SUBJECT: CIVIL LAW

Our Law On Agrarian Reform Is A Legislated Promise To Emancipate

Poor Farm Families From The Bondage Of The Soil
by The Lawyer's Post February 13, 2015 Comments Off on Our Law On Agrarian Reform Is A Legislated Promise To Emancipate
Poor Farm Families From The Bondage Of The Soil

The late Juan, a former governor, owned a 4-hectare farm in Nueva Ecija, tilled by Raymundo. As tiller, he was issued a
Certificate of Land Transfer. In 1980, henchmen of Juan evicted Raymundo from the farm, threatening to kill them if
they did not leave. Thus, Raymundo was left with no recourse but to leave with his family. Upon learning of Juans
death in 1993, Raymundo and his family returned to the farm. He then filed with the Department of Agrariam Reform
Adjudication Board a complaint that his possession and cultivation of the farm be respected, against the estate of Juan,
as well as payment of harvest from 1980 to 1993. The estate filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Raymundos cause
of action has prescribed under the provisions of Republic Act 3844 since the dispossession took place in 1980 but the
petition was filed only in 1995, way beyond the three-year period for filing such claims. On the other hand, Raymundo
argues that his possession should be deemed uninterrupted since his departure was made due to threats to his life.
Expectedly, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board ruled in favour of the estate. Raymundo was guilty of
laches since he did not assert his claim within a period of 14 years, according to the PARAB. When the case was
appealed to the DARAB, the latter reversed the PARAD decision., which however, was reinstated by the Court of
Appeals, affirming the PARAD decision. Raymundo thus filed his petition for review on certiorari. He posits that
prescription should have started when the intimidation ceased upon Juans death, not from 1980, when he was forcibly
evicted from the land. Further, the CA decision disregards the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure.
The Supreme Court:
Our Ruling
The Court grants the Petition.
Petitioner availed of the remedy of Petition for Review on Certiorari, but claimed that the CA committed grave abuse of
discretion, which accusation properly pertains to an original Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. However, this should
not affect his case for the CA committed a glaring error on a question of law which must be reversed.
It must be recalled from the facts that the farm has been placed under the coverage of RA 3844. It is also undisputed
that a tenancy relation existed between Chioco and petitioner. In fact, a CLT had been issued in favor of the petitioner;
thus, petitioner already had an expectant right to the farm.[1] A CLT serves as a provisional title of ownership over the
landholding while the lot owner is awaiting full payment of just compensation or for as long as the tenant-farmer is an
amortizing owner. This certificate proves inchoate ownership of an agricultural land primarily devoted to rice and corn
production. It is issued in order for the tenant-farmer to acquire the land he was tilling. [2] Since the farm is

considered expropriated and placed under the coverage of the land reform law[3], Chioco had no right to evict
petitioner and enter the property. More significantly, Chioco had no right to claim that petitioners cause of action had
prescribed.
x x x [T]he Land Reform Code forges by operation of law, between the landowner and the farmer be [he] a leasehold
tenant or temporarily a share tenant a vinculum juris with certain vital consequences, such as security of tenure of the
tenant and the tenants right to continue in possession of the land he works despite the expiration of the contract or the
sale or transfer of the land to third persons, and now, more basically, the farmers pre-emptive right to buy the land he
cultivates under Section 11 of the Code, as well as the right to redeem the land, if sold to a third person without his
knowledge, under Section 12 of this Code.
To strengthen the security of tenure of tenants, Section 10 of R.A. No. 3844 provides that the agricultural leasehold
relation shall not be extinguished by the sale, alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the landholding. With
unyielding consistency, we have held that transactions involving the agricultural land over which an agricultural
leasehold subsists resulting in change of ownership, such as the sale or transfer of legal possession, will not terminate
the rights of the agricultural lessee who is given protection by the law by making such rights enforceable against the
transferee or the landowners successor in interest. x x x
In addition, Section 7 of the law enunciates the principle of security of tenure of the tenant, such that it prescribes that
the relationship of landholder and tenant can only be terminated for causes provided by law. x x x [S]ecurity of tenure
is a legal concession to agricultural lessees which they value as life itself and deprivation of their [landholdings] is
tantamount to deprivation of their only means of livelihood. Perforce, the termination of the leasehold relationship can
take place only for causes provided by law. x x[4] x (Emphasis supplied and citations omitted)
The CA has failed to recognize this vinculum juris, this juridical tie, that exists between the petitioner and Chioco,
which the latter is bound to respect.
Under Section 8 of RA 3844, the agricultural leasehold relation shall be extinguished only under any of the following
three circumstances, to wit: (1) abandonment of the landholding without the knowledge of the agricultural lessor; (2)
voluntary surrender of the landholding by the agricultural lessee, written notice of which shall be served three months in
advance; or (3) absence of the persons under Section 9 to succeed the lessee x x x. None of these is obtaining in this
case. In particular, petitioner cannot be said to have abandoned the landholding. It will be recalled that Chioco forcibly
ejected him from the property through threats and intimidation. His house was bulldozed and his crops were destroyed.
Petitioner left the farm in 1980 and returned only in 1993 upon learning of Chiocos death. Two years after, or in 1995,
he filed the instant Petition.
Indeed, Section 38 of RA 3844 specifically provides that [a]n action to enforce any cause of action under this Code
shall be barred if not commenced within three years after such cause of action accrued. In this case, we deem it proper

to reckon petitioners cause of action to have accrued only upon his knowledge of the death of Chioco in 1993, and not
at the time he was forcibly ejected from the landholding in 1980. For as long as the intimidation and threats to
petitioners life and limb existed, petitioner had a cause of action against Chioco to enforce the recognition of this
juridical tie. Since the threats and intimidation ended with Chiocos death, petitioners obligation to file a case to assert
his rights as grantee of the farm under the agrarian laws within the prescriptive period commenced. These rights, as
enumerated above, include the right to security of tenure, to continue in possession of the land he works despite the
expiration of the contract or the sale or transfer of the land to third persons, the pre-emptive right to buy the land, as
well as the right to redeem the land, if sold to a third person without his knowledge.
Petitioner may not be faulted for acting only after Chioco passed away for his life and the lives of members of his
family are not worth gambling for a piece of land. The bulldozing of his house his castle is only an example of the
fate that could befall them. Under the circumstances, it is therefore understandable that instead of fighting for the farm,
petitioner opted to leave and keep his family safe. Any man who cherishes his family more than the most valuable
material thing in his life would have done the same.
Force and intimidation restrict or hinder the exercise of the will, and so long as they exist, petitioner is deprived of his
free will. He could not occupy his farm, plant his crops, tend to them, and harvest them. He could not file an agrarian
case against Chioco, for that meant having to return to Nueva Ecija. He could not file the case anywhere else; any other
agrarian tribunal or agency would have declined to exercise jurisdiction.
Notably, on various instances, we have set aside technicalities for reasons of equity. We are inclined to apply the same
liberality in view of the peculiar situation in this case.[5]
It is worth reiterating at this juncture that respondent had no right to claim prescription because a CLT had already been
issued in favor of petitioner. The farm is considered expropriated and placed under the coverage of the land reform
law. As such, respondent had neither the right to evict petitioner nor to claim prescription. In Catorce v. Court of
Appeals[6], this Court succinctly held:
Petitioner had been adjudged the bona fide tenant of the landholding in question. Not only did respondent fail to
controvert this fact, but he even impliedly admitted the same in his Answer to petitioners Complaint when he raised, as
one of his defenses, the alleged voluntary surrender of the landholding by petitioner. Respondent Court should have
taken this fact into consideration for tenants are guaranteed security of tenure, meaning, the continued enjoyment and
possession of their landholding except when their dispossession had been authorized by virtue of a final and executory
judgment, which is not so in the case at bar.
The Agricultural Land Reform Code has been designed to promote economic and social stability. Being a social
legislation, it must be interpreted liberally to give full force and effect to its clear intent, which is to achieve a dignified

existence for the small farmers and to make them more independent, self-reliant and responsible citizens, and a source
of genuine strength in our democratic society[7].
At any rate, respondent cannot legally invoke the strict application of the rules on prescription because the failure of
petitioner to immediately file the Petition was due to its own maneuvers.[8] This Court should not allow respondent to
profit from its threats and intimidation. Besides, if we subscribe to respondents ratiocination that petitioners cause of
action had already prescribed, it would lead to an absurd situation wherein a tenant who was unlawfully deprived of his
landholding would be barred from pursuing his rightful claim against the transgressor.[9]
We have ruled time and again that litigants should have the amplest opportunity for a proper and just disposition of their
cause free, as much as possible, from the constraints of procedural technicalities. In the interest of its equity
jurisdiction, the Court may disregard procedural lapses so that a case may be resolved on its merits. Rules of procedure
should promote, not defeat, substantial justice. Hence, the Court may opt to apply the Rules liberally to resolve
substantial issues raised by the parties.
Rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they are adopted to help secure, not
override, substantial justice, and thereby defeat their very ends. Indeed, rules of procedure are mere tools designed to
expedite the resolution of cases and other matters pending in court. A strict and rigid application of the rules that would
result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote justice must be avoided.[10]
It is a better rule that courts, under the principle of equity, will not be guided or bound strictly by the statute of
limitations or the doctrine of laches when to do so, manifest wrong or injustice would result.[11] It must also be
emphasized that [t]he statute of limitations has been devised to operate primarily against those who slept on their rights
and not against those desirous to act but cannot do so for causes beyond their control.[12]
Petitioners tenure on the farm should be deemed uninterrupted since he could not set foot thereon. And if he could not
make the required payments to Chioco or the Land Bank of the Philippines, petitioner should not be faulted. And, since
his tenure is deemed uninterrupted, any benefit or advantage from the land should accrue to him as well.
Our law on agrarian reform is a legislated promise to emancipate poor farm families from the bondage of the soil. P.D.
No. 27 was promulgated in the exact same spirit, with mechanisms which hope to forestall a reversion to the antiquated
and inequitable feudal system of land ownership. It aims to ensure the continued possession, cultivation and enjoyment
by the beneficiary of the land that he tills which would certainly not be possible where the former owner is allowed to
reacquire the land at any time following the award in contravention of the governments objective to emancipate
tenant-farmers from the bondage of the soil.[13]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The April 27, 2007 Decision and November 5, 2007 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 86149 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The December 8, 2003 Decision
of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board is ordered REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. (G.R. No. 180476, June 26, 2013, RAYMUNDO CODERIAS, AS REPRESENTED BY HIS ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, MARLON
M. CODERIAS, PETITIONER, VS. ESTATE OF JUAN CHIOCO, REPRESENTED BY ITS ADMINISTRATOR, DR. RAUL R. CARAG,
RESPONDENT.)

SUBJECT: REMEDIAL LAW

The Rule In Circumstantial Evidence Cases Is That The

Evidence Must Exclude The Possibility That Some Other
Person Committed The Crime...
by The Lawyer's Post May 26, 2015 0 Comments

The Facts:

Kyle Anthony (Zabala) a jeepney driver, and Randolph (Alas) were neighbours in San Jose del
Monte, Bulacan. In the course of his employment at the Manila City Hall, Randolph was able to
save P68,000.00 which he kept in an envelope inside his closet. As neighbours, Randolph
would often invite Kyle for drinking sessions inside the house, sometimes calling oh him to
repair his vehicle, and allow him to follow Randolph when he get cash from his bedroom when
he needed to buy spare parts for his car. On June 18, 2007 he left home for work at 4:00 in the
morning. When he returned at around 11:00 in the evening, he found out that his cash was
missing. When he asked his housemates if they knew where he kept his money, they answered
no. Thus, Randolph filed a case for theft against Kyle. He was supported in the case by Marlyn
(Pinon), Kyles former girlfriend, who testified that in the early morning of June 18, 2007, she
and Kyle were at Kyles house a mere six to seven steps from Randolphs house. She then saw
him climb the fence and scale the tree in front of Randolphs house and enter it. When he
came out, his pockets were bulging with money. He then brought her home. At 10:00 in the
morning, she and Kyle went to Greenhills to buy some cellphones worth P8,500.00. In his
defense, Kyle denied stealing the money belonging to Randolph, and averred that he drove his
jeepney the whole day of June 18, 2007, which testimony was corroborated by his konduktor,
Muriel John (Ganas). He denied being near the house of Randolph nor met Marilyn, whom he
denied being his girlfriend. After trial, the RTC convicted Kyle as charged. On appeal to the CA,
the latter affirmed the conviction, holding that there was enough circumstantial evidence to
convict Kyle for theft. His defense of alibi being weak further contributed to Kyles conviction.
Kyle appealed to the Supreme Court.

The Issue/s:
Whether or not circumstantial evidence in the case warrants the conviction of Kyle for theft.
The Courts ruling:
We reverse the findings of the RTC and the CA. We agree with petitioner, and find that the
evidence presented below does not constitute proof beyond a reasonable doubt, sufficient to
convict petitioner of theft. Thus, he must be acquitted.
Discussion
Given that the case for the prosecution is largely based on circumstantial evidence, a short
discussion on the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to convict an accused is in order.
Circumstantial evidence as basis for conviction
It is a settled rule that circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a conviction, and that
direct evidence is not always necessary. This is but a recognition of the reality that in certain
instances, due to the inherent attempt to conceal a crime, it is not always possible to obtain
direct evidence. InBacolod v. People, this Court had the occasion to say:
The lack or absence of direct evidence does not necessarily mean that the guilt of the accused
cannot be proved by evidence other than direct evidence. Direct evidence is not the sole
means of establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, because circumstantial evidence, if
sufficient, can supplant the absence of direct evidence. The crime charged may also be proved
by circumstantial evidence, sometimes referred to as indirect or presumptive evidence.
Circumstantial evidence has been defined as that which goes to prove a fact or series of facts
other than the facts in issue, which, if proved, may tend by inference to establish a fact in
issue.1
The Rules of Court itself recognizes that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction,
under certain circumstances:
Sec. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction if:
(1) There is more than one circumstance;
(2) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;
(3) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Moreover, in Lozano v. People, this Court clarified the application of the circumstantial evidence
rule:
To sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, it is essential that the circumstantial
evidence presented must constitute an unbroken chain which leads one to a fair and
reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of the others, as the guilty

person. The circumstantial evidence must exclude the possibility that some other person has
committed the crime.2 (emphasis in the original)
The prosecution failed to establish, by circumstantial evidence, that petitioner is guilty of theft
Unfortunately, in the case at bar, this Court finds that the prosecution failed to present
sufficient circumstantial evidence to convict the petitioner of the offense charged. We find that
the pieces of evidence presented before the trial court fail to provide a sufficient combination
of circumstances, as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
To recall, the evidence of the prosecution purports to establish the following narrative: first,
that the complaining witness Alas hides P68,000 in cash in his closet inside their
house; second, that petitioner is aware that Alas hides money in his bedroom closet; third, that
on the night of the incident, petitioner was with his then girlfriend, witness Pion; fourth, that
petitioner climbed through the fence of Alass house, and was able to successfully gain
entrance to his house; fifth, that petitioner later went out of the house with a bulge in his
pockets; and sixth, that later that day, petitioner and Pion went shopping for a cellphone.
The foregoing narrationbased on the testimonies of the two witnesses of the prosecution,
even if given full faith and credit and considered as established factsfails to establish that
petitioner committed the crime of theft. If at all, it may possibly constitute evidence that
petitioner committed an offense, but not necessarily theft. In the case before the Court, the
evidence presented by the prosecution fails to establish the corpus delicti of theft. In Tan v.
People, this Court said: Corpus delicti means the body or substance of the crime, and, in its
primary sense, refers to the fact that the crime has been actually committed. The essential
elements of theft are (1) the taking of personal property; (2) the property belongs to another;
(3) the taking away was done with intent of gain; (4) the taking away was done without the
consent of the owner; and (5) the taking away is accomplished without violence or intimidation
against persons or force upon things. In theft, corpus delicti has two elements, namely: (1)
that the property was lost by the owner, and (2) that it was lost by felonious taking 3.
First, nobody saw Zabala enter the bedroom of Alas, where the money amounting to P68,000
was allegedly kept and hidden. It is interesting to note that while Alas testified that there were
other persons living in that house, i.e. his family members, the prosecution failed to put any of
them on the witness stand, to testify that they saw or heard something out of the ordinary at
the time the incident allegedly took place, or to explain why nobody else was able to notice
that the theft took place while Alas was absent. Witness Pion, meanwhile, merely testified that
she saw Zabala scale the fence of Alas house and enter it. She did not actually see Zabala
enter the room of Alas, where the money was hidden.
Second, the evidence presented below is insufficient to determine without a reasonable doubt
that the P68,000 in cash was lost due to felonious taking, and, more importantly, that it was
petitioner who committed the felonious taking. Even if believed in its entirety, the testimony of
witness Pion does not show that when petitioner left the house of Alas, he was carrying the
P68,000 in cash which was supposedly lost. All that Pion saw was the bulge in petitioners
pockets. Pions testimony can hardly be considered as evidence to prove that when petitioner
entered the house of Alas, he did so because of his intent to commit asportation.

Third, Pions testimony fails to establish that Alas pocket indeed contained the stolen money,
as she never actually saw what was inside the pocket of Zabala. While she testified that later
that day, they went to buy a cellphone amounting to P8,500, she failed to testify whether the
money that Zabala used in paying for the cellphone was retrieved from the very same bulging
pocket which she saw earlier in the day, which would have led to the conclusion that Zabalas
pocket contained money. Failing this, what is left is the fact that Pion saw a bulge in Zabalas
pocket, and there is no evidence whatsoever to prove that his pocket in fact was used to hide
the money that he allegedly stole. The trial and appellate courts committed error in accepting
as fact that Zabalas pocket contained money, when there is a dearth of evidence to support
such allegation.
And fourth, the rule in circumstantial evidence cases is that the evidence must exclude the
possibility that some other person committed the crime. 4 In the case here, however, the
prosecution failed to prove, or even allege, that it was impossible for some other person to
have committed the crime of theft against Alas. The prosecution failed to adduce evidence that
at the time the theft was committed, there was no other person inside the house of Alas, or
that no other person could have taken the money from the closet of Alas. Alas himself admitted
that there were other residents in the house, but these persons were never presented to prove
their whereabouts at the time the incident took place. This failure of the prosecution leads the
Court to no other conclusion but that they failed to establish that culpability could only belong
to Zabala, and not to some other person.
Given the foregoing discussion, We find that petitioner was wrongfully convicted of theft. In the
absence of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the presumption of innocence must be upheld,
and thus, petitioner should be acquitted.
WHEREFORE, this petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the July 15, 2013 Decision of the Court of
Appeals and its January 8, 2014 Resolution in CA-G.R. CR No. 34428 are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Petitioner Kyle Anthony Zabala is ACQUITTED of the offense of theft, on account of
reasonable doubt. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION, G.R. No. 210760, January 26, 2015, KYLE ANTHONY ZABALA, PETITIONER, VS.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
VELASCO JR., J.:

SUBJECT: REMEDIAL LAW

Law Of The Case Is The Opinion Delivered On A Former

Appeal
by The Lawyer's Post February 17, 2015 Comments Off on Law Of The Case Is The Opinion Delivered On A Former Appeal

Genalyn, the legitimate daughter George and Lilia, filed a complaint against spouses Manuel
and Victoria. According to her, when George died, he left an unregistered land. Lilia then
executed a Supplemental To the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition which adjudicated the property
solely in her favour. She represented Genalyn, then still a minor. Lilia then mortgaged the
property to the spouses Manuel and Victoria. Because Lilia was unable to pay the loan, the
spouses foreclosed the property, registered the certificate of sale, and obtained a tax
declaration in their name. Thus, Genalyn filed the complaint, alleging that the partition was
unenforceable since she was only a minor at the time of its execution, contrary to the Rules of
Court, and the spouses entered into the mortgage knowing that Lilia was unauthorised.
Genalyn then filed a Motion to Admit Supplemental Complaint, invoking her right to exercise
legal redemption as a co-owner of the disputed property. The RTC denied it, ruling that her
cause of action under the Supplemental Complaint was entirely different from the first
complaint. Genalyn elevated the denial to the Court of Appeals, which however, affirmed the
RTC ruling. This denial of the petition by the CA was elevated to the Supreme Court as G.R. No.
157955. While her petition was pending in the upper courts, the RTC proceeded with the
hearing of the case. Genaly moved to suspend the proceedings, but the same was denied. On
August 29, 2001, Genalyn moved to cancel the hearing, but the RTC denied it and issued an
order on August 30, 2001 dismissing her complaint for non-suit. She thus filed her appeal
before the CA (CA-GR. 74045), questioning the orders dismissing her complaint. In the same
vein, she also filed a petition for certiorari to annul the same RTC order subject of the appeal,
but the petition was denied, hence it went up to the Supreme Court as G.R. No. 157745, which
eventually was consolidated with G.R. No. 157955. The Supreme Court, ruling on the
consolidated cases, granted G.R. No. 157955, but denied G.R. No. 157745 for lack of merit. In
G.R. 157955, it ruled that Genalyns right to legal redemption flows out of her right as coowner, thus it ordered the RTC to admit the supplemental complaint. In G. R. 157745, it ruled
that Genalyn engaged in forum shopping when she filed a petition for certiorari despite the
pendency of an appeal (CA-GR. 74045), thus the petition for certiorari should be dismissed.
With respect to the appeal filed by Genalyn on the order dismissing her case (CA-G.R. 74045),
the CA granted it and remanded the case to the RTC for further proceedings. Thus, the spouses
Manuel and Victoria filed their own petition for review with the Supreme Court, questioning the
CA decision granting Genalyns appeal.
The Supreme Court:
We deny the petition.
The present action is barred by the
law of the case

In denying the petition, we necessarily must reiterate our ruling in Young which constitutes as
the controlling doctrine or the law of the case in the present case.
Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. It means that
whatever is once irrevocably established the controlling legal rule of decision between the
same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case whether correct on general
principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the
facts of the case before the court.[1]
We point out in this respect that the law of the case does not have the finality of res judicata.
Law of the case applies only to the same case, whereas res judicata forecloses parties or
privies in one case by what has been done in another case. In law of the case, the rule made by
an appellate court cannot be departed from in subsequent proceedings in the same case.
Furthermore, law of the case relates entirely to questions of law while res judicata is applicable
to the conclusive determination of issues of fact. Although res judicata may include questions
of law, it is generally concerned with the effect of adjudication in a wholly independent
proceeding.[2]
The rationale behind this rule is to enable an appellate court to perform its duties satisfactorily
and efficiently, which would be impossible if a question, once considered and decided by it,
were to be litigated anew in the same case upon any and every subsequent appeal. Without it,
there would be endless litigation. Litigants would be free to speculate on changes in the
personnel of a court, or on the chance of our rewriting propositions once gravely ruled on
solemn argument and handed down as the law of a given case.[3]
In Young, we directed the RTC to admit Genalyns supplemental complaint. In so ruling, we also
vacated the RTC Orders which dismissed Genalyns complaint for failure to prosecute.
Moreover, Genalyns move to suspend the proceedings which led to the dismissal of her
complaint stemmed essentially from the RTCs erroneous refusal to admit the supplemental
complaint. On the second issue, we unequivocably also settled that Genalyn committed forum
shopping when she filed an appeal and a petition for certiorari successively. This ruling we
uphold as the ruling that should apply.
Petition denied.
SECOND DIVISION, G.R. No. 169214, June 19, 2013, SPOUSES MANUEL SY AND VICTORIA SY,
PETITIONERS, VS. GENALYN D. YOUNG, RESPONDENT.

SUBJECT: CRIMINAL LAW

A Libel Is Defined As A Public And Malicious Imputation Of

A Crime, Or Of A Vice Or Defect, Real Or Imaginary, Or Any
Act, Omission, Condition, Status, Or Circumstance Tending
To Cause The Dishonor, Discredit, Or Contempt Of A Natural
Or Juridical Person, Or To Blacken The Memory Of One Who
Is Dead...
by The Lawyer's Post May 26, 2015 0 Comments

The Facts:

Dr. Marilyn Martinez, a Plant Manager of the Cagayan Valley Herbal Processing Plant under PITAHC, an attached
agency of the Department of Health, attended a seminar conducted at the Sulo Hotel by McGimpers International
Consulting Corporation, an agency hired by PITAHC to develop the marketing arm and personality of personnel of the
Sales Department. During the seminar however, an altercation arose between her and one of the female resource
speakers as result of the alleged abusive remarks made by the latter against her capability as a supervisor. She was
summoned on August 8, 2002 by Dr. Policar, the Regional Director of PITAHC to his office, There, she was handed a
copy of Memorandum No. 6 Series of 2002 dated August 5, 2002, signed by the Director General, Alfonso Lagaya
(petitioner), a copy of which reads in full:
Memorandum No. 6, series of 2002 reads:
TO

HPPs Plant Manager & Staff

SUBJECT

Disclosure and Misuse of Confidential and Classified Information

It came into our attention that Dr. MARILYN MARTINEZ, has personally lobbied in a legislature, councils or offices
without authority, to further her private interest or give undue advantage to anyone or to prejudice the public interest.
Please be informed that the Board of Trustees has no decision made as of date regarding the fate of the HPPs.
In addition, this office has received official complaint behavior of Dr. Martinez compromising the efficiency of the
HPPs and the entire organization. Such [behavior] unbecoming of Dr. Martinez is supported by officials of the HPPs as
well as the findings of our Consultant McGimpers International Consulting Corporation during the Mid Year Evaluation
at Sulo Hotel last July 1-2. 2002. recommending that Dr. Martinez be submitted for further psychological and or
psychiatric treatment to prevent further deterioration of her menial and emotional stability.
In view of this, you are hereby directed to submit to this office any incidental report that is affecting the efficiency in the
HPPs operation; and/or information related to her psychiatric behavior.
For information and guidance.
(Signed)
ALFONSO T. LAGAYA, MD, MDM

Director General
Because of this memorandum, Marilyn filed a case for libel against Alfonso. In his defense, he averred that the issuance
elf the memorandum was done in the performance of officiai duty and intended to help Marilyn, who he alleged was
lobbying against the privatisation of herbal processing centres when the same is still being deliberated by the Board.
After trial, the Sandiganbayna convicted him as charge for libel, and his motion for reconsideration denied, hence file a
Rule 45 petition with the Supreme Court to assail the Sandiganbayan.
The Issue:
Whether or not petitioner should be held liable in view of his issuance of the Memorandum; if so, what is the proper
penalty?
The Courts ruling:
The Court finds the petition partly impressed with merit.
All the requisites of the crime of libel are obtaining in this case.
A libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act,
omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical
person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.1 For an imputation to be libelous, the following requisites must
concur: a) it must be defamatory; b) it must be malicious; c) it must be given publicity; and d) the victim must be
identifiable.2
The Court finds the four aforementioned requisites to be present in this case.
As to the first requisite, we find the subject memorandum defamatory. An allegation is considered defamatory if it
ascribes to a person the commission of a crime, the possession of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act,
omission, condition, status or circumstance which tends to dishonor or discredit or put him in contempt or which tends
to blacken the memory of one who is dead. In determining whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are to be
construed in their entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural and ordinary meaning as they would naturally be
understood by persons reading them, unless it appears that they were used and understood in another sense.3
In the present case, the subject memorandum dealt more on the supposedly abnormal behavior of the private respondent
which to an ordinary reader automatically means a judgment of mental deficiency. As the Sandiganbayan correctly
ruled:
xxx To stress, the words used could not be interpreted to mean other than what they intend to say that Martinez has
psychiatric problems and needs psychological and/or psychiatric treatment: otherwise her mental and emotional stability
would further deteriorate. As the law does not make, any distinction whether the imputed defect/condition is real or
imaginary, no other conclusion can be reached, except that accused Lagaya. in issuing the Memorandum. ascribes unto
Martinez a vice, defect, condition, or circumstance which tends to dishonor, discredit, or put her in ridicule, xxx4
The element of malice was also established. Malice, which is the doing of an act conceived in the spirit of mischief or
criminal indifference to the rights of others or which must partake of a criminal or wanton nature, is presumed from any
defamatory imputation, particularly when it injures the reputation of the person defamed.5 As early on, the Court had
perused the second paragraph contained in the subject memorandum and since the same, on its face, shows the injurious
nature of the imputations to the private respondent, there is then a presumption that petitioner acted with malice. Under
Article 354 of the RPC, every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be tme, if no good intention
and justifiable motive for making it is shown.
To buttress his defense of lack of malice, petitioner claimed that when he issued the memorandum, he was motivated by
good intention to help private respondent and improve PITAHC. Such goodness, however, is not sufficient justification
considering the details of the entire contents of the memorandum. Thus, in United States v. Prautch,6 it was held that
[t]he existence of justifiable motives is a question which has to be decided by taking into consideration not only the
intention of the author of the publication but all the other circumstances of each particular case.7 Certainly, the second
paragraph in the memorandum was not encompassed by the subject indicated therein (Disclosure and Misuse of
Confidential and Classified Information) and likewise was riot even germane to the privatization of PITAHC. At this

juncture, the observation of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 83622, an Administrative Case filed against
herein petitioner based on the same set of facts and circumstances, is worth noting, viz:
x x x If. indeed, petitioner was merely disseminating information to the Manager and Staff of HPPs under the
administration of PITAHC, as he claims, he could have just stated in plain terms the current status of HPPs to counter
the alleged misinformation such as what plans, recommendations and steps are being considered by the PITAHC about
the HPPs, any developments regarding the decision-making process with the assurance that the concerns of those
employees involved or will be affected by a possible abolition or reorganization are properly addressed, and similar
matters and just stopped there. Casting aspersion on the mental state of private respondent who herself may just be
needing plain and simple clarification from a superior like petitioner who is no less the Director of the PITAHC. is
totally uncalled for and done in poor taste.
x x x Far from discharging his public duties in good faith petitioner succeeded only in ruining beyond repair the
reputation of private respondent and attack her very person the condition of her mental faculties and emotional being
not only by circulating the memo in their offices nationwide but even personally distributed and made sure that the
Manager and Staff of the HPP in Tuguegarao where private respondent works, have all read the memo in his presence. It
is unbelievable that a public official would stoop so low and diminish his stature by such unethical, inconsiderate, and
unfair act against a co-worker in the public service.
xxxx
We fully concur with the Ombudsmans declaration that short of using the word insane, the statements- in the memo
unmistakably imply that the alleged unauthorized disclosure by private respondent of supposedly classified information
regarding the fate of the HPPs is simply an external manifestation of her deteriorating mental and emotional condition.
Petitioner thereby announced to all the employees of the agency that such alleged infraction by private respondent only
confirms the findings of their consultant that private respondent is suffering from mental and emotional imbalance, even
instructing them to report any information related to private respondents psychiatric behavior.8
This CA ruling in the Administrative Case which had already attained its finality on November 30, 2004 9 has
effectively and decisively determined the issue of malice in the present petition. We see no cogent reason why this Court
should not be bound by it. In Constantino v. Sandiganbayan (First Division)10 the Court ruled:
Although the instant case involves a criminal charge whereas Constantino involved an administrative charge, still the
findings in the latter case are binding herein because the same set of facts are the subject of both cases. What is decisive
is that the issues already litigated in a final and executory judgment preclude by the principle of bar by prior
judgment, an aspect of the doctrine of res judicata. and even under the doctrine of law of the case, the re-litigation
of the same issue in another action. It is well established that when a right or fact has been judicially tried and
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed. it should be conclusive upon the
parties and those in privity with them. The dictum therein laid down became the law of the case and what was once
irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision continues to be binding between the same parties as long
as the facts on which the decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court. Hence, the
binding effect and enforceability of that dictum can no longer be resurrected anew since such issue had already been
resolved and finally laid to rest, if not by the principle of res judicata. at least by conclusiveness of judgment. (Citations
omitted.)
The element of publication was also proven. Publication, in the law of libel, means the making of the defamatory
matter, after it has been written, known to someone other than the person to whom it has been written.11 On the basis
of the evidence on record and as found by the Sandiganbayan, there is no dispute that copies of the memorandum
containing the defamatory remarks were circulated to all the regional offices of the HPP. Evidence also shows that
petitioner allowed the distribution of the subject memorandum and even read the contents thereof before a gathering at a
meeting attended by more or less 24 participants thereat.
Anent the last element, that is, the identity of the offended party, there is no doubt that the private respondent was the
person referred to by the defamatory remarks as she was in fact, particularly named therein.
Privileged Communication Rule is not applicable in this case.
Petitioner tenaciously argues that the disputed memorandum is not libelous since it is covered by the privileged
communication rule. He avers that memorandum is an official act done in good faith, an honest innocent statement
arising from a moral and legal obligation.

Petitioners invocation of the rule on privileged communication is misplaced.

Article 354 of the RPC provides:
Article 354; Requirement for publicity Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if
no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases:
1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral, or social duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative, or other
official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report, or speech delivered in said
proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.
Before a statement would come within the ambit of a privileged communication under paragraph No, 1 of the
abovequoted Article 354, it must be established that: 1) the person who made the communication had a legal, moral or
social duty to make the communication, or at least, had an interest to protect, which interest may either be his own or of
the one to whom it is made; 2) the communication is addressed to an officer or a board, or superior, having some
interest or duty in the matter, and who has the power to furnish the protection sought: and 3) the statements in the
communication are made in good faith and without malice.12 All these requisites must concur.
In the instant case, petitioner addressed the memorandum not only to the Plant Manager but also to the staff of HPP.
Undoubtedly, the staff of HPP were not petitioners superiors vested with the power of supervision over the private
respondent. Neither were they the parties to whom die information should be given for they have no authority to
inquire into the veracity of the charges. As aptly observed by the Sandiganbayan, the memorandum is not simply
addressed to an officer, a board or a superior. Rather, the communication was addressed to all the staff of PITAHC who
obviously do not have the power to furnish the protection sought.13 Substantially, the Court finds no error in the
foregoing findings. The irresponsible act of furnishing the staff a copy of the memorandum is enough circumstance
which militates against the petitioners pretension of good faith and performance of a moral and social duty. As further
held in Brillante,14 the law requires that for a defamatory imputation made out of a legal, moral or social duty to be
privileged, such statement must be communicated only to the person or persons who have some interest or duty in the
matter alleged and who have the power to furnish the protection sought by the author, of the statement. It may not be
amiss to note at this point too that petitioner very well knows that the recommendation of PITAHCs consultant,
McGimpers, is a sensitive matter that should be treated with strictest confidentiality.15
Neither does the defamatory statement in the memorandum covered by paragraph No. 2 of the Article 354. Though
private respondent is a public officer, certainly, the defamatory remarks are not related or relevant to the discharge of
her official duties but was purely an attack on her mental condition which adversely reflect on her reputation and
dignity.
Imposition of the penalty of fine instead of imprisonment.
Notwithstanding the guilt of the petitioner, still the Court finds favorable consideration on his argument that instead of
imprisonment a fine should be imposed on him.
Following precedents16 and considering that the records do not show that petitioner has previously violated any
provision of the penal laws, the Court, in the exercise of its judicious discretion, imposes upon him a penalty of fine
instead of imprisonment.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision of theSandiganbayan finding
petitioner Alfonso Lagaya y Tamondong guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of libel is AFFIRMED in all
respects except that in lieu of imprisonment, petitioner is sentenced to pay a fine of P6,000.00 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION, G.R. No. 176251, July 25, 2012, ALFONSO LAGAYA Y TAMONDONG, PETITIONER, VS.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND DR. MARILYN MARTINEZ, RESPONDENTS.

SUBJECT: LABOR LAW

Pre-Marital Sexual Relations Between Two Consenting

Adults Who Have No Impediment To Marry Each Other, And,
Consequently, Conceiving A Child Out Of Wedlock, Gauged
From A Purely Public And Secular View Of Morality, Does
Not Amount To A Disgraceful Or Immoral Conduct Under
Section 94(e) Of The 1992 MRPS
by The Lawyer's Post March 17, 2015 Comments Off on Pre-Marital Sexual Relations Between Two Consenting Adults Who Have No
Impediment To Marry Each Other, And, Consequently, Conceiving A Child Out Of Wedlock, Gauged From A Purely Public And Secular
View Of Morality, Does Not Amount To A Disgraceful Or Immoral Conduct Under Section 94(e) Of The 1992 MRPS

Cheryl was hired by St. Scholasticas College Westgrove (SSCW) in 2001 as Assistant to the Director of the Lay
Apostolate and Community Outreach. In 2003, Sr. Edna, the school directress learned that Cheryl had a child out of
wedlock with her boyfriend, and advised her to file a resignation letter, but Cheryl refused, hence SSCW thru Sr. Edna
directed Cheryl to explain in writing why she should not be terminated for engaging in pre-marital sex and getting
pregnant, which act amounts to serious misconduct and conduct unbecoming of an employee of a Catholic school. Thru
letter, Cheryl averred that pregnancy out of wedlock is not serious misconduct and she is unaware of any school policy
which prohibits the same. In turn, Sr. Edna cited the 1992 Manual of Regulations for Privale Schools, particularly
Section 94(e) thereof which cites disgraceful or immoral conduct as one of the basis for termination in addition to
those provided by Art. 282 of the Labor Code. Thru counsel, Cheryl explained that pre-marital sex between two
consenting adults without legal impediment to marry does not by itself constitute disgraceful and immoral conduct,
and that the argument that Cheryls conduct would set a bad example to employees and students alike are more
imaginary than real. SSCW countered that SSCW as an institution of Catholic learning has the right to uphold the
Catholic teachings among its employees. Even though Cheryl and her boyfriend subsequently married, the fact remains
that she was looked up to as a role model by the youth. particularly in her position. Cheryl adopted her counsels letter
as her answer to the notice to explain. Subsequently, on June 11, 2003, SSCW informed Cheryl that her services are
terminated. Cheryl thus filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the NLRC. She argues that her pregnancy out of
wedlock does not constitute serious misconduct as it was a purely private matter and not in any way connected with her
employment at SSCW. On the other hand, SSCW countered that engaging is pre-marital sex is disgraceful and immoral
conduct punishable by dismissal. As a Catholic institution catering to young girls, it would lose its credibility if it did
not live up to the values it teaches. Cheryl as an employee had an obligation to live with honor, dignity and uphold the
reputation of SSCW as an institution.

The Labor Arbiter ruled in favour of SSCW, holding that teachers and school employees, both in their official and
personal conduct, must display exemplary behavior and act in a manner that is beyond reproach. Cherryl appealed to the
NLRC, which again ruled against her, holding that the 1992 MPRS applied in her case in addition to Art. 282 of the
Labor Code, and her conduct clearly showed disgraceful and immoral conduct. Cheryll again elevated her case to the
Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari. The CA upheld the NLRC ruling, holding that the MPRS prevails over the
Labor Code, a general law. Given the work environment and social milieu, Cherylls pregnancy out of wedlock was
scandalous, and she cannot separate her personal and public life in a school where values are inculcate to its students,
and the SSCW was within its rights in exercising management prerogative to terminate her for disgraceful and immoral
conduct. In her appeal to the Supreme Court, she posits that the CA erred in applying the 1992 MPRS instead of Art.
282 of the Labor Code, and pre-marital sex and pregnancy out of wedlock does not constitute a valid ground for
termination.
The Supreme Court:
The Court grants the petition.
First Issue: Applicability of the 1992 MRPS
The petitioner contends that the CA, in ruling that there was a valid ground to dismiss her, erred in applying Section 94
of the 1992 MRPS. Essentially, she claims that the 1992 MRPS was issued by the Secretary of Education as the revised
implementing rules and regulations of Batas Pambansa Bilang 232 (BP 232) or the Education Act of 1982. That there
is no provision in BP 232, which provides for the grounds for the termination of employment of teaching and nonteaching personnel of private schools. Thus, Section 94 of the 1992 MRPS, which provides for the causes of terminating
an employment, is invalid as it widened the scope and coverage of BP 232.
The Court does not agree.
The Court notes that the argument against the validity of the 1992 MRPS, specifically Section 94 thereof, is raised by
the petitioner for the first time in the instant petition for review. Nowhere in the proceedings before the LA, the NLRC
or the CA did the petitioner assail the validity of the provisions of the 1992 MRPS.
It is well established that issues raised for the first time on appeal and not raised in the proceedings in the lower court
are barred by estoppel. Points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court ought
not to be considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. To consider the alleged
facts and arguments belatedly raised would amount to trampling on the basic principles of fair play, justice, and due
process[1].
In any case, even if the Court were to disregard the petitioners belated claim of the invalidity of the 1992 MRPS, the
Court still finds the same untenable.
The 1992 MRPS, the regulation in force at the time of the instant controversy, was issued by the Secretary of Education
pursuant to BP 232. Section 70[2] of BP 232 vests the Secretary of Education with the authority to issue rules and
regulations to implement the provisions of BP 232. Concomitantly, Section 57[3] specifically empowers the Department
of Education to promulgate rules and regulations necessary for the administration, supervision and regulation of the
educational system in accordance with the declared policy of BP 232.
The qualifications of teaching and non-teaching personnel of private schools, as well as the causes for the termination of
their employment, are an integral aspect of the educational system of private schools. Indubitably, ensuring that the
teaching and non-teaching personnel of private schools are not only qualified, but competent and efficient as well goes
hand in hand with the declared objective of BP 232 establishing and maintaining relevant quality education[4]. It is
thus within the authority of the Secretary of Education to issue a rule, which provides for the dismissal of teaching and
non-teaching personnel of private schools based on their incompetence, inefficiency, or some other disqualification.
Moreover, Section 69 of BP 232 specifically authorizes the Secretary of Education to prescribe and impose such
administrative sanction as he may deem reasonable and appropriate in the implementing rules and regulations for the
[g]ross inefficiency of the teaching or non-teaching personnel of private schools[5]. Accordingly, contrary to the

petitioners claim, the Court sees no reason to invalidate the provisions of the 1992 MRPS, specifically Section 94
thereof.
Second Issue: Validity of the Petitioners Dismissal
The validity of the petitioners dismissal hinges on the determination of whether pregnancy out of wedlock by an
employee of a catholic educational institution is a cause for the termination of her employment.
In resolving the foregoing question, the Court will assess the matter from a strictly neutral and secular point of view
the relationship between SSCW as employer and the petitioner as an employee, the causes provided for by law in the
termination of such relationship, and the evidence on record. The ground cited for the petitioners dismissal, i.e., premarital sexual relations and, consequently, pregnancy out of wedlock, will be assessed as to whether the same
constitutes a valid ground for dismissal pursuant to Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS.
The standard of review in a Rule 45
petition from the CA decision in labor
cases.
In a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, such as the instant petition, where the CAs disposition in a
labor case is sought to be calibrated, the Courts review is quite limited. In ruling for legal correctness, the Court has to
view the CA decision in the same context that the petition for certiorari it ruled upon was presented to it; the Court has
to examine the CA decision from the prism of whether it correctly determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of
discretion in the NLRC decision before it, not on the basis of whether the NLRC decision on the merits of the case was
correct[6].
The phrase grave abuse of discretion is well-defined in the Courts jurisprudence. It exists where an act of a court or
tribunal is performed with a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction[7]. The
determination of the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion does not include an inquiry into the correctness of
the evaluation of evidence, which was the basis of the labor agency in reaching its conclusion[8].
Nevertheless, while a certiorari proceeding does not strictly include an inquiry as to the correctness of the evaluation of
evidence (that was the basis of the labor tribunals in determining their conclusion), the incorrectness of its evidentiary
evaluation should not result in negating the requirement of substantial evidence. Indeed, when there is a showing that
the findings or conclusions, drawn from the same pieces of evidence, were arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the
evidence on record, they may be reviewed by the courts. In particular, the CA can grant the petition for certiorari if it
finds that the NLRC, in its assailed decision or resolution, made a factual finding not supported by substantial evidence.
A decision that is not supported by substantial evidence is definitely a decision tainted with grave abuse of discretion[9].
The labor tribunals respective
conclusions that the petitioners pregnancy
is a disgraceful or immoral conduct
were arrived at arbitrarily.
The CA and the labor tribunals affirmed the validity of the petitioners dismissal pursuant to Section 94(e) of the 1992
MRPS, which provides that:
Sec. 94. Causes of Terminating Employment In addition to the just causes enumerated in the Labor Code, the
employment of school personnel, including faculty, may be terminated for any of the following causes:
xxxx
e. Disgraceful or immoral conduct;
xxxx

The labor tribunals concluded that the petitioners pregnancy out of wedlock, per se, is disgraceful and immoral
considering that she is employed in a Catholic educational institution. In arriving at such conclusion, the labor tribunals
merely assessed the fact of the petitioners pregnancy vis--vis the totality of the circumstances surrounding the same.
However, the Court finds no substantial evidence to support the aforementioned conclusion arrived at by the labor
tribunals. The fact of the petitioners pregnancy out of wedlock, without more, is not enough to characterize the
petitioners conduct as disgraceful or immoral. There must be substantial evidence to establish that pre-marital sexual
relations and, consequently, pregnancy out of wedlock, are indeed considered disgraceful or immoral.
The totality of the circumstances
surrounding the conduct alleged to be
disgraceful or immoral must be assessed
against the prevailing norms of conduct.
In Chua-Qua v. Clave[10], the Court stressed that to constitute immorality, the circumstances of each particular case
must be holistically considered and evaluated in light of the prevailing norms of conduct and applicable laws[11].
Otherwise stated, it is not the totality of the circumstances surrounding the conduct per se that determines whether the
same is disgraceful or immoral, but the conduct that is generally accepted by society as respectable or moral. If the
conduct does not conform to what society generally views as respectable or moral, then the conduct is considered as
disgraceful or immoral. Tersely put, substantial evidence must be presented, which would establish that a particular
conduct, viewed in light of the prevailing norms of conduct, is considered disgraceful or immoral.
Thus, the determination of whether a conduct is disgraceful or immoral involves a two-step process: first, a
consideration of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the conduct; and second, an assessment of the said
circumstances vis--vis the prevailing norms of conduct, i.e., what the society generally considers moral and
respectable.
That the petitioner was employed by a Catholic educational institution per se does not absolutely determine whether her
pregnancy out of wedlock is disgraceful or immoral. There is still a necessity to determine whether the petitioners
pregnancy out of wedlock is considered disgraceful or immoral in accordance with the prevailing norms of conduct.
Public and secular morality should
determine the prevailing norms of conduct,
not religious morality.
However, determining what the prevailing norms of conduct are considered disgraceful or immoral is not an easy task.
An individuals perception of what is moral or respectable is a confluence of a myriad of influences, such as religion,
family, social status, and a cacophony of others. In this regard, the Courts ratiocination in Estrada v. Escritor[12] is
instructive.
In Estrada, an administrative case against a court interpreter charged with disgraceful and immoral conduct, the Court
stressed that in determining whether a particular conduct can be considered as disgraceful and immoral, the distinction
between public and secular morality on the one hand, and religious morality, on the other, should be kept in mind[13].
That the distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality is important because the jurisdiction of
the Court extends only to public and secular morality[14]. The Court further explained that:
The morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily secular, not religious x x x. Religious teachings as
expressed in public debate may influence the civil public order but public moral disputes may be resolved only on
grounds articulable in secular terms. Otherwise, if government relies upon religious beliefs in formulating public
policies and morals, the resulting policies and morals would require conformity to what some might regard as religious
programs or agenda. The non-believers would therefore be compelled to conform to a standard of conduct buttressed by
a religious belief, i.e., to a compelled religion, anathema to religious freedom. Likewise, if government based its
actions upon religious beliefs, it would tacitly approve or endorse that belief and thereby also tacitly disapprove

contrary religious or non-religious views that would not support the policy. As a result, government will not provide full
religious freedom for all its citizens, or even make it appear that those whose beliefs are disapproved are second-class
citizens. Expansive religious freedom therefore requires that government be neutral in matters of religion; governmental
reliance upon religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.
In other words, government action, including its proscription of immorality as expressed in criminal law like
concubinage, must have a secular purpose. That is, the government proscribes this conduct because it is detrimental (or
dangerous) to those conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society and not because the
conduct is proscribed by the beliefs of one religion or the other. Although admittedly, moral judgments based on religion
might have a compelling influence on those engaged in public deliberations over what actions would be considered a
moral disapprobation punishable by law. After all, they might also be adherents of a religion and thus have religious
opinions and moral codes with a compelling influence on them; the human mind endeavors to regulate the temporal and
spiritual institutions of society in a uniform manner, harmonizing earth with heaven. Succinctly put, a law could be
religious or Kantian or Aquinian or utilitarian in its deepest roots, but it must have an articulable and discernible secular
purpose and justification to pass scrutiny of the religion clauses. x x x[15]. (Citations omitted and emphases ours)
Accordingly, when the law speaks of immoral or, necessarily, disgraceful conduct, it pertains to public and secular
morality; it refers to those conducts which are proscribed because they are detrimental to conditions upon which depend
the existence and progress of human society. Thus, in Anonymous v. Radam[16], an administrative case involving a
court utility worker likewise charged with disgraceful and immoral conduct, applying the doctrines laid down in
Estrada, the Court held that:
For a particular conduct to constitute disgraceful and immoral behavior under civil service laws, it must be regulated
on account of the concerns of public and secular morality. It cannot be judged based on personal bias, specifically those
colored by particular mores. Nor should it be grounded on cultural values not convincingly demonstrated to have been
recognized in the realm of public policy expressed in the Constitution and the laws. At the same time, the
constitutionally guaranteed rights (such as the right to privacy) should be observed to the extent that they protect
behavior that may be frowned upon by the majority.
Under these tests, two things may be concluded from the fact that an unmarried woman gives birth out of wedlock:
(1) if the father of the child is himself unmarried, the woman is not ordinarily administratively liable for disgraceful and
immoral conduct. It may be a not-so-ideal situation and may cause complications for both mother and child but it does
not give cause for administrative sanction. There is no law which penalizes an unmarried mother under those
circumstances by reason of her sexual conduct or proscribes the consensual sexual activity between two unmarried
persons. Neither does the situation contravene any fundamental state policy as expressed in the Constitution, a
document that accommodates various belief systems irrespective of dogmatic origins.
(2) if the father of the child born out of wedlock is himself married to a woman other than the mother, then there is a
cause for administrative sanction against either the father or the mother. In such a case, the disgraceful and immoral
conduct consists of having extramarital relations with a married person. The sanctity of marriage is constitutionally
recognized and likewise affirmed by our statutes as a special contract of permanent union. Accordingly, judicial
employees have been sanctioned for their dalliances with married persons or for their own betrayals of the marital vow
of fidelity.
In this case, it was not disputed that, like respondent, the father of her child was unmarried. Therefore, respondent
cannot be held liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct simply because she gave birth to the child Christian Jeon out
of wedlock[17]. (Citations omitted and emphases ours)
Both Estrada and Radam are administrative cases against employees in the civil service. The Court, however, sees no
reason not to apply the doctrines enunciated in Estrada and Radam in the instant case. Estrada and Radam also required
the Court to delineate what conducts are considered disgraceful and/or immoral as would constitute a ground for
dismissal. More importantly, as in the said administrative cases, the instant case involves an employees security of
tenure; this case likewise concerns employment, which is not merely a specie of property right, but also the means by
which the employee and those who depend on him live[18].

It bears stressing that the right of an employee to security of tenure is protected by the Constitution. Perfunctorily, a
regular employee may not be dismissed unless for cause provided under the Labor Code and other relevant laws, in this
case, the 1992 MRPS. As stated above, when the law refers to morality, it necessarily pertains to public and secular
morality and not religious morality. Thus, the proscription against disgraceful or immoral conduct under Section 94(e)
of the 1992 MRPS, which is made as a cause for dismissal, must necessarily refer to public and secular morality.
Accordingly, in order for a conduct to be considered as disgraceful or immoral, it must be detrimental (or dangerous)
to those conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society and not because the conduct is
proscribed by the beliefs of one religion or the other.
Thus, in Santos v. NLRC[19], the Court upheld the dismissal of a teacher who had an extra-marital affair with his coteacher, who is likewise married, on the ground of disgraceful and immoral conduct under Section 94(e) of the 1992
MRPS. The Court pointed out that extra-marital affair is considered as a disgraceful and immoral conduct is an afront to
the sanctity of marriage, which is a basic institution of society, viz:
We cannot overemphasize that having an extra-marital affair is an afront to the sanctity of marriage, which is a basic
institution of society. Even our Family Code provides that husband and wife must live together, observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage
and unity of the family. Our laws, in implementing this constitutional edict on marriage and the family underscore their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity[20].
The petitioners pregnancy out of
wedlock is not a disgraceful or immoral
conduct since she and the father of her
child have no impediment to marry each
other.
In stark contrast to Santos, the Court does not find any circumstance in this case which would lead the Court to
conclude that the petitioner committed a disgraceful or immoral conduct. It bears stressing that the petitioner and her
boyfriend, at the time they conceived a child, had no legal impediment to marry. Indeed, even prior to her dismissal, the
petitioner married her boyfriend, the father of her child. As the Court held in Radam, there is no law which penalizes an
unmarried mother by reason of her sexual conduct or proscribes the consensual sexual activity between two unmarried
persons; that neither does such situation contravene any fundamental state policy enshrined in the Constitution.
Admittedly, the petitioner is employed in an educational institution where the teachings and doctrines of the Catholic
Church, including that on pre-marital sexual relations, is strictly upheld and taught to the students. That her indiscretion,
which resulted in her pregnancy out of wedlock, is anathema to the doctrines of the Catholic Church. However, viewed
against the prevailing norms of conduct, the petitioners conduct cannot be considered as disgraceful or immoral; such
conduct is not denounced by public and secular morality. It may be an unusual arrangement, but it certainly is not
disgraceful or immoral within the contemplation of the law.
To stress, pre-marital sexual relations between two consenting adults who have no impediment to marry each other, and,
consequently, conceiving a child out of wedlock, gauged from a purely public and secular view of morality, does not
amount to a disgraceful or immoral conduct under Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS.
Accordingly, the labor tribunals erred in upholding the validity of the petitioners dismissal. The labor tribunals
arbitrarily relied solely on the circumstances surrounding the petitioners pregnancy and its supposed effect on SSCW
and its students without evaluating whether the petitioners conduct is indeed considered disgraceful or immoral in view
of the prevailing norms of conduct. In this regard, the labor tribunals respective haphazard evaluation of the evidence
amounts to grave abuse of discretion, which the Court will rectify.
The labor tribunals finding that the petitioners pregnancy out of wedlock despite the absence of substantial evidence is
not only arbitrary, but a grave abuse of discretion, which should have been set right by the CA.
There is no substantial evidence to

prove that the petitioners pregnancy out of

wedlock caused grave scandal to SSCW
and its students.
SSCW claimed that the petitioner was primarily dismissed because her pregnancy out of wedlock caused grave scandal
to SSCW and its students. That the scandal brought about by the petitioners indiscretion prompted them to dismiss her.
The LA upheld the respondents claim, stating that:
In this particular case, an objective and rational evaluation of the facts and circumstances obtaining in this case
would lead us to focus our attention x x x on the impact of the act committed by the complainant. The act of the
complainant x x x eroded the moral principles being taught and project[ed] by the respondent [C]atholic school to their
young lady students[21]. (Emphasis in the original)
On the other hand, the NLRC opined that:
In the instant case, when the complainant-appellant was already conceiving a child even before she got married, such is
considered a shameful and scandalous behavior, inimical to public welfare and policy. It eroded the moral doctrines
which the respondent Catholic school, an exclusive school for girls, is teaching the young girls. Thus, when the
respondent-appellee school terminated complainant-appellants services, it was a valid exercise of its management
prerogative. Whether or not she was a teacher is of no moment. There is no separate set of rules for non-teaching
personnel. Respondents-appellees uphold the teachings of the Catholic Church on pre-marital sex and that the
complainant-appellant as an employee of the school was expected to abide by this basic principle and to live up with the
standards of their purely Catholic values. Her subsequent marriage did not take away the fact that she had engaged in
pre-marital sex which the respondent-appellee school denounces as the same is opposed to the teachings and doctrines it
espouses[22]. (Emphasis ours)
Contrary to the labor tribunals declarations, the Court finds that SSCW failed to adduce substantial evidence to prove
that the petitioners indiscretion indeed caused grave scandal to SSCW and its students. Other than the SSCWs bare
allegation, the records are bereft of any evidence that would convincingly prove that the petitioners conduct indeed
adversely affected SSCWs integrity in teaching the moral doctrines, which it stands for. The petitioner is only a nonteaching personnel; her interaction with SSCWs students is very limited. It is thus quite impossible that her pregnancy
out of wedlock caused such a grave scandal, as claimed by SSCW, as to warrant her dismissal.
Settled is the rule that in termination cases, the burden of proving that the dismissal of the employees was for a valid
and authorized cause rests on the employer. It is incumbent upon the employer to show by substantial evidence that the
termination of the employment of the employees was validly made and failure to discharge that duty would mean that
the dismissal is not justified and therefore illegal[23]. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. It
means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other
minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise[24].
Indubitably, bare allegations do not amount to substantial evidence. Considering that the respondents failed to adduce
substantial evidence to prove their asserted cause for the petitioners dismissal, the labor tribunals should not have
upheld their allegations hook, line and sinker. The labor tribunals respective findings, which were arrived at sans any
substantial evidence, amounts to a grave abuse of discretion, which the CA should have rectified. Security of tenure is
a right which may not be denied on mere speculation of any unclear and nebulous basis[25].
The petitioners dismissal is not a
valid exercise of SSCWs management
prerogative.
The CA belabored the management prerogative of SSCW to discipline its employees. The CA opined that the
petitioners dismissal is a valid exercise of management prerogative to impose penalties on erring employees pursuant
to its policies, rules and regulations.

The Court does not agree.

The Court has held that management is free to regulate, according to its own discretion and judgment, all aspects of
employment, including hiring, work assignments, working methods, time, place and manner of work, processes to be
followed, supervision of workers, working regulations, transfer of employees, work supervision, lay off of workers and
discipline, dismissal and recall of workers. The exercise of management prerogative, however, is not absolute as it must
be exercised in good faith and with due regard to the rights of labor. Management cannot exercise its prerogative in a
cruel, repressive, or despotic manner[26].
SSCW, as employer, undeniably has the right to discipline its employees and, if need be, dismiss them if there is a valid
cause to do so. However, as already explained, there is no cause to dismiss the petitioner. Her conduct is not considered
by law as disgraceful or immoral. Further, the respondents themselves have admitted that SSCW, at the time of the
controversy, does not have any policy or rule against an employee who engages in pre-marital sexual relations and
conceives a child as a result thereof. There being no valid basis in law or even in SSCWs policy and rules, SSCWs
dismissal of the petitioner is despotic and arbitrary and, thus, not a valid exercise of management prerogative.
In sum, the Court finds that the petitioner was illegally dismissed as there was no just cause for the termination of her
employment. SSCW failed to adduce substantial evidence to establish that the petitioners conduct, i.e., engaging in premarital sexual relations and conceiving a child out of wedlock, assessed in light of the prevailing norms of conduct, is
considered disgraceful or immoral. The labor tribunals gravely abused their discretion in upholding the validity of the
petitioners dismissal as the charge against the petitioner lay not on substantial evidence, but on the bare allegations of
SSCW. In turn, the CA committed reversible error in upholding the validity of the petitioners dismissal, failing to
recognize that the labor tribunals gravely abused their discretion in ruling for the respondents.
The petitioner is entitled to
separation pay, in lieu of actual
reinstatement, full backwages and
attorneys fees, but not to moral
and exemplary damages.
Having established that the petitioner was illegally dismissed, the Court now determines the reliefs that she is entitled to
and their extent. Under the law and prevailing jurisprudence, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to
reinstatement as a matter of right[27]. Aside from the instances provided under Articles 283[28] and 284[29] of the
Labor Code, separation pay is, however, granted when reinstatement is no longer feasible because of strained relations
between the employer and the employee. In cases of illegal dismissal, the accepted doctrine is that separation pay is
available in lieu of reinstatement when the latter recourse is no longer practical or in the best interest of the parties[30].
In Divine Word High School v. NLRC[31], the Court ordered the employer Catholic school to pay the illegally
dismissed high school teacher separation pay in lieu of actual reinstatement since her continued presence as a teacher in
the school may well be met with antipathy and antagonism by some sectors in the school community[32].
In view of the particular circumstances of this case, it would be more prudent to direct SSCW to pay the petitioner
separation pay in lieu of actual reinstatement. The continued employment of the petitioner with SSCW would only serve
to intensify the atmosphere of antipathy and antagonism between the parties. Consequently, the Court awards separation
pay to the petitioner equivalent to one (1) month pay for every year of service, with a fraction of at least six (6) months
considered as one (1) whole year, from the time of her illegal dismissal up to the finality of this judgment, as an
alternative to reinstatement.
Also, employees who are illegally dismissed are entitled to full backwages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits
or their monetary equivalent, computed from the time their actual compensation was withheld from them up to the time
of their actual reinstatement but if reinstatement is no longer possible, the backwages shall be computed from the time
of their illegal termination up to the finality of the decision[33]. Accordingly, the petitioner is entitled to an award of
full backwages from the time she was illegally dismissed up to the finality of this decision.

Nevertheless, the petitioner is not entitled to moral and exemplary damages. A dismissed employee is entitled to moral
damages when the dismissal is attended by bad faith or fraud or constitutes an act oppressive to labor, or is done in a
manner contrary to good morals, good customs or public policy. Exemplary damages may be awarded if the dismissal is
effected in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner[34].
Bad faith, under the law, does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose or some
moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, or a breach of a known duty through some motive or interest or ill will
that partakes of the nature of fraud[35].
It must be noted that the burden of proving bad faith rests on the one alleging it[36] since basic is the principle that
good faith is presumed and he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same[37]. Allegations of bad faith and
fraud must be proved by clear and convincing evidence[38].
The records of this case are bereft of any clear and convincing evidence showing that the respondents acted in bad faith
or in a wanton or fraudulent manner in dismissing the petitioner. That the petitioner was illegally dismissed is
insufficient to prove bad faith. A dismissal may be contrary to law but by itself alone, it does not establish bad faith to
entitle the dismissed employee to moral damages. The award of moral and exemplary damages cannot be justified
solely upon the premise that the employer dismissed his employee without cause[39].
However, the petitioner is entitled to attorneys fees in the amount of 10% of the total monetary award pursuant to
Article 111[40] of the Labor Code. It is settled that where an employee was forced to litigate and, thus, incur expenses
to protect his rights and interest, the award of attorneys fees is legally and morally justifiable[41].
Finally, legal interest shall be imposed on the monetary awards herein granted at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum
from the finality of this judgment until fully paid[42].
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated
September 24, 2008 and Resolution dated March 2, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 100188 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The respondent, St. Scholasticas College Westgrove, is hereby declared guilty of illegal dismissal and is hereby
ORDERED to pay the petitioner, Cheryll Santos Leus, the following: (a) separation pay in lieu of actual reinstatement
equivalent to one (1) month pay for every year of service, with a fraction of at least six (6) months considered as one (1)
whole year from the time of her dismissal up to the finality of this Decision; (b) full backwages from the time of her
illegal dismissal up to the finality of this Decision; and (c) attorneys fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total
monetary award. The monetary awards herein granted shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum
from the date of the finality of this Decision until fully paid. The case is REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter for the
computation of petitioners monetary awards.
THIRD DIVISION, G.R. No. 187226, January 28, 2015, CHERYLL SANTOS LEUS, PETITIONER, VS. ST.
SCHOLASTICAS COLLEGE WESTGROVE AND/OR SR. EDNA QUIAMBAO, OSB, RESPONDENTS.

SUBJECT: REMEDIAL LAW

The Definition And Purpose Of A Writ Of Prohibition

Excludes The Use Of The Writ Against Any Person Or Group
Of Persons Acting In A Purely Private Capacity, And The Writ
Will Not Be Issued Against Private Individuals Or
Corporations So Acting
by The Lawyer's Post March 16, 2015 Comments Off on The Definition And Purpose Of A Writ Of Prohibition Excludes The Use Of
The Writ Against Any Person Or Group Of Persons Acting In A Purely Private Capacity, And The Writ Will Not Be Issued Against Private
Individuals Or Corporations So Acting

In January, 2004, Destileria Limtuaco and Co., (DLC) and Convoy Marketing Corp., thru its advertising agency, SLG
Advertising, applied for clearance from Adboard to air a radio advertisement entitled, Ginagabi (Nakatikim ka na ba ng
kinse anyos?). SLG is a member of the Association of Accredited Advertising Agencies Philippines (4As), which in turn
is a member of the Advertising Board of the Philippines, a non-stock, non-profit corporation composed of several
national organisations in the advertising industry. At first, Adboard allowed the airing of the radio advertisement, but
after numerous complaints from the public, it decided to recall the clearance effective immediately after DLC and
Convoy failed to provide a suitable replacement for the ad. Protesting Adboards decision, DLC and Convoy filed a
complaint, later amended, for dissolution of corporation, damages and application for preliminary injunction with
prayer for preliminary injunction against Adboard (Civil Case No. 04-277), on the ground that Adboard usurps the
power of the MTRCB and DTI by misrepresenting that it has the power to screen, review and approve all radio
advertisement. In turn, Adboard issued ACRC Circular No. 2004-02 reminding its members of the Manual of
Operations which prohibit the airing of commercials without its clearance. As a result thereof, DLC and Convoy filed a
petition for Writ Prohibition and Injunction with the Supreme Court, alleging that the right to advertise is a
constitutionally protected right; they were as well are deprived of due process with Adboards requirement of prior
clearance before airing the commercials, an act which is an exercise of the police power subject to constitutional
proscriptions. On the other hand, Adboard seeks the dismissal of the petition for non-compliance with certain
requirements as to its filing. Adboard derives its authority from the voluntary submissions of its members, and there is
no law that prohibits it from regulation of advertisements such as requiring prior clearance.
The Supreme Court:
The petition is bereft of merit.

First of all, the petition filed in this case is one for prohibition, i.e., to command AdBoard to desist from requiring
petitioners to secure a clearance and imposing sanctions on any agency that will air, broadcast or publish petitioners ads
without such clearance[1].
Under Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, for petitioners to be entitled to such recourse, it must establish the
following requisites: (a) it must be directed against a tribunal, corporation, board or person exercising functions,
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial; (b) the tribunal, corporation, board or person has acted without or in excess of
its/his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion; and (c) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law[2].
A respondent is said to be exercising judicial function by which he has the power to determine what the law is and what
the legal rights of the parties are, and then undertakes to determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the
parties. Quasi-judicial function is a term which applies to the action and discretion of public administrative officers or
bodies, which are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions
from them as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. Ministerial function is one
which an officer or tribunal performs in the context of a given set of facts, in a prescribed manner and without regard for
the exercise of his/its own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done[3].
The acts sought to be prohibited in this case are not the acts of a tribunal, board, officer, or person exercising judicial,
quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions[4]. What is at contest here is the power and authority of a private organization,
composed of several members-organizations, which power and authority were vested to it by its own members.
Obviously, prohibition will not lie in this case. The definition and purpose of a writ of prohibition excludes the use of
the writ against any person or group of persons acting in a purely private capacity, and the writ will not be issued against
private individuals or corporations so acting[5].
Moreover, it appears that petitioners already filed Civil Case No. 04-277, wherein they sought the
revocation/cancellation of AdBoards registration and dissolution and the nullity of AdBoards Code of Ethics for
Advertising and ACRC Manual of Procedures for Screening and Filing of Complaints and Appeals (ACRC Manual),
with the RTC. Although dubbed differently, the present petition is obviously an attempt on petitioners part to have
AdBoards authority challenged in yet another forum. This is a clear act of forum shopping on petitioners part.
Forum shopping has been defined as the institution of two (2) or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same
cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition or the act of a party against
whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum, of seeking another (and possibly favorable) opinion in
another forum other than by appeal or the special civil action of certiorari[6].The test in determining the presence of
forum shopping is whether in the two or more cases pending, there is identity of: (a) parties; (b) rights or causes of
action; and (c) reliefs sought[7], such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res adjudicata in the action under consideration: all the requisites, in fine, of auter action
pendant[8].
Civil Case No. 04-277 and the present petition both involve the same parties. The petitioners in this case are Destileria
Limtuaco & Co., Inc. and Convoy Marketing Corp., while the respondent is AdBoard. On the other hand, the plaintiffs
in Civil Case No. 04-277 also are petitioners, while the defendant is still AdBoard, only with the addition of Oscar T.
Valenzuela, who is the Executive Director of AdBoard.
Both cases also raise practically the same basic causes of action/issues and seek the same relief.
The test to determine whether the causes of action are identical is to ascertain whether the same evidence will sustain
both actions, or whether there is an identity in the facts essential to the maintenance of the two actions. If the same facts
or evidence would sustain both, the two actions are considered the same, and a judgment in the first case is a bar to the
subsequent action[9]. The principle applies even if the reliefs sought in the two cases may be different[10]. Otherwise, a
party could easily escape the operation of res judicata by changing the form of the action or the relief sought[11].
There is identity in the causes of action in Civil Case No. 04-277 and the present petition for prohibition inasmuch as
there is identity in the facts and evidence essential to the resolution of the identical issue raised in these cases. Both
cases were instituted after AdBoard recalled the clearance for petitioners Ginagabi advertisement, and its members
refused to air the same. Also, the main issue raised in the present petition and one of the issues raised in Civil Case No.

04-277 refer to AdBoards authority and the legality of the AdBoard Code of Ethics and ACRC Manual. The
determination of this issue in either case would clearly amount to res judicata in regard to the other. Consequently, the
present petition should be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSEDfor lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION, G.R. No. 164242, November 28, 2008, DESTILERIA LIMTUACO & CO., INC. and CONVOY
MARKETING CORPORATION,petitioners, vs. ADVERTISING BOARD OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

SUBJECT: REMEDIAL LAW

Production Of Privileged Medical Records Not Allowed

During Discovery Stage
by The Lawyer's Post December 27, 2014 Comments Off on Production Of Privileged Medical Records Not Allowed During Discovery
Stage

Josielene filed a case for declaration of nullity of marriage against Jose, alleging that he failed to care and support for
his family and that a psychiatrist diagnosed him as mentally deficient due to incessant drinking and excessive use of
prohibited drugs. Johnny opposed the petition, alleging it was Josielene who failed in her wifely duties. During the
pretrial conference, Josielen marked the Philhealth Claim Form 1 that Johnny attached in his answer to show proof that
he was forcibly confined at the rehabilitation unit of a hospital, which form contained a physicians note that Johnny
suffered from metamphetamine and alcohol abuse. On August 22, 2006, Josielene filed with the RTC a request for the
issuance of a subpoena duces tecum addressed to Medical City with a motion that she allowed to submit the same in
evidence. Johnny opposed the motion, reasoning out that the same is covered with physician-patients privilege. The
RTC sided with Johnny and denied Josielenes motion. Her motion for reconsideration again denied by the RTC, she
filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which also denied her petition, ruling that if courts were allowed
to subpoena medical records, patients would then be left with no assurance that whatever confidential information they
disclosed to physicians will be kept secret. The prohibition cover also affidavits, certificates and pertinent records. In
this case, Johnny did not waive the privilege. Josielene thus appealed to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court:
The physician-patient privileged communication rule essentially means that a physician who gets information while
professionally attending a patient cannot in a civil case be examined without the patients consent as to any facts which
would blacken the latters reputation. This rule is intended to encourage the patient to open up to the physician, relate to
him the history of his ailment, and give him access to his body, enabling the physician to make a correct diagnosis of

that ailment and provide the appropriate cure. Any fear that a physician could be compelled in the future to come to
court and narrate all that had transpired between him and the patient might prompt the latter to clam up, thus putting his
own health at great risk.
1. The case presents a procedural issue, given that the time to object to the admission of evidence, such as the hospital
records, would be at the time they are offered. The offer could be made part of the physicians testimony or as
independent evidence that he had made entries in those records that concern the patients health problems.
Section 36, Rule 132, states that objections to evidence must be made after the offer of such evidence for admission in
court. Thus:
SEC. 36. Objection. Objection to evidence offered orally must be made immediately after the offer is made.
Objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral examination of a witness shall be made as soon as the
grounds therefor shall become reasonably apparent.
An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to within three (3) days after notice of the offer unless a different
period is allowed by the court.
In any case, the grounds for the objections must be specified.
Since the offer of evidence is made at the trial, Josielenes request for subpoena duces tecum is premature. She will have
to wait for trial to begin before making a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering Johnnys hospital
records. It is when those records are produced for examination at the trial, that Johnny may opt to object, not just to
their admission in evidence, but more so to their disclosure. Section 24(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence quoted
above is about non-disclosure of privileged matters.
2. It is of course possible to treat Josielenes motion for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering the hospital
records as a motion for production of documents, a discovery procedure available to a litigant prior to trial. Section 1,
Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SEC. 1. Motion for production or inspection; order. Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor, the court
in which an action is pending may (a) order any party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or
photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters,
photographs, objects or tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter
involved in the action and which are in his possession, custody or control; or (b) order any party to permit entry upon
designated land or other property in his possession or control for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or
photographing the property or any designated relevant object or operation thereon. The order shall specify the time,
place and manner of making the inspection and taking copies and photographs, and may prescribe such terms and
conditions as are just. (Emphasis supplied)
But the above right to compel the production of documents has a limitation: the documents to be disclosed are not
privileged.
Josielene of course claims that the hospital records subject of this case are not privileged since it is the testimonial
evidence of the physician that may be regarded as privileged. Section 24(c) of Rule 130 states that the physician cannot
in a civil case, without the consent of the patient, be examined regarding their professional conversation. The privilege,
says Josielene, does not cover the hospital records, but only the examination of the physician at the trial.
To allow, however, the disclosure during discovery procedure of the hospital recordsthe results of tests that the
physician ordered, the diagnosis of the patients illness, and the advice or treatment he gave him would be to allow
access to evidence that is inadmissible without the patients consent. Physician memorializes all these information in the
patients records. Disclosing them would be the equivalent of compelling the physician to testify on privileged matters
he gained while dealing with the patient, without the latters prior consent.
3. Josielene argues that since Johnny admitted in his answer to the petition before the RTC that he had been confined in
a hospital against his will and in fact attached to his answer a Philhealth claim form covering that confinement, he

should be deemed to have waived the privileged character of its records. Josielene invokes Section 17, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Evidence that provides:
SEC. 17. When part of transaction, writing or record given in evidence, the remainder admissible. When part of an
act, declaration, conversation, writing or record is given in evidence by one party, the whole of the same subject may be
inquired into by the other, and when a detached act, declaration, conversation, writing or record is given in evidence,
any other act, declaration, conversation, writing or record necessary to its understanding may also be given in evidence.
But, trial in the case had not yet begun. Consequently, it cannot be said that Johnny had already presented the Philhealth
claim form in evidence, the act contemplated above which would justify Josielene into requesting an inquiry into the
details of his hospital confinement. Johnny was not yet bound to adduce evidence in the case when he filed his answer.
Any request for disclosure of his hospital records would again be premature.
For all of the above reasons, the CA and the RTC were justified in denying Josielene her request for the production in
court of Johnnys hospital records.
THIRD DIVISION, G.R. No. 179786, July 24, 2013, JOSIELENE LARA CHAN, PETITIONER, VS. JOHNNY T.
CHAN, RESPONDENT. The Facts and the Case

SUBJECT: POLITICAL LAW

The Conditional Examination Of A Prosecution Witness

Cannot Defeat The Rights Of The Accused To Public Trial
And Confrontation Of Witnesses
by The Lawyer's Post May 25, 2015 0 Comments

The Facts:
Harry, Tonny, Jerry and Jane were charged with violation of Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code (Other Deceits)
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila in Criminal Case No. 396447. The private complainant in the case,
Highdone Company Ltd., was represented by a frail old businessman from Laos,Li Luen Ping, who traveled from his
country to attend the hearing held on September 9, 2004. Several trial dates were subsequently postponed due to his
unavailability. On October 13, 2005, the private prosecutor in the case filed a Motion To Take Oral Deposition of Li
Luen Ping, alleging that he could not attend the hearing in the Philippines on doctors advice due to ill health since he
was being treated in a lung facility at the Cambodia Charity Hospital in Laos. Against the petitioners opposition, the
MeTC granted the motion. The RTC however, set aside the MeTC order, and held that Section 17, Rule 23 on the
taking of depositions of witnesses in civil cases cannot apply suppletorily to the case since there is a specific provision
in the Rules of Court with respect to the taking of depositions of prosecution witnesses in criminal cases, which is
primarily intended to safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused to meet the witness against him face to face.

When elevated to the CA, the appellate court set aside the RTC order, holding that no rule of procedure expressly
disallows the taking of depositions in criminal cases. In any case, the petitioners can still make timely objection thru
counsel or thru the consular officer who will take the oral depositions. The petitioners elevated the case to the Supreme
Court.
The Issue/s:
Whether or not Rule 23 on the taking of depositions of witnesses is applicable in criminal prosecutions.
The Courts ruling:
We rule in favor of petitioners.
The Procedure for Testimonial Examination of an Unavailable Prosecution Witness is Covered Under Section 15, Rule
119.
The examination of witnesses must be done orally before a judge in open court.1 This is true especially in criminal
cases where the Constitution secures to the accused his right to a public trial and to meet the witnessess against him face
to face. The requirement is the safest and most satisfactory method of investigating facts as it enables the judge to test
the witness credibility through his manner and deportment while testifying.2 It is not without exceptions, however, as
the Rules of Court recognizes the conditional examination of witnesses and the use of their depositions as testimonial
evidence in lieu of direct court testimony.
Even in criminal proceedings, there is no doubt as to the availability of conditional examination of witnesses both for
the benefit of the defense, as well as the prosecution. The Courts ruling in the case of Vda. de Manguerra v. Risos 3
explicitly states that
x x x As exceptions, Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court provide for the different modes of discovery that may be
resorted to by a party to an action. These rules are adopted either to perpetuate the testimonies of witnesses or as modes
of discovery. In criminal proceedings, Sections 12, 13 and 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
which took effect on December 1, 2000, allow the conditional examination of both the defense and prosecution
witnesses. (Underscoring supplied)4
The procedure under Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court allows the taking of depositions in civil cases, either upon oral
examination or written interrogatories, before any judge, notary public or person authorized to administer oaths at any
time or place within the Philippines; or before any Philippine consular official, commissioned officer or person
authorized to
administer oaths in a foreign state or country, with no additional requirement except reasonable notice in writing to the
other party.5
But for purposes of taking the deposition in criminal cases, more particularly of a prosecution witness who would
forseeably be unavailable for trial, the testimonial examination should be made before the court, or at least before the
judge, where the case is pending as required by the clear mandate of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. The pertinent provision reads thus:
SEC. 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution. When it satisfactorily appears that a witness for the prosecution
is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the court, orhas to leave the Philippines with no definite date of
returning, he may forthwith be conditionally examined before the court where the case is pending. Such examination, in
the presence of the accused, or in his absence after reasonable notice to attend the examination has been served on him
shall be conducted in the same manner as an examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of the accused to attend the
examination after notice shall be considered a waiver. The statement taken may be admitted in behalf of or against the
accused.
Since the conditional examination of a prosecution witness must take place at no other place than the court where the
case is pending, the RTC properly nullified the MeTCs orders granting the motion to take the deposition of Li Luen
Ping before the Philippine consular official in Laos, Cambodia. We quote with approval the RTCs ratiocination in this
wise:

The condition of the private complainant being sick and of advanced age falls within the provision of Section 15 Rule
119 of the Rules of Court. However, said rule substantially provides that he should be conditionally examined before the
court where the case is pending. Thus, this Court concludes that the language of Section 15 Rule 119 must be
interpreted to require the parties to present testimony at the hearing through live witnesses, whose demeanor and
credibility can be evaluated by the judge presiding at the hearing, rather than by means of deposition. No where in the
said rule permits the taking of deposition outside the Philippines whether the deponent is sick or not. (Underscoring
supplied)6
Certainly, to take the deposition of the prosecution witness elsewhere and not before the very same court where the case
is pending would not only deprive a detained accused of his right to attend the proceedings but also deprive the trial
judge of the opportunity to observe the prosecution witness deportment and properly assess his credibility, which is
especially intolerable when the witness testimony is crucial to the prosecutions case against the accused. This is the
import of the Courts ruling in Vda. de Manguerra7 where we further declared that
While we recognize the prosecutions right to preserve the testimony of its witness in order to prove its case, we cannot
disregard the rules which are designed mainly for the protection of the accuseds constitutional rights. The giving of
testimony during trial is the general rule. The conditional examination of a witness outside of the trial is only an
exception, and as such, calls for a strict construction of the rules.8 (Underscoring supplied)
It is argued that since the Rules of Civil Procedure is made explicitly applicable in all cases, both civil and criminal as
well as special proceedings, the deposition-taking before a Philippine consular official under Rule 23 should be deemed
allowable also under the circumstances. However, the suggested suppletory application of Rule 23 in the testimonial
examination of an unavailable prosecution witness has been categorically ruled out by the Court in the same case of
Vda. de Manguerra, as follows:
It is true that Section 3, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the rules of civil procedure apply to all actions, civil
or criminal, and special proceedings. In effect, it says that the rules of civil procedure have suppletory application to
criminal cases. However, it is likewise true that criminal proceedings are primarily governed by the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Considering that Rule 119 adequately and squarely covers the situation in the instant case, we find
no cogent reason to apply Rule 23 suppletorily or otherwise. (Underscoring supplied)
The Conditional Examination of a Prosecution Witness Cannot Defeat the Rights of the Accused to Public Trial and
Confrontation of Witnesses
The CA took a simplistic view on the use of depositions in criminal cases and overlooked fundamental considerations
no less than the Constitution secures to the accused, i.e., the right to a public trial and the right to confrontation of
witnesses. Section 14(2), Article III of the Constitution provides as follows:
Section 14. (1) x x x
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the
right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a
speedy, impartial and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable. (Underscoring supplied)
In dismissing petitioners apprehensions concerning the deprivation of their constitutional rights to a public trial and
confrontation, the CA opined that petitioners would still be accorded the right to cross-examine the deponent witness
and raise their objections during the deposition-taking in the same manner as in a regular court trial.
We disagree. There is a great deal of difference between the face-to- face confrontation in a public criminal trial in the
presence of the presiding judge and the cross-examination of a witness in a foreign place outside the courtroom in the
absence of a trial judge. In the aptly cited case of People v. Estenzo,9 the Court noted the uniqueness and significance
of a witness testifying in open court, thus:

The main and essential purpose of requiring a witness to appear and testify orally at a trial is to secure for the adverse
party the opportunity of cross-examination. The opponent, according to an eminent authority, demands
confrontation, not for the idle purpose of gazing upon the witness, or of being gazed upon by him, but for the purpose of
cross examination which cannot be had except by the direct and personal putting of questions and obtaining immediate
answers. There is also the advantage of the witness before the judge, and it is this it enables the judge as trier of facts
to obtain the elusive and incommunicable evidence of a witness deportment while testifying, and a certain subjective
moral effect is produced upon the witness. It is only when the witness testifies orally that the judge may have a true idea
of his countenance, manner and expression, which may confirm or detract from the weight of his testimony. Certainly,
the physical condition of the witness will reveal his capacity for accurate observation and memory, and his deportment
and physiognomy will reveal clues to his character. These can only be observed by the judge if the witness testifies
orally in court. x x x (Underscoring supplied)10
The right of confrontation, on the other hand, is held to apply specifically to criminal proceedings and to have a twofold
purpose: (1) to afford the accused an opportunity to test the testimony of witnesses by cross-examination, and (2) to
allow the judge to observe the deportment of witnesses.11 The Court explained in People v. Seneris12 that the
constitutional requirement insures that the witness will give his testimony under oath, thus deterring lying by the threat
of perjury charge; it forces the witness to submit to cross-examination, a valuable instrument in exposing falsehood and
bringing out the truth; and it enables the court to observe the demeanor of the witness and assess his credibility.13
As the right of confrontation is intended to secure the accused in the right to be tried as far as facts provable by
witnesses as meet him face to face at the trial who give their testimony in his presence, and give to the accused an
opportunity of cross-examination,14 it is properly viewed as a guarantee against the use of unreliable testimony in
criminal trials. In the American case of Crawford v. Washington,15 the US Supreme Court had expounded on the
procedural intent of the confrontation requirement, thus:
Where testimonial statements are involved, we do not think the Framers meant to leave the Sixth Amendments [right to
confront witness face to face] protection to the vagaries of the rules of evidence, much less to amorphous notions of
reliability. Certainly, none of the authorities discussed above acknowledges any general reliability exception to the
common-law rule. Admitting statements deemed reliable by a judge is fundamentally at odds with the right of
confrontation. To be sure, the Clauses ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a procedural rather than
a substantive guarantee. It commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular
manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination. The Clause thus reflects a judgment, not only about the
desirability of reliable evidence (a point on which there could be little dissent), but about how reliability can best be
determined. (Underscoring supplied)
The Webb Ruling is Not on All Fours with the Instant Case
The CA found the frail and infirm condition of the prosecution witness as sufficient and compelling reason to uphold the
MeTC Orders granting the deposition-taking, following the ruling in the case ofPeople v. Webb16 that the taking of an
unavailable witness deposition is in the nature of a discovery procedure the use of which is within the trial courts
sound discretion which needs only to be exercised in a reasonable manner and in consonance with the spirit of the
law17.
But the ruling in the cited case is not instantly applicable herein as the factual settings are not similar. The accused in the
Webb case had sought to take the oral deposition of five defense witnesses before a Philippine consular agent in lieu of
presenting them as live witnesses, alleging that they were all residents of the United States who could not be compelled
by subpoena to testify in court. The trial court denied the motion of the accused but the CA differed and ordered the
deposition taken. When the matter was raised before this Court, we sustained the trial courts disallowance of the
deposition-taking on the limited ground that there was no necessity for the procedure as the matter sought to be proved
by way of deposition was considered merely corroborative of the evidence for the defense18.
In this case, where it is the prosecution that seeks to depose the complaining witness against the accused, the stringent
procedure under Section 15, Rule 119 cannot be ignored without violating the constitutional rights of the accused to due
process.

Finally, the Court takes note that prosecution witness Li Luen Ping had managed to attend the initial trial proceedings
before the MeTC of Manila on September 9, 2004. At that time, Li Luen Pings old age and fragile constitution should
have been unmistakably apparent and yet the prosecution failed to act with zeal and foresight in having his deposition or
testimony taken before the MeTC pursuant to Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court. In fact, it should have
been imperative for the prosecution to have moved for the preservation of Li Luen Pings testimony at that first instance
given the fact that the witness is a non-resident alien who can leave the Philippines anytime without any definite date of
return. Obviously, the prosecution allowed its main witness to leave the courts jurisdiction without availing of the court
procedure intended to preserve the testimony of such witness. The loss of its cause is attributable to no other party.
Still, even after failing to secure Li Luen Pings conditional examination before the MeTC prior to said witness
becoming sick and unavailable, the prosecution would capitalize upon its own failure by pleading for a liberal
application of the rules on depositions. It must be emphasized that while the prosecution must provide the accused every
opportunity to take the deposition of witnesses that are material to his defense in order to avoid charges of violating the
right of the accused to compulsory process, the State itself must resort to deposition-taking sparingly if it is to guard
against accusations of violating the right of the accused to meet the witnesses against him face to face. Great care must
be observed in the taking and use of depositions of prosecution witnesses to the end that no conviction of an accused
will rely on ex parte affidavits and depositions19.
Thus, the CA ignored the procedure under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure for taking the deposition of an
unavailable prosecution witness when it upheld the trial courts order allowing the deposition of prosecution witness Li
Luen Ping to take place in a venue other than the court where the case is pending. This was certainly grave abuse of
discretion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated February 19, 2008 and the Resolution
dated November 28, 2008 of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Decision ofthe
Regional Trial Court which disallowed the deposition-taking in Laos, Cambodia is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION, G.R. No. 185527, July 18, 2012 ]
HARRY L. GO, TONNY NGO, JERRY NGO AND JANE GO, PETITIONERS, VS. THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND HIGHDONE COMPANY, LTD., ET AL., RESPONDENTS.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

SUBJECT: CIVIL LAW

Declaratory Relief: Malls May Collect Parking Fees

by The Lawyer's Post January 8, 2015 Comments Off on Declaratory Relief: Malls May Collect Parking Fees

The Senate Committee on Trade and Commerce and on Justice and Human Rights conducted a
joint hearing on the issue of collection of parking fees by several malls within Metro Manila,
owned particularly Ayala Land, Robinsons Land, Shangri-La, and SM Prime Holdings. After the
hearings, it published Joint Committee Report No. 225 which declared that the collection of
parking fees by the malls is illegal as it violates the National Building Code. It recommended

among others, that the Office of the Solicitor General should institute the necessary action to
enjoin the collection of parking fees as well as enforce the penal provision of the National
Building Code. SM Prime received information thereafter that the DPWH, and the local building
officials of different cities within Metro Manila intend to file thru the OSG an action to enjoin
respondent SM Prime and similar establishments from collecting parking fees, and to impose
upon said establishments penal sanctions under Presidential Decree No. 1096, otherwise known
as the National Building Code of the Philippines (National Building Code), and its Implementing
Rules and Regulations (IRR). Thus, SM Prime filed a petition for declaratory relief and injunction
with prayer for temporary restraining order to declare Rule XIX of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the National Building Code as ultra vires; and to declare it as entitled to
collection of parking fees, and also to declare the IRR of the National Building Code as
ineffective. The next day, the OSG also filed its own petition for declaratory relief, to enjoin the
companies from collecting parking fees. The cases were consolidated into the sala of Judge
Marella. After trial, the RTC ruled in favour of the companies. It declared OSG as a proper party
to file the petition for declaratory relief; that the cases all meet the requirements of a petition
for declaratory relief; and, that the companies are entitled to collect parking fees. While the
National Building Code provided for buildings to have parking parking spaces, it did not say
whether the same should be free or paid. To compel the companies to provide free parking
spaces would be tantamount to deprivation of property without due process of law. The OSG
appealed the case to the Court of Appeals which also denied it, hence this case before the
Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court:
The OSG argues that respondents are mandated to provide free parking by Section 803 of the
National Building Code and Rule XIX of the IRR.
According to Section 803 of the National Building Code:
SECTION 803. Percentage of Site Occupancy
(a) Maximum site occupancy shall be governed by the use, type of construction, and height of
the building and the use, area, nature, and location of the site; and subject to the provisions of
the local zoning requirements and in accordance with the rules and regulations promulgated by
the Secretary.
In connection therewith, Rule XIX of the old IRR, provides:
RULE XIX PARKING AND LOADING SPACE REQUIREMENTS

Pursuant to Section 803 of the National Building Code (PD 1096) providing for maximum site
occupancy, the following provisions on parking and loading space requirements shall be
observed:
1. The parking space ratings listed below are minimum off-street requirements for specific
uses/occupancies for buildings/structures:
1.1 The size of an average automobile parking slot shall be computed as 2.4 meters by 5.00
meters for perpendicular or diagonal parking, 2.00 meters by 6.00 meters for parallel parking.
A truck or bus parking/loading slot shall be computed at a minimum of 3.60 meters by 12.00
meters. The parking slot shall be drawn to scale and the total number of which shall be
indicated on the plans and specified whether or not parking accommodations, are attendantmanaged. (See Section 2 for computation of parking requirements).
xxxx
1.7 Neighborhood shopping center 1 slot/100 sq. m. of shopping floor area
The OSG avers that the aforequoted provisions should be read together with Section 102 of the
National Building Code, which declares:
SECTION 102. Declaration of Policy
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to safeguard life, health, property, and public
welfare, consistent with the principles of sound environmental management and control; and to
this end, make it the purpose of this Code to provide for all buildings and structures, a
framework of minimum standards and requirements to regulate and control their location, site,
design, quality of materials, construction, use, occupancy, and maintenance.
The requirement of free-of-charge parking, the OSG argues, greatly contributes to the aim of
safeguarding life, health, property, and public welfare, consistent with the principles of sound
environmental management and control. Adequate parking spaces would contribute greatly to
alleviating traffic congestion when complemented by quick and easy access thereto because of
free-charge parking. Moreover, the power to regulate and control the use, occupancy, and
maintenance of buildings and structures carries with it the power to impose fees and,
conversely, to control partially or, as in this case, absolutely the imposition of such fees.
The Court finds no merit in the present Petition.
The explicit directive of the afore-quoted statutory and regulatory provisions, garnered from a
plain reading thereof, is that respondents, as operators/lessors of neighborhood shopping
centers, should provide parking and loading spaces, in accordance with the minimum ratio of

one slot per 100 square meters of shopping floor area. There is nothing therein pertaining to
the collection (or non-collection) of parking fees by respondents. In fact, the term parking
fees cannot even be found at all in the entire National Building Code and its IRR.
Statutory construction has it that if a statute is clear and unequivocal, it must be given its
literal meaning and applied without any attempt at interpretation. Since Section 803 of the
National Building Code and Rule XIX of its IRR do not mention parking fees, then simply, said
provisions do not regulate the collection of the same. The RTC and the Court of Appeals
correctly applied Article 1158 of the New Civil Code, which states:
Art. 1158. Obligations derived from law are not presumed. Only those expressly determined in
this Code or in special laws are demandable, and shall be regulated by the precepts of the law
which establishes them; and as to what has not been foreseen, by the provisions of this Book.
(Emphasis ours.)
Hence, in order to bring the matter of parking fees within the ambit of the National Building
Code and its IRR, the OSG had to resort to specious and feeble argumentation, in which the
Court cannot concur.
The OSG cannot rely on Section 102 of the National Building Code to expand the coverage of
Section 803 of the same Code and Rule XIX of the IRR, so as to include the regulation of parking
fees. The OSG limits its citation to the first part of Section 102 of the National Building Code
declaring the policy of the State to safeguard life, health, property, and public welfare,
consistent with the principles of sound environmental management and control; but totally
ignores the second part of said provision, which reads, and to this end, make it the purpose of
this Code to provide for all buildings and structures, a framework of minimum standards and
requirements to regulate and control their location, site, design, quality of materials,
construction, use, occupancy, and maintenance. While the first part of Section 102 of the
National Building Code lays down the State policy, it is the second part thereof that explains
how said policy shall be carried out in the Code. Section 102 of the National Building Code is
not an all-encompassing grant of regulatory power to the DPWH Secretary and local building
officials in the name of life, health, property, and public welfare. On the contrary, it limits the
regulatory power of said officials to ensuring that the minimum standards and requirements for
all buildings and structures, as set forth in the National Building Code, are complied with.
Consequently, the OSG cannot claim that in addition to fixing the minimum requirements for
parking spaces for buildings, Rule XIX of the IRR also mandates that such parking spaces be
provided by building owners free of charge. If Rule XIX is not covered by the enabling law, then
it cannot be added to or included in the implementing rules. The rule-making power of
administrative agencies must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceedings to

carry into effect the law as it has been enacted, and it cannot be extended to amend or expand
the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Administrative
regulations must always be in harmony with the provisions of the law because any resulting
discrepancy between the two will always be resolved in favor of the basic law.
From the RTC all the way to this Court, the OSG repeatedly referred toRepublic v.
Gonzales and City of Ozamis v. Lumapas to support its position that the State has the power
to regulate parking spaces to promote the health, safety, and welfare of the public; and it is by
virtue of said power that respondents may be required to provide free parking facilities. The
OSG, though, failed to consider the substantial differences in the factual and legal backgrounds
of these two cases from those of the Petition at bar.
In Republic, the Municipality of Malabon sought to eject the occupants of two parcels of land of
the public domain to give way to a road-widening project. It was in this context that the Court
pronounced:
Indiscriminate parking along F. Sevilla Boulevard and other main thoroughfares was prevalent;
this, of course, caused the build up of traffic in the surrounding area to the great discomfort
and inconvenience of the public who use the streets. Traffic congestion constitutes a threat to
the health, welfare, safety and convenience of the people and it can only be substantially
relieved by widening streets and providing adequate parking areas.
The Court, in City of Ozamis, declared that the City had been clothed with full power to
control and regulate its streets for the purpose of promoting public health, safety and welfare.
The City can regulate the time, place, and manner of parking in the streets and public places;
and charge minimal fees for the street parking to cover the expenses for supervision,
inspection and control, to ensure the smooth flow of traffic in the environs of the public market,
and for the safety and convenience of the public.
Republic and City of Ozamis involved parking in the local streets; in contrast, the present
case deals with privately owned parking facilities available for use by the general public. In
Republic and City of Ozamis, the concerned local governments regulated parking pursuant to
their power to control and regulate their streets; in the instant case, the DPWH Secretary and
local building officials regulate parking pursuant to their authority to ensure compliance with
the minimum standards and requirements under the National Building Code and its IRR. With
the difference in subject matters and the bases for the regulatory powers being invoked,
Republic and City of Ozamis do not constitute precedents for this case.
Indeed, Republic and City of Ozamis both contain pronouncements that weaken the position
of the OSG in the case at bar. In Republic, the Court, instead of placing the burden on private

persons to provide parking facilities to the general public, mentioned the trend in other
jurisdictions wherein the municipal governments themselves took the initiative to make more
parking spaces available so as to alleviate the traffic problems, thus:
Under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, parking in designated areas along public
streets or highways is allowed which clearly indicates that provision for parking spaces serves a
useful purpose. In other jurisdictions where traffic is at least as voluminous as here, the
provision by municipal governments of parking space is not limited to parking along public
streets or highways. There has been a marked trend to build off-street parking facilities with the
view to removing parked cars from the streets. While the provision of off-street parking facilities
or carparks has been commonly undertaken by private enterprise, municipal governments have
been constrained to put up carparks in response to public necessity where private enterprise
had failed to keep up with the growing public demand. American courts have upheld the right
of municipal governments to construct off-street parking facilities as clearly redounding to the
public benefit.
In City of Ozamis, the Court authorized the collection by the City of minimal fees for the
parking of vehicles along the streets: so why then should the Court now preclude respondents
from collecting from the public a fee for the use of the mall parking facilities? Undoubtedly,
respondents also incur expenses in the maintenance and operation of the mall parking
facilities, such as electric consumption, compensation for parking attendants and security, and
upkeep of the physical structures.
It is not sufficient for the OSG to claim that the power to regulate and control the use,
occupancy, and maintenance of buildings and structures carries with it the power to impose
fees and, conversely, to control, partially or, as in this case, absolutely, the imposition of such
fees. Firstly, the fees within the power of regulatory agencies to impose are regulatory fees. It
has been settled law in this jurisdiction that this broad and all-compassing governmental
competence to restrict rights of liberty and property carries with it the undeniable power to
collect a regulatory fee. It looks to the enactment of specific measures that govern the relations
not only as between individuals but also as between private parties and the political society.
True, if the regulatory agencies have the power to impose regulatory fees, then conversely,
they also have the power to remove the same. Even so, it is worthy to note that the present
case does not involve the imposition by the DPWH Secretary and local building officials of
regulatory fees upon respondents; but the collection by respondents of parking fees from
persons who use the mall parking facilities. Secondly, assuming arguendo that the DPWH
Secretary and local building officials do have regulatory powers over the collection of parking
fees for the use of privately owned parking facilities, they cannot allow or prohibit such
collection arbitrarily or whimsically. Whether allowing or prohibiting the collection of such

parking fees, the action of the DPWH Secretary and local building officials must pass the test of
classic reasonableness and propriety of the measures or means in the promotion of the ends
sought to be accomplished.
Keeping in mind the aforementioned test of reasonableness and propriety of measures or
means, the Court notes that Section 803 of the National Building Code falls under Chapter 8 on
Light and Ventilation. Evidently, the Code deems it necessary to regulate site occupancy to
ensure that there is proper lighting and ventilation in every building. Pursuant thereto, Rule XIX
of the IRR requires that a building, depending on its specific use and/or floor area, should
provide a minimum number of parking spaces. The Court, however, fails to see the connection
between regulating site occupancy to ensure proper light and ventilation in every building vis-vis regulating the collection by building owners of fees for the use of their parking spaces.
Contrary to the averment of the OSG, the former does not necessarily include or imply the
latter. It totally escapes this Court how lighting and ventilation conditions at the malls could be
affected by the fact that parking facilities thereat are free or paid for.
The OSG attempts to provide the missing link by arguing that:
Under Section 803 of the National Building Code, complimentary parking spaces are required to
enhance light and ventilation, that is, to avoid traffic congestion in areas surrounding the
building, which certainly affects the ventilation within the building itself, which otherwise, the
annexed parking spaces would have served. Free-of-charge parking avoids traffic congestion by
ensuring quick and easy access of legitimate shoppers to off-street parking spaces annexed to
the malls, and thereby removing the vehicles of these legitimate shoppers off the busy streets
near the commercial establishments.[33]
The Court is unconvinced. The National Building Code regulates buildings, by setting the
minimum specifications and requirements for the same. It does not concern itself with traffic
congestion in areas surrounding the building. It is already a stretch to say that the National
Building Code and its IRR also intend to solve the problem of traffic congestion around the
buildings so as to ensure that the said buildings shall have adequate lighting and ventilation.
Moreover, the Court cannot simply assume, as the OSG has apparently done, that the traffic
congestion in areas around the malls is due to the fact that respondents charge for their
parking facilities, thus, forcing vehicle owners to just park in the streets. The Court notes that
despite the fees charged by respondents, vehicle owners still use the mall parking facilities,
which are even fully occupied on some days. Vehicle owners may be parking in the streets only
because there are not enough parking spaces in the malls, and not because they are deterred
by the parking fees charged by respondents. Free parking spaces at the malls may even have
the opposite effect from what the OSG envisioned: more people may be encouraged by the free

parking to bring their own vehicles, instead of taking public transport, to the malls; as a result,
the parking facilities would become full sooner, leaving more vehicles without parking spaces in
the malls and parked in the streets instead, causing even more traffic congestion.
Without using the term outright, the OSG is actually invoking police power to justify the
regulation by the State, through the DPWH Secretary and local building officials, of privately
owned parking facilities, including the collection by the owners/operators of such facilities of
parking fees from the public for the use thereof. The Court finds, however, that in totally
prohibiting respondents from collecting parking fees from the public for the use of the mall
parking facilities, the State would be acting beyond the bounds of police power.
Police power is the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use
of liberty and property. It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use and enjoyment
of the property of the owner. The power to regulate, however, does not include the power to
prohibit. A fortiori, the power to regulate does not include the power to confiscate. Police power
does not involve the taking or confiscation of property, with the exception of a few cases where
there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order to destroy it for the purpose of
protecting peace and order and of promoting the general welfare; for instance, the confiscation
of an illegally possessed article, such as opium and firearms.
When there is a taking or confiscation of private property for public use, theState is no longer
exercising police power, but another of its inherent powe1rs, namely, eminent domain. Eminent
domain enables the State to forcibly acquire private lands intended for public use upon
payment of just compensation to the owner.
Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title
to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why the said
power may not be availed of only to impose a burden upon the owner of condemned property,
without loss of title and possession. It is a settled rule that neither acquisition of title nor total
destruction of value is essential to taking. It is usually in cases where title remains with the
private owner that inquiry should be made to determine whether the impairment of a property
is merely regulated or amounts to a compensable taking. A regulation that deprives any person
of the profitable use of his property constitutes a taking and entitles him to compensation,
unless the invasion of rights is so slight as to permit the regulation to be justified under the
police power. Similarly, a police regulation that unreasonably restricts the right to use business
property for business purposes amounts to a taking of private property, and the owner may
recover therefor.
Although in the present case, title to and/or possession of the parking facilities remain/s with
respondents, the prohibition against their collection of parking fees from the public, for the use

of said facilities, is already tantamount to a taking or confiscation of their properties. The State
is not only requiring that respondents devote a portion of the latters properties for use as
parking spaces, but is also mandating that they give the public access to said parking spaces
for free. Such is already an excessive intrusion into the property rights of respondents. Not only
are they being deprived of the right to use a portion of their properties as they wish, they are
further prohibited from profiting from its use or even just recovering therefrom the expenses for
the maintenance and operation of the required parking facilities.
The ruling of this Court in City Government of Quezon City v. Judge Ericta is edifying.
Therein, the City Government of Quezon City passed an ordinance obliging private cemeteries
within its jurisdiction to set aside at least six percent of their total area for charity, that is, for
burial grounds of deceased paupers. According to the Court, the ordinance in question was null
and void, for it authorized the taking of private property without just compensation:
There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total
area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion
of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is
actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit
paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a
public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.
The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not covered by
Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city
council to prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of population of the city and to
provide for their burial in a proper place subject to the provisions of general law regulating
burial grounds and cemeteries. When the Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337
provides in Section 177(q) that a sangguniang panlungsod may provide for the burial of the
dead in such place and in such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance it simply authorizes
the city to provide its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private properties to
construct public cemeteries. This has been the law, and practise in the past. It continues to the
present. Expropriation, however, requires payment of just compensation. The questioned
ordinance is different from laws and regulations requiring owners of subdivisions to set aside
certain areas for streets, parks, playgrounds, and other public facilities from the land they sell
to buyers of subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety, health, and convenience are very
clear from said requirements which are intended to insure the development of communities
with salubrious and wholesome environments. The beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are
made to pay by the subdivision developer when individual lots are sold to homeowners.

In conclusion, the total prohibition against the collection by respondents of parking fees from
persons who use the mall parking facilities has no basis in the National Building Code or its IRR.
The State also cannot impose the same prohibition by generally invoking police power, since
said prohibition amounts to a taking of respondents property without payment of just
compensation.
Given the foregoing, the Court finds no more need to address the issue persistently raised by
respondent SM Prime concerning the unconstitutionality of Rule XIX of the IRR. In addition, the
said issue was not among those that the parties, during the pre-trial conference for Civil Cases
No. 12-08 and No. 00-1210, agreed to submit for resolution of the RTC. It is likewise axiomatic
that the constitutionality of a law, a regulation, an ordinance or an act will not be resolved by
courts if the controversy can be, as in this case it has been, settled on other grounds.
THIRD DIVISION, G.R. No. 177056, September 18, 2009, THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR
GENERAL, PETITIONER, VS. AYALA LAND INCORPORATED, ROBINSONS LAND CORPORATION,
SHANGRI-LA PLAZA CORPORATION AND SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC.,

SUBJECT: CIVIL LAW

Once Negligence On The Part Of The Employee Is

Established, A Presumption Instantly Arises That The
Employer Was Remiss In The Selection And/Or Supervision
Of The Negligent Employee
by The Lawyer's Post May 25, 2015 0 Comments

The Facts:
Loreta Yu, just alighted from a bus in front of the Robinsons Galeria, was hit and run over by a bus
driven by antonio Gimena, an employee of R Transport Corporation, but registered in the name of
the Metro Manila Transport Corporation (MMTC). She died as a result of the accident, hence,
Luisito, her husband, filed a case for damages against R Transport, Antonio and MMTC. In their
defense, MMTC alleged that it merely purchased the bus under the Bus Installment Purchase
Program of the government, for resale to R Transport, who actually operated the bus within Metro
Manila; R Transport denied liability, averring that it exercised due diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employee, Antonio, who was declared in default for failure to file an answer.
After trial, the RTC rendered judgment in favour of Luisitio and against R Transport and MMTC. It
ruled that R Transport failed to prove that it exercised the diligence of a good father of the family in
the selection and supervision of Antonio, whose negligence caused the death of Lorena. MMTC
was held liable solidarily as the registered owner since it would unduly prejudice the heirs of the
victim if the latter would look beyond the certificate of registration and prove the actual owner.
On appeal to the CA, the latter affirmed the ruling, with the modification that Antonio was held
solidarily liable for the damages caused to the heirs of Lorena. R Transport assails the ruling of the
CA thru a Rule 45 petition. It argues that no evidence was presented to prove that its employee was
negligent in driving the bus, and faults the bus where Lorena alighted as the party negligent. Since
it it not the registered owner of the vehicle, it cannot be liable for damages.
The Issue/s:
Whether or not R Transport should be held solidarily liable for the negligence of its employee,
Antonio.
The Courts ruling:
We disagree.
Time and again, it has been ruled that whether a person is negligent or not is a question of fact
which this Court cannot pass upon in a petition for review on certiorari, as its jurisdiction is limited
to reviewing errors of law.1 This Court is not bound to weigh all over again the evidence adduced
by the parties, particularly where the findings of both the trial and the appellate courts on the matter
of petitioners negligence coincide. As a general rule, therefore, the resolution of factual issues is a
function of the trial court, whose findings on these matters are binding on this Court, more so where
these have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals2, save for the following exceptional and
meritorious circumstances: (1) when the factual findings of the appellate court and the trial court are
contradictory; (2) when the findings of the trial court are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises

or conjectures; (3) when the lower courts inference from its factual findings is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible; (4) when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; (5)
when the findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues of the case, or fail to notice certain
relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; (6) when there is a
misappreciation of facts; (7) when the findings of fact are themselves conflicting; and (8) when the
findings of fact are conclusions without mention of the specific evidence on which they are based,
are premised on the absence of evidence, or are contradicted by evidence on record.3
After a review of the records of the case, we find no cogent reason to reverse the rulings of the
courts below for none of the aforementioned exceptions are present herein. Both the trial and
appellate courts found driver Gimena negligent in hitting and running over the victim and ruled that
his negligence was the proximate cause of her death. Negligence has been defined as the failure to
observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and
vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers
injury.4Verily, foreseeability is the fundamental test of negligence.5 It is the omission to do
something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the
conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man
would not do6.
In this case, the records show that driver Gimena was clearly running at a reckless speed. As
testified by the police officer on duty at the time of the incident7 and indicated in the Autopsy
Report,8 not only were the deceaseds clothes ripped off from her body, her brain even spewed out
from her skull and spilled over the road. Indeed, this Court is not prepared to believe petitioners
contention that its bus was travelling at a normal speed in preparation for a full stop in view of the
fatal injuries sustained by the deceased. Moreover, the location wherein the deceased was hit and
run over further indicates Gimenas negligence. As borne by the records, the bus driven by Gimena
bumped the deceased in a loading and unloading area of a commercial center. The fact that he was
approaching such a busy part of EDSA should have already cautioned the driver of the bus. In fact,
upon seeing that a bus has stopped beside his lane should have signalled him to step on his brakes to
slow down for the possibility that said bus was unloading its passengers in the area. Unfortunately,
he did not take the necessary precaution and instead, drove on and bumped the deceased despite
being aware that he was traversing a commercial center where pedestrians were crossing the street.
Ultimately, Gimena should have observed due diligence of a reasonably prudent man by slackening
his speed and proceeding cautiously while passing the area.
Under Article 21809 of the New Civil Code, employers are liable for the damages caused by their
employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. Once negligence on the part of the
employee is established, a presumption instantly arises that the employer was remiss in the selection
and/or supervision of the negligent employee. To avoid liability for the quasi-delict committed by
its employee, it is incumbent upon the employer to rebut this presumption by presenting adequate
and convincing proof that it exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of its employees10.
Unfortunately, however, the records of this case are bereft of any proof showing the exercise by
petitioner of the required diligence. As aptly observed by the CA, no evidence of whatever nature
was ever presented depicting petitioners due diligence in the selection and supervision of its driver,

Gimena, despite several opportunities to do so. In fact, in its petition, apart from denying the
negligence of its employee and imputing the same to the bus from which the victim alighted,
petitioner merely reiterates its argument that since it is not the registered owner of the bus which
bumped the victim, it cannot be held liable for the damage caused by the same. Nowhere was it
even remotely alleged that petitioner had exercised the required diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employee. Because of this failure, petitioner cannot now avoid liability for the
quasi-delict committed by its negligent employee.
At this point, it must be noted that petitioner, in its relentless attempt to evade liability, cites our
rulings in Vargas v. Langcay11 and Tamayo v. Aquino12 insisting that it should not be held
solidarily liable with MMTC for it is not the registered owner of the bus which killed the deceased.
However, this Court, in Jereos v. Court of Appeals, et al.13, rejected such contention in the
following wise:
Finally, the petitioner, citing the case of Vargas vs. Langcay, contends that it is the registered owner
of the vehicle, rather than the actual owner, who must be jointly and severally liable with the driver
of the passenger vehicle for damages incurred by third persons as a consequence of injuries or death
sustained in the operation of said vehicle.
The contention is devoid of merit. While the Court therein ruled that the registered owner or
operator of a passenger vehicle is jointly and severally liable with the driver of the said vehicle for
damages incurred by passengers or third persons as a consequence of injuries or death sustained in
the operation of the said vehicle, the Court did so to correct the erroneous findings of the Court of
Appeals that the liability of the registered owner or operator of a passenger vehicle is merely
subsidiary, as contemplated in Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code. In no case did the Court exempt
the actual owner of the passenger vehicle from liability. On the contrary, it adhered to the rule
followed in the cases of Erezo vs. Jepte, Tamayo vs. Aquino, and De Peralta vs. Mangusang, among
others, that the registered owner or operator has the right to be indemnified by the real or actual
owner of the amount that he may be required to pay as damage for the injury caused.
The right to be indemnified being recognized, recovery by the registered owner or operator may be
made in any form-either by a cross-claim, third-party complaint, or an independent action. The
result is the same.14
Moreover, while We held in Tamayo that the responsibility of the registered owner and actual
operator of a truck which caused the death of its passenger is not solidary, We noted therein that the
same is due to the fact that the action instituted was one for breach of contract, to wit:
The decision of the Court of Appeals is also attacked insofar as it holds that inasmuch as the thirdparty defendant had used the truck on a route not covered by the registered owners franchise, both
the registered owner and the actual owner and operator should be considered as joint tortfeasors and
should be made liable in accordance with Article 2194 of the Civil Code. This Article is as follows:
Art. 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary.
But the action instituted in the case at bar is one for breach of contract, for failure of the defendant
to carry safely the deceased for her destination. The liability for which he is made responsible, i.e.,
for the death of the passenger, may not be considered as arising from a quasi-delict. As the

registered owner Tamayo and his transferee Rayos may not be held guilty of tort or a quasi-delict;
their responsibility is not solidary as held by the Court of Appeals.
The question that poses, therefore, is how should the holder of the certificate of public convenience,
Tamayo, participate with his transferee, operator Rayos, in the damages recoverable by the heirs of
the deceased passenger, if their liability is not that of Joint tortfeasors in accordance with Article
2194 of the Civil Code. The following considerations must be borne in mind in determining this
question. As Tamayo is the registered owner of the truck, his responsibility to the public or to any
passenger riding in the vehicle or truck must be direct, for the reasons given in our decision in the
case of Erezo vs. Jepte, supra, as quoted above. But as the transferee, who operated the vehicle
when the passenger died, is the one directly responsible for the accident and death he should in turn
be made responsible to the registered owner for what the latter may have been adjudged to pay. In
operating the truck without transfer thereof having been approved by the Public Service
Commission, the transferee acted merely as agent of the registered owner and should be responsible
to him (the registered owner), for any damages that he may cause the latter by his negligence15.
However, it must be noted that the case at hand does not involve a breach of contract of carriage, as
in Tamayo, but a tort or quasi-delict under Article 217616, in relation to Article 218017 of the New
Civil Code. As such, the liability for which petitioner is being made responsible actually arises not
from a pre-existing contractual relation between petitioner and the deceased, but from a damage
caused by the negligence of its employee. Petitioner cannot, therefore, rely on our ruling in
Tamayoand escape its solidary liability for the liability of the employer for the negligent conduct of
its subordinate is direct and primary, subject only to the defense of due diligence in the selection and
supervision of the employee18.
Indeed, this Court has consistently been of the view that it is for the better protection of the public
for both the owner of record and the actual operator to be adjudged jointly and severally liable with
the driver19. As aptly stated by the appellate court, the principle of holding the registered owner
liable for damages notwithstanding that ownership of the offending vehicle has already been
transferred to another is designed to protect the public and not as a shield on the part of
unscrupulous transferees of the vehicle to take refuge in, inorder to free itself from liability arising
from its own negligent act.20
Hence, considering that the negligence of driver Gimena was sufficiently proven by the records of
the case, and that no evidence of whatever nature was presented by petitioner to support its defense
of due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees, petitioner, as the employer of
Gimena, may be held liable for damages arising from the death of respondent Yus wife.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution,
dated September 9, 2005 and August 8, 2006, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 84175 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION, G.R. No. 174161, February 18, 2015, R TRANSPORT CORPORATION,
PETITIONER, VS. LUISITO G. YU, RESPONDENT.
PERALTA, J.:

SUBJECT: REMEDIAL LAW

A Complaint Directly Assailing the Validity Of The Written

Instrument Itself Should Not be Bound By The Exclusive
Venue Stipulation Contained Therein And Should Be Filed In
Accordance With The General Rules On Venue
by The Lawyer's Post March 28, 2015 Comments Off on A Complaint Directly Assailing the Validity Of The Written Instrument Itself
Should Not be Bound By The Exclusive Venue Stipulation Contained Therein And Should Be Filed In Accordance With The General
Rules On Venue

The Facts:
Virgilio filed a complaint for Nullity of Mortgage Contract, Promissory Note, Loan Agreement, Foreclosure of
Mortgage, and Cancellation of TCT No. 290846 against Cash Asia Credit Corporation (Cash Asia) before the RTC of
Manila. According to him, he was informed by his sister that his property covered by TCT No. 160689 had been
foreclosed and a corresponding writ of possession issued in favour of Cash Asia because he supposedly executed a
promissory note, loan agreement, and deed of real estate mortgage with Cash Asia on December 6, 2007; the loan was
left unpaid and the real estate mortgage foreclosed. The signatures on the documents were forged as he was in the
Philippines only from December 28, 2007 to January 3, 2008 for a family vacation. Nobody informed him of any loan
he had with Cash Asia during his brief stay in the Philippines. Cash Asia filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of
improper venue, pointing out that the venue stipulation in the contracts stated that all legal actions arising out of this
notice in connection with the Real Estate Mortgage subject hereof shall only be brought in or submitted to the
jurisdiction of the proper court of Makati City. Since the case was filed in Manila, venue was improperly laid.
Replying, Virgilio assured that he should not be bound by the venue stipulations since he was never a party to the
contracts and his signatures were forged. The RTC denied Cash Asias motion to dismiss, asseverating that the parties
must be afforded the right to be heard in view of the allegations of Virgilio in his complaint. On petition for certiorari by
Cash Asia before the Court of Appeals, however, the CA granted it, ruling that the contracts clearly stipulated that all
actions should be filed exclusively with the courts of Makati City, hence, the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion.
Dissatisfied, Virgilio filed the petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.
The Courts ruling:
The petition is meritorious.
At the outset, the Court stresses that [t]o justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, [the petitioner]
must satisfactorily show that the court or quasi-judicial authority gravely abused the discretion conferred upon it. Grave
abuse of discretion connotes judgment exercised in a capricious and whimsical manner that is tantamount to lack of
jurisdiction. To be considered grave, discretion must be exercised in a despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law[1].

Guided by the foregoing considerations, the Court finds that the CA gravely abused its discretion in ordering the
outright dismissal of Brioness complaint against Cash Asia, without prejudice to its re-filing before the proper court in
Makati City.
Rule 4 of the Rules of Court governs the rules on venue of civil actions, to wit:
Rule 4
VENUE OF ACTIONS
SECTION 1. Venue of real actions. Actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest therein, shall
be commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a
portion thereof, is situated.
Forcible entry and detainer actions shall be commenced and tried in the municipal trial court of the municipality or city
wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.
SEC. 2. Venue of personal actions. All other actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the
principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a nonresident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.
SEC. 3. Venue of actions against nonresidents. If any of the defendants does not reside and is not found in the
Philippines, and the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff, or any property of said defendant located in the
Philippines, the action may be commenced and tried in the court of the place where the plaintiff resides, or where the
property or any portion thereof is situated or found.
SEC. 4. When Rule not applicable. This Rule shall not apply
(a) In those cases where a specific rule or law provides otherwise; or
(b) Where the parties have validly agreed in writing before the filing of the action on the exclusive venue thereof.
Based therefrom, the general rule is that the venue of real actions is the court which has jurisdiction over the area
wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated; while the venue of personal actions is the court
which has jurisdiction where the plaintiff or the defendant resides, at the election of the plaintiff. As an exception,
jurisprudence in Legaspi v. Rep. of the Phils[2]. instructs that the parties, thru a written instrument, may either introduce
another venue where actions arising from such instrument may be filed, or restrict the filing of said actions in a certain
exclusive venue, viz.:
The parties, however, are not precluded from agreeing in writing on an exclusive venue, as qualified by Section 4 of the
same rule. Written stipulations as to venue may be restrictive in the sense that the suit may be filed only in the place
agreed upon, or merely permissive in that the parties may file their suit not only in the place agreed upon but also in the
places fixed by law. As in any other agreement, what is essential is the ascertainment of the intention of the parties
respecting the matter.

As regards restrictive stipulations on venue, jurisprudence instructs that it must be shown that such stipulation is
exclusive. In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, such as exclusively, waiving for this purpose any other
venue, shall only preceding the designation of venue, to the exclusion of the other courts, or words of similar
import, the stipulation should be deemed as merely an agreement on an additional forum, not as limiting venue to the
specified place[3]. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In this relation, case law likewise provides that in cases where the complaint assails only the terms, conditions, and/or
coverage of a written instrument and not its validity, the exclusive venue stipulation contained therein shall still be
binding on the parties, and thus, the complaint may be properly dismissed on the ground of improper venue[4].
Conversely, therefore, a complaint directly assailing the validity of the written instrument itself should not be bound by
the exclusive venue stipulation contained therein and should be filed in accordance with the general rules on venue.To
be sure, it would be inherently consistent for a complaint of this nature to recognize the exclusive venue stipulation
when it, in fact, precisely assails the validity of the instrument in which such stipulation is contained.
In this case, the venue stipulation found in the subject contracts is indeed restrictive in nature, considering that it
effectively limits the venue of the actions arising therefrom to the courts of Makati City. However, it must be
emphasized that Brioness complaint directly assails the validity of the subject contracts, claiming forgery in their
execution. Given this circumstance, Briones cannot be expected to comply with the aforesaid venue stipulation, as his
compliance therewith would mean an implicit recognition of their validity. Hence, pursuant to the general rules on
venue, Briones properly filed his complaint before a court in the City of Manila where the subject property is located.
In conclusion, the CA patently erred and hence committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Brioness complaint
on the ground of improper venue.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated March 5, 2012 and the Resolution dated
October 4, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 117474 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The
Orders dated September 20, 2010 and October 22, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 173 in Civil Case
No. 10-124040 are REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION, G.R. No. 204444, January 14, 2015, VIRGILIO C. BRIONES, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF
APPEALS AND CASH ASIA CREDIT CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS.

SUBJECT: REMEDIAL LAW

Preliminary Investigation: Due Process In Petition For

Review
by The Lawyer's Post November 6, 2014 Comments Off on Preliminary Investigation: Due Process In Petition For Review

Teodulo was charged before the Provincial Prosecutor of Camarines Norte for alleged Rape on three occasions by AAA,
a minor. After the requisite preliminary investigation where Teodulo was charged with rape, but filed a motion for
reconsideration thereof, the provincial prosecutor charged Teodulo with acts of lasciviousness instead of rape. The
corresponding Information was filed before the Regional Trial Court presided by Judge Leo. Unknown to Teodulo,
BBB, the mother of AAA sent a letter to the Secretary of Justice narrating what happened to AAA, who allegedly
suffers from an intellectual disability. Thus, the Secretary of Justice ordered the Provincial Prosecutor to forward the
entire records of the case and to defer the filing of the Information against Teodulo.
Thus, the assistant provincial prosecutor, on a mistaken belief that Teodulo filed a petition for review with the DOJ,
requested the withdrawal of the information against Teodulo. While the judge found probable cause with the
Information filed, he took into consideration Prosecutor Estrellados letter and suspended the proceedings. He also
ordered Estrellado to submit a copy of Teodulos petition for review. When Prosecutor Estrellado realised his mistake,
he filed a Manifestation before the RTC that Teodulo did not in fact file a Petition for Review but was merely informed
by BBB that they sought the assistance of the DOJ Secretary by way of the letter.
Alarmed at this development, Teodulo moved to lift the suspension of proceedings and his arraignment on the charge
for acts of lasciviousness set, invoking his right to speedy trial. The RTC granted the motion. Prosecutor Estrellado,
confused, withdrew his appearance before the case, in view of the directive by the DOJ. The RTC denied this order,
citing that withdrawal of appearance is not a proper remedy. The prosecutor then filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings
which the RTC also denied and set the case for pre-trial.
Meantime, at the Department of Justice, the review process ended in the DOJ reversing the earlier finding of acts of
lasciviousness and directing the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor to file a case for rape against Teodulo. Teodulo thus
filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the review of the resolution by the Secretary of Justice did not go through the appeals
process mandated by the DOJ, thus it should not have been treated as a petition for review. The review therefore was
made with grave abuse of discretion.
The Secretary of Justice elevated the case to the Supreme Court, invoking its power of review over the orders and
resolutions of the provincial and city prosecutors. Further, Teodulo was charged with notice of the letter of BBB which
they treated as a petition for review.
The Supreme Court:

The conduct of preliminary investigation is subject to the requirements of both substantive and procedural due process.
Preliminary investigation is considered as a judicial proceeding wherein the prosecutor or investigating officer, by the
nature of his functions, acts as a quasi-judicial officer. Even at the stage of petition for review before the Secretary of
Justice, the requirements for substantive and procedural due process do not abate.
xxx
What Alaon eventually learned is that the records of I.S. No. 2002-10728 were with the Secretary of Justice for his
review. Alaon cannot be charged with notice that the Secretary of Justice had treated the letter of BBB as a petition for
review. Notice in this case, as a function of an opportunity to be heard, a component of procedural due process, was not
met. Once the Secretary of Justice decided to treat the letter of BBB as an appeal, he should have required Alaon to
comment thereon. Even if the letter did not comply with the requirements for an appeal under the 2000 National
Prosecution Service Rules on Appeal, indeed, precisely for such reason, the Secretary of Justice was duty-bound, as the
one hearing the case, to afford Alaon, respondent therein, an opportunity to be heard to satisfy procedural due process.
On this score, the DOJ abused its discretion when it rode roughshod over Alaons rights as it accommodated private
complainant.
With our holding that the Secretary of Justice acted in excess of jurisdiction when he failed to afford Alaon an
opportunity to be heard on private complainants letter which he deemed as a petition for review, we affirm the appellate
courts issuance of the special writ of certiorari, annulling the 18 March 2008 Resolution of the DOJ.
SECOND DIVISION, G.R. No. 189596, April 23, 2014, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, PETITIONER, VS.
TEODULO NANO ALAON, RESPONDENT.

SUBJECT: CIVIL LAW

Marriage For Immigration Purposes: Marriage For Any

Purpose, As Long As It Complies With All Legal Requisites
Are Equally Valid
by The Lawyer's Post December 29, 2014 Comments Off on Marriage For Immigration Purposes: Marriage For Any Purpose, As
Long As It Complies With All Legal Requisites Are Equally Valid

Daniel Lee Fringer and Liberty Albios married each other on October 22, 2004. On December 6,
2006, Liberty filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. According to her, after their
marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and wife, because they never really had
an intention to marry; she merely paid Fringer US2,000.00 for him to marry her so she can
acquire American citizenship and migrate to the United States. After the marriage, however,
Fringer left for the United States and never communicated with her again, so she did not pay
the promised money because he did not process her American citizenship. Because the
marriage lacked an essential requisite, that is consent of the parties, then the marriage is void
from the very beginning. After trial, the RTC ruled the marriage as void, citing the grounds
stated by Liberty in her petition, the RTC declared that when a marriage was entered into for a
purpose other than establishment of conjugal and family life, such marriage was a farce and
void from the very beginning. On motion for reconsideration by the Office of the Solicitor
General, the RTC denied it, explaining that the marriage was declared void because the parties
failed to freely give their consent to the marriage, the parties having no intention to be legally
bound by it, and merely used it as a means to acquire American citizenship in consideration of
the amount of US$2,000.00. The OSG appealed the ruling to the Court of Appeals, which also
denied it, ruling that the marriage was only in jest, as the parties never really intended to
establish family life. The OSG therefore elevated the case to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court:
Marriage Fraud in Immigration
The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant benefits. This has led to the development
of marriage fraud for the sole purpose of availing of particular benefits. In the United States,
marriages where a couple marries only to achieve a particular purpose or acquire specific
benefits, have been referred to as limited purpose marriages. A common limited purpose
marriage is one entered into solely for the legitimization of a child.Another, which is the subject
of the present case, is for immigration purposes. Immigration law is usually concerned with the
intention of the couple at the time of their marriage, and it attempts to filter out those who use
marriage solely to achieve immigration status.

In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, established the
principal test for determining the presence of marriage fraud in immigration cases. It ruled that
a marriage is a sham if the bride and groom did not intend to establish a life together at the
time they were married. This standard was modified with the passage of the Immigration
Marriage Fraud Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now requires the couple to instead
demonstrate that the marriage was not entered into for the purpose of evading the
immigration laws of the United States. The focus, thus, shifted from determining the intention
to establish a life together, to determining the intention of evading immigration laws. It must
be noted, however, that this standard is used purely for immigration purposes and, therefore,
does not purport to rule on the legal validity or existence of a marriage.
The question that then arises is whether a marriage declared as a sham or fraudulent for the
limited purpose of immigration is also legally void and inexistent. The early cases on limited
purpose marriages in the United States made no definitive ruling. In 1946, the notable case
of United States v. Rubenstein was promulgated, wherein in order to allow an alien to stay in
the country, the parties had agreed to marry but not to live together and to obtain a divorce
within six months. The Court, through Judge Learned Hand, ruled that a marriage to convert
temporary into permanent permission to stay in the country was not a marriage, there being no
consent, to wit:
x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never married at all. Mutual consent is necessary
to every contract; and no matter what forms or ceremonies the parties may go through
indicating the contrary, they do not contract if they do not in fact assent, which may always be
proved. x x x Marriage is no exception to this rule: a marriage in jest is not a marriage at all. x x
x It is quite true that a marriage without subsequent consummation will be valid; but if the
spouses agree to a marriage only for the sake of representing it as such to the outside world
and with the understanding that they will put an end to it as soon as it has served its purpose
to deceive, they have never really agreed to be married at all. They must assent to enter into
the relation as it is ordinarily understood, and it is not ordinarily understood as merely a
pretence, or cover, to deceive others.(Italics supplied)
On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines, which declared
as valid a marriage entered into solely for the husband to gain entry to the United States,
stating that a valid marriage could not be avoided merely because the marriage was entered
into for a limited purpose. The 1980 immigration case of Matter of McKee, further recognized
that a fraudulent or sham marriage was intrinsically different from a nonsubsisting one.
Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of consent has, therefore, been recognized
as problematic. The problem being that in order to obtain an immigration benefit, a legal
marriage is first necessary. At present, United States courts have generally denied annulments

involving limited purpose marriages where a couple married only to achieve a particular
purpose, and have upheld such marriages as valid.
The Court now turns to the case at hand.
Respondents marriage not void
In declaring the respondents marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a marriage was entered
into for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce
and should not be recognized from its inception. In its resolution denying the OSGs motion for
reconsideration, the RTC went on to explain that the marriage was declared void because the
parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally
bound by it and used it only as a means for the respondent to acquire American citizenship.
Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. It held
that the parties clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of getting married. As
in the Rubenstein case, the CA found the marriage to be similar to a marriage in jest
considering that the parties only entered into the marriage for the acquisition of American
citizenship in exchange of $2,000.00. They never intended to enter into a marriage contract
and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a family.
The CAs assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the parties supposed lack of consent.
Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the
same Code provides that the absence of any essential requisite shall render a marriage void ab
initio.
Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the
presence of a solemnizing officer. A freely given consent requires that the contracting parties
willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is
not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles 45 and 46 of
the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence. Consent must also be
conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of intelligently understanding the
nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act. Their
understanding should not be affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real
consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their
consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial
and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so.
That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring
American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and
deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid

marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There
was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them,
since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
In ruling that Albios marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA characterized such as akin to
a marriage by way of jest. A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered
into as a joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and with a
clear understanding that the parties would not be bound. The ceremony is not followed by any
conduct indicating a purpose to enter into such a relation. It is a pretended marriage not
intended to be real and with no intention to create any legal ties whatsoever, hence, the
absence of any genuine consent. Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective,
or unintelligent consent, but for a complete absence of consent. There is no genuine consent
because the parties have absolutely no intention of being bound in any way or for any purpose.
The respondents marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest. Albios and Fringer had
an undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the very bond necessary to allow the
respondent to acquire American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married would allow
them to further their objective, considering that only a valid marriage can properly support an
application for citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention to enter into the actual
marriage status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose. Genuine consent was,
therefore, clearly present.
The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to
establish a conjugal and family life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no
real intention to establish a life together is, however, insufficient to nullify a marriage freely
entered into in accordance with law. The same Article 1 provides that the nature,
consequences, and incidents of marriage are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. A
marriage may, thus, only be declared void or voidable under the grounds provided by law.
There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what
the Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so
long as all the essential and formal requisites precribed by law are present, and it is not void or
voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid.
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot
dictate on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle
would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional
questions. The right to marital privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in
almost any way they see fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to
love one another or not, and so on. Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or
otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they

comply with all the legal requisites, are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a
marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded
by law, may validly support a marriage.
Although the Court views with disdain the respondents attempt to utilize marriage for
dishonest purposes, It cannot declare the marriage void. Hence, though the respondents
marriage may be considered a sham or fraudulent for the purposes of immigration, it is not
void ab initio and continues to be valid and subsisting.
Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud under Article 45 (3) of
the Family Code. Only the circumstances listed under Article 46 of the same Code may
constitute fraud, namely, (1) non-disclosure of a previous conviction involving moral turpitude;
(2) concealment by the wife of a pregnancy by another man; (3) concealment of a sexually
transmitted disease; and (4) concealment of drug addiction, alcoholism, or homosexuality. No
other misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute fraud as a ground for an action to annul a
marriage. Entering into a: marriage for the sole purpose of evading immigration laws does not
qualify under any oft he listed circumstances. Furthermore, under Article 47 (3), the ground of
fraud may only be brought by the injured or innocent party. In the present case, there is no
injured party because Albios and Fringer both conspired to enter into the sham marriage.
Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage. Allowing her marriage
with Fringer to be declared void would only further trivialize this inviolable institution. The
Cout1 cannot declare such a marriage void in the event the parties fail to quality for
immigration benefits, after they have availed of its benefits, or simply have no further use for
it. These unscrupulous individuals cannot be allowed to use the courts as instruments in their
fraudulent schemes. Albios already misused a judicial institution to enter into a marriage of
convenience; she should not be allowed to again abuse it to get herself out of an inconvenient
situation.
No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. It must, therefore, be safeguarded
from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. This Court cannot leave the impression
that marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as
easily nullified when no longer needed.
THIRD DIVISION, G.R. No. 198780, October 16, 2013, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
PETITIONER, VS. LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, RESPONDENT.

SUBJECT: CIVIL LAW

Rescission Of Contract Proper When Fraud Attended

Consummation Of The Contract
by The Lawyer's Post November 18, 2014 Comments Off on Rescission Of Contract Proper When Fraud Attended Consummation Of
The Contract

Spouses Carmen and Jose agreed to sell their parcel of land to Danilo for P3,000,000. They then executed a
Memorandum of Agreement. Danilos lawyer meanwhile prepared a Deed of Absolute Sale where the stated
consideration was only P400,000.00. When Carmen noticed the amount indicated, she complained. Danilo told her not
to worry as he would be the one to pay taxes and she would receive the net amount of P3,000,000.00 Another
Memorandum of Agreement was executed between the parties to conform to with the consideration stated in the Deed
of Absolute Sale. Upon signing the Deed of Absolute Sale, Danilo paid the spouses P200,000.00 and issued a Philippine
National Bank check for the remaining balance which is P2,800,000.00. TCT No. 143020 was cancelled and a new TCT
No. T-186128 was issued in the name of Emergency Pawnshop Bula Inc. (EPBI). When presented for payment, the
check issued by Danilo was dishonoured for reason Drawn Against Insufficient Fund; despite repeated demands from
the spouses to either pay the full value of the check or to return the parcel of land, Danilo failed to heed the same, hence
the spouses filed a complaint for Annulment of Contract with Damages with a prayer for temporary restraining order or
writ of preliminary injunction to prevent Danilo from selling the property.
The RTC ruled in favour of the spouses ruled that the case fell within the ambit of Art. 1338 0f the Civil Code, where
fraud attended the execution of the contract justifying the annulment of the contract. On appeal to the Court of Appeals,
the appellate court ruled that indeed there was fraud, but the fraud does not justify the annulment of contract since it was
not the determining cause for the sale of the land. Instead, it ordered Danilo to pay the remaining balance of
P2,800,000.00.
The spouses therefore appealed the CA decision to the Supreme Court.
A contract is a meeting of the minds between two persons, whereby one is bound to give something or to render some
service to the other. A valid contract requires the concurrence of the following essential elements: (1) consent or meeting
of the minds, that is, consent to transfer ownership in exchange for the price; (2) determinate subject matter; and (3)
price certain in money or its equivalent.

xxx
Under Article 1338 of the Civil Code, there is fraud when, through insidious words or machinations of one of the
contracting parties, the other is induced to enter into a contract which, without them, he would not have agreed to. In
order that fraud may vitiate consent, it must be the causal (dolo causante), not merely the incidental (dolo incidente),
inducement to the making of the contract.[19] Additionally, the fraud must be serious.
We find no causal fraud in this case to justify the annulment of the contract of sale between the parties. It is clear from
the records that the Spouses Tongson agreed to sell their 364-square meter Davao property to Napala who offered to pay
P3,000,000 as purchase price therefor. Contrary to the Spouses Tongsons belief that the fraud employed by Napala was
already operational at the time of the perfection of the contract of sale, the misrepresentation by Napala that the
postdated PNB check would not bounce on its maturity hardly equates to dolo causante. Napalas assurance that the
check he issued was fully funded was not the principal inducement for the Spouses Tongson to sign the Deed of
Absolute Sale. Even before Napala issued the check, the parties had already consented and agreed to the sale
transaction. The Spouses Tongson were never tricked into selling their property to Napala. On the contrary, they
willingly accepted Napalas offer to purchase the property at P3,000,000. In short, there was a meeting of the minds as
to the object of the sale as well as the consideration therefor.
xxx
However, while no causal fraud attended the execution of the sales contract, there is fraud in its general sense, which
involves a false representation of a fact, when Napala inveigled the Spouses Tongson to accept the postdated PNB check
on the representation that the check would be sufficiently funded at its maturity. In other words, the fraud surfaced when
Napala issued the worthless check to the Spouses Tongson, which is definitely not during the negotiation and perfection
stages of the sale. Rather, the fraud existed in the consummation stage of the sale when the parties are in the process of
performing their respective obligations under the perfected contract of sale. In Swedish Match, AB v. Court of Appeals,
the Court explained the three stages of a contract, thus:
In general, contracts undergo three distinct stages, to wit: negotiation; perfection or birth; and consummation.
Negotiation begins from the time the prospective contracting parties manifest their interest in the contract and ends at
the moment of agreement of the parties. Perfection or birth of the contract takes place when the parties agree upon the
essential elements of the contract. Consummation occurs when the parties fulfill or perform the terms agreed upon in the
contract, culminating in the extinguishment thereof.
Indisputably, the Spouses Tongson as the sellers had already performed their obligation of executing the Deed of Sale,
which led to the cancellation of their title in favor of EPBI. Respondents as the buyers, on the other hand, failed to
perform their correlative obligation of paying the full amount of the contract price. While Napala paid P200,000 cash to
the Spouses Tongson as partial payment, Napala issued an insufficiently funded PNB check to pay the remaining
balance of P2.8 million. Despite repeated demands and the filing of the complaint, Napala failed to pay the P2.8 million
until the present. Clearly, respondents committed a substantial breach of their reciprocal obligation, entitling the
Spouses Tongson to the rescission of the sales contract. The law grants this relief to the aggrieved party, thus:

Article 1191 of the Civil Code provides:

Article 1191. The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should not
comply with what is incumbent upon him.
The injured party may choose between the fulfillment and the rescission of the obligation, with payment of damages in
either case. He may also seek rescission, even after he has chosen fulfillment, if the latter should become impossible.
Article 1385 of the Civil Code provides the effects of rescission, viz:
ART. 1385. Rescission creates the obligation to return the things which were the object of the contract, together with
their fruits, and the price with its interest; consequently, it can be carried out only when he who demands rescission can
return whatever he may be obliged to restore.
Neither shall rescission take place when the things which are the object of the contract are legally in the possession of
third persons who did not act in bad faith.
While they did not file an action for the rescission of the sales contract, the Spouses Tongson specifically prayed in their
complaint for the annulment of the sales contract, for the immediate execution of a deed of reconveyance, and for the
return of the subject property to them. The Spouses Tongson likewise prayed for such other reliefs which may be
deemed just and equitable in the premises. In view of such prayer, and considering respondents substantial breach of
their obligation under the sales contract, the rescission of the sales contract is but proper and justified. Accordingly,
respondents must reconvey the subject property to the Spouses Tongson, who in turn shall refund the initial payment of
P200,000 less the costs of suit.
Napalas claims that rescission is not proper and that he should be given more time to pay for the unpaid remaining
balance of P2,800,000 cannot be countenanced. Having acted fraudulently in performing his obligation, Napala is not
entitled to more time to pay the remaining balance of P2,800,000, and thereby erase the default or breach that he had
deliberately incurred. To do otherwise would be to sanction a deliberate and reiterated infringement of the contractual
obligations incurred by Napala, an attitude repugnant to the stability and obligatory force of contracts.
SECOND DIVISION, G.R. No. 167874, January 15, 2010, SPOUSES CARMEN S. TONGSON AND JOSE C.
TONGSON SUBSTITUTED BY HIS CHILDREN NAMELY: JOSE TONGSON, JR., RAUL TONGSON, TITA
TONGSON, GLORIA TONGSON ALMA TONGSON, PETITIONERS, VS. EMERGENCY PAWNSHOP BULA,
INC. AND DANILO R. NAPALA, RESPONDENTS.

SUBJECT: CIVIL LAW

The Principal Object Of A Notice Of Sale In A Foreclosure Of

Mortgage Is Not So Much To Notify The Mortgagor As To
Inform The Public Generally Of The Nature And Condition Of
The Property To Be Sold, And Of The Time, Place, And Terms
Of The Sale
by The Lawyer's Post May 24, 2015 0 Comments

The Facts:
The Spouses Jesus and Nanette (Crisologo) mortgaged their property covered by TCT No. T-181103 to secure their loan
from the PDCP Development Bank. For failure to pay completely their loans, the bank sent them a detailed breakdown
of their outstanding obligation, hence they wrote back to the bank proposing to pay their loan in full with a request that
the penalty and interest charges be waived. Nothing happened to the offers and counter-offers of both sides until such
time that the bank wrote them refusing their counter-offer and demanding payment of the loan now amounting to
P2,822,469.90 and ballooned to P3,041,287.00 by October, 1997. PDCP then filed a Petition for Extra-Judicial
Foreclosure of the Mortgage. Atty. Leo Caubang, as Notary Public, prepared the notice of sale, and announced the
foreclosure of the real state mortgage and sale of the mortgage property at public auction on July 15, 1998, caused the
posting of the notices in three public places, and publication of the notices in the Oriental Daily Examiner, a local
newspaper in Davao City. He then conducted the auction sale of the mortgaged property where the bank emerged as the
only bidder. The spouses Crisologo were surprised to leaner that their property had been sold to the bank thus they filed
a Complaint for Nullity of Extrajudicial Foreclosure and Auction Sale with Damages against PDCP Bank and Caubang.
After trial, the RTC ruled in their favour, declaring the foreclosure and sale of the property null and void, cancelling the
entry of foreclosure.
The spouses Crisologo appealed to the Court of Appeals, seeking modification of the RTC decision insofar as their
claims for moral and exemplary damages, attorney fees and costs of suit were concerned. The CA modified the
decision by holding Atty. Caubang liable for damages to the spouses. Hence, Atty. Caubang elevated the case to the
Supreme Court, assailing the CAs findings on the publication with the Oriental Daily Examiner as based on
assumptions and conjectures.

The Issue/s:
Whether or not Atty. Caubang should be held liable for damages in view of the defective/non-compliant publication, it
appearing that the newspaper, the Oriental Daily Publication was not a newspaper of general circulation.
The Courts ruling:
The petition lacks merit.
Under Section 3 of Act No. 3135:1
Section 3. Notice of sale; posting; when publication required. Notice shall be given by posting notices of the sale for
not less than twenty days in at least three public places of the municipality or city where the property is situated, and if
such property is worth more than four hundred pesos, such notices shall also be published once a week for at least three
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the municipality or city2
Caubang never made an effort to inquire as to whether the Oriental Daily Examiner was indeed a newspaper of general
circulation, as required by law. It was shown that the Oriental Daily Examineris not even on the list of newspapers
accredited to publish legal notices, as recorded in the Davao RTCs Office of the Clerk of Court. It also has no paying
subscribers and it would only publish whenever there are customers. Since there was no proper publication of the
notice of sale, the Spouses Crisologo, as well as the rest of the general public, were never informed that the mortgaged
property was about to be foreclosed and auctioned. As a result, PDCP Bank became the sole bidder. This allowed the
bank to bid for a very low price (P1,331,460.00) and go after the spouses for a bigger amount as deficiency.
The principal object of a notice of sale in a foreclosure of mortgage is not so much to notify the mortgagor as to inform
the public generally of the nature and condition of the property to be sold, and of the time, place, and terms of the sale.
Notices are given to secure bidders and prevent a sacrifice of the property. Therefore, statutory provisions governing
publication of notice of mortgage foreclosure sales must be strictly complied with and slight deviations therefrom will
invalidate the notice and render the sale, at the very least, voidable. Certainly, the statutory requirements of posting and
publication are mandated and imbued with public policy considerations. Failure to advertise a mortgage foreclosure
sale in compliance with the statutory requirements constitutes a jurisdictional defect, and any substantial error in a
notice of sale will render the notice insufficient and will consequently vitiate the sale.3
Since it was Caubang who caused the improper publication of the notices which, in turn, compelled the Spouses
Crisologo to litigate and incur expenses involving the declaration of nullity of the auction sale for the protection of their
interest on the property, the CA aptly held that Caubang shall be the one liable for the spouses claim for litigation
expenses and attorneys fees.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated May 22, 2006, and its Resolution
dated August 16, 2006, in CA-G.R. CV. No. 68365, are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION, G.R. No. 174581, February 04, 2015, ATTY. LEO N. CAUBANG, PETITIONER, VS. JESUS G.
CRISOLOGO AND NANETTE B. CRISOLOGO, RESPONDENTS.
PERALTA, J.:

SUBJECT: CRIMINAL LAW

The Research a.k.a Sexual Harassment

by The Lawyer's Post September 2, 2014 Comments Off on The Research a.k.a Sexual Harassment

Touching the body parts of an applicant for a job in the guise of research is sexual harassment
Juliet was a 22-year old fresh nursing graduate. In order to look for a job, her father accompanied her to his boyhood
friend, Rico, then City Health Officer. The latter entertained them and told them there was really no vacancy, but that
he will ask around if there is a jobs vacancy in any of the offices. The next day, Rico informed them that there is a
group of doctors from the U.S. who might put up a clinic where Juliet may apply and be considered. After several days,
Rico told Juliet that there is a vacancy in a family planning project for the city and he can interview her if she wish to
apply. Rico then asked a series of questions, all intimate, such as whether or not she already have a boyfriend, if she is a
virgin, and if she will tell her family or friend if a male friend intimately touched her. Rico offered her the job and told
her she will be subject to a research program, and told her to be back in the afternoon.
Juliet was hesitant to go back, but she did so after lunch, where Rico called several hospitals to inquire about any
opening. Finding none, he offered her the family planning job. He then invited her to a bowling session.
The research turned out to be Ricos downfall. First he asked her if she had taken a bath. She said no. Does she have
any varicose veins? She again said no, but Rico insisted on checking it, so he asked her to raise her foot and lower her
pants so he can check it. All part of the research anyway. Rico still pushed her pants down to her knees and held her
thigh. He put his hands inside her panty until he reached her pubic hair. Surprised, Juliet exclaimed hala ka! and
instinctively pulled her pants up. Rico then touched her abdomen with his right hand saying words of endearment and
letting the back of his palm touch her forehead. He told her to raise her shirt to check whether she had nodes or lumps.
She hesitated for a while but, eventually, raised it up to her navel. Rico then fondled her breast. Shocked at what
petitioner did, she lowered her shirt and embraced her bag to cover herself, telling him angrily that she was through with

the research. He begged her not to tell anybody about what had just happened. Before she alighted from the car, Rico
urged her to reconsider her decision to quit. He then handed over to her P300.00 for her expenses.
After the incident, Juliet filed a case for Sexual Harassment against Rico. Rico denied the accusations, citing alibi as
defense.
Is Rico guilty of Sexual Harassment?
Yes.
The above contentions of petitioner are not meritorious. Section 3 of Republic Act 7877 provides:
SEC. 3. Work, Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment Defined. Work, education or training-related sexual
harassment is committed by an employer, employee, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, instructor,
professor, coach, trainor, or any other person who, having authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another in a
work or training or education environment, demands, requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from the other,
regardless of whether the demand, request or requirement for submission is accepted by the object of said Act.
(a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment is committed when:
(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment, re-employment or continued
employment of said individual, or in granting said individual favorable compensation, terms, conditions, promotions, or
privileges; or the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in limiting, segregating or classifying the employee which in
any way would discriminate, deprive or diminish employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said
employee.
Petitioner was the City Health Officer of Cagayan de Oro City, a position he held when complainant, a newly graduated
nurse, saw him to enlist his help in her desire to gain employment. He did try to show an interest in her plight, her father
being a boyhood friend, but finding no opening suitable for her in his office, he asked her about accepting a job in a
family planning research project. It all started from there; the Sandiganbayan recited the rest of the story:
x x x. Succeeding in convincing the complainant that her physical examination would be a part of a research, accused
asked complainant if she would agree that her private parts (bolts) would be seen. Accused assured her that with her
cooperation in the research, she would gain knowledge from it. As complainant looked upon the accused with utmost
reverence, respect, and paternal guidance, she agreed to undergo the physical examination. At this juncture, accused
abruptly stopped the interview and told the complainant to go home and be back at 2:00 oclock in the afternoon of the
same day, December 1, 1995. Complainant returned at 2:00 oclock in the afternoon, but did not proceed immediately to
the office of the accused, as she dropped by a nearby church to ask divine guidance, as she was confused and at a loss
on how to resolve her present predicament. At 3:00 oclock in the afternoon, she went back to the office of the accused.
And once inside, accused called up a certain Madonna, inquiring if there was a vacancy, but he was told that she would
only accept a registered nurse. Complainant was about to leave the office of the accused when the latter prevailed upon
her to stay because he would call one more hospital. In her presence, a call was made. But again accused told her that
there was no vacancy. As all efforts to look for a job in other hospitals failed, accused renewed the offer to the

complainant to be a part of the research in the Family Planning Program where there would be physical examination.
Thereafter, accused motioned his two (2) secretaries to go out of the room. Upon moving closer to the complainant,
accused asked her if she would agree to the offer. Complainant told him she would not agree because the research
included hugging. He then assured her that he was just kidding and that a pre-schooler and high schooler have already
been subjected to such examination. With assurance given, complainant changed her mind and agreed to the research,
for she is now convinced that she would be of help to the research and would gain knowledge from it. At this point,
accused asked her if she was a tomboy, she answered in the negative. He then instructed her to go with him but he
would first play bowling, and later proceed with the research (physical examination). On the understanding of the
complainant that they will proceed to the clinic where the research will be conducted, she agreed to go with the accused.
But accused instructed her to proceed to Borja St. where she will just wait for him, as it was not good for people to see
them riding in a car together. She walked from the office of the accused and proceeded to Borja St. as instructed. And
after a while, a white car arrived. The door was opened to her and she was instructed by the accused to come inside.
Inside the car, he called her attention why she was in a pensive mood. She retorted she was not. As they were seated side
by side, the accused held her pulse and told her not to be scared. He informed her that he would go home for a while to
put on his bowling attire. After a short while, he came back inside the car and asked her if she has taken a bath. She
explained that she was not able to do so because she left the house hurriedly. Still while inside the car, accused directed
her to raise her foot so he could see whether she has varicose veins on her legs. Thinking that it was part of the research,
she did as instructed. He told her to raise it higher, but she protested. He then instructed her to lower her pants instead.
She did lower her pants, exposing half of her legs. But then the accused pushed it forward down to her knees and
grabbed her legs. He told her to raise her shirt. Feeling as if she had lost control of the situation, she raised her shirt as
instructed. Shocked, she exclaimed, hala ka! because he tried to insert his hand into her panty. Accused then held her
abdomen, saying, you are like my daughter, Day! (Visayan word of endearment), and let the back of his palm touch
her forehead, indicating the traditional way of making the young respect their elders. He again told her to raise her shirt.
Feeling embarrassed and uncomfortable, yet unsure whether she was entertaining malice, she raised her shirt up to her
breast. He then fondled her breast. Reacting, she impulsively lower her shirt and embraced her bar while silently asking
God what was happening to her and asking the courage to resist accuseds physical advances. After a short while, she
asked him if there could be a right place for physical examination where there would be many doctors. He just
exclaimed, so you like that there are many doctors! Then he asked her if she has tooth decay. Thinking that he was
planning to kiss her, she answered that she has lots of decayed teeth. He advised her then to have them treated. Finally,
she informed him that she would not continue with the research. The accused retorted that complainant was entertaining
malice and reminded her of what she earlier agreed; that she would not tell anybody about what happened. He then
promised to give her P15,000.00 so that she could take the examination. She was about to open the door of the car when
he suddenly grabbed her thigh, but this time, complainant instantly parried his hand with her bag.
G.R. No. 140604 March 6, 2002, DR. RICO S. JACUTIN, petitioner, vs .PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

SUBJECT: CRIMINAL LAW

Solemnizing A Marriage Without Required Marriage License

Is Illegal
by The Lawyer's Post December 26, 2014 Comments Off on Solemnizing A Marriage Without Required Marriage License Is Illegal

Joey and Claire were supposed to be married by Fr. Mario Ragaza of the Roman Catholic Church. The latter, however,
discovered that the couple were not issued a marriage license, and refused to solemnise their marriage. The couple thus
proceeded to the Aglipayan Church nearby, together with the wedding sponsors and guests, and requested Rene, an
Aglipayan priest to perform the ceremony. He agreed despite being told by the couple that they had no marriage license.
The choir prepared, Rene scheduled a mass for the couple on the same date and conducted the ceremony in the presence
of the groom, the bride, their parents, the principal and secondary sponsors, as well as the invited guests. After the
wedding, Rene was charged with violating Article 352 of the Revised Penal Code for allegedly performing an illegal
marriage ceremony. During the trial, witnesses Joseph, veil sponsor and Mary Anne, cord sponsor, testified as to the fact
of marriage. Florida, mother of Joey, secured a certification from the local civil registrar that no marriage license was
issued to Joey and Claire. The MTC after trial, convicted Rene as charged, applying Section 44 of the Marriage Law
(Act No. 3613) in the imposition of the proper penalty. His appeal to the RTC and the CA denied, Rene went all the way
to the Supreme Court to contest his conviction for the crime. According to him, the ceremony was not the solemnisation
of marriage required by law. He argues that the husband and wife did not personally declare each other as husband and
wife, as required by the Family Code; the separation of church and state precludes the State from converting a
ceremony into a marriage; he conducted the blessing in good faith hence he had no criminal intent and the nonfiling of a case for violation of Article 350 against Joey and Claire precludes filing of a case against him.
The Supreme Court:
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer who shall perform or authorize any
illegal marriage ceremony. The elements of this crime are as follows: (1) authority of the solemnizing officer; and (2)
his performance of an illegal marriage ceremony.
In the present case, the petitioner admitted that he has authority to solemnize a marriage. Hence, the only issue to be
resolved is whether the alleged blessing by the petitioner is tantamount to the performance of an illegal marriage
ceremony which is punishable under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended.

While Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not specifically define a marriage ceremony and what constitutes its
illegal performance, Articles 3(3) and 6 of the Family Code are clear on these matters. These provisions were taken
from Article 55 of the New Civil Code which, in turn, was copied from Section 3 of the Marriage Law with no
substantial amendments.
Article 6 of the Family Code provides that [n]o prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage
is required. It shall be necessary, however, for the contracting parties to appear personally before the solemnizing officer
and declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife.
Pertinently, Article 3(3) mirrors Article 6 of the Family Code and particularly defines a marriage ceremony as that
which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal
declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
Even prior to the date of the enactment of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, the rule was clear that no prescribed
form of religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required. However, as correctly found by the CA, the law
sets the minimum requirements constituting a marriage ceremony: first, there should be the personal appearance of the
contracting parties before a solemnizing officer; and second, their declaration in the presence of not less than two
witnesses that they take each other as husband and wife.
As to the first requirement, the petitioner admitted that the parties appeared before him and this fact was testified to by
witnesses. On the second requirement, we find that, contrary to the petitioners allegation, the prosecution has proven,
through the testimony of Florida, that the contracting parties personally declared that they take each other as husband
and wife.
The petitioners allegation that the court asked insinuating and leading questions to Florida fails to persuade us. A judge
may examine or cross-examine a witness. He may propound clarificatory questions to test the credibility of the witness
and to extract the truth. He may seek to draw out relevant and material testimony though that testimony may tend to
support or rebut the position taken by one or the other party. It cannot be taken against him if the clarificatory questions
he propounds happen to reveal certain truths that tend to destroy the theory of one party.
At any rate, if the defense found the line of questioning of the judge objectionable, its failure to timely register this bars
it from belatedly invoking any irregularity.
In addition, the testimonies of Joseph and Mary Anne, and even the petitioners admission regarding the circumstances
of the ceremony, support Floridas testimony that there had indeed been the declaration by the couple that they take each
other as husband and wife. The testimony of Joey disowning their declaration as husband and wife cannot overcome
these clear and convincing pieces of evidence. Notably, the defense failed to show that the prosecution witnesses,
Joseph and Mary Anne, had any ill-motive to testify against the petitioner.
We also do not agree with the petitioner that the principle of separation of church and State precludes the State from
qualifying the church blessing into a marriage ceremony. Contrary to the petitioners allegation, this principle has
been duly preserved by Article 6 of the Family Code when it provides that no prescribed form or religious rite for the
solemnization of marriage is required. This pronouncement gives any religion or sect the freedom or latitude in
conducting its respective marital rites, subject only to the requirement that the core requirements of law be observed.
We emphasize at this point that Article 15 of the Constitution recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution and
that our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the State
is vitally interested. The State has paramount interest in the enforcement of its constitutional policies and the
preservation of the sanctity of marriage. To this end, it is within its power to enact laws and regulations, such as Article
352 of the RPC, as amended, which penalize the commission of acts resulting in the disintegration and mockery of
marriage.
From these perspectives, we find it clear that what the petitioner conducted was a marriage ceremony, as the minimum
requirements set by law were complied with. While the petitioner may view this merely as a blessing, the presence of

the requirements of the law constitutive of a marriage ceremony qualified this blessing into a marriage ceremony as
contemplated by Article 3(3) of the Family Code and Article 352 of the RPC, as amended.
We come now to the issue of whether the solemnization by the petitioner of this marriage ceremony was illegal.
Under Article 3(3) of the Family Code, one of the essential requisites of marriage is the presence of a valid marriage
certificate. In the present case, the petitioner admitted that he knew that the couple had no marriage license, yet he
conducted the blessing of their relationship.
Undoubtedly, the petitioner conducted the marriage ceremony despite knowledge that the essential and formal
requirements of marriage set by law were lacking. The marriage ceremony, therefore, was illegal. The petitioners
knowledge of the absence of these requirements negates his defense of good faith.
We also do not agree with the petitioner that the lack of a marriage certificate negates his criminal liability in the present
case. For purposes of determining if a marriage ceremony has been conducted, a marriage certificate is not included in
the requirements provided by Article 3(3) of the Family Code, as discussed above.
Neither does the non-filing of a criminal complaint against the couple negate criminal liability of the petitioner. Article
352 of the RPC, as amended, does not make this an element of the crime.
SECOND DIVISION, G.R. No. 182438, July 02, 2014, RENE RONULO, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

SUBJECT: CRIMINAL LAW

A Review Of The Provisions Of Republic Ac 9344 Reveals

That Imprisonment Of Children In Conflict With The Law Is
By No Means Prohibited
by The Lawyer's Post March 12, 2015 Comments Off on A Review Of The Provisions Of Republic Ac 9344 Reveals That
Imprisonment Of Children In Conflict With The Law Is By No Means Prohibited

Rosal, the accused, was only 17 year, 4 months and 2 days old when he killed Jayson with a knife, thus Rosal was
charged with Homicide. Finding merits in the prosecutions case, the Regional Trial Court convicted him of Homicide
and imposed the penalty of indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of four years and one day of prision correcional as
minimum, to eight years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum. When he appealed to the Court of Appeals, his
sentence was modified in that he was sentenced to six months and one day of prision correctional as minimum, to six
years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum. On motion for reconsideration, however, the Court of Appeals
partially granted Rosals appeal and imposed on him the penalty of six months and one day of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum. It remanded the case to the RTC to determine
whether or not Rosal is entitled to probation. Not satisfied with the ruling, Rosal appealed to the Supreme Court.
According to him, the CA should have suspended his sentence in accordance with Republic Act 9344; that he is entitled
to probation or suspension of sentence, and the CA did not impose the correct penalty.
The Supreme Court:
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporal for homicide. Considering that the
petitioner was then a minor at the time of the commission of the crime, being 17 years, four months and 28 days old
when he committed the homicide on March 30, 20. Per his birth certificate, Rosals date of birth was November 2, 1982
[1] such minority was a privileged mitigating circumstance that lowered the penalty to prision mayor[2].
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence should be within the penalty next
lower than the imposable penalty, which, herein, was prision correccional (i.e., six months and one day to six years). For

the maximum of the indeterminate sentence, prision mayor in its medium period eight years and one day to 10 years
-was proper because there were no mitigating or aggravating circumstances present. Accordingly, the CA imposed the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six months and one day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years
and one day of prision mayor, as maximum.
The petitioner insists, however, that the maximum of his indeterminate sentence of eight years and one day of prison
mayor should be reduced to only six years of prision correccional to enable him to apply for probation under
Presidential Decree No. 968.
The petitioners insistence is bereft of legal basis. Neither the Revised Penal Code, nor Republic Act No. 9344, nor any
other relevant law or rules support or justify the further reduction of the maximum of the indeterminate sentence. To
yield to his insistence would be to impose an illegal penalty, and would cause the Court to deliberately violate the law.
A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC[3] (Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law) provides certain guiding principles in the trial
and judging in cases involving a child in conflict with the law. One of them is that found in Section 46 (2), in
conjunction with Section 5 (k), whereby the restrictions on the personal liberty of the child shall be limited to the
minimum[4]. Consistent with this principle, the amended decision of the CA imposed the ultimate minimums of the
indeterminate penalty for homicide under the Indeterminate Sentence Law. On its part, Republic Act No. 9344 nowhere
allows the trial and appellate courts the discretion to reduce or lower the penalty further, even for the sake of enabling
the child in conflict with the law to qualify for probation.
Conformably with Section 9(a) of Presidential Decree 968[5], which disqualifies from probation an offender sentenced
to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years, the petitioner could not qualify for probation. For this
reason, we annul the directive of the CA to remand the case to the trial court to determine if he was qualified for
probation.
Although Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344 allows the suspension of the sentence of a child in conflict with the law
adjudged as guilty of a crime, the suspension is available only until the child offender turns 21 years of age, pursuant to
Section 40 of Republic Act No. 9344, to wit:
Section 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. -If the court finds that the objective of the disposition
measures imposed upon the child in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law
has wilfully failed to comply with the conditions of his/her disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict
with the law shall be brought before the court for execution of judgment.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended sentence, the court
shall determine whether to discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend
the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21)
years.
We note that the petitioner was well over 23 years of age at the time of his conviction for homicide by the RTC on July
19, 2006. Hence, the suspension of his sentence was no longer legally feasible or permissible.
Lastly, the petitioner posits that condemning him to prison would be in violation of his rights as a child in conflict with
the law as bestowed by Republic Act No. 9344 and international agreements.
A review of the provisions of Republic Act No. 9344 reveals, however, that imprisonment of children in conflict with
the law is by no means prohibited. While Section 5 (c) of Republic Act No. 9344 bestows on children in conflict with
the law the right not to be unlawfully or arbitrarily deprived of their liberty; imprisonment as a proper disposition of a
case is duly recognized, subject to certain restrictions on the imposition of imprisonment, namely: (a) the detention or
imprisonment is a disposition of last resort, and (b) the detention or imprisonment shall be for the shortest appropriate
period of time. Thereby, the trial and appellate courts did not violate the letter and spirit of Republic Act No. 9344 by
imposing the penalty of imprisonment on the petitioner simply because the penalty was imposed as a last recourse after

holding him to be disqualified from probation and from the suspension of his sentence, and the term of his
imprisonment was for the shortest duration permitted by the law.
A survey of relevant international agreements[6] supports the course of action taken herein. The United Nations
Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (Beijing Guidelines[7]), the United Nations
Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency (Riyadh Guidelines) and the United Nations Rules for the
Protection of Juveniles Deprived of Liberty[8][ are consistent in recognizing that imprisonment is a valid form of
disposition, provided it is imposed as a last resort and for the minimum necessary period.
Lastly, following Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344, the petitioner, although he has to serve his sentence, may serve
it in an agricultural camp or other training facilities to be established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the
Bureau of Corrections, in coordination with the Department of Social Welfare and Development, in a manner consistent
with the offender childs best interest. Such service of sentence will be in lieu of service in the regular penal institution.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; AFFIRMS the amended decision promulgated
on December 7, 2006 in C.A.- G.R. CR No. 29295, but DELETING the order to remand the judgment to the trial court
for implementation; and DIRECTS the Bureau of Corrections to commit the petitioner for the service of his sentence in
an agricultural camp or other training facilities under its control, supervision and management, in coordination with the
Department of Social Welfare and Development.
FIRST DIVISION, G.R. No. 176102, November 26, 2014, ROSAL HUBILLA Y CARILLO, PETITIONER, VS.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

SUBJECT: POLITICAL LAW

The Calling Out Of The Armed Forces To Prevent Or

Suppress Lawless Violence In Such Places Is A Power That
The Constitution Directly Vests In The President. She Did
Not Need A Congressional Authority To Exercise the Same
by The Lawyer's Post May 23, 2015 0 Comments

The Facts:
A day after the Maguindanao Masaccre, President Glora Arroyo issued Proclamation 1946, placing the provinces of
Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and the Cotabato City under a state of emergency and directing the AFP and the PNP to
undertake measures to prevent lawless violence in the places. On November 27, she also issued Administrative Order
273 (AO 273) transferring supervision of the ARMM from the Office of the President to the DILG Secretary. Later, she
issued AO 273-A amending AO 273 by delegating instead of transferring supervision over the ARMM to the DILG
Secretary. Alleging that the Presidents issuances violated and encroached on the ARMMs autonomy, the petitioners
herein, all ARMM officials, filed a petition for prohibition under Rule 65. They aver that the issaucnes allowed the
DILG secretary to take over ARMMs operations and violate the principles of local autonomy under RA 9054 since it
gave the DILG secretary the power to exercise, not merely supervise, but control over the ARMM, including the power
to suspend its officials. They also argue that there was no factual basis for the declaration of the state of emergency, and
the deployment of troops constitute an invalid exercise of her emergency powers. In its comment, the respondent,
through the OSG, in sited that the president issued the proclamation not to deprive ARMM of tis local autonomy but to
restore order in the provinces. On the other hand, the delegation of the authority to the DILG secretary was done to
investigate the mass killings.
The Issue:

1. Whether or not Proclamation 1946 and AOs 273 and 273-A violate the principle of local autonomy under Section 16,
Article X of the Constitution, and Section 1, Article V of the Expanded ARMM Organic Act;
2. Whether or not President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers when she called out the AFP and the PNP to
prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City; and
3. Whether or not the President had factual bases for her actions.
The Courts ruling:
We dismiss the petition.
One. The claim of petitioners that the subject proclamation and administrative orders violate the principle of local
autonomy is anchored on the allegation that, through them, the President authorized the DILG Secretary to take over the
operations of the ARMM and assume direct governmental powers over the region.
But, in the first place, the DILG Secretary did not take over control of the powers of the ARMM. After law
enforcement agents took respondent Governor of ARMM into custody for alleged complicity in the Maguindanao
massacre, the ARMM Vice-Governor, petitioner Ansaruddin Adiong, assumed the vacated post on December 10, 2009
pursuant to the rule on succession found in Article VII, Section 12,1 of RA 9054. In turn, Acting Governor Adiong
named the then Speaker of the ARMM Regional Assembly, petitioner Sahali-Generale, Acting ARMM Vice-Governor.2
In short, the DILG Secretary did not take over the administration or operations of the ARMM.
Two. Petitioners contend that the President unlawfully exercised emergency powers when she ordered the deployment
of AFP and PNP personnel in the places mentioned in the proclamation.3 But such deployment is not by itself an
exercise of emergency powers as understood under Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, which provides:
SECTION 23. x x x (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President,
for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry
out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the
next adjournment thereof.
The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the three places mentioned. And she
did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers. The calling
out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the Constitution directly
vests in the President. She did not need a congressional authority to exercise the same.
Three. The Presidents call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence springs from the power vested
in her under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which provides4.
SECTION 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it
becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. x x
x
While it is true that the Court may inquire into the factual bases for the Presidents exercise of the above power, 5 it
would generally defer to her judgment on the matter. As the Court acknowledged in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v.
Hon. Zamora6, it is clearly to the President that the Constitution entrusts the determination of the need for calling out
the armed forces to prevent and suppress lawless violence. Unless it is shown that such determination was attended by
grave abuse of discretion, the Court will accord respect to the Presidents judgment. Thus, the Court said:
If the petitioner fails, by way of proof, to support the assertion that the President acted without factual basis, then this
Court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings. The factual necessity of calling out the
armed forces is not easily quantifiable and cannot be objectively established since matters considered for satisfying the
same is a combination of several factors which are not always accessible to the courts. Besides the absence of textual
standards that the court may use to judge necessity, information necessary to arrive at such judgment might also prove
unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent information might be difficult to verify, or wholly unavailable to the
courts. In many instances, the evidence upon which the President might decide that there is a need to call out the armed
forces may be of a nature not constituting technical proof.

On the other hand, the President, as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence network to gather information, some of
which may be classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of the power to call,
on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and
mass destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to call out the military to prevent or suppress lawless violence must
be done swiftly and decisively if it were to have any effect at all. x x x.7
Here, petitioners failed to show that the declaration of a state of emergency in the Provinces of Maguindanao, Sultan
Kudarat and Cotabato City, as well as the Presidents exercise of the calling out power had no factual basis. They
simply alleged that, since not all areas under the ARMM were placed under a state of emergency, it follows that the take
over of the entire ARMM by the DILG Secretary had no basis too.8
But, apart from the fact that there was no such take over to begin with, the OSG also clearly explained the factual bases
for the Presidents decision to call out the armed forces, as follows:
The Ampatuan and Mangudadatu clans are prominent families engaged in the political control of Maguindanao. It is
also a known fact that both families have an arsenal of armed followers who hold elective positions in various parts of
the ARMM and the rest of Mindanao.
Considering the fact that the principal victims of the brutal bloodshed are members of the Mangudadatu family and the
main perpetrators of the brutal killings are members and followers of the Ampatuan family, both the military and police
had to prepare for and prevent reported retaliatory actions from the Mangudadatu clan and additional offensive
measures from the Ampatuan clan.
xxxx
The Ampatuan forces are estimated to be approximately two thousand four hundred (2,400) persons, equipped with
about two thousand (2,000) firearms, about four hundred (400) of which have been accounted for. x x x
As for the Mangudadatus, they have an estimated one thousand eight hundred (1,800) personnel, with about two
hundred (200) firearms. x x x
Apart from their own personal forces, both clans have Special Civilian Auxiliary Army (SCAA) personnel who support
them: about five hundred (500) for the Ampatuans and three hundred (300) for the Mangudadatus.
What could be worse than the armed clash of two warring clans and their armed supporters, especially in light of
intelligence reports on the potential involvement of rebel armed groups (RAGs).
One RAG was reported to have planned an attack on the forces of Datu Andal Ampatuan, Sr. to show support and
sympathy for the victims. The said attack shall worsen the age-old territorial dispute between the said RAG and the
Ampatuan family.
xxxx
On the other hand, RAG faction which is based in Sultan Kudarat was reported to have received three million pesos
(P3,000,000.00) from Datu Andal Ampatuan, Sr. for the procurement of ammunition. The said faction is a force to
reckon with because the group is well capable of launching a series of violent activities to divert the attention of the
people and the authorities away from the multiple murder case. x x x
In addition, two other factions of a RAG are likely to support the Mangudadatu family. The Cotabato-based faction has
the strength of about five hundred (500) persons and three hundred seventy-two (372) firearms while the Sultan
Kudarat-based faction has the strength of about four hundred (400) persons and three hundred (300) firearms and was
reported to be moving towards Maguindanao to support the Mangudadatu clan in its armed fight against the
Ampatuans.9
In other words, the imminence of violence and anarchy at the time the President issued Proclamation 1946 was too
grave to ignore and she had to act to prevent further bloodshed and hostilities in the places mentioned. Progress reports
also indicated that there was movement in these places of both high-powered firearms and armed men sympathetic to
the two clans10. Thus, to pacify the peoples fears and stabilize the situation, the President had to take preventive

action. She called out the armed forces to control the proliferation of loose firearms and dismantle the armed groups
that continuously threatened the peace and security in the affected places.
Notably, the present administration of President Benigno Aquino III has not withdrawn the declaration of a state of
emergency under Proclamation 1946. It has been reported11 that the declaration would not be lifted soon because there
is still a need to disband private armies and confiscate loose firearms. Apparently, the presence of troops in those places
is still necessary to ease fear and tension among the citizenry and prevent and suppress any violence that may still erupt,
despite the passage of more than a year from the time of the Maguindanao massacre.
Since petitioners are not able to demonstrate that the proclamation of state of emergency in the subject places and the
calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence there have clearly no factual bases, the Court
must respect the Presidents actions.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC, G.R. No. 190259, June 07, 2011, DATU ZALDY UY AMPATUAN, ANSARUDDIN ADIONG, REGIE
SAHALI-GENERALE PETITIONERS, VS. HON. RONALDO PUNO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ALTER-EGO OF PRESIDENT GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, AND ANYONE ACTING IN HIS STEAD AND ON BEHALF OF THE PRESIDENT OF
THE PHILIPPINES, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP), OR ANY OF THEIR UNITS OPERATING IN
THE AUTONOMOUS REGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO (ARMM), AND PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, OR
ANY OF THEIR UNITS OPERATING IN ARMM, RESPONDENTS.
ABAD, J.:

SUBJECT: CRIMINAL LAW

RA 9262: It Is Immaterial Whether The Relationship Had

Ceased For As Long As There Is Sufficient Evidence Showing
The Past Or Present Existence Of Such Relationship
Between The Offender And The Victim When The Physical
Harm Was Committed
by The Lawyer's Post September 20, 2014 Comments Off on RA 9262: It Is Immaterial Whether The Relationship Had Ceased For
As Long As There Is Sufficient Evidence Showing The Past Or Present Existence Of Such Relationship Between The Offender And The
Victim When The Physical Harm Was Committed

Karlo was charged with violation of Republic Act 9262 because he allegedly used physical violence against ABC, her
former girlfriend. When the Information was filed against him by the Office of the City Prosecutor, and a warrant of
arrest issued against him, he filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause and to Quash Information.
According to him, he cannot be charged with violation of Republic Act 9262 because the incident subject of the case
happened after their break-up, which ABC admitted in her affidavit, hence there is no more dating relationship which
will make the case fall under Republic Act 9262, and the appropriate case should be slight physical injuries only
cognizable by the MTC. His motion was denied by the RTC, hence he filed a Rule 45 petition directly with the Supreme
Court on pure question of law.
Can Karlo be charged with violation of Republic Act 9262 even if the alleged incident took place after their break-up as
lovers?

The Court is not persuaded. Sec. 3(a) of RA 9262 reads:

SEC. 3. Definition of Terms.- As used in this Act, (a) Violence against women and their children refers to any act or a
series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom
the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether
legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual,
psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment
or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. x x x.
The law is broad in scope but specifies two limiting qualifications for any act or series of acts to be considered as a
crime of violence against women through physical harm, namely: 1) it is committed against a woman or her child and
the woman is the offenders wife, former wife, or with whom he has or had sexual or dating relationship or with whom
he has a common child; and 2) it results in or is likely to result in physical harm or suffering.
In Ang v. Court of Appeals, the Court enumerated the elements of the crime of violence against women through
harassment, to wit:
1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman;
2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts of harassment against the woman; and
3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to her.
Notably, while it is required that the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman, for
RA 9262 to be applicable, it is not indispensable that the act of violence be a consequence of such relationship.
Nowhere in the law can such limitation be inferred. Hence, applying the rule on statutory construction that when the law
does not distinguish, neither should the courts, then, clearly, the punishable acts refer to all acts of violence against
women with whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship. As correctly ruled by the RTC, it is
immaterial whether the relationship had ceased for as long as there is sufficient evidence showing the past or present
existence of such relationship between the offender and the victim when the physical harm was committed.
Consequently, the Court cannot depart from the parallelism in Ang and give credence to petitioners assertion that the
act of violence should be due to the sexual or dating relationship.
Neither can the Court construe the statute in favor of petitioner using the rule of lenity because there is no ambiguity in
RA 9262 that would necessitate any construction. While the degree of physical harm under RA 9262 and Article 266 of
the Revised Penal Code are the same, there is sufficient justification for prescribing a higher penalty for the former.
Clearly, the legislative intent is to purposely impose a more severe sanction on the offenders whose violent act/s
physically harm women with whom they have or had a sexual or dating relationship, and/or their children with the end
in view of promoting the protection of women and children.
The Court will not read into Republic Act (RA) No. 9262 a provision that would render it toothless in the pursuit of the
declared policy of the State to protect women and children from violence and threats to their personal safety and
security.

G.R. No. 193960, January 07, 2013, KARLO ANGELO DABALOS Y SAN DIEGO, VS. PETITIONER, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 59, ANGELES CITY (PAMPANGA), REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDING JUDGE MA.
ANGELICA T. PARAS QUIAMBAO; THE OFFICE OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR, ANGELES CITY
(PAMPANGA); AND ABC,RESPONDENTS.

SUBJECT: CRIMINAL LAW

According To Article 48 Of The Revised Penal Code, The

Penalty For A Complex Crime Is That Corresponding To The
Most Serious Crime, The Same To Be Applied In Its
Maximum Period. Otherwise, The Penalty Will Be Void And
Ineffectual, And Will Not Attain finality
by The Lawyer's Post May 23, 2015 0 Comments

The Facts:
Amparo (Matuguina) and Milagrosa (Cornejo) were depositors in the Malibay branch of the BPI Family Savings Bank,
where Marieta (De Castro) was employed as a bank teller. In separate occasions in October and November, 1993,
Amparo and Milagrosa left their respective passbooks with Marieta upon Marietas instruction. With respect to
Amparo, she had to return three times to get her passport, as Marieta told her she left her passbook at home, and
reported the incident to the branch manager, Cynthia Zialcita. The latter examined Amparos account and found three
withdrawal slips containing signatures different from Amparos, with a total withdrawal of P65,000.00. Cynthia then
instructed her assistant, Benjamin to visit Amparo and confirm the withdrawals, which was disavowed by Amparo. A

confrontation between Amparo and Marieta in the presence of the branch manager led to Marieta admitting the the
passbook was with her and kept in her house. The teller who posted and released the withdrawal, Janet, pointed to
Marieta as the person who gave her the withdrawal slip with Marietas initials on it attesting to her having verified the
signature of the depositor. On Milagrosa s account, she told the branch manager that she left her passbook with
Marieta, but when she retrieved it the latter averred that she left it at home. It appeared that Marieta also made an
unauthorised withdrawal of P2,000.00 from her account. Cynthia reported the matter to the bank authorities, and
Marieta wrote down her confession admitting the infractions. The bank paid Amparo the P65, 000.00 while Marieta
paid Milagrosa the P2,000.00. During trial, Milagrosa admitted signing the withdrawal slips, the confession letter, and
the answers to the banks questions during the administrative investigation.
After trial, the RTC convicted her as charged, imposing upon her the following penalties as follows:
(a)

In Criminal Case No. 94-5524, involving the withdrawal of P20,000.00 from the account of Matuguina, the

indeterminate sentence of two years, 11 months and 10 days of prison correccional, as minimum, to six years, eight
months and 20 days of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay BPI Family P20,000.00 and the costs of suit;
(b)

In Criminal Case No. 94-5525, involving the withdrawal of P2,000.00 from Cornejos account, the

indeterminate sentence of three months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one year and eight months of prision
correccional, as maximum, and to pay BPI Family P2,000.00 and the costs of suit;
(c)

In Criminal Case No. 94-5526, involving the withdrawal of P10,000.00 from the account of Matuguina, the

indeterminate sentence of four months and 20 days of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years, 11 months and 10 days
of prision correccional, as maximum, and to pay BPI Family P10,000.00 and the costs of suit; and
(d)

In Criminal Case No. 94-5527, involving the withdrawal of P35,000 from Matuguinas account, the

indeterminate sentence of two years, 11 months and 10 days of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years of
prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay BPI Family P35,000.00 and the costs of suit.
In her appeal to the CA and the Supreme Court, she argues that her conviction was null and void as she was never
assisted by counsel during the investigation and the evidence against her was obtained in violation of her right to selfincrimination, thus the fruit of a poisonous tree and inadmissible.
The Issue:
Whether or not Marietas right against self-incrimination was violated, rendering her conviction null and void.
The Courts ruling:
The appeal lacks merit.
We first note that the petitioner has accepted the findings of fact about the transactions that gave rise to the accusations
in court against her for four counts of estafa through falsification of a commercial document. She raised no challenges
against such findings of fact here and in the CA, being content with limiting herself to the supposed denial of her rights
to due process and to counsel, and to the inadmissibility of the evidence presented against her. In the CA, her main

objection focused on the denial of her right against self-incrimination and to counsel, which denial resulted, according
to her, in the invalidation of the evidence of her guilt.
Debunking the petitioners challenges, the CA stressed that the rights against self-incrimination and to counsel
guaranteed under the Constitution applied only during the custodial interrogation of a suspect. In her case, she was not
subjected to any investigation by the police or other law enforcement agents. Instead, she underwent an administrative
investigation as an employee of the BPI Family Savings Bank, the investigation being conducted by her superiors. She
was not coerced to give evidence against herself, or to admit to any crime, but she simply broke down bank when
depositors Matuguina and Cornejo confronted her about her crimes. We quote with approval the relevant portions of the
decision of the CA, viz:
The accused comes to Us on appeal to nullify her conviction on the ground that the evidence presented against her was
obtained in violation of her constitutional right against self-incrimination. She also contends that her rights to due
process and counsel were infringed. Without referring to its name, she enlists one of the most famous metaphors of
constitutional law to demonize and exclude what she believes were evidence obtained against her by illegal or
unconstitutional means evidence constituting the fruit of the poisonous tree. We hold, however, that in the particular
setting in which she was investigated, the revered constitutional rights of an accused to counsel and against selfincrimination are not apposite.
The reason is elementary. These cherished rights are peculiarly rights in the context of an official proceeding for the
investigation and prosecution for crime. The right against self-incrimination, when applied to a criminal trial, is
contained in this terse injunction no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. In other words, he may
not be required to take the witness stand. He can sit mute throughout the proceedings. His right to counsel is expressed
in the same laconic style: he shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel. This means inversely that the
criminal prosecution cannot proceed without having a counsel by his side. These are the traditional rights of the accused
in a criminal case. They exist and may be invoked when he faces a formal indictment and trial for a criminal offense.
But since Miranda vs Arizona 384 US 436, the law has come to recognize that an accused needs the same protections
even before he is brought to trial. They arise at the very inception of the criminal process when a person is taken into
custody to answer to a criminal offense. For what a person says or does during custodial investigation will eventually be
used as evidence against him at the trial and, more often than not, will be the lynchpin of his eventual conviction. His
trial becomes a parody if he cannot enjoy from the start the right against self-incrimination and to counsel. This is the
logic behind what we now call as the Miranda doctrine.
The US Supreme Court in Miranda spells out in precise words the occasion for the exercise of the new right and the
protections that it calls for. The occasion is when an individual is subjected to police interrogation while in custody at
the station or otherwise deprived of his freedom in a significant way. It is when custodial investigation is underway that
the certain procedural safeguards takes over the person must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right
to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of
an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning.

We must, therefore, be careful to note what the Miranda doctrine does not say. It was never intended to hamper the
traditional law-enforcement function to investigate crime involving persons not under restraint. The general questioning
of citizens in the fact-finding process, as the US Supreme Court recognizes, which is not preceded by any restraint on
the freedom of the person investigated, is not affected by the holding, since the compelling atmosphere inherent in incustody interrogation is not present.
The holding in Miranda is explicitly considered the source of a provision in our 1987 bill of rights thatany person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to
have competent and independent counsel, a provision identical in language and spirit to the earlier Section 20, Article
IV of the 1973 Constitution. People vs. Caguioa 95 SCRA 2. As we can see, they speak of the companion rights of a
person under investigation to remain silent and to counsel, to ensure which the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine had
also to be institutionalized by declaring that any confession or admission obtained in violation of these rights is
inadmissible. But to what extent must the rights to remain silent and to counsel be enforced in an investigation for the
commission of an offense? The answer has been settled by rulings of our Supreme Court in Caguoia and in the much
later case of Navallo vs Sandiganbayan 234 SCRA 175 incorporating in toto the Miranda doctrine into the above-cited
provisions of our bill of rights. Thus, the right to remain silent and to counsel can be invoked only in the context in
which the Mirandadoctrine applies when the official proceeding is conducted under the coercive atmosphere of a
custodial interrogation. There are no cases extending them to a non-coercive setting. In Navallo, the Supreme Court
said very clearly that the rights are invocable only when the accused is under custodial investigation. A person
undergoing a normal audit examination is not under custodial investigation and, hence, the audit examiner may not be
considered the law enforcement officer contemplated by the rule.
By a fair analogy, the accused in the case before us may not be said to be under custodial investigation. She was not
even being investigated by any police or law enforcement officer. She was under administrative investigation by her
superiors in a private firm and in purely voluntary manner. She was not restrained of her freedom in any manner. She
was free to stay or go. There was no evidence that she was forced or pressured to say anything. It was an act of
conscience that compelled her to speak, a true mental and moral catharsis that religion and psychology recognize to
have salutary effects on the soul. In this setting, the invocation of the right to remain silent or to counsel is simply
irrelevant.
The accused makes a final argument against her conviction by contending that she did not get effective legal
representation from her former counsel who was already old and feeble when the case was being heard. In fact, the
records show, her counsel died during the pendency of the case, an octogenarian at that. One can truly make a case from
ones lack of a competent and independent counsel, but we are not prepared to say that the accused was so poorly
represented that it affected her fundamental right to due process. Except for the several postponements incurred by her
counsel, there is really no showing that he committed any serious blunder during the trial. We have read the transcripts
of the trial and failed to get this impression. The evidence against the accused was simply too overwhelming. We may
take note that once, the trial court admonished the accused to replace her counsel due to his absences, but she did not.
She must live by that.1

Considering that the foregoing explanation by the CA was justly supported by the records, and that her investigation as
a bank employee by her employer did not come under the coverage of the Constitutionally-protected right against selfincrimination, right to counsel and right to due process, we find no reversible error committed by the CA in affirming
the conviction of the petitioner by the RTC.
The guilt of the petitioner for four counts of estafa through falsification of a commercial document was established
beyond reasonable doubt. As a bank teller, she took advantage of the bank depositors who had trusted in her enough to
leave their passbooks with her upon her instruction. Without their knowledge, however, she filled out withdrawal slips
that she signed, and misrepresented to her fellow bank employees that the signatures had been verified in due course.
Her misrepresentation to her co-employees enabled her to receive the amounts stated in the withdrawal slips. She
thereby committed two crimes, namely: estafa, by defrauding BPI Family Savings, her employer, in the various sums
withdrawn from the bank accounts of Matuguina and Cornejo; and falsification of a commercial document, by forging
the signatures of Matuguina and Cornejo in the withdrawal slips to make it appear that the depositor concerned had
signed the respective slips in order to enable her to withdraw the amounts. Such offenses were complex crimes, because
the estafa would not have been consummated without the falsification of the withdrawal slips.
Nonetheless, there is a need to clarify the penalties imposable.
According to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code2, the penalty for a complex crime is that corresponding to the most
serious crime, the same to be applied in its maximum period. Otherwise, the penalty will be void and ineffectual, and
will not attain finality.
In the four criminal cases involved in this appeal, the falsification of commercial documents is punished with prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods (i.e., two years, four months and one day to six years) and a fine of
P5,000.003. In contrast, the estafa is punished according to the value of the defraudation, as follows: with the penalty
of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period (i.e., four years, two months and
one day to eight years) if the amount of the fraud is over P12,000.00 but does not exceed P22,000.00, and if such
amount exceeds P22,000.00, the penalty is imposed in the maximum period, adding one year for each additional
P10,000.00, but the total shall not exceed 20 years, in which case the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion
temporal, as the case may be, in connection with the accessory penalties that may be imposed and for the purpose of the
other provisions of the Revised Penal Code; with the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods (i.e., six months and one day to four years and two months) if the amount of the fraud is over P6,000.00 but
does not exceed P12,000.00; with the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period (i.e., four months and one day to two years and four months) if the amount of the fraud is over P200.00
but does not exceed P6,000.00; and with the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods (i.e., two
months and one day to six months) if the amount of the fraud does not exceed P200.00.4
In Criminal Case No. 94-5524, estafa was the graver felony because the amount of the fraud was P20,000.00; hence,
the penalty for estafa is to be imposed in its maximum period. However, the RTC and the CA fixed the indeterminate
sentence of two years, 11 months and 10 days of prison correccional, as minimum, to six years, eight months and 20
days of prision mayor, as maximum. Such maximum of the indeterminate penalty was short by one day, the maximum

period of the penalty being six years, eight months and 21 days to eight years. Thus, the indeterminate sentence is
corrected to three years of prison correccional, as minimum, to six years, eight months and 21 days ofprision mayor, as
maximum.
In Criminal Case No. 94-5525, involving P2,000.00, the estafa is punished with four months and one day of arresto
mayor in its maximum period to two years and four months of prision correccionalin its minimum period. The
falsification of commercial document is penalized with prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods (i.e.,
two years, four months and one day to six years) and a fine of P5,000.00. The latter offense is the graver felony, and its
penalty is to be imposed in the maximum period, which is from four years, nine months and 11 days to six years plus
fine of P5,000.00. The penalty next lower in degree is arresto mayor in its maximum period toprision correccional in its
minimum period (i.e., four months and one day to two years and four months). Thus, the indeterminate sentence of three
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one year and eight months of prision correccional, as maximum that both the
RTC and the CA fixed was erroneous. We rectify the error by prescribing in lieu thereof the indeterminate sentence of
two years of prision correccional, as minimum, to four years, nine months and 11 days of prision correccional plus fine
of P5,000.00, as maximum.
In Criminal Case No. 94-5526, involving P10,000.00, the RTC and the CA imposed the indeterminate sentence of four
months and 20 days of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years, 11 months and 10 days of prision correccional, as
maximum. However, the penalty for the falsification of commercial documents is higher than that for the estafa. To
accord with Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for falsification of commercial documents (i.e., prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of P5,000.00) should be imposed in the maximum period.
Accordingly, we revise the indeterminate sentence so that its minimum is two years and four months of prision
correccional, and its maximum is five years of prision correccional plus fine of P5,000.00.
In Criminal Case No. 94-5527, where the amount of the fraud was P35,000.00, the penalty forestafa (i.e., prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, or four years, two months and one day to
eight years) is higher than that for falsification of commercial documents. The indeterminate sentence of two years, 11
months and 10 days of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years of prision mayor, as maximum, was prescribed.
Considering that the maximum period ranged from six years, eight months and 21 days to eight years, the CA should
have clarified whether or not the maximum of eight years of prision mayor already included the incremental penalty of
one year for every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00. Absent the clarification, we can presume that the incremental
penalty was not yet included. Thus, in order to make the penalty clear and specific, the indeterminate sentence is hereby
fixed at four years ofprision correccional, as minimum, to six years, eight months and 21 days of prision mayor, as
maximum, plus one year incremental penalty. In other words, the maximum of the indeterminate sentence is seven
years, eight months and 21 days of prision mayor.
The CA deleted the order for the restitution of the P2,000.00 involved in Criminal Case No. 94-5525 on the ground that
such amount had already been paid to the complainant, Milagrosa Cornejo. There being no issue as to this, the Court
affirms the deletion.

The Court adds that the petitioner is liable to BPI Family for interest of 6% per annum on the remaining unpaid sums
reckoned from the finality of this judgment. This liability for interest is only fair and just.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals on August 18, 2005, subject to
the following MODIFICATIONS, to wit:
(1)
In Criminal Case No. 94-5524, the petitioner shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of three years of <I>prison
correccional, as minimum, to six years, eight months and 21 days of prision mayor , as maximum;
(2)
In Criminal Case No. 94-5525, the petitioner shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of two years of <I>prision
correccional, as minimum, to four years, nine months and 11 days of prision correccional</I> plus fine of P5,000.00, as
maximum;
(3)
In Criminal Case No. 94-5526, the petitioner shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of two years and four
months of prision correccional, as the minimum, to five years of prision correccional</I> plus fine of P5,000.00, as the
maximum; and
(4)
In Criminal Case No. 94-5527, the petitioner shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of four years of <I>prision
correccional, as minimum, to seven years, eight months and 21 days of prision mayor,</I> as maximum.
The Court ORDERS the petitioner to pay to BPI Family Saving Bank interest of 6% per annum on the aggregate
amount of P65,000.00 to be reckoned from the finality of this judgment until full payment.
The petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION, G.R. No. 171672, February 02, 2015, MARIETA DE CASTRO, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

SUBJECT: REMEDIAL LAW

Warrantless Arrest: Peeking Inside Partially Opened Door

Not Valid Ground For Warrantless Arrest And Search
by The Lawyer's Post January 19, 2015 Comments Off on Warrantless Arrest: Peeking Inside Partially Opened Door Not Valid
Ground For Warrantless Arrest And Search

At around 4:45 A.M. of February 11, 2004, police officers Gregorio and Laurence while onboard
a patrol car, saw two unidentified men rush out of a house in David St., Pasay City. Sensing
something amiss, the police officers approached the house and peeked inside the partially
opened door, where they saw George holding an improvised tooter and a pink lighter, and
beside him, his live-in partner, Corazon. Because of this, they entered the house, and arrested
George and Corazon. A search of the immediate surroundings revealed a wooden box

containing improvised tooter, scoop 10 sachets of suspected shabu, and strips of aluminium oil.
Because of this, they were charged with illegal possession of drugs paraphernalia. Only George
appealed the decision rendered by the RTC convicting him as charged, since Corazon jumped
bail. The Court of Appeals denied his appeal, hence he elevated his case to the Supreme Court.
Both lower courts justified the conviction of George, citing his arrest was a valid warrantless
arrest under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
The Supreme Court:
The prosecutions theory, upheld by both the RTC and the CA, is that it was a case of valid
warrantless arrest in that the police officers saw accused Antiquera and Cruz through the door
of their house, in the act of having a pot session. That valid warrantless arrest gave the officers
the right as well to search the living room for objects relating to the crime and thus seize the
paraphernalia they found there.
The prosecution contends that, since the seized paraphernalia tested positive for shabu, they
were no doubt used for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting, or introducing
dangerous drug into the body in violation of Section 12 of Republic Act 9165. That the accused
tested negative for shabu, said the prosecution, had no bearing on the crime charged which
was for illegal possession of drug paraphernalia, not for illegal use of dangerous drugs. The
prosecution added that even assuming that the arrest of the accused was irregular, he is
already considered to have waived his right to question the validity of his arrest when he
voluntarily submitted himself to the courts jurisdiction by entering a plea of not guilty.
Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. This is
an arrest in flagrante delicto. The overt act constituting the crime is done in the presence or
within the view of the arresting officer.
But the circumstances here do not make out a case of arrest made in flagrante delicto.
1. The police officers claim that they were alerted when they saw two unidentified men
suddenly rush out of 107 David Street, Pasay City. Since they suspected that a crime had been
committed, the natural thing for them to do was to give chase to the jeep that the two fleeing
men boarded, given that the officers were in a patrol car and a tricycle. Running after the
fleeing suspects was the more urgent task but the officers instead gave priority to the house
even when they heard no cry for help from it.
2. Admittedly, the police officers did not notice anything amiss going on in the house from the
street where they stood. Indeed, even as they peeked through its partially opened door, they
saw no activity that warranted their entering it.

Thus, PO1 Cabutihan testified:

THE COURT:
Q By the way, Mr. Cabutihan, when you followed your companion towards the open door, how
was the door open?Was it totally open, or was it partially open?
A It was partially open Your Honor.

Q By how much, 1/3, 1/2? Only by less than one (1) foot?
A More or less 4 to 6 inches, Your Honor.

Q So how were you able to know, to see the interior of the house if the door was only open by
6 inches? Or did you have to push the door?
A We pushed the door, Your Honor.

xxxx

Q Were you allowed to just go towards the door of the house, push its door and peeped inside
it, as a police officer?
A Kasi po naghinala po kami baka may

Q Are you not allowed to Are you not required to get a search warrant before you can search
the interior of the house?
A Yes, Your Honor.

Q What do you mean by yes? Would you first obtain a search warrant before searching the
interior of the house?
A Yes, Your Honor.

Q So why did you not a [sic] secure a search warrant first before you tried to investigate the
house, considering your admission that you suspected that there was something wrong inside
the house?
A Because we saw them that they were engaged in pot session, Your Honor.

Q But before you saw them, you just had to push the door wide open to peep through its
opening because you did not know what was happening inside?
A Yes, Your Honor. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, no crime was plainly exposed to the view of the arresting officers that authorized the
arrest of accused Antiquera without warrant under the above-mentioned rule. Considering that
his arrest was illegal, the search and seizure that resulted from it was likewise illegal.
Consequently, the various drug paraphernalia that the police officers allegedly found in the
house and seized are inadmissible, having proceeded from an invalid search and seizure. Since
the confiscated drug paraphernalia is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, the Court
has no choice but to acquit the accused.
One final note. The failure of the accused to object to the irregularity of his arrest by itself is not
enough to sustain his conviction. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not carry with it
a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest.
Accused acquitted.
THIRD DIVISION, G.R. No. 180661, December 11, 2013, GEORGE ANTIQUERA Y CODES,
PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.