DE LEON V.

ESGUERRA, 153 SCRA 602, AUGUST, 31, 1987

(EN BANC), J. MELENCIO-HERRERA

FACTS:
On May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay Captain
together with the other petitioners as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores,
Muncipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal in a Barangay election held under Batas
Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known as Barangay Election Act of 1982.
On February 9, 1987, petitioner De Leon received a Memorandum antedated
December 1, 1986 but signed by respondent OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on
February 8, 1987 designating respondent Florentino G. Magno as Barangay Captain
of Barangay Dolores and the other respondents as members of Barangay Council of
the same Barangay and Municipality.
Petitoners prayed to the Supreme Court that the subject Memoranda of February 8,
1987 be declared null and void and that respondents be prohibited by taking over
their positions of Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen.
Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982
(BP Blg. 222), their terms of office shall be six years which shall commence on June
7, 1988 and shall continue until their successors shall have elected and shall have
qualified. It was also their position that with the ratification of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no longer has the authority to replace them
and to designate their successors.
On the other hand, respondents contend that the terms of office of elective and
appointive officials were abolished and that petitioners continued in office by virtue
of Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional Constitution and not because their term of six
years had not yet expired; and that the provision in the Barangay Election Act fixing
the term of office of Barangay officials to six years must be deemed to have been
repealed for being inconsistent with Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was validly
made during the one-year period which ended on Feb 25, 1987.
RULING:
Supreme Court declared that the Memoranda issued by respondent OIC Gov on Feb
8, 1987 designating respondents as Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen of
Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal has no legal force and effect.
The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on Feb 2, 1987, therefore, the
Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have superseded. Having become
inoperative, respondent OIC Gov could no longer rely on Sec 2, Art 3, thereof to
designate respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners. Relevantly,
Sec 8, Art 1 of the 1987 Constitution further provides in part:

"Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law, shall be three years x x x."
Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by aw, therefore,
the term of office of 6 years provided for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982 should
still govern.
SAN JUAN VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSSION
GR NO. 92299, 19 APRIL 1991

FACTS:
The Provincial Budget Officer of Rizal (PBO) was left vacant; thereafter Rizal Governor San
Juan, peititioner, nominated Dalisay Santos for the position and the latter quickly assumed
position. However, Director Abella of Region IV Department of Budget and Management
(DBM) did not endorse the nominee, and recommended private respondent Cecilia
Almajose as PBO on the ground that she was the most qualified. This appointment was
subsequently approved by the DBM. Petitioner protested the appointment of Almajose
before the DBM and the Civil Service Commission who both dismissed his complaints. His
arguments rest on his contention that he has the sole right and privilege to recommend the
nominees to the position of PBO and that the appointee should come only from his
nominees. In support thereof, he invokes Section 1 of Executive Order No. 112.
ISSUE:
Whether or not DBM is empowered to appoint a PBO who was not expressly nominated by
the provincial governor.
HELD:
Under the cited Sec 1 of EO 112, the petitioner's power to recommend is subject to the
qualifications prescribed by existing laws for the position of PBO. Consequently, in the event
that the recommendations made by the petitioner fall short of the required standards, the
appointing authority, public respondent DBM is expected to reject the same. In the event
that the Governor recommends an unqualified person, is the Department Head free to
appoint anyone he fancies?
Petitioner states that the phrase of said law: "upon recommendation of the local chief
executive concerned" must be given mandatory application in consonance with the state
policy of local autonomy as guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution under Art. II, Sec. 25 and
Art. X, Sec. 2 thereof. He further argues that his power to recommend cannot validly be
defeated by a mere administrative issuance of public respondent DBM reserving to itself the
right to fill-up any existing vacancy in case the petitioner's nominees do not meet the
qualification requirements as embodied in public respondent DBM's Local Budget Circular
No. 31 dated February 9, 1988.
This case involves the application of a most important constitutional policy and principle,
that of local autonomy. We have to obey the clear mandate on local autonomy. Where a law
is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in Malacaang and the
other beneficial to local autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy.

The 1935 Constitution clearly limited the executive power over local governments to
"general supervision . . . as may be provided by law." The President controls the executive
departments. He has no such power over local governments. He has only supervision and
that supervision is both general and circumscribed by statute. The exercise of greater local
autonomy is even more marked in the present Constitution. Article II, Section 25 provides:
"The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments"
Thereby, DBM Circular is ultra vires and is, accordingly, set aside. The DBM may appoint
only from the list of qualified recommendees nominated by the Governor. If none is
qualified, he must return the list of nominees to the Governor explaining why no one meets
the legal requirements and ask for new recommendees who have the necessary eligibilities
and qualifications.
RODOLFO GANZON VS COURT OF APPEALS

an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to
fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them
perform their duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify of set
aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute
the judgment of the former for that of the latter. But from this pronouncement it cannot be
reasonably inferred that the power of supervision of thePresident over local government
officials does not include the power of investigation when in his opinion the good of the
public service so requires.
The Secretary of Local Government, as the alter ego of the president, in suspending
Ganzon is exercising a valid power. He however overstepped by imposing a 600 day
suspension.

FACTS:
HUMBERTO BASCO VS PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENTS AND GAMING CORPORATION
Rodolfo Ganzon was the then mayor of Iloilo City. 10 complaints were filed against him on
grounds of misconduct and misfeasance of office. The Secretary of Local Government
issued several suspension orders against Ganzon based on the merits of the complaints
filed against him hence Ganzon was facing about 600 days of suspension. Ganzon
appealed the issue to the CA and the CA affirmed the suspension order by the Secretary.
Ganzon asserted that the 1987 Constitution does not authorize the President nor any of his
alter ego to suspend and remove local officials; this is because the 1987 Constitution
supports local autonomy and strengthens the same. What was given by the present
Constitution was mere supervisory power.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the Presidents alter ego, can
suspend and or remove local officials.

197 SCRA 52 Political Law Constitutional Law Bill of Rights Equal ProtectionClause
Municipal Corporation Local Autonomy Imperium in Imperio
FACTS:
In 1977, the Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was
created by Presidential Decree 1067-A. PD 1067-B meanwhile granted PAGCOR the power
to establish, operate and maintain gambling casinos on land or water within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Philippines. PAGCORs operation was a success hence in 1978, PD
1399 was passed which expanded PAGCORs power. In 1983, PAGCORs charter was
updated through PD 1869. PAGCORs charter provides that PAGCOR shall regulate and
centralize all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law. Section
1 of PD 1869 provides:

HELD:
Yes. Ganzon is under the impression that the Constitution has left thePresident mere
supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and denied her
control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken impression because
legally, supervision is not incompatible with disciplinary authority.
The SC had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of supervision by
the President over local government officials in contrast to the power of control given to him
over executive officials of our government wherein it was emphasized that the two terms,
control and supervision, are two different things which differ one from the other in meaning
and extent. In administration law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of

Section 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to

centralize and integrate all games of chance not heretofore authorized by existing
franchises or permitted by law.
Atty. Humberto Basco and several other lawyers assailed the validity of the law creating
PAGCOR. They claim that PD 1869 is unconstitutional because a) it violates the equal
protection clause and b) it violates the local autonomy clause of the constitution.
Basco et al argued that PD 1869 violates the equal protection clause because it legalizes
PAGCOR-conducted gambling, while most other forms of gambling are outlawed, together
with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices.

Anent the issue of local autonomy, Basco et al contend that P.D. 1869 forced cities
like Manila to waive its right to impose taxes and legal fees as far as PAGCOR is
concerned; that Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 which exempts PAGCOR, as the franchise
holder from paying any tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise, as well as fees,
charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local is violative of the local
autonomy principle.

Further, the City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to
impose taxes. The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should
be stressed that municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress which has the
power to create and abolish municipal corporations due to its general legislative powers.
Congress, therefore, has the power of control over Local governments. And if Congress can
grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions
or even take back the power.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not PD 1869 violates the equal protection clause.
2. Whether or not PD 1869 violates the local autonomy clause.
HELD:
1. No. Just how PD 1869 in legalizing gambling conducted by PAGCOR is violative of
the equal protection is not clearly explained in Bascos petition. The mere fact that
some gambling activities like cockfighting (PD 449) horse racing (RA 306 as amended by
RA 983), sweepstakes, lotteries and races (RA 1169 as amended by BP 42) are legalized
under certain conditions, while others are prohibited, does not render the applicable laws,
PD. 1869 for one, unconstitutional.

Further still, local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National
Government. PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation with an original
charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National Government.
Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere
Local government.
This doctrine emanates from the supremacy of the National Government over local
governments.
G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994
MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF CAGAYAN DE ORO, petitioners,
vs.
PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC. & PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING
CORPORATION,
FACTS:

Bascos posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause equal protection of the
laws. The clause does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded
different treatment under the law as long as the classification is not unreasonable or
arbitrary. A law does not have to operate in equal force on all persons or things to be
conformable to Article III, Sec 1 of the Constitution. The equal protection clause does not
prohibit the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which
different rules shall operate. The Constitution does not require situations which are different
in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same.
2. No. Section 5, Article 10 of the 1987 Constitution provides:

There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced the opening of a casino in
Cagayan de Oro City. Civic organizations angrily denounced the project.The trouble arose
when in 1992, flush with its tremendous success in several cities, PAGCOR decided to
expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City.he reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod
of Cagayan de Oro City was swift and hostile. On December 7, 1992, it enacted Ordinance
No. 3353.Nor was this all. On January 4, 1993, it adopted a sterner Ordinance No. 337593Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was joined by
PAGCOR as intervenor and supplemental petitioner. Their challenge succeeded. On March
31, 1993, the Court of Appeals declared the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed
for to prohibit their enforcement
ISSUE:

Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue and to
levy taxes, fees, and other charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as the
congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees
and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local government.
A close reading of the above provision does not violate local autonomy (particularly on
taxing powers) as it was clearly stated that the taxing power of LGUs are subject to such
guidelines and limitation as Congress may provide.

WON Ordinance 3353 and 3375-93 valid

HELD:
No.Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress,
among others, "gambling and other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision
excludes games of chance which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law.The
rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is
obvious.Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute
that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. Hence, it was not competent for
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to enact Ordinance No. 3353
prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93

prohibiting the operation of casinos. For all their praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are
contrary to P.D. 1869 and the public policy announced therein and are therefore ultra vires
and void.

ABBAS VS COMELEC (179 SCRA 287)

FACTS:
The arguments against R.A. 6734 raised by petitioners may generally be categorized into
either of the following:

(a) that R.A. 6734, or parts thereof, violates the Constitution, and
(b) that certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the Tripoli Agreement.

Petitioner Abbas argues that R.A. No. 6734 unconditionally creates an autonomous region
in Mindanao, contrary to the aforequoted provisions of the Constitution on the autonomous
region which make the creation of such region dependent upon the outcome of the
plebiscite.

determinative of (1) whether there shall be an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and
(2) which provinces and cities, among those enumerated in R.A. No. 6734, shall
compromise it.
It will readily be seen that the creation of the autonomous region is made to depend,
not on the total majority vote in the plebiscite, but on the will of the majority in each
of the constituent units and the proviso underscores this. for if the intention of the
framers of the Constitution was to get the majority of the totality of the votes cast,
they could have simply adopted the same phraseology as that used for the
ratification of the Constitution, i.e. the creation of the autonomous region shall be
effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the
purpose.
It is thus clear that what is required by the Constitution is a simple majority of votes
approving the organic Act in individual constituent units and not a double majority of
the votes in all constituent units put together, as well as in the individual constituent
units.
More importantly, because of its categorical language, this is also the sense in which the
vote requirement in the plebiscite provided under Article X, section 18 must have been
understood by the people when they ratified the Constitution.

CHIONGBIAN VS. ORBOS

FACTS:
In support of his argument, petitioner cites Article II, section 1(1) of R.A. No. 6734 which
declares that [t]here is hereby created the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, to be
composed of provinces and cities voting favorably in the plebiscite called for the purpose, in
accordance with Section 18, Article X of the Constitution. Petitioner contends that the tenor
of the above provision makes the creation of an autonomous region absolute, such that
even if only two provinces vote in favor of autonomy, an autonomous region would still be
created composed of the two provinces where the favorable votes were obtained.
The matter of the creation of the autonomous region and its composition needs to be
clarified.
HELD:
Thus, under the Constitution and R.A. No 6734, the creation of the autonomous region shall
take effect only when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a
plebiscite, and only those provinces and cities where a majority vote in favor of the Organic
Act shall be included in the autonomous region. The provinces and cities wherein such a
majority is not attained shall not be included in the autonomous region. It may be that even
if an autonomous region is created, not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities
mentioned in Article II, section 1 (2) of R.A. No. 6734 shall be included therein. The single
plebiscite contemplated by the Constitution and R.A. No. 6734 will therefore be

Congress passed the ORGANIC ACT FOR ARMM, calling for a plebiscite in Mindanao.
Only 4 provinces voted for the creation of ARMM (LanaoSur, Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi2)
The other provinces who did not vote for ARMM shall remain in the existing administrative
regions, provided that the PRESIDENT may by ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATION,
MERGE THE EXISTING REGIONS.
So, President Cory issued EO 429 which reorganized those regions who did not vote for
ARMM.
Petitioners are Congressmen who opposed the issuance of EO 429. They claim that
President Cory had no authority to restructure new administrative regions. They insist
that the provinces should remain as they are.
ISSUE:
Whether the Organic Act for ARMM unduly delegates legislative power to the President by
allowing Cory to merge the existing regions by mere ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATION.
Whether the Organic Act provided a standard to guide President Corys discretion.
DEFENSE: The SOLGEN argues that the Act is valid and there is no undue delegation but
only a POWER TO FILL UP THE DETAILS OF LEGISLATION which was given to Cory.
SC:
LAW VALID. NO UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS TO THE PRESIDENT.

While the power to merge regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a
power traditionally lodged with the President, in view of the POWER OF GENERAL
SUPERVISION OVER LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. Thus there is no abdication by Congress
of its legislative powers in conferring on the President the POWER TO MERGE
ADMINISTRATIVE REGIONS.
As to the question of STANDARD, a legislative standard NEED NOT BE EXPRESSED. IT
MAY SIMPLY BE GATHERED OR IMPLIED. Nor need it be found in the law challenged
because it may be EMBODIED IN OTHER STATUTES ON THE SAME SUBJECT as that of
the challenged legislation.
With respect to the power to merge existing administrative regions, the STANDARD IS TO
BE FOUND IN THE SAME POLICY underlying the grant o the PRESIDENT in RA5434,
THE POWER TO REORGANIZE THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT. Under said law, the
standard is to promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in the government, to enable it to
pursue programs consistent with national goals for acceleration socio-economic
development and to improve the service in the transaction of public business.
Since the original 11 administrative regions were established with this same law/ policy, it is
but logical to suppose that in authorizing the President to merge by administrative
determination, the existing regions (following the rejection of the ARMM by some regions),
the purpose of Congress in enacting the Organic Act of ARMM was to reconstitute the
original basis for the organization of administrative regions.

CORDILLERA BROAD COALITION VS COADATE: JANUARY 29, 1990

Yes A reading of E.O. No. 220 will easily reveal that what it actually envisions is the
consolidation and coordination of the delivery of services of line departments and agencies
of the National Government in the areas covered by the administrative region as a step
preparatory to the grant of autonomy to the Cordilleras. It does not create the autonomous
region contemplated in the Constitution. It merely provides for transitory measures in
anticipation of the enactment of an organic act and the creation of an autonomous region. In
short, it prepares the ground for autonomy. This does not necessarily conflict with the
provisions of the Constitution on autonomous regions, as we shall show later. Moreover, the
transitory nature of the CAR does not necessarily mean that it is, as petitioner Cordillera
Broad Coalition asserts, "the interim autonomous region in the Cordilleras". The Constitution
provides for a basic structure of government in the autonomous region composed of an
elective executive and legislature and special courts with personal, family and property law
jurisdiction. Using this as a guide, we find that E.O. No. 220 did not establish an
autonomous regional government. It created a region, covering a specified area, for
administrative purposes with the main objective of coordinating the planning and
implementation of programs and services. To determine policy, it created a representative
assembly, to convene yearly only for a five-day regular session, tasked with, among others,
identifying priority projects and development programs. To serve as an implementing body, it
created the Cordillera Executive Board. The bodies created by E.O. No. 220 do not supplant
the existing local governmental structure, nor are they autonomous government agencies.
They merely constitute the mechanism for an "umbrella" that brings together the existing
local governments, the agencies of the National Government, the ethno-linguistic groups or
tribes, and non-governmental organizations in a concerted effort to spur development in the
Cordilleras.
ISSUE:
WON CAR is a territorial and political subdivision.

FACTS:
EO 220, issued by the President in the exercise of her legislative powers under Art.
XVIII,sec. 6 of the Constitution, created the CAR. It was created to accelerate economic and
social growth in the region and to prepare for the establishment of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras. Its main
function is to coordinate the planning and implementation of programs and services in the
region, particularly, to coordinate with the local government units as well as with the
executive departments of the National Government in the supervision of field offices and in
identifying, planning, monitoring, and accepting projects and activities in the region. It shall
also monitor the implementation of all ongoing national and local government projects in the
region. The CAR shall have a Cordillera Regional Assembly as a policy-formulating body
and a Cordillera Executive Board as an implementing arm. The CAR and the Assembly and
Executive Board shalle xist until such time as the autonomous regional government is
established and organized. In these cases, petitioners principally argue that by issuing E.O.
No. 220 the President, inthe exercise of her legislative powers prior to the convening of the
first Congress under the 1987Constitution, has virtually pre-empted Congress from its
mandated task of enacting an organicact and created an autonomous region in the
Cordilleras.
ISSUE:
W ON EO 220 is va lid
RULING:

RULING:
No We have seen earlier that the CAR is not the autonomous region in the Cordilleras
contemplated by the Constitution. Thus, we now address petitioners' assertion that E.O. No.
220contravenes the Constitution by creating a new territorial and political subdivision. After
carefully considering the provisions of E.O. No. 220, we find that it did not create a new
territorial and political subdivision or merge existing ones into a larger subdivision. Firstly,
the CAR is not a public corporation or a territorial and political subdivision. It does not have
a separate juridical personality, unlike provinces, cities and municipalities. Neither is it
vested with the powers that are normally granted to public corporations, e.g. the power to
sue and be sued, the power to own and dispose of property, the power to create its own
sources of revenue, etc. As stated earlier, the CAR was created primarily to coordinate the
planning and implementation of programs and services in the covered areas. The creation
of administrative regions for the purpose of expediting the delivery of services is nothing
new. The Integrated Reorganization Plan of 1972, which was made as part of the law of the
land by virtue of PD 1, established 11regions, later increased to 12, with definite regional
centers and required departments and agencies of the Executive Branch of the National
Government to set up field offices therein. The functions of the regional offices to be
established pursuant to the Reorganization Plan are: (1) to implement laws, policies, plans,
programs, rules and regulations of the department or agency in the regional areas; (2) to
provide economical, efficient and effective service to the people in the area; (3) to
coordinate with regional offices of other departments, bureaus and agencies in the area; (4)
to coordinate with local government units in the area; and (5) to perform such other
functions as may be provided by law.CAR is in the same genre as the administrative regions
created under the Reorganization Plan, albeit under E.O. No. 220 the operation of the CAR

requires the participation not only of the line departments and agencies of the National
Government but also the local governments, ethno-linguistic groups and non-governmental
organizations in bringing about the desired objectives and the appropriation of funds solely
for that purpose.
Issue: WON the creation of the CAR contravened the constitutional guarantee of the local
autonomy for the provinces (Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain
Province) andcity (Baguio City) which compose the CAR.
Ruling: No, It must be clarified that the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the
Constitution refers to the administrative autonomy of local government units or, cast in more
technical language, the decentralization of government authority. Local autonomy is not
unique to the1987 Constitution, it being guaranteed also under the 1973 Constitution. And
while there was no express guarantee under the 1935 Constitution, the Congress enacted
the Local Autonomy Act(R.A. No. 2264) and the Decentralization Act (R.A. No. 5185), which
ushered the irreversible march towards further enlargement of local autonomy in the
country. On the other hand, the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and
the Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the 1987 Constitution, contemplates the grant of political
autonomy and not just administrative autonomy to these regions. Thus, the provision in the
Constitution for an autonomous regional government with a basic structure consisting of ane
xecutive department and a legislative assembly and special courts with personal, family and
property law jurisdiction in each of the autonomous regions. As we have said earlier, the
CAR is a mere transitory coordinating agency that would prepare the stage for political
autonomy for the Cordilleras. It fills in the resulting gap in the process of transforming a
group of adjacent territorial and political subdivisions already enjoying local or administrative
autonomy into an autonomous region vested with political autonomy.

ORDILLO VS COMELEC (192 SCRA 100)

FACTS:
On January 30, 1990, the people of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao,
Abra and Kalinga-Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their votes in a plebiscite held
pursuant to Republic Act No. 6766 entitled An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the
Cordillera Autonomous Region.
The official Commission on Elections (COMELEC) results of the plebiscite showed that the
creation of the Region was approved by a majority of 5,889 votes in only the Ifugao
Province and was overwhelmingly rejected by 148,676 votes in the rest of the provinces and
city above-mentioned.
Consequently, the COMELEC, on February 14, 1990, issued Resolution No. 2259 stating
that the Organic Act for the Region has been approved and/or ratified by majority of the
votes cast only in the province of Ifugao.
the petitioner filed a petition with COMELEC to declare the non-ratification of the Organic
Act for the Region. The petitioners maintain that there can be no valid Cordillera
Autonomous Region in only one province as the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766
require that the said Region be composed of more than one constituent unit.

ISSUE:
The question raised in this petition is whether or not the province of Ifugao, being the only
province which voted favorably for the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region can,
alone, legally and validly constitute such Region.
HELD:

The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region.
It is explicit in Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution. The keywords provinces,
cities, municipalities and geographical areas connote that region is to be made up
of more than one constituent unit. The term region used in its ordinary sense
means two or more provinces. This is supported by the fact that the thirteen (13)
regions into which the Philippines is divided for administrative purposes are
groupings of contiguous provinces. Ifugao is a province by itself. To become part of a
region, it must join other provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas. It
joins other units because of their common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage,
economic and social structures and other relevant characteristics. The Constitutional
requirements are not present in this case.
Article III, Sections 1 and 2 of Republic Act No. 6766 provide that the Cordillera Autonomous
Region is to be administered by the Cordillera government consisting of the Regional
Government and local government units. It further provides that:
SECTION 2. The Regional Government shall exercise powers and functions necessary for
the proper governance and development of all provinces, cities, municipalities, and
barangay or ili within the Autonomous Region . . .
From these sections, it can be gleaned that Congress never intended that a single
province may constitute the autonomous region. Otherwise, we would be faced with
the absurd situation of having two sets of officials, a set of provincial officials and
another set of regional officials exercising their executive and legislative powers over
exactly the same small area.

ROGELIO BAGABUYO VS COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

FACTS:
Cagayan de Oro used to have only one legislative district. But in 2006, CdO Congressman
Constantino Jaraula sponsored a bill to have two legislative districts in CdO instead. The
law was passed (RA 9371) hence two legislative districts were created. Rogelio Bagabuyo

assailed the validity of the said law and he went immediately to the Supreme Court to enjoin
the COMELEC from enforcing the law in the upcoming elections. Bagabuyo was contending
that the 2nd district was created without a plebiscite which he averred was required by the
Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a plebiscite was required in the case at bar.

(MILF) as an aspect of Tripoli Agreement of Peace in 2001 is scheduled to be signed in

Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
This agreement was petitioned by the Province of North Cotabato for Mandamus and
Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary
Restraining Order. The agreement mentions Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) to which it
grants the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the
Bangsamoro; authority and jurisdiction over all natural resources within internal waters. The
agreement is composed of two local statutes: the organic act for autonomous region in
Muslim Mindanao and the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA).

HELD:
No, a plebiscite is not required in the case at bar. RA 9371 merely increased the
representation of Cagayan de Oro City in the House of Representatives and Sangguniang
Panglungsod pursuant to Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution; the criteria
established under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution only apply when there is a
creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of a province, city,
municipality, or barangay; in this case, no such creation, division, merger, abolition or
alteration of boundaries of a local government unit took place; and R.A. No. 9371 did not
bring about any change in Cagayan de Oros territory, population and income classification;
hence, no plebiscite is required. What happened here was a reapportionment of a
single legislative district into two legislativedistricts. Reapportionment is the realignment or
change in legislative districts brought about by changes in population and mandated by the
constitutional requirement of equality of representation.
Before, Cagayan de Oro had only one congressman and 12 city council members citywide
for its population of approximately 500,000. By having two legislativedistricts, each of them
with one congressman, Cagayan de Oro now effectively has two congressmen, each one
representing 250,000 of the citys population. This easily means better access to their
congressman since each one now services only 250,000 constituents as against the
500,000.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the GRP violated the Constitutional and statutory provisions on public
consultation and the right to information when they negotiated and initiated the MOA-AD
and Whether or not the MOA-AD brought by the GRP and MILF is constitutional.

HELD:

GRP violated the Constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation and the right
to information when they negotiated and initiated the MOA-AD and it are unconstitutional
because it is contrary to law and the provisions of the constitution thereof.

THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO VS. THE GRP PEACE PANEL ON

ANCESTRAL DOMAIN,
568 SCRA 402 (2008)
REASONING:

FACTS:
The GRP is required by this law to carry out public consultations on both national and local
levels to build consensus for peace agenda and process and the mobilization and facilitation
of peoples participation in the peace process.
The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) brought about by the
Government of the republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front

Article III (Bill of Rights)

Sec. 7. The right of people on matters of public concern shall be recognized, access to
official records and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development
shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
Article II
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law , that state adopts and
implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
LGC (1991), require all national agencies and officers to conduct periodic consultations. No
project or program be implemented unless such consultations are complied with and
approval mus be obtained.
Article VII (Executive Department)
Sec. 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred
in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
Article X. (Local Government)
Sec. 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the
province, cities, municipalities and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions on
Muslim Mindanao and the Cordillera as hereinafter provided.
Sec. 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the
Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas sharing
common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures and
other relevant characteristics within the framework of this constitution and the national
sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.

3. Ancestral domain and natural resources;

4. Personal, family, and property relations;
5. Regional urban and rural planning development;
6. Economic, social, and tourism development;
7. Educational policies;
8. Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
9. Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare
of the people of the region.
The President has sole authority in the treaty-making.
ARTICLE XVII (AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS)
Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
1. The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or
2. A constitutional convention.
Section 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section 1 hereof shall
be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not
earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the approval of such amendment or
revision.
MOA-AD states that all provisions thereof which cannot be reconciled with the present
constitution and laws shall come into force upon signing of a comprehensive compact and
upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework. The presidents authority is
limited to proposing constitutional amendments. She cannot guarantee to any third party
that the required amendments will eventually be put in place nor even be submitted to a
plebiscite. MOA-AD itself presents the need to amend therein.

EVARDONE V. COMELEC, 204 SCRA 464, 472, DECEMBER 2, 1991

Section 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions to
ensure that laws are faithfully executed.

FACTS:

Sec. 18. The creation of autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority
of the votes cast by the constituents units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided
that only provinces, cities and geographic areas voting favourably in such plebiscite shall be
included in the autonomous region.

Felipe Evardone the mayor of Sulat, Eastern Samar, having been elected to the position during the 1988 local
elections. He assumedoffice immediately after proclamation. In 1990, Alexander R. Apelado, Victozino E. Aclan and
Noel A. Nival filed a petition for the recall of Evardone with the Office of the Local Election Registrar, Municipality of
Sulat. The Comelec issued a Resolution approving therecommendation of Election Registrar Vedasto Sumbilla to
hold the signing of petition for recall against Evardone.Evardone filed a petition for prohibition with urgent prayer of
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. Later, inan en banc resolution, the Comelec nullified the signing
process for being violative of the TRO of the court. Hence, this present petition.

Sec. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and
national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers
over:
1. Administrative organization;
2. Creation of sources of revenues;

ISSUE 1:
WON Resolution No. 2272 promulgated by the COMELEC by virtue of its powers under the Constitution and BP 337
(Local GovernmentCode) was valid.

HELD:

RATIO:

Yes

In the present case, the records show that Evardone knew of the Notice of Recall filed by Apelado, on or about 21
February 1990 asevidenced by the Registry Return Receipt; yet, he was not vigilant in following up and determining
the outcome of such notice. Evardonealleges that it was only on or about 3 July 1990 that he came to know about the
Resolution of the COMELEC setting the signing of thepetition for recall on 14 July 1990. But despite his urgent prayer
for the issuance of a TRO, Evardone filed the petition for prohibition onlyon 10 July 1990. Indeed, this Court issued a
TRO on 12 July 1990 but the signing of the petition for recall took place just the same on thescheduled date through
no fault of the COMELEC and Apelado. The signing process was undertaken by the constituents of theMunicipality of
Sulat and its Election Registrar in good faith and without knowledge of the TRO earlier issued by this Court. As attested
byElection Registrar Sumbilla, about 2,050 of the 6,090 registered voters of Sulat, Eastern Samar or about 34%
signed the petition for recall.As held in Parades vs. Executive Secretary there is no turning back theclock.The right to
recall is complementary to the right to elect or appoint. It is included in the right of suffrage. It is based on thetheory that
the electorate must maintain a direct and elastic control over public functionaries. It is also predicated upon the idea that
apublic office is "burdened" with public interests and that the representatives of the people holding public offices are
simply agents orservants of the people with definite powers and specific duties to perform and to follow if they wish to
remain in their respective offices.Whether or not the electorate of Sulat has lost confidence in the incumbent mayor is a
political question. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people are the judge. "Loss of confidence is the
formal withdrawal by an electorate of their trust in a person'sability to discharge his office previously bestowed on him
by the same electorate. The constituents have made a judgment and their willto recall Evardone has already been
ascertained and must be afforded the highest respect. Thus, the signing process held last 14 July1990 for the recall of
Mayor Felipe P.Evardone of said municipality is valid and has legal effect.However, recall at this time is no longer
possible because of the limitation provided in Sec. 55 (2) of B.P.Blg, 337. TheConstitution has mandated a
synchronized national and local election prior to 30 June 1992, or more specifically, as provided for in ArticleXVIII, Sec.
5 on the second Monday of May, 1992. Thus,

RATIO:
Evardone maintains that Article X, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution repealed Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 in favor of
one to be enacted byCongress. Since there was, during the period material to this case, no local government code
enacted by Congress after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution nor any law for that matter on the subject of recall of
elected government officials, Evardone contends that there isno basis for COMELEC Resolution No. 2272 and that
the recall proceedings in the case at bar is premature.The COMELEC avers that the constitutional provision does not
refer only to a local government code which is in futurum butalso in esse. It merely sets forth the guidelines which
Congress will consider in amending the provisions of the present LGC. Pending theenactment of the amendatory law,
the existing Local Government Code remains operative.Article XVIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution express
provides that all existing laws not inconsistent with the 1987Constitution shall remain operative, until amended,
repealed or revoked. Republic Act No. 7160 providing for the Local Government Codeof 1991, approved by the
President on 10 October 1991, specifically repeals B.P.Blg. 337 as provided in Sec. 534, Title Four of said Act.But the
Local Government Code of 1991 will take effect only on 1 January 1992 and therefore the old Local Government
Code (B.P.Blg.337) is still the law applicable to the present case. Prior to the enactment of the new Local Government
Code, the effectiveness of B.P.Blg. 337 was expressly recognized in the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission. We therefore rule that Resolution No. 2272promulgated by the COMELEC is valid and constitutional.
Consequently, the COMELEC had the authority to approve the petition for recalland set the date for the signing of said
petition.
ISSUE 2:
WON the TRO issued by this Court rendered nugatory the signing process of the petition for recall held pursuant to
Resolution No. 2272.
HELD:
No