fully paid.

"cralaw virtua1aw library

Appellant is a former policeman while the co-accused,
Irene Yabut, is his common-law wife. Both were charged
with estafa and illegal recruitment in large scale, but only
appellant stood trial as Yabut has eluded arrest and
remains at-large.chanrobles.com : virtual law library

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 115719-26. October 5, 1999.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
IRENE YABUT @ IRENE CORTEZ @ FLORENCE
MADRID 1 (At-large), FERNANDO CORTEZ y
VEGA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
On appeal is the decision dated February 16, 1994 of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 159, convicting
appellant Fernando Cortez y Vega of the crime of illegal
recruitment in large scale, imposing upon him the penalty of
life imprisonment, and ordering him to pay a fine of
P100,000.00 and to indemnify private complainants in the
following amounts
"a. Fely M. Casanova in the amount of
P151,581.00;chanrobles.com : virtual law library
b. Arnel M. Diana in the amount of P50,000.00;
c. Reynaldo P. Claudio in the amount of P58,454.00;
d. German Aquino in the amount of P40,000.00;
e. Manolito Latoja in the amount of P45,000.00;
f. Alejandro P. Ruiz in the amount of P50,000.00;
g. Antonio S. Bernardo in the amount of P60,000.00; and,
h. Henry Ilar in the amount of P25,000.00; all with legal rate
of interest reckoned from the filing of the Information until

The facts, as summarized by the Office of the Solicitor

General, which we find to be duly supported by the records,
are as follows: 2
On August 13, 1992, prosecution witness and private
complainant Mr. Henry Ilar met for the first time the herein
appellant, who was at that time a policeman, and his live-in
partner and co-accused Irene Yabut, at Rm. 103 P.M.
Apartelle, N. Domingo Street, San Juan, Metro Manila
(TSN, June 9, 1993, pp. 3-7). Ilar handed over to the
appellant and co-accused Irene Yabut the initial down
payment of P10,000.00 for the processing of papers and
visa for Japan where he was to work as a roomboy in a
hotel (Ibid., p. 3-4, Exh. "A" Pros.). Appellant assured Ilar
not to worry since he would be able to leave for Japan
otherwise his money would be refunded (TSN, June 9,
1993, p. 7). Additional amounts were given by Ilar to coaccused Irene Yabut thru her employee Butch Barrios,
namely: P6,000.00, and P4,000.00 for the purpose of
processing his papers (TSN, June 9, 1993, pp. 4-5; Exhs.
"B" and "C" pros.). On September 26, 1993, Ilar handed
over additional P5,000.00 to the appellant the amount to be
used allegedly for the expenses to be incurred for Ilars
training (TSN, June 9, 1993, p. 5; Exh. "D" pros.). Finally,
Ilar was made to sign a one (1) year contract but he was
not furnished a copy of the same (TSN, June 9, 1993, p. 4).
Ilar was scheduled to leave for Japan on October 8, 1993
but this date was postponed allegedly due to problems
(TSN, June 9, 1993, p. 5). The second scheduled date for
departure was again cancelled allegedly due to the
necessity of applicants undergoing medical examination
(TSN, June 9, 1993, p. 6). After undergoing the medical
examination, Ilar was again scheduled to depart on
December 12, 1992 (Ibid). Prior to the scheduled
departure, Ilar checked on Irene Yabut but she was no
longer in her apartelle (Ibid) although he found the
appellant who re-assured Ilar that he would be able to
leave for Japan (TSN, June 9, 1993, p. 7). Sensing

fraudulent practice on the part of the appellant and his coaccused, Ilar verified from the POEA whether the appellant
and his co-accused were authorized or licensed to engage
in recruitment and placement activities. A certification was
issued by the POEA stating that the appellant and coaccused Irene Yabut were neither licensed nor authorized
to recruit workers for overseas employment (TSN, June 9,
1993, p. 6; Exh. "E" pros). As expected, the last scheduled
departure of Ilar on December 12, 1993 (sic) (1992) did not
push through.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
In the case of private complainant Mr. Reynaldo P. Claudio,
on July 28, 1992, he went to Room 103 P.M. Apartelle, San
Juan, Metro Manila, to apply for a job as hotel worker in
Japan. Appellant and co-accused Irene Yabut, introducing
themselves as husband and wife, told him that he could
work in Japan provided he paid the fees (TSN, June 15,
1993, pp. 8-9, 26). Convinced by their assurances, (TSN,
June 15, 1993, p. 19) Claudio gave them an initial payment
of P15,000.00 (TSN, June 15, 1993, pp. 9-10; Exhibits "A"
and "G" pros.). Claudio was required to undergo training
(June 15, 1993, p. 10-11, Exhs. "B" and "H" pros.). On
August 18, 1992, Claudio paid P30,000.00 to co-accused
Irene Yabut (June 15, 1993, p. 11; Exhs. "C" and "I" pros).
On August 21, 1992, Claudio paid another P25,000.00 to
the co-accused Irene Yabut (TSN, June 15, 1993, pp. 12,
22; Exhs. "J" and "D" pros.). The amounts he paid all in all
totalled P70,000.00 which would allegedly be used for the
processing of the visa, plane ticket expenses, medical tests
and seminar costs for Claudio and his two (2) brothers
(TSN, June 15, 1993, pp. 11, 13). Claudio was made to
sign a recruitment contract but he was not furnished a copy
of the same by the appellant and his co-accused (TSN,
June 15, 1993, p. 13). Yabut tried to convince Claudio not
to appear at the preliminary investigation hearing
scheduled the next day at the Department of Justice by
refunding to him the amount of the plane ticket already paid
for by Claudio. This proved futile as Claudio appeared at
the hearing nonetheless (TSN, June 15, 1993, pp. 14-16).
Claudio was scheduled to depart five (5) times but not one
of those scheduled departures for Japan materialized for
purportedly the following reasons: that there was no escort
or that the contract had to be changed or that it was
necessary for him to undergo a medical examination (TSN,
June 15, 1993, pp. 18-19). Persistent follow-ups made by
Claudio with the appellant and Yabut at their apartelle went

for naught as Claudio was repeatedly told to wait as they

were allegedly doing something about the delay (TSN,
June 15, 1993, p. 20).chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law
library
In the case of Mr. Arnel Diana, on July 20, 1992, he along
with his brother-in-law, met the appellant and his coaccused Irene Yabut at their room in P.M. Apartelle, No. 26
N. Domingo Street, San Juan Metro Manila (TSN, June 15,
1993, p. 30). Diana and his companion were assured by
the appellant that they could leave for abroad (Ibid). The
appellant and his co-accused asked Diana to pay the fee of
P50,000.00 for the travel documents and POEA papers
(TSN, June 15, 1993, p. 31). Diana was made to sign an
employment contract (Ibid; Exhs. "A" to "A-4" and "P" to "P4") which convinced him to part with his money (TSN, June
15, 1993, pp. 40-42). The amount was paid on installments.
Diana made the first payment on July 20, 1992 for
P15,000.00 (TSN, June 15, 1993, pp. 33; Exhs. "B" and "Q"
pros), handed over to the appellant and Irene Yabut (TSN,
June 15, 1993, pp. 40-41). The second installment on July
24, 1992 for P25,000.00 (Ibid, Exhs. "C" and "R" pros) and
the third installment was given on July 27, 1992 for
P10,000.00 (TSN, July 15, 1993, p. 34; Exhs. "D" and "S"
pros). Diana was first scheduled to leave on August 8, 1992
but his departure did not push through (TSN, June 15,
1993, p. 35). Disappointed, Diana asked the appellant and
his co-accused Irene Yabut for an explanation. Appellant
cited lack of escort as the reason for his non-departure
(Ibid).
The second scheduled date of departure was also
cancelled for alleged unavailability of the Japanese who
was to hire him (Ibid). Diana was scheduled five (5) times
to depart but each time the departure went for naught,
while appellant and co-accused Irene Yabut kept on
assuring him that they were going to do something about it
(TSN, June 15, 1993, p. 36). Exasperated, Diana
demanded for the return of his money from appellant (TSN,
June 15, 1993, pp. 37-38). Despite the promises of the
appellant, the money he paid was never refunded.
Thereafter, Diana found out from another complainant
Henry Ilar, that the appellant and his co-accused were not
licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for overseas
employment (TSN, June 15, 1993, p. 38).chanrobles virtual
lawlibrary

In the case of private complainant Antonio S. Bernardo, he

entered into an employment contract with appellants coaccused Irene Yabut (TSN, August 18, 1993, pp. 2-3).
Bernardo was told by the appellant that he did not affix his
signature on the employment contract because of his
government employment i.e., a member of the Philippine
National Police (PNP), but appellant on several occasions
promised Bernardo that he would be able to leave for
abroad (TSN, August 18, 1993, p. 3).

jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named

accused mutually confederating and conspiring with each
other did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
contract, enlist and recruit for a fee, eight (8) persons for
employment abroad without first obtaining the required
license and/or authority from the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary:red
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Manila, for Makati, Metro Manila, March 31, 1993

Still another complainant, Fely Casanova testified that she

first met appellant and his co-accused Irene Yabut who
introduced themselves as Mr. and Mrs. Madrid on June 8,
1992 (TSN, August 18, 1993, p. 5). Casanova always saw
the appellant at the P.M. Apartelle on Domingo Street, San
Juan, Metro Manila whenever she made follow-ups on her
papers (Ibid). Casanova also saw the appellant and his coaccused Irene Yabut at the Town and Country on
December 18, and 22, 1992 when the two were already in
hiding. They were talking to other applicants whom they
promised to send abroad (TSN, August 19, 1993, p. 6). On
those two occasions, appellant and his co-accused assured
her about a job placement abroad or the return of her
money (Ibid)."cralaw virtua1aw library
Realizing that their overseas jobs would never materialize,
complainants hauled appellant and his co-accused to the
Department of Justice, which conducted a preliminary
investigation on the complaints. Both were subsequently
charged with (1) Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale in
Criminal Case No. 98224, and (2) eight (8) counts of Estafa
in Criminal Case Nos. 98997-99004. The Information for
Illegal Recruitment reads: 3chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
"The undersigned State Prosecutor of the Department of
Justice and Presidential Anti-Crime Commission hereby
accuses Irene Yabut and Fernando Cortez for (sic) Illegal
Recruitment as defined and penalized under Articles 38
and 39 of Presidential Decree No. 422 as Amended,
otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines,
committed as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That during the period from June to September, 1992 or
thereabouts, in San Juan, Metro Manila and within the

Francisco F. Benedicto, Jr.

State Prosecutor II"
Upon arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty to
all charges. 4 Accused Irene Yabut already fled and was
not arraigned.
During joint trial, the prosecution presented as its witnesses
three (3) of the complainants, namely: (1) Henry L. Ilar; (2)
Reynaldo P. Claudio; and (3) Arnel M. Diana. The
testimonies of the other five (5) complainants were
dispensed with upon the agreement of the prosecution and
the defense that affidavits would be offered as their
testimonies. The corresponding receipts issued by accused
Yabut for amounts received from complainants were
marked as evidence for the prosecution. 5chanrobles.com :
virtual law library
For the defense, appellant testified on his behalf. He
admitted that accused Irene Yabut was his live-in partner
with whom he has a child, but he washed his hands of any
participation in her business activities. He further insisted
that Yabut was not engaged in recruitment of workers for
overseas employment but only in the processing of visas.
He also denied any knowledge of the special power of
attorney executed in his favor by Yabut for the refund of the
PAL tickets of several recruits. Moreover, he claimed that
he was not present at any given time when large sums of
money were received by Yabut and that he never gave any
assurances to complainants regarding their departure to
Japan. 6
The prosecution then presented complainants Antonio S.

Bernardo, Fely M. Casanova, and Henry L. Ilar as rebuttal

witnesses to refute appellants denials and protestations of
innocence regarding accused Yabuts recruitment activities.
On February 16, 1994, the trial court rendered a decision 7
acquitting appellant of eight (8) counts of estafa but
convicting him of illegal recruitment in large scale. The
dispositive portion of the decision states:chanrobles law
library : red
"WHEREFORE, Accused Fernando Cortez is hereby
Acquitted under Criminal Case Nos. 98997-99004 of the
crime of Estafa under Art. 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised
Penal Code, on grounds of reasonable doubt.
Upon the other hand, the prosecution having established
beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of accused Fernando
Cortez under Criminal Case No. 98224 of the crime of
Illegal Recruitment (in large scale) penalized under Art.
38(a) in relation to Art. 39(b) of P.D. 442, this Court hereby
imposes upon accused Fernando Cortez as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. To suffer life imprisonment and pay a fine of ONE
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00);chanrobles
virtual lawlibrary
2. To indemnify private complainants
a) Fely M. Casanova in the amount of P151,581.00;
b) Arnel M. Diana in the amount of P50,000.00;
c) Reynaldo P. Claudio in the amount of P58,454.00;
d) German Aquino in the amount of P40,000.00;
e) Manolito Latoja in the amount of P45,000.00;
f) Alejandro F. Ruiz in the amount of P50,000.00;
g) Antonio S. Bernardo in the amount of P60,000.00; and
h) Henry Ilar in the amount of P25,000.00; all with legal rate
of interest reckoned from the filing of the Information until
fully paid.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

SO ORDERED."cralaw virtua1aw library

Hence, the present appeal. Appellant contends that the trial
court 8
". . . ERRED IN THE APPRECIATION OF THE EVIDENCE
ADDUCED DURING THE TRIAL ON THE MERITS AND
AS A RESULT IT ALSO ERRED IN CONVICTING
FERNANDO CORTEZ OF ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT
WHILE AT THE SAME TIME IT ACQUITTED HIM OF THE
CRIME OF ESTAFA BASED ON THE SAME
EVIDENCE."cralaw virtua1aw library
Appellant anchors his bid for acquittal on the insufficiency
of evidence, documentary and testimonial, to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. If at all, appellant argues, the
sole person guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale should
be Yabut since she was the only one who signed the
receipts for the amounts received from the complainants.
He contends that the mere fact that he is "romantically
linked" with Yabut does not mean he acted in conspiracy
with her.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
The Office of the Solicitor General, in praying for the
affirmance in toto of the trial court decision, insists that
appellant acted in conspiracy with his co-accused, as
shown by the following acts: 9
". . . (1) He received deposits of money to defray travelling
expenses (TSN, June 9, 1993, pp. 3-5; June 15, 1993, pp.
9-12, 22, 40-41; July 15, 1993, p. 34); (2) He informed the
complainants that the money turned over would be used for
the processing of papers and visas for Japan (TSN, June 9,
1993, pp. 3-5; June 15, 1993, pp. 11, 13, 31); (3) He gave
assurance to the complainants that they would be able to
leave for Japan otherwise their money would be refunded
(TSN, June 9, 1993, p. 7; June 15, 1993, pp. 8-9, 20, 26,
30, 36; August 18, 1993, p. 3; August 19, 1993, p. 6); (4)
He stayed at the apartelle office and manned the office by
entertaining job seekers even after his co-accused Irene
Yabut had gone into hiding (TSN, June 9, 1993, pp. 3-7;
June 15, 1993, pp. 8-9, 20, 30; August 18, 1993, p.
5)" chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary:red
The crux of the issue is whether appellant could be

convicted of illegal recruitment in large scale despite his

acquittal of the crime of estafa. If so, did the prosecution
prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of illegal
recruitment in large scale insofar as appellant is
concerned?
In this jurisdiction, it is settled that a person who commits
illegal recruitment may be charged and convicted
separately of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code and
estafa under par. 2 (a) of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal
Code. 10 The offense of illegal recruitment is malum
prohibitum where the criminal intent of the accused is not
necessary for conviction, while estafa is malum in se where
the criminal intent of the accused is crucial for conviction.
11 Conviction for offenses under the Labor Code does not
bar conviction for offenses punishable by other laws. 12
Conversely, conviction for estafa under par. 2 (a) of Art. 315
of the Revised Penal Code does not bar a conviction for
illegal recruitment under the Labor Code. It follows that
ones acquittal of the crime of estafa will not necessarily
result in his acquittal of the crime of illegal recruitment in
large scale, and vice versa.chanrobles law library : red
Article 13, par. (b) of the Labor Code enumerates the acts
which constitute recruitment and placement as follows
"(b) Recruitment and placement refer to any act of
canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing,
hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract
services, promising or advertising for employment, locally
or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That any
person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises
for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be
deemed engaged in recruitment and placement."cralaw
virtua1aw library
The acts of appellant consisting of his promises, offers and
assurances of employment to complainants fall squarely
within the ambit of recruitment and placement as defined
above. The fact that he did not issue the receipts for
amounts received from complainants has no bearing on his
culpability for the complainants have shown through their
respective testimonies and affidavits that appellant was
involved in the prohibited recruitment. 13 It is immaterial
that appellant ingeniously stated to one of the complainants
that he (appellant) was a member of the PNP and a

government employee, hence could not sign the receipts.

14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary:red
Article 38 of the Labor Code renders illegal all recruitment
activities without the necessary license or authority from the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration. Art. 38 of
the Labor Code provides
"ARTICLE 38. Illegal Recruitment. (a) Any recruitment
activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated
under Article 34 of this Code, to be undertaken by nonlicensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed
illegal and punishable under Article 39 of this Code. The
Ministry of Labor and Employment (now Department of
Labor and Employment) or any law enforcement officer
may initiate complaints under this Article.
(b) Illegal Recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in
large scale shall be considered an offense involving
economic sabotage and shall be penalized in accordance
with Article 39 hereof.cralawnad
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if
carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons
conspiring and/or confederating with one another in
carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or
scheme defined under the first paragraph hereof. Illegal
recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if
committed against three (3) or more persons individually or
as a group. . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
Thus, if the illegal recruitment is committed by a syndicate
or in large scale, the Labor Code considers it an offense
involving economic sabotage and imposes a stiffer penalty
therefor in accordance with Article 39 of the Labor Code.
The elements of illegal recruitment in large scale are:" (1)
the accused undertakes any recruitment activity defined
under Art. 13, par. (b), or any prohibited practice
enumerated under Art. 34 of the Labor Code; (2) he does
not have a license or authority to lawfully engage in the
recruitment and placement of workers; and, (3) he commits
the same against three (3) or more persons, individually or
as a group." 15chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Indisputably, all three (3) elements exist in the case at bar.

First, the complaining witnesses have satisfactorily

established that appellant had actively promised them
employment, gave assurance of their placement overseas,
and with his co-accused received certain sums as fees
therefor. Second, the Licensing Division of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration issued a Certification
dated March 1, 1993 that JAWOH GENERAL
MERCHANDISING 16 represented by Irene Yabut and
Fernando Cortez are neither licensed nor authorized by the
POEA to recruit workers for overseas employment. 17 In
fact, the defense even entered into a stipulation during trial
that appellant is not authorized by the POEA to recruit
overseas workers. 18 Third, appellant and co-accused
undertook recruitment of not less than eight (8) workers
complainants herein, who were recruited individually on
different occasions. For purposes of illegal recruitment,
however, the law makes no distinction whether the workers
were recruited as a group or individually.

secure a decent future for them. Illegal recruiters prey on

hapless workers, charge exorbitant fees that siphon their
meager savings, then cruelly dash their dreams with false
promises of lucrative jobs overseas. For this reason, illegal
recruiters have no place in society. Illegal recruitment
activities must be stamped out by the full force of the
law.cralawnad

There is no showing that any of the complainants had illmotive to testify falsely against appellant. And it is generally
observed that it is against human nature and experience for
strangers to conspire and accuse another stranger of a
most serious crime just to mollify their hurt feelings. 19
Moreover, we have no reason to discount the trial courts
appreciation of the complainants truthfulness, honesty and
candor. For such appreciation deserves the highest
respect, since the trial court is best-equipped to make the
assessment of the witnesses credibility, and its factual
findings are generally not disturbed on appeal. 20 Thus,
after a careful review of the records, we see no cogent
reason to disturb the findings of the trial court.chanrobles
law library : red

SO ORDERED.

As to the amounts to be refunded to complainants, we find

the trial courts computations in accord with the evidence,
except with respect to complainant Fely M. Casanova.
Upon recomputation, the amount to be refunded for the
failed promise of employment of her daughter and sister-inlaw should be P150,781.00 instead of P151,581.00. 21
Lastly, it would not be amiss to stress that in these difficult
times, many of our countrymen venture abroad and work
even in hazardous places to ensure for themselves and
their families a life worthy of human dignity. They labor
overseas to provide proper education for their children and

WHEREFORE, WE AFFIRM the Decision of the Regional

Trial Court finding appellant Fernando Cortez y Vega guilty
of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale beyond reasonable
doubt and sentencing him to life imprisonment, as well as
to pay a fine of P100,000.00 and to indemnify complainants
in the amounts stated therein, EXCEPT that only
P150,781.00 instead of P151,581.00 should be paid to
complainant Fely M. Casanova, with interest at the legal
rate from the time of filing the information until fully paid.
Costs against Appellant.

Mendoza and Buena, JJ., concur.

Bellosillo, J., on official leave.

payment.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; VENUE, A
VITAL INGREDIENT OF JURISDICTION. It is settled
that venue in criminal cases is a vital ingredient of
jurisdiction. (Sec. 14, par. [a], Rule 110, of the, Revised
Rules of Sec. 15, par. [a], Rule 110 of the Court; 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure)

SYLLABUS

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE IN TRANSITORY CRIMES. If all

the acts material and essential to the crime and requisite
of its consummation occurred in one municipality or
territory, the court therein has the sole jurisdiction to try the
case. There are certain crimes in which some acts material
and essential to the crimes and requisite to their
consummation occur in one municipality or territory and
some in another, in which event, the court of either has
jurisdiction to try the cases, it being understood that the
first court taking cognizance of the case excludes the
other. These are the so-called transitory or continuing
crimes under which violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is categorized.
In other words, a person charged with a transitory crime
may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where
the offense was in part committed.

1. CRIMINAL LAW; BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 22;

BOUNCING CHECKS; ELEMENTS. Section 1, par. 1,
of B.P. Blg. 22 punishes" [a]ny person who makes or
draws and issues any cheek to apply on account or for
value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which
check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been
dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid reason. ordered the bank to stop
payment . . ." The gravamen of the offense is knowingly
issuing a worthless cheek. Thus, a fundamental element is
knowledge on the part of the drawer of the insufficiency of
his funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment
of such cheek in full upon presentment. Another essential
element is subsequent dishonor of the cheek by the
drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would
have been dishonored for the same reason had not the.
drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. In determining proper

venue in these cases, the following acts material and
essential to each crime and requisite to its consummation
must be considered: (a) the seven (7) cheeks were issued
to LINTON at its place of business in Balut, Navotas; (b)
they were delivered to LINTON at the same place; (c) they
were dishonored in Kalookan City; and (d) petitioners had
knowledge of the insufficiency of their funds in
SOLIDBANK at the time the cheeks were issued. Since
there is no dispute that the checks were dishonored in
Kaloocan City it is no longer necessary to discuss where
the checks were dishonored. Consequently, venue or
jurisdiction lies either in the Regional Trial Court of
Kaloocan City or Malabon. Moreover, we ruled in the same
Grospe and Manzanilla cases as reiterated in Lim v.
Rodrigo that venue or jurisdiction is determined by the
allegations in the Information. The Informations in the
cases under consideration allege that the offenses were
committed in the Municipality of Navotas which is
controlling and sufficient to vest jurisdiction upon the
Regional Trial Court of Malabon.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 107898. December 19, 1995.]
MANUEL LIM and ROSITA LIM, Petitioners, v. COURT
OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
Pantaleon, Mendoza & Associates, for Petitioners.
The Solicitor General for public Respondent.

5. COMMERCIAL LAW; NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS

LAW; "ISSUE," CONSTRUED. Under Sec. 191 of the
Negotiable Instruments Law the term "issue" means the
first delivery of the instrument complete in form to a person
who takes it as a holder.
6. ID.; ID.; "HOLDER," CONSTRUED. On the other
hand, the term "holder" refers to the payee or indorsee of a
bill or note who is in possession of it or the bearer thereof.
7. ID.; ID.; RECEIPT OF CHECKS BY A COLLECTOR,
NOT THE ISSUANCE AND DELIVERY CONTEMPLATED
BY LAW. Although LINTON sent a collector who
received the checks from petitioners at their place of
business in Kalookan City. they were actually issued and
delivered to LINTON at its place of business in Balut,
Navotas. The receipt of the checks by the collector of
LINTON is not the issuance and delivery to the payee in
contemplation of law. The collector was not the person
who could take the checks as a holder, i.e. as a payee or
indorsee thereof, with the intent to transfer title thereto.
Neither could the collector be deemed an agent of LINTON
with respect to the checks because he was a mere
employee.
8. CRIMINAL, LAW; BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 22; PRIMA
FACIE EVIDENCE OF KNOWLEDGE OF INSUFFICIENT
FUNDS; NOT OVERCOME BY FAILURE OF PARTY TO
PAY THE AMOUNTS DUE ON THE CHECKS. Section
2 of B.P. Blg. 22 establishes a prima facie evidence of
knowledge of insufficient funds. The prima facie evidence
has not been overcome by petitions in the cases before us
because they did not pay LINTON the amounts due on the
checks; neither did they make arrangements for payment
in full by the drawee bank within five (5) banking days after
receiving notices that the checks had not been paid by the
drawee bank. In People v. Grospe citing People v.
Manzanilla we held that." . . knowledge on the part of the
maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his
funds is by itself a continuing eventuality, whether the
accused be within one territory or another."
DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.:
MANUEL LIM and ROSITA LIM, spouses, were charged
before the Regional Trial Court of Malabon with estafa on
three (3) counts under Art. 315, par. 2 (d), of The Revised
Penal Code, docketed as Crim. Cases Nos. 1696-MN to
1698-MN. The Informations substantially alleged that
Manuel and Rosita, conspiring together, purchased goods
from Linton Commercial Company, Inc. (LINTON), and
with deceit issued seven Consolidated Bank and Trust
Company (SOLIDBANK) checks simultaneously with the
delivery as payment therefor. When presented to the
drawee bank for payment the checks were dishonored as
payment on the checks had been stopped and/or for
insufficiency of funds to cover the amounts. Despite
repeated notice and demand the Lim spouses failed and
refused to pay the checks or the value of the goods.
On the basis of the same checks, Manuel and Rosita Lim
were also charged with seven (7) counts of violation of B.P.
Big. 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law,
docketed as Crim. Cases Nos. 1699-MN to 1705-MN. In
substance, the Informations alleged that the Lims issued
the checks with knowledge that they did not have sufficient
funds or credit with the drawee bank for payment in full of
such checks upon presentment. When presented for
payment within ninety (90) days from date thereof the
checks were dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds. Despite receipt of notices of such
dishonor the Lims failed to pay the amounts of the checks
or to make arrangements for full payment within five (5)
banking days.
Manuel Lim and Rosita Lim are the president and
treasurer, respectively, of Rigi Built Industries, Inc. (RIGI).
RIGI had been transacting business with LINTON for
years, the latter supplying the former with steel plates,
steel bars, flat bars and purlin sticks which it uses in the
fabrication, installation and building of steel structures. As
officers of RIGI the Lim spouses were allowed 30, 60 and
sometimes even to 90 days credit.
On 27 May 1983 the Lims ordered 100 pieces of mild steel

plates worth P51,815.00 from LINTON which were

delivered on the same day at their place of business at
666 7th Avenue, 8th Street, Kalookan City. To pay LINTON
for the delivery the Lims issued SOLIDBANK Check No.
027700 postdated 3 September 1983 in the amount of
P51,800.00. 1

CHECK NO. DATE PRESENTED REASON FOR

DISHONOR

On 30 May 1983 the Lims ordered another 65 pieces of

mild steel plates worth P63,455.00 from LINTON which
were delivered at the place of business on the same day.
They issued as payment SOLIDBANK Check No. 027699
in the amount of P63,455.00 postdated 20 August 1983. 2

Insufficient Fund (DAIF) 9

The Lim spouses also ordered 2,600 "Z" purlins worth

P41,800 which were delivered to them on various dates, to
wit: 15 and 22 Apr 1983; 11, 14, 20, 23, 25, 28 and 30 May
1983; and, 2 and 9 June 1983. To pay for the deliveries,
they issued seven SOLIDBANK checks, five of which were

027719 9 Aug. 1993 DAIF 12

Check No. Date of issue Amount

027683 16 July 1983 P27,900.00 3
027684 23 July 1983 P27,900.00 4
027719 6 Aug. 1983 P32,550.00 5
027720 13 Aug. 1983 P27,900.00 6

027683 22 July 1983 Payment Stopped (PS) 8

027684 23 July 1983 PS and Drawn Against

027699 24 Aug. 1983 PS and DAIF 10

027700 5 Sept 1993 PS and DAIF 11

027720 16 Aug. 1983 PS and DAIF 13

027721 30 Aug. 1983 PS and DAIF 14
Manuel Lim admitted having issued the seven (7) checks
in question to pay for deliveries made by LINTON but
denied that his companys account had insufficient funds to
cover the amounts of the checks. He presented the bank
ledger showing a balance of P65,752.75. Also, he claimed
that he ordered SOLIDBANK to stop payment because the
supplies delivered by LINTON were not in accordance with
the specifications in the purchase orders.
Rosita Lim was not presented to testify because her
statements would only be corroborative.

027721 27 Aug. 1983 P37,200.00 7

William Yu Bin, Vice President and Sales Manager of
LINTON testified that when those seven (7) checks were
deposited with the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation
they were dishonored for "insufficiency of funds" with the
additional notation "payment stopped" stamped thereon.
Despite demand Manuel and Rosita refused to make good
the checks or pay the value of the deliveries.
Salvador Alfonso, signature verifier of SOLIDBANK, Grace
Park Branch, Kalookan City, where the Lim spouses
maintained an account, testified on the following
transactions with respect to the seven (7)
checks:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

On the basis of the evidence thus presented the trial court

held both accused guilty of estafa and violation of B.P. Big.
22 in its decision dated 25 January 1989. In Crim. Case
No. 169-MN they were sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal as maximum plus one (1) year for each additional
P10,000.00 with all the accessory penalties provided for by
law, and to pay the costs. They were also ordered to
indemnify LINTON in the amount of P241,800.00. Similarly
sentences were imposed in Crim. Cases Nos. 1697-MN
and 1698-MN except as to the indemnities awarded, which
were P63,455.00 and P51,800.00, respectively.
In Crim. Case No. 1699-MN the trial court sentenced both

accused to a straight penalty of one (1) year imprisonment

with all the accessory penalties provided for by law and to
pay the costs. In addition, they were ordered to indemnify
LINTON in the amount of P27,900.00. Again, similar
sentences were imposed in Crim. Cases Nos. 1700-MN to
A705-MN except for the indemnities awarded, which were
P32,550.00, P27,900.00, P27,900.00, P63,455.00,
P51,800.00 and P37,200.00 respectively. 15
On appeal, the accused assailed the decision as they
imputed error to the trial court as follows: (a) the regional
Trial Court of Malabon had no jurisdiction over the cases
because the offenses charged ere committed outside its
territory; (b) they could not be held liable for estafa
because the seven (7) checks were issued by them
several weeks after the deliveries of the goods; and, (c)
neither could they be held liable for violating B.P. Blg. 22
as they ordered payment of the checks to be stopped
because the goods delivered were not those specified by
them, besides they had sufficient funds to pay the checks.
In the decision of 18 September 1992 16 respondent Court
of Appeals acquitted accused-appellants of estafa on the
ground that indeed the checks were not made in payment
of an obligation contracted at the time of their issuance.
However it affirmed the finding of the trial court that they
were guilty of having violated B.P. Blg. 22. 17 On 6
November 1992 their motion for reconsideration was
denied. 18
In the case at bench petitioners maintain that the
prosecution failed to prove that any of the essential
elements of the crime punishable under B.P. Blg. 22 was
committed within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court
of Malabon. They claim that what was proved was that all
the elements of the offense were committed in Kalookan
City. The checks were issued at their place of business,
received by a collector of LINTON, and dishonored by the
drawee bank, all in Kalookan City. Furthermore, no
evidence whatsoever supports the proposition that they
knew that their checks were insufficiently funded. In fact,
some of the checks were funded at the time of
presentment but dishonored nonetheless upon their
instruction to the bank to stop payment. In fine,
considering that the checks were all issued, delivered, and
dishonored in Kalookan City, the trial court of Malabon

exceeded its jurisdiction when it tried the case and

rendered judgment thereon.
The petition has no merit. Section 1, par. 1, of B.P. Blg. 22
punishes" [a]ny person who makes or draws and issues
any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the
time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check
in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or
credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason
had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the
bank to stop payment. . . ." The gravamen of the offense is
knowingly issuing a worthless check 19 Thus, a
fundamental element is knowledge on the part of the
drawer of the insufficiency of his funds in 20 or credit with
the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full
upon presentment. Another essential element is
subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been
dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop
payment. 21
It is settled that venue in criminal cases is a vital ingredient
of jurisdiction. 22 Section 14, par. (a), Rule 110, of the
Revised Rules of Court, which has been carried over in
Sec. 15, par. (a), Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, specifically provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
Sec. 14. Place where action is to be instituted. (a) In all
criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and
tried in the court of the municipality or province wherein
the offense was committed or any one of the essential
ingredients thereof took place.
If all the acts material and essential to the crime and
requisite of its consummation occurred in one municipality
or territory, the court therein has the sole jurisdiction to try
the case. 23 There are certain crimes in which some acts
material and essential to the crimes and requisite to their
consummation occur in one municipality or territory and
some in another, in which event, the court of either has
jurisdiction to try the cases, it being understood that the
first court taking cognizance of the case excludes the

other. 24 These are the so-called transitory or continuing

crimes under which violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is categorized.
In other words, a person charged with a transitory crime
may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where
the offense was in part committed.25cralaw:red
In determining proper venue in these cases, the following
acts material and essential to each crime and requisite to
its consummation must be considered: (a) the seven (7)
checks were issued to LINTON at its place of business in
Balut, Navotas; (b) they were delivered to LINTON at the
same place; (c) they were dishonored in Kalookan City;
and, (d) petitioners had knowledge of the insufficiency of
their funds in SOLIDBANK at the time the checks were
issued. Since there is no dispute that the checks were
dishonored in Kaloocan City, it is no longer necessary to
discuss where the checks were dishonored.
Under Sec. 191 of the Negotiable Instruments Law the
term "issue" means the first delivery of the instrument
complete in form to a person who takes it as a holder. On
the other hand, the term "holder" refers to the payee or
indorsee of a b- or note who is in possession of it or the
bearer thereof. In People v. Yabut 26 this Court explained

. . . The place where the bills were written, signed, or dated

does not necessarily fix or determine the place where they
were executed. What is of decisive importance is the
delivery thereof. The delivery of the instrument is the final
act essential to its consummation as an obligation. An
undelivered bill or note is inoperative. Until delivery, the
contract is revocable. And the issuance as well as the
delivery of the check must be to a person who takes it as a
holder, which means (t)he payee or indorsee of a bill or
note, who is in possession of it, or the bearer thereof.
Delivery of the check signifies transfer of possession,
whether actual or constructive, from one person to another
with intent to transfer title thereto . . .
Although LINTON sent a collector who received the checks
from petitioners at their place of business in Kalookan City,
they were actually issued and delivered to LINTON at its
place of business in Balut, Navotas. The receipt of the
checks by the collector of LINTON is not the issuance and
delivery to the payee in contemplation of law. The collector

was not the person who could take the checks as a holder,
i.e., as a payee or indorsee thereof, with the intent to
transfer title thereto. Neither could the collector be deemed
an agent of LINTON with respect to the checks because
he was a mere employee. As this Court further explained
in People v. Yabut 27

checks had not been paid by the drawee bank. In People

v. Grospe 28 citing People v. Manzanilla 29 we held that." .
. knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of the
check of the insufficiency of his funds is by itself a
continuing eventuality, whether the accused be within one
territory or another."cralaw virtua1aw library

Modesto Yambaos receipt of the bad checks from Cecilia

Oue Yabut or Geminiano Yabut, Jr., in Caloocan City
cannot, contrary to the holding of the respondent Judges,
be licitly taken as delivery of the checks to the complainant
Alida P. Andan at Caloocan City to fix the venue there. He
did not take delivery of the checks as holder, i.e., as
payee or indorsee. And there appears to be no contract
of agency between Yambao and Andan so as to bind the
latter for the acts of the former. Alicia P. Andan declared in
that sworn testimony before the investigating fiscal that
Yambao is but her messenger or part-time employee.
There was no special fiduciary relationship that permeated
their dealings. For a contract of agency to exist, the
consent of both parties is essential. The principal consents
that the other party, the agent, shall act on his behalf, and
the agent consents so as to act. It must exist as a fact. The
law makes no presumption thereof. The person alleging it
has the burden of proof to show, not only the fact of its
existence, but also its nature and extent . . .

Consequently, venue or jurisdiction lies either in the

Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City or Malabon.
Moreover, we ruled in the same Grospe and Manzanilla
cases as reiterated in Lim V. Rodrigo 30 that venue or
jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the
Information. The Informations in the cases under
consideration allege that the offenses were committed in
the Municipality of Navotas which is controlling and
sufficient to vest jurisdiction upon the Regional Trial Court
of Malabon. 31

Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 establishes a prima facie

evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds as follows
The making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of
which is refused by the bank because of insufficient funds
in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety
(90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie
evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or
credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof
the amount due thereon, or makes arrangement for
payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5)
barking days after receiving notice that such check has not
been paid by the drawee.
The prima facie evidence has not been overcome by
petitioners in the cases before us because they did not pay
LINTON the amounts due on the checks; neither did they
make arrangements for payment in full by the drawee bank
within five (5) banking days after receiving notices that the

We therefore sustain likewise the conviction of petitioners

by the Regional Trial Court of Malabon for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 thus
Accused-appellants claim that they ordered payment of the
checks to be stopped because the goods delivered were
not those specified by them. They maintain that they had
sufficient funds to cover the amount of the checks. The
records of the bank, however, reveal otherwise. The two
letters (Exhs. 21 and 22) dated July 23, and August 10,
1983 which they claim they sent to Linton Commercial,
complaining against the quality of the goods delivered by
the latter, did not refer to the delivery of mild steel plates (6
mm x 4 x 8) and "Z" purlins (16 x 7 x 2-1/2 mts) for which
the checks in question were issued. Rather, the letters
referred to B.1. Lally columns (Sch. #20), which were the
subject of other purchase orders.
It is true, as accused-appellants point out, that in a case
brought by them against the complainant in the Regional
Trial Court of Kalookan City (Civil Case No. C-10921) the
complainant was held liable for actual damages because
of the delivery of goods of inferior quality (Exh. 23). But the
supplies involved in that case were those of B.1. pipes,
while the purchases made by accused-appellants, for
which they issued the checks in question, were purchases
of mild steel plates and "Z" purlins.

Indeed, the only question here is whether accusedappellants maintained funds sufficient to cover the
amounts of their checks at the time of issuance and
presentment of such checks. Section 3 of B.P. Big. 22
provides that notwithstanding receipt of an order to stop
payment, the drawee bank shall state in the notice of
dishonor that there were no sufficient funds in or credit with
such bank for the payment in full of the check, if such be
the fact.
The purpose of this provision is precisely to preclude the
maker or drawer of a worthless check from ordering the
payment of the check to be stopped as a pretext for the
lack of sufficient funds to cover the check.
In the case at bar, the notice of dishonor issued by the
drawee bank, indicates not only that payment of the check
was stopped but also that the reason for such order was
that the maker or drawer did not have sufficient funds with
which to cover the checks. . . . Moreover, the bank ledger
of accused-appellants account in Consolidated Bank
shows that at the time the checks were presented for
encashment, the balance of accused-appellants account
was inadequate to cover the amounts of the checks. 32
x

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated

18 September 1992 affirming the conviction of petitioners
Manuel Lim and Rosita Lim
In CA-.G.R. CR No. 07277 (RTC Crim. Case No. 1699MN); CA-G.R. CR No. 07278 (RTC Crim. Case No. 1700MN); CA-G.R.- CR No. 07279 (RTC Crim. Case No. 1701MN); - CR No. 07280 (RTC Crim. Case No. 1702-MN);
CA-G.R. CR No. 07281 (RTC Crim. Case No. 1703-MN);
CA-G.R. CA No. 07282 (RTC Crim. Case No. 1704-MN);
and CA-G.R. CR No. 07283 (RTC Crim Case No. 1705MN), the Court finds the Accused-Appellants.
MANUEL LIM and ROSITA LIM guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 and are
hereby sentenced to suffer a STRAIGHT PENALTY OF
ONE (1) YEAR IMPRISONMENT in each case, together
with all the accessory penalties provided by law, and to

pay the costs.

In CA-G.R. CR No. 07277 (RTC Crim. Case No. 1699MN), both accused-appellants are hereby ordered to
indemnify the offended party in the sum of P27,900.00.
In CA-G.R. CR No. 07278 (RTC Crim. Case No. 1700-MN)
both accused-appellants are hereby ordered to indemnify
the offended party in the sum of P32,550.00.
In CA-G.R. CR No. 07279 (RTC Crim. Case No. 1701-MN)
both accused-appellants are hereby ordered to indemnify
the offended party in the sum of P27,900.00.
In CA-G.R. CR No. 07280 (RTC Crim. Case No. 1702-MN)
both accused-appellants are hereby ordered to indemnify
the offended party in the sum of P27,900.00.
In CA-G.R. CR No. 07281 (RTC Crim. Case No. 1703-MN)
both accused are hereby ordered to indemnify the
offended party in the sum of P63,455.00.
In CA-G.R CR No. 07282 (RTC Crim. Case No. 17-MN)
both accused-appellants are hereby ordered to indemnify
the offended party in the sum of P51,800.O0, and
In CA-G.R. CR No. 07283 (RTC Crim. Case No. 170-MN)
both accused-appellants are hereby ordered to indemnifythe offended party in the sum of P37,200.00. 33
as well as its resolution of 6 November 1992 denying
reconsideration thereof, is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

GARCIA
and
Respondents.

JUDGE

RICARDO

TENSUAN,

DECISION
MEDIALDEA, J.:

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 69863-65 : December 10, 1990.]
192 SCRA 183
LINO BROCKA, BENJAMIN CERVANTES, COSME
GARCIA, RODOLFO SANTOS, VALENTINO SALIPSIP,
RICARDO VEGA, ERIC MARIANO, JOSE EMMANUEL
OYALES, RONNIE MATTA, ALFREDO VIAJE, RUBEN
EUGENIO, REYNALDO ORTIZ, ORLANDO ORTIZ,
NOEL REYES, EDUARDO IMPERIAL, NESTOR
SARMIENTO, FRANCO PALISOC, VIRGILIO DE
GUZMAN, ALBERTO REYES, JESSIE PINILI, ROMULO
AUGUIS, DOMINADOR RESURRECION III, RONNIE
LAYGO, ROSAURO ROQUE, CLARENCE SORIANO,
OCTAVO DEPAWA, CARLITO LA TORRE, SEVERNO
ILANO, JR., DOMINGO CAJIPE, ALAN ALEGRE,
RAMON MARTINEZ, MA. GILDA HERNANDEZ, EDNA P.
VILLANUEVA, DOLLY S. CANU, MELQUIADES C.
ATIENZA, ELIGIO P. VERA CRUZ, ROGER C. BAGAN,
ABUNDIO M. CALISTE, Petitioners, vs. JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, MAJ. GENERAL FIDEL V. RAMOS, BRIG.
GENERAL PEDRO BALBANERO, COL. ABAD, COL.
DAWIS, SERGIO APOSTOL, P/LT, RODOLFO M.

This petition was originally filed on February 13, 1985 to

secure the release of petitioners on habeas corpus and to
permanently enjoin the City Fiscal of Quezon City from
investigating charges of "Inciting to Sedition" against
petitioners Lino Brocka, Benjamin Cervantes, Cosme
Garcia and Rodolfo Santos, (hereafter Brocka, et al.). On
learning that the corresponding informations for this
offense has been filed by the City Fiscal against them on
February 11, 1985, a supplemental petition was filed on
February 19, 1985 (p. 51, Rollo) to implead the Presiding
Judge, 1 and to enjoin the prosecution of Criminal Cases
Nos. Q-38023, Q-38024 and Q-38025 (p. 349, Rollo) and
the issuance of warrants for their arrests, including their
arraignment. Since then President Ferdinand E. Marcos
had ordered the provisional release of Brocka, et al., the
issue on habeas corpus has become moot and academic
(p. 396, Rollo). We shall thus focus on the question of
whether or not the prosecution of the criminal cases for
Inciting to Sedition may lawfully be enjoined.:-cralaw
Petitioners were arrested on January 28, 1985 by
elements of the Northern Police District following the
forcible and violent dispersal of a demonstration held in
sympathy with the jeepney strike called by the Alliance of
Concerned Transport Organization (ACTO). Thereafter,
they were charged with Illegal Assembly in Criminal Cases
Nos. 37783, 37787 and 37788 with Branch 108, Regional
Trial Court, NCJR, Quezon City. 2
Except for Brocka, et al. who were charged as leaders of
the offense of Illegal Assembly and for whom no bail was
recommended, the other petitioners were released on bail
of P3,000.00 each. Brocka, et al.'s provisional release was
ordered only upon an urgent petition for bail for which daily
hearings from February 1-7, 1985 were held.
However, despite service of the order of release on

February 9, 1985, Brocka, et al. remained in detention,

respondents having invoked a Preventive Detention Action
(PDA) allegedly issued against them on January 28, 1985
(p. 6, Rollo). Neither the original, duplicate original nor
certified true copy of the PDA was ever shown to them (p.
367, Rollo).
Brocka, et al. were subsequently charged on February 11,
1985 with Inciting to Sedition, docketed as Criminal Cases
Nos. Q-38023, Q-38024 and Q-38025 (p. 349, Rollo),
without prior notice to their counsel (p. 7, Rollo). The
original informations filed recommended no bail (p. 349,
Rollo). The circumstances surrounding the hasty filing of
this second offense are cited by Brocka, et al. (quoting
from a separate petition filed on their behalf in G.R. Nos.
69848-50 entitled "Sedfrey A. Ordoez vs. Col. Julian
Arzaga, et al."), as follows:
"x x x
"6. The sham' character of the inquest examination
concocted by all respondents is starkly bizarre when we
consider that as early as 10:30 A.M. today, February 11,
1985, Benjamin Cervantes was able to contact
undersigned petitioner by phone informing counsel that
said Benjamin Cervantes and the 4 other persons who are
the subjects of this petition will be brought before the
Quezon City Fiscal at 2:30 for undisclosed reasons:
subsequently, another phone call was received by
petitioning counsel informing him that the appearance of
Benjamin Cervantes et al. was to be at 2:00 P.M. When
petitioning counsel arrived in the office of Assistant City
Fiscal Arturo Tugonon, the complainants' affidavits had not
yet been received by any of the panel of three assistant
city fiscals, although the five persons under detention were
already in the office of said assistant fiscal as early as 2:00
P.M. It was only at 3:00 when a representative of the
military arrived bringing with him alleged statements of
complainants against Lino Broka (sic) et al. for alleged
inciting to sedition, whereupon undersigned counsel asked
respondent Colonel Agapito Abad 'who ordered the
detained persons to be brought to the office of Assistant
Fiscal Arturo Tugonon since there were no charges on file;'
and said Colonel Agapito Abad said aloud: 'I only received
a telephone call from Colonel Arzaga about 11:00 A.M. to
bring the detained persons today I am only the
custodian.' At 3:15, petitioning counsel inquired from the

Records Custodian when the charges against Lino Broka

(sic) had been officially received and he was informed that
the said charges were never coursed through the Records
Office.
"7. Under the facts narrated above, respondents have
conspired to use the strong arm of the law and hatched the
nefarious scheme to deprive Lino Broka (sic) et al. the
right to bail because the utterances allegedly constituting
inciting to sedition under Article 142 of the Revised Penal
Code are, except for varying nuances, almost verbatim the
same utterances which are the subject of Criminal Cases
No. 37783, 37787 and 37788 and for which said detained
persons are entitled to be released on bail as a matter of
constitutional right. Among the utterances allegedly made
by the accused and which the respondents claimed to be
violative of Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code are:
'Makiisa sa mga drivers, "Makiisa sa aming layunin,
"Digmaang bayan ang sagot sa kahirapan,' Itigil ang
pakikialam ng imperyalismo sa Pilipinas,' 'Rollback ng
presyo ng langis sa 95 Centavos.' (See Annex B)
"8. That when petitioning counsel and other members of
the defense panel requested that they be given 7 days
within which said counsel may confer with their clients
the detained persons named above, the panel of assistant
fiscals demanded that said detained persons should sign a
'waiver' of their rights under Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code as a condition for the grant of said request,
which is a harassing requirement considering that Lino
Broka (sic) et al. were already under the detention, albeit
illegally, and they could not have waived the right under
Rule 125 which they did not enjoy at the time the ruling
was made by the panel of assistant city fiscals." (pp. 4-6,
Rollo in G.R. 69848-50).
They were released provisionally on February 14, 1985, on
orders of then President F. E. Marcos. The circumstances
of their release are narrated in Our resolution dated
January 26, 1985, as quoted in the Solicitor General's
Manifestation as follows:
"G.R. Nos. 69848-50 (Sedfrey A. Ordoez, Petitioner,
vs. Col. Julian Arzaga, et al., Respondents). Petitioner
Sedfrey A. Ordoez filed this petition for habeas corpus in
behalf of Lino Brocka, Benjamin Cervantes, Cosme
Garcia, Alexander Luzano, and Rodolfo Santos, who were
all detained under a Preventive Detention Action (PDA)

issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on January

28, 1985. They were charged in three separate
informations of the crime of illegal assembly under Art.
146, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by PD 1834. On February 7, 1985, the Honorable Miriam
Defensor Santiago, Regional Trial Judge of Quezon City,
issued a resolution in the above criminal cases, directing
the release of the five accused on bail of P6,000.00 for
each of them, and from which resolution the respondent
fiscals took no appeal. Immediately thereafter, the accused
filed their respective bail bonds. This notwithstanding, they
continued to be held in detention by order of the
respondent colonels; and on February 11, 1985, these
same accused were 'reinvestigated,' this time on charges
of 'inciting to sedition' ** under Art. 142 of the Revised
Penal Code, following which corresponding cases were
filed. The respondents complied with Our resolution
requiring them, inter alia, to make a RETURN of the writ of
habeas corpus. In their RETURN, it appeared that all the
accused had already been released, four of them on
February 15, 1985 and one February 8, 1985. The
petitioner, nevertheless, argued that the petition has not
become moot and academic because the accused
continue to be in the custody of the law under an invalid
charge of inciting to sedition." (p. 395, Rollo).
Hence, this petition.
Brocka, et al. contend that respondents' manifest bad faith
and/or harassment are sufficient bases for enjoining their
criminal prosecution, aside from the fact that the second
offense of inciting to sedition is illegal, since it is premised
on one and the same act of attending and participating in
the ACTO jeepney strike. They maintain that while there
may be a complex crime from a single act (Art. 48, RTC),
the law does not allow the splitting of a single act into two
offenses and filing two informations therefor, further, that
they will be placed in double jeopardy.
The primary issue here is the legality of enjoining the
criminal prosecution of a case, since the two other issues
raised by Brocka, et al. are matters of defense against the
sedition charge.
We rule in favor of Brocka, et al. and enjoin their criminal
prosecution for the second offense of inciting to sedition.
Indeed, the general rule is that criminal prosecution may

not be restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary or

final. There are however exceptions, among which are:
"a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights
of the accused (Hernandez vs. Albano, et al., L-19272,
January 25, 1967, 19 SCRA 95);
"b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice
or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions (Dimayuga,
et al. vs. Fernandez, 43 Phil. 304; Hernandez vs. Albano,
supra; Fortun vs. Labang, et al., L-38383, May 27, 1981,
104 SCRA 607);
"c. When there is a pre-judicial question which is sub
judice (De Leon vs. Mabanag, 70 Phil. 202);
"d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of
authority (Planas vs. Gil, 67 Phil. 62);
"e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law,
ordinance or regulation (Young vs. Rafferty, 33 Phil. 556;
Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 389);
"f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent (Sangalang
vs. People and Avendia, 109 Phil. 1140);
"g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense
(Lopez vs. City Judge, L-25795, October 29, 1966, 18
SCRA 616);
"h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than
prosecution (Rustia vs. Ocampo, CA-G.R. No. 4760,
March 25, 1960);
"i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated
by the lust for vengeance (Recto vs. Castelo, 18 L.J.
[1953], cited in Raoa vs. Alvendia, CA-G.R. No. 30720R, October 8, 1962; Cf, Guingona, et al vs. City Fiscal, L60033, April 4, 1984, 128 SCRA 577); and
"j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the
accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been
denied (Salonga vs. Pao, et al., L-59524, February 18,
1985, 134 SCRA 438).
"7. Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme
Court to prevent the threatened unlawful arrest of
petitioners (Rodriguez vs. Castelo, L-6374, August 1,
1958)." (cited in Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, p.
188, 1988 Ed.)
In the petition before Us, Brocka, et al. have cited the

circumstances to show that the criminal proceedings had

become a case of persecution, having been undertaken by
state officials in bad faith.: nad
Respondents, on the other hand, had invoked a PDA in
refusing Brocka, et al.'s release from detention (before
their release on orders of then Pres. Marcos). This PDA
was, however, issued on January 28, 1985, but was
invoked only on February 9, 1985 (upon receipt of the trial
court's order of release). Under the guidelines issued,
PDAs shall be invoked within 24 hours (in Metro Manila) or
48 hours (outside Metro Manila). (Ilagan v. Enrile, G.R. No.
70748, October 28, 1985, 139 SCRA 349). Noteworthy
also is Brocka, et al.'s claim that, despite subpoenas for its
production, the prosecution merely presented a purported
xerox copy of the invoked PDA (par. 4, Counter-Rejoinder,
p. 367, Rollo).
The foregoing circumstances were not disputed by the
Solicitor General's office. In fact they found petitioner's
plight "deplorable" (par. 51, Manifestation, p. 396, Rollo).
The hasty filing of the second offense, premised on a
spurious and inoperational PDA, certainly betrays
respondent's bad faith and malicious intent to pursue
criminal charges against Brocka, et al.
We have expressed Our view in the Ilagan case that
"individuals against whom PDAs have been issued should
be furnished with the original, and the duplicate original,
and a certified true copy issued by the official having
official custody of the PDA, at the time of the
apprehension" (supra, p. 369).
We do not begrudge the zeal that may characterize a
public official's prosecution of criminal offenders. We,
however, believe that this should not be a license to run
roughshod over a citizen's basic constitutional lights, such
as due process, or manipulate the law to suit dictatorial
tendencies.
We are impelled to point out a citizen's helplessness
against the awesome powers of a dictatorship. Thus, while
We agree with the Solicitor General's observation and/or
manifestation that Brocka, et al. should have filed a motion
to quash the information, We, however, believe that such a
course of action would have been a futile move,
considering the circumstances then prevailing. Thus, the
tenacious invocation of a spurious and inoperational PDA

and the sham and hasty preliminary investigation were

clear signals that the prosecutors intended to keep Brocka,
et al. in detention until the second offense of "Inciting to
Sedition" could be facilitated and justified without need of
issuing a warrant of arrest anew. As a matter of fact the
corresponding informations for this second offense were
hastily filed on February 11, 1985, or two days after
Brocka, et al.'s release from detention was ordered by the
trial judge on February 9, 1985.
Constitutional rights must be upheld at all costs, for this
gesture is the true sign of democracy. These may not be
set aside to satisfy perceived illusory visions of national
grandeur.: nad
In the case of J. Salonga v. Cruz Pao, We point out:
"Infinitely more important than conventional adherence to
general rules of criminal procedure is respect for the
citizen's right to be free not only from arbitrary arrest and
punishment but also from unwarranted and vexatious
prosecution . . ." (G.R. No. L-59524, February 18, 1985,
134 SCRA 438-at p. 448).
We, therefore, rule that where there is manifest bad faith
that accompanies the filing of criminal charges, as in the
instant case where Brocka, et al. were barred from
enjoying provisional release until such time that charges
were filed, and where a sham preliminary investigation
was hastily conducted, charges that are filed as a result
should lawfully be enjoined.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The
trial court is PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from proceeding
in any manner with the cases subject of the petition. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr.,
Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento,
Grio-Aquino and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.

JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALBERTO P. DALMACIO, and

ROMEO B. OCON, Petitioners, v.VIRGILIO M.
TULIAO, Respondent.

apprehension of private respondents Jose "Pempe"

Miranda, SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon
and accused Rodel T. Maderal in said Criminal Cases Nos.
36-3523 and 36-3524.2

DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, assailing the 18 December 2002
Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
67770 and its 12 June 2003 Resolution denying petitioners'
Motion for Reconsideration. The dispositive portion of the
assailed decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding public respondent Judge Anastacio
D. Anghad to have acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
assailed Orders, the instant petition
for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition is hereby
GRANTED and GIVEN DUE COURSE, and it is hereby
ordered:
1. The assailed Joint Order dated August 17, 2001, Order
dated September 21, 2001, Joint Order dated October 16,
2001 and Joint Order dated November 14, 2001 dismissing
the two (2) Informations for Murder, all issued by public
respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad in Criminal Cases
Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524 are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and
another entered UPHOLDING, AFFIRMING[,] and
REINSTATING the Order dated June 25, 2001 and Joint
Order dated July 6, 2001 issued by the then acting
Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan;

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 158763 : March 31, 2006]

2. Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524 are hereby

ordered REINSTATED in the docket of active criminal
cases of Branch 36 of the Regional Trial Court of Santiago
City, Isabela; andcralawlibrary
3. Public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is
DIRECTED to ISSUE forthwith Warrants of Arrest for the

The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as

follows:
On 8 March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in
Purok Nibulan, Ramon, Isabela, which were later identified
as the dead bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao,
son of private respondent Virgilio Tuliao who is now under
the witness protection program.
Two informations for murder were filed against SPO1
Wilfredo Leao, SPO1 Ferdinand Marzan, SPO1 Ruben B.
Agustin, SPO2 Alexander Micu, SPO2 Rodel Maderal, and
SPO4 Emilio Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Santiago City.
The venue was later transferred to Manila. On 22 April
1999, the RTC of Manila convicted all of the accused and
sentenced them to two counts of reclusion perpetua except
SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be arraigned at that time,
being at large. The case was appealed to this Court on
automatic review where we, on 9 October 2001, acquitted
the accused therein on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was
arrested. On 27 April 2001, he executed a sworn
confession and identified petitioners Jose C. Miranda, PO3
Romeo B. Ocon, and SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, a certain
Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe, as the persons
responsible for the deaths of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer
Tuliao.
Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder
against petitioners, Boyet dela Cruz, and Amado Doe, and
submitted the sworn confession of SPO2 Maderal. On 25
June 2001, Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan
issued warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2
Maderal.

On 29 June 2001, petitioners filed an urgent motion to

complete preliminary investigation, to reinvestigate, and to
recall and/or quash the warrants of arrest.

dated 15 November 2001, and issued the temporary

restraining order while referring the petition to the Court of
Appeals for adjudication on the merits.

In the hearing of the urgent motion on 6 July 2001, Judge

Tumaliuan noted the absence of petitioners and issued a
Joint Order denying said urgent motion on the ground that,
since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their
persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by the court.
In the meantime, petitioners appealed the resolution of
State Prosecutor Leo T. Reyes to the Department of
Justice.

Respondent Tuliao filed with this Court a Motion to Cite

Public Respondent in Contempt, alleging that Judge
Anghad "deliberately and willfully committed contempt of
court when he issued on 15 November 2001 the Order
dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the informations for
murder." On 21 November 2001, we referred said motion to
the Court of Appeals in view of the previous referral to it of
respondent's petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus .

On 17 August 2001, the new Presiding Judge Anastacio D.

Anghad took over the case and issued a Joint Order
reversing the Joint Order of Judge Tumaliuan.
Consequently, he ordered the cancellation of the warrant of
arrest issued against petitioner Miranda. He likewise
applied this Order to petitioners Ocon and Dalmacio in an
Order dated 21 September 2001. State Prosecutor Leo S.
Reyes and respondent Tuliao moved for the
reconsideration of the said Joint Order and prayed for the
inhibition of Judge Anghad, but the motion for
reconsideration was denied in a Joint Order dated 16
October 2001 and the prayer for inhibition was denied in a
Joint Order dated 22 October 2001.
On 25 October 2001, respondent Tuliao filed a petition
for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with this Court,
with prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order, seeking to
enjoin Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the case,
and seeking to nullify the Orders and Joint Orders of Judge
Anghad dated 17 August 2001, 21 September 2001, 16
October 2001, and 22 October 2001.
On 12 November 2001, this Court issued a Resolution
resolving to grant the prayer for a temporary restraining
order against Judge Anghad from further proceeding with
the criminal cases. Shortly after the aforesaid resolution,
Judge Anghad issued a Joint Order dated 14 November
2001 dismissing the two Informations for murder against
petitioners. On 19 November 2001, this Court took note of
respondent's cash bond evidenced by O.R. No. 15924532

On 18 December 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered the

assailed decision granting the petition and ordering the
reinstatement of the criminal cases in the RTC of Santiago
City, as well as the issuance of warrants of arrest against
petitioners and SPO2 Maderal. Petitioners moved for a
reconsideration of this Decision, but the same was denied
in a Resolution dated 12 June 2003.

With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals

gravely erred in directing the reinstatement of Criminal
Cases No. 36-3523 and 36-3524 in the docket of Active
Criminal Cases of Branch 36 of the Regional Trial Court of
Santiago City, Philippines, and in ordering the public
respondent to re-issue the warrants of arrest against herein
petitioners.
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
Wit all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals
committed a reversible error in ordering the reinstatement
of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 in the
docket of active criminal cases of Branch 36 of the regional
trial court of Santiago City, Philippines, and in ordering the
public respondent to issue warrants of arrest against herein
petitioners, the order of dismissal issued therein having
become final and executory.
Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest
requires neither jurisdiction over the person of the accused,
nor custody of law over the body of the accused.

Hence, this petition.

The facts of the case being undisputed, petitioners bring
forth to this Court the following assignments of error:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals
gravely erred in reversing and setting aside the Joint Order
of Judge Anastacio D. Anghad dated August 17, 2001,
September 21, 2001, October 16, 2001 and November 14,
2001 issued in criminal cases numbered 36-3523 and 363524; and, erred in upholding, affirming and reinstating the
Order dated July 6, 2001 issued by then Acting Presiding
Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan, on the alleged rule that an
accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not
submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

The first assignment of error brought forth by the petitioner

deals with the Court of Appeals' ruling that:
[A]n accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not
submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court.
Jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be
acquired either through compulsory process, such as
warrant of arrest, or through his voluntary appearance,
such as when he surrenders to the police or to the court. It
is only when the court has already acquired jurisdiction
over his person that an accused may invoke the processes
of the court (Pete M. Pico v. Alfonso V. Combing, Jr., A.M.
No. RTJ-91-764, November 6, 1992). Thus, an accused
must first be placed in the custody of the law before the
court may validly act on his petition for judicial reliefs. 3
Proceeding from this premise, the Court of Appeals ruled
that petitioners Miranda, Ocon and Dalmacio cannot seek
any judicial relief since they were not yet arrested or
otherwise deprived of their liberty at the time they filed their

"Urgent Motion to complete preliminary investigation; to

reinvestigate; to recall and/or quash warrants of arrest." 4
Petitioners counter the finding of the Court of Appeals by
arguing that jurisdiction over the person of the accused is
required only in applications for bail. Furthermore,
petitioners argue, assuming that such jurisdiction over their
person is required before the court can act on their motion
to quash the warrant for their arrest, such jurisdiction over
their person was already acquired by the court by their filing
of the above Urgent Motion.
In arguing that jurisdiction over the person is required only
in the adjudication of applications for bail, petitioners quote
Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar Herrera:
Except in applications for bail, it is not necessary for the
court to first acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
accused to dismiss the case or grant other relief. The
outright dismissal of the case even before the court
acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused is
authorized under Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure (Sec. 12a). In Allado v. Diokno (232
SCRA 192), the case was dismissed on motion of the
accused for lack of probable cause without the accused
having been arrested. In Paul Roberts v. Court of Appeals
(254 SCRA 307), the Court was ordered to hold the
issuance of a warrant of arrest in abeyance pending review
by the Secretary of Justice. And in Lacson v. Executive
Secretary (301 SCRA 1025 ), the Court ordered the case
transferred from the Sandiganbayan to the RTC which
eventually ordered the dismissal of the case for lack of
probable cause.6
In arguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction over their
person was already acquired by their filing of the above
Urgent Motion, petitioners invoke our pronouncement,
through Justice Florenz D. Regalado, in Santiago v.
Vasquez7 :
The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the
court acquires jurisdiction over his person, is accomplished

either by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a

motion to quash or other pleadings requiring the exercise of
the court's jurisdiction thereover, appearing for arraignment,
entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since
the same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the
accused, as a rule the same cannot be posted before
custody of the accused has been acquired by the judicial
authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender.
Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction
between custody of the law and jurisdiction over the
person. Custody of the law is required before the court can
act upon the application for bail, but is not required for the
adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant where
the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the
defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
accused.8 Custody of the law is accomplished either by
arrest or voluntary surrender,9 while jurisdiction over the
person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or
voluntary appearance.10 One can be under the custody of
the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court
over his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue
of a warrant files a motion before arraignment to quash the
warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to the
jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in
the custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes
custody after his trial has commenced.11 Being in the
custody of the law signifies restraint on the person, who is
thereby deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him to
become obedient to the will of the law.12 Custody of the law
is literally custody over the body of the accused. It includes,
but is not limited to, detention.
The statement in Pico v. Judge Combong, Jr., 13 cited by
the Court of Appeals should not have been separated from
the issue in that case, which is the application for
admission to bail of someone not yet in the custody of the
law. The entire paragraph of our pronouncement in Pico
reads:
A person applying for admission to bail must be in the
custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty. A
person who has not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of

the court has no right to invoke the processes of that court.

Respondent Judge should have diligently ascertained the
whereabouts of the applicant and that he indeed had
jurisdiction over the body of the accused before considering
the application for bail.13
While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico
insofar as it concerns bail, we clarify that, as a general rule,
one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court.15 As we held in the
aforecited case of Santiago, seeking an affirmative relief in
court, whether in civil or criminal proceedings, constitutes
voluntary appearance.
Pico deals with an application for bail, where there is the
special requirement of the applicant being in the custody of
the law. In Feliciano v. Pasicolan, 16 we held that "[t]he
purpose of bail is to secure one's release and it would be
incongruous to grant bail to one who is free. Thus, 'bail is
the security required and given for the release of a person
who is in the custody of law.' " The rationale behind this
special rule on bail is that it discourages and prevents
resort to the former pernicious practice wherein the
accused could just send another in his stead to post his
bail, without recognizing the jurisdiction of the court by his
personal appearance therein and compliance with the
requirements therefor.17
There is, however, an exception to the rule that filing
pleadings seeking affirmative relief constitutes voluntary
appearance, and the consequent submission of one's
person to the jurisdiction of the court. This is in the case of
pleadings whose prayer is precisely for the avoidance of
the jurisdiction of the court, which only leads to a special
appearance. These pleadings are: (1) in civil cases,
motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant, whether or not other grounds
for dismissal are included; 18 (2) in criminal cases, motions
to quash a complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the accused; and (3) motions to quash a
warrant of arrest. The first two are consequences of the fact
that failure to file them would constitute a waiver of the
defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person. The third is a

consequence of the fact that it is the very legality of the

court process forcing the submission of the person of the
accused that is the very issue in a motion to quash a
warrant of arrest.
To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal
cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is
deemed waived by the accused when he files any pleading
seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he
invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning
such jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in narrow
cases involving special appearances, an accused can
invoke the processes of the court even though there is
neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law.
However, if a person invoking the special jurisdiction of the
court applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the
custody of the law.
In cases not involving the so-called special appearance, the
general rule applies, i.e., the accused is deemed to have
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court upon
seeking affirmative relief. Notwithstanding this, there is no
requirement for him to be in the custody of the law. The
following cases best illustrate this point, where we granted
various reliefs to accused who were not in the custody of
the law, but were deemed to have placed their persons
under the jurisdiction of the court. Note that none of these
cases involve the application for bail, nor a motion to quash
an information due to lack of jurisdiction over the person,
nor a motion to quash a warrant of arrest:
1. In Allado v. Diokno, 19 on the prayer of the accused in a
petition for certiorari on the ground of lack of probable
cause, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
PACC from enforcing the warrant of arrest and the
respondent judge therein from further proceeding with the
case and, instead, to elevate the records to us.
2. In Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,20 upon the accused's
Motion to Suspend Proceedings and to Hold in Abeyance
Issuance of Warrants of Arrest on the ground that they filed
a Petition for Review with the Department of Justice, we
directed respondent judge therein to cease and desist from

further proceeding with the criminal case and to defer the

issuance of warrants of arrests against the accused.
3. In Lacson v. Executive Secretary,21 on the prayer of the
accused in a petition forcertiorari on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the Sandiganbayan, we directed
the Sandiganbayan to transfer the criminal cases to the
Regional Trial Court even before the issuance of the
warrants of arrest.
We hold that the circumstances forcing us to require
custody of the law in applications for bail are not present in
motions to quash the warrant of arrest. If we allow the
granting of bail to persons not in the custody of the law, it is
foreseeable that many persons who can afford the bail will
remain at large, and could elude being held to answer for
the commission of the offense if ever he is proven guilty.
On the other hand, if we allow the quashal of warrants of
arrest to persons not in the custody of the law, it would be
very rare that a person not genuinely entitled to liberty
would remain scot-free. This is because it is the same
judge who issued the warrant of arrest who will decide
whether or not he followed the Constitution in his
determination of probable cause, and he can easily deny
the motion to quash if he really did find probable cause
after personally examining the records of the case.
Moreover, pursuant to the presumption of regularity of
official functions, the warrant continues in force and effect
until it is quashed and therefore can still be enforced on any
day and at any time of the day and night.22 Furthermore,
the continued absence of the accused can be taken against
him in the determination of probable cause, since flight is
indicative of guilt.
In fine, as much as it is incongruous to grant bail to one
who is free, it is likewise incongruous to require one to
surrender his freedom before asserting it. Human rights
enjoy a higher preference in the hierarchy of rights than
property rights,23 demanding that due process in the
deprivation of liberty must come before its taking and not
after.

Quashing a warrant of arrest based on a subsequently filed

Petition for Review with the Secretary of Justice and based
on doubts engendered by the political climate constitutes
grave abuse of discretion.
We nevertheless find grave abuse of discretion in the
assailed actions of Judge Anghad. Judge Anghad seemed
a little too eager of dismissing the criminal cases against
the petitioners. First, he quashed the standing warrant of
arrest issued by his predecessor because of a
subsequently filed appeal to the Secretary of Justice, and
because of his doubts on the existence of probable cause
due to the political climate in the city. Second, after the
Secretary of Justice affirmed the prosecutor's resolution, he
dismissed the criminal cases on the basis of a decision of
this Court in another case with different accused, doing so
two days after this Court resolved to issue a temporary
restraining order against further proceeding with the case.
After Judge Tumaliuan issued warrants for the arrest of
petitioners, petitioner Miranda appealed the assistant
prosecutor's resolution before the Secretary of Justice.
Judge Anghad, shortly after assuming office, quashed the
warrant of arrest on the basis of said appeal. According to
Judge Anghad, "x x x prudence dictates (that) and because
of comity, a deferment of the proceedings is but proper." 24
Quashal on this basis is grave abuse of discretion. It is
inconceivable to charge Judge Tumaliuan as lacking in
prudence and oblivious to comity when he issued the
warrants of arrest against petitioners just because the
petitioners might, in the future, appeal the assistant
prosecutor's resolution to the Secretary of Justice. But even
if the Petition for Review was filed before the issuance of
the warrants of arrest, the fact remains that the pendency
of a petition for the review of the prosecutor's resolution is
not a ground to quash the warrants of arrest.
In Webb v. de Leon,25 we held that the petitioners therein
cannot assail as premature the filing of the information in
court against them on the ground that they still have the
right to appeal the adverse resolution of the DOJ Panel to
the Secretary of Justice. Similarly, the issuance of warrants

of arrest against petitioners herein should not have been

quashed as premature on the same ground.
The other ground invoked by Judge Anghad for the quashal
of the warrant of arrest is in order if true: violation of the
Constitution. Hence, Judge Anghad asked and resolved the
question:
In these double murder cases, did this Court comply or
adhere to the above-quoted constitutional proscription,
which is Sec. 2, Article III Bill of Rights; to Sec. 6(a), Rule
112, Rules of Criminal Procedure and to the above-cited
decisional cases? To this query or issue, after a deep
perusal of the arguments raised, this Court, through [its]
regular Presiding Judge, finds merit in the contention of
herein accused-movant, Jose "Pempe" Miranda.26
Judge Anghad is referring to the following provision of the
Constitution as having been violated by Judge Tumaliuan:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.27
However, after a careful scrutiny of the records of the case,
including the supporting evidence to the resolution of the
prosecutor in his determination of probable cause, we find
that Judge Anghad gravely abused his discretion.
According to petitioners:
In this case, the nullity of the order of Judge Tumaliuan, for
the arrest of the petitioners is apparent from the face of the
order itself, which clearly stated that the determination of
probable cause was based on the certification, under oath,
of the fiscal and not on a separate determination personally

made by the Judge. No presumption of regularity could be

drawn from the order since it expressly and clearly showed
that it was based only on the fiscal's certification. 28
Petitioners' claim is untrue. Judge Tumaliuan's Joint Order
contains no such indication that he relied solely on the
prosecutor's certification. The Joint Order even indicated
the contrary:
Upon receipt of the information and resolution of the
prosecutor, the Court proceeded to determine the existence
of a probable cause by personally evaluating the records x
x x.[29]
The records of the case show that the prosecutor's
certification was accompanied by supporting documents,
following the requirement under Lim, Sr. v. Felix30 and
People v. Inting.31 The supporting documents are the
following:
1. Resolution dated 21 June 2001 of State Prosecutor Leo
S. Reyes;
2. Affidavit dated 22 May 2001 of Modesto Gutierrez;
3. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Romeo B. Ocon;
4. Joint Counter Affidavit dated 23 May 2001 of Mayor Jose
C. Miranda and Reynaldo de la Cruz;
5. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Alberto Dalmacio;
6. Decision dated 22 April 1999 of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 41 in Criminal Case No. 97-160355;
7. Sworn statement dated 27 April 2001 of Rodel Maderal;
8. Information dated 22 June 2001;
9. Affidavit-complaint of Virgilio Tuliao; andcralawlibrary

10. Medico-legal Reports of the cadavers of Elezer Tuliao

and Vicente Buazon.
Hence, procedurally, we can conclude that there was no
violation on the part of Judge Tumaliuan of Article III,
Section 2, of the Constitution. Judge Anghad, however,
focused on the substantive part of said section, i.e., the
existence of probable cause. In failing to find probable
cause, Judge Anghad ruled that the confession of SPO2
Maderal is incredible for the following reasons: (1) it was
given after almost two years in the custody of the National
Bureau of Investigation; (2) it was given by someone who
rendered himself untrustworthy for being a fugitive for five
years; (3) it was given in exchange for an obvious reward of
discharge from the information; and (4) it was given during
the election period amidst a "politically charged scenario
where "Santiago City voters were pitted against each other
along the lines of the Miranda camp on one side and former
City Mayor Amelita S. Navarro, and allegedly that of DENR
Secretary Heherson Alvarez on the other."32
We painstakingly went through the records of the case and
found no reason to disturb the findings of probable cause of
Judge Tumaliuan.
It is important to note that an exhaustive debate on the
credibility of a witness is not within the province of the
determination of probable cause. As we held in Webb33 :
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence
showing that more likely than not a crime has been
committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable
cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence
of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond
reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence
establishing absolute certainty of guilt. As well put in
Brinegar v. United States, while probable cause demands
more than "bare suspicion," it requires "less than evidence
which would justify x x x conviction." A finding of probable
cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not
a pronouncement of guilt.

x x x Probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and

should be determined in a summary manner. Preliminary
investigation is not a part of trial x x x.
Dismissing a criminal case on the basis of a decision of this
Court in another case with different accused constitutes
grave abuse of discretion.
Judge Anghad had quashed the warrant of arrest on the
ground, among other things, that there was a Petition for
Review of the assistant prosecutor's resolution before the
Secretary of Justice. However, after the Secretary of
Justice affirmed the prosecutor's resolution, Judge Anghad
summarily dismissed the two criminal cases against the
petitioners on the basis of the following explanation:
Rodel Maderal was one of the accused in People v.
Wilfredo Leano, et al., RTC, Branch 41, Manila, and based
from his sworn statements, he pinpointed to Mr. Miranda the mastermind and with him and the other police officers
as the direct perpetrators, the October 9, 2001 Decision of
the Supreme Court absolving the five cops of murder,
certainly makes his sworn Statements a "narration of
falsehood and lies" and that because of the decision
acquitting said officers "who were likewise falsely linked by
said Rodel Maderal in his April 27, 2001 statements, it is
now beyond doubt that Rodel Maderal made untruthful,
fabricated and perjured statements and therefore the same
is without probable value." This Court agrees with the
defense's views. Indeed, of what use is Maderal's
statements when the Supreme Court rejected the
prosecution's evidence presented and adduced in Criminal
Case No. 97-160355. Rodel Maderal is supposed to turn
state witness in these two (2) cases but with the Supreme
Court decision adverted to, the probative value of his
statements is practically nil.
xxx
This Court finds merit to the manifestation of the accused
Miranda dated October 18, 2001, praying for the summary
dismissal of the two (2) murder charges in view of the latest
decision of the Supreme Court in People of the Philippines

v. Wilfredo Leao, et al., G.R. No. 13886, acquitting the

accused therein and in effect disregarding all the evidence
presented by the prosecution in that case. Accordingly, the
two (2) informations [for] murder filed against Jose Miranda
are ordered dismissed.34
This is a clear case of abuse of discretion. Judge Anghad
had no right to twist our decision and interpret it to the
discredit of SPO2 Maderal, who was still at large when the
evidence of the prosecution in the Leao case was
presented. A decision, even of this Court, acquitting the
accused therein of a crime cannot be the basis of the
dismissal of criminal case against different accused for the
same crime. The blunder of Judge Anghad is even more
pronounced by the fact that our decision in Leao was
based on reasonable doubt. We never ruled in Leao that
the crime did not happen; we just found that there was
reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused therein,
since the prosecution in that case relied on circumstantial
evidence, which interestingly is not even the situation in the
criminal cases of the petitioners in the case at bar as there
is here an eyewitness: Rodel Maderal. The accused in
Leao furthermore had no motive to kill respondent Tuliao's
son, whereas petitioners herein had been implicated in the
testimony of respondent Tuliao before the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee.
It is preposterous to conclude that because of our finding of
reasonable doubt in Leao, "it is now beyond doubt that
Rodel Maderal made untruthful, fabricated and perjured
statements and therefore the same is without probable
value."35 On the contrary, if we are to permit the use of our
decision in Leao, an acquittal on the ground of reasonable
doubt actually points to the probability of the prosecution's
version of the facts therein. Such probability of guilt
certainly meets the criteria of probable cause.
We cannot let unnoticed, too, Judge Anghad's dismissal of
the informations two days after we resolved to issue, upon
the filing of a bond, a temporary restraining order
prohibiting him from further proceeding with the case. The
bond was filed the day after the informations were
dismissed. While the dismissal of the case was able to beat

the effectivity date of the temporary restraining order, such

abrupt dismissal of the informations (days after this Court's
resolve to issue a TRO against Judge Anghad) creates wild
suspicions about the motives of Judge Anghad.
Nullification of a proceeding necessarily carries with it the
reinstatement of the orders set aside by the nullified
proceeding.
In their second assignment of error, petitioners claim that
the Court of Appeals did not recall or reinstate the warrants
of arrest issued by Judge Tumaliuan, but instead directed
Judge Anghad to issue apparently new warrants of
arrest.36 According to the petitioners, it was an error for the
Court of Appeals to have done so, without a personal
determination of probable cause.
We disagree. Whether the Court of Appeals ordered the
issuance of new warrants of arrest or merely ordered the
reinstatement of the warrants of arrest issued by Judge
Tumaliuan is merely a matter of scrupulous semantics, the
slight inaccuracy whereof should not be allowed to affect
the dispositions on the merits, especially in this case where
the other dispositions of the Court of Appeals point to the
other direction. Firstly, the Court of Appeals had reinstated
the 25 June 2001 Order of Judge Tumaliuan,37 which
issued the warrants of arrest. Secondly, the Court of
Appeals likewise declared the proceedings conducted by
Judge Anghad void. Certainly, the declaration of nullity of
proceedings should be deemed to carry with it the
reinstatement of the orders set aside by the nullified
proceedings. Judge Anghad's order quashing the warrants
of arrest had been nullified; therefore those warrants of
arrest are henceforth deemed unquashed.
Even if, however, the Court of Appeals had directed the
issuance of new warrants of arrest based on a
determination of probable cause, it would have been legally
permissible for them to do so. The records of the
preliminary investigation had been available to the Court of
Appeals, and are also available to this Court, allowing both
the Court of Appeals and this Court to personally examine
the records of the case and not merely rely on the

certification of the prosecutor. As we have ruled in Allado v.

Diokno and Roberts v. Court of Appeals, the determination
of probable cause does not rest on a subjective criteria. As
we had resolved in those cases to overrule the finding of
probable cause of the judges therein on the ground of
grave abuse of discretion, in the same vein, we can also
overrule the decision of a judge reversing a finding of
probable cause, also on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion.
There is no double jeopardy in the reinstatement of a
criminal case dismissed before arraignment
In their third assignment of error, petitioners claim that the
Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in ordering
the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No.
36-3524, alleging that the order of dismissal issued therein
had become final and executory. According to petitioners:
It is also worthy to point out at this juncture that the Joint
Order of Judge Anghad dated November 14, 2001 is NOT
ONE of those Orders which were assailed in the private
respondent Tuliao's Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and
Prohibition filed by the private respondent before the Court
of Appeals. As carefully enumerated in the first page of the
assailed Decision, only the following Orders issued by
Judge Anghad were questioned by private respondent, to
wit:
1.) Joint Order dated August 17, 2001;
2.) Order dated September 21, 2001;
3.) Joint Order dated October 16, 2001; andcralawlibrary
4.) Joint Order dated October 22, 2001.

Obviously, the Joint Order dated November 14, 2001 of

Judge Anghad, which ultimately dismissed Criminal Cases
Nos. 36-3523 AND 36-3524 is NOT included in the list of
the assailed Order/Joint Orders. Hence, the Court of
Appeals should not have passed upon the validity or nullity
of the Joint Order of November 14, 2001.38
Petitioners must have forgotten that respondent Tuliao's
Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus was filed
not with the Court of Appeals, but with this Court. The Court
of Appeals decided the case because we referred the same
to them in our 19 November 2001 Resolution. Such petition
was filed on 25 October 2001, around three weeks before
the 14 November 2001 Order. Upon receipt of the 14
November 2001 Order, however, respondent Tuliao lost no
time in filing with this Court a Motion to Cite Public
Respondent in Contempt, alleging that Judge Anghad
"deliberately and willfully committed contempt of court
when he issued on 15 November 2001 the Order dated 14
November 2001 dismissing the informations for murder."
On 21 November 2001, we referred said motion to the
Court of Appeals, in view of the previous referral of
respondent Tuliao's petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus .
Our referral to the Court of Appeals of the Motion to Cite
Public Repondent in Contempt places the 14 November
2001 Order within the issues of the case decided by the
Court of Appeals. In claiming that Judge Anghad committed
contempt of this Court in issuing the 14 November 2001
Order, respondent Tuliao had ascribed to Judge Anghad an
act much more serious than grave abuse of discretion.
Respondent Tuliao claims that Judge Anghad issued the 14
November 2001 Order on 15 November 2001, antedating it
so as to avoid the effects of our 12 November 2001
Resolution. In said 12 November 2001 Resolution, we
resolved to issue a temporary restraining order enjoining
Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the criminal
cases upon the respondent Tuliao's filing of a bond in the
amount of P20,000.00. Respondent Tuliao had filed the
bond on 15 November 2005.

While we cannot immediately pronounce Judge Anghad in

contempt, seeing as disobedience to lawful orders of a
court and abuse of court processes are cases of indirect
contempt which require the granting of opportunity to be
heard on the part of respondent,39 the prayer to cite public
respondent in contempt and for other reliefs just and
equitable under the premises should be construed to
include a prayer for the nullification of said 14 November
2001 Order.
In any case, the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed
before arraignment does not constitute double jeopardy.
Double jeopardy cannot be invoked where the accused has
not been arraigned and it was upon his express motion that
the case was dismissed.40
As to respondent Tuliao's prayer (in both the original
petition for certiorari as well as in his motion to cite for
contempt) to disqualify Judge Anghad from further
proceeding with the case, we hold that the number of
instances of abuse of discretion in this case are enough to
convince us of an apparent bias on the part of Judge
Anghad. We further resolve to follow the case of People v.
SPO1 Leao,41 by transferring the venue of Criminal Cases
No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 to the City of Manila,
pursuant to Article VIII, Section 4, of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
18 December 2002 and the Resolution dated 12 June 2003
of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED, with the
modification that Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 363524 be transferred to and raffled in the Regional Trial
Court of the City of Manila. In this connection,
1) Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Executive
Judge of the RTC of the City of Santiago, Isabela, who is
directed to effect the transfer of the cases within ten (10)
days after receipt hereof;
2) The Executive Judge of the RTC of the City of Santiago,
Isabela, is likewise directed to report to this Court
compliance hereto within ten (10) days from transfer of
these cases;

3) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila shall proceed

to raffle the criminal cases within ten (10) days from the
transfer;
4) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila is likewise
directed to report to this Court compliance with the order to
raffle within ten (10) days from said compliance;
andcralawlibrary
5) The RTC Judge to whom the criminal cases are raffled is
directed to act on said cases with reasonable dispatch.
6) Finally, Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is directed to issue
forthwith warrants of arrest for the apprehension of
petitioners Jose C. Miranda, Alberto P. Dalmacio, Romeo B.
Ocon, and accused Rodel T. Maderal, conformably with the
decision of the Court of Appeals dated 18 December 2002.
The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court
dated 4 August 2003 is hereby LIFTED. Costs against
Petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 196209 : June 08, 2011]
CARINA L. DACER, SABINA DACER-REYES, EMILY
DACER-HUNGERFORD, AND AMPARO DACERHENSON V. PANFILO M. LACSON
Sirs/Mesdames:
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a
Resolution dated 08 June 2011, which reads as follows:
G.R. No. 196209 Carina L. Dacer, Sabina DacerReyes, Emily Dacer-Hungerford, and Amparo DacerHenson v. Panfilo M. Lacson
RESOLUTION
The petitioners come to the Court to assail via petition for
review on certiorari the adverse decision promulgated on
February 3, 2011 in CA-G.R. SP No. 116057,[1] and the
resolution issued on March 18, 2011 (denying the motion
for reconsideration).
Antecedents
In the morning of November 24, 2000, prominent PR
practitioner Salvador "Bubby" Dacer was abducted along
Zobel Roxas St. in Manila along with his driver Emmanuel
Corbito while on board their white Toyota Revo. Two days
after the abduction, Edwin Fargas, acting in behalf of the
Dacer family, requested the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) Director to investigate the incident.
After almost five months of investigation, the NBI filed
several complaints for kidnapping (I.S. No. 2001-247) and

double murder (I.S. Nos. 2001-311 & 2001-347) against

several persons in the Department of Justice (DOJ), which
were referred to a panel of public prosecutors for
preliminary investigation.
On May 11, 2001, after preliminary investigation, the DOJ
Panel of Prosecutors (DOJ Panel) filed an information for
double murder in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Manila
against several persons (docketed as Criminal Case No.
01-191969), namely: Jimmy L. Lopez, Alex B. Diloy,
William L. Lopez, SPO4 Marino Soberano, SPO3 Mauro
Torres, SPO3 Jose Escalante, Crisostomo M. Purificacion,
Rigo De Pedro, Renato Malabanan, Jovencio Malabanan,
Margarito Cueno, Rommel Rollan, P/Supt. Glen Dumlao,
P/C Insp. Vicente Arnado, P/Insp. Roberto Langcauon,
SPO4 Benjamin Taladua, SPO1 Rolando Lacasandile,
P/Insp. Danilo Villanueva, SPO1 Mario Sarmiento, SPO1
William Reed, PO2 Thomas J. Sarmiento, SPO1 Ruperto
A. Nemeno, various John Does and James Does. Criminal
Case No. 01-191969 was raffled to Branch 41, but was
transferred to Branch 18 due to the inhibition of the
presiding judge of Branch 41.
After his arrest, Supt. Dumlao, one of the accused,
executed on June 12, 2001 a handwritten affidavit, wherein
he narrated his actual knowledge and recollection about
the Dacer-Corbito abduction and murder.
Also, the RTC directed the DOJ Panel to determine
whether probable cause existed against Sr. Supt. Cezar
Mancao, Sr. Supt. Michael Ray Aquino, Sr. Supt. Teofilo
Via and PO3 Larry Ambre. Thus, the DOJ Panel issued
subpoenas to said persons for them to appear on July 27
and 31, 2001.
During the reinvestigation, Sr. Supt. Mancao submitted a
counter-affidavit dated June 29, 2001.
On September 14, 2001, after the reinvestigation, the DOJ
Panel issued a resolution whose dispositive portion
states:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that
P/Senior Supt. Cezar Mancao II, P/Senior Supt. Michael

Ray B. Aquino, P/Senior Supt. Teofilo Via and SPO3 Allan

Cadenilla Villanueva be indicted of double murder for the
deaths of Salvador "Bubby" Dacer and Emmanuel Corbito.
Further, it is respectfully recommended that the complaint
for double murder against PO3 Larry Ambre be
DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence and that P/Senior
Supt. Glenn Dumlao, P/C Insp. Danilo Villanueva, Jimmy
Lopez, William Lopez and Alex Diloy be DISCHARGED as
accused from the said Amended Information, for them to
testify as witnesses for the State, with the exception of
P/Chief Inspector Danilo Villanueva.
Accordingly, the State filed a motion dated September 17,
2001 for the admission of the amended information. The
RTC denied the motion on October 1, 2001. The State
assailed the denial on certiorarito the Court of Appeals
(CA), which promulgated its decision on April 4, 2002
ordering the admission of the amended information
substituting SPO3 Allan C. Villanueva for Insp. Danilo
Villanueva as accused; charging Sr. Supt. Michael Ray
Aquino, Sr. Supt. Mancao and Sr. Supt. Teofilo Via as
additional accused; discharging Jimmy L. Lopez, William
L. Lopez, and Alex B. Diloy as accused; and directing the
RTC to continue its proceedings with utmost deliberate
dispatch.
The Court, through its decision dated October 5, 2005,
affirmed the CA's decision "with MODIFICATION to include
P/Sr. Supt. GLEN G. DUMLAO as one of the accused
excluded from the Amended Information dated 17
September 2001."
On March 1, 2007, while in the United States, Sr. Supt.
Mancao executed his second affidavit on the DacerCorbito case.
On February 13, 2009, Sr. Supt. Mancao, while in the
custody of the United States Federal Agents, executed his
third affidavit on the Dacer-Corbito case.
On March 27, 2009, the petitioners, who were the
daughters of the late Salvador Dacer, filed a complaintaffidavit against Senator Panfilo M. Lacson in the DOJ,
docketed as I.S. No. XVI-INV-09C-00232, and sought the

re-opening and reinvestigation of the Dacer-Corbito case.

On October 26, 2009, Senator Lacson submitted his
counter-affidavit (ex abundante ad cautelam), denying any
involvement in the Dacer-Corbito case and refuting the
allegations in the complaint-affidavit filed against him.
The DOJ Panel initially set hearings on December 1, 2009
and December 18, 2009, but later cancelled the hearings
and declared the case submitted for resolution.
On December 2, 2009, the DOJ Panel denied Senator
Lacson's motion for reconsideration ad cautelam; and on
December 18, 2009, issued a resolution finding probable
cause for two counts of murder against Senator Lacson,
but dismissing the charge of violation of Section l(c) of
Presidential Decree No. 1929 for lack of merit.
On January 7, 2010, two informations for murder were filed
in the RTC in Manila against Senator Lacson for his having
allegedly conspired with those already charged in Criminal
Case No. 01-191969. The cases (docketed as Criminal
Case No. 10272905 and Criminal Case No. 10272906)
were raffled to Branch 32.
The information in Criminal Case No. 10272905 reads:
That on or about November 24, 2000, in the City of Manila,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
PANFILO M. LACSON, conspiring, confederating and
acting together with, aiding and helping, and with the aid
and help of the accused in Criminal Case No. 01-191969,
pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18,
Manila, namely, P/SSupt. Michael Ray B. Aquino, P/SSupt.
Cezar Ochoco Mancao II, P/SSupt. Teofilo Via, SPO2
Allan C. Villanueva, SPO4 Marino Soberano, SPO3 Mauro
Torres, SPO3 Jose Escalante, Crisostomo M. Purificacion,
Digo De Pedro, Renato Malabanan, Jovencio Malabanan,
Margarito Cueno, Rommel Rollan, P/Slnsp. Roberto
Langcauon, SPO4 Benjamin Taladua, SPO1 Rolando
Lacasandile, SPO1 Mario Sarmiento, SPO1 William Reed,
PO2 Thomas J. Sarmiento, SPO1 Ruperto A. Nemeo,
P/C Insp. Vicente Arnado and several John Does,
abducted SALVADOR "BUBBY" DACER and Emmanuel

Corbito at the corner of Osmea Highway (formerly South

Super Highway) and Zobel Roxas Street, in Manila, and
brought them to Indang, Cavite, and with treachery,
evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength,
nighttime and remoteness of place, malice and intent to
kill, did then and there knowingly, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously kill SALVADOR "BUBBY" DACER by
strangulation which was the direct and the immediate
cause of his death and then burned his body to the
damage and prejudice of the said Salvador "Bubby" Dacer
and his legal heirs.
The information in Criminal Case No. 10272906 is as
follows:
That on or about November 24, 2000, in the City of Manila,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
PANFILO M. LACSON, conspiring, confederating and
acting together with, aiding and helping, and with the aid
and help of, the accused in Criminal Case No. 01-191969,
pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18,
Manila, namely, P/SSupt. Michael Ray B. Aquino, P/SSupt.
Cezar Ochoco Mancao II, P/SSupt. Teofilo Via, SPO2
Allan C. Villanueva, SPO4 Marino Soberano, SPO3 Mauro
Torres, SPO3 Jose Escalante, Crisostomo M. Purificacion,
Digo De Pedro, Renato Malabanan, Jovencio Malabanan,
Margarito Cueno, Rommel Rollan, P/SInsp. Roberto
Langcauon, SPO4 Benjamin Taladua, SPO1 Rolando
Lacasandile, SPO1 Mario Sarmiento, SPO1 William Reed,
PO2 Thomas J. Sarmiento, SPO1 Ruperto A. Nemeo,
P/C Insp. Vicente Arnado and several John Does,
abducted Salvador "Bubby" Dacer and EMMANUEL
CORB1TO at the corner of Osmea Highway (formerly
South Super Highway) and Zobel Roxas Street, in Manila,
and brought them to Indang. Cavite, and with treachery,
evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength,
nighttime and remoteness of place, malice and intent to
kill, did then and there knowingly, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously kill EMMANUEL CORB1TO by strangulation
which was the direct and the immediate cause of his death
and then burned his body to the damage and prejudice of
the said EMMANUEL CORBITO and his legal heirs.
On January 7, 2010, Senator Lacson filed an omnibus
motion for consolidation and judicial determination of

probable cause.
On February 4, 2010, then RTC Judge Myra Fernandez of
Branch 18 found probable cause and directed the
issuance of a warrant of arrest against Senator Lacson.
On February 10, 2010, Senator Lacson sought
reconsideration (with prayer for the voluntary inhibition of
Judge Fernandez). In March 2010, however, Judge
Fernandez was appointed CA Associate Justice.
On May 21, 2010, Senator Lacson filed a motion for
reinvestigation; and later on, a supplemental motion for
reinvestigation.
On July 23, 2010, Acting Presiding RTC Judge Thelma
Bunyi-Medina of Branch 18 denied Senator Lacson's
motion for reconsideration and motion for reinvestigation.
On September 24, 2010, Senator Lacson commenced
special civil actions for certiorari and prohibition (with
application for a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction). After the petitioners filed
their comment dated November 17, 2010, the CA denied
the application for injunctive relief.
On November 26, 2010, the CA directed the parties to
submit their respective memoranda upon the merits.
Senator Lacson submitted his memorandum dated
December 16, 2010; the petitioners submitted a
memorandum dated December 21, 2010; and the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) opted to adopt
its comment dated November 26, 2010 to serve as its
memorandum.
Ruling of the CA
In its assailed decision promulgated on February 3, 2011,
the CA found that the RTC had committed grave abuse of
discretion in finding probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest against Senator Lacson primarily on the
basis of the third affidavit dated February 13, 2009 of Sr.

Supt. Mancao, pointing out that the third affidavit was

diametrically opposed to his June 21, 2001 counteraffidavit and his March 1, 2007 affidavit wherein he (Sr.
Supt. Mancao) strongly denied any involvement in the
Dacer-Corbito case, and stressed that Supt. Dumlao's
attempt to link him to the case was made in order to
implicate Senator Lacson therein; and noting that Sr. Supt.
Mancao had implicated Senator Lacson in the DacerCorbito case for the first time in the third affidavit, in total
contradiction of his first affidavit given eight years earlier.
The CA further noted several inconsistencies of Sr. Supt.
Mancao.
Accordingly, the CA disposed:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The
Orders dated February 4, 2010 and July 23, 2010 of public
respondent court finding probable cause for the issuance
of warrants of arrest against petitioner are NULLIFIED and
SET ASIDE. The Informations in Criminal Cases Nos.
10272905 & 10272906 are hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[2]
On February 18, 2011, the petitioners filed their motion for
reconsideration.
On February 21, 2011, the OSG filed its motion for
reconsideration.
On March 18, 2011, the CA denied both motions for
reconsideration. The petitioners received notice of the
denial on March 24, 2011.
Issues
Only the petitioners have come to the Court to
challenge via appeal the CA's decision on the following
grounds:
I.
The Court of Appeals violated the right to due process of

the Prosecution and the offended party when it nullified the

trial court's finding of probable cause and dismissed the
criminal cases.
II.
The Court of Appeals violated the right to due process of
the Prosecution and the offended party when it dismissed
the cases instead of ordering the Prosecution to submit
additional evidence for the purpose of issuing arrest
warrants.
III.
The Court of Appeals acted without authority in declaring a
portion of its own decision executory, thereby denying the
Prosecution and the offended party the right of appeal.
IV.
The Court of Appeals erred in not dismissing Respondent's
petition for certiorari and prohibition for deliberate forumshopping.
Ruling
The petition for review is denied.
A.
Petitioners are not real parties in interest
to file the petition for review
The right of the petitioners to file the petition for review
on certiorari to seek on appeal the reversal of the CA's
dismissal of the criminal action without the conformity and
participation of the OSG is non-existent. Hence, they are
not the real parties in interest to appeal by petition for
review.
Basic in procedural law is that every action must be
prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in
interest.[3] A real party in interest is the party who stands to
be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the

party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise

authorized by law or the Rules of Court, every action must
be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in
interest.[4] The rule has two components, to wit: (a) to
institute an action, the plaintiff must be the real party in
interest; and (b) the action must be prosecuted in the
name of the real party in interest.[5]
Necessarily, the purposes of the rule on real party in
interest are: (a) to prevent the prosecution of actions by
persons without any right, title or interest in the case; (b) to
require that the actual party entitled to legal relief be the
one to prosecute the action; (c) to avoid a multiplicity of
suits; and (d) to discourage litigation and keep it within
certain bounds, pursuant to sound public policy.[6]
Interest within the meaning of the rule means a material
interest or an interest in the issue to be affected by the
decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from
mere curiosity about the question involved.[7] One having
no material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction
of the court as the plaintiff in an action.[8] When the plaintiff
is not the real party in interest, the case is dismissible on
the ground of lack of cause of action.[9]
The same rule governs on appeal, in that only a party in
interest can challenge a decision. A party, in order to
appeal, must have a present interest in the subject matter
of the litigation and must be aggrieved or prejudiced by the
judgment.[10] A party is aggrieved or prejudiced when his
interest recognized by law in the subject matter of the
lawsuit is injuriously affected by the judgment or order;
[11]
on the other hand, a party not aggrieved by the decision
or order may not appeal because he would have no
arguable error to assign on appeal. Thus, the prevailing
party in a lawsuit is not ordinarily entitled to appeal a
decision or order in his favor.[12]
Are the petitioners real parties in interest who may appeal
the assailed decision of the CA dismissing Criminal Case
No. 10272905 and Criminal Case No. 10272906 as
against Senator Lacson?

They are not.

Section 5 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court dictates that all
criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information
shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the
public prosecutor; hence, any private prosecutor assisting
the private offended party upon the civil aspect comes
under the public prosecutor's authority. Yet, although
the Rules of Court so permit the offended party to take part
in the prosecution of a criminal action, and in certain
instances on appeal from the order or judgment of the
courts in a criminal action, the permission to take part is
true only where the party injured has to protect his
pecuniary interest as part of the civil liability of the
accused.
Here, however, the petitioners do not appeal to protect
their pecuniary interest as offended parties of the crime,
but to cause the reinstatement of the criminal action
against Senator Lacson that the CA had dismissed on the
ground that there was no probable cause to issue the
warrant of arrest against Senator Lacson. As such, they
have no right to the recourse, because the right exclusively
pertained to the OSG in behalf of the People of the
Philippines.[13] Indeed, we have ruled in a number of
cases[14] that only the Solicitor General may bring or
defend actions in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines,
or may represent the People or the State in criminal
proceedings before the Court and the CA.
The exclusivity lodged in the OSG has statutory basis.
Section 35, Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of
theAdministrative Code of 1987 pertinently so provides, to
wit:
Section 35. Powers and Functions. The Office of the
Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the
Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its
officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding,
investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers.
When authorized by the President or head of the office
concerned, it shall also represent government owned or
controlled corporations. The Office of the Solicitor
General shall constitute the law office of the

Government and, as such, shall discharge duties

requiring the services of lawyers. It shall have the
following specific powers and functions:
(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court
and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings;
represent the Government and its officers in the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and all other
courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special
proceedings in which the Government or any officer
thereof in his official capacity is a party.
xxx
The exclusivity vested in the OSG rests on sound theory.
The sovereign State has the authority, under its police
power, to define and punish crimes and to lay down the
rules of criminal procedure. As part of its police power, the
State has a large measure of discretion in creating and
defining criminal offenses.[15] The right of prosecution and
punishment of a crime is one of the attributes that by
natural law belongs to the sovereign power instinctively
charged by the common will of the members of society to
look after, guard, and defend the interests of the
community, the individual and social rights and the liberties
of every citizen, and guaranty the exercise of his rights.
[16]
Otherwise stated, every violation of penal laws results in
the disturbance of public order and safety which the State
is committed to uphold and protect.[17]
As a general rule, an offense causes two classes of
injuries: (a) social injury, produced by the disturbance and
alarm that are the outcome of the offense; and (b) personal
injury, caused to the victim of the crime who may have
suffered damage, either to his person, to his property, to
his honor, or to her chastity. The social injury is sought to
be repaired through the imposition of the corresponding
penalty in criminal proceedings; while the personal injury,
through indemnity, which is civil in nature.[18] Thus, when a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery
of civil liability arising from the offense is deemed instituted
with the criminal action unless the offended party waives
the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately,

or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. [19]

Verily, the petitioners, even if they may be the private
offended parties, have no interest to assail the decision of
the CA (dismissing Criminal Case No. 10272905 and
Criminal Case No. 10272906), because the matter
involved did not affect the civil, but only the criminal,
aspect.
B.
Petitioners were not denied due process
Jurisprudence lays down two exceptions under which a
private complainant or offended party in a criminal case
may file a petition for review directly with the Court,
namely: (a) when there is a denial of due process of law to
the prosecution, and the State or its agents refuse to act to
the prejudice of the State and the offended party; [20] and (b)
when the private offended party assails the civil aspect of a
decision of a lower court.[21]
In their petition for review on certiorari, the petitioners posit
that they were deprived of due process because the OSG
did not appeal the adverse CA decision and resolution
despite their counsel's repeated prodding to appeal; and
that the thrust of their present petition is consistent with the
OSG's earlier position supporting the actions taken by the
RTC and the DOJ. Ostensibly, the petitioners are invoking
the first exception (i.e., denial of due process of law to the
prosecution) as basis of their standing to file their petition.
The petitioners' position is not warranted.
The antecedents show that the petitioners vigorously
participated in the proceedings in the CA, specifically,
through their comment on the petition for certiorari of
Senator Lacson; through their memorandum filed on
December 22, 2010; and through their motion for
reconsideration against the February 3, 2011 decision of
the CA. Such vigorous participation satisfied the
requirements of due process to afford to the parties a fair
and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective
sides of the controversy.

C.
Final Word
This Court is not unmindful of the controversy surrounding
the Dacer-Corbito double murder case the public's
repugnance at the manner in which the abduction,
murders, and disposal of the bodies was committed, as
well as the public alarm that politically powerful
personalities could possibly have a hand in or be the
brains behind those gruesome acts. There is palpable
revulsion at the idea that impunity for horrible crimes is
also possibly being allowed to prevail, and that the pillars
of justice are unable to ensure that crime does not pay.
We have dug deeply into the arsenal of remedies that this
Court may grant and in this instance have come up empty.
Whether or not the CA committed any reversible error in
nullifying the issuance by a lower court of the warrant of
arrest against Senator Lacson is a question we may not
address, because it was not posed by the right party. This
Court, for very important policy and institutional reasons,
has consistently followed the rule that only the State and
its representatives may appeal the dismissal of a criminal
action. That the State is the offended party in criminal
proceedings is a doctrine we must uphold because it is
founded on the fundamental definition of crimes and the
authority of the State to exact penalties therefor. To give up
the right to prosecute for crimes in favor of private parties
is to abandon what makes a State a state. By definition, a
modern state has monopoly of all lawful coercive powers,
and among these are the right to define, to prosecute, and
to punish crimes. Corollarily, the right to appeal a dismissal
of a criminal case, wrongful or otherwise, may not be
usurped by private persons. It is only when a
representative of the State has by wrongful action forfeited
this right to appeal, as to cause prejudice to the State, that
the Court may move to correct the injustice.
We thus deem it necessary to clarify that the Court does
not hereby pass upon the substantive merits of the
charges brought against Senator Lacson, and is limiting
itself only to determining whether the petitioners can
appeal the CA decision without the conformity or

participation of the OSG.

WHEREFORE, the Court denies the petition for review
on certiorari upon the premises stated herein.
SO ORDERED.