IKYA Human Capital

Sanjay Bakshi
Tuesday, 7 January 2015
Teaching Note
IKYA Human Capital A Cash Generating Machine Called 1-800-5000
I am writing this note to help you ask interesting questions from IKYAs CEO, Ajit Isaac
who will be addressing all of you on 9 January.
Thomas Cook Buys IKYA
I first got to know about IKYA when, on 5 February, 2013, Thomas Cook India Limited
(TCIL) made the following announcement.

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So, TCIL a travel and forex company, was diversifying through an acquisition into the
business of HR. When I read this, a couple of key questions came to my mind:
1.
2.

The averaged-out experience (remember baseline information?) of businesses diversifying

into new areas is not good. Why is TCIL doing this?
Most acquisitions dont create value for the buyers (baseline information again). Why
would this deal be any different?

Prem Watsa
At the time, I had no position in TCIL. I did know, however, that the legendary value investor,
Prem Watsas company, Fairfax Financial, had acquired a controlling stake in TCIL in May
2012.
Here is what TCILs Chairman stated in the companys AGM in June 2012, just after the
company had been acquired by Fairfax:

I knew that Prem Watsa had delivered a terrific track record for the long-term shareholders
of Fairfax, and more importantly, that track record was created through both organic and
inorganic growth over more than 20 years.
Key Question: Shouldnt a terrific past track record of value-creative acquisitions be sufficient to discard the
baseline evidence evidencing that the average deal is value destructive?
Key question: What happens when an experienced, well-financed acquirer with an excellent track record of
making value-creating acquisitions, negotiates with a distressed seller as was the case in this acquisition?
On 19th April, 2013, a friend of mine in the UK, sent me the Fairfax AGM notes taken by his
friend.

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The statement that Thomas Cooks cash flow will be reinvested in India in other
opportunities was very interesting to me, given what I already knew about Prem Watsas
excellent track record in capital allocation.
Clearly, there was something interesting cooking at Thomas Cook.
Sidecar Investing with Great Capital Allocators
Key question: Will TCIL become Prem Watsas investment vehicle in India?
If that was indeed the case, then I was very interested in looking into this situation, because I
knew that there is a lot of option value in making side-car investments, an idea that was
described in Richard Zeckhausers brilliant note titled Investing in the Unknown and the
Unknowable. He wrote:
Individuals with complementary skills enjoy great positive excess returns from uU (unknown and unknowable)
investments. Make a sidecar investment alongside them when given the opportunityThe investor rides along in
a sidecar pulled by a powerful motorcycle. The more the investor is distinctively positioned to have confidence in
the drivers integrity and his motorcycles capabilities, the more attractive the investment.1

In the past, I had used this capital allocator mental model to invest with Ajay Piramal. I
had written about that in 2011 and as I write this, since that post, Piramal Enterprises stock
has delivered an annualised IRR of 22% as compared at 11% delivered by Nifty.

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Prem Watsa on TCIL and IKYA

I downloaded Prem Watsas recent letter to the shareholders of Fairfax. Heres what he had
written in that letter (dated 8 March 2013) about the TCIL acquisition and also about
Thomas Cooks acquisition of IKYA:

For me, the four highlighted portions in the above letter were key.
First, the travel business was going to grow a lot over the years. And I knew that the travel
business of TCIL has negative working capital because customers pay upfront, while payments
for travel components (hotel rooms, airline seats etc) are made much later. The word that
came to mind, obviously was: FLOAT an idea about which I have written in the past.
Key Question: Did Prem Watsa invest in TCIL because of its float? After all his company runs a very large
insurance operation and he totally understands the power of float. Hmmm
Second, Prem Watsa wrote that he paid just ten times operating cash flow (after adjusting for
surplus real estate an adjustment2 which a control investor can make but an OPMI
(outside, passive, monitory investor a term coined by one of my role models, Marty
Whitman) cant.
Key Question: Why?
Anyway, this was terribly exciting for me. Whenever I see a valuation of less than ten times
operating cash flow for a wonderful collection of assets (and thats what TCIL was even before
it acquired IKYA), I feel like a teenage boy who is about to kiss a girl for the first time.
Key Question: Why? (Hint: the answer is to do with interest rates of 10% p.a. as well as the

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profitable growth prospects of the business).

Third, Prem Watsa wrote that he was going to use TCIL as his India investment vehicle.3
That, incidentally, is one very good reason to justify TCILs decision to diversify. Earlier I had
asked about the logic of TCIL diversifying into HR. I had stated that the averaged-out
experience in diversification is not good and therefore, the default position for an investor
should be to look at such attempts with skepticism.
Many firms continue to use their resources to diversify, however, and justify this behaviour
with rationales like:
Our cash flows are very volatile and diversification into an unrelated business will make overall cash flows
more stable.
This is nonsense. After all, investors can achieve the benefits of diversification on their own
within their own portfolios. Thats the big and important lesson from academic corporate
finance. So, usually conglomerates are a bad idea. But there are exceptions. Like Berkshire
Hathaway (BRK). And Fairfax Financial.
Warren Buffett provides his rationale to make BRK one of the worlds largest conglomerates.
In Principle # 8 of his Owners Manual, he writes:
A managerial wish list will not be filled at shareholder expense. We will not diversify by purchasing entire
businesses at control prices that ignore long-term economic consequences to our shareholders. We will only do
with your money what we would do with our own, weighing fully the values you can obtain by diversifying your
own portfolios through direct purchases in the stock market.
In other words, diversification makes sense, if value can be created in a manner which
investors cannot replicate on their own. For example, when people buy BRKs stock, they get
access to Buffetts deal flow. Most of these deals are private, negotiated transactions, not
available to the general public. While public investors in BRK dont have direct access to those
deals, no one stops them from getting an indirect exposure through BRKs stock.
Exactly the same logic, in my view, justifies TCILs attempts to diversify into HR. By owning
TCILs shares, its public shareholders get indirect access to Prem Watsas deal flow in India.
And IKYA was just first of such deals. I was almost certain there would be others.
Key question: If Prem Watsa is buying TCIL at what he believes to be a very attractive valuation (BEFORE
CONSIDERING FUTURE ACQUISITIONS LIKE IKYA), then, isnt the package deal involving: (1)
TCIL owned by a well-financed, and rational, long-term owner; (2) IKYA (and other potential future value
creating acquisitions); and (3) Prem Watsa looking after capital allocation (so risk of future misallocation of
capital is hugely mitigated), even more attractive?
This seemed like a pretty good package deal (like a Thomas Cook Holiday Package Deal) to
me, especially given the fact that the stock market had ignored it all and TCILs stock price
was quoting below the price at which Fairfax had acquired control over the company. Nice. I
wrote about that here.
For me, understanding the IKYA deal was instrumental in deciding to invest in TCIL or not.

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Well, the fourth highlighted portion in above extract of Prem Watsas letter was very
encouraging. He wrote:
Early in 2013, Harsha, Madhavan and Chandran identified an excellent Indian company run by a
wonderful entrepreneur, Ajit Isaac.
Ajit Isaac
When Prem Watsa calls someone a wonderful entrepreneur, you dont just sit on your ass
and ignore it. You get onto Google and type Ajit Isaac.You hit enter, and you end up here:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AHzpJIgvp0Y
My wife saw me watch that October 2012 video over and over again. (I think she was a bit
jealous.) In the video, Ajit describes his journey as an entrepreneur which should be quite
inspirational to you. So, you should ask him questions about that journey.
There were, of course, other things Ajit said in the video which I found very interesting.
1.

He bought a significant minority stake in IKYA (funded by India Equity Partners, a

private equity firm).
2. IKYA acquired Magna Infotech (Indias largest professional staffing company).
3. IKYA also acquired Avon which Ajit described as Indias fastest growing FMS (facility
management services) company.
4. In 2009, when Ajit invested into IKYA, it had annual revenues of Rs 100 cr. and a
combined associate strength of about 10,000 people which had grown to 45,000
people at the time of the interview.
5. In FY13, the company would generate revenues close to Rs 1,000 cr. And Ajits plan
was to deliver annual revenues of $0.5 billion by FY15 and he could see visibility for
70% to 75% of those numbers.
6. More importantly, IKYAs margins had expanded over this period from under 1% to
more than 4% which is the industry leading margin in emerging markets for HR
companies.
7. In each of its businesses, IKYA was either #1 by growth or #1 by absolute size.
8. IKYA is run on two dimensions. #1 is market penetration and potential for future growth (what
he calls volume of revenues). #2 is margin expansion (what he calls quality of
revenues).
9. The key differentiator for IKYA was its ownership of Magna Infotech, a company
involved in professional staffing services. Ajit mentioned that Magna has an industry
leading position in this field as it was three times the size of its nearest competitor.
10. He said that IKYA is not a top-line oriented company despite healthy growth in
revenues. Focus, instead, is on margin expansion.
11. IKYAs internal norm for growth is 4 times GDPs growth rate. Even if you think, Ajit
is being over-optimistic, I think should heed to Charlie Mungers advice: Never underestimate a man who over-estimates himself You should pay attention to his track record
(which I cover later in this note) and not forget that Prem Watsa stands behind Ajit.
14. Ajit said that in the next 18 to 24 months, IKYA would become the #1 HR company
in India and that it would be one of the very few companies to grow to a size of $0.5
billion in less than seven years in the services industry.

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After seeing this video, one thing was clear to me: Ajit and IKYA were focused on profitable
growth, the only thing that really matters if your chief interest is to earn exceptional long-term
returns from ownership of great businesses. No wonder, Prem Watsa had described him as a
wonderful entrepreneur.
TCIL On IKYA
And then, in March 2013, I saw a presentation4 put up by TCIL on its website explaining the
IKYA acquisition.

You should download this presentation and read it carefully. Here are a few interesting slides.

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Notice in the above slide, net revenues have been used instead of gross revenues. This is an
important point. IKYAs main cost is the money it pays to the tens of thousands of people it
employs on behalf of its own clients, who pay IKYA for this service. IKYA appears to be a low
margin company because in its financial reporting it recognises gross revenues. Had it used
net revenues instead (money received from clients less money paid to associates hired), its true
margin profile would be revealed. For example, for the 9 month period ended FY13, IKYA
delivered net revenues of Rs 91 cr., on which it earned an EBITDA of Rs 36 cr. That
translates into an EBITDA margin of 39%.

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IKYAs Value Proposition

You should spend some time thinking about the value proposition that IKYA offers to its
clients and how they relate to various sources of competitive advantage we talked about in
this course. A politically incorrect way (in todays world) of putting it would be to read this
crazy ad.

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Kelly Girl was an idea that caught the Americans attention in post World War II 1940s.
Erin Hatton, an Assistant Professor of Sociology at the State University of New York, Buffalo,
is the author of The Temp Economy: From Kelly Girls to Permatemps in Postwar
America (a book, which in my view, focuses on the negative aspects of temporary
employment) writes in a January 2013 column in The New York Times:
The story begins in the years after World War II, when a handful of temp agencies were started, largely in
the Midwest. In 1947, William Russell Kelly founded Russell Kelly Office Service (later known as Kelly Girl
Services) in Detroit, with three employees, 12 customers and $848 in sales. A year later, two lawyers, Aaron
Scheinfeld and Elmer Winter, founded a similarly small outfit, Manpower Inc., in Milwaukee. At the time, the
future of these fledgling agencies was no foregone conclusion. Unions were at the peak of their power, and the
protections that they had fought so hard to achieve workers compensation, pensions, health benefits and
more had been adopted by union and nonunion employers alike.5
Here a few more Kelly Girl ads which I found quite fascinating.

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Its always a good idea to read up both sides of the story. The other side of the story the
positive side is laid out quite well by Chris Benner in, Work in the New Economy: Flexible
Labor Markets in Silicon Valley. Benner argues in favor of flexible labor markets by showing

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how this flexibility is a key component in the long-term competitive success of firms and
industries in the Valley. He writes:
Certain aspects of the flexibility of Silicon Valley labor markets have been a critical component of the regions
economic success. Flexibility in work practices, for instance, helps ensure rapid adjustment to changing
technologies and market opportunities while also providing valuable learning opportunities for large sectors of
the workforce.
Employment in electronic manufacturing service firms is highly insecure. Employers need to be able to rapidly
ramp up and ramp down production to respond to employers needs. Time-to-market is a crucial competitive
factor in the industry, leading to rapid fluctuations in employment. Such fluctuations occur not simply on a
week-to-week or day-to-day basis, but even hour to hour.
An important function intermediaries play in the labor market is managing risk. The information economy
creates more risky labor markets than older, stable, production regimes, for both employers and workers Clearly
workers face more dire consequences of unanticipated misfortune in the labor market but employers also face
risk. Unexpected competition, rapidly changing markets, technological obsolescence, volatile financial markets,
and so on, can threaten firms profitability and even survival in unexpected ways. Both employers and workers
use intermediaries as part of their efforts to minimize exposure to risk and the consequences of misfortune in the
labor market. Intermediaries attempt to minimize their own exposure to risk through diversifying their
relationships among multiple firms and groups of workers.
The use of intermediaries to manage risk is particularly strong for employers. Here, both cyclical and
structural factors play a role. On the one hand, all firms experience cyclical fluctuations in demand. By using
intermediaries, they can delay hiring permanent employees till later in cyclical upturns and layoff temporary
employees earlier in cyclical downturns. On the structural side, an increase in the volatility experienced by firms
has led many businesses to attempt to reduce their own internal labor force and shift economic risk through a
series of more short-term contracts with external agents. Firms also are able to shift risks to intermediaries by
reducing their own human resource screening, hiring, and administration functions, reducing their exposure to
unexpected downturns while still benefiting from access to workers during upturns.
In Silicon Valley it is not accurate to characterize firms use of temporary agencies as simply a cost-cutting
strategy in an effort to shrink the size of their core workforce and reduce labor costs for noncore positions.
Firms use intermediaries to find and employ people for many purposes, including many core functions within
the regions high-tech industries. To be sure, temporary employees do include many assembly, shipping, light
industrial, and clerical positions, which combined still account for well over half the employment in temporary
agencies in the region. Temporary employees, however, also include highly skilled technicians, engineers, and
computer professionals, who are the most rapidly growing segment in the temporary help industry and form the
core of workers placed through many of the other types of private sector intermediaries. Furthermore, many
other private sector intermediaries specialize in highly skilled occupations and thus, as a category, private sector
intermediaries cut across all skill levels.
In the end it boils down to this: You can either get job security (think jobs for life) and very
few jobs and high unemployment. Or, you can get very little job security and end up with
more job creation. If a capitalist is not allowed to fire workers, he wont hire workers. A job is
better than no job.6 Flexible labor markets work better than rigid ones. If you want to Make in
India give it a flexible labor market or it will remain just a slogan.
In my view, IKYA has a hugely pro-social business model. It offers a fantastic value

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proposition to its clients: flexibility. It also offers jobs to people who may not find any in a rigid
labor market. You only have to walk into a Samsung Store to see how this works. The people
who sell you mobile phones there dont work for Samsung. They work for IKYA. Samsung
wants to focus on its own core competencies product development and branding. It wants
to be able to quickly expand or contract based on market conditions just like those companies
in the Silicon Valley. It doesnt want to worry about compliance with hundreds of labor laws,
some of them more than 100 years old. IKYA fills a need for Samsung. It provides it with
6,000 people who work in its stores every day. For many of these people, this is their first job.
This is the first step in their life towards financial freedom. And IKYA put them there in the first
place.
And you know something, the whole world will ultimately trend towards flexible markets of
Silicon Valley. This is an unstoppable force. Its already happening all over America as the
chart below from a story7 in the current issue of The Economist depicts vividly.

Those temporary Kelly Girl typist jobs may have gone, but the Kelly Girl company and its
peers are still around. ManpowerGroup has a market cap of $5.8 billion. Adecco has a
market cap of $12 billion.
The Sources of IKYAs Moat
Apart from thinking in terms of the value proposition IKYA offers, it will also be useful to
think about various sources of moat in its business model:
1.

2.
3.

A low cost advantage hiring workers though IKYA is cheaper than hiring them on
your own, especially if you count the cost of rehiring workers in industries where
churn rates are high, training costs, and compliance costs. Moreover, IKYA can derive
a low cost advantage over its current and potential competitors because it has a large
scale operation, which for workers is an important consideration when deciding who
to work for.
High switching costs Once Samsung hires IKYA, and has virtually handed over its
HR department to the company, its unlikely to fire it.
Network effects IKYA is a labor market intermediary where it helps people find

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jobs and helps businesses find people who will do those jobs. In that sense, its not very
different from an exchange like naukri.com. Large potential customers come to
IKYA because it has a large talent pool and complies will all laws. Employees want to
work for IKYA because they get relatively more secure jobs because IKYA is a big
company. Its no wonder IKYA now has more than 80,000 employees on its rolls.
IKYAs Post-Acquisition Performance
How did Ajit and IKYA actually do post acquisition by TCIL? We have data for two
accounting periods, which I have aggregated and annualised in the table below:

Note that the EBIT margin looks low because, as I described earlier, revenues are being
reported on a gross and not net basis. You should work out, how margins look on a net basis.
One of the slides in the March 2013 presentation (slide # 5) noted that net debt in the
company, as on 31 December, 2012 was Rs 27 cr. Lets assume no change in that figure until
the date of acquisition. TCIL paid Rs 256 cr. to acquire a 74% stake. For a 100% stake, this
would translate into a sum of Rs 346 cr. Adding estimated net debt, the acquisition cost for
the business comes to Rs 373 cr.
The computations in the above table show that IKYA earned an EBIT of Rs 85 cr. for an
annualised period of 365 days. So, in effect, IKYA was acquired by TCIL at an EBIT
multiple of just 4.3x. Wow.
Segment data for TCILs results show that the capital employed at IKYA varied as under:

Average capital employed comes to Rs 134 cr. and annualised EBIT, as computed earlier,
came to Rs 85 cr. This translates into an EBIT/Average Capital Employed of 63%. Wow.
This is quite astonishing, especially when you consider other players like Adecco, and Team
Lease whose filings I obtained from Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) website. In FY13,
Adecco India delivered revenues of Rs 1,500 cr. and pre-tax earnings of just Rs 3 cr. and
Team Lease delivered revenues of Rs 1,249 cr. and barely broke even.

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Key Question: Why is IKYA so much more profitable than its competitors?
There is one company, however, which is making money. Thats Indo-Edge, the owner of the
popular website, naukri.com. That companys earnings have actually shrunk in the last two
years.
Heres an interesting piece of statistic. Info-edge earned an EBIT of Rs 120 cr. in FY14
which is about 50% more than IKYAs annualised EBIT of Rs 85 cr. Info-Edge is currently
being valued by the stock market at about Rs 10,000 cr. On the other hand, TCIL, which
owns 74% of IKYA, and also owns other highly profitable assets, is being valued at about Rs
4,200 cr.
Key Question: When will IKYA overtake Info-Edge?
Key Question: What role does naukri.com play in IKYAs business model?
Recall that in FY09 when Ajit bought into IKYA, the company had revenues of just Rs 100
cr. In just six years by the end of FY15, annual revenues will exceed Rs 1,500 cr. I think
youll regard IKYA as a rapidly growing company.
To summarise, TCIL bought a highly-profitable business growing at an astonishing pace for
less than 5 times earnings. Wow.
Key question: How did this happen?
Key Question: Where is this cash generating machine headed?
That brings me to 1-800-5000. This is the number that Ajit thinks about every day. He
invented it in 2009 when he bought into IKYA. It means 1 decade from now, 800 basis points
margin, and Rs 5,000 cr. of revenues.
Key Question: Can he do it?
Part of the answer to that question lies in Ajits ability to profitably grow IKYA inorganically.
And given that he has already concluded three deals (at least one of them will astonish you) in
the last few months, I wont bet against 1-800-5000.
IKYA Acquires Hofincons
On 5 June, 2014, TCIL announced the acquisition of Hofincons by IKYA.

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The announcement did not mention how much was paid for this acquisition.
On 27 June, TCIL announced the completion of the deal and still there was no mention of
what was paid for the acquisition.

With the help of a colleague, I got hold of the financial information filed by Hofincons with
MCA for FY12 and FY13.
The numbers were very impressive. In FY 13, the company delivered pre-tax operating cash
flow of Rs 14 cr. while employing average operating assets of only Rs 23 cr.8 There was no
debt on the balance sheet. Indeed cash assets alone were Rs 33 cr. and total net worth was Rs
52 cr.
Key Question: This was a stunningly profitable business. Why was it up for sale?
A bit of search on the net provided the answer: The Australian owner, Transfield Services,
was distressed.
We come back to the same question, I had asked a while ago.

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Key question: What happens when an experienced, well-financed acquirer with an excellent track record of
making value-creating acquisitions, negotiates with a distressed seller?
Fast forward a few months. Recently, I obtained the FY14 financial statements of Hofincons
from MCA. Revenues for the year were Rs 145 cr. Pre-tax earnings were Rs 15 cr., and posttax earnings were Rs 10 cr. Cash on the balance sheet was Rs 43 cr. However, the company
paid a dividend of Rs 25 cr., after the year end but before the sale to IKYA. Therefore cash
would have fallen to Rs 18 cr.
And what did IKYA pay for this highly profitable business? I got the answer on 25 July, when
TCIL made the following disclosure to BSE.

IKYA paid about Rs 50 cr. for this wonderful business which had no debt, had cash of Rs 18
cr., and pre-tax earnings of Rs 15 cr. At less than 4 times earnings. Wow. This is what happens
when an experienced, well-financed acquirer with an excellent track record of making valuecreating acquisitions, negotiates with a distressed seller.
IKYA Acquires Brainhunter
On 17 September, 2014 TCIL made an announcement to the exchanges informing them that
IKYA had acquired Brainhunter in Canada from its distressed Indian owner Zylog Systems.

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It appears that Zylogs lenders sold the shares in the company to IKYA. Zylog had acquired
this business for $33 million in 2010. Although I do not know what price was paid by IKYA
for this asset, the same pattern seems to be playing out: An experienced, well-financed acquirer with
an excellent track record of making value-creating acquisitions negotiated with a distressed seller and bought the
asset.
That Brainhunter is a Canadian company and that Prem Watsa is also a Canadian is not, it
appears, a co-incidence. It seems to me that Mr. Watsa is taking active interest in building
value in IKYA and TCIL.
Key question: How will this acquisition add value to IKYA?
That Prem Watsa is keen to build value in TCIL and IKYA became even more apparent,
when Fairfax and IKYA entered into a JV, just a few weeks after the Brainhunter acquisition.
Joint Venture with Fairfax
On 4 November, 2014, TCIL announced that Fairfax Financial has sold a 49% stake in
MFXchange Holdings to IKYA.

MFXchange, is the IT subsidiary of Fairfax which supports the IT needs of its insurance
businesses. That this transaction was led by Prem Watsa is evident from a recent interview9
given by Ajit in which he said:
Despite all the competition there's an opportunity to create another billion-dollar company in the IT services
industry. Fairfax has been a phenomenal backer for usthey actually came to us and suggested we integrate
their IT subsidiary with IKYA.
Key Question: How will this JV add value to IKYA?
Key Question: How does Ajit think about M&A?

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Key Question: How has the Fairfax culture influenced him?

Partnering with an Intelligent Fanatic
A few weeks ago I had shared with you, this wonderful quote from Charlie Munger:
You do get an occasional opportunity to get into a wonderful business thats being run by an intelligent fanatic
and if you dont load up when you get those opportunities, its a big mistake.
Key Question: Will Ajit achieve his dream of 1-800-5000?

Disclosure: I own shares in TCIL, IKYAs holding company. This is not a recommendation to
buy TCIL shares.
Ends
1

See Investing in the Unknown and the unknowable by Ricard Zeckhauser

While this adjustment was made, the real estate assets of TCIL are yet to be
monetised.
3
This intention was subsequently diluted. See, for instance http://
timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/Watsa-lines-up-1-billioninvestment-for-India/articleshow/45253323.cms
4
See http://www.thomascook.in/tcportal/downloads/EGMPresentationonIkya.pdf
2

5
6

The Rise of the Permanent Temp Economy - NYTimes.com.

Manish Sabharwal, founder and CEO of Team Lease.

Theres an App for that: The Future of Work, The Economist.
8
Assuming Rs 25 cr cash as surplus, as compared to Rs 33 cr total cash on balance
sheet. There was no long or short term debt.
9
IKYA buys 49 per cent stake in Canadian tech company MFXchange, The Economic
Times
7

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