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Review Questions
1.
2.
Errors and irregularities: Auditors are required to plan the audit to detect errors
and irregularities that would have a material effect on the financial statements.
Clients illegal acts: Auditors are not required to search for illegal acts, but they
are warned to be alert to any that might be detected in the ordinary course of an
audit.
3.
Existence assertion:
The practical objective is to establish with evidence that assets, liabilities
and equities actually exist and that sales and expense transactions actually
occurred. Cut-off can be considered an aspect of the existence assertion.
b.
Occurrence assertion:
The practical objective is to establish with evidence that recorded
transactions or events that occurred during a given accounting period
pertained to the entity.
c.
Completeness assertion:
The practical objective is to establish with evidence that all transactions of
the period are in the financial statements and all transactions that properly
belong in the preceding or following accounting periods are excluded.
Another term for these aspects of completeness is cut-off.
Completeness also refers to proper inclusion in financial statements of all
assets, liabilities, revenue, expense, and related disclosures.
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e.
Measurement assertion:
The practical objective is to establish with evidence that a transaction or
event is recorded at the proper amount and revenue or expense is allocated
to the proper period.
f.
Valuation assertion:
The practical objective is to establish with evidence that proper values have
been assigned to things (assets, liabilities, equities and related disclosures)
and events (revenues, expenses and related disclosures).
Auditing
Standards refer to the practical objective of obtaining evidence about
valuations achieved by cost allocations such as depreciation and
inventory costing methods.
g.
4.
5.
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In assessing inherent risk and control risk, the auditor must consider the types of
errors or irregularities that might occur and their impact on the financial
statements (materiality.) In evaluating materiality, the auditor should consider
the impact of errors and irregularities both individually and in the aggregate.
Auditing Standards require that the auditor design the audit to provide
reasonable assurance of detecting errors and irregularities that are material to the
financial statements. Auditing Standards require that audit risk and materiality
be considered both in planning the audit and in evaluating audit results.
Control risk and inherent risk are also directly related to the setting of
materiality thresholds. If, for example, application of analytical procedures
(inherent risk analysis) leads the auditor to suspect earnings inflation, individual
item materiality thresholds should be reduced accordingly (i.e., either the
materiality percentage or the amount of unaudited income should be decreased.)
Similarly, if control risk analysis leads the auditor to suspect numerous errors,
aggregate materiality thresholds need to be lowered accordingly.
7.
An auditors reaction to an immaterial error may differ from his or her reaction
to an immaterial irregularity. Auditors generally accumulate the amount of
individual immaterial errors to be sure that the aggregate of all errors is not
material. In addition, the auditor is concerned about whether an error came from
a misunderstanding or other cause that would have resulted in yet more errors
during the period. An auditor is expected to report all irregularities to the audit
committee or the board of directors and senior management.
8.
9.
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15. Use the model AR = IR x CR x DR to solve for different values of Audit Risk
(AR) when internal control risk (CR) is given different values. In all cases IR =
0.90 and DR = 0.10, therefore, AR = 0.90 x CR x 0.10
When CR is
0.10
0.50
0.70
0.90
1.00
AR is
0.009 or 0.9 percent
0.045 or 4.5 percent
0.063 or 6.3 percent
0.081 or 8.1 percent
0.090 or 9.0 percent
16. a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
17. Assessing the control risk too low causes auditors to assign less control risk
(CR) in planning procedures than proper evaluation would cause them to assign.
The result could be (1) inadvertently conducting less audit work than properly
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necessary and taking more audit risk (AR) than originally contemplated, perhaps
to the unpleasant results of failing to detect material misstatements (damaging
the effectiveness of the audit) or (2) discovering in the course of the audit work
that control is not as good as first believed, causing an increase in the audit
work, perhaps at a time when doing so is very costly (damaging the efficiency of
the audit).
18. The important consideration involved in judging an acceptable risk of assessing
control risk too high is the efficiency of the audit. Assessing control risk too
high causes auditors to think they need to perform a level of substantive work
which is greater than a proper evaluation of control would suggest. Assessing
control risk too high leads to overauditing.
Some auditors may be willing to accept high risks of assessing the control risk
too high because they intend to overaudit anyway, and the audit budget can
support the work.
Other auditors want to minimize their work (within acceptable professional
bounds of audit risk) and thus want to minimize the risk (probability) of
overauditing by mistake.
Technically, the risk of assessing control risk too high in relation to an attribute
sample is the probability of finding in the sample (n) one deviation more than
the acceptable number for the sampling plan. For example, if the plan called
for a sample of 100 units and a tolerable rate of 3 percent at a 0.10 risk of
assessing control risk too low, the acceptable number is zero deviations.
The probability of finding 1 or more deviations when the population rate is
actually 2 percent is:
Probability (x > 0 : n = 100, r = 0.02)
=
=
=
1 (1 r) n
1 (1 0.02) 100
0.867 or 86.7 percent
19. All the elements of the risk model are products of auditors professional
judgments. Auditors must judge:
Inherent risk the probability that material errors or irregularities have entered
the accounting system used to develop financial statements.
Internal control risk the probability that clients system of internal control
policies and procedures will fail to detect material errors and irregularities,
provided any enter the data accounting system in the first place.
Analytical procedures risk the probability that auditors analytical procedures
will fail to produce evidence of material errors and irregularities, provided
any have entered the accounting system in the first place and have not been
detected and corrected by the clients internal control procedures.
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11-7
26. Detection risk exists because auditors (1) may use an inappropriate audit
procedure, (2) may misapply an audit procedure, (3) may misinterpret the
findings, or (4) do not examine 100 percent of an account balance or transaction
class.
27. The amount of audit evidence an auditor must gather varies inversely with
allowable detection risk. As allowable detection risk decreases, the amount of
evidence required increases, and vice versa. Chapter 12 introduces audit
procedures and discusses how auditors modify audit procedures to obtain
sufficient competent evidential matter by changing (1) the nature, (2) the timing,
or (3) the extent of procedures.
28. The audit risk model is
Audit risk (AR) = Inherent risk (IR) x Control risk (CR) x Detection risk (DR)
29. Risks identified at the financial statement level may have a substantial impact on
the assessment of inherent risk for specific assertions. For example, concern
about management integrity, identified as a risk at the financial statement level,
would cause an auditor to assess a higher level of inherent risk for existence of
sales.
II. Multiple Choice Questions
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
d
c
c
b
d
a
c
d
c
d
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
d
a
c
c
a
a
a
d
b
d
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
b
d
d
c
d
a
b
a
a
b
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
b
a
d
a
d
d
c
b
a
a
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
b
d
a
c
c
d
d
c
b
d
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
a
a
b
a
c
d
b
d
d
c
61. a
62. c
63. d
b.
The problem does not describe the kind of related party transactions
discussed in PSA 550.
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d.
The problem description indicates that this element of the audit was
conducted in a negligent manner. Theres nothing wrong about auditing a
sample of the transactions, but Campos follow-up and explanation of the
missing receiving reports leaves much to be desired. At the very least he
could have reviewed the reports produced by Antonio at a later date, and he
could have traced the purchases to the inventory records and perhaps
noticed an over-stocking condition. The auditors had some evidence that an
irregularity might exist, but they failed to apply extended audit procedures
properly.
Case 2. a.
Yes. Nicolas was a party to the issuance of false financial statements and as
such is a joint tortfeasor. The elements necessary to establish an action for
common law fraud are present. There was a material misstatement of fact,
knowledge of falsity (scienter), intent that the plaintiff bank rely on the false
statement, actual reliance and damage to the bank as a result thereof. If
action is based upon fraud there is no requirement that the bank establish
privity of contract with the CPA. Moreover, if the action by the bank is
based upon ordinary negligence, which does not require a showing of
scienter, the bank may recover as a third-party beneficiary (an exception to
the strict privity requirement). Thus, the bank will be able to recover its
loss from Nicolas under either theory.
b.
No. The lessor was a party to the secret agreement. As such, the lessor
cannot claim reliance on the financial statements and cannot recover
uncollected rents. Even if he was damaged indirectly, his own fraudulent
actions led to his loss, and the equitable principle of unclean hands
precludes him from obtaining relief.
c.
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Case 3.
1.
2.
3.
h
k
g
4.
5.
6.
j
f
a
7.
8.
9.
Case 4. 1.
a.
b.
2.
a.
b.
3.
a.
b.
4.
a.
b.
5.
a.
b.
6.
a.
b.
7.
a.
b.
o
l
c
10. b
11. n
12. p
Case 5. a.
b.
13. i
14. d
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Case 7. The purposes of obtaining the representation letter are to have management
acknowledge their primary responsibility for the financial statements, and to get
in writing the important oral representations that have been obtained from
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management during the course of the audit. PSA 500, Audit Evidence, requires
that the auditors obtain written representations from management on every audit
engagement. Failure to do so is a scope limitation, which precludes the
auditors from issuing an unqualified opinion. The representation letter should
be signed by members of management that are responsible for and
knowledgeable about the matters covered by the representations and that,
normally, they should be signed by the chief executive officer and the chief
financial officer. The auditors should consider the effects of managements
refusal to furnish written representations on their ability to rely on other of their
representations.
PSA 700, The Auditors Report on Financial Statements, states that when the
client imposes restrictions that significantly limit the scope of the audit, the
auditors generally should issue a disclaimer of opinion.
(a) The following are alternative courses of action that are available to you, and
supporting arguments.
(1) You could accept Angeles suggestion and issue an unqualified opinion.
Delos Santos is no longer part of management of the company.
Therefore, there is no reason to require his signature on the
representation letter. Your firm can still adhere to the letter of the
standard by having Gamboa sign the letter.
(2) You could issue a qualified opinion because of the scope limitation.
delos Santos was an important part of management during the period
under audit. He is knowledgeable of and responsible for many of the
matters covered by the representations. Failure to obtain his signature
would be a significant scope limitation. Since delos Santos is no longer
part of management, this is not a scope limitation imposed by the client
that would generally result in a disclaimer of opinion.
(3) You could issue a disclaimer of opinion, using the arguments from (2),
but concluding that the refusal to sign is a scope limitation imposed by
management.
The mysterious circumstances surrounding the
resignation of delos Santos might also support this conclusion.
(4) You could withdraw from the engagement. This course of action may
be justified if delos Santos refusal to sign the letter causes you to
question the integrity of management. The unanswered questions
regarding the reasons for delos Santos resignation also provide some
support for this course of action.
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Case 8. Factors that will affect your evaluation of audit risk include
Case 9. The factors that will affect Josefinas audit risk and business risk are (a) this is a
special audit, (b) the audit will be used to set the value of certain assets, (c) the
auditor is to evaluate any disputed amount (although this is a common provision
in purchase agreements, one might question whether auditors should agree to
such terms), and (d) the materiality level is set at P50,000, even though that is
considerably below an amount that might be determined using a percentage of
assets and/or income. These factors will increase the risk at the financial
statement level and potentially increase business risk.
Case 10. a.
(4) 3.33%
(5) 2.5%
In the third situation, the auditor does not have to accumulate any evidence
because inherent risk and control risk give the appropriate level of planned
audit risk.
b.
(1) 3 (tied)
(2) 5
(3) 1
(4) 2
(5) 3 (tied)
b.
Case 12. 1.
a.
b.
2.
a.
b.
3.
a.
b.
4.
a.
b.
5.
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a.
b.
(4) 2 (tied)
(5) 2 (tied)
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Case 13. 1.
a.
b.
c.
2.
a.
b.
c.
3.
a.
b.
c.
4.
a.
b.
c.