Sisis reformed foreign policy could restore Egypt as major

regional power
David Hartwell is a Middle East political, military and
security expert, and Director and Managing Editor at Middle
East Insider. He tweets: @DaveHartwell1
One of the key challenges facing Egypts President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has been to bring
a new sense of direction and order to the countrys foreign policy. After the domestic
political upheaval of the post-2011 period, during which foreign policy became more
influenced by public opinion than at any time in Egypts recent past, Sisi has sought to
replace the impulsive, nave and often amateurish path pursued by former Muslim
Brotherhood President Mohamed Morsi with one more in keeping with the historical
guiding tenets of Egypts foreign policy. These place a priority on the strategic alliances
with the United States, Europe and Arab Gulf states, with policy formation dominated by
the president, in concert with the military, intelligence agencies and the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs.
Morsis mistakes
There were a number of reasons for the failure of Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhoods
foreign policy. First, they failed to appreciate the depth of the link between Egypts
foreign and domestic policies. After 2011, public opinion played an almost unprecedented
role in the formation and influence of policy, but Egypts domestic stability prior to 2011
had always been built on a foundation of a moderate, consistent and pragmatic foreign
policy underpinned by strong alliances with the United States and the Arab Gulf
monarchies. Nevertheless, the role popular pressure played after 2011 meant that as
Morsi and the Brotherhoods popularity decreased during their time in power, they failed
to grasp the extent to which this would limit their room for manoeuvre or embolden their
opponents in the military, security and political establishment.
Second, and unusually for a party that had waited more than 40 years to form a
government, Morsi and the Brotherhood were unable to grasp the fundamental tools of
diplomacy associated with foreign policy-making. This was due in large part to the
Armys continued domination of intelligence and security decision-making and the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs success in resisting the Brotherhoods attempts to take-over
the ministry.

Finally, the continued dominance of the Muslim Brotherhoods Guidance Bureau and
Morsis unwillingness to question its advice led to a clash between the idealism
underpinning the Brotherhoods politico-Islamic ideology and the mixture of flexibility
and pragmatism required for a successful foreign policy in the Middle East.
These underlying factors would combine during Morsi and the Brotherhoods brief period
in power to produce a foreign policy that was impulsive, inconsistent and often nave.
From the downgrading in importance of Egypts alliances with the US and the Gulf
monarchies; the failure to agree a loan with the IMF to prevent the collapse of the
Egyptian economy; the abortive attempt to replace these with an Egypt-Turkey-Qatar
axis; the failure to properly engage with the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) nations;
a somewhat laissez faire attitude to the peace treaty with Israel; and the inability to
prevent upstream Nile states (especially Ethiopia) from threatening Egypts agreed share
of the rivers flow, foreign policy under Morsi lurched from one crisis to the next.
Sisi hits the reset button
On assuming office in June 2014, Sisi set about resetting foreign policy. In doing so, he
has not necessarily returned it to the Mubarak era the increased influence of public
opinion remains as does the fact that the policy challenges remain dynamic rather, he
has reinforced Egypts long-standing foreign policy strengths, combining them with
greater flexibility and pragmatism.
First, Sisi has rebuilt Egypts alliance with the Gulf monarchies, especially its traditional
allies, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). During Morsis period in
office, both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi had made their displeasure with the Brotherhood
plain. After Egypt failed to secure a USD4.5 billion loan from the IMF, both refused to
supply financial aid at a level that could replace this amount and bolster the beleaguered
the Egyptian economy. Moreover, Qatars extension of generous loans to Morsi in place
of Saudi and UAE finance only served to further irritate Riyadh and Abu Dhabi and
exacerbate already tense relations between Doha and its other GCC partners. Sisis
election saw Egypt once more welcome in the Saudi and the UAE and his success in
stabilising the Egyptian economy is in no small measure down to substantial financial
assistance provided by GCC states. In exchange, Egypt has supported the Saudi-led
coalitions military intervention in Yemen, contributing naval vessels and even suggesting
early in the campaign that it would consider the deployment of Egyptian troops in Yemen
should this be deemed necessary.

Second, Egypt has stabilised its relationship with the US, although there remains an
intangible residue of suspicion. Washington (and the European Union) is critical of
Egypts domestic political environment, especially restrictions on the press and political
association, which Egyptian authorities have justified by the terrorist threat emanating
from the Sinai. That said, the US is also in need of allies to support its efforts to tackle
Islamic State (IS). Sisi pledged Egyptian support for this on the proviso that it not purely
focus on IS, but other regional terrorist groups, such as those in the Sinai.
Third, in an effort to counter US and EU pressure over its domestic politics, Sisi is
diversifying his foreign policy options in the direction of the BRIC nations, especially
Russia. Sisi welcomed Russian President Vladimir Putin to Egypt in February and in May
Russian media reported that a USD2 billion deal for 46 MiG-29 multi-role combat
aircraft discussed by the two men had been agreed. Russias engagement with Sisi is part
of a wider move to become involved in the Middle East, but Egypts positive response is
indicative of Cairos desire to be solely reliant on the US and Europe for financial and
military support.
Fourth, aware that the countrys domestic fortunes are intimately linked to its
international reputation, Sisi has also had to prioritise stabilising the Egyptian economy
in an effort to alter the perception among foreign investors and tourists that Egypt is an
economic basket case. In this he has been helped by the substantial aid provided by
Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which has boosted Egypts foreign currency reserves and
restored confidence that the worst of the economic crisis has passed. He has also been
able to reap the benefits of the economic measures instituted by interim President Adly
Mansour who finally introduced a capital gains tax after many years of delay, amended
the Investment Law to offer greater legal protection and incentives for investors, and
reduced energy subsidies. On assuming office, Sisi augmented these measures by
announcing a series of major infrastructure projects, chief among which is the plan to
substantially increase the capacity of the Suez Canal.
Fifth, Sisi has moved to reassure Israel over the security of the 1979 peace treaty and,
likely due to the current security challenges in the Sinai, has even suggested ways of
strengthening it. Egypt has deployed thousands of troops close to the border with Israel,
in a technical breach of the treaty; however, Israeli agreement to this securing the Sinai
from jihadist groups is clearly in Israels national interest hints at further innovation and
flexibility in the future that could deepen an already prosperous security relationship.

Underpinning Israeli confidence in Sisi is his ambivalent attitude to Hamas, whose close
relationship with Morsi and the Brotherhood was a source of constant Israeli unease.
Sixth, Sisi has sought to engage constructively with Ethiopia and the other upstream Nile
states to find an amicable solution to the problem of sharing out the rivers water
resources. The 1959 Nile Waters Agreement between the Sudan and Egypt entitles Egypt
to 55.5 billion cubic metres of the annual flow of the Nile; however, development
projects upstream, especially Ethiopias Renaissance Dam project, threaten this
agreement. Egypt is sympathetic to Ethiopias argument that such projects are necessary
to allow its economy to develop, but it will not countenance any agreement that decreases
its current share of the waters. In this respect, Ethiopias declaration in September 2014
that the dam is intended for power generation rather than irrigation may provide hope that
Sisi can secure agreement in the future.
A new-old foreign policy
All of this means that Sisi has restored the traditional guiding tenets of Egyptian foreign
policy while adapting them to the challenges Egypt currently faces. Future success will
depend much on the continued improvement of the economy; the successful and peaceful
completion of the long-delayed parliamentary elections; tangible signs of an
improvement in the security situation (especially in the Sinai); and the return of Egypts
reputation as a major pragmatic, moderate power, able to exert influence across the
region in the way it did prior to 2011.
Project for Study of the 21st Century is a non-national, non-partisan, non-ideological
organization. All views expressed are the authors own.