Herberg 11 [Mikkal, Research Director, Energy Security Program The National
Bureau of Asian Research, Chinas Energy Rise and the Future of U.S.-China
Energy Relations, New America Foundation, June 21]
much will depend on the character of the energy relationship

between China and the U.S. Nevertheless, despite its desirability, establishing something
resembling an E-2 seems likely to be elusive. China and the U.S. continue to have
fundamentally different world views about energy security and how to
achieve it. Beijings political leaders see energy security in distinctly
national terms of establishing national control over energy resources and
transportation routes. It is a decidedly 19th Century, mercantilist agenda. Maintaining
adequate, reliable, and growing supplies of energy is viewed as
indispensible for ensuring rapid economic growth, job creation, and social and political
stability; i.e. the continued claim to legitimacy to rule by the Communist Party .
Beijings political leaders have little faith in global energy markets to ensure
adequate, reliable, and affordable energy to China : energy is simply too
important to be left to the markets. Despite gradual market reforms, state control and
intervention remain central to Chinas approach to energy security. Alternatively, the U.S. has
built its conception of energy security over the past 40 years on an international
energy structure based on integrated and transparent global markets, competitive
pricing, private investment, private technological innovation, and
multilateral cooperation. To paraphrase former President Bill Clinton, its the market, stupid.
So each country views energy security through very different prisms . Moreover,
the potential to view our energy security problems as shared challenges
continues to be undermined by the chronic overlay of distrust at a strategic
level. Beijings leaders suspect that the U.S. seeks to use its energy
vulnerabilities as part of a broader effort to contain China . Criticism of the
impact of Chinas overseas oil investments in pariah states and elsewhere is seen as
a cynical ploy to weaken Chinas access to vital oil supplies. Pressure from
Therefore,
Washington to reduce carbon emissions is seen as a thinly veiled attempt to slow Chinas economic
growth and frustrate it from achieving its rightful economic role in the world. Washington, on the other
hand, sees Chinas energy expansion globally as built on predatory collaboration between Beijing and its
national oil champions to carve out privileged access to petroleum supplies, an approach that many
This strategic suspicion casts

a pall of a zero-sum atmosphere of national competition over
energy access and security that is repeatedly reinforced by rhetoric on
both sides. The 2005 episode when Chinas CNOOC sought to acquire Unocal and was forced to
believe undermines future U.S. access to needed supplies.
withdraw its bid due to a firestorm of criticism of Chinas strategic energy intentions epitomized the toxic
to the extent that the U.S.

might encourage China to take a stronger leadership role on global energy
security cooperation, it is still very unclear what role Beijing would want to
take on the world energy stage. This is a corollary to the broader lack of clarity over what role
mix of bilateral energy suspicions and mirror-imaging. Further,
Beijing wants to play in other global issues, from currencies to nuclear proliferation. Beijing remains
largely inwardly focused and driven by its domestic search for stability, economic development, and
territorial integrity. Consistent with its traditional broader foreign policy of keeping a low profile,
Beijing has shown relatively little serious interest in multilateral energy cooperation.5 Conversely,
assuming China were to show interest in a strategic energy partnership, it is not clear to what extent
Washington is truly ready for a shared global energy partnership. This would require accommodating
very different Chinese views on the role of energy markets and pricing, policies toward key petroleum
producers and regions, the role of the IEA and multilateral cooperation, and responsibility for reducing
Washington tends to view a partnership as China simply joining

in and becoming enmeshed and integrated into a set of U.S.-sponsored and
led energy institutions and policy agendas established by the west. This is
highly unlikely to be acceptable to Beijings leadership .6
carbon emissions.
internal link oil key

China is competing for access to Latin American oil
Arnson and Davidow 11[Cynthia J. arnson is director of the Latin American Program at the
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Jeffrey Davidow is the president of the Institute of the
Americas, China, Latin America, and the United States: The New Triangle, Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars, Institute of the Americas, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,
January]
Conference participants also addressed the implications of Chinas growing energy demands for LAC
countries, for Chinas own economic development, and for the world energy market. Are
we
looking at China and Latin American oil as [a] panda or a dragon ? asked Jeremy
Martin, director of the Energy Program at the Institute of the Americas. Estimates project that
Chinas demand for oil will grow from 8 million barrels per day (mbd) to 16 mbd by 2030;
current imports as a percentage of consumption are over 50 percent .
Beijings general strategy for satisfying Chinese demand consists of securing
access to a diverse array of material reserves and inserting itself into
production positions in oil projects. Beijing is pursuing a strategy to assure
that all of its oil reserve and production eggs are not in the same basket .
Despite its ready economic capital, the Chinese must face increased competition for
oil resources as they undertake their strategy against the backdrop of a
global shift to peak access; in todays world there are few easy targets and
access to resources has been seriously diminished .
China is looking to diversify its oil imports with Mexican oil

January]
hongbo of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences pointed to strong

Chinese economic growth, national oil companies, government, and financial
organizationsespecially the Chinese Development bankas the four elements driving
Chinese energy cooperation with Latin America. A new trend emerging from
this mix is the increased cooperation between financial organizations and
national oil companies. Sun listed five models that China employs for cooperation: 1) a technical
Dr. Sun
service model, 2) a joint development model, 3) an infrastructure-building participation model, 4) a loans

for oil model, and 5) a bio-fuels technology joint research model. These models can be seen across
For example, in Mexico,

Chinese companies had provided nearly $1 billion in engineering services
for oil projects by the end of 2007. Sun also cited successful joint ventures in Colombia and Ecuador
various countries with which China is cooperating (See Figure 6)
including the Andes Petroleum purchase of all of Encanas assets in Ecuadoras areas of successful
cooperation. In addition to the China Brazil loan-for-oil agreement, China will also cooperate with Brazil
in the development of renewable energy sources such as biofuels. However, given that Latin America only
accounted for 7.58 percent of Chinas oil imports in 2008, Sun doubted that Latin America would play a
strategic role in guaranteeing Chinas future energy security. While opportunities for growth and
investment are present for both China and Latin America, Chinas national oil companies are confronting
risks of social conflict at the local level, political instability, intense competition, environmental clauses,
transportation costs, and the uncertain U.S. response to Chinas presence in the region. Sun also
Latin America can still be viewed as a strategic alternative for

China to diversify its oil imports.
indicated that
Internal link oil war

The US and China are competing for Latin American oil
resources
Zhao 8 [Suisheng Zhao is Professor at the Graduate School of International
Studies, Executive Director of the Center for China-US Cooperation, University of
Denver, China's Global Search for Energy Security: cooperation and competition in
the Asia-Pacific, Journal of Contemporary China]
China's strategy has alarmed the United States, the world's largest energy
consumer, and raised concerns among some in the US that China is not only challenging
the United States' historic dominance in Africa, Latin America, and Asia but also undermining Western
damaging US
interests and values as China has vied for energy resources in some of the
most unstable parts of the world and often ignored the promotion of transparency, good
governance and responsible behavior with its partner nations. It is particularly a concern of
the US as China has pursued deals with countries that are off-limits to
Western companies because of sanctions, security concerns or the threat of bad publicity. Some
observers have worried that China's active quest to secure energy supplies
in Africa and Latin America may have fueled an energy cold war. In this case, it is not
efforts to promote transparency and human rights in these developing countries,
totally a surprise to see that when CNOOC put together an $18.5 billion takeover bid for California-based
firm Unocal Corp in early 2005, the fierce opposition in US Congress prompted CNOOC to abandon the
bid.
Internal link oil war

China will go to war to protect foreign oil supplies from US
competition
Evans 6 [Justin, Adjunct Professor of Political Science, IUPUI; J.D./M.B.A.
Candidate, 2007, Indiana University School of Law, A New Energy Paradigm for the
Twenty-First Century: China, Russia, and America's Triangular Security Strategy,
39 Ind. L. Rev. 627]
China is now the world's second largest demander of oil and is projected to
consume 14.2 million barrels daily by 2025 with a net import of 10.9 million
barrels per day. n75 In 1998, Beijing reorganized its state-owned petroleum assets into two
vertically-integrated firms: the China National Petroleum Corporation ("CNPC") and the China
Petrochemical Corporation ("Sinopec"). n76 Other major firms include the China National Offshore Oil
Corporation ("CNOOC") and China National Star Petroleum. n77 To date, the Chinese government still
holds majority shares in CNPC, Sinopec, and CNOOC; the Chinese government "[has] not give[n] . . .
The unwillingness of the

Chinese government to give foreign investors significant influence over the
state's petroleum companies suggests an acute paranoia afflicting the
government as it pursues a reliable energy supply. China's increasing
dependence upon foreign crude oil is, "[f]or the security-obsessed Chinese . .
. scary." n79 As a result, the government is explicitly adopting offensive
military scenarios to reinforce its petroleum supply n80 and is working
to ensure that energy is not cut off from the mainland: " the Chinese are
grabbing what they can-and fending off anyone with a rival claim in a
show of muscular petrodiplomacy." n81 Some in the Chinese media see
immediate conflicts over oil as inevitable, particularly with Japan. n82 At least one scholar
has suggested that [*642] this posturing is unsurprising, given that "a liberal
internationalist foreign policy is incompatible with China's illiberal domestic
order." n83 These trends reinforce the theory of offensive realism as China
escalates its competition with other nations for economic and security
interests. American policymakers should note the immutable mindset of
Chinese officials as they create U.S. energy security policy for the twenty-first
foreign investors a major voice in corporate governance." n78
century.
internal link oil conflict

China will backlash to any perceived attempt at infringing on
oil markets even if theres no real trade-off
Zweig 10 [David Zweig is the Director of the Center on Chinas Transnational
Relations and a Chair Professor in the Division of Social Science, Hong Kong
University of Science and Technology, CHINAS ENERGY RISE, THE U.S., AND
THE NEW GEOPOLITICS OF ENERGY, April, PCIP]
As a hegemon, the U.S. can affect the supply, prices, and delivery of the
resources that China needs, thereby slowing Chinas emergence as a great
power. American companies can bid up the price of oil, influencing resource prices and Chinas ability
to buy those resources. The U.S. military can threaten Chinas oil supplies should
conflict with Taiwan or Japan erupt. American oil companies have worldwide resource
partnerships and deep pockets against which Chinas neophyte national oil and resources companies
As the moral hegemon, America

determines which countries are violating international norms , such as nuclear
non-proliferation or geno cide, complicating Chinas energy relations with pariah states,
such as Sudan, Venezuela, and Iran. Chinese efforts to expand into Latin America or
Africa trigger congressional hearings, while the U.S. media challenges China
to improve its moral behavior. And even if the U.S. cannot really disrupt
Chinas energy supplies, China believes it can, and will, follow such a
path to limit Chinas rise. The result: as China evaluates its resources
security, it sees Americans everywhere.
must compete. (Still, today Chinas pockets are also deep).
internal link energy conflict

Chinese resource shortages increase the risk of a U.S.-China war
Zweig and Jianhai, 05 (David, director of the Center on China's Transnational
Relations at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, and Bi, postdoctoral fellow at the Center, Foreign Affairs, Chinas Global Hunt for Energy,
September/October, proquest)
Although China's new energy demands need not be a source of serious conflict with
the West in the long term, at the moment, Beijing and Washington feel especially
uneasy about the situation. While China struggles to manage its growing pains, the United
States, as the world's hegemon, must somehow make room for the rising giant; otherwise,
war will become a serious possibility. According to the power transition theory, to
maintain its dominance, a hegemon will be tempted to declare war on its
challengers while it still has a power advantage. Thus, easing the way for the United
States and China -- and other states -- to find a new equilibrium will require careful
management, especially of their mutual perceptions. Because China's extraordinary
growth also increases its dependence on foreign resources, the Chinese government
has developed a new sense of insecurity vis--vis the United States. An article published last
June in the Beijing-backed Hong Kong newspaper Ta Kung Pao suggested that Washington might resort to
economic tactics to contain China. Given the White House's current penchant for unilateral intervention
and the loud voices in Congress calling China a military threat, Beijing might reasonably begin to
fear that the United States will try to block its purchases of natural resources to
destabilize it. Washington must be mindful of these worries and not exacerbate them
needlessly.
Impact China economy

China is focused on improving relations with Mexico in order to
access oil its key to their economy
AP 6/2/13 [China's president visits Latin America, eyes Mexico's plans to open
energy sector, www.foxnews.com/world/2013/06/02/china-president-visits-latinamerica-eyes-mexico-plans-to-open-energy-sector/#ixzz2VwkkzArw]
China has invested heavily in resource-rich Latin America in

recent years, striking major trade deals with governments from Venezuela to
Argentina. Now its president is reaching out to one of the few countries in the region
where ties have been slow to develop: Mexico. President Xi Jinping's three-day visit
starting Tuesday comes as Mexico debates opening its highly regulated
energy sector to more foreign investment . China's president has said he
plans to address Mexico's large trade deficit with the Asian power and
discuss ways to increase Mexican exports. Analysts say that could mean oil,
which Mexico has and China needs to fuel its expanding economy and the
cars of its growing middle class. "Access to strategic raw materials is key to understanding
MEXICO CITY
the dynamic of relations with China," said Hugo Beteta, director for Mexico and Central America of the
United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. " Clearly
there is an
interest by China in Mexican oil." The trip is part of a four-country regional tour that ends in
the United States. Xi started in Trinidad and Tobago, where he also met with leaders of other Caribbean
countries, and he arrives Sunday night in Costa Rica. China and Trinidad have had diplomatic ties for
almost 40 years, and Trinidad is a major trading partner in the Caribbean for China. Costa Rica is the
only country in Central America to have diplomatic relations with China. U.S. trade still dwarfs China's
China's trade with Costa Rica and with Mexico has

tripled since 2006, according to the International Monetary Fund. Relations with Mexico
had been chilly in the past, especially when former President Felipe Calderon hosted the Dalai
for the three countries Xi is visiting. But
Lama in 2011, something China's Foreign Ministry said "hurt the feelings of the Chinese people and
President Enrique Pena Nieto, who took office in

December, has been aggressive so far about changing that, and the two new
presidents reportedly hit if off on a personal level when Pena Nieto visited
China and met with Xi in April. That resulted in an unusually quick diplomatic
follow-up, just two months into Xi's presidency. During the April talks, Xi said "he is
committed to working with Mexican authorities to help Mexico export
more," Mexico's vice minister of foreign relations, Carlos de Icaza , told The
Associated Press. That's key for Mexico, because its trade deficit with China is
exploding, far surpassing that of any other Latin American nation. While China is looking to
assure supplies of raw materials, Mexico is looking to diversify its trade and
investment, which have long been dominated by its superpower neighbor to
the north. "In the new global geopolitical and economic map, China is, and I
think it has arrived to stay, the world's second economic power," De Icaza
said. Mexico "has to understand and strengthen relations with a nation that
has such great strategic value." De Icaza said the countries hope to sign at least a dozen
harmed Chinese-Mexican relations."
agreements in the fields of trade, energy, tourism, science and technology during Xi's visit. Mexican
exports to China came to a bit over $5.7 billion in 2012, while its imports from that country stood at
almost $57 billion, according to statistics from Mexico's Economy Department. Cell phones, video games
and parts for electronics factories have been pouring into Mexico, which sends China minerals such as
copper and lead. Overall trade between China and Latin America has expanded quickly over the past
decade and the continent now imports more from China than it does from the European Union, according
to the U.N. economic agency for the region. Many countries balance those imports by sending China raw
materials: oil from Venezuela, copper from Chile, soybeans from Argentina. But Mexico's exports go
China imports
three-quarters of the oil it consumes. "China needs to guarantee oil for
overwhelmingly to the huge U.S. market right on its border. Beteta noted that
its citizens' cars, but also obviously for its economy as a whole, which
has a high energy intensity, and Mexico is an oil power," he said. At the same
time, Pena Nieto's government has said that it will soon present an energy
reform bill to allow greater national and international investment in its oil
sector. It hasn't revealed the details of the initiative, but Beteta said it "has awakened the appetite of
many people." State oil company Petroleos Mexicanos, or Pemex, already has taken small
steps to increase its relationship with China, which until recently had been
minimal. Of the roughly 2.5 million barrels of crude that Pemex produces a day, about 1.2 million are
exported. Energy ministry figures show that 75 percent of these exports go to the United States and
about 7 percent to the "Far East." It does not specify how much each specific country in that region
Pemex signed its first long-term

contract with a Chinese company, agreeing to ship 30,000 barrels a day to
the state oil company Sinopec. Mexico may have other goods and investment opportunities to
offer as well. "China is the principal consumer of coal, gas, oil, of secondary industries like
receives. In April, during Pena Nieto's visit to China,
cement, steel, concrete," said Juan Carlos Rivera, director of the Center for Business with Asia at the
private Monterrey Technological Institute. "Evidently
(China) is looking to satisfy
their market needs."
Chinese economic downturn causes World War III

Plate, 03 (Tom, professor of Policy and Communication Studies at UCLA where he founded the Asia
Pacific Media Network, WHY NOT INVADE CHINA? With allies like the neo-cons, Bush scarcely needs
enemies,, June 30, 2003, http://asiamedia.ucla.edu/TomPlate2003/06302003.htm)
But imagine a China disintegrating- on its own, without neo-conservative or Central Intelligence Agency
prompting, much less outright military invasion because the economy (against all predictions) suddenly
collapses. That would knock Asia into chaos. A massive flood of refugees would head for Indonesia and
other places with poor border controls, which dont want them and cant handle them; some in Japan
might lick their lips at the prospect of of World War II revisited and look to annex a slice of China. That
would send Singapore and Malaysia- once occupied by Japan- into nervous breakdowns. Meanwhile, India
might make a grab for Tibet, and Pakistan for Kashmir. Then you can say hello to World War III, Asia
style. Thats why wise policy encourages Chinese stability, security and economic growth the very
direction the White House now seems to prefer.
impact china economy - key to

global
Chinese economic growths key to fuel global growth
Hoge, 04 (James, Editor of Foreign Affairs, from a speech given to Johns Hopkins
University. A Global Power Shift in the Making. Foreign Affairs. July/August)
Nevertheless, China's own extraordinary economic rise is likely to continue for several decades -- if, that
is, it can manage the tremendous disruptions caused by rapid growth, such as internal migration from
rural to urban areas, high levels of unemployment, massive bank debt, and pervasive corruption. At the
moment, China is facing a crucial test in its transition to a market economy. It is experiencing increased
inflation, real-estate bubbles, and growing shortages of key resources such as oil, water, electricity, and
steel. Beijing is tightening the money supply and big-bank lending, while continuing efforts to clean up
the fragile banking sector. It is also considering raising the value of its dollar-pegged currency, to lower
the cost of imports. If such attempts to cool China's economy -- which is much larger and more
decentralized than it was ten years ago, when it last overheated -- do not work, it could crash. Even if
a massive bust would have dire consequences. China is now such a

large player in the global economy that its health is inextricably linked to that of the
system at large. China has become the engine driving the recovery of other Asian
economies from the setbacks of the 1990s. Japan, for example, has become the largest
temporary, such
beneficiary of China's economic growth, and its leading economic indicators, including consumer
spending, have improved as a result. The latest official figures indicate that Japan's real GDP rose at the
annual rate of 6.4 percent in the last quarter of 2003, the highest growth of any quarter since 1990.
Thanks to China, Japan may finally be emerging from a decade of economic malaise. But that trend might
not continue if China crashes.
Chinas the biggest driver in global economic growth and dwarfs the US in
economic growth
Washington Times, Patrice Hill, Editor, July 26, 2007,
http://washingtontimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?
AID=/20070726/BUSINESS/107260073/1001
China, this year for the first time, has dislodged the United States from its long reign as
the main engine of global economic growth, with its more than 11 percent growth
eclipsing sputtering U.S. growth of about 2 percent, according to the International Monetary
Fund's 2007 projections released yesterday. China's growth, which has been fueled by
booming domestic building and commercial development, as well as soaring exports,
has accelerated even as U.S. growth dropped to 0.7 percent in the first quarter under the
weight of a profound housing recession. China is expected to drive a hearty 5.2 percent expansion of the
global economy this year, the IMF said. The United States, with one-quarter of the world's economy and
the richest consumer markets in the world, has dominated global growth for decades. But China's
emergence has been foreshadowed for years by its pull on world commodity markets, where it has driven
up the price of raw materials to record levels, from oil to copper, in its race to build and export goods
around the world. "This year for the very first time with its very strong growth expected, and with the
growth slowdown in the United States China will be contributing the largest part to the
increase in the global growth measured at market exchange rates, " said Charles Collyns,
the IMF's deputy director of research. China will provide one-quarter of the annual growth
rate of the world economy, and, Mr. Collyns said, "if you add together Russia and India as well,
you get over half of global growth coming from the emerging-market countries."
Sustained economic growth in Chinas key to global growth

Bloomberg News, July 6, 2004, http://quote.bloomberg.com/apps/news?
pid=nifea&&sid=a8fksVM80TgA
China is finally having the economic impact its backers have long predicted. The
country's boom accounted for almost one-sixth of worldwide economic growth last year. Now that its
economy is slowing, the world's most populous country may curb global expansion.
Premier Wen Jiabao's effort to cool China's growth rate to about 7 percent from last
year's 9.1 percent may trim global growth by half a percentage point in 2005 and Asia's
expansion by a full percentage point, said Stephen S. Roach, chief economist at Morgan Stanley & Co. in
New York. ``As the Chinese leadership now moves to bring its overheated economy under control,
important to understand the global implications. '' Roach said in an interview. ``When
it's
today's Chinese economy sneezes, Asia -- and possibly even the rest of the world -could catch a cold.'' China's slowdown already is evident in commodity markets, said John
Mothersole, an economist for Global Insight Inc. in Lexington, Massachusetts. Commodity prices soared
by 40 percent during 2003 and the first four months of 2004, the biggest jump in nine years, largely
because of China's buying of products such as steel, copper, nickel and oil, Mothersole said in an
interview. Commodity prices this year, as measured by Global Insight's Industrial Materials Index,
already have declined 12 percent from their April peaks ``and the slowing in China was a major part of
that,'' Mothersole said. Shipping rates that more than tripled from the end of 2002 through the first six
weeks of 2004 partly because of China's purchases have fallen about 45 percent since April, based on the
Baltic Dry Index, which measures dry bulk freight rates.
A Chinese economic slowdown triggers a global economic recession and

prevents global growth
James Pethokoukis, assistant managing editor for the Money & Business section at
U.S. News & World Report, May 30, 2007, http://www.usnews.com/blogs/capitalcommerce/2007/5/30/is-america-at-chinas-mercy.html?s_cid=rss:capitalcommerce:is-america-at-chinas-mercy
Just how vulnerable is the U.S. economy to troubles in China ? It's a question I really
started pondering after watching the 6.5 percent drop overnight in Chinese stocks in response to a
government tripling of a tax on stock trading. Now Wall Street is sure reacting much better to the decline
than it did back in February when the Shanghai Composite index fell 9 percent, sparking a 400-point
drop in the Dow Jones industrial average. This time, the Dow industrials were flattish in midday trading.
Paul Hoffmeister, chief economist at Bretton Woods Research, doesn't see much risk to the Chinese
economy at this point: "As long as the Chinese apply this sort of 'acupuncture' to the market and avoid
imposing growth-killing measures such as introducing a capital gains tax, these negative surprises could
turn out to be buying opportunities." But what if the Chinese do make a policy mistake or some other
internal issue slows down the amazing Chinese economic growth machine? What if
there is a U.S.-China trade war, not an impossibility given the bipartisan protectionist zeal of the
new Congress? China is a country, after all, that holds a trillion bucks in dollar-backed assets and imports
some $800 billion worth of goods and services overall every year. Plus, there is the $60 billion in foreign
direct investment pouring into the country on an annual basis. To get some handle on all this, I asked
several experts to E-mail me their quick takes on what would happen to America if there were a hard
landing in China. Bruce Kasman, chef economist at JP Morgan: At present, the global
economy has a number of engines running, and a specific China event that slows demand theresay to 5
percent or sowould have a very modest impact on global growth. However, to the extent that the
source of the Chinese slowing represents broader global themes at work, its effects
could be much larger. I would note in this context that we do not think Chinese authorities are
setting policies to slow growth at present. While they are working to restrain bank lending and limit the
frothiness of their equity market, they maintain stimulative fiscal policies and continue to maintain a
broadly accommodative monetary policy stance through their efforts to manage currency appreciation .
Will Hutton, author of The Writing on the Wall: Why We Must Embrace China as a Partner or Face It as
an Enemy: Because the country has been so open to imports, has been the single most
important stimulus to the Asian and, thus, world economy over the past five years, China's
stagnation would trigger a global slowdown, maybe even recession. On the plus side, oil
and commodity prices would fall. On the negative side, there would be all the ills of a
slowdown, but on top there would be major financial implications. The World Bank
estimates that if China's growth rate fell by just 2 percent, up to 60 percent of China's bank loans would
become nonperformingso threatening both China's and, via Hong Kong, Asia's financial system . The
flow of saving to finance the U.S.'s deficit would dry up, probably forcing U.S.
interest rates upso worsening the economic slowdown. Kenneth Rogoff,
economics professor at Harvard University: A sharp slowdown in Chinese growth
represents the single biggest risk to U.S. and global growth today. China's massive
excess savings have been helping to hold down mortgage interest rates everywhere.
Trade with China has been a major driver in the revival of U.S. productivity that has helped boost growth
and lower inflation. Above all, China's generally peaceful integration into the world economy has been
helping lower market volatility, thereby driving up the price for risky assets such as housing and equities.
Most investors are far too sanguine about the risk of a China meltdown, forgetting that
China is still very much a poor developing country with huge political, social, and financial
vulnerabilities.. The immediate impact on the United States would be through a sharp rise in interest
rates and market volatility, and a concomitant drop in equity and housing prices. The U.S. may not export
a lot of goods to China, but it sure exports a lot of treasury bills and other bonds. Over time, if the
meltdown persisted, the U.S. would suffer because globalization, and China in particular, has been a
major factor in helping spur innovation and productivity growth.
Impact china economy nuclear

war
Economic collapse risks a Sino-Russian nuclear war
Sharavin, 01 (Alexander, Director of the Institute of Military and Political Analysis, WHAT THE
PAPERS SAY, October 3, 2001)
China's economy is among the fastest-growing economies in the world. It remains socialistic in many
aspects, i.e. extensive and highly expensive, demanding more and more natural resources. China's
natural resources are rather limited, whereas the depths of Siberia and the Russian Far East are almost
inexhaustible. Chinese propaganda has constantly been showing us skyscrapers in free trade zones in
southeastern China. It should not be forgotten, however, that some 250 to 300 million people live there,
i.e. at most a quarter of China's population. A billion Chinese people are still living in misery. For them,
even the living standards of a backwater Russian town remain inaccessibly high. They have absolutely
nothing to lose. There is every prerequisite for "the final throw to the north." The strength of the Chinese
People's Liberation Army (CPLA) has been growing quicker than the Chinese economy. A decade ago the
CPLA was equipped with inferior copies of Russian arms from late 1950s to the early 1960s. However,
through its own efforts Russia has nearly managed to liquidate its most significant technological
advantage. Thanks to our zeal, from antique MiG-21 fighters of the earliest modifications and S-75 air
defense missile systems the Chinese antiaircraft defense forces have adopted Su-27 fighters and S-300
air defense missile systems. China's air defense forces have received Tor systems instead of anti-aircraft
guns which could have been used during World War II. The shock air force of our "eastern brethren" will
in the near future replace antique Tu-16 and Il-28 airplanes with Su-30 fighters, which are not yet
available to the Russian Armed Forces! Russia may face the "wonderful" prospect of combating the
Chinese army, which, if full mobilization is called, is comparable in size with Russia's entire population,
which also has nuclear weapons (even tactical weapons become strategic if states have common borders)
and would be absolutely insensitive to losses (even a loss of a few million of the servicemen would be
acceptable for China). Such a war would be more horrible than the World War II. It would require from
our state maximal tension, universal mobilization and complete accumulation of the army military
hardware, up to the last tank or a plane, in a single direction (we would have to forget such "trifles" like
Talebs and Basaev, but this does not guarantee success either). Massive nuclear strikes on basic military
forces and cities of China would finally be the only way out, what would exhaust Russia's armament
completely. We have not got another set of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-based
missiles, whereas the general forces would be extremely exhausted in the border combats. In the long
run, even if the aggression would be stopped after the majority of the Chinese are killed, our country
would be absolutely unprotected against the "Chechen" and the "Balkan" variants both, and even against
the first frost of a possible nuclear winter.
An economic slowdown would force the CCP to tap into nationalist

sentiment and attack Taiwan
Elizabeth Economy, Senior Fellow and Director of Asia Studies, Center on Foreign
Relations, 2004 (The River Runs Black: The Environmental Challenge to Chinas
Future, p.269-271)
In the political realm, this kind of economic downturn could produce at least three
different scenarios. The first and most predictable would be a reversal in the
present trend of modest political reform, exacerbating the tension within the
Chinese leadership between its relatively newfound belief that there is much to gain from embracing
forces of local political action and integration with the international community and its traditional fear
that such processes will undermine the security of the state and their capacity to govern. In such a time
of domestic stress and leadership vulnerability, the environment is not likely to receive much positive
attention. More likely, the public security apparatus would increasingly scrutinize the work of NGOs and
independent lawyers for the political content of their work. Peasant and worker unrest would be
managed through repression and, perhaps, through the projection of an external

threat or a manufactured crisis in the Taiwan Straits to rally nationalist sentiment
and deflect attention from the country's economic woes. Although the CCP has
proved remarkably adept at harnessing nationalistic sentiment for its own
legitimizing purposes, the wave of anti-Party sentiment expressed during the
confrontation with the United States over the EP3 spy plane during spring 2001 (when a
Chinese fighter jet crashed and a U.S. spy plane was forced to land on Hainan Island) suggests that
such views could spiral out of the government's control, producing a new challenge
to the stability of the regime.
impact narcoterrorism
Chinese investment in Latin America is crucial to fighting
nacrotrafficking
Chinas donation of goods to countries and its sale of goods

at relatively low prices have contributed to the ability of governments in the
region to assert control over national territory and meet such challenges as
narcotrafficking. The use of Chinese K-8 aircraft, purchased by Bolivia from
the PRC, is one example. The donation of trucks and buses to the Bolivian
armed forces and non-lethal gear to the Jamaica Defense Force are other
such examples.15
On the positive side,
impact energy conflict

Energy conflict between the US and China in Latin America
escalates and draws in other countries
Bajpaee 5 [Chietigj Bajpaee is a Ph.D. Candidate at Kings College London and
he previously was a senior Asia analyst at Control Risks, a London-based risk
consultancy. Prior to working at Control Risks, Mr. Bajpaee worked at IHS Global
Insight, the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC and
the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), CHINESE
ENERGY STRATEGY IN LATIN AMERICA, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?
no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=30557#.Ubedt2TwJOg]
The U.S. is looking on with caution as China encroaches upon a region that
has traditionally been a major supplier of energy resources. Venezuela and Canada
together provide the U.S. with a third of its energy imports. For every barrel of oil that China
purchases from Latin America there is potentially one less barrel available
for the U.S. Furthermore, as the American states reduce their reliance on the
U.S. oil market, they will have greater political leverage over the U.S. on
contentious issues such as Canadian trade disputes with the U.S. over lumber and beef, and tensions over
human rights abuses in Venezuela. Finally,
the competition for energy resources in

Latin America is not limited to the U.S. and China. In October 2004, several oil
companies including Chinas PetroChina and Indias ONGC (Oil and Natural Gas Corporation) were
looking into acquiring oil assets valued at $1.5 billion in Ecuador. Japan and South Korea are also
stepping up efforts to secure raw materials in Latin America. Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi
visited Brazil in September 2004 and South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun also made trips to
Friction between
China and the U.S. has so far focused on the question of China's undervalued
exchange rate, its human rights record, relations with rogue states and
the issue of Taiwan. However, the competition over energy resources is now
becoming an additional area of contention. While China and the U.S. have launched the
U.S.-China Energy Policy Dialogue, both states are also engaged in a competition for
energy resources in Russia, the Caspian, the Middle East, Africa and the Americas. This
competition could foreseeably combine with other areas of friction.
Argentina, Brazil and Chile in 2004. Setting the Stage for an Energy Cold War
For example, if the U.S. were to side with Japan on its territorial dispute in the potentially oil and gas rich
strategic blocs
or alliances could form in the international energy arena. Latin
America is likely to emerge as a major stage of this energy
competition or confrontation.
East China Sea or support India over China in meeting its growing energy needs,
impact us econ
Chinese investment in Latin America causes investment in US
markets
Chinese purchases of US assets in Latin America provide

liquidity to US companies to invest elsewhere . Although it eventually fell through, the
$7.1 billion deal in which China National Overseas Oil Corporation was to
purchase 30 percent of the assets of British Petroleum, to help BP cover
obligations stemming from the DeepwaterHorizon oil spill in the Gulf of
Mexico, is a primary example.10 Beyond such direct impacts of Chinese
investment in Latin America, in sectors such as cars, heavy machinery and telecommunications
equipment, investment by Chinese companies in the region also situates them
to enter US markets. Such was the case with Chinese auto manufacturer
First Auto Works (FAW), which positioned itself to invest in the Mexican
maquiladora sector with the hope of assembling Chinese cars using Chinese
components for export to the United States, leveraging advantageous tax treatment
under the North American Free Trade Agreement. Similarly, investment promoters have
cited other Latin American opportunities as indirect channels to the US
market. They include Chinese companies production in Central America in order to export goods to
At the same time,
the United States under the advantageous tax terms of the Central America Free Trade Agreement
(CAFTA), or production in Colombia, Panama and Peru in order to enter the United States under the
bilateral free trade agreements those nations share with the United Statesalthough the ability to meet
the provisions of the relevant agreements (particularly domestic content requirements) in order to realize
such tax savings is questionable. To date, Chinese investments in final assembly operations in Latin
American countries, with an eye on entering the US market, have been limited. To a lesser extent,
Chinese companies may see sales to Latin American markets as a way of

incrementally increasing quality, giving them the experience and reputation
required to successfully penetrate more discriminating US markets .
impact latin American econ

Chinese investment in Latin America prevents economic
decline
January]
enrique garca, president and CEO of the Corporacin

Andina de Fomento (CAF), a Latin American development bank, indicated
that despite the economic downturn in 2009, the global economic crisis has
not obstructed Latin Americas path to sustained economic growth,
macroeconomic stability, and positive external balances. On average, the region was
in a keynote address,
projected to grow by 4.5 percent in 2010, and in certain countries, by as much as 78 percent. This
success is partially due to the implementation of conservative fiscal and monetary policies, continued
Strong regional growth rates

and resilience in the face of the crisis can also be attributed to the favorable
terms of trade between Latin Americas resource rich countries and China .
central bank independence, and strict financial regulations.
impact us-china relations

Regional competition for energy threatens the entirety of
relations
Zweig 10 [David Zweig is the Director of the Center on Chinas Transnational
Relations and a Chair Professor in the Division of Social Science, Hong Kong
University of Science and Technology, CHINAS ENERGY RISE, THE U.S., AND
THE NEW GEOPOLITICS OF ENERGY, April, PCIP]
Americas bilateral policy may be better coordinated. The Strategic Dialogues will give America a clearer
voice when it speaks to the Chinese. But the target of this dialogue must not be only to promote U.S.
interests, but to find ways to help China adapt to the world and help Chinas energy and environmental
sector. But
there are numerous voices in the U.S. that wish to inflate the China
threat. For them, Chinas global energy dependence is a godsend, an excellent mechanism for limiting
Chinas rise and challenge to the U.S. But there are also ears in China that thrive on
expressions of American concerns about Chinas rise . Mistrust of America
runs surprisingly deep within the Chinese bureaucracy; since most Chinese
are Realists and believers of conspiracy theories, they expect the U.S. to try
to stop their rise and see it doing so, even when it is no t. And while American
concerns about China cannot, nor should not be silenced, they must not drive Americas China policy. The
message must be clear: the U.S. welcomes a rising China that brings solutions to the bilateral, triangular
and global problems. Finally, if the hypothesis is correct, that America is a silent and often invisible
many issues could be best discussed

within a triangular format, such as a Sino-American-African dialogue or a SinoAmerican-Latin America one. While the U.S. may hesitate to join such
discussions, as they give credence and legitimacy to Chinas engagement in
regions from which the U.S. would have preferred to exclude them, such
dialogue with a rising China is necessary . Many of the meetings could be track-two,
player triangularizing Chinas bilateral ties, then
bringing influential academics and middle level policy makers together to discuss how Chinas rise in a
particular region can be best managed to insure a win-win scenario. Conferences in the West on these
issues tend to be run by the U.S. congressional committees and reflect the concerns of a declining
hegemon. No doubt, both sides will hesitate to put their cards on the table. But the first step is to get
people to recognize that U.S.-China interdependence occurs at the global level, and that
regional
competition poses a serious threat to the bilateral relationship . Only then can the
potentially negative implications of Sino-American triangularization be better managed.
Prevents extinction
Wittner 11 professor of history emeritus at SUNY Albany
(Lawrence Wittner, Huffington Post World, 11-30-2011,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lawrence-wittner/nuclear-warchina_b_1116556.html)
While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will be used . After all,
for centuries international conflicts have led to wars, with nations employing their
deadliest weapons. The current deterioration of U.S. relations with China might end up
providing us with yet another example of this phenomenon. The gathering tension
between the United States and China is clear enough. Disturbed by China's growing
economic and military strength, the U.S. government recently challenged China's
claims in the South China Sea , increased the U.S. military presence in Australia, and deepened
U.S. military ties with other nations in the Pacific region. According to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton,
the United States was "asserting our own position as a Pacific power." But need this lead to nuclear
war? Not necessarily. And yet, there are signs that it could. After all, both the United
States and China possess large numbers of nuclear weapons . The U.S. government
threatened to attack China with nuclear weapons during the Korean War and, later, during their conflict
over the future of China's offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu. In the midst of the latter confrontation,
President Dwight Eisenhower declared publicly, and chillingly, that U.S. nuclear weapons would "be used
China didn't have nuclear

weapons then. Now that it does, perhaps the behavior of national leaders will be
more temperate. But the loose nuclear threats of U.S. and Soviet government
officials during the Cold War, when both nations had vast nuclear arsenals, should
convince us that, even as the military ante is raised, nuclear saber-rattling persists.
Some pundits argue that nuclear weapons prevent wars between nuclear-armed
nations; and, admittedly, there haven't been very many -- at least not yet. But the Kargil War of
1999, between nuclear-armed India and nuclear-armed Pakistan, should convince us
that such wars can occur. Indeed, in that case, the conflict almost slipped into a nuclear war.
just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else." Of course,
Pakistan's foreign secretary threatened that, if the war escalated, his country felt free to use "any
weapon" in its arsenal. During the conflict, Pakistan did move nuclear weapons toward
its border, while India, it is claimed, readied its own nuclear missiles for an attack
on Pakistan. At the least, though, don't nuclear weapons deter a nuclear attack? Do they? Obviously,
NATO leaders didn't feel deterred, for, throughout the Cold War, NATO's strategy
was to respond to a Soviet conventional military attack on Western Europe by
launching a Western nuclear attack on the nuclear-armed Soviet Union . Furthermore, if
U.S. government officials really believed that nuclear deterrence worked, they would not have resorted to
championing "Star Wars" and its modern variant, national missile defense. Why are these vastly
expensive -- and probably unworkable -- military defense systems needed if other nuclear powers are
deterred from attacking by U.S. nuclear might? Of course, the bottom line for those Americans convinced
that nuclear weapons safeguard them from a Chinese nuclear attack might be that the U.S. nuclear
arsenal is far greater than its Chinese counterpart. Today, it is estimated that the U.S.
government possesses over 5,000 nuclear warheads, while the Chinese government
has a total inventory of roughly 300 . Moreover, only about 40 of these Chinese nuclear weapons
can reach the United States. Surely the United States would "win" any nuclear war with
China. But what would that "victory" entail? An attack with these Chinese nuclear
weapons would immediately slaughter at least 10 million Americans in a great storm
of blast and fire, while leaving many more dying horribly of sickness and radiation
poisoning. The Chinese death toll in a nuclear war would be far higher. Both nations
would be reduced to smoldering, radioactive wasteland s. Also, radioactive debris sent
aloft by the nuclear explosions would blot out the sun and bring on a "nuclear
winter" around the globe -- destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and
generating chaos and destruction. Moreover, in another decade the extent of this
catastrophe would be far worse. The Chinese government is currently expanding its
nuclear arsenal, and by the year 2020 it is expected to more than double its number
of nuclear weapons that can hit the United States. The U.S. government, in turn, has
plans to spend hundreds of billions of dollars "modernizing" its nuclear weapons and
nuclear production facilities over the next decade. To avert the enormous disaster of
a U.S.-China nuclear war, there are two obvious actions that can be taken. The first is
to get rid of nuclear weapons, as the nuclear powers have agreed to do but thus far have resisted doing.
The second, conducted while the nuclear disarmament process is occurring, is to improve U.S.-
China relations. If the American and Chinese people are interested in ensuring their
survival and that of the world, they should be working to encourage these policies.
impact sphere of influence

Encroaching on Chinas sphere of influence leads nuclear conflagration
Ivan Eland - Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent
Institute, Former Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute - 4/11/05
(Coexisting with a Rising China,
http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=1494)
Although China is an autocratic state, it still has legitimate security interests. The
United States would be smart to show some empathy with those concerns. In recent
years, as the United States has become alarmed at Chinas expanded military spending, the Chinese have
also become alarmed at large increases in the U.S. defense budget and U.S. attacks on the sovereign
nations of Serbia and Iraq. Many Chinese see the threat of an expanding U.S. empire that
aims at encircling China and preventing its legitimate rise to great power status. To
lessen such perceptions and reduce the chance of conflict between the two nuclear-armed nations, the
United States should retract its forward military and alliance posture in Asia, including repudiating any
implied commitment to defend Taiwan. With large bodies of water as moats and the most formidable
nuclear arsenal in the world, the United States hardly needs a security perimeter that stretches across
the entire Pacific Ocean to protect it from China. If the United States continues to maintain an
outdated Cold War-style empire, it is bound to come into needless conflict with other
powers, especially China. Instead of emulating the policies of pre-World War I
Britain toward Germany, the United States should take a page from another chapter
in British history. In the late 1800s, although not without tension, the British
peacefully allowed the fledging United States to rise as a great power, knowing both
countries were protected by the expanse of the Atlantic Ocean that separated them.
Taking advantage of that same kind separation by a major ocean, the United States
could also safely allow China to obtain respect as a great power, with a sphere of
influence to match. If China went beyond obtaining a reasonable sphere of influence into an Imperial
Japanese-style expansion, the United States could very well need to mount a challenge. However, at
present, little evidence exists of Chinese intent for such expansion, which would run
counter to recent Chinese history. Therefore, a U.S. policy of coexistence, rather
than neo-containment, might avoid a future catastrophic war or even a nuclear
conflagration.
US interfering in Chinas vital interests spurs US-Sino Nuclear War
As during the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States and the
recent tensions between India and Pakistan, nuclear weapons will likely restrain the
conduct of both China and the United States in any crisis. And crises will likely
arise. During the Cold War, neither superpower conducted direct military action in
the other superpowers primary sphere of influence (eastern Europe for the Soviet Union
and the Western Hemisphere for the United States). If one superpower stirred the pot in the
others backyard, it usually did so covertly or by proxynot directly . In other words,
the competition between the superpowers was usually constrained to peripheral
regions of the world over marginal interests and did not occur in core areas over
primary interests. Nuclear weapons can restrain competition and inhibit
conventional war between powers possessing them. They induce caution because their
effects are so horrific. Thus, they can dampen conflict, but at great risk of annihilation.
Catastrophe can occur if there is a miscalculation or misstep . But nuclear weapons are not
going away anytime soon, and both China and the United States already possess them. Although antiChina hawks see as ominous the modernization of Chinas strategic nuclear force, there may be some
positive aspects to it. Right now the Chinese have only about twenty long-range nuclear weapons with the
range to strike the United States. They are very vulnerable to a U.S. preemptive or preventive nuclear
attack. The U.S. threat to those missilesexacerbated, at least in Chinese minds, by
President Bushs new preventive war doctrinemight force China into a use or
lose situation. In that scenario, China might find the need to launch its missiles
before they are preventively attacked by the United States. In the Cold War, nuclear
stability was thought to be enhanced if both sides possessed a survivable second strike capabilitythat
is, powerful nuclear weapons that would survive a fi rst strike by the other side in order to retaliate, thus
diminthe independent institute ishing the incentive to launch a bolt-out-ofthe- blue attack in the fi rst
place. Th e current vulnerability of Chinese obsolescent nuclear forces comes from their need to be
launched from vulnerable fi xed land-based silos and their inability to be fi red quickly. Th ey need to be
assembled before launch because the warhead and liquid fuel are stored separately from the missile.
Modernization of Chinese nuclear capabilities entails building solid fuel missiles that are mobile (the DF31 and DF-31A extended range intercontinental ballistic missiles) thus improving rapidity of fi re and
limiting the enemys ability to detect the missiles by increasing the area in which they can be deployed.
Both attributes should enhance their survivability. Also, further increasing the survivability of the Chinese
nuclear deterrent is the planned deployment of the new JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile on a
new class of ballistic missile submarines.45 Th erefore, a modest Chinese nuclear modernization,
although not to be celebrated, should be expected and should not be alarming to the United States. Yet
it would be dangerous for China and the United States to count solely on nuclear
weapons to reduce or eliminate conflict between them. That strategy might lead to a
tense situation similar to the forty-year Cold War between the Soviet Union and the
United States. In an attempt to avoid conflict with the other power, China and
especially the United States must do some soul searching to reassess and more
modestly construe their vital interests.
Expanding the US empire into Chinas spheres of influence alarms China
leading to nuclear conflict
Reducing the chances of future SinoU.S. conflict requires more drastic changes in
U.S. policy than in Chinese policy, mainly because the United States is in Chinas
face, not vice versa. The United States has alliances, forward force deployments,
and overseas military bases in East Asia and the Pacific that ring China. It is also
improving bilateral relations with other Asian powers (for example, India and Russia) that can help to
counter China. In other words, the United States has developed a stealthy neocontainment
policy toward China in the postCold War years. In contrast, the Chinese have no
alliances, military deployments, overseas bases, signifi - cant antiU.S. bilateral
diplomacy, or containment policy in the Western Hemisphere directed against the
United States. If they did, the United States would be very alarmed and hostile. Th e
United States has a much better human rights record and political and the independent institute
economic system than does China, but its foreign policy is far more aggressive. Th e conventional wisdom
is that democracies have benevolent foreign policies and authoritarian governments have aggressive
ones. Th e historical record and the aforementioned U.S. and Chinese examples show this claim to be
erroneous. Th e U.S. invasion of Iraq, a country halfway around the world that posed little direct threat to
the United States, is an example of U.S. hegemonic behavior. In recent years, China has not invaded even
a neighboring country. From a U.S. perspective, China is a rising power and should be watched, but
current costly distractions have diverted attention, eff ort, and resources from that purpose. China
must be careful about expanding its sphere of infl uence to avoid alarming other
Asian nations, but the United States must conduct a wholesale reassessment of its
informal, but expansive, Asian empire. Th e mainstream view in U.S. policy circles,
among Democrats and Republicans alike, is that an expansive U.S. Empireboth in
Asia and around the globeenhances security. In fact, the opposite is true. Th e U.S.
homeland would be much more secure if the United States worked on reducing the
chance of a needless confl ict with a nuclear-armed China.
impact ccp instability

Chinese control of resources is vital to the stability of the ruling party
Zweig and Jianhai, 05 (David, director of the Center on China's Transnational
Relations at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, and Bi, postdoctoral fellow at the Center, Foreign Affairs, Chinas Global Hunt for Energy,
September/October, proquest)
An unprecedented need for resources is now driving China's foreign policy . A booming
domestic economy, rapid urbanization, increased export processing, and the Chinese people's voracious
appetite for cars are increasing the country's demand for oil and natural gas, industrial and construction
materials, foreign capital and technology. Twenty years ago, China was East Asia's largest oil exporter.
Now it is the world's second-largest importer; last year, it alone accounted for 31 percent of global
growth in oil demand. Now that China is the workshop of the world, its hunger for electricity and
industrial resources has soared. China's combined share of the world's consumption of aluminum, copper,
nickel, and iron ore more than doubled within only ten years, from 7 percent in 1990 to 15 percent in
2000; it has now reached about 20 percent and is likely to double again by the end of the decade. Despite
calls by Prime Minister Wen Jiabao and other politicians to cut consumption of energy and other
resources, there is little sign of this appetite abating. Justin Yifu Lin, director of the China Center for
Economic Research at Peking University, in Beijing, says the country's economy could grow at 9
percent per year for the next 20 years. These new needs already have serious implications for
China's foreign policy. Beijing's access to foreign resources is necessary both for
continued economic growth and, because growth is the cornerstone of China's social
stability, for the survival of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Since China remains a
relatively centralized, government-driven economy, Beijing has been able to adapt its foreign policy to its
domestic development strategy. Traditional institutions, such as the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group
of the CCP, are still making the key decisions, but a more pluralistic environment is emerging and
allowing business leaders to help shape foreign policy. The China Institute for International Studies, a
government think tank, holds numerous conferences bringing together academics and leaders in
business, the military, and the government to devise strategies for the top rung of the Communist Party.
CCP legitimacy depends on economic growth

Council on Foreign Relations, 07 (Report of an Independent Task Force, U.S.China Relations: An Affirmative Agenda, A Responsible Course, April,
http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/ChinaTaskForce.pdf)
Apart from addressing the needs of the poor, Chinas leaders know they must also
confront a host of new challenges, many of them the products of economic growth.
Environmental, demographic, and public health trends, widening income disparities,
a growing middle class clamoring for more responsive and accountable government,
lingering ethnic and religious grievances, and endemic corruption all threaten
Chinas economic health and political stability. Chinas leaders are also aware that
they face these challenges at a time when their own legitimacy and that of the CCP
depend increasingly on sustaining economic growth.
And, Regime instability causes lashout and nuclear war
Renxing, 05 (Sen, staff writer, The Epoch Times, August 3, 2005, CCP Gambles
Insanely to Avoid Death http://www.theepochtimes.com/news/5-8-3/30931.html)
Since the Partys life is above all else, it would not be surprising if the CCP resorts
to the use of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons in its attempt to postpone its
life. The CCP, that disregards human life, would not hesitate to kill two hundred million
Americans, coupled with seven or eight hundred million Chinese, to achieve its ends .
The speech, free of all disguises, lets the public see the CCP for what it really is: with evil filling its
every cell, the CCP intends to fight all of mankind in its desperate attempt to cling to life. And that is the
theme of the speech. The theme is murderous and utterly evil. We did witness in China beggars who
demanded money from people by threatening to stab themselves with knives or prick their throats on
long nails. But we have never, until now, seen a rogue who blackmails the world to die
with it by wielding biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons . Anyhow, the bloody
confession affirmed the CCPs bloodiness: a monstrous murderer, who has killed 80 million Chinese
people, now plans to hold one billion people hostage and gamble with their lives .
impact chinese expansion

Perception of oil supply insecurity will cause China to expand into the South
China Sea causing regional instability
Ronald Soligio, and Amy Jaffe, February 11, 2004, Prof. of Economics at Rice and
Senior Energy Analyst at James Baker III Inst. For Public Policy, China and Longrange Asia Energy Security: An Analysis of the Political, Economic and
Technological Factors Shaping Asian Energy Markets,
http://www.rice.edu/energy/publications/docs/AsianEnergySecurity_ChinaGrowingE
nergyDependence.pdf
Chinas rising oil import requirements and the physical constraints of its refining sector suggests that
China will become increasingly dependent on the same energy sources as the U.S., Japan, and other
industrialized economies. This could tie its strategic interests more closely with Western interests in the
Middle East. A rising reliance on Persian Gulf oil and gas imports imply that China will suffer the
same negative consequences as the U.S., Japan and Europe if military equipment it
or others pass to regimes such as those in Iraq or Iran is used to impede the free
flow of oil from the Middle East or elsewhere. Continued political instability in Afghanistan or
Central Asia will have similarly dire consequences for Chinas chances of tapping Caspian energy
supplies. However, it remains to be seen if Chinas energy interests will be enough to alter Chinas
militarys perceptions of its own more general strategic interests, particularly on the issue of weapons
non-proliferation. China may continue to perceive a benefit in diverting U.S. strategic engagement away
from Asia. Chinas leaders may view larger strategic interests in Asia beyond the energy sector as
better served by diverting US diplomatic attention and military assets away from the Asian theatre to
places like the Middle East. This latter interpretation of Chinese interests will depend
greatly on Beijings perceptions of US intentions and their potential risk to China.

Some analysts worry that Chinas dependence on the same energy supplies as its
neighbors and Western industrial nations will prompt heightened competition in the
energy arena and drive Asian regional arms races. Kent Calder notes that
"Expansionist, confrontationist strategies, not to mention the acquisition of nuclear
weapons, offer some attractive prospects of gain to regional powers, such as
preferential access to energy resources and sea lanes in the South China Sea. The
costs of armament and preparation for war, conversely, become less onerous as East
Asia grows increasingly affluent. This combination of wealth and bellicosity is a
recipe for disaster." But such predictions have already missed the mark on several counts and are
likely to continue to do so. While it is true that China will increasingly compete for similar energy
supplies with Japan, South Korea and India, the possibility that this will lead to increased tensions and
conflict is not a foregone conclusion. For one thing, as the above forecasts show, the possibility that the
world will have a slight to moderate surplus of oil for the foreseeable future reduces the need for a
confrontational posture towards supplies. And, Asias recent financial woes have reduced not only the
rate of rising energy use but also the budgets for increased military spending . However, the
possibility of a major supply disruption will continue to exist and with it, the risk
that rivalry could emerge during a time of crisis.
Chinese adventurism in the South China sea crushes relations with the US
and makes cross-straight war inevitable
Cossa, Executive Director of the Pacific Forum of the CSIS, 1998 (Ralph, "Security
Implications of Conflict in the South China Sea: Exploring Potential Triggers of
Conflict," http://www.southchinasea.org/docs/Cossa,%20Security%20Implications
%20of%20%20Conflict%20in%20the%20S.ChinaSea.pdf)
Implications for Sino-U.S. Relations. A use of force by the PRC in the South China Sea
would have a particularly devastating affect on U.S.-PRC relations. Despite recent
improvements brought about by Chinese President Jiang Zemin's successful visit to the U.S. last fall,
these relations remain fragile, with debates continuing in both capitals as to how
much one side can or should trust and cooperate with the other. A Chinese act of
aggression in the Spratlys would likely tilt the debate in the U.S., perhaps irreparably. Were a major
showdown to occur between the U.S. and China in the South China Sea, it would be
difficult for Japan and for many of China's other neighbors (and primary investors) to remain
neutral. Open conflict between the U.S. and PRC would also likely signal an end to U.S.
adherence to a "one China" policy.
AT heg impact turn

China is economically motivated and wont use Latin America to
challenge US heg
The United States must realise that it is partly responsible for any military
tension with China by backing it into a corner t hrough its relations with Taiwan, India,
and Japan. Mahbubani suggests that given how vulnerable Chinese leaders feel in the
face of U.S pressure, it is only natural for them to look for ways to
counterbalance U.S power. [138] Subsequently a redressing of the security imbalance should
be looked at if the United States desires to see an improvement in bilateral relations with China on this
The likelihood however of an anti-American military alliance forming in

Latin America is exceedingly slim , because ideology does not play a role in
Chinas thinking. Furthermore as previously mentioned, China does not desire conflict
with the U.S, directly or indirectly, and certainly will not allow Chavez to
make China his ally in battles with Washington . [139] Therefore, the United
States must realise that China has no intention of drawing Americas ire in
the same way Caracas and Havana have.
front.
AT heg impact turn

China cant threaten US heg
Ben-Ami 6/8/13 [Shlomo Ben Ami, a former Israeli foreign minister who now
serves as the vice president of the Toledo International Center for Peace, China
muscles in on Latin America, but US influence remains strong, The Australian]
it would be a mistake to regard Latin America's broadening international

relations as marking the end of US preeminence . Unlike in the bygone era of
Yet
superpowers and captive nations, American influence can no longer be defined by the ability to install
and depose leaders from the US embassy. To believe otherwise is to ignore how international politics has
changed over the last quarter-century. A continent once afflicted by military takeovers has slowly but
surely implanted stable democracies. Responsible economic management, poverty-reduction programs,
structural reforms, and greater openness to foreign investment have all helped to generate years of lowinflation growth. As a result, the region was able to withstand the ravages of the global financial crisis.
The US not only encouraged these changes, but has benefited hugely from them. More than 40 per cent
of US exports now go to Mexico and Central and South America, the US's fastest-growing export
destination. Mexico is America's second-largest foreign market (valued at $US215 billion in 2012). US
exports to Central America have risen by 94 per cent over the past six years; imports from the region
have risen by 87 per cent. And the US continues to be the largest foreign investor on the continent.
American interests are evidently well served by having democratic, stable, and increasingly prosperous
neighbors. This new reality also demands a different type of diplomacy - one that recognises the diverse
interests of the continent. For example, an emerging power such as Brazil wants more respect on the
world stage. Obama blundered when he dismissed a 2010 deal on Iran's nuclear program mediated by
Brazil and Turkey (despite having earlier endorsed the talks). Other countries might benefit from US
efforts to promote democracy and socioeconomic ties, as Obama's recent trips to Mexico and Costa Rica
show. Trade relations provide another all-important lever. President Sebastian Pinera of Chile visited the
White House earlier this week to discuss, among other things, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), an
ambitious trade agreement that might encompass New Zealand, Singapore, Australia, Mexico, Canada,
and Japan. President Ollanta Humala of Peru is expected in the White House next week, while Vice
Language and culture

matter, too. Given the extraordinary growth of Latinos' influence in the US, it
is almost inconceivable that America could lose its unique status in the
region to China or Russia, let alone Iran. Gone are the days when military muscle
and the politics of subversion could secure US influence - in Latin America or
anywhere else. A world power today is one that can combine economic vigor and
a popular culture with global outreach on the basis of shared interests. The
US is better positioned than any other power in this respect, particularly
when it comes to applying these advantages in its immediate vicinity .
President Joe Biden is scheduled to visit Latin America soon after.
AT heg impact turn

China wont threaten US heg
Tokatlian 7 [Juan Gabriel Tokatlian is a professor of international relations at the
Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Argentina, Latin America, China, and the United
States: a hopeful triangle, http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracyprotest/hopeful_triangle_4336.jsp]
Beijing's approach to the region involves an active economic diplomacy

characterised by pragmatism, based on conciliation, seeking stability, concerned not
to irritate Washington, and aimed at strengthening interstate ties. Therefore, China's expanding
interest in the region appears to be moderate, not challenging, and in favor
of the status quo. In recent years, China has acted in a responsible fashion in the
region. This helps understand why, for the most part, no large or middle-sized country of the region has
Today,
attempted to exercise a "veto power" to halt or reverse what has become a policy of prudent and reliable
The United States has no motive to fear new ChineseLatin American contacts, for four reasons. First, it should be emphasised that relations
between Latin America, China, and the United States are characterised by
an asymmetrical dynamic in which the United States operates as a global
power, China as a regional power, and Latin America as a non-threatening
periphery. The three parties may manage this asymmetry confidently by
avoiding ambiguity, conflict or miscalculation. Second, Latin America, China, and the
engagement towards China.
United States do not constitute a strategic triangle: the bilateral ties of each pair are not closely
intertwined, nor are they equally vital for all parties. The reciprocal significance of Washington-Beijing
relations is, for each side, greater than their respective relationships with Latin America. At the same
time, the weight of the United States in the external and internal politics of Latin America is much more
important than that of China, and Latin America is not among China's highest priorities when compared
to other countries (particularly, the more developed ones) and regions (especially its closest periphery).
Furthermore, the history and recent evolution of this triangle has not had notable implications for the
international balance of power, nor does it appear that it will in the near future. Third, it should be
Latin America is located in the same hemisphere as

the leading contemporary superpower. Latin America has traditionally been
secure for the United States. In addition, US hegemony in the hemisphere despite the political "left turn" to its south in the 2000s - is still evident . By
recalled that geography matters.
analogy, if we consider that Asia today contains several great contenders (India, Japan, China, and
it is very unlikely that China will have the

capacity and the will to seriously rival the United States in the Americas .
Fourth, values matter. Latin America shares (and contributes to) the
democratic values of the west. In addition, the last authoritarian wave of the 1970s gave
impetus to an affirmative reassessment of the democratic regime. In that regard, China's internal
political model is, in general, not very attractive for Latin America .
Russia) and many medium-size powers, then
AT heg impact turn

Latin America China relations dont threaten the US
Shixue 9 [Jiang, Vice President, Chinese Association of Latin American Studies
Professor, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Understanding Chinas Relations
with Latin America, http://www.sinolatincapital.com/Upload/2009929184158.pdf,
April]
But there are other voices. For instance, Manuel Rocha, former U.S. ambassador to Bolivia also said,
Were it not for China, Latin America would probably be showing a much more lackluster [economic]
performance.1 Daniel P. Erikson, senior associate from the Inter-American Dialogue, a think-tank in
Chinas engagement in Latin America is not yet a

major concern for the United States, and there are few signs of any real
frictions between the two countries on that score.2 At the testimony before the House
Washington, commented that
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere in June 2008, Erikson once
again pointed out that While Chinas expansion into Latin America may imply a potential loss for some
U.S. business sectors, it is important to note that trade is not a zero sum game. To the extent that Chinas
involvement is sparking economic growth in Latin America, it may contribute to economic stability and
well-being in a manner that suits the U.S. desire to see a prosperous and healthy neighborhood. Indeed,
the United States concern over the closer relationship between China and
Latin America is incorrect and unnecessary . It is well-known that Latin America has been
on the way of reforms and opening to the outside world for almost two decades. It endeavors to attract
more foreign investment and liberalize the market so as to stimulate growth. As a result, China is only
Chinas relations
with Latin America are for economic purpose, not for political intention
against the U.S. China understands well that Latin America is the backyard of the United States, so
there is no need for China to challenge the American influence in Latin
America. Both China and Latin America have been opening to the outside
world. In the age of globalization both of them should cooperate to push
forward South-South cooperation. As a matter of fact, further cooperation
between China and Latin America will benefit regional peace and
development in Asia-Pacific and Latin America. This outcome would certainly
be in the favor of the United States.
one of the economic partners Latin America has been trying to cooperate with.
2NC China
Meta-Overview
China will see the plan as an act of the US encroaching on their
sphere of influence and start a war with the US to protect their
interests. If China cant meet its increasing oil demand its
economy will collapse and bring the entire world economy down
with it.
Impact WALL
The disad outweighs the case Extend 1NC RT and Straits an
oil war will go nuclear because China is worried that that the
US is after its energy resources. They have made it explicit that
they are willing to use force including nuclear weapons. A USSino war would drag in other countries who would either try to
expand their own spheres of influence or who have been
attacked by China in the past.
The disad turns case because if China doesnt have access to oil
to fuel its economy it would collapse and trigger the impacts of
the case, additionally a lack of access to oil could drive China
to disregard environmental regulations and drill unsafely or
burn more coal, therefore destroying the environment.
Uniqueness WALL
1. Extend Knowland, the US is backing down in Mexico and
China is taking this as an opportunity to invest in Mexico
because of their increasing oil dependency.
2. US is decreasing investment China filling in
Munoz 6/9/13 [Heraldo, UN Assistant Secretary-General and UN
Development Program Director for Latin America and the Caribbean, The
United States turns to an emerged Latin America,
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/06/20136984021498867.html]
The United States is still the region's top foreign investor . In 2012, US exports
to South and Central America plus the Caribbean totaled $205bn, compared with $110bn in exports
But US exports to Latin

America and the Caribbean have receded during the last decade. This vacuum
is being filled by China, while India's trade with the region is also growing substantially. The
to China. US exports to Mexico alone reached $216bn last year.
United States has become Brazil's second commercial partner after China. Bilateral trade between
the countries stood at about $100bn but Vice President Biden said there is "no reason" why that
number could not be $400-500bn.
3. China is edging out the US for economic influence in Latin

America
Global Post 6/4/13 [Xi flies to Mexico as China battles US for influence in
Latin America]
When it comes to economic influence, China may be gaining the upper

hand in Latin America. China is increasing its funding to the region just
as the US has been coming under pressure to cut aid and investment. "If
Im a Latin American leader, Im very happy because I now have more chips to play with," Kevin
Gallagher, author of the 2010 book "The Dragon in the Room," about Chinas inroads in Latin
America, told Bloomberg. "The
onus is on the US to come up with a more

flexible, attractive offer but thats not so easy because it doesnt have the
deep pockets like it used to." Latin America's growing economy makes for an attractive
investment. The International Monetary Fund forecasts the regions economies will expand 3.4
Xi's tour of
Trinidad, Costa Rica and Mexico are setting the stage for his visit to
California later this week, which will be his first face-to-face talks with Obama since taking office.
That Xi's Latin America trip came so early into his presidency is a
confident approach that shows little concern for American reaction, Evan
Ellis, a professor at the National Defense University in Washington told Bloomberg. " In the past
Chinese presidents were very deferential to the US., always making
reference to Washingtons backyard," Ellis said. "You dont hear any of that
from Xis team, though you dont find any threatening rhetoric either."
percent this year, almost three times the pace of growth in the developed world.
China is focused on improving relations with Mexico in order to

access oil its key to their economy
AP 6/2/13 [China's president visits Latin America, eyes Mexico's plans to open
energy sector, www.foxnews.com/world/2013/06/02/china-president-visits-latinamerica-eyes-mexico-plans-to-open-energy-sector/#ixzz2VwkkzArw]
China has invested heavily in resource-rich Latin America in

recent years, striking major trade deals with governments from Venezuela to
Argentina. Now its president is reaching out to one of the few countries in the region
MEXICO CITY
Mexico. President Xi Jinping's three-day visit

starting Tuesday comes as Mexico debates opening its highly regulated
energy sector to more foreign investment . China's president has said he
plans to address Mexico's large trade deficit with the Asian power and
discuss ways to increase Mexican exports. Analysts say that could mean oil,
which Mexico has and China needs to fuel its expanding economy and the
cars of its growing middle class. "Access to strategic raw materials is key to understanding
where ties have been slow to develop:
the dynamic of relations with China," said Hugo Beteta, director for Mexico and Central America of the
United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. " Clearly
there is an
interest by China in Mexican oil." The trip is part of a four-country regional tour that ends in
the United States. Xi started in Trinidad and Tobago, where he also met with leaders of other Caribbean
countries, and he arrives Sunday night in Costa Rica. China and Trinidad have had diplomatic ties for
almost 40 years, and Trinidad is a major trading partner in the Caribbean for China. Costa Rica is the
only country in Central America to have diplomatic relations with China. U.S. trade still dwarfs China's
China's trade with Costa Rica and with Mexico has

tripled since 2006, according to the International Monetary Fund. Relations with Mexico
had been chilly in the past, especially when former President Felipe Calderon hosted the Dalai
for the three countries Xi is visiting. But
Lama in 2011, something China's Foreign Ministry said "hurt the feelings of the Chinese people and
President Enrique Pena Nieto, who took office in

December, has been aggressive so far about changing that, and the two new
presidents reportedly hit if off on a personal level when Pena Nieto visited
China and met with Xi in April. That resulted in an unusually quick diplomatic
follow-up, just two months into Xi's presidency. During the April talks, Xi said "he is
committed to working with Mexican authorities to help Mexico export
more," Mexico's vice minister of foreign relations, Carlos de Icaza , told The
Associated Press. That's key for Mexico, because its trade deficit with China is
exploding, far surpassing that of any other Latin American nation. While China is looking to
assure supplies of raw materials, Mexico is looking to diversify its trade and
investment, which have long been dominated by its superpower neighbor to
the north. "In the new global geopolitical and economic map, China is, and I
think it has arrived to stay, the world's second economic power," De Icaza
said. Mexico "has to understand and strengthen relations with a nation that
has such great strategic value." De Icaza said the countries hope to sign at least a dozen
harmed Chinese-Mexican relations."
agreements in the fields of trade, energy, tourism, science and technology during Xi's visit. Mexican
exports to China came to a bit over $5.7 billion in 2012, while its imports from that country stood at
almost $57 billion, according to statistics from Mexico's Economy Department. Cell phones, video games
and parts for electronics factories have been pouring into Mexico, which sends China minerals such as
copper and lead. Overall trade between China and Latin America has expanded quickly over the past
decade and the continent now imports more from China than it does from the European Union, according
to the U.N. economic agency for the region. Many countries balance those imports by sending China raw
materials: oil from Venezuela, copper from Chile, soybeans from Argentina. But Mexico's exports go
China imports
three-quarters of the oil it consumes. "China needs to guarantee oil for its
citizens' cars, but also obviously for its economy as a whole, which has a
high energy intensity, and Mexico is an oil power ," he said. At the same time, Pena
Nieto's government has said that it will soon present an energy reform bill to
allow greater national and international investment in its oil sector. It hasn't
overwhelmingly to the huge U.S. market right on its border. Beteta noted that
revealed the details of the initiative, but Beteta said it "has awakened the appetite of many people." State
Pemex, already has taken small steps to increase

its relationship with China, which until recently had been minimal. Of the
oil company Petroleos Mexicanos, or
roughly 2.5 million barrels of crude that Pemex produces a day, about 1.2 million are exported. Energy
ministry figures show that 75 percent of these exports go to the United States and about 7 percent to the
"Far East." It does not specify how much each specific country in that region receives. In April, during
Pemex signed its first long-term contract with a Chinese

company, agreeing to ship 30,000 barrels a day to the state oil company
Pena Nieto's visit to China,
Sinopec. Mexico may have other goods and investment opportunities to offer as well. " China is the
principal consumer of coal, gas, oil, of secondary industries like cement, steel, concrete," said
Juan Carlos Rivera, director of the Center for Business with Asia at the private Monterrey Technological
Institute. "Evidently
(China) is looking to satisfy their market needs ."
Link WALL
Extend Ferguson and Malik, any action by the US to invest in
Mexicos oil will be seen as a threat by China who is
trying to secure oil to meet their rapidly increasing
demand and that China has acknowledged that any
conflict over oil would spark a war.
Chinese perception of access to Latin America determines its
actions
In general, the bases of Chinese soft power differ from those of the United States, leading analysts to
underestimate that power when they compare the PRC to the United States on those factors that are the
sources of U.S. influence, such as the affinity of the world's youth for American music, media, and
lifestyle, the widespread use of the English language in business and technology, or the number of elites
soft power
is based on perceptions and emotion (that is, inferences), and not necessarily on
objective reality. Although China's current trade with and investment
position in Latin America are still limited compared to those of the United
States,3 its influence in the region is based not so much on the current size
of those activities, but rather on hopes or fears in the region of what it could
be in the future. Because perception drives soft power, the nature of the PRC
impact on each country in Latin America is shaped by its particular
situation, hopes, fears, and prevailing ideology . The "Bolivarian socialist" regime of
who have learned their professions in U.S. institutions. It is also important to clarify that
Hugo Chvez in Venezuela sees China as a powerful ally in its crusade against Western "imperialism,"
countries such as Peru, Chile, and Colombia view the PRC in more traditional
terms as an important investor and trading partner within the context of
global free market capitalism. The core of Chinese soft power in Latin
America, as in the rest of the world, is the widespread perception that the PRC,
because of its sustained high rates of economic growth and technology
development, will present tremendous business opportunities in the future,
and will be a power to be reckoned with globally. In general, this perception can be
while
divided into seven areas:
AT Cooperation/Sharing Solves
They say the US and China have agreed to share a sphere of
influence, but just because their governments have said
this doesnt mean that they will actually act on it and
when Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union secretly agreed
to divide Europe into spheres of influence they pursued
this goal with violence and Germany ended up breaking
the pact by invading the Soviet Union
AT No China War
They say China doesnt have the military capabilities for a war,
but the Straits card says that a war between the US and
China would eventually go nuclear because there would
be no world powers to check countries like Russia who
could try and takeover Europe and that China has
threatened to use nuclear weapons.

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Chinas new president, Xi Jinping, traveled to Trinidad and Tobago, Costa

wants to remind the US that just as the US has influence in

supplanted the US as the number one trading partner of

The areas where US

Mexico exported to China copper and

Mexicos new president,

and the Caribbean. Clearly

there is an interest by China in Mexican oil .

(China) is looking to satisfy their market

Mexico has to understand and strengthen relations with a nation

In contrast to Chinas Xi, Obama, accomplished

China is increasing its funding in the region just as the US

investment. Confronted with a rising challenge to its longstanding

US threats to Chinese oil acquisition in Latin America causes a

The U.S has some reason to be concerned by the economic implications of

the future of Sino-American relations with regard to energy

China has established an energy sphere of influence in Latin

"the China option" affords Latin American

Washington is increasingly concerned over

Oil war goes nuclear

are concerned with keeping their sea lanes open. That

we would see the destruction of civilization.

From Trinidad to Mexico City, Xi presented Beijing as

Chinas quick rebound from the 2008 crisis on

the region is an important part of the emerging powers,

Beijing had committed to open its markets to

The trip underscores Chinas growing ties

trade gap with China.

Mexicos government would like to narrow its large

The two countries

Washington has looked with discomfort at China's growing

In April 2005, the U.S. House of

Xi's itinerary took him to Costa Rica

But US exports to Latin

China is edging out the US for economic influence in Latin

When it comes to economic influence, China may be gaining the upper

onus is on the US to come up with a more flexible, attractive

Xi's tour of Trinidad, Costa Rica and Mexico are

There is clear evidence of an

link unconditional engagement

that China has been lining up

Talk about a heavily conditioned offering . So what

Chinas policy banks have provided more finance to Latin

the US has relied on a

China is more appealing to Latin America because they dont

US unconditional engagement is key to out compete China in

Link unconditional engagement

China has many carrots to dangle in its pursuit of international influence ,

A truer characterisation is that China has attempted to

China has also emerged as a favoured political partner for Latin

Link latin america

The ability of the United States to serve as a market and a source of

Link Latin America

The U.S. must

The U.S. should also intensify public efforts to

Given Chinas growing regional footprint,

Link latin america

In Latin America, while many

respect for contracts and rule of law.

Link latin america

The rise of China is

and Costa Rica

Link latin American oil