[G.R. No. 124099.

October 30, 1997]

MANUEL G. REYES, MILA G. REYES, DANILO G. REYES, LYN AGAPE,
MARITES AGAPE, ESTABANA GALOLO, and CELSA AGAPE,petitioners,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIO VIVARES, respondents.
DECISION
TORRES, JR., J.:
Unless legally flawed, a testators intention in his last will and testament is its
life and soul which deserves reverential observance.
The controversy before us deals with such a case.
Petitioners Manuel G. Reyes, Mila G. Reyes, Danilo G. Reyes, Lyn Agape,
Marites Agape, Estebana Galolo and Celsa Agape, the oppositors in Special
Proceedings No. 112 for the probate of the will of Torcuato J. Reyes, assail in this
petition for review the decision of the Court of Appeals [1] dated November 29, 1995,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment appealed from allowing or
admitting the will of Torcuato J. Reyes to probate and directing the issuance of Letter
Testamentary in favor of petitioner Julio A. Vivares as executor without bond is
AFFIRMED but modified in that the declaration that paragraph II of the Torcuato
Reyes' last will and testament, including subparagraphs (a) and (b) are null and void
for being contrary to law is hereby SET ASIDE, said paragraphs (a) and (b) are
declared VALID. Except as above modified, the judgment appealed from is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED."[2]

a. All my shares of our personal properties consisting among others of jewelries,

coins, antiques, statues, tablewares, furnitures, fixtures and the building;
b. All my shares consisting of one half (1/2) or 50% of all the real estates I own in
common with my brother Jose, situated in Municipalities of Mambajao, Mahinog,
Guinsiliban, Sagay all in Camiguin; real estates in Lunao, Ginoong, Caamulan,
Sugbongcogon, Boloc-Boloc, Kinoguinatan, Balingoan, Sta. Ines, Caesta, Talisayan,
all in the province of Misamis Oriental.[3]
The will consisted of two pages and was signed by Torcuato Reyes in the
presence of three witnesses: Antonio Veloso, Gloria Borromeo, and Soledad
Gaputan. Private respondent Julio A. Vivares was designated the executor and in his
default or incapacity, his son Roch Alan S. Vivares.
Reyes died on May 12, 1992 and on May 21, 1992, private respondent filed a
petition for probate of the will before the Regional Trial Court of Mambajao,
Camiguin. The petitioner was set for hearing and the order was published in the
Mindanao Daily Post, a newspaper of general circulation, once a week for three
consecutive weeks. Notices were likewise sent to all the persons named in the
petition.
On July 21, 1992, the recognized natural children of Torcuato Reyes with
Estebana Galolo, namely Manuel, Mila, and Danilo all surnamed Reyes, and the
deceaseds natural children with Celsa Agape, namely Lyn and Marites Agape, filed
an opposition with the following allegations: a) that the last will and testament of
Reyes was not executed and attested in accordance with the formalities of law; and
b) that Asuncion Reyes Ebarle exerted undue and improper influence upon the
testator at the time of the execution of the will. The opposition further averred that
Reyes was never married to and could never marry Asuncion Reyes, the woman he
claimed to be his wife in the will, because the latter was already married to Lupo
Ebarle who was still then alive and their marriage was never annulled. Thus
Asuncion can not be a compulsory heir for her open cohabitation with Reyes was
violative of public morals.

The antecedent facts:

On January 3, 1992, Torcuato J. Reyes executed his last will and testament
declaring therein in part, to wit:
xxx
II. I give and bequeath to my wife Asuncion Oning R. Reyes the following properties
to wit:

On July 22, 1992, the trial court issued an ordering declaring that it had
acquired jurisdiction over the petition and, therefore, allowed the presentation of
evidence. After the presentation of evidence and submission of the respective
memoranda, the trial court issued its decision on April 23, 1993.
The trial court declared that the will was executed in accordance with the
formalities prescribed by law. It, however, ruled that Asuncion Reyes, based on the
testimonies of the witnesses, was never married to the deceased Reyes, and,
therefore, their relationship was an adulterous one. Thus:

The admission in the will by the testator to the illicit relationship between him and
ASUNCION REYES EBARLE who is somebody elses, wife, is further bolstered,
strengthened, and confirmed by the direct testimonies of the petitioner himself and
his two attesting witnesses during the trial.

to destroy the presumption of marriage. To further support their contention,

petitioners attached a copy of the marriage certificate of Asuncion Reyes and Lupo
Ebarle.[6]
The petition is devoid of merit.

In both cases, the common denominator is the immoral meretrecious, adulterous and
adulterous and illicit relationship existing between the testator and the devisee prior
to the death of the testator, which constituted the sole and primary consideration for
the devise or legacy, thus making the will intrinsically invalid.[4]
The will of Reyes was admitted to probate except for paragraph II (a) and (b) of
the will which was declared null and void for being contrary to law and
morals. Hence, Julio Vivares filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals with the
allegation that the oppositors failed to present any competent evidence that Asuncion
Reyes was legally married to another person during the period of her cohabitation
with Torcuato Reyes.
On November 29, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed decision
which affirmed the trial courts decision admitting the will for probate but the
modification that paragraph II including subparagraphs (a) and (b) were declared
valid. The appellee court stated:
Considering that the oppositors never showed any competent, documentary
or otherwise during the trial to show that Asuncion Oning Reyes marriage to
the testator was inexistent or void, either because of a pre-existing marriage or
adulterous relationship, the trial court gravely erred in striking down paragraph
II (a) and (b) of the subject Last Will and Testament, as void for being contrary
to law and morals. Said declarations are not sufficient to destroy the
presumption of marriage. Nor is it enough to overcome the very declaration of
the testator that Asuncion Reyes is his wife.[5]
Dissatisfied with the decision of the Court of Appeals, the oppositors filed this
petition for review.
Petitioners contend that the findings and conclusion of the Court of Appeals
was contrary to law, public policy and evidence on record. Torcuato Reyes and
Asuncion Oning Reyes were collateral relatives up to the fourth civil degree. Witness
Gloria Borromeo testified that Oning Reyes was her cousin as her mother and the
latters father were sister and brother. They were also nieces of the late Torcuato
Reyes. Thus, the purported marriage of the deceased Reyes and Oning Reyes was
void ab initio as it was against public policy pursuant to Article 38 (1) of the Family
Code. Petitioners further alleged that Oning Reyes was already married to Lupo
Ebarle at the time she was cohabiting with the testator hence, she could never contact
any valid marriage with the latter. Petitioners argued that the testimonies of the
witnesses as well as the personal declaration of the testator, himself, were sufficient

As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only upon
the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated. [7] Thus, the court merely
inquires on its due execution, whether or not it complies with the formalities
prescribed by law, and the testamentary capacity of the testator. It does not determine
nor even by implication prejudge the validity or efficacy of the wills provisions.
[8]
The intrinsic validity is not considered since the consideration thereof usually
comes only after the will has been proved and allowed. There are, however, notable
circumstances wherein the intrinsic validity was first determined as when the defect
of the will is apparent on its face and the probate of the will may become a useless
ceremony if it is intrinsically invalid.[9] The intrinsic validity of a will may be passed
upon because practical considerations demanded it as when there is preterition of
heirs or the testamentary provisions are doubtful legality.[10] Where the parties agree
that the intrinsic validity be first determined, the probate court may also do so.
[11]
Parenthetically, the rule on probate is not inflexible and absolute. Under
exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation
constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the will.[12]
The case at bar arose from the institution of the petition for the probate of the
will of the late Torcuato Reyes. Perforce, the only issues to be settled in the said
proceeding were: (1) whether or not the testator had animus testandi; (2) whether or
not vices of consent attended the execution of the will; and (3) whether or not the
formalities of the will had been complied with. Thus, the lower court was not asked
to rule upon the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will. As a result,
the declaration of the testator that Asuncion Oning Reyes was his wife did not have
to be scrutinized during the probate proceedings. The propriety of the institution of
Oning Reyes as one of the devisees/legatees already involved inquiry on the wills
intrinsic validity and which need not be inquired upon by the probate court.
The lower court erroneously invoked the ruling in Nepomuceno vs. Court of
Appeals (139 SCRA 206) in the instant case. In the case aforesaid, the testator
himself, acknowledged his illicit relationship with the devisee, to wit:
Art. IV. That since 1952, I have been living, as man and wife, with one Sofia J.
Nepomuceno, whom I declare and avow to be entitled to my love an [sic] affection,
for all the things which she has done for me, now and in the past; that while Sofia J.
Nepomuceno has with my full knowledge and consent, did comfort and represent
myself as her own husband, in truth and in fact, as well as in the eyes of the law, I
could not bind her to me in the holy bonds of matrimony because of my
aforementioned previous marriage.

Thus, the very tenor of the will invalidates the legacy because the testator
admitted he was disposing of the properties to a person with whom he had been
living in concubinage.[13] To remand the case would only be a waste of time and
money since the illegality or defect was already patent. This case is different from
the Nepomuceno case. Testator Torcuato Reyes merely stated in his will that he was
bequeathing some of his personal and real properties to his wife, Asuncion Oning
Reyes. There was never an open admission of any illicit relationship. In the case of
Nepomuceno, the testator admitted that he was already previously married and that
he had an adulterous relationship with the devisee.

this petition for review. This Court would no try the case a new or settle factual
issues since its jurisdiction is confined to resolving questions of law which have been
passed upon by the lower courts. The settled rule is that the factual findings of the
appellate court will not be disturbed unless shown to be contrary to the evidence on
the record, which petitioners have not shown in this case.[15]

We agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court relied on uncorroborated
testimonial evidence that Asuncion Reyes was still married to another during the
time she cohabited with the testator. The testimonies of the witnesses were merely
hearsay and even uncertain as to the whereabouts or existence of Lupo Ebarle, the
supposed husband of Asuncion. Thus:

ACCORDINGLY, decision appealed from dated November 29, 1995, is

hereby AFFIRMED and the instant petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit.

The foregoing testimony cannot go against the declaration of the testator that
Asuncion Oning Reyes is his wife. In Alvarado v. City Government of Tacloban
(supra) the Supreme Court stated that the declaration of the husband is competent
evidence to show the fact of marriage.
Considering that the oppositors never showed any competent evidence, documentary
or otherwise during the trial to show that Asuncion Oning Reyes marriage to the
testator was inexistent or void, either because of a pre-existing marriage or
adulterous relationship, the trial court gravely erred in striking down paragraph II (a)
and (b) of the subject Last Will and Testament, as void for being contrary to law and
morals. Said declarations are not sufficient to destroy the presumption of
marriage. Nor is it enough to overcome the very declaration of the testator that
Asuncion Reyes is his wife.[14]
In the elegant language of Justice Moreland written decades ago, he saidA will is the testator speaking after death. Its provisions have substantially the same
force and effect in the probate court as if the testator stood before the court in full life
making the declarations by word of mouth as they appear in the will. That was the
special purpose of the law in the creation of the instrument known as the last will and
testament. Men wished to speak after they were dead and the law, by the creation of
that instrument, permitted them to do so. xxx All doubts must be resolved in favor of
the testators having meant just what he said. (Santos vs. Manarang, 27 Phil. 209).
Petitioners tried to refute this conclusion of the Court of Appeals by presenting
belatedly a copy of the marriage certificate of Asuncion Reyes and Lupo
Ebarle. Their failure to present the said certificate before the probate court to support
their position that Asuncion Reyes had an existing marriage with Ebarle constituted a
waiver and the same evidence can no longer be entertained on appeal, much less in

Considering the foregoing premises, we sustain the findings of the appellate

court it appearing that it did not commit a reversible error in issuing the challenged
decision.

SO ORDERED.
Regalado, (Chairman), Romero, Puno, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 113725. June 29, 2000

JOHNNY S. RABADILLA,[1] petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND
MARIA
MARLENA[2] COSCOLUELLA
Y
BELLEZA
VILLACARLOS,respondents.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, [3] dated
December 23, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. CV-35555, which set aside the decision of
Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court in Bacolod City, and ordered the defendantsappellees (including herein petitioner), as heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey
title over Lot No. 1392, together with its fruits and interests, to the estate of Aleja
Belleza.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja
Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny
S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee of 511, 855 square meters of that parcel of
land surveyed as Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre. The said Codicil, which was
duly probated and admitted in Special Proceedings No. 4046 before the then Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental, contained the following provisions:
"FIRST
I give, leave and bequeath the following property owned by me to Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla resident of 141 P. Villanueva, Pasay City:
(a) Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. RT-4002 (10942), which is registered in my name according to
the records of the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental.
(b) That should Jorge Rabadilla die ahead of me, the aforementioned
property and the rights which I shall set forth hereinbelow, shall be inherited
and acknowledged by the children and spouse of Jorge Rabadilla.
xxx
FOURTH

(a)....It is also my command, in this my addition (Codicil), that should I die

and Jorge Rabadilla shall have already received the ownership of the said
Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. RT-4002 (10942), and also at the time that the lease of Balbinito
G. Guanzon of the said lot shall expire, Jorge Rabadilla shall have the
obligation until he dies, every year to give to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y
Belleza, Seventy (75) (sic) piculs of Export sugar and Twenty Five (25)
piculs of Domestic sugar, until the said Maria Marlina Coscolluela y
Belleza dies.
FIFTH
(a) Should Jorge Rabadilla die, his heir to whom he shall give Lot No. 1392
of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT4002 (10492), shall have the obligation to still give yearly, the sugar as
specified in the Fourth paragraph of his testament, to Maria Marlina
Coscolluela y Belleza on the month of December of each year.
SIXTH
I command, in this my addition (Codicil) that the Lot No. 1392, in the event
that the one to whom I have left and bequeathed, and his heir shall later sell,
lease, mortgage this said Lot, the buyer, lessee, mortgagee, shall have also
the obligation to respect and deliver yearly ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs
of sugar to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, on each month of
December, SEVENTY FIVE (75) piculs of Export and TWENTY FIVE
(25) piculs of Domestic, until Maria Marlina shall die, lastly should the
buyer, lessee or the mortgagee of this lot, not have respected my command
in this my addition (Codicil), Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, shall
immediately seize this Lot No. 1392 from my heir and the latter's heirs, and
shall turn it over to my near desendants, (sic) and the latter shall then have
the obligation to give the ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar until
Maria Marlina shall die. I further command in this my addition (Codicil)
that my heir and his heirs of this Lot No. 1392, that they will obey and
follow that should they decide to sell, lease, mortgage, they cannot
negotiate with others than my near descendants and my sister."[4]
Pursuant to the same Codicil, Lot No. 1392 was transferred to the deceased,
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44498 thereto issued in his
name.
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife Rufina and
children Johnny (petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida, all surnamed Rabadilla.

On August 21, 1989, Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza Villacarlos

brought a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 5588, before Branch 52 of the
Regional Trial Court in Bacolod City, against the above-mentioned heirs of Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, to enforce the provisions of subject Codicil. The Complaint alleged that
the defendant-heirs violated the conditions of the Codicil, in that:
1. Lot No. 1392 was mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank and the
Republic Planters Bank in disregard of the testatrix's specific instruction to
sell, lease, or mortgage only to the near descendants and sister of the
testatrix.
2. Defendant-heirs failed to comply with their obligation to deliver one
hundred (100) piculs of sugar (75 piculs export sugar and 25 piculs
domestic sugar) to plaintiff Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza from
sugar crop years 1985 up to the filing of the complaint as mandated by the
Codicil, despite repeated demands for compliance.
3. The banks failed to comply with the 6th paragraph of the Codicil which
provided that in case of the sale, lease, or mortgage of the property, the
buyer, lessee, or mortgagee shall likewise have the obligation to deliver 100
piculs of sugar per crop year to herein private respondent.
The plaintiff then prayed that judgment be rendered ordering defendantheirs to reconvey/return-Lot No. 1392 to the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza,
the cancellation of TCT No. 44498 in the name of the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla,
and the issuance of a new certificate of title in the names of the surviving heirs of the
late Aleja Belleza.
On February 26, 1990, the defendant-heirs were declared in default but on
March 28, 1990 the Order of Default was lifted, with respect to defendant Johnny S.
Rabadilla, who filed his Answer, accordingly.
During the pre-trial, the parties admitted that:
On November 15, 1998, the plaintiff (private respondent) and a certain Alan
Azurin, son-in-law of the herein petitioner who was lessee of the property and acting
as attorney-in-fact of defendant-heirs, arrived at an amicable settlement and entered
into a Memorandum of Agreement on the obligation to deliver one hundred piculs of
sugar, to the following effect:
"That for crop year 1988-89, the annuity mentioned in Entry No. 49074 of
TCT No. 44489 will be delivered not later than January of 1989, more
specifically, to wit:

75 piculs of 'A' sugar, and 25 piculs of 'B' sugar, or then

existing in any of our names, Mary Rose Rabadilla y
Azurin or Alan Azurin, during December of each sugar
crop year, in Azucar Sugar Central; and, this is considered
compliance of the annuity as mentioned, and in the same
manner will compliance of the annuity be in the next
succeeding crop years.
That the annuity above stated for crop year 1985-86, 1986-87, and 1987-88,
will be complied in cash equivalent of the number of piculs as mentioned
therein and which is as herein agreed upon, taking into consideration the
composite price of sugar during each sugar crop year, which is in the total
amount of ONE HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P105,000.00).
That the above-mentioned amount will be paid or delivered on a staggered
cash installment, payable on or before the end of December of every sugar crop year,
to wit:
For 1985-86, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY
(P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or before December of crop year 1988-89;
For 1986-87, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY
(P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or before December of crop year 1989-90;
For 1987-88, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY
(P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or before December of crop year 1990-91; and
For 1988-89, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY
(P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or before December of crop year 1991-92."[5]
However, there was no compliance with the aforesaid Memorandum of
Agreement except for a partial delivery of 50.80 piculs of sugar corresponding to
sugar crop year 1988 -1989.
On July 22, 1991, the Regional Trial Court came out with a decision,
dismissing the complaint and disposing as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the aforegoing findings, the Court finds that
the action is prematurely filed as no cause of action against the defendants
has as yet arose in favor of plaintiff. While there maybe the nonperformance of the command as mandated exaction from them simply
because they are the children of Jorge Rabadilla, the title holder/owner of
the lot in question, does not warrant the filing of the present complaint. The
remedy at bar must fall. Incidentally, being in the category as creditor of the
left estate, it is opined that plaintiff may initiate the intestate proceedings, if

only to establish the heirs of Jorge Rabadilla and in order to give full
meaning and semblance to her claim under the Codicil.
In the light of the aforegoing findings, the Complaint being prematurely
filed is DISMISSED without prejudice.
SO ORDERED."[6]
On appeal by plaintiff, the First Division of the Court of Appeals reversed
the decision of the trial court; ratiocinating and ordering thus:
"Therefore, the evidence on record having established plaintiff-appellant's
right to receive 100 piculs of sugar annually out of the produce of Lot No.
1392; defendants-appellee's obligation under Aleja Belleza's codicil, as
heirs of the modal heir, Jorge Rabadilla, to deliver such amount of sugar to
plaintiff-appellant; defendants-appellee's admitted non-compliance with
said obligation since 1985; and, the punitive consequences enjoined by both
the codicil and the Civil Code, of seizure of Lot No. 1392 and its reversion
to the estate of Aleja Belleza in case of such non-compliance, this Court
deems it proper to order the reconveyance of title over Lot No. 1392 from
the estates of Jorge Rabadilla to the estate of Aleja Belleza. However,
plaintiff-appellant must institute separate proceedings to re-open Aleja
Belleza's estate, secure the appointment of an administrator, and distribute
Lot No. 1392 to Aleja Belleza's legal heirs in order to enforce her right,
reserved to her by the codicil, to receive her legacy of 100 piculs of sugar
per year out of the produce of Lot No. 1392 until she dies.
Accordingly, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE and another one
entered ordering defendants-appellees, as heirs of Jorge Rabadilla, to
reconvey title over Lot No. 1392, together with its fruits and interests, to the
estate of Aleja Belleza.
SO ORDERED."[7]
Dissatisfied with the aforesaid disposition by the Court of Appeals,
petitioner found his way to this Court via the present petition, contending that the
Court of Appeals erred in ordering the reversion of Lot 1392 to the estate of the
testatrix Aleja Belleza on the basis of paragraph 6 of the Codicil, and in ruling that
the testamentary institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla is a modal institution within the
purview of Article 882 of the New Civil Code.
The petition is not impressed with merit.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in resolving the appeal
in accordance with Article 882 of the New Civil Code on modal institutions and in

deviating from the sole issue raised which is the absence or prematurity of the cause
of action. Petitioner maintains that Article 882 does not find application as there was
no modal institution and the testatrix intended a mere simple substitution - i.e. the
instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, was to be substituted by the testatrix's "near
descendants" should the obligation to deliver the fruits to herein private respondent
be not complied with. And since the testatrix died single and without issue, there can
be no valid substitution and such testamentary provision cannot be given any effect.
The petitioner theorizes further that there can be no valid substitution for
the reason that the substituted heirs are not definite, as the substituted heirs are
merely referred to as "near descendants" without a definite identity or reference as to
who are the "near descendants" and therefore, under Articles 843 [8] and 845[9] of the
New Civil Code, the substitution should be deemed as not written.
The contentions of petitioner are untenable. Contrary to his supposition that
the Court of Appeals deviated from the issue posed before it, which was the propriety
of the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of prematurity of cause of action,
there was no such deviation. The Court of Appeals found that the private respondent
had a cause of action against the petitioner. The disquisition made on modal
institution was, precisely, to stress that the private respondent had a legally
demandable right against the petitioner pursuant to subject Codicil; on which issue
the Court of Appeals ruled in accordance with law.
It is a general rule under the law on succession that successional rights are
transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent [10] and compulsory heirs are
called to succeed by operation of law. The legitimate children and descendants, in
relation to their legitimate parents, and the widow or widower, are compulsory heirs.
[11]
Thus, the petitioner, his mother and sisters, as compulsory heirs of the instituted
heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, succeeded the latter by operation of law, without need of
further proceedings, and the successional rights were transmitted to them from the
moment of death of the decedent, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all the
property, rights and obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death.
Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of subject
Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his death. And since
obligations not extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the decedent;
corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death.
In the said Codicil, testatrix Aleja Belleza devised Lot No. 1392 to Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, subject to the condition that the usufruct thereof would be delivered to the
herein private respondent every year. Upon the death of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his
compulsory heirs succeeded to his rights and title over the said property, and they
also assumed his (decedent's) obligation to deliver the fruits of the lot involved to

herein private respondent. Such obligation of the instituted heir reciprocally

corresponds to the right of private respondent over the usufruct, the fulfillment or
performance of which is now being demanded by the latter through the institution of
the case at bar. Therefore, private respondent has a cause of action against petitioner
and the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint below.
Petitioner also theorizes that Article 882 of the New Civil Code on modal
institutions is not applicable because what the testatrix intended was a substitution Dr. Jorge Rabadilla was to be substituted by the testatrix's near descendants should
there be noncompliance with the obligation to deliver the piculs of sugar to private
respondent.
Again, the contention is without merit.
Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons to take
the place of the heir or heirs first instituted. Under substitutions in general, the
testator may either (1) provide for the designation of another heir to whom the
property shall pass in case the original heir should die before him/her, renounce the
inheritance or be incapacitated to inherit, as in a simple substitution, [12] or (2) leave
his/her property to one person with the express charge that it be transmitted
subsequently to another or others, as in a fideicommissary substitution. [13] The
Codicil sued upon contemplates neither of the two.
In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in default of
the first heir by reason of incapacity, predecease or renunciation. [14] In the case under
consideration, the provisions of subject Codicil do not provide that should Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla default due to predecease, incapacity or renunciation, the testatrix's near
descendants would substitute him. What the Codicil provides is that, should Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the conditions imposed in the Codicil, the
property referred to shall be seized and turned over to the testatrix's near
descendants.
Neither is there a fideicommissary substitution here and on this point,
petitioner is correct. In a fideicommissary substitution, the first heir is strictly
mandated to preserve the property and to transmit the same later to the second
heir.[15] In the case under consideration, the instituted heir is in fact allowed under the
Codicil to alienate the property provided the negotiation is with the near descendants
or the sister of the testatrix. Thus, a very important element of a fideicommissary
substitution is lacking; the obligation clearly imposing upon the first heir the
preservation of the property and its transmission to the second heir. "Without this
obligation to preserve clearly imposed by the testator in his will, there is no
fideicommissary substitution."[16] Also, the near descendants' right to inherit from the
testatrix is not definite. The property will only pass to them should Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the obligation to deliver part of the usufruct to
private respondent.

Another important element of a fideicommissary substitution is also missing

here. Under Article 863, the second heir or the fideicommissary to whom the
property is transmitted must not be beyond one degree from the first heir or the
fiduciary. A fideicommissary substitution is therefore, void if the first heir is not
related by first degree to the second heir.[17] In the case under scrutiny, the near
descendants are not at all related to the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
The Court of Appeals erred not in ruling that the institution of Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla under subject Codicil is in the nature of a modal institution and therefore,
Article 882 of the New Civil Code is the provision of law in point. Articles 882 and
883 of the New Civil Code provide:
Art. 882. The statement of the object of the institution or the application of
the property left by the testator, or the charge imposed on him, shall not be
considered as a condition unless it appears that such was his intention.
That which has been left in this manner may be claimed at once provided
that the instituted heir or his heirs give security for compliance with the
wishes of the testator and for the return of anything he or they may receive,
together with its fruits and interests, if he or they should disregard this
obligation.
Art. 883. When without the fault of the heir, an institution referred to in the
preceding article cannot take effect in the exact manner stated by the
testator, it shall be complied with in a manner most analogous to and in
conformity with his wishes.
The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article 882 is what is
known in the law of succession as an institucion sub modo or a modal institution. In
a modal institution, the testator states (1) the object of the institution, (2) the purpose
or application of the property left by the testator, or (3) the charge imposed by the
testator upon the heir.[18] A "mode" imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee but
it does not affect the efficacy of his rights to the succession. [19] On the other hand, in
a conditional testamentary disposition, the condition must happen or be fulfilled in
order for the heir to be entitled to succeed the testator. The condition suspends but
does not obligate; and the mode obligates but does not suspend. [20] To some extent, it
is similar to a resolutory condition.[21]
From the provisions of the Codicil litigated upon, it can be gleaned
unerringly that the testatrix intended that subject property be inherited by Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla. It is likewise clearly worded that the testatrix imposed an obligation on
the said instituted heir and his successors-in-interest to deliver one hundred piculs of
sugar to the herein private respondent, Marlena Coscolluela Belleza, during the
lifetime of the latter. However, the testatrix did not make Dr. Jorge Rabadilla's
inheritance and the effectivity of his institution as a devisee, dependent on the

performance of the said obligation. It is clear, though, that should the obligation be
not complied with, the property shall be turned over to the testatrix's near
descendants. The manner of institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil
is evidently modal in nature because it imposes a charge upon the instituted heir
without, however, affecting the efficacy of such institution.
Then too, since testamentary dispositions are generally acts of liberality, an
obligation imposed upon the heir should not be considered a condition unless it
clearly appears from the Will itself that such was the intention of the testator. In case
of doubt, the institution should be considered as modal and not conditional. [22]
Neither is there tenability in the other contention of petitioner that the
private respondent has only a right of usufruct but not the right to seize the property
itself from the instituted heir because the right to seize was expressly limited to
violations by the buyer, lessee or mortgagee.
In the interpretation of Wills, when an uncertainty arises on the face of the
Will, as to the application of any of its provisions, the testator's intention is to be
ascertained from the words of the Will, taking into consideration the circumstances
under which it was made. [23] Such construction as will sustain and uphold the Will in
all its parts must be adopted.[24]
Subject Codicil provides that the instituted heir is under obligation to
deliver One Hundred (100) piculs of sugar yearly to Marlena Belleza Coscuella.
Such obligation is imposed on the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his heirs, and
their buyer, lessee, or mortgagee should they sell, lease, mortgage or otherwise
negotiate the property involved. The Codicil further provides that in the event that
the obligation to deliver the sugar is not respected, Marlena Belleza Coscuella shall
seize the property and turn it over to the testatrix's near descendants. The nonperformance of the said obligation is thus with the sanction of seizure of the property
and reversion thereof to the testatrix's near descendants. Since the said obligation is
clearly imposed by the testatrix, not only on the instituted heir but also on his
successors-in-interest, the sanction imposed by the testatrix in case of non-fulfillment
of said obligation should equally apply to the instituted heir and his successors-ininterest.
Similarly unsustainable is petitioner's submission that by virtue of the
amicable settlement, the said obligation imposed by the Codicil has been assumed by
the lessee, and whatever obligation petitioner had become the obligation of the
lessee; that petitioner is deemed to have made a substantial and constructive
compliance of his obligation through the consummated settlement between the lessee
and the private respondent, and having consummated a settlement with the petitioner,
the recourse of the private respondent is the fulfillment of the obligation under the
amicable settlement and not the seizure of subject property.

Suffice it to state that a Will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by
which a person disposes of his property, to take effect after his death. [25] Since the
Will expresses the manner in which a person intends how his properties be disposed,
the wishes and desires of the testator must be strictly followed. Thus, a Will cannot
be the subject of a compromise agreement which would thereby defeat the very
purpose of making a Will.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of the
Court of Appeals, dated December 23, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. CV-35555
AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-6801

March 14, 1912

JULIANA BAGTAS, plaintiffs-appellee,

vs.
ISIDRO PAGUIO, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Salas and Kalaw for appellants.
Jose Santiago for appellee.
TRENT, J.:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of the
Province of Bataan, admitting to probate a document which was offered as the last
will and testament of Pioquinto Paguio y Pizarro. The will purports to have been
executed in the pueblo of Pilar, Province of Bataan, on the 19th day of April, 1908.
The testator died on the 28th of September, 1909, a year and five months following
the date of the execution of the will. The will was propounded by the executrix,
Juliana Bagtas, widow of the decedent, and the opponents are a son and several
grandchildren by a former marriage, the latter being the children of a deceased
daughter.
The basis of the opposition to the probation of the will is that the same was
not executed according to the formalities and requirements of the law touching wills,
and further that the testator was not in the full of enjoyment and use of his mental
faculties and was without the mental capacity necessary to execute a valid will.
The record shows that the testator, Pioquinto Paguio, for some fourteen of
fifteen years prior to the time of his death suffered from a paralysis of the left side of
his body; that a few years prior to his death his hearing became impaired and that he
lost the power of speech. Owing to the paralysis of certain muscles his head fell to
one side, and saliva ran from his mouth. He retained the use of his right hand,
however, and was able to write fairly well. Through the medium of signs he was able
to indicate his wishes to his wife and to other members of his family.
At the time of the execution of the will there were present the four
testamentary witnesses, Agustin Paguio, Anacleto Paguio, and Pedro Paguio, and
attorney, Seor Marco, and one Florentino Ramos. Anacleto Paguio and the attorney
have since died, and consequently their testimony was not available upon the trial of
the case in the lower court. The other three testamentary witnesses and the witness
Florentino Ramos testified as to the manner in which the will was executed.
According to the uncontroverted testimony of these witnesses the will was executed
in the following manner:

Pioquinto Paguio, the testator, wrote out on pieces of paper notes and items
relating to the disposition of his property, and these notes were in turn delivered to
Seor Marco, who transcribed them and put them in form. The witnesses testify that
the pieces of paper upon which the notes were written are delivered to attorney by
the testator; that the attorney read them to the testator asking if they were his
testamentary dispositions; that the testator assented each time with an affirmative
movement of his head; that after the will as a whole had been thus written by the
attorney, it was read in a loud voice in the presence of the testator and the witnesses;
that Seor Marco gave the document to the testator; that the latter, after looking over
it, signed it in the presence of the four subscribing witnesses; and that they in turn
signed it in the presence of the testator and each other.
These are the facts of record with reference to the execution of the will and
we are in perfect accord with the judgment of the lower court that the formalities of
the Code of Civil Procedure have been fully complied with.
This brings us now to a consideration of appellants' second assignment of
error, viz, the testator's alleged mental incapacity at the time of the execution of the
will. Upon this point considerable evidence was adduced at the trial. One of the
attesting witnesses testified that at the time of the execution of the will the testator
was in his right mind, and that although he was seriously ill, he indicated by
movements of his head what his wishes were. Another of the attesting witnesses
stated that he was not able to say whether decedent had the full use of his mental
faculties or not, because he had been ill for some years, and that he (the witnesses)
was not a physician. The other subscribing witness, Pedro Paguio, testified in the
lower court as a witness for the opponents. He was unable to state whether or not the
will was the wish of the testator. The only reasons he gave for his statement were the
infirmity and advanced age of the testator and the fact that he was unable to speak.
The witness stated that the testator signed the will, and he verified his own signature
as a subscribing witness.
Florentino Ramos, although not an attesting witness, stated that he was
present when the will was executed and his testimony was cumulative in
corroboration of the manner in which the will was executed and as to the fact that the
testator signed the will. This witness also stated that he had frequently transacted
matters of business for the decedent and had written letters and made inventories of
his property at his request, and that immediately before and after the execution of the
will he had performed offices of his character. He stated that the decedent was able to
communicate his thoughts by writing. The testimony of this witness clearly indicates
the presence of mental capacity on the part of the testator. Among other witnesses for
the opponents were two physician, Doctor Basa and Doctor Viado. Doctor Basa
testified that he had attended the testator some four or five years prior to his death
and that the latter had suffered from a cerebral congestion from which the paralysis
resulted. The following question was propounded to Doctor Basa:

Q.
Referring to mental condition in which you found him the last time
you attended him, do you think he was in his right mind?

matter of the will of Cabigting, 14 Phil. Rep., 463; in the matter of the will of
Butalid, 10 Phil. Rep., 27; Hernaez vs. Hernaez, 1 Phil. Rep., 689.)

A.
I can not say exactly whether he was in his right mind, but I noted
some mental disorder, because when I spoke to him he did not answer me.

The rule of law relating to the presumption of mental soundness is well

established, and the testator in the case at bar never having been adjudged insane by
a court of competent jurisdiction, this presumption continues, and it is therefore
incumbent upon the opponents to overcome this legal presumption by proper
evidence. This we think they have failed to do. There are many cases and authorities
which we might cite to show that the courts have repeatedly held that mere weakness
of mind and body, induced by age and disease do not render a person incapable of
making a will. The law does not require that a person shall continue in the full
enjoyment and use of his pristine physical and mental powers in order to execute a
valid will. If such were the legal standard, few indeed would be the number of wills
that could meet such exacting requirements. The authorities, both medical and legal,
are universal in statement that the question of mental capacity is one of degree, and
that there are many gradations from the highest degree of mental soundness to the
lowest conditions of diseased mentality which are denominated as insanity and
idiocy.

Doctor Basa testified at more length, but the substance of his testimony is
that the testator had suffered a paralysis and that he had noticed some mental
disorder. He does not say that the testator was not in his right mind at the time of the
execution of the will, nor does he give it at his opinion that he was without the
necessary mental capacity to make a valid will. He did not state in what way this
mental disorder had manifested itself other than that he had noticed that the testator
did not reply to him on one occasion when he visited him.
Doctor Viado, the other physician, have never seen the testator, but his
answer was in reply to a hypothetical question as to what be the mental condition of
a person who was 79 years old and who had suffered from a malady such as the
testator was supposed to have had according to the testimony of Doctor Basa, whose
testimony Doctor Viado had heard. He replied and discussed at some length the
symptoms and consequences of the decease from which the testator had suffered; he
read in support of his statements from a work by a German Physician, Dr. Herman
Eichost. In answer, however, to a direct question, he stated that he would be unable
to certify to the mental condition of a person who was suffering from such a disease.
We do not think that the testimony of these two physicians in any way
strengthens the contention of the appellants. Their testimony only confirms the fact
that the testator had been for a number of years prior to his death afflicted with
paralysis, in consequence of which his physician and mental strength was greatly
impaired. Neither of them attempted to state what was the mental condition of the
testator at the time he executed the will in question. There can be no doubt that the
testator's infirmities were of a very serious character, and it is quite evident that his
mind was not as active as it had been in the earlier years of his life. However, we can
not include from this that he wanting in the necessary mental capacity to dispose of
his property by will.
The courts have been called upon frequently to nullify wills executed under
such circumstances, but the weight of the authority is in support if the principle that
it is only when those seeking to overthrow the will have clearly established the
charge of mental incapacity that the courts will intervene to set aside a testamentary
document of this character. In the case of Bugnao vs. Ubag (14 Phil. Rep., 163), the
question of testamentary capacity was discussed by this court. The numerous
citations there given from the decisions of the United States courts are especially
applicable to the case at bar and have our approval. In this jurisdiction the
presumption of law is in favor of the mental capacity of the testator and the burden is
upon the contestants of the will to prove the lack of testamentary capacity. (In the

The right to dispose of property by testamentary disposition is as sacred as

any other right which a person may exercise and this right should not be nullified
unless mental incapacity is established in a positive and conclusive manner. In
discussing the question of testamentary capacity, it is stated in volume 28, 70, of the
American and English Encyclopedia of Law, that
Contrary to the very prevalent lay impression, perfect soundness of mind is
not essential to testamentary capacity. A testator may be afflicted with a
variety of mental weaknesses, disorders, or peculiarities and still be capable
in law of executing a valid will. (See the numerous cases there cited in
support of this statement.)
The rule relating to testamentary capacity is stated in Buswell on Insanity,
section 365, and quoted with approval in Campbell vs. Campbell (130 Ill., 466), as
follows:
To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind
shall be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease or
otherwise, or that the testator should be in the full possession of his
reasoning faculties.
In note, 1 Jarman on Wills, 38, the rule is thus stated:
The question is not so much, that was the degree of memory possessed by
the testator, as, had he a disposing memory? Was he able to remember the
property he was about to bequeath, the manner of disturbing it, and the

objects of his bounty? In a word, were his mind and memory sufficiently
sound to enable him to know and understand the business in which he was
engaged at the time when he executed his will. (See authorities there cited.)

For the reasons above stated, the order probating the will should be and the
same is hereby affirmed, with costs of this instance against the appellants.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Johnson, Carson and Moreland, JJ., concur.

In Wilson vs. Mitchell (101 Penn., 495), the following facts appeared upon
the trial of the case: The testator died at the age of nearly 102 years. In his early
years he was an intelligent and well informed man. About seven years prior to his
death he suffered a paralytic stroke and from that time his mind and memory were
mush enfeebled. He became very dull of hearing and in consequence of the shrinking
of his brain he was affected with senile cataract causing total blindness. He became
filthy and obscene in his habits, although formerly he was observant of the properties
of life. The court, in commenting upon the case, said:
Neither age, nor sickness, nor extreme distress, nor debility of body will
affect the capacity to make a will, if sufficient intelligence remains. The
failure of memory is not sufficient to create the incapacity, unless it be total,
or extend to his immediate family or property. . . .
xxx

xxx

xxx

Dougal (the testator) had lived over one hundred years before he made the
will, and his physical and mental weakness and defective memory were in
striking contrast with their strength in the meridian of his life. He was blind;
not deaf, but hearing impaired; his mind acted slowly, he was forgetful or
recent events, especially of names, and repeated questions in conversation;
and sometimes, when aroused for sleep or slumber, would seem bewildered.
It is not singular that some of those who had known him when he was
remarkable for vigor and intelligence, are of the opinion that his reason was
so far gone that he was incapable of making a will, although they never
heard him utter an irrational expression.
In the above case the will was sustained. In the case at bar we might draw
the same contrast as was pictured by the court in the case just quoted. The striking
change in the physical and mental vigor of the testator during the last years of his life
may have led some of those who knew him in his earlier days to entertain doubts as
to his mental capacity to make a will, yet we think that the statements of the
witnesses to the execution of the will and statements of the conduct of the testator at
that time all indicate that he unquestionably had mental capacity and that he
exercised it on this occasion. At the time of the execution of the will it does not
appear that his conduct was irrational in any particular. He seems to have
comprehended clearly what the nature of the business was in which he was engaged.
The evidence show that the writing and execution of the will occupied a period
several hours and that the testator was present during all this time, taking an active
part in all the proceedings. Again, the will in the case at bar is perfectly reasonable
and its dispositions are those of a rational person.

G.R. No. L-15737

February 28, 1962

LEONOR VILLAFLOR VDA. DE VILLANUEVA, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
DELFIN N. JUICO, in his capacity as Judicial Administrator of the testate
estate of FAUSTA NEPOMUCENO, defendant-appellee.
Amado
G.
Salazar
for
Sycip, Salazar, Luna and Associates for defendant-appellee.

plaintiff-appellant.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Subject to this direct appeal to us on points of law is the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, in its Civil Case No. Q-2809, dismissing plaintiffappellant's complaint for the recovery of certain properties that were originally
owned by the plaintiff's granduncle, Nicolas Villaflor, and which he granted to his
widow, Doa Fausta Nepomuceno, bequeathing to her "su uso y posesion mientras
viva y no se case en segundas nupcias".
The following facts appear of record: On October 9, 1908, Don Nicolas
Villaflor, a wealthy man of Castillejos, Zambales, executed a will in Spanish in his
own handwriting, devising and bequeathing in favor of his wife, Dona Fausta
Nepomuceno, one-half of all his real and personal properties, giving the other half to
his brother Don Fausto Villaflor.
Clause 6th, containing the institution of heirs, reads as follows: .
SIXTH - By virtue of the powers vested in me by the laws, instituted per
my unique and universal heirs of all my rights and shares my brother Fausto
D. Villaflor and my wife Da. Fausta Nepomuceno departing all my goods
who belong to me, in equal parts, for after my death, except donations and
bequests that more expontanea down my will, I do it in the following way:.
SEVENTH: - dispues Lego for my death my wife Da. Fausta Nepomuceno,
in proof of my love and affection, property, jewelry and furniture are stated
below;
EIGHTH: - That these legades referred my wife would enjoy Da. Fausta
Nepomuceno use and possession while alive and not remarried case of the
contrary, these would become the property of those legacies my niece
Eleanor Villaflor.

The 12th clause of the will provided, however, that Clauses 6th and 7th thereof
would be deemed annulled from the moment he bore any child with Doa Fausta
Nepomuceno. Said Clause 12th reads as follows: .
TWELFTH: - remain the paragraphs 6.0 and 7.0 of this testament institution trying to
heirs and the legacies that will be made after my death for my wife at the time that I
will have the joy of contrar with son and legitimate sons canceled or legitimized as
these, according to law will be my heirs.
Don Nicolas Villaflor died on March 3, 1922, without begetting any child
with his wife Doa Fausta Nepomuceno. The latter, already a widow, thereupon
instituted Special Proceeding No. 203 of the Court of First Instance of Zambales, for
the settlement of her husband's estate and in that proceeding, she was appointed
judicial administratrix. In due course of administration, she submitted a project of
partition, now Exhibit "E". In the order of November 24, 1924, now exhibit "C", the
probate court approved the project of partition and declared the proceeding closed.
As the project of partition, Exhibit "E", now shows Doa Fausta Nepomuceno
received by virtue thereof the ownership and possession of a considerable amount of
real and personal estate. By virtue also of the said project of partition, she received
the use and possession of all the real and personal properties mentioned and referred
to in Clause 7th of the will. The order approving the project of partition (Exh. "C"),
however, expressly provided that approval thereof was "sin perjuicio de lo dispuesto
en la clausula 8.o del testamento de Nicolas Villaflor." .
On May 1, 1956, Doa Fausta Nepomuceno died without having contracted
a second marriage, and without having begotten any child with the deceased Nicolas
Villaflor. Her estate is now being settled in Special Proceeding No. Q-1563 in the
lower court, with the defendant Delfin N. Juico as the duly appointed and qualified
judicial administrator.
The plaintiff Leonor Villaflor Vda. de Villanueva is admitted to be the same
Leonor Villaflor mentioned by Don Nicolas Villaflor in his will as his "sobrina nieta
Leonor Villaflor".
Plaintiff Leonor Villaflor instituted the present action against the
administrator of the estate of the widow Fausta Nepomuceno, on February 8, 1958,
contending that upon the widow's death, said plaintiff became vested with the
ownership of the real and personal properties bequeathed by the late Nicolas Villaflor
to clause 7 of his will, pursuant to its eight (8th) clause. Defendant's position,
adopted by the trial court, is that the title to the properties aforesaid became
absolutely vested in the widow upon her death, on account of the fact that she never
remarried.

We agree with appellant that the plain desire and intent of the testator, as
manifested in clause 8 of his testament, was to invest his widow with only a usufruct
or life tenure in the properties described in the seventh clause, subject to the further
condition (admitted by the appellee) that if the widow remarried, her rights would
thereupon cease, even during her own lifetime. That the widow was meant to have no
more than a life interest in those properties, even if she did not remarry at all, is
evident from the expressions used by the deceased "uso y posesion mientras viva"
(use and possession while alive) in which the first half of the phrase "uso y posesion"
instead of "dominio" or "propiedad") reinforces the second ("mientras viva"). The
testator plainly did not give his widow the full ownership of these particular
properties, but only the right to their possession and use (or enjoyment) during her
lifetime. This is in contrast with the remainder of the estate in which she was
instituted universal heir together with the testator's brother (clause 6). 1wph1.t
SEXTO: En virtud de las facultades que me conceden las leyes, instituyo
por mis unicos y universales herederos de todos mis derechos y acciones a
mi hermano D. Fausto Villaflor y a mi esposa Da. Fausta Nepomuceno para
que parten todos mis bienes que me pertenescan, en iguales partes, para
despues de mi muerte, exceptuando las donaciones y legados que, abajo mi
mas expontanea voluntad, lo hago en la forma siguiente.
The court below, in holding that the appellant Leonor Villaflor, as reversionary
legatee, could succeed to the properties bequeathed by clause 7 of the testament only
in the event that the widow remarried, has unwarrantedly discarded the expression
"mientras viva," and considered the words "uso y posesion" as equivalent to
"dominio" (ownership). In so doing, the trial court violated Article 791 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, as well as section 59 of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court.
ART. 791. The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will
give to every expression some effect, rather than one which will render any
of the expressions inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting a will, that
one is to be preferred which will prevent intestacy." .
SEC. 59. Instrument construed so as to give effect to all provisions. In
the construction of an instrument where there are several provisions or
particulars, such a construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give
effect to all." .
Speculation as to the motives of the testator in imposing the conditions contained in
clause 7 of his testament should not be allowed to obscure the clear and
unambiguous meaning of his plain words, which are over the primary source in
ascertaining his intent. It is well to note that if the testator had intended to impose as
sole condition the non-remarriage of his widow, the words "uso y posesion mientras
viva" would have been unnecessary, since the widow could only remarry during her
own lifetime.

The Civil Code, in Article 790, p. 1 (Article 675 of the Code of 1889), expressly
enjoins the following: .
ART. 790. The words of a will are to be taken in their ordinary and
grammatical sense, unless a clear intention to use them in another sense can
be gathered, and that other can be ascertained." .
Technical words in a will are to be taken in their technical sense, unless the
context clearly indicates a contrary intention, or unless it satisfactorily
appears that the will was drawn solely by the testator, and that he was
unacquainted with such technical sense. (675a)
In consonance with this rule, this Supreme Court has laid the doctrine in In re Estate
of Calderon, 26 Phil., 233, that the intention and wishes of the testator, when clearly
expressed in his will, constitute the fixed law of interpretation, and all questions
raised at the trial, relative to its execution and fulfillment, must be settled in
accordance therewith, following the plain and literal meaning of the testator's words,
unless it clearly appears that his intention was otherwise. The same rule is adopted
by the Supreme Court of Spain (TS. Sent. 20 Marzo 1918; 28 Mayo 1918; 30 Abril
1913; 16 Enero 1915; 23 Oct. 1925).
La voluntad del testador, clara, precisa y constantemente expresada al
ordenar su ultimo voluntad, es ley unica, imperativa y obligatoria que han
de obedecer y cumplir fieldmente albaceas, legatarios y heredera, hoy sus
sucesores, sin que esa voluntad patente, que no ha menester de
interpretaciones, pues no ofrece la menor duda, pueda sustituirse, pues no
ofrece la menor duda, pueda sustituirse por ningun otro criterio de alguna de
los interesados, ni tampoco por el judicial. (Tribunal Supremo of Spain,
Sent. 20 March 1918) .
The American decisions invoked by appellee in his brief inapplicable, because they
involve cases where the only condition imposed on the legatee was that she should
remain a widow. As already shown, the testament of Don Nicolas Villaflor clearly
and unmistakably provided that his widow should have the possession and use of the
legacies while alive and did not remarry. It necessarily follows that by the express
provisions of the 8th clause of his will, the legacies should pass to the testator's
"sobrinanieta", appellant herein, upon the widow's death, even if the widow never
remarried in her lifetime. Consequently, the widow had no right to retain or dispose
of the aforesaid properties, and her estate is accountable to the reversionary legatee
for their return, unless they had been lost due to fortuitous event, or for their value
should rights of innocent third parties have intervened.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the
appellant Leonor Villaflor Vda. de VILLANUEVA is declared entitled to the
ownership and fruits of the properties described in clause 7 of the will or testament,

from the date of the death of Doa Fausta Nepomuceno. The records are ordered
remanded to the court of origin for liquidation, accounting and further proceedings
conformably to this decision. Costs against the Administrator-appellee.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and
De
Leon,
JJ.,
concur.
Labrador, J., took no part.

G.R. Nos. L-21938-39 May 29, 1970

VICENTE URIARTE, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL (12th
Judicial District) THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA,
BRANCH IV, JUAN URIARTE ZAMACONA and HIGINIO
URIARTE, respondents.
Norberto J. Quisumbing for petitioner.
Taada, Teehankee & Carreon for respondents.

DIZON, J.:
On October 3, 1963 petitioner Vicente Uriarte filed an original petition
for certiorari docketed as G.R. L-21938 against the respondents Juan Uriarte
Zamacona, Higinio Uriarte, and the Courts of First Instance of Negros Occidental
and of Manila, Branch IV, who will be referred to hereinafter as the Negros Court
and the Manila Court, respectively praying:
... that after due proceedings judgment be rendered annulling the orders of
19 April 1963 (Annex 'H') and 11 July 1963 (Annex 'I') of respondent
Negros court dismissing the first instituted Special Proceeding No. 6344,
supra, and the order of 1 July 1963 (Annex 'K') of respondent Manila court
denying petitioner's omnibus motion to intervene and to dismiss the laterinstituted Special Proceeding No. 51396, supra, both special proceedings
pertaining to the settlement of the same estate of the same deceased, and
consequently annulling all proceedings had in Special Proceeding No.
51396; supra, of the respondent Manila court as all taken without
jurisdiction.
For the preservation of the rights of the parties pending these proceedings,
petitioner prays for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
enjoining respondents Manila court, Juan Uriarte Zamacona and Higinio
Uriarte from proceeding with Special Proceeding No. 51396, supra, until
further orders of this Court.
Reasons in support of said petition are stated therein as follows:

6. Respondent Negros court erred in dismissing its Special Proceeding No.

6344, supra, and failing to declare itself 'the court first taking cognizance of
the settlement of the estate of' the deceased Don Juan Uriarte y Goite as
prescribed in Rule 75 section 1 of the Rules of Court. Respondent Manila
court erred in failing to dismiss its Special Proceeding No. 51396, supra,
notwithstanding proof of prior filing of Special Proceeding No. 6344, supra,
in the Negros court.
The writ of preliminary injunction prayed for was granted and issued by this
Court on October 24, 1963.
On April 22, 1964 petitioner filed against the same respondents a pleading
entitled SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION FOR MANDAMUS docketed in this
Court as G.R. No. L-21939 praying, for the reasons therein stated, that judgment
be rendered annulling the orders issued by the Negros Court on December 7, 1963
and February 26, 1964, the first disapproving his record on appeal and the second
denying his motion for reconsideration, and further commanding said court to
approve his record on appeal and to give due course to his appeal. On July 15, 1964
We issued a resolution deferring action on this Supplemental Petition until the
original action for certiorari (G.R. L-21938) is taken up on the merits.
On October 21, 1963 the respondents in G.R. L-21938 filed their answer
traversing petitioner's contention that the respondent courts had committed grave
abuse of discretion in relation to the matters alleged in the petition forcertiorari.
It appears that on November 6, 1961 petitioner filed with the Negros Court
a petition for the settlement of the estate of the late Don Juan Uriarte y Goite
(Special Proceeding No. 6344) alleging therein, inter alia, that, as a natural son of the
latter, he was his sole heir, and that, during the lifetime of said decedent, petitioner
had instituted Civil Case No. 6142 in the same Court for his compulsory
acknowledgment as such natural son. Upon petitioner's motion the Negros Court
appointed the Philippine National Bank as special administrator on November 13,
1961 and two days later it set the date for the hearing of the petition and ordered that
the requisite notices be published in accordance with law. The record discloses,
however, that, for one reason or another, the Philippine, National Bank never actually
qualified as special administrator.
On December 19, 1961, Higinio Uriarte, one of the two private respondents
herein, filed an opposition to the above-mentioned petition alleging that he was a
nephew of the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite who had "executed a Last Will and
Testament in Spain, a duly authenticated copy whereof has been requested and which
shall be submitted to this Honorable Court upon receipt thereof," and further
questioning petitioner's capacity and interest to commence the intestate proceeding.

On August 28, 1962, Juan Uriarte Zamacona, the other private respondent,
commenced Special Proceeding No. 51396 in the Manila Court for the probate of a
document alleged to be the last will of the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite, and on the
same date he filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344 of the Negros Court a motion to
dismiss the same on the following grounds: (1) that, as the deceased Juan Uriarte y
Goite had left a last will, there was no legal basis to proceed with said intestate
proceedings, and (2) that petitioner Vicente Uriarte had no legal personality and
interest to initiate said intestate proceedings, he not being an acknowledged natural
son of the decedent. A copy of the Petition for Probate and of the alleged Will were
attached to the Motion to Dismiss.
Petitioner opposed the aforesaid motion to dismiss contending that, as the
Negros Court was first to take cognizance of the settlement of the estate of the
deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite, it had acquired exclusive jurisdiction over same
pursuant to Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court.
On April 19, 1963, the Negros Court sustained Juan Uriarte Zamacona's
motion to dismiss and dismissed the Special Proceeding No. 6344 pending before it.
His motion for reconsideration of said order having been denied on July 27, 1963,
petitioner proceeded to file his notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal
for the purpose of appealing from said orders to this court on questions of law. The
administrator with the will annexed appointed by the Manila Court in Special
Proceeding No. 51396 objected to the approval of the record on appeal, and under
date of December 7, 1963 the Negros Court issued the following order:
Oppositor prays that the record on appeal filed by the petitioner on July 27,
1963, be dismissed for having been filed out of time and for being
incomplete. In the meantime, before the said record on appeal was approved
by this Court, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme
Court entitled Vicente Uriarte, Petitioner, vs. Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental, et al., G.R. No. L-21938, bringing this case squarely
before the Supreme Court on questions of law which is tantamount to
petitioner's abandoning his appeal from this Court.
WHEREFORE, in order to give way to the certiorari, the record on appeal
filed by the petitioner is hereby disapproved.
In view of the above-quoted order, petitioner filed the supplemental petition
for mandamus mentioned heretofore.
On April 15, 1963 Vicente Uriarte filed an Omnibus Motion in Special
Proceeding No. 51396 pending in the Manila Court, asking for leave to intervene
therein; for the dismissal of the petition and the annulment of the proceedings had in
said special proceeding. This motion was denied by said court in its order of July 1
of the same year.

It is admitted that, as alleged in the basic petition filed in Special

Proceeding No. 6344 of the Negros Court, Vicente Uriarte filed in the same court,
during the lifetime of Juan Uriarte y Goite, Civil Case No. 6142 to obtain judgment
for his compulsory acknowledgment as his natural child. Clearly inferrable from this
is that at the time he filed the action, as well as when he commenced the aforesaid
special proceeding, he had not yet been acknowledged as natural son of Juan Uriarte
y Goite. Up to this time, no final judgment to that effect appears to have been
rendered.
The record further discloses that the special proceeding before the Negros
Court has not gone farther than the appointment of a special administrator in the
person of the Philippine National Bank who, as stated heretofore, failed to qualify.
On the other hand, it is not disputed that, after proper proceedings were had
in Special Proceeding No. 51396, the Manila Court admitted to probate the
document submitted to, it as the last will of Juan Uriarte y Goite, the petition for
probate appearing not to have been contested. It appears further that, as stated
heretofore, the order issued by the Manila Court on July 1, 1963 denied petitioner.
Vicente Uriarte's Omnibus Motion for Intervention, Dismissal of Petition and
Annulment of said proceedings.
Likewise, it is not denied that to the motion to dismiss the special
proceeding pending before the Negros Court filed by Higinio Uriarte were attached a
copy of the alleged last will of Juan Uriarte y Goite and of the petition filed with the
Manila Court for its probate. It is clear, therefore, that almost from the start of
Special Proceeding No. 6344, the Negros Court and petitioner Vicente Uriarte knew
of the existence of the aforesaid last will and of the proceedings for its probate.
The principal legal questions raised in the petition for certiorari are (a)
whether or not the Negros Court erred in dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6644,
on the one hand, and on the other, (b) whether the Manila Court similarly erred in not
dismissing Special Proceeding No. 51396 notwithstanding proof of the prior filing of
Special Proceeding No. 6344 in the Negros Court.
Under the Judiciary Act of 1948 [Section 44, paragraph (e)], Courts of First
Instance have original exclusive jurisdiction over "all matters of probate," that is,
over special proceedings for the settlement of the estate of deceased persons
whether they died testate or intestate. While their jurisdiction over such subject
matter is beyond question, the matter of venue, or the particular Court of First
Instance where the special proceeding should be commenced, is regulated by former
Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, now Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised
Rules of Court, which provides that the estate of a decedent inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, shall be in the court
of first instance in the province in which he resided at the time of his death, and if he
is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the court of first instance of any province in

which he had estate. Accordingly, when the estate to be settled is that of a nonresident alien like the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite the Courts of First
Instance in provinces where the deceased left any property have concurrent
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the proper special proceeding for the settlement of
his estate. In the case before Us, these Courts of First Instance are the Negros and the
Manila Courts province and city where the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite left
considerable properties. From this premise petitioner argues that, as the Negros
Court had first taken cognizance of the special proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of said decedent (Special Proceeding No. 6344), the Manila Court no longer
had jurisdiction to take cognizance of Special Proceeding No. 51396 intended to
settle the estate of the same decedent in accordance with his alleged will, and that
consequently, the first court erred in dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6344, while
the second court similarly erred in not dismissing Special Proceeding No. 51396.
It cannot be denied that a special proceeding intended to effect the
distribution of the estate of a deceased person, whether in accordance with the law on
intestate succession or in accordance with his will, is a "probate matter" or a
proceeding for the settlement of his estate. It is equally true, however, that in
accordance with settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction, testate proceedings, for the
settlement of the estate of a deceased person take precedence over intestate
proceedings for the same purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the
course of intestate proceedings pending before a court of first instance it is found it
hat the decedent had left a last will, proceedings for the probate of the latter should
replace the intestate proceedings even if at that stage an administrator had already
been appointed, the latter being required to render final account and turn over the
estate in his possession to the executor subsequently appointed. This, however, is
understood to be without prejudice that should the alleged last will be rejected or is
disapproved, the proceeding shall continue as an intestacy. As already adverted to,
this is a clear indication that proceedings for the probate of a will enjoy priority over
intestate proceedings.
Upon the facts before Us the question arises as to whether Juan Uriarte
Zamacona should have filed the petition for the probate of the last will of Juan
Uriarte y Goite with the Negros Court particularly in Special Proceeding No.
6344 or was entitled to commence the corresponding separate proceedings, as he
did, in the Manila Court.
The following considerations and the facts of record would seem to support
the view that he should have submitted said will for probate to the Negros Court,
either in a separate special proceeding or in an appropriate motion for said purpose
filed in the already pending Special Proceeding No. 6344. In the first place, it is not
in accord with public policy and the orderly and inexpensive administration of
justice to unnecessarily multiply litigation, especially if several courts would be
involved. This, in effect, was the result of the submission of the will aforesaid to the
Manila Court. In the second place, when respondent Higinio Uriarte filed an
opposition to Vicente Uriarte's petition for the issuance of letters of administration,

he had already informed the Negros Court that the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite had
left a will in Spain, of which a copy had been requested for submission to said court;
and when the other respondent, Juan Uriarte Zamacona, filed his motion to dismiss
Special Proceeding No. 6344, he had submitted to the Negros Court a copy of the
alleged will of the decedent, from which fact it may be inferred that, like Higinio
Uriarte, he knew before filing the petition for probate with the Manila Court that
there was already a special proceeding pending in the Negros Court for the
settlement of the estate of the same deceased person. As far as Higinio Uriarte is
concerned, it seems quite clear that in his opposition to petitioner's petition in Special
Proceeding No. 6344, he had expressly promised to submit said will for probate to
the Negros Court.
But the fact is that instead of the aforesaid will being presented for probate
to the Negros Court, Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed the petition for the purpose with
the Manila Court. We can not accept petitioner's contention in this regard that the
latter court had no jurisdiction to consider said petition, albeit we say that it was not
the proper venue therefor.
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is merely
a waiveable procedural defect, and, in the light of the circumstances obtaining in the
instant case, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that petitioner has waived the right to
raise such objection or is precluded from doing so by laches. It is enough to consider
in this connection that petitioner knew of the existence of a will executed by Juan
Uriarte y Goite since December 19, 1961 when Higinio Uriarte filed his opposition
to the initial petition filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344; that petitioner likewise
was served with notice of the existence (presence) of the alleged last will in the
Philippines and of the filing of the petition for its probate with the Manila Court
since August 28, 1962 when Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed a motion for the dismissal
of Special Proceeding No. 6344. All these notwithstanding, it was only on April 15,
1963 that he filed with the Manila Court in Special Proceeding No. 51396 an
Omnibus motion asking for leave to intervene and for the dismissal and annulment of
all the proceedings had therein up to that date; thus enabling the Manila Court not
only to appoint an administrator with the will annexed but also to admit said will to
probate more than five months earlier, or more specifically, on October 31, 1962. To
allow him now to assail the exercise of jurisdiction over the probate of the will by
the Manila Court and the validity of all the proceedings had in Special Proceeding
No. 51396 would put a premium on his negligence. Moreover, it must be
remembered that this Court is not inclined to annul proceedings regularly had in a
lower court even if the latter was not the proper venue therefor, if the net result
would be to have the same proceedings repeated in some other court of similar
jurisdiction; more so in a case like the present where the objection against said
proceedings is raised too late.
In his order of April 19, 1963 dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6344,
Judge Fernandez of the Negros Court said that he was "not inclined to sustain the
contention of the petitioner that inasmuch as the herein petitioner has instituted Civil

Case No. 6142 for compulsory acknowledgment by the decedent such action justifies
the institution by him of this proceedings. If the petitioner is to be consistent with the
authorities cited by him in support of his contention, the proper thing for him to do
would be to intervene in the testate estate proceedings entitled Special Proceedings
No. 51396 in the Court of First Instance of Manila instead of maintaining an
independent action, for indeed his supposed interest in the estate of the decedent is of
his doubtful character pending the final decision of the action for compulsory
acknowledgment."
We believe in connection with the above matter that petitioner is entitled to
prosecute Civil Case No. 6142 until it is finally determined, or intervene in Special
Proceeding No. 51396 of the Manila Court, if it is still open, or to ask for its
reopening if it has already been closed, so as to be able to submit for determination
the question of his acknowledgment as natural child of the deceased testator, said
court having, in its capacity as a probate court, jurisdiction to declare who are the
heirs of the deceased testator and whether or not a particular party is or should be
declared his acknowledged natural child (II Moran on Rules of Court, 1957 Ed., p.
476; Conde vs. Abaya, 13 Phil. 249; Severino vs. Severino, 44 Phil. 343; Lopez vs.
Lopez, 68 Phil. 227, and Jimoga-on vs. Belmonte, 47 O. G. 1119).
Coming now to the supplemental petition for mandamus (G.R. No. L21939), We are of the opinion, and so hold, that in view of the conclusions heretofore
stated, the same has become moot and academic. If the said supplemental petition is
successful, it will only result in compelling the Negros Court to give due course to
the appeal that petitioner was taking from the orders of said court dated December 7,
1963 and February 26, 1964, the first being the order of said court dismissing Special
Proceeding No. 6344, and the second being an order denying petitioner's motion for
the reconsideration of said order of dismissal. Said orders being, as a result of what
has been said heretofore beyond petitioner's power to contest, the conclusion can not
be other than that the intended appeal would serve no useful purpose, or, worse still,
would enable petitioner to circumvent our ruling that he can no longer question the
validity of said orders.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, judgment is hereby
rendered denying the writs prayed for and, as a result, the petition for certiorari filed
in G.R. No. L-21938, as well as the supplemental petition formandamus docketed as
G.R. No. L-21939, are hereby dismissed. The writ of preliminary injunction
heretofore issued is set aside. With costs against petitioner.
Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Barredo and Villamor, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., concurs in the result.
Castro, J., is on leave.

Fernando and Teehankee, J., took no part.

G.R. No. L-23678

June 6, 1967

TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.

PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositorsappellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A. Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of
the Court of First Instance of Manila dated April 30, 1964, approving the project of
partition filed by the executor in Civil Case No. 37089 therein.1wph1.t
The facts of the case are as follows:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of
the United States." By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five
legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in
infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second
wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin G.
Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate
children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in
which he directed that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are
paid for, his distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the following order and
manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his
three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma
Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied,
the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives,
namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis
Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal
shares.1wph1.t

Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San

Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First
Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the
bequests therein including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock
to Mary E. Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria
Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each
in satisfaction of their respective legacies, or a total of P120,000.00, which it
released from time to time according as the lower court approved and allowed the
various motions or petitions filed by the latter three requesting partial advances on
account of their respective legacies.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor
submitted and filed its "Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration and
Project of Partition" wherein it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of
Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock amounting to $240,000.00,
and the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis
in the amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of P120,000.00. In the project of
partition, the executor pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will
and Testament divided the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the
benefit of the testator's seven legitimate children by his first and second marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed
their respective oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were
deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs
of the deceased.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of
service of which is evidenced by the registry receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by
the executor.1
After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent
pleadings, the lower court, on April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling the
oppositions and approving the executor's final account, report and administration and
project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national
law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for
legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the
lower court on June 11, 1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to raise
the issue of which law must apply Texas law or Philippine law.

In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the
doctrine of renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749,
January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national
of one country, and a domicile of another. In the present case, it is not disputed that
the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his
death.2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the
domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in
a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law.
Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae)
calling for the application of the law of the place where the properties are situated,
renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In
the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be
presumed different from ours.3 Appellants' position is therefore not rested on the
doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their
arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the circumstances mentioned
in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.

prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not
correct. Precisely, Congressdeleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of
this and the next preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil
Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial change
the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must
have been their purpose to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision
in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate succession. As further
indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art.
1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of
the decedent.

Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the
national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to
four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the
intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They
provide that

Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills one
to govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate arguing from this
that he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such
was the decedent's intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it would not alter
the law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in
a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance
with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national
law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 now Article 16
of the Civil Code states said national law should govern.

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of
the country where it is situated.

It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be

involved in our System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to
the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia,
the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions
must prevail over general ones.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the

order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may he the nature of the property and regardless of the country
wherein said property may be found.

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the
State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or
legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the
amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine
law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the
decedent.

Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with
costs against appellants. So ordered.

Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the
Civil Code, stating that

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar,

Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which
have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not
be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

G.R. No. L-7188

August 9, 1954

In re: Will and Testament of the deceased REVEREND SANCHO ABADIA.

SEVERINA A. VDA. DE ENRIQUEZ, ET AL., petitioners-appellees,
vs.
MIGUEL ABADIA, ET AL., oppositors-appellants.
Manuel A. Zosa, Luis B. Ladonga, Mariano A. Zosa and B. G. Advincula for
appellants.
C. de la Victoria for appellees.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
On September 6, 1923, Father Sancho Abadia, parish priest of Talisay,
Cebu, executed a document purporting to be his Last Will and Testament now
marked Exhibit "A". Resident of the City of Cebu, he died on January 14, 1943, in
the municipality of Aloguinsan, Cebu, where he was an evacuee. He left properties
estimated at P8,000 in value. On October 2, 1946, one Andres Enriquez, one of the
legatees in Exhibit "A", filed a petition for its probate in the Court of First Instance
of Cebu. Some cousins and nephews who would inherit the estate of the deceased if
he left no will, filed opposition.
During the hearing one of the attesting witnesses, the other two being dead,
testified without contradiction that in his presence and in the presence of his cowitnesses, Father Sancho wrote out in longhand Exhibit "A" in Spanish which the
testator spoke and understood; that he (testator) signed on he left hand margin of the
front page of each of the three folios or sheets of which the document is composed,
and numbered the same with Arabic numerals, and finally signed his name at the end
of his writing at the last page, all this, in the presence of the three attesting witnesses
after telling that it was his last will and that the said three witnesses signed their
names on the last page after the attestation clause in his presence and in the presence
of each other. The oppositors did not submit any evidence.
The learned trial court found and declared Exhibit "A" to be a holographic
will; that it was in the handwriting of the testator and that although at the time it was
executed and at the time of the testator's death, holographic wills were not permitted
by law still, because at the time of the hearing and when the case was to be decided
the new Civil Code was already in force, which Code permitted the execution of
holographic wills, under a liberal view, and to carry out the intention of the testator
which according to the trial court is the controlling factor and may override any
defect in form, said trial court by order dated January 24, 1952, admitted to probate
Exhibit "A", as the Last Will and Testament of Father Sancho Abadia. The oppositors
are appealing from that decision; and because only questions of law are involved in
the appeal, the case was certified to us by the Court of Appeals.

The new Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386) under article 810 thereof
provides that a person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely
written, dated and signed by the testator himself and need not be witnessed. It is a
fact, however, that at the time that Exhibit "A" was executed in 1923 and at the time
that Father Abadia died in 1943, holographic wills were not permitted, and the law at
the time imposed certain requirements for the execution of wills, such as numbering
correlatively each page (not folio or sheet) in letters and signing on the left hand
margin by the testator and by the three attesting witnesses, requirements which were
not complied with in Exhibit "A" because the back pages of the first two folios of the
will were not signed by any one, not even by the testator and were not numbered,
and as to the three front pages, they were signed only by the testator.
Interpreting and applying this requirement this Court in the case of In re
Estate of Saguinsin, 41 Phil., 875, 879, referring to the failure of the testator and his
witnesses to sign on the left hand margin of every page, said:
. . . . This defect is radical and totally vitiates the testament. It is not enough
that the signatures guaranteeing authenticity should appear upon two folios
or leaves; three pages having been written on, the authenticity of all three of
them should be guaranteed by the signature of the alleged testatrix and her
witnesses.
And in the case of Aspe vs. Prieto, 46 Phil., 700, referring to the same
requirement, this Court declared:
From an examination of the document in question, it appears that the left
margins of the six pages of the document are signed only by Ventura Prieto.
The noncompliance with section 2 of Act No. 2645 by the attesting
witnesses who omitted to sign with the testator at the left margin of each of
the five pages of the document alleged to be the will of Ventura Prieto, is a
fatal defect that constitutes an obstacle to its probate.
What is the law to apply to the probate of Exh. "A"? May we apply the
provisions of the new Civil Code which not allows holographic wills, like Exhibit
"A" which provisions were invoked by the appellee-petitioner and applied by the
lower court? But article 795 of this same new Civil Code expressly provides: "The
validity of a will as to its form depends upon the observance of the law in force at the
time it is made." The above provision is but an expression or statement of the weight
of authority to the affect that the validity of a will is to be judged not by the law
enforce at the time of the testator's death or at the time the supposed will is presented
in court for probate or when the petition is decided by the court but at the time the
instrument was executed. One reason in support of the rule is that although the will
operates upon and after the death of the testator, the wishes of the testator about the
disposition of his estate among his heirs and among the legatees is given solemn

expression at the time the will is executed, and in reality, the legacy or bequest then
becomes a completed act. This ruling has been laid down by this court in the case of
In re Will of Riosa, 39 Phil., 23. It is a wholesome doctrine and should be followed.
Of course, there is the view that the intention of the testator should be the
ruling and controlling factor and that all adequate remedies and interpretations
should be resorted to in order to carry out said intention, and that when statutes
passed after the execution of the will and after the death of the testator lessen the
formalities required by law for the execution of wills, said subsequent statutes should
be applied so as to validate wills defectively executed according to the law in force at
the time of execution. However, we should not forget that from the day of the death
of the testator, if he leaves a will, the title of the legatees and devisees under it
becomes a vested right, protected under the due process clause of the constitution
against a subsequent change in the statute adding new legal requirements of
execution of wills which would invalidate such a will. By parity of reasoning, when
one executes a will which is invalid for failure to observe and follow the legal
requirements at the time of its execution then upon his death he should be regarded
and declared as having died intestate, and his heirs will then inherit by intestate
succession, and no subsequent law with more liberal requirements or which
dispenses with such requirements as to execution should be allowed to validate a
defective will and thereby divest the heirs of their vested rights in the estate by
intestate succession. The general rule is that the Legislature can not validate void
wills (57 Am. Jur., Wills, Sec. 231, pp. 192-193).
In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is reversed, and Exhibit
"A" is denied probate. With costs.
Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador,
Concepcion and Reyes J.B.L., JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 108581. December 8, 1999]

LOURDES L. DOROTHEO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, NILDA D.
QUINTANA, for Herself and as Attorney-in-Fact of VICENTE DOROTHEO
and JOSE DOROTHEO, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
May a last will and testament admitted to probate but declared intrinsically void
in an order that has become final and executory still be given effect? This is the issue
that arose from the following antecedents:
Private respondents were the legitimate children of Alejandro Dorotheo and
Aniceta Reyes. The latter died in 1969 without her estate being settled. Alejandro
died thereafter. Sometime in 1977, after Alejandros death, petitioner, who claims to
have taken care of Alejandro before he died, filed a special proceeding for the
probate of the latters last will and testament. In 1981, the court issued an order
admitting Alejandros will to probate. Private respondents did not appeal from said
order. In 1983, they filed a Motion To Declare The Will Intrinsically Void. The trial
court granted the motion and issued an order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Order is hereby issued declaring Lourdes
Legaspi not the wife of the late Alejandro Dorotheo, the provisions of the last will
and testament of Alejandro Dorotheo as intrinsically void, and declaring the
oppositors Vicente Dorotheo, Jose Dorotheo and Nilda Dorotheo Quintana as the
only heirs of the late spouses Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes, whose
respective estates shall be liquidated and distributed according to the laws on
intestacy upon payment of estate and other taxes due to the government.[1]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration arguing that she is entitled to some
compensation since she took care of Alejandro prior to his death although she
admitted that they were not married to each other. Upon denial of her motion for
reconsideration, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the same was
dismissed for failure to file appellants brief within the extended period granted.
[2]
This dismissal became final and executory on February 3, 1989 and a
corresponding entry of judgment was forthwith issued by the Court of Appeals on
May 16, 1989. A writ of execution was issued by the lower court to implement the
final and executory Order. Consequently, private respondents filed several motions
including a motion to compel petitioner to surrender to them the Transfer Certificates
of Titles (TCT) covering the properties of the late Alejandro. When petitioner refused
to surrender the TCTs, private respondents filed a motion for cancellation of said
titles and for issuance of new titles in their names. Petitioner opposed the motion.

An Order was issued on November 29, 1990 by Judge Zain B. Angas setting
aside the final and executory Order dated January 30, 1986, as well as the Order
directing the issuance of the writ of execution, on the ground that the order was
merely interlocutory, hence not final in character. The court added that the
dispositive portion of the said Order even directs the distribution of the estate of the
deceased spouses. Private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration which was
denied in an Order dated February 1, 1991. Thus, private respondents filed a petition
before the Court of Appeals, which nullified the two assailed Orders dated November
29, 1990 and February 1, 1991.
Aggrieved, petitioner instituted a petition for review arguing that the case filed
by private respondents before the Court of Appeals was a petition under Rule 65 on
the ground of grave abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner contends
that in issuing the two assailed orders, Judge Angas cannot be said to have no
jurisdiction because he was particularly designated to hear the case. Petitioner
likewise assails the Order of the Court of Appeals upholding the validity of the
January 30, 1986 Order which declared the intrinsic invalidity of Alejandros will that
was earlier admitted to probate.
Petitioner also filed a motion to reinstate her as executrix of the estate of the
late Alejandro and to maintain the status quo or lease of the premises thereon to third
parties.[3] Private respondents opposed the motion on the ground that petitioner has
no interest in the estate since she is not the lawful wife of the late Alejandro.
The petition is without merit. A final and executory decision or order can no
longer be disturbed or reopened no matter how erroneous it may be. In setting aside
the January 30, 1986 Order that has attained finality, the trial court in effect nullified
the entry of judgment made by the Court of Appeals. It is well settled that a lower
court cannot reverse or set aside decisions or orders of a superior court, for to do so
would be to negate the hierarchy of courts and nullify the essence of review. It has
been ruled that a final judgment on probated will, albeit erroneous, is binding on the
whole world.[4]
It has been consistently held that if no appeal is taken in due time from a
judgment or order of the trial court, the same attains finality by mere lapse of
time. Thus, the order allowing the will became final and the question determined by
the court in such order can no longer be raised anew, either in the same proceedings
or in a different motion. The matters of due execution of the will and the capacity of
the testator acquired the character of res judicata and cannot again be brought into
question, all juridical questions in connection therewith being for once and forever
closed.[5]Such final order makes the will conclusive against the whole world as to its
extrinsic validity and due execution.[6]

It should be noted that probate proceedings deals generally with the extrinsic
validity of the will sought to be probated,[7] particularly on three aspects:
whether the will submitted is indeed, the decedents last will and testament;
compliance with the prescribed formalities for the execution of wills;
the testamentary capacity of the testator;[8]
and the due execution of the last will and testament.[9]
Under the Civil Code, due execution includes a determination of whether the
testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time of its execution, that he had
freely executed the will and was not acting under duress, fraud, menace or undue
influence and that the will is genuine and not a forgery, [10] that he was of the proper
testamentary age and that he is a person not expressly prohibited by law from
making a will.[11]
The intrinsic validity is another matter and questions regarding the same may
still be raised even after the will has been authenticated. [12] Thus, it does not
necessarily follow that an extrinsically valid last will and testament is always
intrinsically valid. Even if the will was validly executed, if the testator provides for
dispositions that deprives or impairs the lawful heirs of their legitime or rightful
inheritance according to the laws on succession,[13] the unlawful
provisions/dispositions thereof cannot be given effect. This is specially so when the
courts had already determined in a final and executory decision that the will is
intrinsically void. Such determination having attained that character of finality is
binding on this Court which will no longer be disturbed. Not that this Court finds the
will to be intrinsically valid, but that a final and executory decision of which the
party had the opportunity to challenge before the higher tribunals must stand and
should no longer be reevaluated. Failure to avail of the remedies provided by law
constitutes waiver. And if the party does not avail of other remedies despite its belief
that it was aggrieved by a decision or court action, then it is deemed to have fully
agreed and is satisfied with the decision or order. As early as 1918, it has been
declared that public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional
errors, judgments of courts must at some point of time fixed by law [14] become final
otherwise there will be no end to litigation. Interes rei publicae ut finis sit litium - the
very object of which the courts were constituted was to put an end to controversies.
[15]
To fulfill this purpose and to do so speedily, certain time limits, more or less
arbitrary, have to be set up to spur on the slothful. [16] The only instance where a party
interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is
left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or
inadvertence not imputable to negligence,[17] which circumstances do not concur
herein.

Petitioner was privy to the suit calling for the declaration of the intrinsic
invalidity of the will, as she precisely appealed from an unfavorable order
therefrom. Although the final and executory Order of January 30, 1986 wherein
private respondents were declared as the only heirs do not bind those who are not
parties thereto such as the alleged illegitimate son of the testator, the same
constitutes res judicata with respect to those who were parties to the probate
proceedings. Petitioner cannot again raise those matters anew for relitigation
otherwise that would amount to forum-shopping. It should be remembered that
forum shopping also occurs when the same issue had already been resolved
adversely by some other court.[18] It is clear from the executory order that the estates
of Alejandro and his spouse should be distributed according to the laws of intestate
succession.
Petitioner posits that the January 30, 1986 Order is merely interlocutory, hence
it can still be set aside by the trial court. In support thereof, petitioner argues that an
order merely declaring who are heirs and the shares to which set of heirs is entitled
cannot be the basis of execution to require delivery of shares from one person to
another particularly when no project of partition has been filed. [19] The trial court
declared in the January 30, 1986 Order that petitioner is not the legal wife of
Alejandro, whose only heirs are his three legitimate children (petitioners herein), and
at the same time it nullified the will. But it should be noted that in the same Order,
the trial court also said that the estate of the late spouses be distributed according to
the laws of intestacy.Accordingly, it has no option but to implement that order of
intestate distribution and not to reopen and again re-examine the intrinsic provisions
of the same will.
It can be clearly inferred from Article 960 of the Civil Code, on the law of
successional rights that testacy is preferred to intestacy.[20] But before there could be
testate distribution, the will must pass the scrutinizing test and safeguards provided
by law considering that the deceased testator is no longer available to prove the
voluntariness of his actions, aside from the fact that the transfer of the estate is
usually onerous in nature and that no one is presumed to give - Nemo praesumitur
donare.[21] No intestate distribution of the estate can be done until and unless the will
had failed to pass both its extrinsic and intrinsic validity. If the will is extrinsically
void, the rules of intestacy apply regardless of the intrinsic validity thereof. If it is
extrinsically valid, the next test is to determine its intrinsic validity that is whether
the provisions of the will are valid according to the laws of succession. In this case,
the court had ruled that the will of Alejandro was extrinsically valid but the intrinsic
provisions thereof were void. Thus, the rules of intestacy apply as correctly held by
the trial court.
Furthermore, Alejandros disposition in his will of the alleged share in the
conjugal properties of his late spouse, whom he described as his only beloved wife,
is not a valid reason to reverse a final and executory order. Testamentary dispositions
of properties not belonging exclusively to the testator or properties which are part of
the conjugal regime cannot be given effect. Matters with respect to who owns the

properties that were disposed of by Alejandro in the void will may still be properly
ventilated and determined in the intestate proceedings for the settlement of his and
that of his late spouses estate.
Petitioners motion for appointment as administratrix is rendered moot
considering that she was not married to the late Alejandro and, therefore, is not an
heir.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

C.A. No. 4

March 21, 1946

In the matter of the testate estate of the late Encarnacion Neyra. TRINIDAD
NEYRA, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
TEODORA NEYRA, PILAR DE GUZMAN and MARIA JACOBO VDA. DE
BLANCO, oppositors-appellants.
TEODORA NEYRA, PILAR DE GUZMAN and MARIA JACOBO VDA.
BLANCO, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
TRINIDAD NEYRA and EUSTAQUIO MENDOZA, oppositors-appellees.
Lucio Javillonar for oppositors and appellants.
Alejandro M. Panis for applicants and appellees.
DE JOYA, J.:
This is an appeal from a decree rendered by the Hon. Gervasio Diaz, Judge
of the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila, on December 3, 1943, admitting
to probate a will dated November 3, 1942, executed by the deceased Encarnacion
Neyra; at the same time denying the probate of a previous will dated September 14,
1939, alleged to have been executed by the said testatrix.
Trinidad Neyra, beneficiary in the will executed on November 3, 1942,
filed, on November 10, 1942, a petition in the Court of First Instance of Manila, for
the probate of said will.
On December 19, 1942, Teodora Neyra, Pilar de Guzman, and Maria
Jacobo Vda. de Blanco, who had not been named as beneficiaries in said will, filed
on opposition to the probate of the said will dated November 3, 1942, alleging (1)
that at the time of the alleged execution of the said will, the testatrix Encarnacion
Neyra no longer possessed testamentary capacity; (2) that her thumb marks on said
instrument had been procured by means of fraud by petitioner Trinidad Neyra, and
that Encarnacion Neyra never intended to consider said document as will; (3) that the
alleged will, dated November 3, 1942, had not been executed in the manner and form
prescribed by law; and(4) that Encarnacion Neyra, since September 14, 1939, had
executed a will, naming as beneficiaries said oppositors and others, and that said will
had never been revoked or amended in any manner whatsoever.
On December 26, 1942, petitioner Trinidad Neyra filed a reply denying the
allegations in the opposition.

Subsequently, said oppositors filed a counter petition, asking for the probate
of the first will executed by Encarnacion Neyra, on September 14, 1939, marked as
Exhibit 16. On March 16, 1943, the legatees Trinidad Neyra and Eustaquio Mendoza
filed their opposition to the probate on said will marked as Exhibit 16, and amended
said opposition, on September 15, 1943, to which Teodora Neyra and the others filed
a reply, on September 20, 1943.
On the dates set for the hearing on the petition filed by Trinidad Neyra, and
the counter petition mentioned above, said petitioner as well as the oppositors,
presented evidence, testimonial and documentary. The witnesses presented by the
petitioner Trinidad Neyra were Mons. Vicente Fernandez, Rev. Fr. Teodoro Garcia,
Sor. Andrea Montejo, Dr. Moises B. Abad, Dr. Eladio A. Aldecoa, Atty. Ricardo
Sikat, petitioner Trinidad Neyra herself, and Atty. Alejandro M. Panis, who had acted
as scrivener in the preparation of said will dated November 3, 1942.
Teodora Neyra and the other oppositors also presented several witnesses,
the principal among whom were Presentacion Blanco, Caferina de la Cruz, Acislo
Manuel, Dr. Dionisio Parulan, an alleged medical expert, and the oppositors Teodora
Neyra and Pilar de Guzman themselves.
After considering the evidence, the lower court rendered a decree admitting
to probate the will dated November 3, 1942; at the same time denying the probate of
the will dated September 14, 1939.
From said decision Teodora Neyra and the other oppositors appealed to the
Court of Appeals for the City of Manila, assigning several errors, which may be
reduced to the following, to wit, that the trial court erred (1) in finding that
Encarnacion Neyra wanted to make a new will; (2) in declaring that there was
reconciliation between Encarnacion Neyra and her sister Trinidad; (3) in accepting as
satisfactory the evidence submitted by the petitioner; (4) in ignoring the evidence
submitted by the oppositors; and (5) in not admitting to probate the will dated
September 14, 1939.
The evidence, testimonial and documentary, adduced during the trial of the
case in the court below, has satisfactorily and sufficiently established the following
facts:
That Severo Neyra died intestate in the City of Manila, on May 6, 1938,
leaving certain properties and two children, by his first marriage, named Encarnacion
Neyra and Trinidad Neyra, and several other relatives; that after the death of Severo
Neyra, the two sisters, Encarnacion Neyra and Trinidad Neyra, had serious quarrels,
in connection with the properties left by their deceased father, and so serious were
their dissensions that, after March 31, 1939, they had two litigations in the Court of
First Instance of Manila, concerning said properties (Exhibits 8 and 9): In the first

case, filed on March 31, 1939, Trinidad Neyra and others demanded from
Encarnacion Neyra et al. the annulment of the sale of the property located at No. 366
Raon Street, Manila, and it was finally decided in favor of the defendants in the
Court of First Instance and in the Court of Appeals, on December 21, 1943 (G.R. No.
8162, Exhibit 9).
In the second case, filed on October 25, 1939, Trinidad Neyra demanded
from Encarnacion Neyra, one-half () of the property described therein, and onehalf () of the rents, and the Court of First Instance decided in favor of the plaintiff,
but at the same time awarded in favor of the defendant P727.77, under her
counterclaim; and Trinidad Neyra again elevated the case to the Court of Appeals for
Manila (G.R. No. 8075) Exhibit 8, which was decided, pursuant to the document of
compromise marked as Exhibit D; and the petition for reconsideration filed therein
still remains undecided.
That Encarnacion Neyra, who had remained single, and who had no longer
any ascendants, executed a will on September 14, 1939, marked Exhibit 16,
disposing of her properties in favor of the "Congregacion de Religiosas de la Virgen
Maria" and her other relatives named Teodora Neyra, Pilar de Guzman and Maria
Jacobo Vda. de Blanco, making no provision whatsoever in said will in favor of her
only sister Trinidad Neyra, who had become her bitter enemy; that when the said will
was brought to the attention of the authorities of said Congregation, after due
deliberation and consideration, said religious organization declined the bounty
offered by Encarnacion Neyra, and said decision of the Congregation was duly
communicated to her; that in order to overcome the difficulties encountered by said
religious organization in not accepting the generosity of Encarnacion Neyra, the
latter decided to make a new will, and for that purpose, about one week before her
death, sent for one Ricardo Sikat, an attorney working in the Law Offices of Messrs.
Feria and LaO, and gave him instructions for the preparation of a new will; that
Attorney Sikat, instead of preparing a new will, in accordance with the express
instructions given by Encarnacion Neyra, merely prepared a draft in the form of a
codicil, marked as Exhibit M, amending said will, dated September 14, 1939, again
naming said religious organization, among others, as beneficiary, and said draft of a
codicil was also forwarded to the authorities of the said religious organization, for
their consideration and acceptance.
In the meanwhile, Encarnacion Neyra had become seriously ill, suffering
from Addison's disease, and on October 31, 1942, she sent for her religious adviser
and confessor, Mons. Vicente Fernandez of the Quiapo Church to make confession,
after which she expressed her desire to have a mass celebrated in her house at No.
366 Raon Street, City of Manila, so that she might take holy communion, in view of
her condition; that following the request of Encarnacion Neyra, Mons. Fernandez
caused the necessary arrangements to be made for the celebration of holy mass in the
house of Encarnacion Neyra, and, as a matter of fact, on November 1, 1942, holy
mass was solemnized in her house, Fr. Teodoro Garcia, also of the Quiapo Church,
officiating in said ceremony, on which occasion, Encarnacion Neyra, who remained

in bed, took holy communion; that after said religious ceremony had been
terminated, Father Garcia talked to Encarnacion Neyra and advised reconciliation
between the two sisters, Encarnacion Neyra and Trinidad Neyra. Encarnacion Neyra
accepted said advice and at about noon of the same day (November 1, 1942), sent
Eustaquio Mendoza to fetch her sister Trinidad Neyra, who came at about 2:30 that
same afternoon; that on seeing one another, the two greeted each other in a most
affectionate manner, and became reconciled; that the two had a long and cordial
conversation, in the course of which the two sisters also talked about the properties
left by their deceased father and their litigations which had reached the Court of
Appeals for the City of Manila, and they agreed to have the said appeal dismissed, on
the condition that the property involved therein, consisting of a small house and lot,
should be given exclusively to Trinidad Neyra, on the condition that the latter should
waive her claim for her share in the rents of said property, while under the
administration of Encarnacion Neyra, and that the two should renounce their mutual
claims against one another. It was also agreed between the two sisters to send for
Atty. Alejandro M. Panis, to prepare the necessary document embodying the said
agreement, but Attorney Panis could come only in the afternoon of the following day,
November 2, 1942, when Encarnacion gave him instructions for the preparation of
the document embodying their agreement, and other instructions relative to the
disposition she wanted to make of her properties in her last will and testament; that
Attorney Panis prepared said document of compromise or agreement marked as
Exhibit D, as well as the new will and testament marked as Exhibit C, naming
Trinidad Neyra and Eustaquio Mendoza beneficiaries therein, pursuant to the express
instructions given by Encarnacion Neyra, and said instruments were ready for
signature on November 3, 1942; that in the afternoon of that day, November 3, 1942;
Attorney Panis read said will and testament marked as Exhibit D to Encarnacion
Neyra slowly and in a loud voice, in the presence of Fr. Teodoro Garcia, Dr. Moises
B. Abad, Dr. Eladio Aldecoa, herein petitioner Trinidad Neyra, and others, after
which he asked her if its terms were in accordance with her wishes, if she had
anything else to add, or anything to be changed in said will; and as Encarnacion
Neyra stated that the terms of said will were in accordance with her wishes and
express instructions, she asked for the pad and the will Exhibit C and, with the help
of a son of herein petitioner, placed her thumb mark at the foot of said will, in the
presence of the three attesting witnesses, Dr. Moises B. Abad, Dr. Eladio R. Aldecoa,
and Atty. Alejandro M. Panis, after which the attesting witnesses signed at the foot of
the document, in the presence of the testatrix Encarnacion Neyra, and of each and
everyone of the other attesting witnesses. Fr. Teodoro Garcia and petitioner Trinidad
Neyra and several others were also present.
On November 4, 1942, the testatrix Encarnacion Neyra, due to a heart
attack, unexpectedly died.
Although the "Congregacion de Religiosas de la Virgen Maria" had again
decided not to accept the provision made in its favor by the testatrix Encarnacion
Neyra in the proposed codicil prepared by Atty. Ricardo Sikat, said decision could
not be communicated to the testatrix, before her death.

Mons. Vicente Fernandez and Fr. Teodoro Garcia testified as to the request
made on October 31, 1942, by Encarnacion Neyra for the celebration of holy mass in
her house, on November 1, 1942; that said mass was in fact solemnized in her house,
on that date, in the course of which the testatrix Encarnacion Neyra took holy
communion; that on the same day, after the mass, Encarnacion held a long
conversation with Father Garcia, in the course of which, said priest advised her to
have reconciliation with her sister Trinidad; and that said advise was accepted by
Encarnacion.

corroborated the testimony of the witnesses of the petitioner, with reference to the
signing of documents, in the bedroom of Encarnacion Neyra, on November 3, 1942.

But the testimony of Trinidad Neyra, it has been shown that Encarnacion
sent Eustaquio Mendoza to fetch her, and that in fact she came to the house of
Encarnacion, at about 2:30 o'clock in the afternoon that same day, November 1,
1942, with said Eustaquio Mendoza; that on seeing one another, Encarnacion and
Trinidad Neyra greeted each other most affectionately, forgiving one another, after
which they talked about the property left by their deceased father and the litigation
pending between them; and the two sisters agreed to settle their case, which had been
elevated to the Court of Appeals for the City of Manila, concerning a certain house
and lot, on the understanding that said property should be given exclusively to
Trinidad, and that the latter should renounce her claim against Encarnacion, for her
share in the rents collected on said property, and, at the same time, Encarnacion
renounced her claim for P727.77 against Trinidad; and that it was also agreed
between the two sisters that Atty. Alejandro M. Panis should be called to prepare the
necessary papers for the settlement of said case. Presentacion Blanco, a witness for
the oppositors, also testified substantially to the foregoing facts.

But Ceferina de la Cruz, witness for the oppositors, also stated that the
attesting witnesses signed the documents thumb marked by Encarnacion Neyra, in
the sala near her bed, thus contradicting herself and Teodora Neyra and Presentacion
Blanco.

By the testimony of Trinidad Neyra and Atty. Alejandro M. Panis, and the
other attesting witnesses, it has also been shown that Atty. Alejandro M. Panis came
in the afternoon of the following day, November 2, 1942, and received instructions
from Encarnacion Neyra, not only for the preparation of said agreement, but also for
the preparation of a new will, and consequently Attorney Panis prepared said
document of compromise and the will, dated November 3, 1942, which were both
thumb marked, in duplicate, in the afternoon of that day, by Encarnacion Neyra, who
was then of sound mind, as shown by her appearance and conversation, aided by a
son of Trinidad Neyra, on her bed in the sala, in the presence of the attesting
witnesses, Dr. Moises B. Abad, Dr. Eladio R. Aldecoa, and Atty. Alejandro M. Panis,
who signed in the presence of the testatrix and of each other.
Father Teodoro Garcia was also present at the signing of the will, at the
request of Encarnacion Neyra, and so was Trinidad Neyra.
On November 4, 1942, due to a heart attack as a consequence of Addison's
disease, perhaps, Encarnacion Neyra expired, at about 3 o'clock in the morning.
Oppositor Teodora Neyra, her young daughter Ceferina de la Cruz, and
Presentacion Blanco, daughter of oppositor Maria Jacobo Vda. de Blanco, practically

Teodora Neyra, Presentacion Blanco and Ceferina de la Cruz, witnesses for

the oppositors, testified, however, that when the thumb mark of Encarnacion Neyra
was affixed, as stated above, to the document of compromise in question, dated
November 3, 1942, she was sleeping on her bed in the sala; and that the attesting
witnesses were not present, as they were in the caida.

Strange to say, Teodora Neyra, Presentacion Blanco and Ceferina de la Cruz

also testified that Encarnacion Neyra's thumb mark was affixed to the will, only in
the morning of November 4, 1942, by Trinidad Neyra and Ildefonso del Barrio, when
Encarnacion was already dead.
The testimony of Dr. Dionisio Parulan, alleged medical expert, as to the
nature and effects of Addison's disease, is absolutely unreliable. He had never seen or
talked to the testatrix Encarnacion Neyra.
According to the medical authorities, the cause or causes of the sleeping
sickness, known as Addison's disease, are not yet fully known: that persons attacked
by said decease often live as long as ten (10) years after the first attack, while others
die after a few weeks only, and that as the disease, progresses, asthenia sets in, and
from 80 per cent to 90 per cent of the patients develop tuberculosis, and
complications of the heart also appear. (Cecil, Textbook of Medicine, 3d ed., 1935,
pp. 1250, 1252, 1253; MaCrae, Osler's Modern Medicine, 3d ed., Vol. V. pp. 272279).
And it has been conclusively shown in this case that the testatrix
Encarnacion Neyra, at the age of 48, died on November 4, 1942, due to a heart
attack, after an illness of about two (2) years.
In connection with testamentary capacity, in several cases, this court has
considered the testimony of witnesses, who had known and talked to the testators,
more trustworthy than the testimony of alleged medical experts.
Testamentary capacity is the capacity to comprehend the nature of the
transaction in which the testator is engaged at the time, to recollect the property to be
disposed of, and the persons who would naturally be supposed to have claims upon
the testator, and to comprehend the manner in which the instrument will distribute
his property among the objects of his bounty. (Bugnao vs. Ubag. 14 Phil., 163.)

Insomnia, in spite of the testimony of two doctors who testified for the
opponents to the probate of a will, who stated that it tended to destroy mental
capacity, was held not to affect the full possession of the mental faculties deemed
necessary and sufficient for its execution. (Caguioa vs. Calderon, 20 Phil., 400.) The
testatrix was held to have been compos mentis, in spite of the physician's testimony
to the contrary, to the effect that she was very weak, being in the third or last stage of
tuberculosis. (Yap Tua vs. Yap Ca Kuan and Yap Ca Llu, 27 Phil., 579.) The
testimony testimony of the attending physician that the deceased was suffering from
diabetes and had been in a comatose for several days, prior to his death, was held not
sufficient to establish testamentary incapacity, in view of the positive statement of
several credible witnesses that he was conscious and able to understand what said to
him and to communicate his desires. (Samson vs. Corrales Tan Quintin, 44 Phil.,
573.) Where the mind of the testator is in perfectly sound condition, neither old age,
nor ill health, nor the fact that somebody had to guide his hand in order that he might
sign, is sufficient to invalidate his will. (Amata and Almojuela vs. Tablizo, 48 Phil.,
485.)

the agreement and will in question, in the sala, where the testatrix was lying on her
bed. The true test is not whether they actually saw each other, at the time of the
signing of the will, but whether they might have seen each other sign, had they
chosen to do so; and the attesting witnesses actually saw it in this case.
(Jaboneta vs. Gustilo, 5 Phil., 541.) And the thumbmark placed by the testatrix on the
will is equivalent to her signature. (Yap Tua vs. Yap Ca Kuan and Yap Ca Llu, 27
Phil., 579.)

Where it appears that a few hours and also a few days after the execution of
the will, the testator intelligently and intelligibly conversed with other persons,
although lying down and unable to move or stand up unassisted, but could still effect
the sale of property belonging to him, these circumstances show that the testator was
in a perfectly sound mental condition at the time of executing the will. (Amata and
Almojuela vs. Tablizo, 48 Phil., 485.)

Furthermore, the testimony of the oppositors and their witnesses, to the

effect that there could have been no reconciliation between the two sisters, and that
the thumb mark of Encarnacion Neyra was affixed to the document embodying the
agreement, while she was sleeping, on November 3, 1942, in their presence; and that
her thumb mark was affixed to the will in question, when she was already dead, in
the morning of November 4, 1942, within their view is preposterous, to say the least.
Said testimony is contrary to common sense. It violates all sense of proportion. The
oppositors and their witnesses could not have told the truth; they have testified to
brazen falsehoods; and they are, therefore, absolutely unworthy of belief. And to the
evidence of the oppositors is completely applicable the rule falsus in uno, falsus in
omnibus. (Gonzales vs. Mauricio, 53 Phil., 728, 735.)

Presentacion Blanco, in the course of her cross-examination, frankly

admitted that, in the morning and also at about 6 o'clock in the afternoon of
November 3, 1942, Encarnacion Neyra talked to her and that they understood each
other clearly, thus showing that the testatrix was really of sound mind, at the time of
the signing and execution of the agreement and will in question.
It may, therefore, be reasonably concluded that the mental faculties of
persons suffering from Addison's disease, like the testatrix in this case, remain
unimpaired, partly due to the fact that, on account of the sleep they enjoy, they
necessarily receive the benefit of physical and mental rest. And that like patients
suffering from tuberculosis, insomnia or diabetes, they preserve their mental faculties
until the moments of their death.
Judging by the authorities above cited, the conclusion made the trial court
that the testatrix Encarnacion Neyra was of sound mind and possessed testamentary
capacity, at the time of the execution of the will, cannot be properly disturbed.
The oppositors also claim that the attesting witnesses were not present, at
the time that the testatrix thumbed marked the will in question, on her bed, in
the sala of the house, as they were allegedly in the caida. But it has been fully shown
that the attesting witnesses were present at the time of the signing and execution of

The oppositors as well as their principal witnesses are all interested parties,
as said oppositors had been named legatees in the will dated September 14, 1939, but
eliminated from the will dated November 3, 1942.
On the other hand, the witnesses for the petitioner are all trustworthy men,
who had absolutely no interest in the final outcome of this case. Two of them are
ministers of the Gospel, while the three attesting witnesses are professional men of
irreproachable character, who had known and seen and talked to the testatrix.

In the brief presented by counsel for the oppositors and the appellants, to
show the alleged improbability of the reconciliation of the two sisters and the
execution of the will, dated November 3, 1942, they have erroneously placed great
reliance on the facts that, up to October 31, 1942, the two sisters Encarnacion and
Trinidad Neyra were bitter enemies. They were banking evidently on the common
belief that the hatred of relatives is the most violent. Dreadful indeed are the feuds of
relatives, and difficult the reconciliation. But they had forgotten the fact that
Encarnacion Neyra was a religious and pious woman instructed in the ancient virtues
of Christian faith and hope and charity, and that it was godly to forgive and better
still to forget.
It was most natural that there should have been reconciliation between the
two sisters, Encarnacion and Trinidad Neyra, as the latter is the nearest relative of the
former, her only sister of the whole blood. The approach of imminent death must
have evoked in her the tenderest recollections of childhood. And believing perhaps
that her little triumphs had not always been fair to her sister who in fact, had had

successively instituted two suits against her, to recover what was her due, and for
which Encarnacion believed she must atone, she finally decided upon reconciliation,
so that she might depart in peace.
The record shows that, of the two, Encarnacion lived in greater opulence,
and that Trinidad had been demanding tenaciously her share; and as a Christian
woman, Encarnacion must have known that no one has any right to enrich himself
unjustly, at the expense of another. And it was, therefore, natural that Encarnacion
should desire reconciliation with her sister Trinidad, and provide for her in her last
will and testament.
As for Eustaquio Mendoza, who, according to the evidence, had served
Encarnacion Neyra for so many years and so well, it was also natural that she should
make some provision for him, as gratitude is the noblest sentiment that springs from
the human heart.
The conduct of Encarnacion Neyra, in making altogether a new will, with
new beneficiaries named therein, including principally her bitterest enemy of late,
which is completely incompatible with the will, dated September 14, 1939, may
really seem strange and unusual; but, as it has been truly said, above the logic of the
head is the feeling in the heart, and the heart has reasons of its own which the head
cannot always understand, as in the case of intuitive knowledge of eternal verity.
As Encarnacion Neyra felt the advent of immortality, she naturally wanted
to follow "the path of the just, which is as the shining light that shineth more and
more unto the perfect day," so that her memory may be blessed. As a Christian
woman, she must have loved justice, mercy and truth and to follow the law, for this
is the whole duty of man.
In the present case, the court cannot find any reason or justification to alter
the conclusions set forth in the decree appealed from. This court will not reverse any
findings of fact by the trial court made upon conflicting testimony and depending
largely upon the credibility of witnesses, who testified in the presence of the trial
judge, unless the court below failed to take into consideration some material facts or
circumstances, or to weigh accurately all of the material facts and circumstances
presented to it for consideration. (Baltazar vs. Alberto, 33 Phil., 336;
Melliza vs.Towle, 34 Phil., 345; Caragay vs. Urquiza, 53 Phil., 72, 79;
Garcia vs. Garcia de Bartolome, 63 Phil., 419.)
After a careful consideration of the evidence and the law of this case, we
find it legally impossible to sustain any of the errors assigned by the appellants. The
judgment appealed from is, therefore, affirmed, with costs against the appellants. So
ordered.
Ozaeta, Perfecto, Hilado, and Bengzon, JJ., concur.

G.R. Nos. L-46430-31 July 30, 1979

FRANCISCA ALSUA-BETTS, JOSEPH O. BETTS, JOSE MADARETA,
ESTEBAN P. RAMIREZ, and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR ALBAY
PROVINCE, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, AMPARO ALSUA BUENVIAJE, FERNANDO
BUENVIAJE, FERNANDO ALSUA, represented by his guardian, CLOTILDE
S. ALSUA and PABLO ALSUA, respondents.

(1) Basis of the partition: Inventory (Annex A) of all the properties of the
Alsua spouses, which inventory consists of 97 pages, all of them signed by
the spouses and all the above named heirs in the left margin of every page
(parafo primers).
(2) An acknowledgment of the spouses that all the properties described in
the inventory (Annex A) are conjugal properties with the exception of five
parcels of land Identified with the figures of 1 to 5 and 30 shares of San
Miguel Brewery stock which are paraphernal properties of the late Do;a
Tinay (segundo parafo).

Rafael Triumfante for petitioners.

Sabido-Sabido & Associates and Madrid Law Office for private respondents.

GUERRERO, J.:1wph1.t
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. Nos. 54492-R and 54493-R which reversed the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Albay allowing the probate of the win of Don Jesus Alsua in Special
Proceedings No. 699 and dismissing the complaint in Civil Case 3068 after declaring
the two deeds of sale executed by Don Jesus Alsua legal and valid. The respondent
court 1 denied the probate of the will, declared null and void the two sales subject of
the complaint and ordered the defendants, petitioners herein, to pay damages to the
plaintiffs, now the private respondents, the sum of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00),
to render an accounting of the properties in their possession and to reimburse the
latter the net gain in the proportion that appertains to them in the properties from the
date of the firing of the complaint up to complete restoration plus Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00) as attorney's fees and costs.
The antecedent events leading to the filing of these two consolidated actions
are the following.
On November 25, 1949, Don Jesus Alsua and his wife, Do;a Florentina
Rella, both of Ligao, Albay, together with all their living children, Francisca AlsuaBetts, Pablo Alsua, Fernando Alsua thru this judicial guardian Clotilde Samson, and
Amparo Alsua de Buenviaje, entered into a duly notarized agreement, Escritura de
Particion Extrajudicial (Exhibit 8), over the then present and existing properties of
the spouses Don Jesus and Do;a Florentina enumerated in a prepared inventory,
Exhibit 8-A, the essential features of which are stated in private respondents' Brief,
pp. 26-29, to wit: t.hqw

(3) An acknowledgment that during their marriage, they had nine children
but five of them died minors, unmarried (parafo tercero y cuatro).
(4) An acknowledgment that on the basis of Article 1056 of the Civil Code
(old) to avoid Possible misunderstanding among their children concerning
the inheritance they are entitled to in the event of death of one of them they
have decided to effectuate an extrajudicial partition of all the properties
described in Annex "A" thereto under the following terms and conditions:
(Parafo quinto):
To Francisca Alsua, married to Joseph O. Betts were allotted or assigned all
the real properties with the improvements thereon specifically described from pages
1-12 of said inventory or, 34 parcels of land with a total land area of 5,720,364 sq.
meters, with a book or appraised value of P69,740.00.
To Pablo Alsua, married to Teresa Locsin were allotted or assigned all the
real properties with the improvements thereon specifically described from pages 1220 of said inventory or, 26 parcels of land with a total land area of 5,679,262 sq.
meters, with a book or appraised value of P55,940.00.
To Fernando Alsua, married to Clotilde Samson were allotted or assigned all
the real properties with the improvements thereon specifically described from pages
20-33 of said inventory or, 47 parcels of land with a total land area of 6,639,810 sq.
meters, with a book or appraised value of P89,300.00.
To Amparo Alsua, married to Fernando Buenviaje were allotted or assigned
all the real properties with the improvements thereon specifically described from
pages 33-47 of said inventory or, 47 parcels of land with a total land area of
5,630,715 sq. meters, with a book or appraised value of P58,830.00. t.hqw
(a) Each and every one of the heirs named above acknowledge and admit
that the totality of the properties allotted and adjudicated to the heirs as

described in the preceding paragraph, constitute one half of the properties

described in Annex "A", including any amount of cash deposited.
(b) That all the heirs acknowledge and admit that all the properties assigned
to them as their hereditary portion represent one-half not only of the
conjugal properties but includes the paraphernal properties waiving now
and forever any complaint or claim they have or they may have concerning
the amount, value, extension and location of the properties that are allotted
to each and everyone. They also waive any claim they have or they may
have over the remaining portion of the properties, which spouses reserved
for themselves.
(c) That in case of death of one of the spouses, each and everyone of the
heirs acknowledge that the properties which are left in the possession of the
surviving spouse, including any amount in cash, are even less than the onehalf that should correspond in absolute ownership as his legitimate
participation in the conjugal properties. In consequence they waive any
claim that they have or may have over said portion of said properties or any
amount in cash during the lifetime of the surviving spouse, including any
right or claim they have or they may have over the paraphernal properties of
Do;a Tinay in the event the surviving spouse is Don Jesus.
(d) The spouses on their part in case of death of any one of them, the
surviving spouse waives any claim he or she may have over the properties
assigned or adjudicated to the heirs under and by virtue of this deed. The
properties which were reserved for them (the spouses) should be considered
as his or her legitimate participation in the conjugal properties and the fair
compensation of his or her usufruct on the properties that the surviving
spouse reserved for himself or herself which shag be distributed in equal
shares among the heirs upon his or her death unless said properties of some
of them have been disposed of during the lifetime of the surviving spouse.
(e) Any heir who may dare question the validity and legitimacy of the
provision contained herein shall be under obligation to pay to the other
heirs, in the concept of damages and prejudice, the sum of P5,000.00 plus
attorney's fees.
(f) The provisions of this deed shall bind the successors of the herein heirs.
(g) In the event of death of one of the spouses, the properties assigned or
adjudicated to each and everyone of the heirs shall be considered as his
share or participation in the estate or as his inheritance left by the deceased
and each heir shall become the absolute owner of the properties adjudicated
to him under this deed.

On January 5, 1955, Don Jesus and Do;a Florentina, also known as Do;a
Tinay separately executed their respective holographic wills (Exhs. 6-B and 7-B), the
provisions of which were in conformity and in implementation of the extrajudicial
partition of November 25, 1949. Their holographic wills similarly provided for the
institution of the other to his or her share in the conjugal properties, the other half of
the conjugal assets having been partitioned to constitute their legitime among their
four living children in the Extrajudicial Partition of 1949. The wigs also declared that
in the event of future acquisitions of other properties by either of them, one-half
thereof would belong to the other spouse, and the other half shall be divided equally
among the four children. The holographic will of Do;a Tinay written in Spanish
reads, as translated: t.hqw
TESTAMENT
I, FLORENTINA R. DE ALSUA, 67 years old, Filipina, married to Don
Jesus Alsua, resident of and with postal address in the Municipality of
Ligao, Province of Albay, Philippines, being in the full possession of my
mental and physical faculties freely and spontaneously execute this my last
will and testament in my handwriting and signed by me and expressed in
the Spanish language which I speak, write and understand, this 5th day of
January, 1955 in the Municipality of Ligao, Province of Albay, and in which
I ordain and provide:
First: That in or about the year 1906 I was married to my husband Don
Jesus Alsua and begot nine (9) children with him, four (4) of whom are still
living and they are Francisco Alsua, Pablo Alsua, Fernando Alsua and
Amparo Alsua. The other five (5) died during their minority, single and
without children.
Second: That after my marriage to my husband Don Jesus Alsua and during
our conjugal union, and as a result of our efforts and industry, we were able
to acquire conjugal properties consisting of abaca (abales) and cacao lands
and urban lands registered in the office of the Registry of Property of the
Province of Albay and in the City of Manila.
Third: That I institute as my heirs with right to inherit the following- my
spouse Don Jesus Alsua, one-half (1/2) of my properties, real and personal,
and the other half, to my children Francisco Alsua, married to Joseph O.
Betts, Pablo Alsua, Fernando Alsua, married to Clotilde Samson, and
Amparo Alsua, married to Fernando Buenviaje, in equal parts. It is to be
understood, however, that the other half that corresponds as legitime to my
above named children have already been given to them, pursuant to a
document dated November 25, 1949 and ratified on the same day, month
and year before Notary Public Segundo G. Flores (Reg. No. 525; Pag. 15;
Lib. 11; Series of 1949) enjoining each and everyone of them to respect and

faithfully comply with each and every clause contained in the said
document.
Fourth: That should I acquire new properties after the execution of this
testament, the same shall be partitioned among my spouse and above named
children or the children mentioned in above par. 3 in the same proportion
that is, one-half (1 1/2) to my spouse; and the other half to my children in
equal parts.
Fifth: That I name as my executor my husband Don Jesus Alsua without
having to post any bond.
IN VIRTUE WHEREOF, I hereby sign in my own handwriting this
testament on this 5th day of January, 1955 in the Municipality of Ligao,
Province of Albay, Philippines. t.hqw
(SGD.) FLORENTINA R. DE ALSUA
(Joint Record on appeal pp. 420-423, CA-G.R. No. 54492-R)
As previously stated, Don Jesus Alsua executed a separate but similar
holographic will on the same day, Jan. 5, 1955 in exactly the same terms and
conditions as the above will of his wife.
On May 21, 1956, the spouses Don Jesus and Do;a Tinay filed before the
Court of First Instance of Albay their respective petitions for the probate of their
respective holographic wins which were docketed as Special Proceedings No. 484
(Jesus Alsua, Petitioner) and Special Proceedings No. 485 (Do;a Florentina Ralla de
Alsua, Petitioner).
On August 14, 1956, the spouses Don Jesus and Do;a Tinay executed their
mutual and reciprocal codicils amending and supplementing their respective
holographic wins. Again, the codicils similarly acknowledged and provided that onehalf of all the properties of the spouses, conjugal and paraphernal, had been disposed
of, conveyed to and partitioned among their legitimate heirs in the "Escritura de
Particion" of November 25, 1949, but that they reserved for themselves (the spouses
Don Jesus and Do;a Tinay) the other half or those not disposed of to the said
legitimate heirs under the above agreement of partition, and that they mutually and
reciprocally bequeathed unto each other their participation therein as well as in all
properties which might be acquired subsequently. Each spouse also declared that
should she or he be the surviving spouse, whatever belongs to him or her or would
pertain to him or her, would be divided equally among the four children. It was also
declared in both codicils that upon the death of either of the spouses, the surviving
spouse was designated mutually and reciprocally as the executor or administrator of
all the properties reserved for themselves.

The codicil executed by Do;a Tinay, written in Spanish reads, as

translated: t.hqw
CODICIL
This codicil supplements and amends the preceding testament. That my
spouse and I have agreed to divide the properties which we have acquired
into 2 parts. The 1/2 that would correspond to me covers all the properties
that I have partitioned among my children in the Document of Partition
dated November 25, 1949 before Notary Public Segundo G. Flores, Jr.
(Doc. No. 525; Pag. No. 15; Lib. No. 11; Series of 1949) (and) even as the
properties which by reason of this testament I leave to my husband as his
share and the other half that corresponds to my husband constitutes an the
properties that up to now have not been disposed of, particularly the urban
lands situated in Legaspi, Albay, Ligao of the Province of Albay and in the
City of Manila, with the exception of that portion that I bequeath to my
husband as his inheritance and his legitimate.
That I institute as my heirs with the right to inherit my husband Don Jesus
Alsua and my children Francisco Alsua, Pablo Alsua, Fernando Alsua and
Amparo Alsua. I leave to my aforecited children all the properties described
in the above mentioned Document of Partition dated November 25, 1949
which correspond to each one of them and in the profits (fruits) expressed in
the same, and in the event that the properties granted to one or any of my
children should exceed in quantity or value those corresponding to another
or others, I hereby declare that it is my will that the same be divided among
my children as their inheritance from the free portion of my property.
I leave to my spouse Don Jesus Alsua as his legitime and as Ws inheritance
the part of the free portion of my property which have not been allocated in
favor of my children in the Document of Partition aforecited and that which
should exceed 1/2 of the conjugal property of gains that pertains to him as
above stated, including all those properties which we shall acquire after the
execution of this document.
In case it should be God's will that I survive my spouse, I hereby declare
that it is my will that any and all kinds of property that pertain to me or
would pertain to me, which have not been disposed of pursuant to the
partition, should be divided equally among my above-mentioned heirs after
my death. Ligao, Albay, Philippines, August 14,1956. t.hqw
(SGD.) FLORENTINA RALLA DE ALSUA
(joint Record on Appeal pp. 423-425, CA-G.R. No. 54492-R)

And as stated previously, on the same day, August 14, 1956, Don Jesus
executed also a separate but similar codicil in exactly the same terms and conditions
as the above codicil of his wife. Also on the same day of August 14, 1956, the
spouses Don Jesus and Do;a Tinay both filed their respective supplemental petitions
for the probate of their respective codicils in the probate proceedings earlier filed. On
February 19, 1957, their respective holographic wins and the codicils thereto were
duly admitted to probate.
Upon the death of Do;a Tinay on October 2, 1959, Don Jesus was named
executor to serve without bond in an order issued by the probate court on October
13, 1959. Letters testamentary having been issued in favor of Don Jesus, he took his
oath of office and performed his duties as such until July 1, 1960.
Thereafter in the early part of November, 1959, Don Jesus cancelled his
holographic will in the presence of his bookkeeper and secretary, Esteban P.
Ramirez, whom he instructed to make a list of all his remaining properties with their
corresponding descriptions. His lawyer, Atty. Gregorio imperial Sr. was then
instructed to draft a new will which was duly signed by Don Jesus and his attesting
witnesses on November 14, 1959 at Ms home in Ligao, Albay. This notarial will and
testament (Exh. A) of Don Jesus executed on November 14, 1959 had three essential
features: (a) it expressly cancelled, revoked and annulled all the provisions of Don
Jesus' holographic will of January 5, 1955 and his codicil of August 14, 1956; (b) it
provided for the collation of all his properties donated to his four living children by
virtue of the "Escritura de Particion Extra. judicial" of 1949, and that such properties
be taken into account in the partition of his estate among the children; and (c) it
instituted his children as legatees/devisees of certain specific properties, and as to the
rest of the properties and whatever may be subsequently acquired in the future,
before his death, were to be given to Francisca and Pablo, naming Francesca as
executrix to serve without a bond.
After all debts, funeral charges and other expenses of the estate of Do;a
Tinay had been paid, all her heirs including Don Jesus, submitted to the probate court
for approval a deed of partition executed on December 19, 1959 (Exh. 7-Q) and
which essentially confirmed the provisions of the partition of 1949, the holographic
will and codicil of Do;a Tinay. On July 6, 1960, the court approved the partition of
1959 and on January 6, 1961 declared the termination of the proceedings on the
estate of Do;a Tinay.
On May 6,1964, Don Jesus Alsua died.
On May 20, 1964, petitioner herein Francisca Alsua Betts, as the executrix
named in the will of November 14, 1959, filed a petition for the probate of said new
will of Don Jesus Alsua before the Court of First Instance of Albay and was docketed
as Special Proceedings No. 699. Oppositions thereto were filed by Pablo, Amparo
and Fernando, thru his judicial guardian Clotilde Samson, on the following grounds:

(a) that Don Jesus was not of sound and disposing mind at the time of the execution
of the alleged will; (b) that the will was executed under duress or influence of fear or
threats; or it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part
of the main beneficiaries and of person or persons in collusion with them, or the
signature of the testator was secured by or thru fraud; (c) that the will was not
executed according to the formal requirements of the law; and (d) that the alleged
will subject of probate contravened the Extrajudicial Partition of 1949 agreed upon
by him, his deceased spouse, Do;a Tinay, and all his children, Francisco, Pablo,
Amparo and Fernando thru his judicial guardian Clotilde Samson, and also
contravened Don Jesus' own probated holographic will and codicil of 1955 and 1956,
respectively, essentially confirming and implementing the said partition of 1949
which had already been partially executed by all the signatories thereto in the
partition of the estate of Do;a Tinay in December, 1959.
On the basis of Francisca's designation as executrix in the new will dated
November 14, 1959, the Probate Court appointed her Administratrix of the estate of
her late father, Don Jesus Alsua. She then filed with the Probate Court an inventory
of the properties of the estate which, according to the oppositors therein (the private
respondents now) did not include some properties appearing in the agreement of
November 25. 1949 or in the inventory attached thereto as Annex "A" and in the
"Escritura de Particion" of December 19, 1959 as belonging to or should pertain to
Don Jesus. According to the oppositors, these properties consist of thirty- three (33)
premium agricultural lots with a total land area of 1,187,970 square meters, or
approximately 119 hectares and with a total assessed value of P48,410.00 or a
probable total market value of P238,000.00 at only P2,000.00 per hectare, and four
(4) commercial urban lots Ideally located in the business section of Legazpi City
including the lot and the building presently occupied by the well-known "Mayon
Hotel" with an assessed value of approximately P117,260.00 or a probable market
value at the time of P469,040.00. It appearing from the new will that these properties
were bequeathed to Pablo Alsua and Francisco Alsua-Betts, specifically, 3 parcels of
the 33 agricultural lands to Pablo and the rest to Francisco, the oppositors also raised
in issue the non-inclusion of said properties in the inventory of the estate of their late
father. In answer, Francisco claimed ownership over the same, alleging that she
bought the properties from their father and presenting the two Deeds of Sale now
being assailed, one dated August 26, 1961 purporting to show the sale of the 33
parcels of agricultural land to Francisco by their father for the price of P70,000.00
and the other dated November 26, 1962 evidencing the sale of the four urban lots for
the sum of P80,000.00. Claiming fraud in the sales, the oppositors filed Civil Case
No. 3068, seeking the annulment of the aforesaid two deeds of sale, with damages,
which upon agreement of the parties was then jointly heard and tried with Special
Proceedings No. 699 for probate of the Last Will and Testament of Don Jesus
executed on November 14, 1959.
After a joint hearing of the merits of these two cases, the Court of First
Instance of Albay promulgated a decision on January 15, 1973, the dispositive
portion of which states: t.hqw

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered,

to wit:

II. The respondent Court of Appeals grossly erred in holding that testator
Don Jesus Alsua cannot revoke his previous will.

1. In Special Proceedings 699, the Court hereby APPROVES and ALLOWS

the Will executed by Don Jesus Alsua at Ligao, Albay, on November 14,
1959, which had been marked as Exhibit A, consisting of nine (9) pages,
and orders that the same be made the basis for division and distribution of
the estate of said testator;

III. The respondent court's finding is grounded entirely on speculation,

surmises or conjectures resulting in a gross misapprehension of facts.

2. In Civil Case 3068, the Court hereby dismisses the complaint and holds
that the sale on August 26, 1961 (Exh. U) and the sale on November 26,
1962 (Exh. W), are lawful and valid sales and accordingly conveyed title to
the VENDEE thereof. The Plaintiffs in Civil Case 3068. are ordered jointly
and severally to pay to the defendant, Francisco Alsua Betts Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00) as damages and Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos for
attorney's fees or a total of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00)
and to pay the costs.

On the first issue of estoppel raised in the assignment of errors, We hold that
the same is of no moment. The controversy as to the competency or incompetency of
Don Jesus Alsua to execute his will cannot be determined by acts of the herein
private respondents as oppositors to the will in formally agreeing in writing jointly
with the petitioner Francisca Alsua de Betts that their father, Don Jesus Alsua, be
appointed by the court executor of the will of their mother in Special Proceedings
No. 485, Testate Estate of Do;a Florentina Ralla de Alsua and in subsequently
petitioning the court not to require Don Jesus Alsua to file any accounting as
executor in the proceedings, which petitioners claim and was upheld by the trial
court as constituting estoppel on the part of the private respondents from questioning
the competence of Don Jesus Alsua.

On appeal by herein respondents to the Court of Appeals, the court reversed

the appealed decision in a judgment rendered on April 4, 1977, the dispositive
portion of which states, as translated, thus t.hqw
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Tribunal finds itself constrained to
set aside as it hereby sets aside the decision appealed from in the following
manner: (1) in Special Proceedings 699, the probate of the will, Exh. A, is
hereby denied; (2) in Civil Case No. 3068, Exhs. U and W and the titles
issued on the basis thereof are hereby declared null and void, ordering the
appellees Francisco Alsua and Joseph Betts to pay to the plaintiffs in the
concept of fixed damages, the sum of P5,000.00 and to render an
accounting of properties in their possession and to reimburse the plaintiffs
the net gain, in the proportion that appertains to them in the properties
subject of litigation in Civil Case No. 3068 from the date of the filing of this
complaint, up to the complete restoration of the properties pertaining to
(plaintiffs) pursuant to Article 2208 of the New Civil Code, paragraph 11,
ordering them in addition to pay to the plaintiffs and oppositors the sum of
P50,000.00 as attorney's fees, and the costs.
Hence, the petition at bar assailing the respondent court's decision on four
assigned errors, to wit: t.hqw
I. The respondent Court of Appeals erred in not affirming the findings of the
probate court (Special Proceedings No. 699) that private respondents,
oppositors to the probate of the will, are in estoppel to question the
competence of testator Don Jesus Alsua.

IV. The respondent court grossly erred in annulling the sales of August 26,
1961 (Exh. U), and of November 26, 1962 (Exh. W).

The principle of estoppel is not applicable in probate proceedings, a ruling

laid down in the case of Testate Estate of the Late Procopia Apostol Benedicta
Obispo, et al vs. Remedios Obispo, 50 O.G. 614, penned by Justice J.B.L. Reyes, an
eminent and recognized authority on Civil Law when he was still in the Court of
Appeals, and We quote: t.hqw
Finally, probate proceedings involve public interest, and the application
therein of the rile of estoppel, when it win block the ascertainment of the
truth as to the circumstances surrounding the execution of a testament,
would seem inimical to public policy. Over and above the interest of private
parties is that of the state to see that testamentary dispositions be carried out
if, and only if, executed conformably to law.
The Supreme Court of New York aptly said in Re Canfield's Will, 300
N.Y.S., 502: t.hqw
'The primary purpose of the proceeding is not to establish the
existence of the right of any living person, but to determine
whether or not the decedent has performed the acts specified by the
pertinent statutes, which are the essential prerequisites to personal
direction of the mode of devolution of his property on death. There
is no legal but merely a moral duty resting upon a proponent to
attempt to validate the wishes of the departed, and he may and

frequently does receive no personal benefit from the performance

of the act.
One of the most fundamental conceptions of probate law, is that it
is the duty of the court to effectuate, in so far as may be compatible
with the public interest, the devolutionary wishes of a deceased
person (Matter of Watson's Wilt 262 N.Y., 284, 294, 186, N.E.,
787; Matter of Marriman's Estate, 124 Misc. 320, 325, 208, N.Y.S.,
672; Foley, S., affirmed 217 app. Div., 733, 216 N.Y.S., 126,
Henderson, S., Matter of Draske's Estate, 160 Misc. 587, 593, 290,
N.Y.S., 581). To that end, the court is, in effect, an additional party
to every litigation affecting the disposal of the assets of the
deceased. Matter of Van Valkenburgh's Estate, 164 Misc. 295, 298,
N.Y.S., 219.'
The next issue that commands Our attention is whether the respondent court
erred in not allowing the probate of the last will and testament of Don Jesus Alsua.
Petitioners claim that the disallowance was based on speculations, surmises or
conjectures, disregarding the facts as found by the trial court. The Civil Court is very
clear and explicit in providing the cases where a will may be disallowed under
Article 839 which provides as follows: t.hqw
Art. 839. The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases:
(1) If the formalities required by law have not been complied with;
(2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable of making a
wilt at the time of its execution;
(3) If it was executed through force or under duress, or the influence of fear,
or threats;
(4) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the
part of the beneficiary or of some other person;
(5) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud,
(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the instrument he
signed should be his will at the time of affixing his signature thereto.
The issue under consideration appears to Us to have been answered by the
respondent court itself when it accepted the findings of the trial court on the due
execution of the questioned will and testament of Don Jesus, declaring: t.hqw

... and going back to the previous question, whether the questioned will and
testament of November 14, 1959, Exh. A, was executed in accordance with
Arts. 805-809 of the New Civil Code, this Tribunal from the very beginning
accepts the findings of the inferior court concerning the question, t.
hqw
On October 2, 1959, Do;a Florentina died at Ligao, Albay. About
2 weeks after said death of his wife, Don Jesus Alsua decided to
make a new will, thereby revoking and cancelling his previous
holographic will which he made on January 5, 1955 and also its
codicil dated August 14, 1956. In the presence of his bookkeeper
and secretary, Esteban P. Ramirez, he crossed out in ink each and
every page of said page he wrote on each page the word
"cancelado", and affixed his signature thereon (Exh V-5, V-6,
consecutively up to and including Exh. V-14). He then instructed
Ramirez to make a list of all s properties with their corresponding
descriptions.
Meanwhile, Don Jesus Alsua sent for his lawyer, Don Gregorio
Imperial, Sr. and the latter came accompanied by his son, Atty.
Jorge S, Imperial, who, incidentally, is now a judge of the Court of
First Instance of Naga City, Camarines Sur. Don Jesus informed
his lawyers that he wanted to make a new will, and accordingly
gave more detailed instructions as to how he wanted to divide his
properties among his four children. He handed to them a list and
on the left he indicated the name of the child to whom the listed
properties shall pertain. Atty. Jorge Imperial took notes of the
instructions of Don Jesus Alsua. To Don Jesus, Spanish is his
major language, as in fact his conversations with Don Gregorio are
always in Spanish. A few days before November 14, 1959, Atty.
Jorge S. Imperial showed to Don Jesus the semi-final draft of the
will and after reading it Don Jesus said that it was as directed by
him, and after making a few minor corrections, he instructed Atty.
Jorge S. Imperial to put the win in final form. He further told Atty,
Jorge Imperial that the signing of the will should be at his home in
Ligao, in the morning of November 14, 1959, and that the
witnesses should be Mr. Ramon Balana, the then Register of Deeds
of Albay; Mr. Jose Madarieta who is a friend of the family; and Mr.
Jose Gaya who is a sort of employee of Don Jesus.
Thus in the morning of November 14, 1959, Don Gregorio and
Atty. Jorge S. Imperial, riding in a sedan, stopped at the Legaspi
residence of Mr. Ramon Balana, and informed the latter that Don
Jesus was requesting him to be one of the attesting witnesses to his
will. Mr. Balana, having a very high regard for Don Jesus,
considered it an honor to be so asked, and gladly went with the

Imperials. They arrived at the residence of Don Jesus at Ligao;

Albay, almost ten o'clock of that morning, and they were ushered
in by Mr. Jose Gaya, and the latter requested them to be seated at
the usual receiving room on the ground floor while he announced
their arrival to Don Jesus who was on the second floor. Soon Don
Jesus came down, carrying with him the will to be signed placed
inside a cartolina folder. He greeted Don Gregorio, Mr. Balan, and
Atty. Imperial and immediately joined them in conversation. Mr.
Gaya called for Mr. Jose Madarieta, whose residence is just across
the road from the house of Don Jesus. Mr. Madarieta was already
informed by Don Jesus himself about the fact of signing the will
that morning, and so, on being advised by Mr. Gaya that the
Imperials had already arrived, Madarieta proceeded to the
residence of Don Jesus, without much delay. With the coming of
Madarieta and the coming back of Gaya, there were now six
people gathered in the living room, namely: Don Jesus Alsua, Don
Gregorio Imperial Atty. Jorge S. Imperial Mr. Ramon Balana, Mr.
Jose Madarieta, and Mr. Jose Gaya. All the witnesses who testified
for the petitioner declared that Don Jesus was in bright and lively
conversation which ran from problems of farming and the merits of
French-made wines. At 1 1:00 o'clock, Don Gregorio made a
remark that it is about time to do what they were there for, and this
was followed by a more or less statement from Jesus, who
said: t.hqw
'Preisamente es por lo que he Hamado a ustedes que esten
presentes para ser testigos de rni ultimo voluntad y
testamento que ha sido preparado por el abogado Sr.
Gregorio Imperial segun mis instrucciones cuyo
documento tengo aqui conmigo y encuentro que, despues
de lo he leido, esta satisfactoriamente hecho segun mis
instrucciones, Como saben ustedes tengo cuatro (4) hijos
todos egos.' (pp. 43-44, t.s.n., hearing of December 7,
1967, Sarte.
On request of Don Jesus, all of them moved to the big round table
on another part of the same sala for convenience in signing
because there were chairs all around this table. The will which
consisted of nine pages, with a duplicate, and triplicate was laid on
the round table and the signing began, with Atty. Jorge S. Imperial
assisting each person signing by indicating the proper place where
the signature shall be written. Don Jesus, as testator, signed first.
After signing the original and the two other sets, the three sets
were then passed to Mr. Ramon Balana who signed as attesting
witness. After Mr. Balana, Mr. Jose Madarieta signed next as
another attesting witness, and when Mr. Madarieta finished signing

all the three sets, the same were passed to Mr. Jose Gaya who also
signed as the third attesting witness. On each of the three sets, Don
Jesus signed ten times, one on the margin of each of the nine
pages, and at the end of the instrument proper. Each of the three
attesting witnesses (Balana, Madarieta and Gaya) signed eleven
times on each set, one on the margin of each of the nine pages,
one at the end of the instrument proper and one below the
attestation clause. The original will was marked as Exh. A (or set
A); the duplicate as Exh. K (or set K) and the triplicate of Don
Jesus, Mr. Balana, Mr. Madarieta, and Mr. Gaya were Identified by
Mr. Balana, Mr. Madarieta and Atty. (now Judge) imperial. It was
also clearly established that when Don Jesus signed the will Mr.
Balana, Mr. Madarieta, and Mr. Gaya were present and witnessed
said signing, and that when each of these three witnesses was
signing, Don Jesus and the two other attesting witnesses were
present and Witnessing said Signing. The signing by the testator
and the attesting witnesses having been completed, Atty. Jorge S.
Imperial as Notary Public with commission for the entire province
of Albay, notarized the wilt and sealed it with his notarial seat
which seal he brought along that morning. After all the three sets
were notarized, they were all given back to Don Jesus who placed
them inside the same folder. At that moment, it was already about
12:30 P.M. and Don Jesus invited all of them to lunch, which
invitation was gladly accepted by all of then-L (pp. 474-480, Joint
Record on Appeal in CA-G.R. No. 54492-R)
which findings are supported by the evidence, - it is quite difficult to
conclude that the same had not complied with the requirements of Arts.
804- 806 of the New Civil Code. ... (CA Decision, pp. 13-16, as translated).
This cited portion of the appealed decision accepts as a fact that the findings
of the lower court declaring the contested will as having been executed with all the
formal requirements of a valid will, are supported by the evidence. This finding is
conclusive upon this Tribunal and We cannot alter, review or revise the same. Hence,
there is no further need for Us to dwell on the matter as both the lower court and the
respondent appellate court have declared that these are the facts and such facts are
fully borne and supported by the records. We find no error in the conclusion arrived
at that the contested will was duly executed in accordance with law. We rule that the
questioned last will and testament of Don Jesus Alsua fully complied with the formal
requirements of the law.
Respondent court, however, denied probate of the will after ,'noting certain
details which were a little bit difficult to reconcile with the ordinary course of things
and of life." First was the fact that the spouses Don Jesus and Do;a Tinay together
with their four children Francisco, Pablo, Amparo and Fernando had executed the
Extrajudicial Partition of November 25, 1949 (Exh. A) which divided the conjugal

properties of the spouses between the spouses themselves and the children under the
terms and conditions and dispositions herein before stated and to implement its
provisions, Don Jesus and Do;a Tinay subsequently executed separately their
respective holographic wigs both dated January 5, 1955 and codicils dated August
14, 1956 with the same terms and conditions as reproduced herein earlier. Both
holographic wills and codicils having been probated thereafter and upon the death of
Do;a Tinay, Don Jesus was appointed executor of the will and in due time the
partition of the properties or estate of Do;a Tinay was approved by the probate court
on July 6, 1960.
The respondent court ruled that the Extrajudicial Partition of November 25,
1949 was an enforceable contract which was binding on Don Jesus Alsua as the
surviving spouse, barring him from violating said partition agreement, barring him
from revoking his holographic will of January 5, 1955 and his codicil of August 14,
1956, and further barring him from executing his new will and testament of
November 14, 1959, now the subject of the probate proceedings elevated to this
Court.
We do not agree with this ruling of the Court of Appeals. We hold that the
Extrajudicial Partition of November 25, 1949 is null and void under Article 1056 in
relation to Article 1271 of the old Civil Code which are applicable hereto. These
Articles provide as follows: t.hqw
Art. 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his property by an act
inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall stand in so far as it does not
prejudice the legitime of the forced heirs. ...
Art. 1271. All things, even future ones, which are not excluded from the
commerce of man, may be the subject-matter of contracts.
Nevertheless, no contract may be entered into with respect to future
inheritances, except those the object of which is to make a division inter
vivos of an estate, in accordance with Article 1056.
All services not contrary to law or to good morals may also be the subjectmatter of contract.
Article 1056 specifically uses the word "testator" from which the clear
intent of the law may be deduced that the privilege of partitioning one's estate by acts
inter vivos is restricted only to one who has made a prior will or testament. In other
words, Article 1056 being an exception cannot be given a wider scope as to include
in the exception any person whether he has made a will or not.
Respondent court citing the same Article concluded that under both the old
and new Civil Code, a person who executes a will is permitted at the same time or a

little thereafter or even before as long as he mentions this fact in the will, to partition
his properties pursuant to the provisions of Article 1056 of the old Civil Code. The
court further added that jurisprudence is to the effect that the partition presupposes
the execution of the will that it ratifies or effectuates, citing the case of Legasto vs.
Verzosa, 54 Phil. 776. Finally, respondent court held the opinion that the extrajudicial
partition of November 14, 1949 was ratified in the holographic will executed by Don
Jesus on Jan. 5, 1955 and in the codicil of August 14, 1956.
Again, We do not agree with this ruling of the respondent court. In Legasto
vs. Verzosa, supra, the Supreme Court categorically declared the necessity of a prior
will before the testator can partition his properties among his heirs, and We quote the
pertinent portions of the decision: t.hqw
The first question to decide in the instant appeal is whether the partition
made by Sabina Almadin of her property among her nieces, the defendants
and appellants herein, was valid and enforceable.
Article 1056 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his property by an act
inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall stand in so far as it does not
prejudice the legitime of the forced heirs.
The Supreme Court of Spain, in a decision rendered on June 13, 1903, laid
down the following doctrine:
Considering that the language of article 1056 cannot be interpreted to mean
that a person may, by acts inter vivos, partition his property referred to in
the section wherein said article is found, without the authority of a
testament containing an expression of his last will, or the authority of law,
for, otherwise, a partition thus made would be tantamount to making a will
in a manner not provided for, authorized, nor included in the chapter
referring to testaments, and especially, to the forms thereof, which is
entirely different from the legal consequences of a free disposition made by
parents during their lifetime, whereby they give to their children the whole
or a part of their property;
Considering that, inasmuch as the second paragraph of article 1271 makes
reference to the aforesaid article, in providing that no contracts may be
entered into with respect to future inheritances except those the object of
which is to make a division inter vivos of the estate in accordance with
article 1056, it is evident that said difference likewise leads to the
conclusion that a partition thus made should be on the basis of a
testamentary or legal succession and should be made in conformity with the
fundamental rules thereof and the order of the heirs entitled to the estate,

because neither of the two provisions could be given a wider meaning or

scope than that they simply provide for the division of the estate during the
lifetime of the owner, which, otherwise, would have to be done upon the
death of the testator in order to carry into effect the partition of the estate
among the persons interested.
Manresa comments on the same article as follows:
A distinction must be made between the disposition of property and its
division; and the provision of article 1056 authorizing the testator to dispose
of his property by acts inter vivos or by last will, must be understood in
accordance with this distinction. The Idea is to divide the estate among the
heirs designated by the testator. This designation constitutes the disposition
of the properties to take effect after his death, and said act must necessarily
appear in the testament because it is the expression of the testator's last will
and must be surrounded by appropriate formalities. Then comes the second
part, to wit, the division in conformity with that disposition, and the testator
may make this division in the same will or in another will, or by an act inter
vivos. With these words, the law, in article 1056 as well as in article 1057,
which we shall hereafter examine, makes allusion to the forms or manner of
making the partition and not to the effects thereof, which means that, for
purposes of partition the formal solemnities which must accompany every
testament or last will are not necessary. Neither is it necessary to observe
the special for. realities required in case of donations, because it is not a
matter of disposing gratuitously of properties, but of dividing those which
already have been legally disposed of.
It is thus seen that both the Spanish Supreme Court and the learned and
authoritative commentator, Manresa, are of opinion that a testator may, by
an act inter vivos, partition his property, but he must first make a will with
all the formalities provided for by law. And it could not be otherwise, for
without a will there can be no testator; when the law, therefore, speaks of
the partition inter vivos made by a testator of his property, it necessarily
refers to that property which he has devised to his heirs. A person who
disposes of his property gratis inter vivos is not called a testator, but a
donor. In employing the word "testator," the law evidently desired to
distinguish between one who freely donates his property in life and one who
disposes of it by will to take effect after his death.
We are not in conformity with the holding of the respondent court that the
extrajudicial partition of November 25, 1949 which under the old Civil Code was
expressly prohibited as against public policy had been validly ratified by the
holographic will of Don Jesus executed on January 5, 1955 and his codicil of August
14, 1956. Such a holding of the appellate court that a person who executes a will is
permitted to partition his properties pursuant to the provisions of Article 1056 of the
old Civil Code even before executing his will as long as he mentions this fact in the

will, is not warranted under the ruling of Legasto vs. Verzosa, supra and the
commentary of Manresa as quoted above. We rule, therefore, that the respondent
court erred in denying probate to the will of Don Jesus dated November 14, 1959; it
erred in holding that Don Jesus being a party to the extrajudicial partition of 1949
was contractually bound by the provisions thereof and hence could not revoke his
participation therein by the simple expedience of making a new will with contrary
provisions or dispositions. It is an error because the so-called extrajudicial partition
of 1949 is void and inoperative as a partition; neither is it a valid or enforceable
contract because it involved future inheritance; it may only be given effect as a
donation inter vivos of specific properties to the heirs made by the parents.
Considering that the document, the extrajudicial partition of November 25,
1949, contained specific designation of properties allotted to each child, We rule that
there was substantial compliance with the rules on donations inter vivos under the
old Civil Code (Article 633). On the other hand, there could have been no valid
donation to the children of the other half reserved as the free portion of Don Jesus
and Do;a Tinay which, as stated in the deed, was to be divided equally among the
children for the simple reason that the property or properties were not specifically
described in the public instrument, an essential requirement under Article 633 which
provides as follows: t.hqw
Art. 633. In order that a donation or real property be valid it must be made
by public instrument in which the property donated must be specifically
described and in the amount of the encumbrances to be assumed by the
donee expressed.
The acceptance must be made in the deed of gift or in a separate public
writing; but it shall produce no effect if not made during the lifetime of the
donor.
If the acceptance is made by separate public instrument, authentic notice
thereof shall be given the donor, and this proceeding shall be noted in both
instruments.
This other half, therefore, remained as the disposable free portion of the
spouses which may be disposed of in such manner that either of the spouses would
like in regards to his or her share in such portion, unencumbered by the provision
enjoining the last surviving spouse to give equally to the children what belongs orwould pertain to him or her. The end result, therefore, is that Don Jesus and Do;a
Tinay, in the Deed of 1949, made to their children valid donations of only one-half of
their combined properties which must be charged against their legitime and cannot
anymore be revoked unless inofficious; the other half remained entirely at the free
disposal of the spouses with regards to their respective shares.

Upon the death of Do;a Tinay on October 2, 1959, her share in the free
portion was distributed in accordance with her holographic will dated January 25,
1955 and her codicil dated August 14, 1956. It must be stressed here that the
distribution of her properties was subject to her holographic win and codicil,
independently of the holographic will and codicil of Don Jesus executed by him on
the same date. This is fundamental because otherwise, to consider both wills and
codicils jointly would be to circumvent the prohibition of the Civil Code on joint
wills (Art. 818) and secondly because upon the death of Do;a Tinay, only her estate
was being settled, and not that of Don Jesus.
We have carefully examined the provisions of the holographic will and
codicil of Do;a Tinay and We find no indication whatsoever that Do;a Tinay
expressly or impliedly instituted both the husband and her children as heirs to her
free portion of her share in the conjugal assets. In her holographic will, mention of
her children as heirs was made in the fourth clause but it only provided that, to
wit: t.hqw
Four. If I acquire new properties after this my will will be granted the same
repartados between my husband or children referred to above in the third
paragraph the same proportion that is: half (1/2) to is wife; and the other
half (1/2) for my children equally.
For purposes of clarity and convenience, this fourth clause provided that
"Should I acquire new properties after the execution of this testament, the same shall
be partitioned among my spouse and above named children or the children
mentioned in above par. 3 in the same proportion, that is, one- half (1/2) to my
spouse; and the other half to my children in equal parts." From the above-quoted
provision, the children would only inherit together with Don Jesus whatever new
properties Do;a Tinay would acquire after the execution of her will.
Likewise, the codicil of Do;a Tinay instituted her husband as sole heir to
her share in the free portion of the conjugal assets, and We quote that part of the
codicil: t.hqw
I leave my husband Jesus Alsua as their legitimate and inherit her out of that
account and unrestricted property of those who do not yet have arranged for
my children in writing aforementioned apportionment and exceed half of
acquisitions Corresponds you declare as above, including all achenes
acquire goods that are given to us after this my will.
For if God provide that I survived my husband declared that it is my will
that all property of every kind that belong to me and I could belong,
unwilling even in the distribution, are divided equally among my heirs
mentioned after the death of me.

Again for purposes of clarity and convenience, the above portion states: t.
hqw
I leave to my spouse Don Jesus Alsua as his legitime and as his inheritance
the part of the free portion of my property which have not been allocated in
favor of my children in the Document of Partition aforecited and that which
should exceed 1/2 of the conjugal property of gains that pertains to him as
above stated, including all those properties which we shall acquire after the
execution of this document.
In case it should be God's will that I survive my spouse, I hereby declare
that it is my will that any and all kinds of property that pertains to me or
would pertain to me, which have not been disposed of pursuant to the
partition, should be divided equally among my above-mentioned heirs after
my death.
The children, therefore, would only receive equal shares in the remaining
estate of Do;a Tinay in the event that she should be the surviving spouse. To stress
the point, Do;a Tinay did not oblige her husband to give equally to the children,
upon his death, all such properties she was bequeathing him.
Considering now the efficacy of Don Jesus' last will and testament executed
on November 14, 1959 in view of Our holding that Do;a Tinay's wig and codicil did
not stipulate that Don Jesus will bestow the properties equally to the children, it
follows that all the properties of Do;a Tinay bequeathed to Don Jesus under her
holographic win and codicil became part of Don Jesus' estate unburdened by any
condition obligation or proviso.
Respondents insist that Don Jesus was bound by the extrajudicial partition
of November 25, 1949 and had in fact conformed to said Partition by making a
holographic will and codicil with exactly the same provisions as those of Do;a
Tinay, which respondent court sustained. We rule, however, that Don Jesus was not
forever bound thereby for his previous holographic will and codicil as such, would
remain revokable at his discretion. Art. 828 of the new Civil Code is clear: "A win
may be revoked by the testator at any time before his death. Any waiver or restriction
of this right is void." There can be no restriction that may be made on his absolute
freedom to revoke his holographic will and codicil previously made. This would still
hold true even if such previous will had as in the case at bar already been
probated (Palacios v. Palacios, 106 Phil. 739). For in the first place, probate only
authenticates the will and does not pass upon the efficacy of the dispositions therein.
And secondly, the rights to the succession are transmitted only from the moment of
the death of the decedent (Article 777, New Civil Code). In fine, Don Jesus retained
the liberty of disposing of his property before his death to whomsoever he chose,
provided the legitime of the forced heirs are not prejudiced, which is not herein

claimed for it is undisputed that only the free portion of the whole Alsua estate is
being contested.
After clearly establishing that only Don Jesus was named as sole heir
instituted to the remaining estate of Do;a Tinay in her holographic will and codicil
resulting in all such properties becoming the properties of Don Jesus alone, and after
clearly pointing out that Don Jesus can, in law, revoke his previous holographic will
and codicil, by making another win expressly cancelling and revoking the former, the
next issue for the Court's resolution is the validity of the provisions of the contested
will. Though the law and jurisprudence are clear that only questions about the
extrinsic validity of the will may be entertained by the probate court, the Court had,
on more than one occasion, passed upon the intrinsic validity of a will even before it
had been authenticated. Thus We declared inNuguid v. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 499: t.
hqw
The parties shunted aside the question of whether or not the will should be
allowed to probate. For them, the meat of the case is the intrinsic validity of
the wilt Normally this comes only after the court has declared that the will
has been duly authenticated. ...
... If the case were to be remanded for probate of the wilt nothing will be
gained. On the contrary, this litigation win be protracted and for ought that
appears in the record, in the event of probate or if the court rejects the will
probability exists that the case win come up once again before us on the
issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the wilt Result: waste of time,
effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are the practical considerations
that induce us to a behalf that we might as well meet head-on the time of the
validity of the provisions of the will in question. ...
The last Will and Testament of Don Jesus executed on November 14, 1959
contained an express revocation of his holographic wig of January 5, 1955 and the
codicil of August 14, 1956; a statement requiring that all of his properties donated to
his children in the Deed of 1949 be collated and taken into account in the partition of
his estate; the institution of all his children as devisees and legatees to certain
specific properties; a statement bequeathing the rest of his properties and all that may
be acquired in the future, before his death, to Pablo and Francesca; and a statement
naming Francesca as executrix without bond.
Considering these testamentary provisions, a close scrutiny of the properties
distributed to the children under the Deed of 1949 and those distributed under the
contested will of Don Jesus does not show that the former had in fact been included
in the latter. This being so, it must be presumed that the intention of Don Jesus in his
last win was not to revoke the donations already made in the Deed of 1949 but only
to redistribute his remaining estate, or that portion of the conjugal assets totally left
to his free disposal and that which he received as his inheritance from Do;a Tinay.

The legitimes of the forced heirs were left unimpaired, as in fact, not one of said
forced heirs claimed or intimated otherwise. The properties that were disposed of in
the contested will belonged wholly to Don Jesus Alsua's free portion and may be
diamond of by him to whomsoever he may choose.
If he now favored Francesca more, as claimed by private respondents, or
Pablo as in fact he was, We cannot and may not sit in judgment upon the motives and
sentiments of Don Jesus in doing so. We have clearly laid down this rule
in Bustamante v. Arevalo, 73 Phil. 635, to wit: t.hqw
... nevertheless it would be venturesome for the court to advance its own
Idea of a just distribution of the property in the face of a different mode of
disposition so clearly expressed by the testatrix in the latter will. ...
It would be a dangerous precedent to strain the interpretation of a will in
order to effect what the court believes to be an equitable division of the
estate of a deceased person. The only functions of the courts in these cases
is to carry out the intention of the deceased as manifested in the wig. Once
that intention has been determined through a careful reading of the will or
wills, and provided the law on legitimes has not been violated, it is beyond
the place of judicial cognizance to inquire into the fairness or unfairness of
any devise or bequeast. The court should not sit in judgment upon the
motives and sentiments of the testatrix, first, because as already stated,
nothing in the law restrained her from disposing of her property in any
manner she desired, and secondly, because there are no adequate means of
ascertaining the inward process of her conscience. She was the sole judge of
her own attitude toward those who expected her bounty. ...
Respondent court, in trying to rationalize the will of Don Jesus which
allegedly benefited and favored the petitioner to the prejudice of the other heirs who
would have been entitled to an equal share under the extrajudicial partition of 1949,
faced two alternatives-one, to consider Don Jesus as a man of culture and honor and
would not snow himself to violate the previous agreement, and the other as one
whose mental faculties or his possession of the same had been diminished
considering that when the will was executed, he was already 84 years of age and in
view of his weakness and advanced age, the actual administration of his properties
had been left to his assistant Madarieta who, for his part received instructions from
Francisco and her husband, Joseph Betts. According to the court, the better
explanation is the latter, which is not legally tenable. Under Article 799 of the New
Civil Code which provides as follows: t.hqw
Art. 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full
possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly
unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury or other cause.

It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to
know the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his
bounty, and the character of the testamentary act,
The test of testamentary capacity is at the time of the making of the win.
Mere weakness of mind or partial imbecility from disease of body or from age-does
not render a person incapable of making a will. t.hqw
Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and memory which
unquestionably carries with it full testamentary capacity, and that degrees of
mental aberration generally known as insanity or Idiocy, there are
numberless degrees of mental capacity or incapacity and while on one hand
it has been held that mere weakness of mind, or partial imbecility from
disease of body, or from age, will not render a person incapable of making a
will; a weak or feebleminded person may make a valid will, provided he has
understanding and memory sufficient to enable him to know what he is
about to do and how or to whom he is disposing of his property. To
constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind be
unbroken or unimpaired or unshattered by disease or otherwise. It has been
held that testamentary incapacity does not necessarily require that a person
shall actually be insane or of unsound mind. (Bugnao vs. Ubag, 14 Phil.
163).
The Civil Code itself provides under Article 798 that in order to make a
will, it is essential that the testator be of sound mind at the time of its execution, and
under Article 800, the law presumes that every person is of sound mind in the
absence of proof to the contrary. In the case at bar, the acceptance by the respondent
court of the findings of fact of the trial court on the due execution of the last win and
testament of Don Jesus has foreclosed any and all claim to the contrary that the will
was not executed in accordance with the requirements of the law. But more than that,
gleaned from the quoted portions of the appealed decision, the described behavior of
Don Jesus is not that of a mentally incapacitated person nor one suffering from
"senile dementia" as claimed by private respondents. From these accepted facts, We
find that: (a) it was Don Jesus himself who gave detailed instructions to his lawyer as
to how he wanted to divide his properties among his children by means of a list of
his properties should pertain; (b) the semi-final draft of the contested will prepared
by his lawyer w-as even corrected by Don Jesus; (c) on the day of the signing of the
will at his house in Ligao, "Don Jesus was in bright and lively spirits ..., leading in
the conversation which ran from problems of farming and the merits of French-made
wines"; (d) the signing of the will by Don Jesus and his attesting witnesses was made
after a statement from Don Jesus of the purpose of their meeting or gathering, to
wit: t.hqw
It is precisely why I have loved you that eaten present to witness my last
will and testament which has been prepared by counsel, Mr. Gregorio
Imperial according to my instructions whose documents have here with me

and find that, after what I have read this successfully done according to my
ingtrucciones, As you know you have four (4) children all of them.Clearly
then, Don Jesus knew exactly what his actions were and the fun
implications thereof.
In rejecting probate of the wilt respondent court further pointed out other
details which, in the words of the decision "are a little bit difficult to reconcile with
the ordinary course of things and of fife" such as the fact that Don Jesus had sought
the probate of his will of January 5, 1955 and his codicil of August 14, 1956 during
his lifetime but insofar as the will of November 14, 1959 is concerned, he had no
intention of seeking the probate thereof during his lifetime, the alleged redundant and
unnecessary proceedings undertaken by Don Jesus in the properties under question to
petitioner Franciso Alsua-Betts when the same properties had already been
bequeathed to her in the will of November 14, 1959 and that "nothing, absolutely
nothing, could be made the basis for finding that Don Jesus Alsua had regarded his
other children with less favor, and that he was more sympathetic to Francisca so as to
or forget the former depriving them of benefits already given to them and rewarding
the latter with disproportionate advantages or benefits, to such an extreme as to
violate his previous disposition consecrated in the previous extrajudicial partition,
Exh. 8."
We agree with the petitioner that these details which respondent court found
difficult to reconcile with the ordinary course of things and of life are mere
conjectures, surmises or speculations which, however, do not warrant or justify
disallowance of the probate of the win of Don Jesus. The fact that Don Jesus did not
cause his will to be probated during his lifetime while his previous holographic win
and codicil were duly probated when he was still alive is a mere speculation which
depends entirely on the discretion of Don Jesus as the testator. The law does not
require that a will be probated during the lifetime of the testator and for not doing so
there cannot arise any favorable or unfavorable consequence therefrom. The parties
cannot correctly guess or surmise the motives of the testator and neither can the
courts. Such surmise, speculation or conjecture is no valid and legal ground to reject
allowance or disallowance of the wig. The same thing can be said as to whatever
reason Don Jesus had for selling the properties to his daughter Francisca when he
had already assigned the same properties to her in his will. While We can speculate
that Don Jesus desired to have possession of the properties transferred to Francisca
after the sale instead of waiting for his death may be a reasonable explanation or
speculation for the act of the testator and yet there is no certainty that such was
actually the reason. This is as good a conjecture as the respondents may offer or as
difficult to accept which respondent court believes. A conjecture is always a
conjecture; it can never be admitted as evidence.
Now, the annulment case. The only issue raised anent the civil case for
annulment of the two Deeds of Sale executed by and between Don Jesus and
petitioner Francisco is their validity or nullity. Private respondents mainly contend
that the sales were fictitious or simulated, there having been no actual consideration

paid. They further insist that the issue raised is a question of fact and, therefore, not
reviewable in a certiorari proceeding before the Supreme Court. On the other hand,
petitioners herein maintain that it was error for the respondent court to set aside on
appeal the factual findings of the trial court that the two sales were valid.
It is true that the jurisprudence of this Court in cases brought to Us from the
Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing and revising the errors of law imputed to it,
its findings of fact being conclusive; and this same principle applies even if the Court
of Appeals was in disagreement with the lower court as to the weight of evidence
with a consequent reversal of its findings of fact. But what should not be ignored by
lawyers and litigants alike is the more basic principle that the "findings of fact"
described as "final" or "conclusive" are those borne out by the record or those which
are based upon substantial evidence. The general rule laid down by the Supreme
Court does not declare the absolute correctness of all the findings of fact made by the
Court of Appeals. These are exceptions to the general rule, where We have reviewed
and revised the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals. Among the exceptions to the
rule that findings of fact by the Court of Appeals cannot be reviewed on appeals by
certiorari are:
1. When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises or conjectures (Joaquin vs. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257);
2. When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible
(Luna vs. Linatok, 74 Phil. 15);
3. Where there is a grave abuse of discretion (Buyco vs. People, 51 O.G.
2927);
4. When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts (Cruz vs.
Sosing, L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953);
5. When the findings of fact are conflicting (Casica vs. Villaseca, L-9590,
April 30, 1957); and
6. When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the
issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee (Evangelists vs. Alto Surety & Ins. Co., L-11139,
April 23, 1958; Ramos vs. Pepsi Cola, L-22533, Feb. 9, 1967, 19 SCRA
289).
In the case at bar, We find and so declare that the respondent court's
conclusion as to the nullity of the contested sales was not supported by the evidence
on record and adduced during the trial.

Evident from the records are the following documentary evidence: (1)
Exhibit U, a deed of sale over agricultural lands executed on August 26, 1961 by
Don Jesus in favor of Francisca for the consideration of Seventy Thousand Pesos
(P70,000.00), which document bears the signature of Don Jesus, not assailed as a
forgery, and the signature of Pablo Alsua as an instrumental witness, again not
assailed as a forgery nor alleged as done thru fraud, force or threat. (2) Exhibit "W",
a deed of sale over urban lots executed on November 16, 1962 for the consideration
of Eighty Thousand Pesos (P80,000.00), which document also bears the signature of
Don Jesus, also admittedly not a forgery. (3) Exhibit "F", a document dated August
26, 1961 and signed by Don Jesus and Pablo Alsua as witness, acknowledging
receipt of a Bank of Philippine Island Check No. 0252 in the amount of Seventy
Thousand Pesos (P70,000.00) for the sale of 33 parcels of agricultural land to
Francisco under the same date; again, Pablo did not deny the genuineness of his
signature. (4) Exhibit "X", a Bank of the Philippine Islands Check No. D-6979 dated
November 26, 1962, in the amount of P32,644.71, drawn and signed by Francesca,
payable to Don Jesus. (5) Exhibit "X-1", a second Bank of Philippine Islands Check
(No. D-6980) also dated November 26, 1962 in the amount of ?47,355.29, drawn by
Francisco and payable to Don Jesus. (6) Exhibit "X-3 " and "X-5 ", endorsements on
the back of the last two checks by Don Jesus, again, his signatures thereon were not
assailed. (7) Exhibit "A" (in the annulment case), a Bureau of Internal Revenue
Receipt (No. 2347260) dated November 29, 1962 with a notation acknowledging the
receipt of BPI Check No. D-6980 in the amount of P47,355.29 from Don Jesus Alsua
in payment of Balance of Transfer of Tax Ass. No. EA-35415-19 plus interest. We
are convinced and satisfied from this array of documentary evidence that in fact, Don
Jesus sold the subject properties to his daughter, Francisca for the total consideration
of P150,000.00.
The claim of the private respondents that the sales were fictitious and void
for being without cause or consideration is as weak and flimsy as the ground upon
which the respondent court upheld said claim on the basis that there was no need for
funds in Don Jesus' old age aside from the speculation that there was nothing in the
evidence that showed what motivated Don Jesus to change his mind as to favor
Francesca and discriminate against the other children. The two contracts of same
executed by Don Jesus in favor of Francesca are evidenced by Exhibits "U" and
"W", the genuineness of which were not at all assailed at any time during this long
drawn-out litigation of 15 years standing. That the consideration stated in the
contracts were paid is also sufficiently proved as the receipts thereof by Don Jesus
were even signed by one of the private respondents, Pablo Alsua, as a witness. The
latter cannot now deny the payment of the consideration And even of he now allege
that in fact no transfer of money was involved, We find his allegation belied by
Exhibits "X-3 " and "X-5 ", which show that the checks of Francisco made payable
to Don Jesus. were in fact given to Don Jesus as he endorsed them on the back
thereof, and most specifically Exhibit "A" in the annulment case, which proved that
Don Jesus actually used Exhibit "XI " to complete payment on the estate and
inheritance tax on the estate of his wife to the Bureau of Internal Revenue.

Private respondents further insist that the sales were fraudulent because of
the inadequacy of the given price. Inadequacy of consideration does not vitiate a
contract unless it is proven which in the case at bar was not, that there was fraud,
mistake or undue influence. (Article 1355, New Civil Code). We do not find the
stipulated price as so inadequate to shock the court's conscience, considering that the
price paid was much higher than the assessed value of the subject properties and
considering that the sales were effected by a father to her daughter in which case
filial love must be taken into account.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed
from is hereby set aside. The decision of the Court of First Instance Of Albay in
Special Proceedings No. 699 and Civil Case No. 3068 is hereby reinstated, with
costs against respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar and Fernandez, JJ., concur.1wph1.t
De Castro, J., took no part.
Melencio Herrera, J., concur in the result.

G.R. No. 181409

February 11, 2010

INTESTATE ESTATE OF MANOLITA GONZALES VDA. DE

CARUNGCONG, represented by MEDIATRIX CARUNGCONG, as
Administratrix, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and WILLIAM SATO, Respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 332. Persons exempt from criminal liability. No criminal, but only
civil liability shall result from the commission of the crime of theft, swindling, or
malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by the following persons:
1. Spouses, ascendants and descendants, or relatives by affinity in the
same line;
2. The widowed spouse with respect to the property which belonged to the
deceased spouse before the same shall have passed into the possession of
another; and
3. Brothers and sisters and brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law, if living
together.
The exemption established by this article shall not be applicable to strangers
participating in the commission of the crime. (emphasis supplied)
For purposes of the aforementioned provision, is the relationship by affinity
created between the husband and the blood relatives of his wife (as well as between
the wife and the blood relatives of her husband) dissolved by the death of one
spouse, thus ending the marriage which created such relationship by affinity? Does
the beneficial application of Article 332 cover the complex crime of estafa thru
falsification?
Mediatrix G. Carungcong, in her capacity as the duly appointed
administratrix1 of petitioner intestate estate of her deceased mother Manolita
Gonzales vda. de Carungcong, filed a complaint-affidavit 2 for estafa against her
brother-in-law, William Sato, a Japanese national. Her complaint-affidavit read:

I, MEDIATRIX CARUNGCONG Y GONZALE[S], Filipino, of legal age, single,

and resident of Unit 1111, Prince Gregory Condominium, 105 12th Avenue, Cubao,
Quezon City, after being duly sworn, depose and state that:
1. I am the duly appointed Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Manolita
Carungcong Y Gonzale[s], docketed as Spec. Procs. No. [Q]-95-23621[,]
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, being one (1) of her
surviving daughters. Copy of the Letters of Administration dated June 22,
1995 is hereto attached as Annex "A" to form an integral part hereof.
2. As such Administratrix, I am duty bound not only to preserve the
properties of the Intestate Estate of Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s], but
also to recover such funds and/or properties as property belonging to the
estate but are presently in the possession or control of other parties.
3. After my appointment as Administratrix, I was able to confer with some
of the children of my sister Zenaida Carungcong Sato[,] who predeceased
our mother Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzales, having died in Japan in 1991.
4. In my conference with my nieces Karen Rose Sato and Wendy Mitsuko
Sato, age[d] 27 and 24 respectively, I was able to learn that prior to the
death of my mother Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s], [s]pecifically on
o[r] about November 24, 1992, their father William Sato, through fraudulent
misrepresentations, was able to secure the signature and thumbmark of my
mother on a Special Power of Attorney whereby my niece Wendy Mitsuko
Sato, who was then only twenty (20) years old, was made her attorney-infact, to sell and dispose four (4) valuable pieces of land in Tagaytay City.
Said Special Power of Attorney, copy of which is attached as ANNEX "A"
of the Affidavit of Wendy Mitsuko Sato, was signed and thumbmark[ed] by
my mother because William Sato told her that the documents she was being
made to sign involved her taxes. At that time, my mother was completely
blind, having gone blind almost ten (10) years prior to November, 1992.
5. The aforesaid Special Power of Attorney was signed by my mother in the
presence of Wendy, my other niece Belinda Kiku Sato, our maid Mana
Tingzon, and Governor Josephine Ramirez who later became the second
wife of my sisters widower William Sato.
6. Wendy Mitsuko Sato attests to the fact that my mother signed the
document in the belief that they were in connection with her taxes, not
knowing, since she was blind, that the same was in fact a Special Power of
Attorney to sell her Tagaytay properties.

7. On the basis of the aforesaid Special Power of Attorney, William Sato

found buyers for the property and made my niece Wendy Mitsuko Sato sign
three (3) deeds of absolute sale in favor of (a) Anita Ng (Doc. 2194, Page
No. 41, Book No. V, Series of 1992 of Notary Public Vicente B. Custodio),
(b) Anita Ng (Doc. No. 2331, Page No. 68, Book No. V, Series of 1992 of
Notary Public Vicente B. Custodio) and (c) Ruby Lee Tsai (Doc. No. II,
Page No. 65, Book No. II, Series of 1993 of Notary Public Toribio D.
Labid). x x x
8. Per the statement of Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, the considerations
appearing on the deeds of absolute sale were not the true and actual
considerations received by her father William Sato from the buyers of her
grandmothers properties. She attests that Anita Ng actually
paid P7,000,000.00 for the property covered by TCT No. 3148
and P7,034,000.00 for the property covered by TCT No. 3149. All the
aforesaid proceeds were turned over to William Sato who undertook to
make the proper accounting thereof to my mother, Manolita Carungcong
Gonzale[s].
9. Again, per the statement of Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, Ruby Lee Tsai
paid P8,000,000.00 for the property covered by Tax Declaration No. GR016-0735, and the proceeds thereof were likewise turned over to William
Sato.
10. The considerations appearing on the deeds of sale were falsified as
Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato has actual knowledge of the true amounts paid by
the buyers, as stated in her Affidavit, since she was the signatory thereto as
the attorney-in-fact of Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s].
11. Wendy was only 20 years old at the time and was not in any position to
oppose or to refuse her fathers orders.
12. After receiving the total considerations for the properties sold under the
power of attorney fraudulently secured from my mother, which
total P22,034,000.00, William Sato failed to account for the same and never
delivered the proceeds to Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s] until the latter
died on June 8, 1994.
13. Demands have been made for William Sato to make an accounting and
to deliver the proceeds of the sales to me as Administratrix of my mothers
estate, but he refused and failed, and continues to refuse and to fail to do so,
to the damage and prejudice of the estate of the deceased Manolita
Carungcong Y Gonzale[s] and of the heirs which include his six (6) children
with my sister Zenaida Carungcong Sato. x x x3

Wendy Mitsuko Satos supporting affidavit and the special power of attorney
allegedly issued by the deceased Manolita Gonzales vda. de Carungcong in favor of
Wendy were attached to the complaint-affidavit of Mediatrix.
In a resolution dated March 25, 1997, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City dismissed
the complaint.4 On appeal, however, the Secretary of Justice reversed and set aside
the resolution dated March 25, 1997 and directed the City Prosecutor of Quezon City
to file an Information against Sato for violation of Article 315, paragraph 3(a) of the
Revised Penal Code.5 Thus, the following Information was filed against Sato in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87:6
I N F O R M AT I O N
The undersigned accuses WILLIAM SATO of the crime of ESTAFA under Article
315[,] par. 3(a) of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about the 24th day of November, 1992, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
above-named accused, by means of deceit, did, then and there, wil[l]fully, unlawfully
and feloniously defraud MANOLITA GONZALES VDA. DE CARUNGCONG in
the following manner, to wit: the said accused induced said Manolita Gonzales Vda.
De Carungcong[,] who was already then blind and 79 years old[,] to sign and
thumbmark a special power of attorney dated November 24, 1992 in favor of Wendy
Mitsuko C. Sato, daughter of said accused, making her believe that said document
involved only her taxes, accused knowing fully well that said document authorizes
Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, then a minor, to sell, assign, transfer or otherwise dispose of
to any person or entity of her properties all located at Tagaytay City, as follows:
1. One Thousand Eight Hundred Seven(ty) One (1,871) square meters more
or less and covered by T.C.T. No. 3147;
2. Five Hundred Forty (540) square meters more or less and covered by
T.C.T. No. 3148 with Tax Declaration No. GR-016-0722, Cadastral Lot No.
7106;
3. Five Hundred Forty (540) square meters more or less and covered by
T.C.T. No. 3149 with Tax Declaration No. GR-016-0721, Cadastral Lot No.
7104;
4. Eight Hundred Eighty Eight (888) square meters more or less with Tax
Declaration No. GR-016-1735, Cadastral Lot No. 7062;
registered in the name of Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong, and once in the
possession of the said special power of attorney and other pertinent documents, said
accused made Wendy Mitsuko Sato sign the three (3) Deeds of Absolute Sale
covering Transfer Certificate of Title [TCT] No. 3148 for P250,000.00, [TCT] No.

3149 forP250,000.00 and [Tax Declaration] GR-016-0735 for P650,000.00 and once
in possession of the proceeds of the sale of the above properties, said accused,
misapplied, misappropriated and converted the same to his own personal use and
benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of Manolita Gonzales Vda. De
Carungcong who died in 1994.
7

Contrary to law.

Subsequently, the prosecution moved for the amendment of the Information so as to

increase the amount of damages from P1,150,000, the total amount stated in the
deeds of sale, to P22,034,000, the actual amount received by Sato.
Sato moved for the quashal of the Information, claiming that under Article 332 of the
Revised Penal Code, his relationship to the person allegedly defrauded, the deceased
Manolita who was his mother-in-law, was an exempting circumstance.
The prosecution disputed Satos motion in an opposition dated March 29, 2006.
In an order dated April 17, 2006, 8 the trial court granted Satos motion and ordered
the dismissal of the criminal case:
The Trial Prosecutors contention is that the death of the wife of the accused severed
the relationship of affinity between accused and his mother-in-law. Therefore, the
mantle of protection provided to the accused by the relationship is no longer
obtaining.
A judicious and thorough examination of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code
convinces this Court of the correctness of the contention of the [d]efense. While it is
true that the death of Zenaida Carungcong-Sato has extinguished the marriage of
accused with her, it does not erase the fact that accused and Zenaidas mother, herein
complainant, are still son[-in-law] and mother-in-law and they remained son[-in-law]
and mother-in-law even beyond the death of Zenaida.
Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code, is very explicit and states no proviso. "No
criminal, but only civil liability[,] shall result from the commission of the crime of
theft, swindling or malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by xxx 1)
spouses, ascendants and descendants, or relatives by affinity in the same line."
Article 332, according to Aquino, in his Commentaries [to] Revised Penal Code,
preserves family harmony and obviates scandal, hence even in cases of theft and
malicious mischief, where the crime is committed by a stepfather against his stepson,
by a grandson against his grandfather, by a son against his mother, no criminal
liability is incurred by the accused only civil (Vicente Alavare, 52 Phil. 65; Adame,
CA 40 OG 12th Supp. 63;Cristobal, 84 Phil. 473).

Such exempting circumstance is applicable herein.

WHEREFORE, finding the Motion to Quash Original Information meritorious, the
same is GRANTED and, as prayed for, case is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.9 (underlining supplied in the original)
The prosecutions motion for reconsideration 10 was denied in an order dated June 2,
2006.11
Dissatisfied with the trial courts rulings, the intestate estate of Manolita, represented
by Mediatrix, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals 12 which, however,
in a decision13 dated August 9, 2007, dismissed it. It ruled:
[W]e sustain the finding of [the trial court] that the death of Zenaida did not
extinguish the relationship by affinity between her husband, private respondent Sato,
and her mother Manolita, and does not bar the application of the exempting
circumstance under Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code in favor of private
respondent Sato.
We further agree with the submission of the [Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)]
that nothing in the law and/or existing jurisprudence supports the argument of
petitioner that the fact of death of Zenaida dissolved the relationship by affinity
between Manolita and private respondent Sato, and thus removed the protective
mantle of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code from said private respondent; and
that notwithstanding the death of Zenaida, private respondent Sato remains to be the
son-in-law of Manolita, and a brother-in-law of petitioner administratrix. As further
pointed out by the OSG, the filing of the criminal case for estafa against private
respondent Sato already created havoc among members of the Carungcong and Sato
families as private respondents daughter Wendy Mitsuko Sato joined cause with her
aunt [Mediatrix] Carungcong y Gonzales, while two (2) other children of private
respondent, William Francis and Belinda Sato, took the side of their father.
There is a dearth of jurisprudence and/or commentaries elaborating on the provision
of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code. However, from the plain language of the
law, it is clear that the exemption from criminal liability for the crime of swindling
(estafa) under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code applies to private respondent
Sato, as son-in-law of Manolita, they being "relatives by affinity in the same line"
under Article 332(1) of the same Code. We cannot draw the distinction that following
the death of Zenaida in 1991, private respondent Sato is no longer the son-in-law of
Manolita, so as to exclude the former from the exempting circumstance provided for
in Article 332 (1) of the Revised Penal Code.
Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. Basic is the rule in statutory
construction that where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not

distinguish. There should be no distinction in the application of law where none is

indicated. The courts could only distinguish where there are facts or circumstances
showing that the lawgiver intended a distinction or qualification. In such a case, the
courts would merely give effect to the lawgivers intent. The solemn power and duty
of the Court to interpret and apply the law does not include the power to correct by
reading into the law what is not written therein.

The resolution of this case rests on the interpretation of Article 332 of the Revised
Penal Code. In particular, it calls for the determination of the following: (1) the effect
of death on the relationship by affinity created between a surviving spouse and the
blood relatives of the deceased spouse and (2) the extent of the coverage of Article
332.
Effect of Death on Relationship By Affinity as Absolutory Cause

Further, it is an established principle of statutory construction that penal laws are

strictly construed against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. Any
reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused. In this case, the plain
meaning of Article 332 (1) of the Revised Penal Codes simple language is most
favorable to Sato.14
The appellate court denied reconsideration.15 Hence, this petition.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in not reversing the orders of the
trial court. It cites the commentary of Justice Luis B. Reyes in his book on criminal
law that the rationale of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code exempting the
persons mentioned therein from criminal liability is that the law recognizes the
presumed co-ownership of the property between the offender and the offended
party. Here, the properties subject of the estafa case were owned by Manolita whose
daughter, Zenaida Carungcong-Sato (Satos wife), died on January 28, 1991.
Hence, Zenaida never became a co-owner because, under the law, her right to
the three parcels of land could have arisen only after her mothers death. Since
Zenaida predeceased her mother, Manolita, no such right came about and the
mantle of protection provided to Sato by the relationship no longer existed.
Sato counters that Article 332 makes no distinction that the relationship may not be
invoked in case of death of the spouse at the time the crime was allegedly
committed. Thus, while the death of Zenaida extinguished her marriage with Sato, it
did not dissolve the son-in-law and mother-in-law relationship between Sato and
Zenaidas mother, Manolita.
For his part, the Solicitor General maintains that Sato is covered by the exemption
from criminal liability provided under Article 332. Nothing in the law and
jurisprudence supports petitioners claim that Zenaidas death dissolved the
relationship by affinity between Sato and Manolita. As it is, the criminal case against
Sato created havoc among the members of the Carungcong and Sato families, a
situation sought to be particularly avoided by Article 332s provision exempting a
family member committing theft, estafa or malicious mischief from criminal liability
and reducing his/her liability to the civil aspect only.
The petition has merit.

Article 332 provides for an absolutory cause 16in the crimes of theft, estafa (or
swindling) and malicious mischief. It limits the responsibility of the offender to civil
liability and frees him from criminal liability by virtue of his relationship to the
offended party.
In connection with the relatives mentioned in the first paragraph, it has been held that
included in the exemptions are parents-in-law, stepparents and adopted children. 17 By
virtue thereof, no criminal liability is incurred by the stepfather who commits
malicious mischief against his stepson; 18 by the stepmother who commits theft
against her stepson;19 by the stepfather who steals something from his stepson; 20 by
the grandson who steals from his grandfather; 21 by the accused who swindles his
sister-in-law living with him;22 and by the son who steals a ring from his mother.23
Affinity is the relation that one spouse has to the blood relatives of the other spouse.
It is a relationship by marriage or
a familial relation resulting from marriage. 24 It is a fictive kinship, a fiction created
by law in connection with the institution of marriage and family relations.
If marriage gives rise to ones relationship by affinity to the blood relatives of ones
spouse, does the extinguishment of marriage by the death of the spouse dissolve the
relationship by affinity?
Philippine jurisprudence has no previous encounter with the issue that confronts us
in this case. That is why the trial and appellate courts acknowledged the "dearth of
jurisprudence and/or commentaries" on the matter. In contrast, in the American legal
system, there are two views on the subject. As one Filipino author observed:
In case a marriage is terminated by the death of one of the spouses, there are
conflicting views. There are some who believe that relationship by affinity is not
terminated whether there are children or not in the marriage (Carman vs. Newell,
N.Y. 1 [Denio] 25, 26). However, the better view supported by most judicial
authorities in other jurisdictions is that, if the spouses have no living issues or
children and one of the spouses dies, the relationship by affinity is dissolved. It
follows the rule that relationship by affinity ceases with the dissolution of the
marriage which produces it (Kelly v. Neely, 12 Ark. 657, 659, 56 Am Dec. 288). On
the other hand, the relationship by affinity is continued despite the death of one of

the spouses where there are living issues or children of the marriage "in whose veins
the blood of the parties are commingled, since the relationship of affinity was
continued through the medium of the issue of the marriage" (Paddock vs. Wells, 2
Barb. Ch. 331, 333).25
The first view (the terminated affinity view) holds that relationship by affinity
terminates with the dissolution of the marriage either by death or divorce which gave
rise to the relationship of affinity between the parties. 26 Under this view, the
relationship by affinity is simply coextensive and coexistent with the marriage that
produced it. Its duration is indispensably and necessarily determined by the marriage
that created it. Thus, it exists only for so long as the marriage subsists, such that the
death of a spouse ipso facto ends the relationship by affinity of the surviving spouse
to the deceased spouses blood relatives.
The first view admits of an exception. The relationship by affinity continues even
after the death of one spouse when there is a surviving issue. 27 The rationale is that
the relationship is preserved because of the living issue of the marriage in whose
veins the blood of both parties is commingled.28
The second view (the continuing affinity view) maintains that relationship by affinity
between the surviving spouse and the kindred of the deceased spouse continues even
after the death of the deceased spouse, regardless of whether the marriage produced
children or not.29 Under this view, the relationship by affinity endures even after the
dissolution of the marriage that produced it as a result of the death of one of the
parties to the said marriage. This view considers that, where statutes have indicated
an intent to benefit step-relatives or in-laws, the "tie of affinity" between these
people and their relatives-by-marriage is not to be regarded as terminated upon the
death of one of the married parties.30
After due consideration and evaluation of the relative merits of the two views, we
hold that the second view is more consistent with the language and spirit of Article
332(1) of the Revised Penal Code.
First, the terminated affinity view is generally applied in cases of jury
disqualification and incest.31 On the other hand, the continuing affinity view
has been applied in the interpretation of laws that intend to benefit steprelatives or in-laws. Since the purpose of the absolutory cause in Article
332(1) is meant to be beneficial to relatives by affinity within the degree
covered under the said provision, the continuing affinity view is more
appropriate.
Second, the language of Article 332(1) which speaks of "relatives by
affinity in the same line" is couched in general language. The legislative
intent to make no distinction between the spouse of ones living child and
the surviving spouse of ones deceased child (in case of a son-in-law or

daughter-in-law with respect to his or her parents-in-law) 32 can be drawn

from Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code without doing violence to its
language.
Third, the Constitution declares that the protection and strengthening of the
family as a basic autonomous social institution are policies of the State and
that it is the duty of the State to strengthen the solidarity of the
family.33 Congress has also affirmed as a State and national policy that
courts shall preserve the solidarity of the family.34 In this connection, the
spirit of Article 332 is to preserve family harmony and obviate
scandal.35 The view that relationship by affinity is not affected by the death
of one of the parties to the marriage that created it is more in accord with
family solidarity and harmony.
Fourth, the fundamental principle in applying and in interpreting criminal
laws is to resolve all doubts in favor of the accused. In dubio pro reo. When
in doubt, rule for the accused.36 This is in consonance with the constitutional
guarantee that the accused shall be presumed innocent unless and until his
guilt is established beyond reasonable doubt.37
Intimately related to the in dubio pro reo principle is the rule of lenity.38 The rule
applies when the court is faced with two possible interpretations of a penal statute,
one that is prejudicial to the accused and another that is favorable to him. The rule
calls for the adoption of an interpretation which is more lenient to the accused.
Lenity becomes all the more appropriate when this case is viewed through the lens of
the basic purpose of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code to preserve family
harmony by providing an absolutory cause. Since the goal of Article 332(1) is to
benefit the accused, the Court should adopt an application or interpretation that is
more favorable to the accused. In this case, that interpretation is the continuing
affinity view.
Thus, for purposes of Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code, we hold that the
relationship by affinity created between the surviving spouse and the blood relatives
of the deceased spouse survives the death of either party to the marriage which
created the affinity. (The same principle applies to the justifying circumstance of
defense of ones relatives under Article 11[2] of the Revised Penal Code, the
mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of grave offense committed
against ones relatives under Article 13[5] of the same Code and the absolutory cause
of relationship in favor of accessories under Article 20 also of the same Code.)
Scope of Article 332 of The Revised Penal Code
The absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code only applies to
the felonies of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. Under the said provision, the

State condones the criminal responsibility of the offender in cases of theft, swindling
and malicious mischief. As an act of grace, the State waives its right to prosecute the
offender for the said crimes but leaves the private offended party with the option to
hold the offender civilly liable.
However, the coverage of Article 332 is strictly limited to the felonies mentioned
therein. The plain, categorical and unmistakable language of the provision shows that
it applies exclusively to the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief.
It does not apply where any of the crimes mentioned under Article 332 is complexed
with another crime, such as theft through falsification or estafa through
falsification.39
The Information against Sato charges him with estafa. However, the real nature of
the offense is determined by the facts alleged in the Information, not by the
designation of the offense. 40 What controls is not the title of the Information or the
designation of the offense but the actual facts recited in the Information. 41 In other
words, it is the recital of facts of the commission of the offense, not the nomenclature
of the offense, that determines the crime being charged in the Information. 42 It is the
exclusive province of the court to say what the crime is or what it is named. 43 The
determination by the prosecutor who signs the Information of the crime committed is
merely an opinion which is not binding on the court.44

The above averments in the Information show that the estafa was committed by
attributing to Manolita (who participated in the execution of the document)
statements other than those in fact made by her. Manolitas acts of signing the SPA
and affixing her thumbmark to that document were the very expression of her
specific intention that something be done about her taxes. Her signature and
thumbmark were the affirmation of her statement on such intention as she only
signed and thumbmarked the SPA (a document which she could not have read)
because of Satos representation that the document pertained to her taxes. In signing
and thumbmarking the document, Manolita showed that she believed and adopted
the representations of Sato as to what the document was all about, i.e., that it
involved her taxes. Her signature and thumbmark, therefore, served as her
conformity to Satos proposal that she execute a document to settle her taxes.
Thus, by inducing Manolita to sign the SPA, Sato made it appear that Manolita
granted his daughter Wendy a special power of attorney for the purpose of selling,
assigning, transferring or otherwise disposing of Manolitas Tagaytay properties
when the fact was that Manolita signed and thumbmarked the document presented by
Sato in the belief that it pertained to her taxes. Indeed, the document itself, the SPA,
and everything that it contained were falsely attributed to Manolita when she was
made to sign the SPA.
Moreover, the allegations in the Information that

A reading of the facts alleged in the Information reveals that Sato is being charged
not with simple estafa but with the complex crime of estafa through falsification of
public documents. In particular, the Information states that Sato, by means of deceit,
intentionally defrauded Manolita committed as follows:
(a) Sato presented a document to Manolita (who was already blind at that
time) and induced her to sign and thumbmark the same;
(b) he made Manolita believe that the said document was in connection with
her taxes when it was in fact a special power of attorney (SPA) authorizing
his minor daughter Wendy to sell, assign, transfer or otherwise dispose of
Manolitas properties in Tagaytay City;
(c) relying on Satos inducement and representation, Manolita signed and
thumbmarked the SPA in favor of Wendy Mitsuko Sato, daughter of Sato;
(d) using the document, he sold the properties to third parties but he neither
delivered the proceeds to Manolita nor accounted for the same and
(d) despite repeated demands, he failed and refused to deliver the proceeds,
to the damage and prejudice of the estate of Manolita.

(1) "once in the possession of the said special power of attorney and other
pertinent documents, [Sato] made Wendy Mitsuko Sato sign the three (3)
Deeds of Absolute Sale" and
(2) "once in possession of the proceeds of the sale of the above properties,
said accused, misapplied, misappropriated and converted the same to his
own personal use and benefit" raise the presumption that Sato, as the
possessor of the falsified document and the one who benefited therefrom,
was the author thereof.
Furthermore, it should be noted that the prosecution moved for the amendment of the
Information so as to increase the amount of damages from P1,150,000
to P22,034,000. This was granted by the trial court and was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals on certiorari. This meant that the amended Information would now state
that, while the total amount of consideration stated in the deeds of absolute sale was
only P1,150,000, Sato actually received the total amount of P22,034,000 as proceeds
of the sale of Manolitas properties. 45 This also meant that the deeds of sale (which
were public documents) were also falsified by making untruthful statements as to the
amounts of consideration stated in the deeds.
Therefore, the allegations in the Information essentially charged a crime that was not
simple estafa. Sato resorted to falsification of public documents (particularly, the

special power of attorney and the deeds of sale) as a necessary means to commit the
estafa.
Since the crime with which respondent was charged was not simple estafa but the
complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents, Sato cannot avail
himself of the absolutory cause provided under Article 332 of the Revised Penal
Code in his favor.
Effect of Absolutory Cause Under Article 332 on Criminal Liability For The
Complex Crime of Estafa Through Falsification of Public Documents
The question may be asked: if the accused may not be held criminally liable for
simple estafa by virtue of the absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised
Penal Code, should he not be absolved also from criminal liability for the complex
crime of estafa through falsification of public documents? No.
True, the concurrence of all the elements of the two crimes of estafa and falsification
of public document is required for a proper conviction for the complex crime of
estafa through falsification of public document. That is the ruling in Gonzaludo v.
People.46 It means that the prosecution must establish that the accused resorted to the
falsification of a public document as a necessary means to commit the crime of
estafa.
However, a proper appreciation of the scope and application of Article 332 of the
Revised Penal Code and of the nature of a complex crime would negate exemption
from criminal liability for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public
documents, simply because the accused may not be held criminally liable for simple
estafa by virtue of the absolutory cause under Article 332.
The absolutory cause under Article 332 is meant to address specific crimes against
property, namely, the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. Thus,
all other crimes, whether simple or complex, are not affected by the absolutory cause
provided by the said provision. To apply the absolutory cause under Article 332 of
the Revised Penal Code to one of the component crimes of a complex crime for the
purpose of negating the existence of that complex crime is to unduly expand the
scope of Article 332. In other words, to apply Article 332 to the complex crime of
estafa through falsification of public document would be to mistakenly treat the
crime of estafa as a separate simple crime, not as the component crime that it is in
that situation. It would wrongly consider the indictment as separate charges of estafa
and falsification of public document, not as a single charge for the single (complex)
crime of estafa through falsification of public document.
Under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the State waives its right to hold the
offender criminally liable for the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious
mischief and considers the violation of the juridical right to property committed by

the offender against certain family members as a private matter and therefore subject
only to civil liability. The waiver does not apply when the violation of the right to
property is achieved through (and therefore inseparably intertwined with) a breach of
the public interest in the integrity and presumed authenticity of public
documents. For, in the latter instance, what is involved is no longer simply the
property right of a family relation but a paramount public interest.
The purpose of Article 332 is to preserve family harmony and obviate
scandal.47 Thus, the action provided under the said provision simply concerns the
private relations of the parties as family members and is limited to the civil aspect
between the offender and the offended party. When estafa is committed through
falsification of a public document, however, the matter acquires a very serious public
dimension and goes beyond the respective rights and liabilities of family members
among themselves. Effectively, when the offender resorts to an act that breaches
public interest in the integrity of public documents as a means to violate the property
rights of a family member, he is removed from the protective mantle of the
absolutory cause under Article 332.
In considering whether the accused is liable for the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public documents, it would be wrong to consider the component
crimes separately from each other. While there may be two component crimes (estafa
and falsification of documents), both felonies are animated by and result from one
and the same criminal intent for which there is only one criminal liability.48 That is
the concept of a complex crime. In other words, while there are two crimes, they are
treated only as one, subject to a single criminal liability.
As opposed to a simple crime where only one juridical right or interest is violated
(e.g., homicide which violates the right to life, theft which violates the right to
property),49 a complex crime constitutes a violation of diverse juridical rights or
interests by means of diverse acts, each of which is a simple crime in itself. 50 Since
only a single criminal intent underlies the diverse acts, however, the component
crimes are considered as elements of a single crime, the complex crime. This is the
correct interpretation of a complex crime as treated under Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code.
In the case of a complex crime, therefore, there is a formal (or ideal) plurality of
crimes where the same criminal intent results in two or more component crimes
constituting a complex crime for which there is only one criminal liability. 51 (The
complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document falls under this
category.) This is different from a material (or real) plurality of crimes where
different criminal intents result in two or more crimes, for each of which the accused
incurs criminal liability.52 The latter category is covered neither by the concept of
complex crimes nor by Article 48.

Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the formal plurality of crimes
(concursus delictuorum or concurso de delitos) gives rise to a single criminal liability
and requires the imposition of a single penalty:

(3) the offended party personally signed the document and

(4) prejudice is caused to the offended party.

Although [a] complex crime quantitatively consists of two or more crimes, it is only
one crime in law on which a single penalty is imposed and the two or more crimes
constituting the same are more conveniently termed as component
crimes.53 (emphasis supplied)

While in estafa under Article 315(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the law does not
require that the document be falsified for the consummation thereof, it does not mean
that the falsification of the document cannot be considered as a necessary means to
commit the estafa under that provision.

The phrase "necessary means" does not connote indispensable means for if it did,
then the offense as a "necessary means" to commit another would be an
indispensable element of the latter and would be an ingredient thereof. 55 In People v.
Salvilla,56 the phrase "necessary means" merely signifies that one crime is committed
to facilitate and insure the commission of the other.57 In this case, the crime of
falsification of public document, the SPA, was such a "necessary means" as it was
resorted to by Sato to facilitate and carry out more effectively his evil design to
swindle his mother-in-law. In particular, he used the SPA to sell the Tagaytay
properties of Manolita to unsuspecting third persons.

In [a] complex crime, although two or more crimes are actually committed, they
constitute only one crime in the eyes of the law as well as in the conscience of the
offender. The offender has only one criminal intent. Even in the case where an
offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the evil intent of the offender
is only one.54
For this reason, while a conviction for estafa through falsification of public
document requires that the elements of both estafa and falsification exist, it does not
mean that the criminal liability for estafa may be determined and considered
independently of that for falsification. The two crimes of estafa and falsification of
public documents are not separate crimes but component crimes of the single
complex crime of estafa and falsification of public documents.
Therefore, it would be incorrect to claim that, to be criminally liable for the complex
crime of estafa through falsification of public document, the liability for estafa
should be considered separately from the liability for falsification of public
document. Such approach would disregard the nature of a complex crime and
contradict the letter and spirit of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. It would
wrongly disregard the distinction between formal plurality and material plurality, as
it improperly treats the plurality of crimes in the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public document as a mere material plurality where the felonies are
considered as separate crimes to be punished individually.
Falsification of Public Documents May Be a Necessary Means for Committing
Estafa Even Under Article 315 (3[a])
The elements of the offense of estafa punished under Article 315 (3[a]) of the
Revised Penal Code are as follows:
(1) the offender induced the offended party to sign a document;
(2) deceit was employed to make the offended party sign the document;

When the offender commits in a public document any of the acts of falsification
enumerated in Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code as a necessary means to
commit another crime, like estafa, theft or malversation, the two crimes form a
complex crime under Article 48 of the same Code. 58 The falsification of a public,
official or commercial document may be a means of committing estafa because,
before the falsified document is actually utilized to defraud another, the crime of
falsification has already been consummated, damage or intent to cause damage not
being an element of the crime of falsification of a public, official or commercial
document.59 In other words, the crime of falsification was committed prior to the
consummation of the crime of estafa. 60 Actually utilizing the falsified public, official
or commercial document to defraud another is estafa. 61 The damage to another is
caused by the commission of estafa, not by the falsification of the
document.621avvphi1
Applying the above principles to this case, the allegations in the Information show
that the falsification of public document was consummated when Sato presented a
ready-made SPA to Manolita who signed the same as a statement of her intention in
connection with her taxes. While the falsification was consummated upon the
execution of the SPA, the consummation of the estafa occurred only when Sato later
utilized the SPA. He did so particularly when he had the properties sold and
thereafter pocketed the proceeds of the sale. Damage or prejudice to Manolita was
caused not by the falsification of the SPA (as no damage was yet caused to the
property rights of Manolita at the time she was made to sign the document) but by
the subsequent use of the said document. That is why the falsification of the public
document was used to facilitate and ensure (that is, as a necessary means for) the
commission of the estafa.

The situation would have been different if Sato, using the same inducement, had
made Manolita sign a deed of sale of the properties either in his favor or in favor of
third parties. In that case, the damage would have been caused by, and at exactly the
same time as, the execution of the document, not prior thereto. Therefore, the crime
committed would only have been the simple crime of estafa. 63 On the other hand,
absent any inducement (such as if Manolita herself had been the one who asked that
a document pertaining to her taxes be prepared for her signature, but what was
presented to her for her signature was an SPA), the crime would have only been the
simple crime of falsification.64
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision dated August 9,
2007 and the resolution dated January 23, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
S.P. No. 95260 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the trial
court which is directed to try the accused with dispatch for the complex crime of
estafa through falsification of public documents.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-47428

April 8, 1941

Testamentaria de la finada Perpetua Albornoz Viuda de Soriano. ALFONSO

ALBORNOZ, solicitante-apelada,
vs.
DOLORES ALBORNOZ y JOSE ALBORNOZ, opositores-apelantes.
Sres. Santos y Solidum y D. Emilio L. Medina en representacion de los apelantes.
Sres. Diaz y Lazaro en representacion de los apelados.

Alfonso Albornoz and those who made common cause with the appealed the
decision rendered by the court on both records; and in this instance they argue now
that committed errors in their arguments pointing substantially in these terms:

DIAZ, J.:

The mistake of Perpetua Albornoz declrado Soriano widow did not have the mental
capacity June 24, 1936, to grant a testament to that date, Exhibit A, who filed for
probate in case No. 40504 (CS-RG No. 47428).

These two cases were raised us under the appeal of some of the interested parties
against the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, because it is both
a legalization two alleged wills and codicil in which the properties of the author
thereof is available, they are worth much more than P50,000.

The have stopped giving credit to the testimony of the attesting witnesses of that will
of June 24, 1936.

In the q.s-R.G record. No. 47428 was petitioner in the first instance Alfonso
Albornoz (File No. 4054 of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte), and the CSR record. G. No. 47429 (File No. 4017 of the same court), the petitioner was Dolores
Albornoz. Osn the two brothers of the deceased today Perpetua bathrobe Vda.
Soriano they said in their cases, be the grantor of wills and codicil whose legalization
requested.

The Court of Ilocos Norte he met the two records, ordered depues of rigorous
procedures, the leglizacion of the documents presented as Dolores had Albornoz will
and codicil of said deceased, and the workers are today in cars as Exhibits A and B
(Docket No. 4017 of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte and CS-RG No.
47429); and the refusal to submit to the same purpose the petitioner's file No. 4054
which corresponds to this Court CS-RG No. 47428, Alfonso Albornoz. This made
the Court a single decision, at the request of interested parties.

In the first case (Expdiente No. 4017; CS-RG No. 47429), was opposition to Alfonso
Albornoz and made common cause Amador, Alicia, Clara and brothers of these
except Jose, surnamed all Albornoz; and in another case, that is, No. 4054 (CS-RG
No. 47428) were opponents Dolores and Jose Albornoz Albornoz.

The state had stopped, regardless of the attestation clause of the will that claimed to
be of Perpetual deceased widow Soriano Albornoz, that it was duly granted; and
having failed to declare while Dolores and Jose Albornoz Albornoz who challenged
not submit conclusive evidence to support its contention that it was not stated that
the deceased will.

Have allowed the legalization as a testament of the deceased, and as codicil thereof,
as such documents were presented by Dolores Albornoz in case No. 4017, CS-RG
No. 47429; and finally,

The have denied the motion filed to request the holding of a new hearing.

Appellants did not appeal even to repair; gimp em about the authenticity and due
execution as will and codicil, of Exhibits A and B in case No. 4017, CS-RG No.
47429; and Dolores Albornoz dutifully proved otherwise, that the deceased Perpetua
A. Vda. Soriano I give them the April 25, 1934 and June 19, 1936, respectively,
comes freedom, she sat in the leno enjoyment of their mental facultads and in the

presence of witnesses whose names and signatures are mentioned and shown in
attestation clauses of the documents referred to.

The deceased died on June 25, 1936, around 8 in the morning in the city of Laoag in
Ilocos Norte province, taking her then 68 years old. Pedecio of diarrhea and enteritis
complications of myocarditis, since June 3, 1936 until his death which should not
have more than these causes. His weakness was accentuated from day to day since
shortly after falling ill, having contributed to this absolute liquid diet that had been
submitted, but its already quite old. Prostration that came later was dal that 22 of the
month and year and expressed delirious and barely could move and speak; and if he
spoke, his words were so inconsistent. 23 completely lost his speech, and even had
open garlic, no longer moved, noting that they saw not; and nothing that you caused
him and redeaba impression or reaction. Sobrevenrle continued till death. In these
circumstances, clore this was physically impossible as they would grant the
appellants tried to prove his alleged testament Exhibit A in file No. 4054, (CS-RG
No. 47428). Keep in mind that this document shows on its face, and thus also the
witnesses of the appellants, which was prepared and signed by the deceased and
witnesses had called Antonio Quirolgico, Adriano and Isaac S. Pedro Ruiz to 6 am
on June 24, 1936.

I said one of the witnesses of the will in question, and yet, firms will attribute are
written with a lot of symmetry, righteously, and to keep the letters to each other,
about the same distance. Although the deceased had been helped by another for
stamping such firms, they had not gone as well as appear in the document stated.

The motion for a new view that the appellants filed and was denied by the court a
quo, does not allege any new fact. They had just pro forma, so they can be reviewed
the facts.

For these reasons, and being manifestly unfounded errors attributed by the appellants
to the Court a quo, hereby confirm in its entirety the decision appealed, the costs to
these appellants, in both instances. So it is ordered.

Avancea, Pres. Imperial, Laurel, and Horrilleno, JJ., Concur.

Moran, M., did not take part.

The deceased was not poor and could not afford to procure the services of domestic
and care parients and more or less interested in their health friends; not lived alone
and was alone at home since I got sick, and less on the day mentioned, this being all
the more true since the same Alfonso Albornoz, diclarando in view of the two cases,
said his sister Dolores and Bathrobe the friend of this call Cunegonde eg special
Benito had watched over not seeing her; and in fact, the deceased had raised his nine
nine maids service. If this is true, it is undoubtedly true also, as Dolores Albornos
proved that the deceased was never without company in his room during his illness,
especialement, during his last days, because that required continuous ciudado. It is
therefore incredible queu Adriano Ruiz and other instrumental witnesses of the
alleged will of June 24, they could go no longer in the room of the deceased but even
within your home, unseen and unnoticed by anyone. The granting of the will in
question could not be done in a short time; I must have required some teimpo, I
teimpo enough for the house could see that there were strangers in it, at a time when
it is not customary visit. Add to this that the Laperal Arcadio handwriting expert who
made a close study of the signature "A. PERPETUAL VDA. DE SORIANO"
appearing in Exhibit A record document No. 4054, which is the same work in Exhibit
1 file No. 4017, comparing them tothe authentic of the deceased and those in the will
and the codicil legalized by the court a quo, which were not discussed, expressed the
view that one and the other could not have exrito by one person, helped poor or no
other, because they differ in all respects. We believe that the opinion of that expert is
founded on facts, especially considering that the deceased could not see well, and so

G.R. No. L-25966

November 1, 1926

In the matter of the estate of Tomas Rodriguez, deceased. MANUEL TORRES,

special administrator, and LUZ LOPEZ DE BUENO, heir, appellee,
vs.
MARGARITA LOPEZ, opponent-appellant.
Marcaida, Capili and Ocampo and Camus, Delgado and Recto for appellant.
Araneta and Zaragoza for appellee.

STREET, J.:
This appeal involves a controversy over one-half of the estate of Tomas Rodriguez,
decedent. The appellant, Margarita Lopez, claims said half by the intestate
succession as next of kin and nearest heir; while the appellee, Luz Lopez de Bueno,
claims the same by accredition and in the character of universal heir the will of the
decedent. The trial court decided the point of controversy in favor of Luz Lopez de
Bueno, and Margariat Lopez appealed.
The facts necessary to an understanding of the case are these: On January 3, 1924,
Tomas Rodriguez executed his last will and testament, in the second clause of which
he declared:
I institute as the only and universal heirs to all my property, my cousin
Vicente F. Lopez and his daughter Luz Lopez de Bueno.
Prior to the time of the execution of this will the testator, Tomas Rodriguez, had been
judicially declared incapable of taking care of himself and had been placed under the
care of his cousin Vicente F. Lopez, as guardian. On January 7, 1924, or only four
days after the will above-mentioned was made, Vicente F. Lopez died; and the
testator, Tomas Rodriguez, died on February 25, 1924, thereafter. At the time the will
was made Vicente F. Lopez had not presented his final accounts as guardian, and no
such accounts had been presented by him at the time of his death. Margariat Lopez
was a cousin and nearest relative of the decedent. The will referred to, and after
having been contested, has been admitted to probate by judicial determination
(Torres and Lopez de Bueno vs. Lopez, 48 Phil., 772).
Our discussion of the legal problem presented should begin with article 753 of the
Civil Code which in effect declares that, with certain exceptions in favor of near
relatives, no testamentary provision shall be valid when made by a ward in favor of
his guardian before the final accounts of the latter have been approved. This

provision is of undoubted application to the situation before us; and the provision
made in the will of Tomas Rodriguez in favor of Vicente F. Lopez was not any
general incapacity on his part, but a special incapacity due to the accidental relation
of guardian and ward existing between the parties.
We now pass to article 982 of the Civil Code, defining the right of accretion. It is
there declared, in effect, that accretion take place in a testamentary succession, first
when the two or more persons are called to the same inheritance or the same portion
thereof without special designation of shares; and secondly, when one of the persons
so called dies before the testator or renounces the inheritance or is disqualifying to
receive it. In the case before us we have a will calling Vicente F. Lopez and his
daughter, Luz Lopez de Bueno, to the same inheritance without special designation
of shares. In addition to this, one of the persons named as heir has predeceased the
testator, this person being also disqualified to receive the estate even if he had been
alive at the time of the testator's death. This article (982) is therefore also of exact
application to the case in hand; and its effect is to give to the survivor, Luz Lopez de
Bueno, not only the undivided half which she would have received in conjunction
with her father if he had been alive and qualified to take, but also the half which
pertained to him. There was no error whatever, therefore, in the order of the trial
court declaring Luz Lopez de Bueno entitled to the whole estate.
The argument in favor of the appellant supposes that there has supervened a partial
intestacy with respect to the half of the estate which was intended for Vicente F.
Lopez and that this half has descended to the appellant, Margarita Lopez, as next of
kin and sole heir at law of the decedent. In this connection attention is directed to
article 764 of the Civil Code wherein it is declared, among other things, that a will
may be valid even though the person instituted as heir is disqualified to inherit. Our
attention is next invited to article 912 wherein it is declared, among other things, that
legal succession takes place if the heir dies before the testator and also when the heir
instituted is disqualified to succeed. Upon these provisions an argument is planted
conducting to the conclusion that the will of Tomas Rodriguez was valid,
notwithstanding the fact that one of the individuals named as heirs in the will was
disqualified to take, and that as a consequence Margarita Lopez s entitled to inherit
the share of said disqualified heir.
We are the opinion that this contention is untenable and that the appellee clearly has
the better right. In playing the provisions of the Code it is the duty of the court to
harmonize its provisions as far as possible, giving due effect to all; and in case of
conflict between two provisions the more general is to be considered as being limited
by the more specific. As between articles 912 and 983, it is obvious that the former is
the more general of the two, dealing, as it does, with the general topic of intestate
succession while the latter is more specific, defining the particular conditions under
which accretion takes place. In case of conflict, therefore, the provisions of the
former article must be considered limited by the latter. Indeed, in subsection 3 of
article 912 the provision with respect to intestate succession is expressly

subordinated to article 983 by the expression "and (if) there is no right of accretion."
It is true that the same express qualification is not found in subsection 4 of article
912, yet it must be so understood, in view of the rule of interpretation above referred
to, by which the more specific is held to control the general. Besides, this
interpretation supplies the only possible means of harmonizing the two provisions. In
addition to this, article 986 of the Civil Code affords independent proof that intestate
succession to a vacant portion can only occur when accretion is impossible.
The attorneys for the appellant direct attention to the fact that, under paragraph 4 of
article 912, intestate succession occurs when the heir instituted is disqualified to
succeed (incapaz de suceder), while, under the last provision in paragraph 2 of
article 982, accretion occurs when one of the persons called to inherit under the will
is disqualified to receive the inheritance (incapaz de recibirla). A distinction is then
drawn between incapacity to succeed and incapacity to take, and it is contended that
the disability of Vicente F. Lopez was such as to bring the case under article 912
rather than 982. We are of the opinion that the case cannot be made to turn upon so
refined an interpretation of the language of the Code, and at any rate the disability to
which Vicente F. Lopez was subject was not a general disability to succeed but an
accidental incapacity to receive the legacy, a consideration which makes a case for
accretion rather than for intestate succession.
The opinions of the commentators, so far as they have expressed themselves on the
subject, tend to the conclusion that the right of accretion with regard to portions of an
inheritance left vacant by the death or disqualification of one of the heirs or his
renunciation of the inheritance is governed by article 912, without being limited, to
the extent supposed in appellant's brief, by provisions of the Code relative to
intestate succession (Manresa, Comentarios al Codigo Civil Espaol, 4th ed., vol.
VII, pp. 310, 311; id., 34; 13 Mucius Scaevola, pp. 372, 373, 285-287; 16 Mucius
Scaevola, 186). Says Escriche: "It is to be understood that one of the coheirs or
colegatees fails if nonexistent at the time of the making of the will, or he renounces
the inheritance or legacy, if he dies before the testator, if the condition be not
fulfilled, or if he becomes otherwise incapacitated. . . . (Diccionario de Legislacion y
Jurisprudencia, vol. I, p. 225.)lawphil.net
In conclusion it may be worth observing that there has always existed both in the
civil and in the common law a certain legal intendment, amounting to a mild
presumption, against partial intestacy. In Roman law, as is well known, partial
testacy systems a presumption against it, a presumption which has its basis in the
supposed intention of the testator.
The judgment appealed from will be affirmed, and it is so ordered, with costs against
the appellant.
Avancea, C, J., Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

[G.R.

Nos.

L-3272-73.

November

29,

1951.]

MANUEL GONZALES, Petitioner-Appellant, v. MANOLITA GONZALES DE

CARUNGCONG, petitioner-appellee; ALEJANDRO GONZALES, JR., and
JUAN
GONZALES, Oppositors-Appellants.
Claro
Reyes,

M.
Albert,

Agcaoili

Recto,
and

Raf.

L.

for Petitioner-Appellant.
Arcega,

for Petitioner-Appellee.

Emiliano Pamintuan and Felixberto M. Serrano, for oppositors-appellants.

SYLLABUS
1. WILLS; ATTESTATION CLAUSE MADE BY TESTATOR AND SIGNED BY
WITNESSES, SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIES WITH LAW. An attestation
clause made by the testator himself more than by the instrumental witnesses, but
signed by the latter right under the signature of the testator, substantially complies
with
the
requirements
of
law.
2. ID.; ID.; STATEMENT OF SHEETS OR PAGES IN BODY OF WILL HELD
SUFFICIENT WHEN CONSIDERED IN CONNECTION WITH ATTESTATION
CLAUSE. The statement in the penultimate paragraph of the will as to the
number of the sheets or pages used is sufficient attestation which may be considered
in conjunction with the last paragraph which was herein held as the attestation
clause. The law does not require the attestation to be contained in a single clause.
3. ID.; TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY; TESTIMONY OF ATTENDING
PHYSICIAN PREVAILS OVER THAT OF TESTAMENTARY WITNESSES.
Where the family physician attended the testatrix during her last illness and saw her
on the day when the alleged document of revocation was executed, the testimony of
the attesting witnesses tending to imply that the testatrix was of sound mind at the
time said document was executed, cannot prevail over the contrary testimony of the
attending physician.

DECISION

PARAS, C.J. :

On November 27, 1948, Manuela Ibarra Vda. de Gonzales (hereafter to be referred to

as testatrix) died at the age of about seventy-eight years, leaving five children,
namely, Alejandro Gonzales, Jr., Manuel Gonzales, Leopoldo Gonzales, Manolita
Gonzales de Carungcong, and Juan Gonzales. The estate left by her is estimated at
P150,000.
On December 22, 1948, Manuel Gonzales filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal
a petition (Special Proceeding No. 837) for the probate of an alleged will executed
by the testatrix on November 16, 1942 (Exhibit B Manuel Gonzales), devising to
Manuel Gonzales the greater portion of the estate, without impairing the legitimes of
the
other
children.
On December 31, 1948, Manolita G. de Carungcong died in the same court a petition
(Special Proceeding No. 838) for the probate of another alleged will executed by the
testatrix on May 5, 1945 (Exhibit 1 Manolita G. Carungcong), leaving to
Manolita G. de Carungcong the greater bulk of the estate, without impairing the
legitimes
of
the
other
children.
In his opposition filed on February 16, 1949, Alejandro Gonzales, Jr. sought the
disallowance of the wills executed on November 16, 1942, and May 5, 1945, on the
ground that, assuming their validity, they had been revoked by the testatrix in an
instrument executed by her on November 18, 1948 (Exhibit 2 Alejandro and Juan
Gonzales), with the result that her estate should be distributed as if she died
intestate.
With the exception of Leopoldo Gonzales, the children of the testatrix filed mutual
oppositions to one or the other instruments tending to negative their respective
positions. After a joint hearing, the Court of First Instance of Rizal rendered a
decision with the following dispositive pronouncements:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"All facts considered in the light of the evidence presented and in the manner in
which the witnesses testified the court concludes and holds:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"First: That Exhibit B Manuel Gonzales, though validity executed on November
16, 1942, was revoked by Exhibit 1 Manolita G. Carungcong in accordance with
the provisions of section 623 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
"Second: That Exhibit 2 Alejandro and Juan Gonzales being executed without the
knowledge and testamentary capacity of the testatrix and being contrary to the
provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the said document is
hereby
declared
null
and
void.
"Third: That Exhibit 1 Manolita G. Carungcong having been executed in
accordance with law the same is hereby declared as the true and last will and
testament of the deceased Manuela Ibarra Viuda de Gonzales, and said will is hereby
admitted
probate."cralaw
virtua1aw
library

From this judgment petitioner Manuel Gonzales and oppositors Alejandro Gonzales,
Jr. and Juan Gonzales have appealed. The appeal as to Juan Gonzales was dismissed
in view of his failure to pay the proportionate share of the printing cost of the record
on
appeal.
In the parts material to the present appeal, the will executed by the testatrix on May
5, 1945, is of the following form and tenor:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"IKALABING-DALAWA. Na ang aking Huling BILIN AT TESTAMENTONG ito
ay binubuo ng PITONG (7) dahon o pagina na may bilang na sunod-sunod at ang
bawat dahon o pagina ay mayroong tunay kong lagda o firma, gayon din ang lahat
g
aking
saksi
o
testigos.
"SA KATUNAYAN ng lahat ng isinasaysay ko dito ay aking nilagdaan ito dito sa
Imus, Kavite, Filipinas gayong ika-5 g Mayo ng taong 1945, na nakaharap dito sa
ating paglagda o pagfirma ang tatlong saksi o testigos. At aking ding nilagdaan o
pinirmahan ang tagilirang kaliwa ng lahat at bawat dahon o pagina nitong
testamento kong ito sa harap ng lahat at bawat isang saksi o testigos at ang lahat at
bawat isa naman sa kanila ay nangagsilagda o nagsifirma din dito bilang saksi ko sa
harap ko at sa harap ng lahat at bawat isa sa kanila, at ganoon din silang mga saksi
ko ay nangag-lagda o nagsi-firma sa tagilirang kaliwa ng lahat at bawat isa sa mga
dahon o pagina nitong aking testamento.
"

(Sgd.)

MANUELA

Y.

VDA.

DE

GONZALES

MANUELA IBARRA VDA. DE GONZALES

"Mga Saksi o Testigos:
"
"(Sgd.)

(Sgd.)

BIENVENIDO
TAHIMIK

DE

LOS
T.

REYES
SAYOC

"(Sgd.) LUIS GAERLAN"

It is contended for the appellants that this will does not contain any attestation
clause; that, assuming the concluding paragraph to be the attestation clause, it is not
valid because it is the act of the testatrix and not of the witnesses, and because it does
not
state
the
number
of
sheets
or
pages
of
the
will.
In the very recent case of Valentina Cuevas v. Pilar Achacoso, G. R. No. L-3497,
decided May, 1951 * we sustained, finding a precedent in Aldaba v. Roque, 43 Phil.,
378, an attestation clause made by the testator and forming part of the body of the
will. Through
Mr. Justice
Bautista,
we
held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The clause above quoted is the attestation clause referred to in the law which, in our
opinion, substantially complies with its requirements. The only apparent anomaly we

did is that it appears to be an attestation made by the testator himself more than by
the instrumental witnesses. This apparent anomaly, however, is not in our opinion
serious nor substantial as to affect the validity of the will, it appearing that right
under the signature of the testator, there appear the signatures of the three
instrumental
witnesses.
"Instrumental witness, as defined by Escriche in his Diccionario Razonada de
Legislacion, y Jurisprudencia, Vol. 4, p. 1115, is one who takes part in the execution
of an instrument or writing" (in re will of Tan Diuco, 45 Phil., 807, 809). An
instrumental witness, therefore, does not merely attest to the signature of the testator
but also to the proper execution of the will. The fact that the three instrumental
witnesses have signed the will immediately under the signature of the testator, shows
that they have in fact attested not only to the genuineness of his signature but also to
the due execution of the will as embodied in the attestation clause.
"The attestation clause in question bears also similarity with the attestation clause in
the will involved in Aldaba v. Roque, (43 Phil, 378). In that case, the attestation
clause formed part of the body of the will and its recital was made by the testatrix
herself and was signed by her and by the three instrumental witnesses. In upholding
the
validity
of
the
will,
the
court
said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In reality, it appears that it is the testatrix who makes the declaration about the
points in the last paragraph of the will; however, as the witnesses, together with the
testatrix, have signed the said declaration, we are of the opinion and so hold that the
words above quoted of the testament constitute a sufficient compliance with the
requirements
of
Act
No.
2645."cralaw
virtua1aw
library
Of course three of the Justices of this Court concurred in the result, "in the possibility
that the testator in the present case, or the person or persons who prepared the will
had relied upon the ruling laid down in the case of Aldaba v. Roque, supra, and that it
would now be unfair to reject the present will when in its preparation a ruling of this
Court has been followed." But the case at bar still falls within this view, the will
(Exhibit 1 Manolita G. Carungcong) having been executed on May 5, 1945.
The attestation clause contained in the body of the will being thus valid, the
statement in the penultimate paragraph of the will hereinabove quoted as to the
number of sheets or pages used, is sufficient attestation which may be considered in
conjunction with the last paragraph. It is significant that the law does not require the
attestation to be contained in a single clause. While perfection in the drafting of a
will may be desirable, unsubstantial departure from the usual forms should be
ignored, especially where the authenticity of the will is not assailed, as in this case.
The result reached in respect of the sufficiency of the will (Exhibit 1 Manolita G.
Carungcong) necessarily disposes of the contention of appellant Manuel Gonzales
that the trial court erred in not admitting to probate the will (Exhibit B Manuel
Gonzales), since the latter will must be considered revoked by the subsequent will

(Exhibit

Manolita

G.

Carungcong).

What remains to be discussed is the claim of appellant Alejandro Gonzales, Jr. that
the will (Exhibit 1 Manolita G. Carungcong) has been revoked by the testatrix in
the instrument of November 18, 1948 (Exhibit 2 Alejandro and Juan Gonzales)
which
provides
as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Ako, MANUELA YBARRA VDA. DE GONZALES, may sapat na gulang at
naninirahan sa ciudad ng Rizal, may mahusay at wastong pagiisip at mabuting
pagtatanda, sa pamamaguitan ng kasulatang ito at bilang huling kapasiyahan ay
sinasaysay ko at ipinahahayag sa gayon sa alin mang testamento o huling habilin na
napirmahan kong una sa kasulatang ito ay pinawawalan ko ng saysay at kabuluhang
lahat
pagkat
hindi
iyong
ang
tunay
kong
kalooban
gayon.
"Sa katunayan ng lahat ng ito at sa pagkat hindi ako makalagda ngayon ang pinakiusapan si Constancio Padilla na ilagda ako sa kasulatang ito ngayon ika-17 ng
Noviembre ng taong ito 1948, dito sa ciudad ng Pasay."cralaw virtua1aw library
Appellee Manolita G. de Carungcong, like Manuel Gonzales (as appellee), contends
that the testatrix lacked the testamentary capacity when she allegedly executed the
instrument of revocation, and their contention was sustained by the trial court. We
have examined the record and found no valid reason for reversing the finding of said
court which had the benefit of observing and hearing the witnesses testify. Upon the
other hand, the following considerations amply support the appealed
decision:chanrob1es
virtual
1aw
library
1. For more than ten years prior to her death, the testatrix had suffered from
hypertension. On November 14, 1948, she had aphasia and on November 15, 1948,
she was taken to the hospital upon advice of the family physician, Dr. Jose C.
Leveriza. In the letter introducing her to the hospital authorities (Exhibit E
Manuel Gonzales), Dr. Leveriza stated that the testatrix was suffering from
hypertension and cerebral thrombosis. Particularly on November 18, 1948, when the
alleged instrument of revocation was executed by her, the testatrix was in a comatose
and unconscious state and could not talk or understand. The following is the
testimony of Dr. Leveriza portraying the physical condition of the testatrix up to
November
18,
1948:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q. And you did when Doa Manuela I. Vda. Gonzales was already in the hospital?
A. I went there to examine it.
"Q. What was the result of consideration?

A. When he went to the hospital to be examined in the first day via the aphasia was
aggravated, so it has lost the power to speak intelligently; I also found that he was
unconscious, constantly sleeping and could not awaken, had the laborious, slow,
rattling breath, and could not get up, so I perscribi to give food through
hypodermoclysis, or by injection .
"Mr. Pamintuan. - We would like to know, Your Honor, if the witness is presented as
an expert?
"Mr. SERRANO -. I would also like to know if presented as family doctor or
medical expert?
"Mr. ARCEGA -. I present to witness as practitioner and as a medical expert the
same time.
"Q. And they did in the hospital in vieta his instructions?
R. Meeting the mia prescription.
"Q. What happened regarding the status of the patient?
A. The patient with each passing day the symptoms remained increasingly serious
and more serious even than the first day she was taken to hospital.
"Q. Turning to the condition of the patient, in that state was Doa Manuela I. Vda.
Gonzales on November 14, 1948 before entering it in the hospital?
A. I found with aphasia, could not speak intelligently.
"Q. Can you explain to the Court the course of the disease Doa Manuela I. Vda.
Gonzales?
R. Was worsening since the second day he was admitted to hospital, and from that
day and urinated in bed and Deponia unconsciously.

xxx
"Q. After the November 15, 1948 in which, according to you, the patient was
admitted in the hospital and she could speak to understand his words?
(TSN, Laquindanum, March 21, 1949, pp. 24-26.)
A. No, sir.
Q. Can you explain to the court during the patient's illness referring to the days in the
Exhibitos 3 and 3-4?
A. November 14, order entry of patients to Mercy Hospital, because he had partial
paralysis of the tongue, probably embalismo origin or cerebral thrombosis, and as it
was night, the hospital can not take it, but the day November 15 where I have made
two visits; the condition of the patient continued to deteriorate until the 25th of
November in the ensuing complication of pneumonia hypostatica to qus died on
November 27, 1948, at 2:30 pm
xxx

(TSN, Laquindanum, March 21, 1948, pp. 28-29.)

"COURT -. Q. As you arrive at the conclusion that since the November 14, 1948 in
which you ordered the delivery of the patient to the hospital until his health
worsened died on November 27, 1948?

"Q. And to the patient?

A. I was constantly sleeping, could not open his eyes alone, but I opened to see the
pupil.
"Q. Did you have conversation with the patient treatment?
R. course was, but did not answer, and not think he understood me.
"Q. patient could stand?
A. No, sir, because I was in a coma, and prevent pneumonia hypostatica two or three
men had to lift and put some reclining side or something.
"Q. And what result did you take this precaution?

A. Because more and more her comatose state is emphasized, and other his breathing
became increasingly labored passing day, and crackles.

R. has been delayed or slowed the pneumonia, but came at the end, which is always
fatal.

"Q. And was in state of mind?

A. I was completely unconscious from the day I entered the hospital.
"Mr. ARCEGA -. Q. He could speak the patient at the time she was admitted to
hospital?
A. No, sir.

"Q. You said that the end came the pneumonia, pneumonia that had that effect to the
patient?
R. precipitated the death of the patient.
"Q. EI November 18, 1948, according to testimony of witnesses, gave the document
Exhibit 2 - Alejandro and Juan Gonzales, can you tell the Court what state I was
Doa Manuela Gonzales Vda.?

R. hands and feet.

A. I was in esetedo comatose.
"Q. patient could move his hands and his body?
"Q. Why do you know that?
R. The left side if.
A. Because at that time I visit twice: once in the morning and one in the afternoon.
"Q. And right?
"Q. And being in the coma, as you said, can you tell the Court if she could speak or
understand his words or his desire?
A. No, sir.
"Q. Did you pear efforts hacerie understand his words?
A. Always examined to see if it reacted pro-patient mind, but each time was worse.
"Q. Can you tell if the patient equella date even nod could do?
A. No, sir, because the right side of the body had hemihejia or paralysis.
"Q. What is the reason that you say hemiflejia or paralysis?
A. Generally a cerebral brain hemorrhage or thrombosis is due.
"Q. Given cerebral hemorrhage or thrombosis of the brain, according to you, ee
which part of the human body is affected?
A. The head and arms as well as members of the body.
"Q. What do you mean 'as miembroe body'?

A. No, sir.
"COURT -. But a person in this state of health, as the patient was Doa Manuela I.
Gonzales Vda, the November 18, 1948, could understand words spoken to her or
statements made by any person to it.?
A. No, sir. "Cralaw virtua1aw library
(TSN Laquindanum, March 21, 1948, pp. 30-33.)
While appellant Alejandro Gonzales, Jr. has attempted to show that Dr. Leveriza was
not an expert, the latters testimony remains uncontradicted. The fact that the
testimony of the attesting witnesses tends to imply that the testatrix was of sound
mind at the time the alleged instrument of revocation was executed, cannot prevail
over the findings of the attending physician, Dr. Leveriza, because even Dr. Ramon
C. Talavera (an attesting witness) testified that although he had not examined the
testatrix, her case appeared serious; that he had a hunch that "they were taking
advantage of the last moment of the deceased and they were trying to make me an
instrument in the accomplishment of their aims," and that he had the idea that the
testatrix was in doubtful condition because he "could only judge from the people
going
there."cralaw
virtua1aw
library
It is also argued that if the testatrix was in a comatose condition, Dr. Leveriza would
not have ordered to "let her sit on bed or on a chair and let her turn on her side
sometime." However, Dr. Leveriza has given the reason for this prescription, namely,
to
avoid
hypostatic
pneumonia.
In support of the contention that the testimony of the attesting witnesses should be
given more credence than the opinion of an expert witness, reliance is placed on the
case of Caguioa v. Calderon, 20 Phil., 400; Bagtas v. Paguio, 22 Phil., 227; Galvez v.
Galvez, 26 Phil., 243; Samson v. Corrales Tan Quintin, 44 Phil., 573; Amata v.

Tablizo, 48 Phil., 485, and Neyra v. Neyra, 42 Off. Gaz., 2790 * These cases are
notably distinguishable from the case at bar. The former refer to situations in which
the doctors were not in a position to certify definitely as to the testamentary capacity
of the testators at the time the wills therein involved were executed, because they had
not observed the testators on said dates or never saw them; whereas the case now
before us involves a family physician who attended the testatrix during her last
illness and saw her on the day when the alleged instrument of revocation was
executed.
2. We cannot help expressing our surprise at the fact that the instrument of revocation
was allegedly executed on November 18, 1948, when, according to the testimony of
Jose Padilla, the latter was asked by the testatrix to prepare the necessary document
as early as in the month of May, 1948, and reminded about it for the second time
weeks before November 1, 1948, and for the third time several days before the latter
date (November 1, 1948). The first excuse given by Jose Padilla for the delay is that
he was busy and the children of the testatrix had certain disputes which he tried to
settle. The second excuse is that he was not able to secure soon enough from
Alejandro Gonzales, Jr. some documents of transfer which he wanted to examine in
connection with the preparation of the desired instrument of revocation. We are
inclined to state that these excuses are rather poor. If Jose Padilla was too busy to
give attention to the matter, he could have very easily informed the testatrix and the
latter, if really desirous of revoking her former wills, would have employed another
to prepare the requisite document. The fact that there were disputes between the
children of the testatrix certainly was not an obstacle to the accomplishment of the
wish of the testatrix. Neither was it necessary to examine the documents relating to
the properties of the testatrix, since the instrument of revocation could be prepared

without any reference to the details of her estate. Indeed, the instrument (Exhibit 2
Alejandro and Juan Gonzales) is couched in general terms.
3. Even under the theory of appellant Alejandro Gonzales, Jr., it is hard to rule that
the testatrix had sufficient testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of the
alleged instrument of revocation. In the first place, Constancio Padilla (brother of
Jose Padilla) merely asked the testatrix, first, if she was agreeable to the instrument
of revocation prepared by Jose Padilla, and secondly, if she was agreeable to the
signing of said document by Constancio Padilla, to which two questions the testatrix
allegedly answered "Yes." It is not pretended that the testatrix said more about the
matter or gave any further instruction. The attesting witnesses were not introduced to
the testatrix, and their presence was not even mentioned to her. It is obviously
doubtful whether the testatrix understood the meaning and extent of the ceremony.
Assuming that the testatrix answered in the affirmative the two questions of
Constancio Padilla, without more, we cannot fairly attribute to her a manifestation of
her desire to proceed, right then and there, with the signing of the questioned
instrument. In other words, contrary to the recital of the attestation clause, the
testatrix cannot rightly be said to have published her last will to the attesting
witnesses.
The appealed decision is, therefore, affirmed without costs. So ordered.
Feria, Bengzon, Tuason, Reyes, Jugo and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.